Harry Truman was at Washington D.C.’s National Airport on Saturday, 26 July 1947, waiting impatiently to fly home to Missouri to see his dying mother. First, however, he wanted to sign a long-delayed bill reorganizing the government to deal with national security matters. Congress had completed action on the measure, but the printing office had closed, so there was a delay in preparing the bill for Truman’s signature.

A little after noon, congressional clerks brought the bill on board the Sacred Cow, the four-engine C-54 presidential plane. Truman promptly signed it, as well as an executive order setting forth roles and missions for the Armed Forces and a paper nominating James Forrestal to be the first Secretary of Defense. An hour later, en route to Missouri, Truman learned that his mother had died. Meanwhile, just before adjourning until November, the Senate quickly approved Forrestal’s nomination by voice vote.

The press hailed the National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253, as a major accomplishment. Headlines called it a “Unification Bill,” although it fell far short of merging the Armed Forces. In fact, it created an independent Air Force and preserved the autonomy of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. The new law did not even create the Department of Defense—only the awkwardly named National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense with just three special assistants. The secretary had only limited power to “establish general policies and programs” and “exercise general direction, authority, and control” over the service departments.

In 1949, amendments to the law gave the position more power and created a regular Department of Defense. However, there have been few other significant changes in the 60 years since Truman signed the original bill.

The story behind the act is a tale of bitter interservice rivalry, clever alliance building with Congress, clashing ambitions—and, yes, a desire to strengthen America’s defenses so it could exert global leadership and counter the emerging Soviet threat.

Wartime Experience

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ran World War II directly from the White House, working with and through four senior military officers—two Navy admirals, Ernest King and William Leahy, and two Army generals, Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of the Army Air Forces Hap Arnold. These four became the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but the president never issued an order describing their roles or powers. They met at least weekly as a group to develop consensus recommendations to the president, and they
met with their British counterparts as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Although the system seemed to work surprisingly well, General George C. Marshall and others in the Army started advocating a clearer, centralized structure early on.

Marshall believed that unity of command in the various theaters of war needed to extend to Washington as well—in the form of a single chief of staff who could resolve disputes among the military and assign clear priorities for plans and budgets. Reformers also wanted to create a policy structure that minimized the role of personal idiosyncrasies and maximized rational strategic planning. FDR’s management style dismayed even his loyal admirers, such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson. As Stimson confided to his diary in 1943, “The President is the poorest administrator I have ever worked under in respect to the orderly procedure and routine of his performance. He is not a good chooser of men and he does not know how to use them in coordination.”

Many senior leaders did not want the same organizational chaos to continue under Harry Truman.

In April 1945, a JCS committee on “Reorganization of National Defense” recommended creating a single Department of the Armed Forces with a civilian head above a military commander of the Armed Forces. The senior Navy member dissented from the otherwise unanimous report, and the committee noted that most Army officers, but only half the Navy officers, favored a single department. This Army-Navy split was the defining feature of the fight over postwar defense organization.

The New Commander in Chief

Only 82 days after taking the oath as vice president, Harry Truman became president. He brought strong views and valuable experience on military matters to the White House. As a captain in World War I, he commanded a field artillery battery in France, and he remained in the Army reserves thereafter. As a Senator, he served on the Military Affairs Committee and headed a special investigative panel on wartime contracting. He was pro-Army, in contrast to his pro-Navy predecessor.

Truman also had little regard for the Marine Corps. Once, after losing numerous fights to USMC supporters on Capitol Hill, he vented his true feelings in a letter to a congressman advocating a JCS seat for the USMC commandant: “The Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.”

Even before the 1944 elections, Truman made it clear he supported unification of the Armed Forces. In a magazine article, he wrote: “The end, of course, must be the integration of every element of America’s defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head. Call it the War Department or the Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is one department . . . One team with all the reins in one hand.” He later told his staff that wartime experience had hardened his views: “We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two,” he told his staff. “I have the feeling that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier.”

The Postwar Challenge

World War II had convinced most American political and military leaders that isolation was no longer possible, and that postwar security required U.S. involvement and leadership. Roosevelt especially wanted to avoid repeating mistakes made after World War I, when the United States retreated from the world stage and refused to join the League of Nations. Thus, the administration consulted with congressional leaders in 1943 and 1944 to build support for postwar institutions to promote security and economic growth. The United States took the lead and built new international organizations that reflected and helped maintain its superpower status. A conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 devised the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. A San Francisco conference in 1945 established the United Nations, a global body to keep the peace and deter aggression, but subject to an American veto.

The role of military power in this postwar world was not clear in 1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union had been a wartime ally and was just beginning to demonstrate its uncooperativeness in rebuilding a democratic Europe. Only the United States had atomic bombs, but there was still debate on whether these were merely bigger explosives or a quantum leap requiring a completely new strategy. A few theorists—mainly air power advocates—argued that all you needed for future conflicts was an Air Force, but most military men foresaw the requirement for a full spectrum of ground, sea, and air capabilities.

How to organize and equip these forces was another challenge. The wartime disputes made Army leaders determined to centralize command and control. They also thought that a single budget bill for all services would best protect Army programs, since they had already witnessed political enthusiasm for ships and planes in separate measures in previous years. Army aviators, long envious of the Royal Air Force’s independent status since 1918, were determined to achieve a separate Air Force, but they believed that goal was likely as an equal branch within a unified department.8

The Navy valued its autonomy and traditions and was resistant to change, as even Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged: “The Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy. The admirals are really something to cope with—and I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.”9 The Marine Corps, which had survived Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to amalgamate it into the Navy and drastically reduce its role, was also determined to protect its size and separate identity.10

**The Army Plan**

General Marshall had presented his own proposal for a single military department in 1943, and the Army went public with its plan in 1944 before a House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy. The plan called for a Secretary of the Armed Forces over civilian undersecretaries, and military chiefs of staff for Army, Navy, and air. The act gave the chiefs of staff, plus a military chief of staff to the president, the role of recommending strategies and budgets directly to the president.11

Secretary of War Stimson made the case for change, arguing that there were “many duplications of time, material, and manpower, with the loss of effectiveness, resources, and power which such duplications inevitably produce.” He also said that current interservice harmony was due “not to the form of the present organization, but to the personalities of the military leaders, their good will, and their intelligent and devoted efforts.” Stimson knew that many admirals were opposed to unification, but Navy Secretary Knox had told him that he favored a single department. The day before Knox was to testify, however, he suffered a fatal heart attack.12

The new Navy secretary, James Forrestal, who had enlisted as a Seaman in 1917 and later taken flight training, was a strong opponent of unification. He spent the next three years spearheading the fight against it.

**The Navy Counterattack**

The Navy had cultural, budgetary, and strategic reasons to oppose unification. Seafaring, especially in the days before radio, inculcated in officers fierce habits of independence and self-reliance. Once over the horizon, a ship’s captain became an all-powerful god. It was unthinkable that anyone else, certainly not a land-based warrior or a mere civilian, could tell a Navy man what to do, or how to do it. To preserve its autonomy, the Navy needed resources, which until 1947 were funneled through a Navy Department that had strong allies in congressional Naval Affairs Committees which were dominated by people from

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places that built ships. A single military department, funded by a single defense appropriations bill, risked putting the Navy in competition with the other services, perhaps to the Navy’s detriment. Strategically, the Navy feared the loss of its air and ground components: Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps. What the Navy viewed as a powerful synergy of land, sea, and air capabilities was seen by others as unnecessary duplication. But Forrestal believed that loss of these components would be “fatal” to the sea service.13

The chair of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Sen. David Walsh (D-MA), shared those concerns and suggested a countering strategy to Forrestal. In a 15 May 1945 letter, Walsh said, “I doubt very much if any useful purpose would be served by merely objecting to plans which propose the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments.” Instead, Walsh suggested a Council on National Defense for planning and coordination and urged a Navy study of the issue.14

Forrestal saw the potential value of such an approach and promptly turned to an old friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, who had served on the Army-Navy Munitions Board and the War Production Board, to conduct the study. He also assigned 30 Navy personnel to help prepare the report. Eberstadt was not a Navy partisan, and he got assurances from Forrestal that he could “let the chips fall where they may.”15 But his report, by broadening the issue from military organization to whole-of-government handling of national security, gave the Navy an alternative that it could argue was both more important than military unification and sufficient by itself to strengthen the government for future challenges.

Eberstadt submitted a 250-page report in September, and it was sent to Congress in October 1945. The Eberstadt report marshaled the arguments against consolidation and fleshed out the idea of a national security council (NSC) as a substitute. Eberstadt argued that military unification “looks good on paper,” but “has never been put to the acid test of modern war.” The idea “strikes deeply into the traditions, fiber, morale, and operations of our military services,” he claimed. He also noted that the only countries that had tried such systems were ones where the military dominated and there was no civilian control. He doubted that a single person could run the huge consolidated department. “The lone civilian Secretary would run the risk of becoming a mere puppet completely hemmed in by the regular establishment.” And he warned, “Under unification Congress would be presented only with a single ‘organizational line.’”16

The case for an NSC was powerful in its own right. Eberstadt argued that “strategic planning and operational execution were good” during the war, but that “there were serious weaknesses in coordination.” He cited “gaps between foreign and military policy—between the State Department and the Military Establishments. Gaps between strategic planning and its logistical implementation—between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. Gaps between and within the military services—principally in the field of procurement and logistics. Gaps in information and intelligence—between the executive and legislative branches of our Government, between the several departments, and between Government and the people.”17

Eberstadt proposed an NSC to formulate and coordinate policies in political and military fields; to assess and appraise U.S. foreign objectives, commitments, and risks; and to keep these in balance with American military power. “It would be a policy-forming and advisory, not an executive, body.” He also said that such a structure could wage both peace and war. The members were to be the president as chairman, plus the secretaries of State and the three military departments, the chairman of a new National Security Resources Board that was to plan defense mobilization, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.18

Unification advocates readily accepted the NSC proposal—except for, interestingly, Harry Truman. The president suspected that Forrestal truly wanted
a British-style cabinet—a system to force him to listen to people like Forrestal. In fact, even after the passage of the 1947 act, Forrestal expected to run the NSC and its staff, and even house them in the Pentagon. But the president would have none of that. Despite his service in the Senate, President Truman was a strong defender of presidential prerogatives and responsibilities. He made little use of the NSC before the Korean War, in part because he believed that only the president could make decisions or be accountable. “There is much to this idea,” Truman wrote in his memoirs. “In some ways a Cabinet government is more efficient—but under the British system there is a group responsibility of the Cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President.” In the final stages of the legislation, Truman had his staff insist on word changes to make the NSC clearly advisory, with no power to coordinate or integrate policy.

During the next two years, Truman played a deft political game, pushing Forrestal and his Army counterpart to reach some kind of agreement but never making demands that might force his Navy secretary to resign in protest, since he knew that would jeopardize the unification effort.

Congressional Allies

On Capitol Hill, the battle lines were drawn. Three of the four chairmen of the military committees were opponents of unification. Carl Vinson (D-GA) had been in Congress since 1914 and had already opposed consolidation efforts in 1925 and 1932. He saw to it that House committees pigeonholed various reorganization proposals in 1945 and 1946. He told them that the Senate Military Affairs Committee was more involved. It held hearings in the fall of 1945 with Eberstadt and others and seemed favorable toward some reorganization. Truman met with Forrestal, Walsh, and Vinson on 21 November to get the Navy viewpoint. Vinson cautioned the president against offering a bill of his own, saying that no such bill would pass “either this winter, next winter, or the winter after.”

But Truman went ahead on 19 December, sending a message to Congress calling for a Department of National Defense, combining the War and Navy Departments. As a gesture to his adversaries, he agreed to let the Navy retain its own aviation and to keep the U.S. Marine Corps as a separate military branch. He also called for rotation of the chief of staff position among the military branches. But most significantly, he granted Forrestal and other Navy witnesses permission to “express their personal views on this subject without restraint” when called before congressional committees.

Meanwhile, both the Army and Navy mobilized their supporters among the public. Forrestal established a special office to publicize the Navy viewpoint and the Army aviation community made a grassroots effort to lobby Congress. In favor of the Army position were such groups as the Air Force Association, American Legion, Catholic War Veterans, Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Reserve Officers Association. Opposing them were the Navy League, Marine Corps League, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Throughout 1946, both sides made their case in every available forum. While pumping out its own propaganda very effectively, the Navy also seized upon statements by its opponents that confirmed their worst suspicions. In March, Carl Spaatz, new commanding general of the Army Air Forces, made a supposedly off-the-record talk to aviation writers in which he said, “The Air Force that the nation must have, if it is to be properly protected, is the Army Air Force. It would be a waste of the taxpayers’ money to have two. . . . Why should we have a Navy at all? . . . In this day and age, talking of fighting the next war on the oceans is a ridiculous assumption. It will be fought in the air by an Air Force.”

His remarks did not stay off the record for long. Even Dwight Eisenhower got caught, in a secret memo to the JCS, recommending limiting the Marine Corps to 50,000 or 60,000 men, one-tenth of their size in World War II. The Marine Corps commandant, General Alexander Vandegrift, revealed the Eisenhower proposal in congressional hearings.

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—General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, 1946
testimony in May 1946, creating such a firestorm that Truman’s uni-
ification bill was set aside for the rest of the year.26

Chairman Elbert Thomas (D-UT) of the Senate Military Affairs Commit-
tee brought a few of his members to meet with Truman on 4 April to dis-
cuss the bill they were preparing to report. They went through the measure paragraph by paragraph, and the president was pleased. He pledged to do everything possible to push for passage. The Thomas bill created a Council of Common Defense and a Unified Department of Common Defense. It also created a Joint Staff of the Service Chiefs and a Chief of Staff of Common Defense.27

On 13 May, Truman orchestrated a meeting of senior civilian and military officials to try to break the impasse and get them behind a common bill. His staff had persuaded him to drop the idea of a single chief of staff in the hope of getting Forrestal’s support for a single department headed by a single secretary. He got his military liaison officer, Admiral William D. Leahy, to suggest that compromise. Then Truman himself said he agreed that there was some danger of “the man on horseback,” and the provision should be dropped. Secretary of War Patterson said he was not prepared to “jump into the ditch and die” for the single chief of staff.28 Forrestal and Patterson then agreed to report back by the end of the month.

Their 31 May letter noted agreement on eight points, including creation of a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a JCS without a single chief or chairperson. However, Forrestal and Patterson remained in disagreement on the issues of a single department, a single civilian secretary, and the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Truman responded two weeks later with his position on the disputed issues: he was for a single department and three coordinate services, but also for substantial naval aviation and guaranteed status for the Marine Corps.29

Meanwhile, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee held hearings into the summer, giving opponents of the Thomas bill full opportunity to express their concerns. With Congress moving toward adjournment for the forthcoming elections, Truman accepted the advice of Democratic leaders that the bill was dead for the time being.

On 10 September, Truman reconvened his senior officials to press for action. He said he wanted an immediate agreement, and urged everyone to “let (their) hair down and express (their) true feelings about this.” Patterson offered a concession: to limit the Secretary of Common Defense to broad matters of policy and not allow interference in the administration of the services. Forrestal, growing increasingly emotional, insisted that the secretary have no real authority over the services. He also warned that he could not agree to testify before Congress in favor of any bill “which did violence to my principles.” Eisenhower calmed things down by noting that everyone had accepted the concept of a Secretary of Common Defense. Let the details be worked out later, he suggested. Truman asked the service secretaries to get together to try to work things out.30

Final Congressional Action

In January 1947, Patterson and Forrestal finally came to an agreement. They would give general authority to the Secretary of National Defense, but individual secretaries would administer the three departments as separate units. In a victory for future flexibility, they also agreed to let an executive order rather than permanent law define service roles and missions.31 Truman sent a revised bill to Congress on 26 February. Forrestal remained suspicious at every turn. Even the day after the Army capitulated to another series of Navy demands, he warned, “We are going to have to watch them [the Army] very carefully.” 32

Changes in Congress made favorable action more possible in 1947. The elections gave the Republicans overwhelming control of both the Senate and House, and the power of the Naval Affairs Committees had been somewhat reduced by their merger into armed services committees overseeing both the Army and the Navy. In the House, Speaker Joe Martin (R-MA) supported reorganization and made key rulings when challenged by pro-Navy congress-
One key decision was to refer the administration bill to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments rather than the more hostile Armed Services Committee. The Expenditures Committee had jurisdiction over reorganization legislation, and an anti-unification congressional representative, Clare Hoffman (R-CA) chaired it. Despite his personal views, Hoffman headed a full committee review between April and early July.

In the Senate, president pro tempore Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) made another key decision, referring the reorganization bill to the newly combined Armed Services Committee, whose chairman supported the measure, rather than to the Senate counterpart to Hoffman’s committee, whose chairman opposed the bill. The Senate panel held hearings over the course of two months and reported its bill on 5 June.

However, the Navy, and especially the Marines, still fought a rearguard action. Senators met with Forrestal and White House Counsel Clark Clifford on 18 April and demanded specific language to protect the Marine Corps’ special status. Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) expressed the common view: “This is not a matter of logic but emotion. You can’t win this one. These are the boys who took Mount Suribachi [on Iwo Jima]. The American people will not forget them or let them down.”

The Senate reported the bill unanimously, but members reserved the right to offer amendments. The committee measure included language to reassure the Navy, such as inserting “general” to modify the secretary’s “direction, authority, and control” and language specifically denying an intent to “merge” the military departments. The bill also declared that its provisions “shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the fleet marine forces) or of naval aviation.”

Only one Senator, Edward V. Robertson (R-WY), spoke at length against the bill, and he gave up after the Senate defeated the first three of his 25 planned amendments by voice vote. Final passage came on a voice vote on 9 July.

Congress was now hurtling toward adjournment for the year. House hearings had not ended until 1 July, in part because of demands to see JCS papers like the one in which General Eisenhower had proposed slashing the size of the Marine Corps. A threat to stop action on the reorganization bill led the administration to grant access to the papers. The House committee reported its bill a week after the Senate passed its version. The latest bill added the executive order on roles and missions as bill language and deleted the authority for the secretary to “formulate and finally determine” budget estimates. The majority leader then used parliamentary tactics to clear the way for action without the normal referral to the Rules Committee.

House debate lasted only seven hours, with numerous speeches and 14 amendments, half of which the committee accepted. One amendment deleted Senate language requiring original service budget requests to be included in submissions to Congress, and another strengthened language on land-based naval aviation. A 36-190 vote defeated a proposal to weaken the defense secretary’s powers by deleting language allowing him to exercise general direction and control over the military departments. The bill passed on another voice vote.

It took five meetings over the next several days to iron out differences between the houses. Conferrees adopted most but not all of the House amendments, with no fundamental change in the basic outline of the bill. Each house approved the conference report by voice vote, and the measure was sent for the president’s signature. On 26 July, it was rushed to National Airport.

**The Legacy of Compromise**

Just after signing the bill, Harry Truman signed the executive order on service roles and missions, as promised, and also signed the paper nominating Forrestal to be the first secretary of defense. White House Counsel Clark Clifford explained the rationale for the appointment: “If Forrestal remained Secretary of the Navy, he would make life unbearable for the Secretary of Defense; if, on the other hand, he was the Secretary, he would have to try to make the system work.”

Forrestal himself had premonitions of his difficulties. Shortly after taking office, he wrote to a friend, “This office will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history.” A few months later, and despite his most diligent efforts, he concluded that he had failed, and indeed would continue to fail, unless his position was strengthened with new legislation. By the summer of 1948, he told Clifford,
“I was wrong. I cannot make this work. No one can make it work.”

The law was not changed until 1949, by which time Forrestal had been fired from his job and had plunged to his death from the 16th floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The worst fears of the Navy and the greatest hopes of the Army were not realized by passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The act protected the Marine Corps. The Navy kept its airplanes—and eventually got aircraft carriers for them. The Air Force got its independent status and soaring Cold War budgets for bombers and missiles. The Army suffered continued cutbacks, with the greatest punishment imposed by its five-star hero, Dwight Eisenhower, who as president restructured the Armed Forces for nuclear war.

Even George Marshall had doubts about his handiwork. As secretary of state in March 1947, he wrote to President Truman, complaining that the proposed law would greatly “diminish the responsibility of the Secretary of State” and make him only “the automaton of the [National Security] Council.”

There are other ironies in this landmark law. It arose as a measure to reorganize the military, yet it became basic law for foreign policy and for the intelligence community. It was crafted as a means to impose restraints on military spending, yet it provided the framework for the Cold War military buildup. Its strongest opponent received the job of putting it into practice, yet he himself became an advocate for changes he had fiercely resisted. It had been one of the highest priorities for the president who signed it into law, yet he deliberately ignored and tried to undercut some of its most important provisions.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that, despite the uncertainty over the wording of the law until the very last moment, the language has remained largely fixed for over 60 years. 

NOTES

1. Truman diaries and calendars are accessible via <www.trumanlibrary.org/library/htm>.
7. Clifford, 146.
11. Cole et al., The Department of Defense, 4.
15. Caraley, 40, 41n.
17. Ibid., 30, 5.
18. Ibid., 6, 7.
22. Hoopes and Brinkley, 326.
23. Clifford, 148-149.
27. Caraley, 127, Cole et al., The Department of Defense, 52-59.
28. Hoopes and Brinkley, 331.
29. Ibid., 33, Cole et al., The Department of Defense, 22-26, 26-8.
31. Cole et al., The Department Of Defense, 52-59.
32. Clifford, 155.
34. Ibid., 208.
35. Clifford, 156.
37. Ibid., 168-9.
38. Ibid., 171, 179-9.
39. Ibid., 180-81.
40. Ibid., 181-2.
41. Clifford, 158.
43. Clifford, 160.