



IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: BOOKLET OF RELATED READINGS 20

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**π 60 Years of Service to the Federal Government π
1948 – 2008**

PREFACE

This booklet represents the twentieth in a series of compilations of print and electronic articles that are relevant to the defeat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that insurgent and terrorist operatives use to kill and injure U.S. military forces and civilian populations. The readings are related to IED technology, social networks that may provide insight into how insurgent groups communicate and relate to their members, and other technical and cultural phenomena that will help the Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) meet its mission.

The first section of the booklet contains abstracts of the articles included in the booklet in alphabetical order by author and title. The abstracts are hyperlinked to the article itself located later in the booklet. At the end of each article is a hot link to the original article on the Internet. Information of particular relevance is highlighted in yellow.

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Al-Rashed, Abdul Rahman. [“Zawahiri’s Bizarre Press Conference,”](#) *Asharq Al-Awsat*, April 8, 2008.

The author, the current general manager of *Al-Arabiya* television and the former editor-in-chief of both *Asharq Al-Awsat* and the leading Arabic weekly magazine, *Al-Majalla*, believes that many signs indicate that Al-Qaeda’s traditional leadership is facing the problem of controlling its field commands and the public everywhere, and has chosen the forum of repeated appearances of Al-Zawahiri (in photo or voice) to hold on to what is left of its authority. [Researcher Note: Al-Rashed is a “heavy hitter” in Middle East media.]

[“Backpack Straps Can Decrease Blood Flow in the Shoulder and Arm, and May Result in Loss of Fine Motor Control,”](#) *ScienceDaily*, April 8, 2008.

The findings of a recent study indicate that even light loads of 26 pounds can decrease upper extremity blood flow, and may result in a loss of fine motor control and increased fatigue. This is because backpack straps typically rest on an area of the body where they may compress the axillary vein thereby causing abnormally high blood pressure inside the veins and a subsequent decrease of blood flow in the shoulders and arms. [Researcher Note: If our IED technicians carry packs with their equipment and then are required to do detailed, fine, sensitive work, they may experience a loss of fine motor control.]

Bright, Arthur. [“New Zawahiri Tape Suggests Al Qaeda PR Shift,”](#) *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 2008.

Dissent among its supporters may be forcing Al Qaeda to change tactics.

[“Clip-on Wind and Solar Charger Powers your Mobile Devices,”](#) *Physorg.com*, April 8, 2008.

A company called miniWIZ has developed a handheld universal charger that captures wind power, solar power, and power from electrical outlets to charge a variety of portable devices. [Researcher Note: This looks like a versatile, simple recharger that could prove valuable for our needs. More information can be found at: <http://www.hymini.com>.]

[“Crime Scene Investigations: Gunshot Residue Analysis on a Single Gunpowder Particle,”](#) *Physorg.com*, April 7, 2008.

Scientists in Texas have developed a highly dependable, rapid, and inexpensive new method for identifying the presence of gunshot residue (GSR) with only a single speck of GSR. This method could boost the accuracy of one of the most widely used tests employed at crime scenes involving gunplay. [Researcher Note: Could this also assist in IED explosive identification?]

Kimery, Anthony L. [“Every Eye a Spy,”](#) *Homeland Security Today*, March 30, 2008.

The author discusses potential terrorist use of geospatial information on the Internet. The article also discusses the RAND book *Mapping the Risks: Assessing Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information*, prepared for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Kimery, Anthony L. [“TSA Behavior Detection Said to Work, Examples Cited.”](#) *Homeland Security Today*, April 3, 2008.

The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) has begun using behavior detection officers in airports to look for people with hostile intent. TSA officials state “behavior analysis is based on the fear of being discovered. People who are trying to get away with something display signs of stress through involuntary physical and physiological behaviors.” [Researcher Note: Do we have a need to leverage the TSA training for our own requirements?]

Kissinger, Henry. [“The Three Revolutions.”](#) *Real Clear Politics*, April 7, 2008. (Article also appeared in *The Washington Post*.)

This is a strategic-level article on three challenges to US national security policy. Kissinger says that today there are three simultaneous revolutions occurring around the globe: “(a) the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; (b) the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”

McGregor, Andrew. [“Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive.”](#) *The Jamestown Foundation*, April 3, 2008.

The article discusses the expected Taliban offensive in the border region, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass. It also discusses the planned six joint intelligence centers along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border (the first opened on March 29 at Torkham), which have been described as “the cornerstone upon which future cooperative efforts will grow...to disrupt insurgents from going back and forth, going into Afghanistan and back into Pakistan.”

McGroarty, Patrick. [“UN and Google to Map Global Conflict Regions.”](#) *Spiegel* (GE), April 8, 2008.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has unveiled a multimedia system to monitor refugees in conflict regions using Google Earth, the Internet search giant’s global mapping software. However some concerns exist that the system could draw attention to highly detailed satellite images of refugee camps in volatile regions, raising potential security concerns for refugee camps’ residents. [Researcher Note: The interactive system is available for download at unhcr.org/googleearth. It currently includes multimedia information on refugees in Iraq.]

[“Mobile T-Rays Ready to Go: Terahertz Device Offers Clear View of Hidden Objects.”](#) *ScienceDaily*, April 9, 2008.

In the electromagnetic spectrum, terahertz waves are to be found between infrared radiation and microwaves. Among other things, they can detect explosives. Previous research in developing the concept has been slow, but now researchers at the Fraunhofer Institute for Physical Measurement Techniques (IPM) are making the devices mobile. To generate terahertz waves, the IPM scientists use a femtosecond laser, which emits extremely short flashes of infrared light.

Moubayed, Sami. [“Muqtada Out of Step in Shi’ite Dance.”](#) *Asia Times Online*, April 5, 2008.

The author describes the relationship between Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and examines potential schisms in the Shi’ite community. For example, according to the author, al-Sadr has been opposed to too much emphasis being placed on Iran. He has aimed at creating a Shi’ite theocracy in Iraq, based on the Iranian model, but nevertheless has desired it to remain independent of the mullahs of Tehran.

Nkrumah, Gamal. [“Blasted Backlash.”](#) *Al-Ahram*, April 3, 2008.

The author queries several Egyptian clerics and intellectuals on their views concerning recent Western artistic criticisms of Islam. Many in the Muslim world feel that films such as *Fitna* are deliberately designed to offend and hurt the feelings of Muslims.

Paynter, Ben. [“To Catch a Car Thief, the Police Exercise a Little Remote Control.”](#) *Wired*, March 24, 2008.

Police in British Columbia use a high-tech “bait truck” to catch car thieves. Sensors linked to GPS and cell phone modems send telemetry and pinhole cameras stream live footage.

Peck, Morgen E. [“A Brainy Approach to Image Sorting.”](#) *IEEE Spectrum Online*, April 3, 2008.

Researchers at Honeywell, Teledyne Scientific and Imaging, and Columbia University are linking image analysts with EEG machines and reading their brain activity. As a result data sorting is increased six-fold in speed. The research is for a DARPA program called Neurotechnology for Intelligence Analysts.

Sageman, Mark. [“The Next Generation of Terror.”](#) *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2008.

The author discusses the rise of self-recruited terrorist “wannabes” who find purpose in terror and comrades on the worldwide web. As such, they are even more unpredictable than previous generations of terrorists.

[“Splinternet Debuts Dirty Bomb Detector Network.”](#) *Gizmag*, April 2, 2008.

This short article describes advances in systems that manage a network of solid state gamma radiation sensors, which send real-time notifications to command centers as soon as the presence of threat-level gamma rays is detected. Potential customers with IP networks can add radiation detection capability, and administrators can designate alerts to be automatically sent to cell phones, pagers, PDAs, or other devices if radiation is detected.

[“Terrorism: Last Days of Suicide Bomber Revealed by Ex-al-Qaeda Members.”](#) *Adnkronos International* (IT), April 4, 2008.

An Algerian newspaper put together testimonies of several Algerian ex-terrorists to describe the final days of a suicide bomber. They found that once selected for the suicide attack the bomber was isolated from his/her fellow terrorists and kept in the dark about the actual attack plans until just before the attack.

ARTICLES



A Brainy Approach to Image Sorting

By Morgen E. Peck



3 April 2008 – We may need computers to tell us the square root of 529 679, but for now, at least, they still need us to recognize a kitten napping in a box of yarn. The point goes to the humans for our keen sense of the relationship between objects, our eye for texture, and our understanding of emotional relevance, but we don't wield these abilities with great speed.

This slowness, unfortunately, has caused intelligence agencies a good deal of distress. They collect surveillance images from satellites, infrared sensors, and

aerial-mounted cameras so quickly that analysts must struggle to keep up.

But what if we could combine the speed of a computer with the sensitivity of the human brain? Teams of researchers at Honeywell, Teledyne Scientific and Imaging, and Columbia University are busy hooking image analysts up to EEG machines, reading their brain activity, and speeding up data sorting six-fold. Their research is for a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program called Neurotechnology for Intelligence Analysts, which began its second of three phases this year. Each phase whittles down the number of participating research teams, and by the end, DARPA expects to have one team with a superior system.

“This [system] could be used for searching for desired images in a large database of images. It would be faster than a manual search,” says Deniz Erdogmus, a computer science professor at Oregon Health & Science University, in Portland, who collaborates with the group at Honeywell. Erdogmus presented an EEG approach to image triage on 2 April at the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, in Las Vegas.

Erdogmus explains that it takes humans about 300 milliseconds to consciously recognize specific information in a picture—an adult face among children, for example. It takes another 200 ms for the person to react physically, say, by pushing a button as an analyst would do. But even before a person is conscious of what he or she is seeing—about 150 ms after being shown an image—the electrical activity in the brain's visual cortex has already spiked. The activity is called an event related potential, or ERP.



In Erdogmus's experiments, which DARPA funded, six professional image analysts watched as aerial photographs flashed on a computer screen, more than five of them per second. The analysts were told to

search the terrain for large targets, such as golf courses. Meanwhile, a 32-electrode EEG cap, plastered to the analysts' heads, detected brain activity that was then recorded in a separate computer. After the experiment, Erdogmus ran the recordings through a program that flagged any pictures whose appearance coincided with an ERP. While his analysis pulled out many false targets, it rarely missed a real one. Even if it were used to isolate candidate targets for another analyst to scrutinize more closely, the technique could save a lot of time, says Erdogmus. For the system to meet DARPA standards, the analysis will have to happen concurrently with the recordings. The research team at Columbia University, in New York City, has already shown that it can analyze its data in real time, says Paul Sajda, an associate professor of biomedical engineering and the project leader at Columbia.

One main challenge in using the technique has been clearly detecting a signal against the background of normal brain activity. The Oregon lab uses a commercial EEG electrode cap that detects and evenly weighs signals from all parts of the brain. The baseline hum of activity in the human brain produces a voltage signal of 10 to 100 microvolts, while the ERP signal has an amplitude of only 1 to 10 microvolts.

Another problem is that the brain continues to respond electrically even after the image disappears, which makes it difficult to match signals with the pictures that evoked them. In an effort to get around that problem, Erdogmus has been refining a strategy to calibrate the system for each new user. During a training period, images are presented in controlled sequence so that the responding brain signals won't overlap. In these trials, the analyst must push a button in response to target pictures. This gives the computer a clear indication of what each person's ERP looks like so that it can better sort out overlapping ones.

The question remains whether watching images in rapid sequence will tire analysts out faster and ultimately make them less efficient. Catherine Huang, a graduate student in the Erdogmus lab who has tried the procedure, says it's essential to take small breaks between chunks of images but

that even after an hour of watching satellite images flash past, she didn't feel tired. "Each block is only 5 seconds, and you can take a break for as long as you want," she says. Honeywell has reported the same feedback from the subjects in its in-house experiments. Teledyne could not be reached for comment.

The real difficulty could be in making the system user-friendly. "Even though our system is faster, we still need to hook up the electrode to the head. So we are not sure if the user will accept this," says Huang. Securing an electrical connection between the ERP cap and the analyst's head usually requires dousing the scalp in a conductive gel, and with all the necessary wires, the user must sit there looking like a futuristic Medusa.

<http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/apr08/6121>



Backpack Straps Can Decrease Blood Flow In The Shoulder And Arm, And May Result In Loss of Fine Motor Control

ScienceDaily (Apr. 8, 2008) — More than 92 percent of the children in the U.S. carry backpacks. Typically the backpacks are loaded with almost one-fourth of the child's body weight (22 percent) and worn with only one strap. Last year, a team of physician researchers examined the effect heavy-loaded backpack straps can have on children. They found the straps can significantly increase pressure when the load is ten percent or more. They also found that strap pressures with loads as small as ten percent of bodyweight can obstruct localized blood flow and contribute to shoulder fatigue.

This year the team has examined pack straps and adults. In some professions, such as the military, firefighting and mountain rescue, the packs may equal as much as 60 percent of adult body weight. The findings of the most recent study indicate that even light loads of 26 pounds can decrease upper extremity blood flow, and may result in a loss of fine motor control and increased fatigue.

The studies were conducted by Timothy Neuschwander, Brandon Macias and Alan Hargens, all of the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of California–San Diego. Dr. Neuschwander will present the team's findings, *Backpack Straps Decrease Upper Extremity Blood Flow*, at the 121st Annual Meeting of the American Physiological Society, part of the Experimental Biology 2008 scientific conference.

Background and Study Summary

Backpack straps typically rest on an area of the body where they may compress the axillary vein which causes abnormally high blood pressure inside the veins and a subsequent decrease of blood flow in the shoulders and arms. The researchers speculated that blood flow of the large and small vessels of the upper extremity area would decrease in an individual while wearing a backpack.

To test their theory, they examined eight healthy volunteers, six men and two women between the ages of 18-30. The right brachial artery was measured using ultrasound and the index finger pulp microvascular flow was measured using the photoplethysmography method. Baseline flows were measured immediately before and ten minutes after donning a 26 pound backpack. A ten

minute testing period was chosen because people typically wear a backpack for at least ten minutes. This amount of time is also sufficient to measure blood flow.

After wearing the pack for ten minutes, brachial artery blood flow decreased from 2.66 ± 0.36 to 1.52 ± 0.27 mL/s ($p < 0.05$, paired T-test), and index finger microvascular flow decreased from 100 percent to 46 ± 6 percent ($p < 0.05$, paired test).

Conclusions


The researchers concluded that backpack loads of just 26 pounds decrease upper extremity macrovascular and microvascular blood flows, and may result in a loss of fine motor control and increased fatigue. According to Timothy Neuschwander, MD, the first author of the study and a physician, “We surmise that the mechanism of diminished blood flow is likely due to strap compression of the axillary vein. We think that backpack straps may benefit from a redesign that skirts the vein leading from the upper extremity to the heart.”

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080407114622.htm>



Blasted backlash

Gamal Nkrumah feels the pulse of Egyptian intellectuals and clerics in the aftermath of a spate of Western artistic outpourings criticising Islam and denigrating the Prophet Mohamed



April 3, 2008. Which is worse, the films, plays and cartoons by Westerners who fail to understand that depicting Islam, Muslims and the Prophet Mohamed in a denigrating manner deeply offends many devout Muslims, or the determination of Western politicians to fiddle away while Rome burns?

Fitna (Sedition), a recently-released 17- minute film made by the far-right Dutch MP Geert Wilders, is the latest production to incense sentiment across the Muslim world, Egypt included. This wave of

"Islamophobia" that swept the West is ostensibly seen by many as a backlash to avenge the humiliation of the United States in the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Divergent views -- if not downright hostility -- masquerading as freedom of expression cannot help but widen cultural gaps and sour relations between the West and the Muslim world.

The hitherto heated dispute is fast acquiring a sharper edge, and reactions in Egypt and other Muslim countries to the screening of *Fitna* have been nothing short of frenzied. Perhaps the most galling scene was the tearing up of pages of the Quran with which the film ends. "Nothing less than repugnant," declared Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit. He described the film as an affront and an offence to the religion of more than 1.5 billion Muslims across the world, and added he was speaking on behalf of the world's Muslim nations.

"Egypt rejects any offence or denigration of Islam and its prophet," Abul-Gheit stressed.

When *Fitna*, featuring images of the terror attacks in New York and Madrid interspersed with Quranic texts, was posted on the Internet on Thursday the indignation it provoked was predictable. A more optimistic sign, though, were those who are beginning to find the blizzard of European anti-Muslim artistic expression tiresome. Ironically, three Dutch nationals converted to Islam after watching *Fitna*.

"Freedom of expression and secularism were once the hallmark of our own cultural heritage," Samir Farid, one of Egypt's leading film critics, told *Al-Ahram Weekly*. "In 1935 an Egyptian

writer, Ismail Adham, published a book entitled *Why I am an Apostate*. Nobody called for his trial, let alone his death. Nobody called him an infidel. That was freedom of expression,"

Farid laments the way in which, over recent decades, Muslim societies have become prey to the dictates of self-styled religious authorities who are seeking power. "When Westerners watch televised interviews with Osama bin Laden and Ayman El-Zawahri in which they celebrate the attacks of 11 September it should come as no surprise that some of them will go on to produce films, plays and books depicting Islam as a religion that glorifies violence," says Farid.

There is a reign of terror, he contends, and the view of the world that exists in Europe is irreconcilable with views prevalent in the Muslim world. The anti-Islamic tide remains as strong, he believes, as in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

He is not in the least surprised that *Fitna* falsely designates the Quran as a manifesto of violence, or that another spat should have erupted over a play directed by the German Uwe Eric Laufenberg and based on Indian-born British writer Salman Rushdie's novel *Satanic Verses*. It will be staged at the Hans Otto Theatre in Potsdam, southwest of Berlin. Turkish actor Oktay Khan has already withdrawn from the production after receiving death threats.

Farid draws a comparison once again with the far more relaxed climate of the early and middle part of the 20th century. "In 1926, the celebrated Egyptian actor Youssef Wahbi announced that he intended to portray the life and times of the Prophet Mohamed. The issue was debated in the press but no one dared to threaten Wahbi. Yet such an announcement would be unthinkable today. Times have changed, and no actor now has the courage to challenge conventional Islamist wisdom."

Nor, says Farid, is the phenomenon, the dangerous politicisation of religion, restricted to Muslim countries. "US President George W Bush talked about a crusade, and it was not a slip of the tongue. The Dalai Lama is involved in the Tibetan independence movement. He is, indeed, its symbolic leader. Politicians the world over are using the language of religion to justify war and pursue political ends. Whatever the dangers, to remain silent in such a climate is to court disaster."

Others beg to differ. "As Muslims, we have a duty to respond to attacks on Islam launched in the name of freedom of expression. Artistic expressions such as *Fitna* necessitate rejoinders from intellectuals who are true believers," Gamal Qutb, Islamic scholar, told the *Weekly*.

"The film is an unwarranted affront to Prophet Mohamed and Islam. We have an inalienable right to defend the values of Islam and monotheistic religions. Westerners may have forsaken religion but we in the East uphold its sanctity and the respectability of the prophets of old, not just the Prophet Mohamed, but of Jesus, Moses and other prophets."

If such thinking is sometimes viewed in the West as more of a threat than a badge of honour, it is far more moderate than the calls of those militant Islamists who demand retribution and insist that producers of such films, plays and books are "infidels" who should be executed.

Qatari-based Egyptian cleric Sheikh Youssef El-Qaradawi dismissed *Fitna* as "lies and fabrications". And according to the Saudi Arabian-based Muslim World League, the film is an "offensive act that aims to spread discord between people".

There is a widespread belief in the Muslim world that films like *Fitna* are deliberately designed to "offend and hurt the feelings of Muslims", notes Qutb. "Most Muslims would support freedom of expression but are for the censorship of provocative and insulting productions," he explains.

"We must differentiate between a film produced by a fascist such as Wilders and *Submission*, produced by a liberal such as Theo Van Gogh, who was murdered because his film was critical of the Muslim *hijab* and of violence against women and actually defended the rights of Muslim women," Farid told the *Weekly*.

Yet the prevalent view in the Muslim world is that the producers of all such films are *agents provocateur*.

"Unfortunately films such as *Fitna* provide a platform for Europeans from across the political spectrum to denounce Islam," noted Qutb. "It amounts to bad publicity which we can do without."

The politics of religion may be a puzzling business but no one would deny it is prickly.

"We regret that Wilders made this film, we believe it serves no other purpose than to cause offence," Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende was reported as saying.

"I condemn in the strongest terms the airing of Geert Wilders' offensively anti-Islamic film," announced UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. "The right of free expression is not at stake. Freedom must always be accompanied by social responsibility."

It was a message repeated last week by Professor Nadia Mustafa, director of the Dialogue of Cultures programme at Cairo University's School of Political Science during a meeting with Dutch religious and intellectual figures to discuss *Fitna*. A seminar scheduled for 8 April will further consider the matter.

"There is a schism over freedom of speech. There is the question of the politics of morality, or the lack of it," is how Farid sums up the situation.

<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/891/eg5.htm>



Clip-on wind and solar charger powers your mobile devices

April 8, 2008

You're riding your bike, the winds in your hair - and now it can be in your miniature wind and solar charger clipped to your handlebars or upper arm. A company called miniWIZ has developed a handheld universal charger that captures wind power, solar power, and power from electrical outlets to charge a variety of portable devices.



The HYmini is a handheld universal charger that captures wind power, solar power, and power from electrical outlets to charge a variety of portable devices.

Although the charger, called HYmini, should be initially charged via an electrical wall outlet (which takes about 4 hours), it can be topped off away from home in windy or sunny conditions. With enough solar batteries, it's possible to fully charge the HYmini without any electrical power. Wind power is intended solely for supplemental charging, though.

When fully charged, HYmini's 5V/1A lithium ion battery can provide power for cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, iPods, and even digital cameras. Gadgets are hooked up to the charger via a USB cable and various adapters that are included in the package. miniWIZ claims the charger's battery can be recharged up to 500 times, providing at least 1000mA/h of storage capacity that can be transferred to mobile devices.

HYmini's built-in wind charger consists of a micro wind power generator activated by a tiny fan. At wind speeds between 9 and 40 mph, the turbine can provide up to 1W of power with a 65 mA capacity. A green LED lights up when charging, which can also be used as a night light. The input current depends on the wind speed: in tests, 20 minutes of 19-mph winds could generate enough charge to power an MP3 player for 40 minutes, a cell phone for 4 minutes, or a digital camera for 20 pictures.

The company suggests that the charger would be ideal when biking, skiing, or participating in similar high-speed activities, although it caps off at 40 mph for safety reasons. The charger is moisture-proof, and the turbine is made of soft PVC that breaks on impact to avoid injury. Replacement turbines can be purchased online.

Besides electrical and wind, the HYmini can also be charged by the sun. The package comes with four optional 6-inch solar miniSOLAR panels, which can be linked together to the charger to provide up to 5V. When charging, a side indicator turns red to note that sunlight is being converted into electricity and stored in the device's internal battery.

The HYmini is available starting at USD \$50 in black, white, and green. The miniSOLAR panels are \$25 each, and the site also provides data on the average percentage of sunlight and wind speeds for various US cities.

<http://www.physorg.com/news126886047.html>



Crime scene investigations: Gunshot residue analysis on a single gunpowder particle

April 7, 2008

Scientists in Texas are reporting development of a highly dependable, rapid, and inexpensive new method for identifying the presence of gunshot residue (GSR). The test fills a GSR-detection gap that results from wider use of “green” — lead free — ammunition.



With what could be a shot in the arm for crime scene investigators, chemists have developed a reliable new test for detecting the presence of gunshot residue. Above is a residue particle -- roughly 1/20 the size of a period -- that has been magnified 200 times with a digital microscope. Credit: Courtesy of Garrett Burluson

It requires only a single speck of GSR smaller than the period at the end of this sentence and could boost the accuracy of one of the most widely used tests employed at crime scenes involving gunplay.

In a poster presented here today at the 235th national meeting of the American Chemical Society, graduate student Garrett Lee Burluson and his advisor, chemist Jorn Chi Chung Yu, Ph.D., of Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, described their new method. It extracts almost all components of gunpowder residue from particles about 15 times smaller than the width of a human hair, without the use of chemical reagents. After extraction, gas chromatography coupled with a nitrogen phosphorus detector is used to separate and identify the analytes.

“Gunshot residue tests are done in almost every case where a shooting has taken place,” Burluson said. “The main focus of our research is to develop a method that will help credibility of gunshot residue evidence in court. You can get results with this test in 30 to 40 minutes with the new test. In addition you only need small amounts of evidence to run the test.”

Many of the current methods are susceptible to outside interferences that can produce false positive or false negative results. For example, most tests require the presence of lead for a valid reading, including two of the three mainstays of residue analysis — the sodium rhodizonate test and scanning electron microscopy with energy dispersive x-ray detection.

But Burluson points out that lead is disappearing from ammunition. That potentially toxic metal poses environmental hazards at outdoor firing ranges, where it can leach into groundwater. In response, manufacturers have begun to create safer, environmentally friendly ammunition out of other metals, such as zinc and aluminum alloys.

This recent trend toward lead-free ammunition, Burleson said, has decreased reliability of gunshot residue analysis and created the need for smarter tests to identify more diverse components of residue in gunpowder, including elements like stabilizers and plasticizers, which are added in the powder during the manufacturing process for safety reasons.

“When a gun fires, the gunpowder explodes, producing gases at enormous pressure that propels the bullet out of the barrel of the firearm,” explained Burleson, a graduate student in the Master of Science in Forensic Science Program at Sam Houston State University. “Some of the residue from that explosion is deposited on the hands of the shooter and the clothing of the victim.” Burleson’s new test, which uses a technology called solid phase micro-extraction combined with gas chromatography, focuses on chemical compounds present in that ejected material. “When you have a residue particle, no matter how small, it’s going to contain signatures of every element in that powder.”

These signatures offer a wider range of detection possibilities compared to traditional methods, he said. Using an alternative method with a scanning electron microscope, for example, a forensic examiner would perform a search for lead, passing up numerous powder constituents in the analysis. “You would just look for the one little piece of metal that might be there, so the analysis could take hours,” Burleson said.

“If you’re looking for powder, however, there’s a lot more of it. You’re getting more of the residue to analyze. It makes it a much more efficient method of detection.” For example, a distinctive combination of certain chemicals, such as diphenylamine, ethyl centralite and nitrodiphenylamine, is typically found only in explosive mixtures and therefore allows for a simple analysis of gunplay at a crime scene.

In contrast, another traditional test for finding gunshot residue, the modified Griess test, often fails because it lacks such specificity. Its analysis is based on the detection of Nitrogen-based compounds called nitrites, which are gunpowder byproducts. But these compounds are also found elsewhere, leading to possible ambiguity in testing.

“Many chemical cleaners — anything that can be used to take off motor oil or freight dust — will test positive for gunshot residue using the Griess test,” Burleson said.

That would make the reading a false positive, which opens the door in court cases for reasonable doubt and possibly incarcerating an innocent person. “The worst thing you can possibly say is, ‘There’s a chance I’m wrong.’ Our preliminary results indicate you can determine the presence of gunshot residue with a high level of confidence.”

More efficient testing also would reduce the need for extraneous tests that require time and money while draining resources from a criminal justice system that cannot afford it, Burleson said.

The research was funded by the College of Criminal Justice and Department of Chemistry at Sam Houston State University.

Burleson's test could be used as a preliminary or confirmatory one. "As far as a stand-alone test, it's an excellent, reliable and cheap test to do," he said. "But for the sake of clarity and thoroughness, examiners will usually run multiple tests, such as the sodium rhodizonate test at the crime scene, and they could then confirm the findings with my method."

Source: American Chemical Society

<http://www.physorg.com/news126764831.html>

Homeland Security Today

EVERY EYE A SPY

Anthony L. Kimery, 30 March 2008

Geospatial information on the Internet has put enormous power in the hands of everyone with a personal computer—a power that can be used for both good and evil.

It was over a late-night dinner at a small, secluded restaurant not far from the American consulate and King David Hotel in Jerusalem that the official with whom I was dining related his startling concerns about a potential open door for terrorists that he believes was unbolted by the proliferation of certain geospatial intelligence (GSI).

I had begun to work on this report well in advance of a planned counterterrorism fact-finding trip to Israel in early February to meet with defense and intelligence officials. But during a chance encounter with a US intelligence official unrelated to the trip, I was proffered a story that, surprisingly, had direct bearing on this dispatch. And with renewed terrorism in Israel emanating from Gaza only the day before, his story took on added urgency.

Tags and terrorists

The RAND Corp. defines “geospatial information” broadly to include geospatial data and information that exist in a variety of forms and are accessible through various media and sources—from raw geospatial data (e.g., latitude and longitude coordinates, maps and nautical charts, aerial and satellite images, textual geospatial descriptions) to relatively sophisticated geospatial datasets like highly detailed, high accuracy geographic information system (GIS) databases.

GIS refers to computer applications that can store, retrieve, manipulate, analyze, display and share geographic data in a real-time environment (as opposed to GSI, which refers specifically to intelligence, or the information produced by GIS platforms and technology). GIS technology has rapidly morphed into a multimedia infrastructure management tool replete with tabular databases, maps, digital photography, engineering plans, detailed street maps and video that all can be merged into a single application with powerful search, query and analysis functions.

But just as GSI datasets and the GIS applications that are used to manipulate them are increasingly being used to help federal, state and local governments prepare for and respond to homeland security issues and emergencies, so, too, can terrorists potentially turn to them to plot and execute attacks ranging from bombings to calculating the best location to unleash a virulent pathogen.

My dinner companion’s legitimate concerns were made all the more disconcerting in the context of the unease that had just descended like a gloomy, gray haze over the city—and it wasn’t smog—following the Hamas-directed suicide bombing not far south in Dimona by young terrorists from the West Bank city of Hebron.

By Thursday evening, Hamas terrorists had launched dozens of short-range “Qassam” rockets against Israeli communities north and east of Gaza and had threatened more suicide bombings throughout the Jewish state. Also that day, the Israeli Defense Forces, using its own GSI, had successfully begun to carry out search and destroy missions against rocket-launching sites using the Israel Air Force’s “Heron” unmanned aerial vehicle to pinpoint terrorist locations for destruction by the Cobra attack helicopters at the Palmachim air base—“the eyes of Israel.”

The US official’s mission in Israel was classified, but what he could say was indeed unnerving. He said that at an unspecified time not all that long ago he discovered “recent” imagery on Google Earth that clearly showed temporary housing and other facilities that had been erected for a US mission in an undisclosed Middle East country with which he was directly involved. As soon as he realized the full implications of what he was seeing, he was horrified—and Google was immediately contacted.

While the official stressed that Google quickly, willingly and without opposition removed the offending imagery, he nevertheless drilled down on the threat that it could have posed had it been left in the public domain. Had terrorists stumbled across the unusually fresh imagery—which counterterror intelligence analysts say terrorists search for with “sophisticated regularity”—they potentially could have used it to plan an attack on the site.

“Right there was all the intelligence they needed to plan an attack,” he said.

Threat response

For its part, Google has previously said of such information that it could indeed be used for “bad” purposes and is available to the public in many forms. “Of course, we are always ready to listen to governments’ requests,” a spokesman said, adding that the search engine giant has “opened channels” with the United States and other countries when it comes to potentially sensitive but open source GIS. Google, however, is “not prepared to discuss what we have discussed with them,” he maintained, adding, “but we do listen and we are sensitive to [their] requests.”

In the case of the US security official, Google *did* respond to the threat concerns he brought to its attention regarding imagery that could be used by terrorists.

Similarly, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian jihadist terrorist organization, reputedly has been using Google Earth to help in planning attacks on Israeli Defense Forces positions and other Israeli targets.

“We obtain the details from Google Earth and check them against our maps of the city center and sensitive areas,” Khaled Jaabari, the group’s commander in Gaza—also known as Abu Walid—has been reported as saying.

During my counterterrorism fact-finding mission, arranged by Shaneson Consulting Group, Israeli defense and intelligence officials did in fact express concern that, in some instances, there’s little doubt that the level of tactical-attack-utility information that’s contained in some easily accessible GSI on locations in Israel could be used to virtually recon targets of opportunities for martyr-seeking suicide bombers close by in Gaza or the West Bank—or already within Israel proper, as is believed to have been the case with the suicide bombers from Hebron who struck a mall in Dimona.

During one intelligence briefing, several officials, including a reservist general, clearly articulated several instances in which it appeared that both Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists had used some sort of overhead imagery to target not only the firing of their rough-hewn rocket bombs but the locations from which they could be launched, which sometimes has been straight out of the windows of multi-story residential buildings.

John Bumgarner is an 18-year veteran of special operations who has worked with most of the three-letter intelligence agencies at one time or another and is now research director for security technology at the US Cyber Consequences Unit, a non-profit research institute. He pointed out to me that, during raids on Al Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan, laptops were found with the schematics of critical infrastructures in the United States that were gleaned from mining online GSI resources. Indeed, as *HSToday* has previously reported, terrorists' notebook computers have been found with considerable data on North American oil and gas distribution pipelines and infrastructure.

Last summer, a raid on an Al Qaeda safe house in Iraq in conjunction with the killing of the terror group's leader, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, yielded computers that were brimming with plans to launch multiple attacks in American cities using conventional high explosives. They were being planned with the assistance of an array of Google Earth images and other GIS that had been downloaded for a number of potential targets.

According to intelligence sources, the operation had been given the green light by Al Qaeda's Shura Council. But the fortuitous raid effectively foiled the plan.

US Defense Intelligence Agency chief, Gen. Michael Maples, told the House and Senate intelligence committees in January that "documents captured in a raid on an Al Qaeda safe house in Iraq revealed AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] was planning terrorist operations in the US." A spokesperson for the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) said the DNI's office "agrees with the statement for the record Gen. Maples made on Jan. 18, 2007, about current and projected national security threats to the United States."

Gabriel Weimann, a noted analyst of terrorism and the mass media as a professor of communications at the University of Haifa in Israel and author of the book *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*, told a conference on Internet security at Germany's Federal Police Office last November that Al Qaeda uses Google Earth to scour satellite images for targets.

In his lengthy report, "[Al Qaeda in Lebanon: The Iraq War Spreads.](#)" in the January/February issue of the *Boston Review*, journalist Nir Rosen noted that, during a visit to the home of a converted jihadist, he and another member of the jihad "were looking at Google Earth on the laptop."

The issues

The American intelligence official who'd piqued my interest in the Jerusalem café is convinced there are legitimate security issues posed by the relatively new virtual public library of

sometimes sensitive GSI—information that in the hands of terrorists, rogue states and other assorted bad guys can, may and seems to have been, in at least some instances, used to find targets and to plan ingress and egress routes.

“There are at least anecdotal reports that commercial imagery has been acquired for attacks on allied forces in Iraq and elsewhere. It’s not unreasonable to imagine that hostile parties could turn such imagery to their advantage,” Steve Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientist’s Project on Government Secrecy told *HSToday*.

“Granted, its public access, right? But the deal with open source is, if you have no ill intent to use it for any ill-gain, it’s no big deal,” Bumgarner agreed. “But if you have the need to use it for something to plot an attack or to do some research to find out somebody’s identity, then it becomes a very big deal.”

“There are all kinds of GSI-type stuff out there; there’s all kinds of databases out there” and, from it, “you can build a very detailed target folder, or a target profile, of a high-value target to actually plan [an attack] before you even put someone on US soil,” he said.

John Olesak, vice president for the Geospatial Intelligence Operating Unit at Northrop Grumman Corp., Los Angeles, Calif., pointed out that the security concerns posed by the ready availability of all this esoteric information is “the issue that has surfaced in the [GSI] community quite a bit over the course of the last couple of years. ... As we make more and more geospatial information available, or just information in general, on the Internet, well, that’s exactly what we’re doing—we’re making it available to ... *anyone*.”

He added, “While I may use it for the appropriate reason to get from point A to point B, someone else may use it for a very inappropriate reason.”

“The hardest question to have around all this data, like that that can be used in Virtual Earth applications, is that it’s really unique and isn’t available to just anyone with malicious intent to use,” pointed out Kevin Adler, a geospatial solutions specialist at Microsoft Corp., Redmond, Wash.

As Adler and his colleague, Glenn Schoonover, chief technical architect for homeland security in the Microsoft Public Sector Industry Unit, explained, proprietary applications of Virtual Earth that are tailored for homeland security clients using GIS datasets that are internal to the client, but which would be of most value to a potential terrorist, aren’t accessible to outsiders and, therefore, are unlikely to pose any real risk.

But as open source GSI datasets and the applications to exploit them evolve at breakneck speeds, so, too, do the concerns about the darker side of their potential.

Meanwhile, critics of the alarmists say the concerns are hugely overblown. They point out that terrorists can just as easily and probably more effectively go physically surveil a target for themselves.

“If they really wanted to do a reconnaissance of a target, then they’d be wiser to get in their car and drive by,” said Schoonover.

Karen Morley, senior director of TerraGo Technologies, Atlanta, Ga., who began her career in the geospatial industry in the US Air Force as a target intelligence specialist, echoed Schoonover, saying terrorists would probably be better off physically staking out a potential target. But she also agreed with Olesak’s view that the open source world of GIS has opened a Pandora’s Box that, like a lot of things intended for good, can also be used on behalf of the dark side.

“I just don’t think that generic, open source GIS can provide the kind of level of targeting information a terrorist would need to be successful,” Morley said, emphasizing that the best granularization of datasets that would be most useful are proprietary within application solutions like that customized by TerraGo for its clients.

Still, experts say a suicide bomber probably isn’t going to bother downloading gigabits of GIS on someplace where he’s going to blow himself up.

In 2004, RAND developed the book *Mapping the Risks: Assessing Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information* for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. RAND concluded that “accessible geospatial information has the potential to be somewhat useful for helping with selecting a target and determining its location,” but “potential attackers, such as terrorist groups or hostile governments, are more likely to desire more reliable and timely information, which is often obtainable via other means, such as through direct access or observation. In addition, many types of attacks, such as those by ground parties, are likely to require detailed information for attack planning purposes (depending on the target type and mode of attack). This type of information, which mostly comes from such nongeospatial sources as engineering textbooks or human expertise on the operations of a particular type of industrial complex, is essential for attackers to have a high confidence in their plan.”

Bumgarner and other veteran counterterrorism intelligence authorities strongly disagree, saying a good number of suicide bombings are well thought out and executed. “They aren’t just random suicide bombers out walking around with an Ace Hardware pipe bomb who suddenly say, ‘There’s a good place to kill infidels and meet Allah today!’” as one colorfully put it. “To actually start planning very detailed reconnaissance of a building, and all the streets that go into it, and all the alleyways and everything else, that could require a lot of physical reconnaissance on the ground—it’s not something that you can actually just easily do anymore,” Bumgarner stressed, especially in the post-9/11 environment where conspicuous photographing, videoing and other apparent physical surveillance can, and has—repeatedly across the nation—caused people to be detained and questioned about their activities.

“In other words,” Bumgarner said, “it’s gotten a whole lot harder for a terrorist to conduct the kind of conspicuous physical surveillance of a target that’s necessary for conducting a large-scale or mass casualty attack.”

He added: “Imagine trying to find all the actual points on the ground. To actually do that, it’s very hard. But with, say, Google Earth and Virtual Earth, it’s very easy.”

Going forward

Olesak believes that, “as we move forward” in using this rapidly evolving information technology, “those individuals that have data that we can use in geospatial intelligence applications will become more sensitive to actually exposing that data. I think we’re going to have sort of a self-policing type of environment as people become sensitive to the exposure of that data and its potential use.

“As more and more of this data becomes readily available, I think the sensitivities associated with that are going to grow,” he said.

However, Olesak also noted that he “doesn’t know that we’ll see policies and procedures across the board, but I think that at individual organizational levels we’re going to see those kinds of protections provided—whether it’s access control or simply not making it available via the Internet. I think those are the kinds of self-policing activities we’re going to adopt over time. And we have the technology to do it.”

“We all have to beware of arguments that say ‘terrorists could use X’ and, therefore, ‘X should be restricted,’” Aftergood cautioned. “The problem with this way of thinking is that terrorists can use anything—even credit cards and cellular phones—so this kind of argument quickly becomes absurd and self-defeating.

“Open source GIS is still an emerging field and its public, private and commercial applications are still unfolding. The burden is on those who would restrict access to such information to show that it poses an extraordinary and imminent threat. I doubt that it does.”

Others, though, believe it does. Certainly, some of the authorities I spoke to in Israel implied this.

And “why do I need to pull up all the military bases in the United States via Google Earth or Microsoft Virtual Earth?” Bumgarner mused. “I mean, that’s a major issue. Why should I be able to pull it up and see imagery from just a few months ago? Why do we need that? [The Defense Department] should be asking itself this same question.”

Bumgarner continued that “the United States government needs to step back and start looking at this technology better and trying to understand the technology and the threats posed by this technology and potentially come up with new regulations, or laws, that don’t hinder the technology, but kind of protect our national interests. The genie is out of the bottle; there’s no way to go back and tell Google, ‘You can no longer put Street View out there.’ But, if there was some law, you could tell them, ‘Hey, look, I don’t want you to put up a photo of a secret service building in Miami, Florida, and have all the paths to and from the building online.’ Or, ‘Don’t put details about the UN and where all the air handlers are online.’”

Bumgarner conceded that the road to implementing such regulations will be fraught with opposition. “There are going to be lawsuits against it, first amendment rights issues like free speech—that’s going to be an issue. And then they’re going to say that people are hindering the technology.”

But as Olesak pointed out, “We don’t have to put everything out on the Internet. We put a transportation network out there, but we don’t have to tell you all the details about the transportation network.”

Analysis

Olesak’s right, and a lot of stuff considered harmless prior to 9/11 has been removed from online access. But internal government audits and surveys of critical infrastructure-related websites have found considerable sensitive GIS still available, albeit sometimes deeply buried and requiring access, but nevertheless still there, just waiting to be hacked.


As an Israeli intelligence official put it: “There’s a treasure trove of information that terrorists can, are and will be using. And when it’s all compiled together and manipulated by the many GIS tools there are, they then have a powerful, cheap and easy-to-use virtual weapon.”

http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2649&Itemid=27&limit=1&limitstart=0



Mobile T-Rays Ready To Go: Terahertz Device Offers Clear View Of Hidden Objects

ScienceDaily (Apr. 9, 2008) — Terahertz waves, which until now have barely found their way out of the laboratory, could soon be in use as a versatile tool. Researchers have mobilized the transmitting and receiving devices so that they can be used anywhere with ease.



Ready to go: mobile terahertz devices.
(Credit: Image courtesy of Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft)

Everybody knows microwaves – but what are terahertz waves? These higher-frequency waves are a real jack-of-all-trades. They can help to detect explosives or drugs without having to open a suitcase or search through items of clothing. They can reveal which substances are flowing through plastic tubes. Doctors even hope that these waves will enable them to identify skin cancer without having to perform a

biopsy. In the electromagnetic spectrum, terahertz waves are to be found between infrared radiation and microwaves.

They can penetrate wood, ceramics, paper, plastic or fabrics and are not harmful to humans. On the other hand, they cannot pass through metal. This makes them a universal tool: They change when passing through gases, solid materials or liquids. Each substance leaves its specific fingerprint, be it explosives or water, heroin or blood.

So far, however, the technology has not made a breakthrough, as it is expensive and time-consuming to build the required transmitters and receivers. Now researchers at the Fraunhofer Institute for Physical Measurement Techniques IPM are making the devices mobile. To generate terahertz waves, the scientists use a femtosecond laser which emits extremely short flashes of infrared light.

To illustrate: In one femtosecond, a ray of light moves forward by about the width of a hair. The pulsed light is directed at a semiconductor, where it excites electrons which then emit terahertz waves. In conventional equipment, the laser light moves freely through the room, which makes measurement inflexible and susceptible to vibrations. The Fraunhofer experts have taken a different approach, guiding the light through a glass fiber of a type similar to that used for

transmitting data. “Our fiber-based system is so robust that we can simply plug it into a standard 240-volt socket,” says IPM expert Joachim Jonscheit. This is not the only benefit: Until now the equipment has required a shock-proof base so that measurements are not falsified by vibrations. With the beam path inside a glass fiber, this is no longer necessary.

The advantages are obvious: The transmitters and receivers, which are about the size of beverage cans, are now attached to a flexible cable and can be positioned wherever desired. Since vibrations are no longer a problem, the device can even be deployed on the factory floor with fork-lift trucks driving around and heavy machinery vibrating. No inspection point is too difficult to access, as the glass fiber cables can bridge distances up to 25 meters.

Adapted from materials provided by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft.

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080408102830.htm>



Muqtada out of step in Shi'ite dance

By Sami Moubayed, April 5, 2008

DAMASCUS - Two years ago, Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was interviewed by *La Repubblica*, explaining his relationship with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Then, the two men were firmly allied in a friendship that was frowned on by almost everybody; the Americans, the Iranians, Arab states and Iraqi Sunnis. Muqtada's supporters were critical, claiming that by working with Maliki, their boss was legitimizing a US-backed prime minister.

Maliki's supporters were equally uneasy, claiming that Muqtada was an embarrassment and that they would never be taken seriously as statesmen, or be accepted by the regional neighborhood, as long as they relied on protection from Muqtada's militia, the Mahdi Army.

Maliki and Muqtada, however, thought otherwise. Maliki needed Muqtada to win the hearts of grassroot Iraqis. Muqtada was popular among poor and young people, especially in the slums of Baghdad, where Maliki had virtually no powerbase. Muqtada had religious legitimacy, given the influence and standing of his father and family in the Iraqi Shi'ite community.

Maliki had none of that and needed a face-lift, having just been elected prime minister after many years of obscure service in the underground against Saddam Hussein. Nobody really knew him in Baghdad as he had spent most of the Saddam years as a refugee in Syria. Muqtada on the other hand needed protection from the American dragnet. The relationship was: "You protect me from US persecution, I legitimize you in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis."

The price for this marriage of convenience was having to tolerate the Sadrists in government, where they were given six important portfolios and 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament - meaning they had a paramount say in Iraqi decision-making and their militia, the Mahdi Army, would be preserved and protected.

Maliki lived up to this promise, going to great length at times - often at the expense of his own reputation - to talk the Americans out of raiding Sadr City. The George W Bush administration realized that in as much as it wanted to punish Muqtada for all the violence it blamed on him it nevertheless needed him on the safe side to prevent him from repeating violence which he had on occasions unleashed.

By bringing him into the political process and giving him money, authority and responsibility, the Americans thought they could clip his wings and pacify him, while simultaneously upholding the Maliki regime.

Trying to downplay all of that when speaking to the Italian daily, Muqtada said: "Between

myself and Abu Israa [an alternate name for Maliki] there has never been much feeling. I have always suspected that he was being maneuvered, and I have never trusted him. We have met only on a couple of occasions. At our last meeting, he first told me: 'You are the country's backbone,' and then he confessed that he was 'obliged' to combat us. Obligated, you hear me?"

Nobody believed the young cleric, suspecting this was talk targeting the Western media. Had Maliki truly not trusted Muqtada, he would not have given him government office and prevented the US from cracking down on the Mahdi Army in 2006-2007. Had Muqtada truly believed that Maliki was being "maneuvered" by the Americans, he would not have legitimized him by taking part in his government, thereby effectively legitimizing the political process of post-2003 Iraq.

The Sadrists were treating government agencies like their own back yard, investing heavily in the Ministry of Education, for example, to indoctrinate young Iraqis with Sadrism propaganda. They used the Ministry of Health to provide services, medication and hospitalization - frequently for free - to poverty-stricken Iraqis, making them loyal supporters of the Mahdi Army.

Those Shi'ites who could not find jobs were given impressive salaries in the Mahdi Army - along with a gun and a license of kill. They created death squads at night and roamed Iraq's cities, targeting traditional enemies, mainly Sunnis, with no one to hold them accountable.

The relationship soured in December 2006 when Maliki refused to argue for a timetable for US troop withdrawal during his Amman meeting with Bush. Muqtada was equally disturbed by Maliki's alliance with the Kurds and his willingness to help them annex the oil-rich Kirkuk area to Iraqi Kurdistan, as a means of endearing himself to a powerful constituency in the Iraqi street, that had excellent relations with the Americans.

Muqtada wanted to uphold Iraq's Arab identity. That was not even on the agenda of the prime minister, him being more of a Shi'ite nationalist than an Iraqi one. Muqtada was opposed to the carving up of Iraq and the creation of an autonomous district for Shi'ites in the south. He was also opposed to too much emphasis being placed on Iran. He aimed at creating a Shi'ite theocracy in Iraq, based on the Iranian model, but nevertheless wanted it to remain independent of the mullahs of Tehran.

Maliki on the other hand was cozying up to the Iranians. At one point, Muqtada withdrew his ministers from government, then froze the activity of his 30 deputies, effectively crippling the Maliki administration. He wanted Maliki to come back on hands and knees, begging him to reconsider. The premier saw this walkout as a blessing in disguise. Glad to see the end of the young rebel, he thanked him for his services and immediately snuggled up to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), headed by Muqtada's rival in the Shi'ite community, the pro-Iranian and yet pro-American cleric, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

The Arab world had been haranguing the prime minister for his ties to Muqtada, especially after the Sadrists executed Saddam in December 2006. In black ski-masks, they chanted "Muqtada! Muqtada!" at the execution scene, looking more like gangsters than Iraqi officials carrying out a legal verdict passed by the Iraqi courts.

This enflamed Sunni emotions throughout the Arab world, who blamed Maliki for creating a Frankenstein out of Muqtada - one that could no longer be controlled. Maliki snubbed Muqtada, consolidated his ties to Hakim, and opened channels with the Iraqi Accordance Front (a Sunni coalition) and the Kurds. He began to brandish himself as an Iraqi nationalist, rather than a Shi'ite one, visiting Arab heavyweights like Syria and Saudi Arabia to cement ties with Arab officialdom.

Today, the two sides engage in combat that quietly unintentionally crowns Muqtada as Shi'ite king in Iraq, greatly damaging the reputation of the prime minister. Scores of Iraqi troops have laid down their arms after one week of combat and simply refused to open fire against the Sadrists. Many have mutinied and joined the Mahdi Army. Some are saying that instead of using all this force against the Sadrists - fellow Iraqis and fellow Shi'ites - it would be wiser for Maliki to train his guns against the Americans.

The war between Maliki's troops and Muqtada's militiamen has led to the killing of nearly 300 people in Sadr City, Basra and Karbala. Maliki described the Sadrists - his former allies - as "ignorant", adding that they were "paid agents who corrupted all posts they had assumed". He added, "We spoke before about al-Qaeda, but there are among us those who are worse than al-Qaeda."

The Shi'ite divide

For many years now, the West has watched the world through the narrow parameter of Sunni vs Shi'ite. At one point from the 1970s onwards, it was Muslims vs Christians. Apparently today, the relationship stands as Shi'ite vs Shi'ite. The Muslim group can no longer be viewed as one big family - thanks to the preferences of Iran and the existence of people like Muqtada.

One year ago, the Iranians started to deal with the Sadrists in a more favorable manner. They were afraid that their traditional proxies in the Arab world, being Hezbollah and the Badr Brigade of the SIIC, were facing an uncertain future. Hezbollah was locked into a vicious feud within the Lebanese political system, and United Nations forces on the border prevented it from carrying out its traditional resistance role against the Israelis.

There was much speculation that Hezbollah might depart the scene - at least as an effective player - due to domestic restrictions, an upcoming war with Israel, or a new Lebanese civil war. On the other hand, the Badr Brigade was simply unable - despite all the money pouring into it from Tehran - to compete with the Sadrist network.

Muqtada had studied the Hezbollah model in Lebanon and created a system of charity and patronage among ordinary Shi'ites that made Hakim's men look like amateurs. He generously dished out money, sent personal gifts to Shi'ites in need, protected them from harm's way, sent them to school, and found jobs for all able young men.

Hakim too had money, plenty of it, but it was used to enrich himself and his limited circle of supporters, never the grassroots level (although commanders of the Badr Brigade are well paid). Muqtada became king in districts such as the southern city of Basra and Sadr City, imposing his

version of Islam on everybody and everything, with much support from the local population.

He enforced Islamic dress code, banned the sale of alcohol, and banked on "Iraqism" rather than "Shi'itism". He trashed Badr for being "not Iraqi enough". He trumpeted how during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s they had fought with the Iranian army against fellow Iraqis, claiming they were more bonded by Shi'ite blood than Iraqi nationalism.

In as much as this annoyed the Iranians, they nevertheless had little means of keeping him quiet. Writing him off the political scene would be political suicide, since he was too powerful - and well protected - to be killed. Assassinating him would only make a martyr out of him. With him gone, and the Badr Brigade in uncertain waters, it was feared that their political and military arm in the Arab world would be amputated.

Hakim was recently diagnosed with cancer - making things all the more difficult - and his son Ammar would be unable to rule the SIIC after him, especially when challenged by somebody like Muqtada. Therefore, just like the Americans had reasoned before them, the Iranians decided to deal with Muqtada - although this might upset Hakim - with the aim of bringing him under their wing.

The Iranians began investing in the Mahdi Army - shyly at first - with the hope of creating either another Badr Brigade or another Hezbollah. As the situation intensified in Lebanon, they increased their efforts, supplying him with money, arms and orders. Muqtada froze activity of the Mahdi Army with the aim of revamping it and dismissing all undisciplined members.

One theory says that Imad Mughniya, the Hezbollah commander who was assassinated in Damascus in February, had been charged by Iran to restructure the Mahdi Army. He had been one of the architects of Hezbollah in 1982 and was asked to do the same to professionalize the Sadrists. While all of this was being done, Muqtada was asked to return to his religious studies so he could rise to the rank of ayatollah and therefore gain a much stronger role in Shi'ite domestics. He would then be authorized to issue religious decrees and answer religious questions related to politics - just like Hakim.

Then suddenly something went wrong, and last week Maliki (who is now equally close to the Iranians) went to war against the Sadrists. Some claim that an under-the-table deal was hammered out in Baghdad in March between the Americans, Maliki and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

The Iranian leader would let the Americans have their way - and crush the Sadrists - in exchange for softening pressure on the Iranian regime. In return, Ahmadinejad would help them bring better security to Iraq through a variety of methods stemming from Iranian cooperation.

This would please the Americans, Maliki and the Iranians, who in exchange for Muqtada's head would enter a new relationship with the Americans. This might explain why the only people who have been lobbying heavily with Maliki - to stop the war on Muqtada - have been those opposed to Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs, mainly Sunni tribes, ex-prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari (who refused sanctuary in Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war) and the Sunni speaker of parliament,

Mahmud Mashadani.

Other Shi'ite heavyweights in the Arab world, like Hasan Nasrallah of Hezbollah and Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri, who are both very close to Iran, have been relatively silent over the ordeal. Syria, which is a traditional friend of Iran and has good relations with Muqtada, has also refused to comment. Are all Shi'ites two sides of the same coin, or has this long-held belief been shattered by the war - and mutiny - in Basra?

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD05Ak02.html

NEW ZAWAHIRI TAPE SUGGESTS AL QAEDA PR SHIFT

The latest audio message from No. 2 Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri signals growing doubt among supporters, experts say.

By Arthur Bright
April 04, 2008

The latest public message released by No. 2 Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri may signal a change in public-relations moves by the terrorist group in the face of growing doubt about its tactics among Muslim supporters, experts say.

Reuters reports that in an audiotape released Wednesday, Mr. Zawahiri responded to unusually pointed questions submitted earlier by users of Al Qaeda-linked online forums. The fact that Zawahiri answered the forum posts, which challenged Al Qaeda's policies on attacks against innocents, the United Nations, and Iran, suggests that dissent among its supporters may be forcing Al Qaeda to change tactics, according to an anonymous US counterintelligence official.

The US official, interpreting the questions and the answers given by Ayman al-Zawahiri, said: "They've been taken to the online woodshed on a number of things."

"Some of the questioners are raising tough issues, such as the legitimacy of murdering innocent civilians and the effectiveness of Al Qaeda's overall strategy," the US official, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters. "Since Al Qaeda chose what questions to address, it suggests Al Qaeda's tactics have raised serious concerns – even among potential sympathizers – and that the group's leadership recognizes that it has some serious explaining to do," he said.

ABC News reports that the medium by which Zawahiri's latest message was released also suggests a tactical change.

One terrorism expert who studies jihadist websites says the audio message may signal a shift in Al Qaeda's media operations. The expert cites the fact that both Zawahiri's message and top Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's last address were both released without video. The expert also says the recent files uploaded to jihadist websites have appeared in Arabic, rather than their usual format in English.

The Daily Telegraph of London reports that in the tape – which bore the logo of Al Qaeda's media arm, Al Sahab – Zawahiri denied that the terrorist group targeted innocents in its operations.

"We haven't killed the innocents, not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, nor in Algeria, nor anywhere else," he said, according to the transcript, in response to the question: "Excuse me, Zawahiri, but who is it who is killing with Your Excellency's blessing the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco, and Algeria?"

"If there is any innocent who was killed in the Mujahideen's operations, then it was either an unintentional error or out of necessity," Zawahiri added, saying that it was Al Qaeda's enemies who killed the innocent, "intentionally [taking] up positions in the midst of the Muslims for them to be human shields for him."

Agence France-Presse reports that Zawahiri said that 18 United Nations staff members who were killed in December suicide attacks in Morocco were not innocents, however, and accused the UN of double standards.

[The UN] "is the one which considers Chechnya an inseparable part of Crusader Russia, and considers Ceuta and Melilla inseparable parts of Crusader Spain," he said, referring to two Spanish enclaves in North Africa claimed by Morocco. The UN had agreed to the presence of outsiders, dubbed "Crusaders" by Zawahiri, in Afghanistan and Iraq and had approved the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. Yet "it doesn't recognize that right for Chechnya, nor for all the Muslim Caucasus, nor for Kashmir, nor for Ceuta and Melilla, nor for Bosnia", he said.

The **BBC** writes that Zawahiri also denied reports that Mr. bin Laden is in poor health. "The ill-intentioned always try to circulate false reports about him being sick," he said.

Noah Shachtman, a national security blogger for **Wired.com**, writes that Zawahiri addressed Al Qaeda's hostile stance toward Iran, saying that a protracted struggle between Iran and the US would be "in the interest" of the terrorist group, and that Al Qaeda would strike against the winning party.

Al Qaeda, a Sunni organization, has long regarded Iran, a Shiite nation, as an enemy. Mr. Shachtman emphasizes a particular passage of the Zawahiri transcript (translated by **IntelCenter**):

The dispute between America and Iran is a real dispute based on the struggle over areas of influence, and the possibility of America striking Iran is a real possibility. As for what might happen in the region, I can only say that major changes will occur in the region, and the situation will be in the interest of the Mujahideen if the war saps both of them.

If, however, one of them emerges victorious, its influence will intensify and fierce battles will begin between it and the Mujahideen, except that the Jihadi awakening currently

under way and the degeneration state of affairs of the invaders in Afghanistan and Iraq will make it impossible for Iran or America to become the sole decision-maker in the region.


The questions Zawahiri answered were submitted between December and January on Islamist militant web sites at the prompting of Al Sahab, writes **The Associated Press**.

AP notes that the questioners "appeared to be as much in the dark about the terror network's operations and intentions as Western analysts and intelligence agencies," and "appeared uncertain whether Al Qaeda's central leadership directly controls the multiple, small militant groups around the Middle East that work in its name, or whether those groups operate on their own."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0404/p99s01-duts.html>

Gizmag

Splinternet debuts Dirty Bomb detector network



April 2, 2008. The [United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission](#) states that while a “Dirty Bomb” would not release enough radiation to kill people or cause severe illness, prompt detection of the type of radioactive material used is critical for protective measures. To this end, new unattended detection systems known as DefenTect, GammaTect and GammaTect Plus are being introduced by [Splinternet Holdings](#) at the International Security Conference and Exposition ISC West Show in Las Vegas, from April 2 – 4.

A Dirty Bomb is an explosive device that includes radioactive materials, which can be found at hospitals, research facilities, and construction sites. The DefenTect system manages a network of solid state GammaTect radiation sensors that send real-time notifications to command centers as soon as the presence of threat-level gamma rays is detected. Customers with IP networks can add radiation detection capability, and administrators can designate alerts to be automatically sent to cell phones, pagers, PDAs, or other devices.

The GammaTect sensors detect gamma radiation at 2mR/hr in less than one second, the equivalent of a dirty bomb made with 60 curies of Cesium-137 at a distance of 83.82 meters. The sensors are small enough to be hidden under ceiling tiles or in walls, and each individual sensor's detection threshold can be configured and reset using a web browser from any part of the globe.

The sensors send notifications of 'all clear,' 'no answer,' or 'alert' every few seconds to a guard station monitor.

The scintillator-based GammaTect Plus is a more sophisticated gamma sensor than GammaTect. By providing real-time isotope identification, it can be set to ignore medical or other benign environmental isotopes if threat-level violations occur. This feature also allows them to subtract predictive background radiation in high radiation areas, and the “patient mode” can account for medical treatments involving radiation. The sensors include digital cameras that automatically document events of importance.

<http://www.gizmag.com/splinternet-debuts-dirty-bomb-detector-isc-west/9093/>

The JAMESTOWN

F O U N D A T I O N

Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban's Spring Offensive



04/03/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from *Terrorism Monitor*, April 3) - Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Bradar Muhammad Akhand announced “a new series of operations” under the code name “Operation Ebrat” (Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban’s spring offensive is “aimed at giving the enemy a lesson through directing powerful strikes at it, which it can never expect, until it is forced to end the occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the occupier soldiers... We will add to the tactics and experiences of the past years new types of operations. The operations will also

be expanded to cover all locations of the country, in order for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere” (*Sawt al-Jihad*, March 28). There are indications that a main target of the offensive will be the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass. Citing an improvement in the skills and capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the announcement as “a psychological campaign and not a reality which could be implemented on the ground” (*AFP*, March 25). In reality the situation along the border is extremely precarious and threatens the ability of Coalition forces to operate within Afghanistan.

Joint Intelligence Centers on the Border

The first in a planned series of six joint intelligence centers along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border was opened at the Afghanistan border town of Torkham on March 29. When the plan is fully implemented there will be three such centers on each side of the border at a cost of \$3 million each. There are high hopes for the centers, which have been described by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan as “the cornerstone upon which future cooperative efforts will grow” (*Daily Times* [Lahore], March 30). According to U.S. Brigadier General Joe Votel, “The macro view is to disrupt insurgents from going back and forth, going into Afghanistan and back into Pakistan, too. This is not going to instantly stop the infiltration problem, but it’s a good step forward” (*Daily Times*, March 30).

The centers are designed to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is an outgrowth of the earlier Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) established in Kabul in January 2007. This center, comprising 12 ISAF, six Afghan and six Pakistani intelligence officers, was initiated by the Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group, a subcommittee of the Tripartite Plenary Commission of military commanders that meets on a

bimonthly basis (*American Forces Press Service*, January 30, 2007). The JIOC is designed to facilitate intelligence sharing, joint operations planning and an exchange of information on improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The working languages are English, Dari and Pashto, aided by a number of translators.

The new border centers will each be manned by 15 to 20 intelligence agents. One of the main innovations is the ability to view real-time video feeds from U.S. surveillance aircraft. The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, described the centers as “a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination” (*The News* [Karachi], March 29). Despite such glowing descriptions, there remains one hitch—Pakistan’s military has yet to make a full commitment to the project. According to Major General Athar Abbas, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, a military information organization, “At this time this proposal is being analyzed and evaluated by the concerned officials. But Pakistan has not yet come to a decision on this matter” (*The News*, March 30). General Abbas and other officials have declined to discuss Pakistan’s reservations or even to commit to a deadline for a decision. It is possible that the failure to sign on as full partners in the project may have something to do with the stated intention of Pakistan’s new prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, to pursue a greater focus on negotiation than military action in dealing with the Taliban and other frontier militants. There may also be reservations on the part of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to share intelligence on their clients within the Taliban.

Actual intelligence cooperation along the border is hampered by a number of factors, not least of which is a basic inability to agree on exactly where the border lies. In the past, Pakistan has responded to complaints from Afghanistan of Taliban fighters infiltrating across the border by threatening to fence or even mine the frontier, a shocking proposal to the Pashtun clans that straddle the artificial divide. Afghanistan’s long-standing policy is simply to refuse recognition of the colonial-era Durand Line, which it claims was forced on it by British imperialists in 1893. Pakistan accepts the Durand Line, but the two nations are frequently unable to agree on exactly where the 1,500-mile line is drawn.

U.S. Intervention in the Frontier Region?

The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to increase security and diminish the influence of the Taliban in the frontier regions of Pakistan, including a massive economic aid program, counter-insurgency training for the Frontier Corps and enhancement of the CIA’s monitoring and surveillance abilities in the area (*Dawn* [Karachi], February 26). The CIA already gathers information on the region from over-flights of its unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft, which can also deliver precisely targeted missiles on suspected Taliban safe-houses. Complicating efforts to increase security in the border region is a belief within Pakistan that the United States is preparing to intervene militarily in Pakistan’s frontier region (*The Nation* [Islamabad], March 24).

In a March 30 interview, CIA Director Michael Hayden declared that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region would be the most probable source for new terrorist attacks on the United States: “If there is another terrorist attack, it will originate there.” The CIA chief warned that the situation along the border “presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to

the West in general and to the United States in particular.” Hayden also suggested that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were present in the Pakistan tribal frontier, where they were training “operatives who look Western” (*NBC*, March 30; *Dawn*, March 31).

A spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry responded angrily to the CIA director’s comments, stating that if the United States has information about the whereabouts of the al-Qaeda leadership, it should share it with Pakistan so it can take action. “Such a statement does not help trace alleged hideouts... Terrorists have threatened Pakistan and targeted our people. We are, therefore, combating terrorism in our own interest” (*Daily Times*, April 3). Syed Munawar Hasan, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, suggested that Hayden’s statements were “white lies,” similar to Washington’s allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Munawar urged the new government to stand fast in the face of what he described as U.S. threats to invade Pakistan despite the establishment of a democratic government (*The News*, April 2). The provincial assembly of the North-West Frontier Province issued a unanimous condemnation of Hayden’s remarks (*The Post* [Lahore], April 2; *Geo TV News*, April 1).

The Torkham Gate

The location of the first joint intelligence center at Torkham reflects the strategic importance of this border town at the Afghanistan end of the fabled Khyber Pass. It is the main gateway for supplies to U.S. and ISAF forces within Afghanistan and is believed to be one of the main targets for the forthcoming Taliban spring offensive (*The Nation*, April 2). Linking Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province and Pakistan’s Khyber Agency, Torkham is traditionally the busiest commercial border post between the two countries. A new round of attacks on Torkham may have already begun—as many as 40 oil tankers destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed in a series of explosions in a Torkham parking lot on March 20 (*Dawn*, March 24). There were 70 to 100 tankers awaiting clearance to cross into Afghanistan at the time.

Only a day before the attack on the tankers, an effort by a U.S. Army colonel to expedite border clearances for military transports at Torkham failed when the chief Pakistani customs official refused to meet with her (*Daily Times*, March 19). Vehicles typically wait in parking lots at Torkham for up to 20 days awaiting clearance to proceed. Part of the problem is due to delays in permits faxed to Torkham from the U.S. base in Bagram—until these are received the vehicles are forbidden to cross into Afghanistan (*Daily Times*, March 27). There are also accusations that some tanker operators may be selling their fuel along the road in Pakistan before deliberately torching their vehicles at Torkham to claim the insurance on the missing load.

Torkham has also become a nearly unregulated transit point for legal and illegal migrants since the demolition of the border gate by the National Highway Authority of Pakistan two years ago. A series of meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials—attended as well by NATO officials—have been unable to agree on the design and other details of a replacement gate. Smuggling and illegal crossings have spun out of control while tensions between the respective border authorities nearly erupted into open fighting in September 2006 (*Daily Times*, April 2).

Conclusion

Pakistan's reluctance to make a full commitment to intelligence sharing raises a number of difficult questions: Is the ISI still cooperating or even aiding the Afghan Taliban? Do the military and the intelligence services operate outside of political control? Is it possible to collaborate with the Taliban and not the Taliban's allies, al-Qaeda? Why do the better-armed and -trained regular forces frequently relinquish their security role in the frontier regions to the poorly-equipped Pashtun Frontier Corps?

After a meeting on security and terrorism issues with Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani on April 3, a spokesman for Prime Minister Gillani stated that the prime minister was formulating a comprehensive terrorism strategy "based on political engagement, economic development and backed by a credible military element" (*Daily Times*, April 3). Many within the new government believe that Musharraf's aggressive military approach to the frontier crisis is responsible for the recent rash of suicide bombings and other attacks that have taken scores of lives across the country.

In the meantime there is a dangerous lack of coordination on border issues in which all parties bear responsibility. There is every indication that the Taliban have identified Torkham as a crucial weak point in the supply and logistics system that maintains the international military presence in Afghanistan. The failure to share intelligence combined with bureaucratic delays and infighting along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier threatens the entire Coalition mission in Afghanistan.

Dr. Andrew McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=314



Terrorism: Last days of suicide bomber revealed by ex-al-Qaeda members



Algiers, 4 April (AKI) - Former members of the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb have revealed the details of the last days of a suicide bomber in a report published in the Algerian newspaper *Ech-Chourouk*.

"Once chosen for the suicide attack, the suicide bomber is isolated by the other mujahadeen and is kept in the dark about the plans for the attack until a few minutes before its execution," said the report.

The newspaper put together the testimonies of several ex-terrorists from the Algeria based al-Qaeda group and described in detail the way in which a suicide bomber is selected and how the bomber spends the last few days of his or her life.

"About three weeks before they go into action, they call their families to say goodbye," it said.

"They are then excluded from their original terror cell and join a new group composed only of aspiring suicide bombers who know that they will die soon for the cause of Jihad."

The suicide bombers do not know anything about the attack until a few minutes before they have to carry it out. In this way, they do not have the chance to change their minds or to go to the police.

Often it's the new recruits in the al-Qaeda Organisation of the Islamic Maghreb are chosen to be suicide bombers.

The only exception was the suicide attacker involved in the attack on the United Nations office in Algiers on 11 December 2007. Rabbah Bishla was reportedly part of the armed group for about 10 years.

"Before choosing a new suicide bomber in a group, the head of the cell, the one responsible for training and the head of the cell with the aspiring suicide bombers all meet to agree on a candidate," said the report.

"The group of aspiring suicide bombers never exceeds 15 people and those who enter only know that they will be carrying out an attack without any other explanations."

"To ensure that the aspiring suicide bombers are strong in their convictions, the head of the group of 15 people tells them of the possibility of participating in a major operation, an attack on a large scale, and especially the use of the weapon of revenge."

"In fact every potential suicide bomber is told that his or her attack is necessary to avenge the death or arrested of other members of the group or members of al-Qaeda, in order to motivate them morally," said the *Ech-Chourouk* report.

"Often the aspiring suicide bomber is forced to volunteer for the job because if he or she does not do so, it could raise doubts in their leaders who may see this as an element of insecurity, which makes betrayal always possible."

On Friday another Algerian newspaper *Ennahar*, published a report on killings carried out within al-Qaeda by the leaders of a group which was against the militants who expressed doubts about the strategy of the Jihadi organisation or there were fears that they could hand them over to the Algerian authorities.

Often the youngest are chosen to be suicide bombers and especially those who volunteer to do the job.

The only exception yet again is Rabah Bishla, who was chosen because he was 60 years old and was the oldest suicide bomber in the history of al-Qaeda, according to the report.

The leader of the group, Abu Musab Abdel Wudud, wanted him to carry out that operation as a response to accusations made in the Algerian press that the group only sent minors to carry out such attacks.

"Before entering in action, the aspiring suicide bomber is brought to a safe place, far from his cell and possibly close to the target that he has strike," explained a former member of the group.

"Within the first few days, the bomber can call his family, given that most of the suicide bombers are very young people who have abandoned their homes to join the terrorists without informing their parents."

This is what was done by an attacker from Algerian that went by the name Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who carried out an attack last year on a barracks in the area of Dallas which is in the Algerian province of Boumerdes. He was believed to be the youngest suicide attacker in the history of the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb.

"After the phone call, the suicide attacker then only has contact with the head of his cell who trains the suicide bomber, giving the bomber a long speech on the importance of martyrdom in Islam and for some days the bomber will only watch videos and listened to audio recordings of the leaders of al-Qaeda which describe the rewards and compensation that the martyrs will then be

able to receive in paradise."

The bomber is reportedly only informed about the target the night before the attack and in some cases is accompanied to the location a few hours before in order to get to know what the attack will take place and to monitor the situation.

According to the former members of the terror group, this was the case for Abdullah al-Shiaani, the one who carried out the attack in the Lakhdariya. He was in the area with other terrorists before carrying out the attack.

"The last act before carrying out the action is to record the video testament," said the report.

"The aspiring suicide bomber must wear military attire, carry a Kalashnikov rifle [perhaps the first time that the bomber will use one as often they are so young that many have not had the time to even have any military training], in order read out his last statement in front of a camera."

"The morning of the attack, the bomber wakes at dawn for his last prayer in which he was to recite a special address dedicated to martyrs, meet the emir of the al-Qaeda cell who will be asked to inform his family after his death and then he will head directly to his appointment with death."

According to the Algerian newspaper, the aspiring suicide bombers usually drink water, known as the water or martyrs, before they carry out their attack.

The police in Algeria however have not excluded the possibility that the water is drugged in order to ensure that the suicide bomber does not change his mind before the attack.

<http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2039578925>



The Next Generation of Terror

By Marc Sageman, March/April 2008

The world's most dangerous jihadists no longer answer to al Qaeda. The terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited wannabes who find purpose in terror and comrades on the Web. This new generation is even more frightening and unpredictable than its predecessors, but its evolution just may reveal the key to its demise.



Europe's worst attack: Spanish prosecutors' efforts to convict the accused Madrid bombers were hampered by the group's lack of structure.
David S. Holloway/Getty Images

When British police broke down Younis Tsouli's door in October 2005 in a leafy west London neighborhood, they suspected the 22-year-old college student, the son of a Moroccan diplomat, of little more than having traded e-mails with men planning a bombing in Bosnia. It was only after they began examining the hard drive on Tsouli's computer that they realized they had stumbled upon one of the most infamous—

and unlikely—cyberjihadists in the world.

Tsouli's online username, as they discovered, was Irhabi007 ("Terrorist007" in Arabic). It was a moniker well known to international counterterrorism officials. Since 2004, this young man, with no history of radical activity, had become one of the world's most influential propagandists in jihadi chatrooms. It had been the online images of the war in Iraq that first radicalized him. He began spending his days creating and hacking dozens of Web sites in order to upload videos of beheadings and suicide bombings in Iraq and post links to the texts of bomb-making manuals. From his bedroom in London, he eventually became a crucial global organizer of online terrorist networks, guiding others to jihadist sites where they could learn their deadly craft. Ultimately, he attracted the attention of the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. When British police discovered this young IT student in his London flat, he was serving as Zarqawi's public relations mouthpiece on the Web.

Tsouli's journey from computer geek to radical jihadist is representative of the wider evolution of Islamist terrorist networks today. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the threat confronting the West has changed dramatically, but most governments still imagine their foe in the mold of the old al Qaeda. The enemy today is not a product of poverty, ignorance, or religious brainwashing. The individuals we should fear most haven't been trained in terrorist camps, and they don't answer to Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. They often do not even adhere to the most austere and dogmatic tenets of radical Islam. Instead, the new generation of terrorists consists of homegrown wannabes—self-recruited, without leadership, and globally connected through the Internet. They are young people seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging in their lives. And their lack of structure and organizing principles makes them even more terrifying and volatile than their terrorist forebears.

THE NEW FACE OF TERROR

The five years between Osama bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war against the United States from his safe haven in Afghanistan to the attacks of 9/11 were the "golden age" of what could be called al Qaeda Central. Those days are long over, but the social movement they inspired is as strong and dangerous as ever. The structure has simply evolved over time.

Today's new generation of terrorists constitutes the third wave of radicals stirred to battle by the ideology of global jihad. The first wave to join al Qaeda was Afghan Arabs who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. They were, contrary to popular belief, largely well educated and from solidly middle-class backgrounds. They were also mature, often about 30 years old when they took up arms. Their remnants still form the backbone of al Qaeda's leadership today, but there are at most a few dozen of them left, hiding in the frontier territories of northwest Pakistan.

The second wave that followed consisted mostly of elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend universities. The separation from family, friends, and culture led many to feel homesick and marginalized, sentiments that hardened into the seeds of their radicalization. It was this generation of young men who traveled to al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. They were incorporated into al Qaeda Central, and today there are at most about 100 of them left, also in hiding in northwest Pakistan.

The new, third wave is unlike its predecessors. It consists mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the movement and the men they hail as heroes. But it is nearly impossible for them to link up with al Qaeda Central, which was forced underground after 9/11. Instead, they form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. Theirs is a scattered, decentralized social structure—a leaderless jihad.

Take the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, perhaps the most infamous member of a network of aspiring jihadists that Dutch authorities dubbed the "Hofstad Netwerk," in 2004.

Bouyeri, then a 26-year-old formerly secular social worker born to Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam, could also trace his radicalization to outrage over the Iraq war. He became influential among a loosely connected group of about 100 young Dutch Muslims, most of whom were in their late teens and born in the Netherlands. The network informally coalesced around three or four active participants, some of whom had acquired a local reputation for trying (and failing) to fight the jihad abroad. Some of the initial meetings were at demonstrations for international Muslim causes, others at radical mosques, but mostly they met in Internet chatrooms. Other popular meeting spots included Internet cafes or the few apartments of the older members, as most of the network still lived with their parents. The group had no clear leader and no connection to established terrorist networks abroad.

On Nov. 2, 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri brutally murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh on an Amsterdam street, nearly sawing off van Gogh's head and pinning a five-page note threatening the enemies of Islam to his victim's chest. Bouyeri had been enraged by van Gogh's short film, *Submission*, about Islam's treatment of women and domestic violence, and written by former Dutch parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali. After killing van Gogh, Bouyeri calmly waited for the police in the hope that he would die in the gunfight that he expected would follow. He was only wounded and, less than a year later, sentenced to life in prison. A series of raids against other members of the network uncovered evidence of plans to bomb the Dutch parliament, a nuclear power plant, and Amsterdam's airport, as well as assassination plots against prominent Dutch politicians.

The fluidity of the Hofstad Network has created problems for Dutch prosecutors. The first few trials succeeded in convicting some members as belonging to a terrorist organization because they met regularly. But at later trials, when defendants faced more serious charges, the prosecutors' cases began to break down. Some guilty verdicts have even been subsequently overturned. In January, a Dutch appeals court threw out the convictions of seven men accused of belonging to the Hofstad Network because "no structured cooperation [had] been established." It is difficult to convict suspects who rarely meet face to face and whose cause has no formal organization.

The perpetrators of the Madrid bombings in March 2004 are another example of the self-recruited leaderless jihad. They were an unlikely network of young immigrants who came together in haphazard ways. Some had been lifelong friends from their barrio in Tetouan, Morocco, and eventually came to run one of the most successful drug networks in Madrid, selling hashish and ecstasy. Their informal leader, Jamal Ahmidan, a 33-year-old high school dropout who liked to chase women, wavered between pointless criminality and redemptive religion. When he was released from a Moroccan jail in 2003 after serving three years for an alleged homicide, he became increasingly obsessed with the war in Iraq. He linked up with Tunisian-born Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhret, who had moved to Madrid to get his doctorate in economics. They were part of a loose network of foreign Muslims in Spain who spent time together after soccer games and mosque prayers. They later masterminded the Madrid bombings, the deadliest Islamist terror attack on European soil. As Spanish authorities closed in on their hideout several weeks after the bombings, Fakhret, Ahmidan, and several accomplices blew themselves up as the police moved in.

Try as they may, Spanish authorities have never found any direct connection between the Madrid bombers and international al Qaeda networks. The 2007 trials of collaborators concluded that the bombings were inspired by al Qaeda, but not directed by it.

Evidence of hopeful young jihadists is not limited to Western Europe. In June 2006, Canadian security forces conducted a series of raids against two clusters of young people in and around Toronto. The youths they apprehended were mostly second-generation Canadians in their late teens or early 20s and from secular, middle-class households. They were accused of planning large-scale terrorist attacks in Toronto and Ottawa, and when they were arrested, they had already purchased vast quantities of bomb-making materials. The core members of the group were close friends from their early high school years, when they had formed a “Religious Awareness Club,” which met during lunch hours at school. They also created an online forum where they could share their views on life, religion, and politics. Eventually, a number of the young men and women intermarried while still in their teens.

The group expanded their network when they moved to other parts of the greater Toronto area, attending radical mosques and meeting like-minded young people. They also reached out in international chatrooms, eventually linking up with Irhabi007 prior to his arrest. Through his forum, they were directed to Web sites providing them with information on how to build bombs. Other militants in Bosnia, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and even Atlanta, Georgia, also virtually connected through this forum and actively planned attacks. Again, there is no evidence that any of the core Toronto plotters were ever in contact with al Qaeda; the plot was completely homegrown.

What makes these examples of the next generation of terrorists so frightening is the ease with which marginalized youths are able to translate their frustrations into acts of terrorism, often on the back of professed solidarity with terrorists halfway around the world whom they have never met. They seek to belong to a movement larger than themselves, and their violent actions and plans are hatched locally, with advice from others on the Web. Their mode of communication also suggests that they will increasingly evade detection. Without links to known terrorists, this new generation is more difficult to discover through traditional intelligence gathering. Of course, their lack of training and experience could limit their effectiveness. But that’s cold comfort for their victims.

WHY THEY FIGHT

Any strategy to fight these terrorists must be based on an understanding of why they believe what they believe. In other words, what transforms ordinary people into fanatics who use violence for political ends? What leads them to consider themselves special, part of a small vanguard trying to build their version of an Islamist utopia?

The explanation for their behavior is found not in how they think, but rather in how they feel. One of the most common refrains among Islamist radicals is their sense of moral outrage. Before 2003, the most significant source of these feelings were the killings of Muslims in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it was the fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir. Then came the second Palestinian intifada beginning in 2000. And since 2003, it has been all about the war in Iraq, which has become the focal point of global moral outrage for Muslims all over the world. Along with the humiliations of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, Iraq is monopolizing today's conversations about Islam and the West. On a more local level, governments that appear overly pro-American cause radicals to feel they are the victims of a larger anti-Muslim conspiracy, bridging the perceived local and global attacks against them.

In order for this moral outrage to translate into extremism, the frustrations must be interpreted in a particular way: The violations are deemed part of a unified Western strategy, namely a "war against Islam." That deliberately vague worldview, however, is just a sound bite. The new terrorists are not Islamic scholars. Jihadists volunteering for Iraq are interested not in theological debates but in living out their heroic fantasies.

How various individuals interpret this vision of a "war against Islam" differs from country to country, and it is a major reason why homegrown terrorism within the United States is far less likely than it is in Europe. To a degree, the belief that the United States is a melting pot protects the country from homegrown attacks. Whether or not the United States is a land of opportunity, the important point is that people believe it to be. A recent poll found that 71 percent of Muslim Americans believe in the "American Dream," more than the American public as a whole (64 percent). This is not the case in Europe, where national myths are based on degrees of "Britishness," "Frenchness," or "Germanness." This excludes non-European Muslim immigrants from truly feeling as if they belong.

Feeling marginalized is, of course, no simple springboard to violence. Many people feel they don't belong but don't aspire to wage violent jihad. What transforms a very small number to become terrorists is mobilization by networks. Until a few years ago, these networks were face-to-face groups. They included local gangs of young immigrants, members of student associations, and study groups at radical mosques. These cliques of friends became radicalized together. The group acted as an echo chamber, amplifying grievances, intensifying bonds to each other, and breeding values that rejected those of their host societies. These natural group dynamics resulted in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation, transforming a few young Muslims into dedicated terrorists willing to follow the model of their heroes and sacrifice themselves for comrades and cause. Their turn to violence was a collective decision, rather than an individual one.

During the past two or three years, however, face-to-face radicalization has been replaced by online radicalization. The same support and validation that young people used to derive from their offline peer groups are now found in online forums, which promote the image of the terrorist hero, link users to the online social movement, give them guidance, and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtual marketplaces for

extremist ideas, have become the “invisible hand” that organizes terrorist activities worldwide. The true leader of this violent social movement is the collective discourse on half a dozen influential forums. They are transforming the terrorist movement, attracting ever younger members and now women, who can participate in the discussions.

At present, al Qaeda Central cannot impose discipline on these third-wave wannabes, mostly because it does not know who they are. Without this command and control, each disconnected network acts according to its own understanding and capability, but their collective actions do not amount to any unified long-term goal or strategy. These separate groups cannot coalesce into a physical movement, leaving them condemned to remain leaderless, an online aspiration. Such traits make them particularly volatile and difficult to detect, but they also offer a tantalizing strategy for those who wish to defeat these dangerous individuals: The very seeds of the movement’s demise are within the movement itself.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END?

There has been talk of an al Qaeda resurgence, but the truth is that most of the hard-core members of the first and second waves have been killed or captured. The survival of the social movement they inspired relies on the continued inflow of new members. But this movement is vulnerable to whatever may diminish its appeal among the young. Its allure thrives only at the abstract fantasy level. The few times its aspirations have been translated into reality—the Taliban in Afghanistan, parts of Algeria during its civil war, and more recently in Iraq’s Anbar Province—were particularly repulsive to most Muslims.

What’s more, a leaderless social movement is permanently at the mercy of its participants. As each generation attempts to define itself in contrast to its predecessor, what appeals to the present generation of young would-be radicals may not appeal to the next. A major source of the present appeal is the anger and moral outrage provoked by the invasion of Iraq. As the Western footprint there fades, so will the appeal of fighting it. And new hotheads in the movement will always push the envelope to make a name for themselves and cause ever escalating atrocities. The magnitude of these horrors will, in turn, likely alienate potential recruits.

The U.S. strategy to counter this terrorist threat continues to be frozen by the horrors of 9/11. It relies more on wishful thinking than on a deep understanding of the enemy. The pursuit of “high-value targets” who were directly involved in the 9/11 operation more than six years ago was an appropriate first step to bring the perpetrators to justice. And the United States has been largely successful in degrading the capability of al Qaeda Central.

But this strategy is not only useless against the leaderless jihad; it is precisely what will help the movement flourish. Radical Islamist terrorism will never disappear because the West defeats it. Instead, it will most likely disappear for internal reasons—if the United States has the sense to allow it to continue on its course and fade away. The main threat

to radical Islamist terrorism is the fact that its appeal is self-limiting. The key is to accelerate this process of internal decay. This need not be a long war, unless American policy makes it so.

Terrorist acts must be stripped of glory and reduced to common criminality. Most aspiring terrorists want nothing more than to be elevated to the status of an FBI Most Wanted poster. “[I am] one of the most wanted terrorists on the Internet,” Younis Tsouli boasted online a few months before his arrest in 2005. “I have the Feds and the CIA, both would love to catch me. I have MI6 on my back.” His ego fed off the respect such bragging brought him in the eyes of other chatroom participants. Any policy or recognition that puts such people on a pedestal only makes them heroes in each other’s eyes—and encourages others to follow their example. These young men aspire to nothing more glorious than to fight uniformed soldiers of the sole remaining superpower. That is why the struggle against these terrorists must be demilitarized and turned over to collaborative law enforcement. The military role should be limited to denying terrorists a sanctuary.

It is equally crucial not to place terrorists who are arrested or killed in the limelight. The temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another “major victory” in the war on terror must be resisted, for it only transforms terrorist criminals into jihadist heroes. The United States underestimates the value of prosecutions, which often can be enormously demoralizing to radical groups. There is no glory in being taken to prison in handcuffs. No jihadi Web site publishes such pictures. Arrested terrorists fade into oblivion; martyrs live on in popular memory.

This is very much a battle for young Muslims’ hearts and minds. Any appearance of persecution for short-term tactical gains will be a strategic defeat on this battlefield. The point is to regain the international moral high ground, which served the United States and its allies so well during the Cold War. With the advent of the Internet, there has been a gradual shift to online networks, where young Muslims share their hopes, dreams, and grievances. That offers an opportunity to encourage voices that reject violence.

It is necessary to reframe the entire debate, from imagined glory to very real horror. Young people must learn that terrorism is about death and destruction, not fame. The voices of the victims must be heard over the bragging and posturing that go on in the online jihadist forums. Only then will the leaderless jihad expire, poisoned by its own toxic message.

Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA case officer, is author of *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4168



The Three Revolutions

By Henry Kissinger, April 7, 2008

The long-predicted national debate about national security policy has yet to occur. Essentially tactical issues have overwhelmed the most important challenge a new administration will confront: how to distill a new international order from three simultaneous revolutions occurring around the globe: (a) the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; (b) the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Conventional wisdom holds that disenchantment with President Bush's alleged unilateralism is at the heart of European-American disagreements. But it will become apparent soon after the change of administrations that the principal difference between the two sides of the Atlantic is that America is still a traditional nation-state whose people respond to calls for sacrifices on behalf of a much wider definition of the national interest than Europe's definition.

The nations of Europe, having been drained by two world wars, have agreed to transfer significant aspects of their sovereignties to the European Union. Political loyalties associated with the nation-state have proved not to be automatically transferable, however. Europe is in a transition between its past, which it seeks to overcome, and a future it has not yet reached.

In the process, the nature of the European state has been transformed. With nations no longer defining themselves by a distinct future and with the cohesion of the European Union as yet untested, the capacity of most European governments to ask their people for sacrifices has diminished dramatically. The states with the longest continuous histories, such as Britain and France, have been most willing to assume international military responsibilities.

The disagreement over the use of NATO forces in Afghanistan is a case in point. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Council, acting without any request by the United States, invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty, calling for mutual assistance. But when NATO set about to assume military responsibilities, domestic constraints obliged many of the allies to limit the number of troops provided and to constrict the

missions for which lives could be risked. As a result, the Atlantic alliance is in the process of evolving a two-tiered system -- an alliance a la carte whose capability for common action does not match its general obligations. Over time, one of two adaptations must take place: either a redefinition of the general obligations or a formal elaboration of a two-tiered system in which political obligations and military capabilities are harmonized through some system of alliances of the willing.

While the traditional role of the state in Europe is being diminished by the choice of its governments, the declining role of the state in the Middle East is inherent in the way those states were founded. The successor states of the Ottoman Empire were established by the victorious powers at the end of the First World War. Unlike the European states, their borders did not reflect ethnic principles or linguistic distinctiveness but the balances between the European powers in their contests outside the region.

Today it is radical Islam that threatens the already brittle state structure via a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran as the basis of a universal political organization. Jihadist Islam rejects national sovereignty based on secular state models; it seeks to extend its reach to wherever significant populations profess the Muslim faith. Since neither the international system nor the internal structure of existing states has legitimacy in Islamist eyes, its ideology leaves little room for Western notions of negotiation or equilibrium in a region of vital interest to the security and well-being of the industrial states. That struggle is endemic; we do not have the option of withdrawal. We can retreat from any one place, such as Iraq, but only to be obliged to resist from new positions, probably more disadvantageously. Even advocates of unilateral withdrawal from Iraq speak of retaining residual forces to prevent a resurgence of al-Qaeda or radicalism.

These transformations take place against the backdrop of a third trend, a shift in the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Paradoxically, this redistribution of power is to a part of the world where nations still possess the characteristics of traditional European states. The major states of Asia -- China, Japan, India and, in time, possibly Indonesia -- view each other the way participants in the European balance of power did, as inherent competitors even when they occasionally participate in cooperative ventures.

In the past, such shifts in the structure of power generally led to war, as happened with the emergence of Germany in the late 19th century. Today the rise of China is assigned such a role in much alarmist commentary. True, the Sino-American relationship will inevitably contain classical geopolitical and competitive elements. These must not be neglected. But there are countervailing elements. Economic and financial globalization, environmental and energy imperatives, and the destructive power of modern weapons all impose a major effort at global cooperation, especially between the United States and China. An adversarial relationship would leave both countries in the position of Europe

after the two world wars, when other societies achieved the preeminence the nations of Europe sought through self-destructive conflict with each other.

No previous generation has had to deal with different revolutions occurring simultaneously in separate parts of the world. The quest for a single, all-inclusive remedy is chimerical. In a world in which the sole superpower is a proponent of the prerogatives of the traditional nation-state, where Europe is stuck in halfway status, where the Middle East does not fit the nation-state model and faces a religiously motivated revolution, and where the nations of South and East Asia still practice the balance of power, what is the nature of the international order that can accommodate these different perspectives? What should be the role of Russia, which is affirming a notion of sovereignty comparable to America's and a strategic concept of the balance of power similar to Asia's? Are existing international organizations adequate for this purpose? What goals can America realistically set for itself and the world community? Is the internal transformation of major countries an attainable goal? What objectives must be sought in concert, and what are the extreme circumstances that would justify unilateral action?

This is the kind of debate we need, not focus-group-driven slogans designed to grab headlines.

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/04/the_three_revolutions.html

WIRED

To Catch a Car Thief, the Police Exercise a Little Remote Control

By Ben Paynter, 03.24.08



Illustration: Patrick Leger

It's pouring rain here in Surrey, British Columbia, just outside Vancouver. A Ford F-350 Super Duty is parked in front of an office building with its front passenger-side tire squashed against the curb, a telltale sign that its driver was in a big hurry. People in a hurry make mistakes. I amble past the truck to scope it out. It's unlocked. The bed holds a few bright orange construction cones, and the cab is littered with crumpled fast-food containers. Then I spot the jackpot: a glittering set of keys tossed on the center console. This truck is just begging me to steal it.

No, seriously. The truck is here to be stolen. It's a bait car, a decoy modded with an arsenal of gadgetry that allows cops to track anyone foolish enough to take it. As dumb as it sounds, it works: Sprawling,

exurban Surrey used to be one of the car-theft capitals of North America, with 8,000 vehicles stolen in 2003. The government responded by forming the Integrated Municipal Provincial Auto Crime Team, or Impact, a squad armed with infrared-camera-equipped helicopters and license-plate readers that pick out stolen cars in traffic. Impact recruited detective Scott Cooke, who had started a bait-car program in Vancouver in 2002. Since he got this larger version running four years ago, auto theft in Surrey has declined 50 percent.

Today, Cooke has let me loose with permission to indulge my inner felon. He's confident I won't get away with it. Ninety percent of bait-car thieves get nabbed while the crime is in progress, he says. "It's kind of an easy arrest." We'll see. I hop into the truck and start 'er up, flip the radio from traffic reports to alternative rock, and pull away.

Big brother is watching. Sensors linked to GPS and cell phone modems are sending telemetry — the door opening, the ignition turning on, even my speed and heading. Impact officers can kill

the engine, honk the horn, and toggle the door locks. (For liability reasons, they never lock suspects in.)

My ride also captures real-time audio and video. Pinhole cameras stream live footage, letting the good guys enjoy their doughnuts and bide their time if it looks like I might lead them to a heist or a chop shop. Or they can bring the hammer down: Recently, when Cooke determined a suspect was unarmed and unagitated, he choreographed the bust to go down at a McDonald's drive-through. I head toward a highway on-ramp, but this won't turn into a cinematic chase. The pickup has a built-in governor. And anyway, traffic is limiting me to a poky 27 mph.

Back at Impact, Cooke decides to end my slo-mo getaway. The engine dies. The radio cuts out. I yelp as my speed decreases and the steering and brakes go squishy. I swerve in front of a blue sedan before rolling to a stop, blocking the entrance to a strip mall. I call Cooke's cell phone to check in.

"We were just wondering if anyone is honking at you right now," Cooke says. My truck's horn starts blaring. Funny guy. I put up my hands in surrender.

http://www.wired.com/cars/coolwheels/magazine/16-04/ps_baitcar

Homeland Security Today

TSA Behavior Detection Said to Work, Examples Cited

Anthony L. Kimery, 3 April 2008

'A further testament that the behavior detection program works'

“This is an excellent example of the layers of security in action throughout the airport. This is also a good example of using specially trained Behavior Detection Officers [BDOs] to look for people with hostile intent as well as the items they intend to use. It's a further testament that the behavior detection program works (yes, I'm partial...)” said a Transportation Security Administration officer in a recent TSA blog regarding the recent arrest of a passenger at Orlando International Airport whose behavior was deemed suspicious by trained BDOs.

The individual was taken into custody by Orlando Police and the FBI after he was detained and bomb-making materials were discovered in baggage he was carrying. Read more on the case [here](#).

The TSA's official's comment that the incident is “a further testament that the behavior detection program works” reiterates what HSToday.us has been saying – that behavior detection, the focus on people rather than things - is a much more effective methodology for ferreting out potential threats. The May issue of *HSToday* takes a close look at how behavior detection has become the centerpiece of the Israeli's security at Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv. HSToday.us has regularly taken a look at TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)-trained BDOs. See, for example, "*TSA Stepping Up Scrutiny of People, Chertoff Indicates*."

In another TSA blog, an official noted that “behavior analysis is based on the fear of being discovered. People who are trying to get away with something display signs of stress through involuntary physical and physiological behaviors. Whether someone's trying to sneak through that excellent stone ground mustard they bought on vacation, a knife, or a bomb, behavior detection officers like me are trained to spot certain suspicious behaviors out of the crowd. Once we make our determination, we refer these passengers for additional screening or directly to law enforcement.”

Continuing, the official related that “just recently at the Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport, two of my fellow BDOs spotted behaviors on a passenger and conducted secondary screening. They were unaware at the time the individual was an undercover ‘passenger’ involved in covert testing. The concealed item was an unassembled weapon in a carry-on bag. The BDOs caught this right away, and when the testing was over, it was revealed that the passenger also had plastic explosive simulants in the cups of her bra. This was an excellent catch, and proof the behavior detection program works. If this were the real thing, we would have caught it.”

As *HSToday* points out in the upcoming May issue, the Israelis certainly believe it works.

http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2741&Itemid=128

SPIEGEL ONLINE

04/08/2008

REFUGEES IN REALTIME**UN and Google to Map Global Conflict Regions***By Patrick McGroarty*

A new partnership between the UN refugee agency and Google allows users of the powerful Google Earth search tool to track refugees in global conflict regions.



A screenshot of the new software available through the UN and Google Earth. *Google Earth*

Nearly 35 million people across the globe have been uprooted by violence, political conflict and catastrophe. Now the United Nations is partnering with Google in a new effort to keep track of them.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees unveiled on Tuesday a multimedia system to

monitor refugees in conflict regions using Google Earth, the internet search giant's global mapping software.

The new system works as a "layer" of multimedia tools that a Web user can place on top of Google Earth's interactive satellite maps. Google Earth has around 300 million users.

The interactive system, available for download at unhcr.org/googleearth, currently includes multimedia information on refugees and the persecution they face in three places: Colombia, Sudan's Darfur region and Iraq.

As a user drags her cursor across each region, she can read about the violence there that forced people from their homes, learn the name and population of nearby refugee camps and watch a series of video reports or photo essays.

"It's designed to narrow the distance -- not just in terms of geography, but also experience -- between refugees and the rest of the world," Claudia Gisiger-Gonzalez, a spokesperson for the UN refugee agency, told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

The agency plans to regularly update the refugee data available on Google Earth with a goal to map each of the world's major conflict regions by the end of 2008. The list is not finalized, but is likely to include Afghanistan and Kenya, said Gisiger-Gonzalez. Later, the agency hopes to introduce a tool that will track the global movement of refugees.

The agency also plans to use Google's technology internally, by creating a database for refugee camp managers and researchers to share information.

Security Concerns

But the system could draw attention to highly detailed satellite images of refugee camps in volatile regions, raising potential security concerns for the camp's residents. UN officials admit that deciding what information can be made public and what should stay on the internal system is an ongoing discussion.

"The Web is a challenge because it requires us to redefine all the time what is confidential and what is not," Karl Steinacker, who manages field information and support efforts for the agency, told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

It wouldn't be the first time that the search engine's power has raised questions. Last year a US congressional subcommittee accused the search engine of "airbrushing history" for using outdated images of New Orleans that predated the destruction of Hurricane Katrina in their Google Earth maps of the city. Google later updated its mapping to reflect the post-storm coastline.

A spokesman for Google in Germany said it would be the responsibility of the UN agency to withhold potentially sensitive information, such as the name or size of a refugee camp.

"We provide Google Earth for all interested NGOs, and the type of content that they provide there is up to them," Stefan Keuchel, the spokesman, told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

The new partnership is part of a larger company program called Google Outreach. The effort already includes partnerships with other nonprofits including the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, UN Environmental Program and the Jane Goodall Institute. Several groups in Europe are expected to join soon, a Google spokesman told SPIEGEL ONLINE in an e-mail. More information on the project is available at google.com/outreach.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,546145,00.html>



Zawahiri's Bizarre Press Conference

Tuesday 08 April 2008

By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed

He spent two months collecting the questions, which reportedly reached him like a flood from all over the world. Though we doubted the seriousness of the invitation of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second most dangerous wanted man in the world, he carried out his electronic press conference, the first of its kind by any terrorist movement, which lasted about two hours.

Why did he do it?

Al-Zawahiri certainly proved that he is an adversary who cannot be isolated, wherever is the cave in which he is hiding. He proved he is commanding the battles personally. He made us more perplexed: How can he do all this? Sometimes one's imagination strays and I say the hiding of Al-Qaeda's leaders deserves simple, not complicated, thinking. He is like a leader without a government or armies and not in need to fortify himself in the impregnable tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. He can live in the middle of Cairo, Riyadh, the coastal Yemeni city of Aden, Dubai, or probably in the Arab Edgware Road in London without anyone noticing him. One who receives thousands of questions from all over the world in his cave is capable of running most of his military and administrative activities through the same computer from any comfortable apartment. Proof of this is that the questions came to him from Tokyo and even New York and he was supported by dozens of websites which received the questions and later conveyed his answers to them.

But despite the ease of hiding, it is difficult to believe that Al-Zawahiri has the courage to leave his cave.

We must ask: Why did Al-Zawahiri take a risk in the cyberspace which is watched and agreed to receive the questions?

Al-Zawahiri sees two options before him: Either he fights militarily or fights with his voice. We therefore see him doubling his activities in the verbal sphere to compensate for Al-Qaeda's disastrous losses, especially in Iraq. Al-Qaeda suffered heavily in Iraq and at the hands of the Iraqi Bedouins and not through the American forces' efforts. It did not win any major battle in any other place in the world, though it succeeded in delivering some sporadic blows.

Al-Zawahiri invented the idea of the press conference and took an electronic and political risk probably because of the continuing losses. It is known that many of the internet websites are

watched and public discussion means more splits inside the extremist Islamic arena. No matter what he answers or justifies, he will anger fundamentalist groups which will consider him exceeding the boundaries in his extremism or leniency. This will deepen the argument that has continued since Al-Qaeda carried out its crimes on 9/11 and after it in Riyadh, Casablanca, and elsewhere. The shouting in their websites has started to stink, as revealed by the recordings and letters exchanged between Al-Zawahiri and Al-Zarqawi, his former field commander in Iraq, over issues like targeting civilians and dealing with Iran.

This is what probably prompted Al-Zawahiri and his supreme leader Osama Bin Laden to resort very frequently to the internet. All the signs indicate that Al-Qaeda's traditional leadership is facing the problem of controlling its field commands and public everywhere and has apparently chosen the repeated appearance, in photo or voice, to hold on to what is left of its authority. It is the appetite to speak that probably always distinguishes those behind the extremist movements.



Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is the general manager of *Al-Arabiya* television. Mr. Al-Rashed is also the former editor-in-chief of *Asharq Al-Awsat* and the leading Arabic weekly magazine, *Al-Majalla*. He is also a senior Columnist in the daily newspapers of *Al-Madina* and *Al-Bilad*. He has a US post-graduate degree in mass communications. He has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs. He is currently based in Dubai.

<http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=12352>