Conference Report:

U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase III:

The Role of National Perceptions of Security Environments in Shaping Sino-American Nuclear Affairs

November 4-6, 2007; Honolulu, Hawaii


Report on Conference Findings by

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Background

The third annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Honolulu, HI from November 4 through 6, 2007. The Dialogue is a track 1.5 conference; thus, it is formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants. [1] The Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-CSIS and is funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. As the leading agency responsible for addressing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), DTRA/ASCO desires generally to enhance American situational awareness of Chinese nuclear strategies and capabilities, reduce the prospects for...
proliferation in Asia and beyond, and more broadly enhance American deterrence during a time of transformation. Particular interests guiding DTRA/ASCO's leadership of this project have included identifying important misperceptions, misunderstandings, and key divergences in national interests, with a goal of reducing these over the long term.

Thus, the goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side's nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. Beyond that, the conference aims to deepen American understandings of the way China views nuclear weapons, the domestic debates that shape those views, and the degree to which there is change in strategy, doctrine, and force posture in Beijing. Both of the first two meetings had focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and prospects for cooperation with regard to specific policy areas. (Conference reports from the first two meetings were published previously and are available from NPS.)

The first U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in August of 2005 and focused on broad, strategic-level areas for potential cooperation. At the broadest level, Chinese participants repeatedly emphasized that their government's overall outlook centered on ensuring a peaceful environment conducive to economic development. American participants confirmed China's economic strength, and pointed out that China's turn has made it into a worldwide economic power with particular impact on the American economy. It has brought into being a Chinese middle class that is forcing the government to evolve and it has allowed China to engage in useful diplomatic as well as economic relationships around the world. Everyone agreed that any assessment of the military and nuclear aspects of the strategic relationship must take these basics into account. Chinese and American threat perceptions were discussed more in depth. Chinese interpretations of the Nuclear Posture Review, nuclear triangles, and China's position relative to the United States were factors important shaping Chinese threat perceptions. On the American side, post 9/11 realities dominated the discussions on threat perception. Both the American and Chinese participants characterized the Sino-American relationship as relatively stable given the existence of something approaching a secure nuclear second-strike capability held by both sides. This first meeting opened the door for future dialogues, and more specific areas for potential cooperation were identified.

Based on feedback from both Chinese and American participants, as well as constructive guidance on the part of DTRA/ASCO, the 2006 dialogue was centered around the theme of crisis management. Two American presentations stressed the dangers of inadvertent crisis escalation in historic Cold War cases and in recent South Asian cases. One Chinese participant gave a presentation on Chinese "lessons learned" from the past fifty years. A number of interesting perspectives were raised by all participants in the ensuing discussion, and several narrow areas for potential future consideration that might directly enhance security in a time of crisis emerged. Nuclear weapons safety and security on the Chinese side was discussed in detail, the importance of direct communication was highlighted, and the need for increased transparency was stressed.

This year, the meeting was organized around five panels (see the attached agenda) centering on the key strategic threat perceptions of each side—general and proliferation related—and the various sorts of security policies each undertakes to address these threats—
In keeping with the ground rules of the conference, particular participant statements are not quoted, nor are individual views summarized. Rather, an overall sense of the themes of the discussions are provided here.

The Chinese discussion of overall threat perceptions paralleled some of the concerns raised in China’s recent Defense White Paper. It highlighted the trend towards multipolarity in the world at large. China’s rise was clearly part of this, but others are important as well: EU, Russia, India, and Brazil. Two presenters on the Chinese side concurred that Chinese statements regarding multipolarization are an evaluation of reality, rather than a highlighted policy goal actively being pursued.

The second key element highlighted was the rising importance of economic source of conflict. Here, however, rather than an emphasis on resource competition, the primary concerns were the dangers flowing from international economic competition stemming from globalization, protectionism, and the difficulties that come from managing globalization.

Ms. Elaine Bunn and Professor Li Bin present as RADM Michael McDevitt (ret.) listens on.

General Strategic Threat Perceptions

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On the U.S. side, discussions of general threat perceptions centered around nontraditional security concerns. The rise in terrorism and extremism were discussed in terms of transnational issues critically important to the United States, but many Chinese interlocutors also agreed this was an important area of concern for Beijing. In one American presentation this was mentioned as an area ripe for U.S.-Sino cooperation. Increasing participation in institutions and organizations which address nontraditional security concerns presents the two countries with an opportunity to work together; thus reducing overall differences in threat perceptions. This assertion was supported by others, and cooperation in the area of nonproliferation was agreed upon as another area where the two countries—indeed the greater Asian region—should work toward.

Both sides agreed that the overall prospect of nuclear conflict between the United States and China was quite low. This was a core element in the first Chinese presentation, but was echoed by two other Chinese panelists individually. One Chinese went further to argue that nuclear weapons were not the primary capability within China’s arsenal, and indeed he was concerned about exaggerating their importance by focusing on them in this Dialogue.

However, several Chinese participants noted the increased likelihood of nuclear use given proliferation in the context of regional conflicts. This did not appear to be in the context of Sino-American relations. That said, Chinese participants recognized the dangers that might come from misperception in that dyad. In particular, one Chinese participant raised concerns that nuclear posturing by the United States might get misinterpreted in China, leading to dangerous escalation within a crisis.
Chinese Nuclear Strategy

While not the central goal of this year’s Dialogue session, there were some interesting discussions regarding Chinese nuclear forces. Three themes are highlighted here: improvements in China’s nuclear weapons capability; emphasis on China’s traditional, declared defensive nuclear strategy; and some discussion of civilian control.

Improvements in Chinese Nuclear Capabilities

One Chinese panelist highlighted a number of structural improvements made by the PLA in recent years. He argued that improvements in command and control, basing arrangements, launch site improvements, and personnel were well on their way, and would create a basis to move forward by 2010. Chinese participants also emphasized the importance of new kinds of warheads, submarines, and land- and submarine-based missiles. He also noted that regardless of the nature of the relationship with the United States, China would need to maintain both land- and submarine-based forces.

This Chinese panelists went on to suggest that in all these areas, China already had a sound foundation but that continued improvements would be made in research and development, warhead penetration, and multi-head warheads. Multiple Chinese emphasized the importance of recent improvements in Chinese weapons’ survivability.

Emphasis on Existing Declaratory Strategy

Throughout all Chinese participants’ discussions of their nuclear strategy, the traditional defensive and retaliatory characteristics of Beijing’s strategy were emphasized. One Chinese participant argued that Chinese forces were configured to ensure their ability to “counter nuclear coercion.” As elements of Chinese operational practice that support this strategy, several participants pointed to the slowness of retaliation in publicly described military exercises and the separation of warheads even from mobile missiles. This, it was argued, was strong evidence for the depth of Chinese views on the irrelevance of speed in Beijing’s thoughts regarding retaliation.

(Related to this terminological concern, again, as in previous sessions of the Dialogue, was an important terminological difficulty. The closest analogue to the term deterrence in Chinese contains a strong element of coercion or compellence. While this linguistic issue is well understood by American Sinologists and some Chinese specialists in U.S. security policy, it still colors the language used between the two sides in ways that have a subtle negative effect on deliberation. Any discussion of the positive aspects of a situation characterized by secure second strike potential for both sides is undermined by this issue of phrasing. It is important to remember that this linguistic issue will continue to shape the way Chinese interlocutors (and Chinese policy makers and military leaders more generally) interpret statements that Americans may make intending to convey relatively benign intentions (i.e., “we view our nuclear weapons as having deterrence value only” has something of an offensive edge in Chinese.) Thus, aspects of the strategic nuclear relationship that should be viewed as relatively stabilizing from both sides are not always viewed as such.)
On the “no first use” (NFU) strategy itself, the Chinese repeatedly argued that probing for a precise delineation of the circumstances it might cover would undermine its viability. They conceived of the NFU policy as dependent on a fairly ideational understanding of international security, giving prominence to the concept of a “nuclear taboo.” One panelist suggested that even scholarly inquiry into the issue had the effect of undermining this, and perhaps thereby leading to questioning of the associated “no first use” policy. Thus, such views suggest it would undermine the efficacy of the NFU policy to engage in detailed discussion of questions such as “do PGM attacks on nuclear facilities permit a response under a NFU policy?”

U.S. Strategy

Most generally, there seemed to be some, small improvement in the Chinese understanding of U.S. nuclear strategy. Traditionally, the Chinese characterization of U.S. nuclear strategy and doctrine has been as offensive and dangerous. That was more muted in this session. For instance, one Chinese participant led a series of questions in the strategic forces panel asking, “Given the increased conventional strike capability of the United States, would the role of nuclear weapons be decreased?” (An American participant answered with a definitive yes.) Chinese participants did not emphasize the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) nor even
mention the drafted-but-then-withdrawn *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*. These had been frequently cited, or mis-cited, in previous such discussions. This sort of misperception was nearly absent; clearly indicative of the progress of this and similar dialogues for fostering understanding and reducing misperceptions.

Other aspects of U.S. strategic modernization seemed to point to some Chinese interlocutors as being aimed at Beijing. A Chinese panelist highlighted missile defense modernization, the Space Radar proposals, the movement of SSBNs to the Pacific from the Atlantic, and RRW. Another similarly suggested that the U.S. Global Strike program was very dangerous. This panelist was particularly concerned regarding the inability to distinguish between warnings of an attack by conventional versus nuclear forces.

The issue of RRW was indeed much discussed. One Chinese participant argued it would result in smaller warheads, which he argued would make nuclear weapons more useful and thus raise the prospect for nuclear use. Another suggested that—while not being directly threatening to China—Chinese scientists might want to follow suit with their own such programs. There was also significant discussion of the degree to which this program had been adequately explained to Beijing.

Finally, there was a sense of pessimism among some of the Chinese participants regarding the seriousness with which the United States was willing to discuss nuclear issues. In particular, one suggested that questions about the nature of the nuclear relationship between the two sides is not something the United States is ready to talk about. *That is, he felt questions such as “what would stability in the nuclear relationship mean?” were beyond the bounds of the current official dialogue for the United States.* Similarly, he saw a lack of consensus within the United States about the acceptability of a Chinese second-strike capability.

Similarly, there were continuing Chinese concerns regarding American demands for transparency. Chinese expressed the view that as the weaker power, opacity enhanced the credibility and security of their deterrent force.
Regional Issues in the Sino-American Strategic Relationship

Much of the discussion throughout the conference is best considered on a regional basis. This section begins by highlighting some general discussions of alliances and extended deterrence, before turning to important discussions on Japan and Taiwan. Sparser insights regarding South Asia, Korea, Iran, and Russia are also included.

*Extended Deterrence*

There was a generally positive view of the role of extended deterrence from both the Chinese and American participants. One Chinese participant noted he saw extended deterrence as contributing to preventing proliferation and arms races, and explicitly stated that China does not aim to push the United States out of the region. However, in particular cases, various participants raised concerns about specific cases. One participant questioned the expanding nature of missile defense cooperation across the region (Japan, Taiwan, and India). He also questioned the need for the United States to encourage more “mission sharing” with some allies.

There may be a very important terminological miscommunication here as well: One Chinese spoke of extended deterrence as also encompassing the use of nuclear weapons to deter...
conventional defeat (he mentioned this specifically with reference to Pakistan). This is not how the term is used in the academic literature. Traditionally, extended deterrence has referred to extending deterrence from a patron to an ally. Generally, but not always, this takes the form of a nuclear umbrella. While the Cold War situation in Europe complicated these conceptual distinctions,[4] that era has not redefined the term in the U.S. usage.

Japan

The view toward the U.S.-Japan alliance was predictably mixed. On the positive side, quite notably, one Chinese panelist stated that he personally welcomed the Rice speech reiterating the nuclear umbrella to Japan. Others obliquely supported this point.

Other areas were viewed more negatively. Some reiterated past concerns about the strengthening of the alliance—and the so-called Alliance of Values concept[5]—primarily in the context of the Taiwan issue. The statement in the 2006 2+2 meetings that identified stability in the Taiwan Strait as being an important concern was highlighted. Also, some concerns regarding what was characterized as an evolving position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were briefly raised. The urgency of need regarding deployment of a multi-tiered missile defense system in Japan was raised.

- In response to Chinese feelings of insecurity related to U.S. alliances and extended deterrence (especially with regards to Japan, but also South Korea and Taiwan) one American presenter took the opportunity to focus on the positive aspects of U.S. alliances. The presenter noted that by providing predictability amid changes in administrations; raising the costs of acting out of order; reinforcing nonproliferation norms; and providing a channel to address grievances solid U.S. alliances could at times lessen uneasy feelings on the part of the Chinese.

Taiwan

On Taiwan, one Chinese participant argued that if there was a declaration of independence, China would have no choice but recourse to violence. He emphasizes the consistency and breadth of statements on this point (the 2000 White Paper; Premier Wen Jiabao’s statement in 2004; and even noted that this emphasis began in 1995-96).

However, there were also assertions that even in the context of a conventional loss in the Taiwan Strait, China would not resort to nuclear weapons use. Instead, the conventional war would continue. That is, in the context of Chinese declaratory policy on Taiwan, it is impossible to imagine any Chinese representative saying “after we lose, we’ll give up.” Thus, there are two choices: nuclear escalation, or continued conventional warfare. The Chinese participants were signaling the later.

Finally, a Chinese participant noted the Chinese concerns regarding defense cooperation with Taiwan. In particular, he worried that the PAC-3 weapons system will require Taiwan to have more integrated communications with the United States.

American participants typically noted that Taiwan served as the key focal point for potential tension. While participants from both sides repeatedly asserted that the prospects for war, let alone nuclear war, were low between the two, one American participant noted that it would
be more accurate to say that outside of the Taiwan issue, the prospects for war were low. Other American participants noted that the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship meant that any use of force in the strait would be a matter of grave concern to the United States.

**South Asia**

It was noted that India sizes its arsenal relative to that of China, but that Beijing was not concerned given the power imbalance that exists today.

The United States was seen by Chinese to play a negative role in the region for two reasons. First, Chinese interlocutors complained regarding the U.S. proliferation policy toward the region. Second, it was suggested that increased cooperation on missile defense was likely to lead to increased command and control integration with the United States.

- Both Chinese and American panelists agreed that the relationship between India and Pakistan continues to dominate South Asian stability. The security of nuclear weapons inside South Asian nations as well as the potential for proliferation spirals in the region were core concerns for the Americans.

**Korea**

Generally, the tone was positive, if apprehensive, regarding the future of the denuclearization project in North Korea. Both Chinese and American participants highlighted the recent positive progress, but noted potential problems, particularly emanating from Japan. One Chinese panelist argued that the key turning point in the North Korean diplomacy was when the Bush Administration allowed for direct contact with North Korea. Other Americans emphasized the positive role played by China through the Six Party talks and financial and oil sanctions.

**Iran**

Iran was clearly recognized as an important proliferation problem. Indeed one Chinese panelist cited favorably conclusions from a CIA report regarding the dangers of Iranian ambitions. However, the general view here was pessimism for two reasons. First was the lack of a multilateral platform to address the issue, in the way the Six Party Framework has facilitated progress in Korea. This seemed to include an implicit, but clear, signal that the some may regard the UN as not sufficient to address the problem. Even in the context of the above two points, there was acute pessimism regarding the utility of military operations as coercive tools from both the American and Chinese speakers. The wide range of potential responses that Iran might take, emphasizing its potential to shut down the Straits of Hormuz and to exert influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon were discussed.
Proliferation Issues

The proliferation discussions primarily focused on the tools to constrain it rather than a general discussion of the sources of it. There was some discussion of the dangers of regional spirals, both in East Asia and elsewhere. (One panelist specifically noted a potential arms race in the Middle East pointing to Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and suggesting close monitoring of their enhancing of existing nuclear programs in the context of the Iranian problem.)

With regard to the responses to proliferation, several topics will be highlighted here: the role of the United States, the role of formal and informal multilateral cooperation, and areas for Sino-American cooperation in particular.

The Role of Each Side

Chinese participants often argued that the United States maintained the ability to greatly restrain proliferation through its bilateral relations. For instance, one participant on the Chinese side argued that the United States would be able to constrain virtual or latent nuclear powers, ensuring they remain below the weaponization threshold. Several noted that these are market democracies, which are close to the United States, thus Washington's
leverage was thought to be substantial.

On the negative side, several Chinese participants questioned the U.S. commitment to the non-proliferation treaty, and noted that national regime type seemed to trump international norms in Washington’s decision-making calculus regarding proliferants. The U.S. response to South Asian proliferation was mentioned in this regard.

- Domestic factors concerned American panelists most when discussing U.S. perceptions of China in terms of proliferation. From the U.S. point of view, the policymaking process in Beijing is becoming increasingly complex and is influenced by various sources of both internal and external backing. The relationship between the Party and the military is always a concern, and not always clearly delineated. A decade of PLA rapid expansion has increased its political influence. Questionable Chinese coordination in the EP-3 incident, the unwillingness of the 2nd Artillery to carry forward the nuclear dialogue to which President Hu committed it in April 2006, and the political ramifications of the ASAT test all contribute to American’s questioning of how China’s security environment is constructed; and whose views affect policymaking.

**Formal Institutions**

In general, Chinese participants often expressed support for formal regimes, arguing their transparency and basis in rules made them more effective. The U.S. participants were markedly less optimistic, although not wholly dismissive. There was some interesting discussion of two specific formal institutions: the NPT and the future of the START/SORT regime. On the former, one Chinese presenter suggested that some strengthening of the NPT might be warranted. He suggested requiring a longer notification period for withdrawal, and stated that China supports limited economic and political sanctions for those who withdraw from the treaty.

On the question of whether China might participate in developing a post-START/SORT treaty regime, the standard Chinese formulation that deeper cuts were required in the United States and Russia before Beijing would join was raised (including specifically mentioned of a threshold of approximately 1,000 warheads). However, others also added that a broader movement in the P-5 would also be grounds for Chinese participation.

- More than one Chinese participant reiterated China’s interest in moving forward on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). The American panelists responded by stating that indeed, the United States strongly supports a FMCT, and has put forth proposals in that regard. The United States has been serious about opening negotiations but the inability of others to move forward independently on a FMCT due to that fact that discussions were linked to issues such as space have thus far seriously stalled progress.

**Informal Institutions**

There seemed to be continued movement on the Chinese side regarding less formal counter-proliferation initiatives. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was cited multiple times as an approach that China supported in principle, just not in practice. China’s support for the
Container Security Initiative was also highlighted in this regard. The Six Party Talks were also viewed as an innovative approach that blended elements of formality and informality, bilateralism and multilateralism; and were positively mentioned by presenters on the U.S. and Chinese side.

**Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation**

Proliferation was generally discussed as an area with bright prospects for bilateral cooperation. Having said that, there were a number of narrow perspectives on this issue. One Chinese participant raised the possibility that U.S. non-proliferation policy was a tool to contain China (and noted the agreement with India sent precisely the wrong signal on that issue). Several Chinese participants clearly viewed proliferation cooperation as a tool to appease the United States, rather than a matter of intrinsic interest to China. Overall, however, the prospect for cooperation with regard to proliferation can be characterized as high.

**Other Strategic Areas**

Three other areas of national security interest were discussed in passing, all somewhat outside of the nuclear arena: naval strategy, cyber warfare, and space. Each is summarized in turn.

**Cyber Warfare**

There were two interesting perspectives raised regarding cyber war. One Chinese analyst suggested that offensive cyber warfare capabilities might potentially enhance deterrence for some states. Thus, presumably this gives states added retaliatory options against which defenses are not particularly effective. On the other hand, a Chinese participant noted that China had looked at the cost of offensive and defensive weapons in cyberspace. He stated they had found a small cost advantage for offensive weapons, but noted that the United States was so much wealthier that any such advantage would be ephemeral. He also highlighted a potentially dangerous misperception, questioning why cyber war has military significance given that military computers are physically separate from the internet. If such views are widely held, this may lead to unanticipated consequences in times of tension. An American presenter, responding to the issue of possible military significance to cyber war, pointed out that during a crisis situation a cyber attack might possibly be viewed as escalatory from one side—or both. Cyber defense is an area where both states remain somewhat vulnerable to sophisticated actors.

**Space**

While specifically excluded from the agenda, two brief points are worth relating. First, a Chinese participant insisted that the ASAT test was a General Armaments Department “scientific experiment” rather than a PLA weapons test *per se*. Second, he suggested that a form of coercive policy had worked for China: only after the ASAT test was the United States interested in discussing space officially. It was noted by American panelists that the 2007 Chinese ASAT test soured the way the United States views space policy, especially with regards to China. Both China and the United States are increasing their reliance on space in both the civilian and military realms.
Conclusions and Looking Forward

This year was widely regarded by the U.S. participants as the most successful of the three Dialogue sessions held to date. There was some progress made on reducing the mischaracterizations of U.S. strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in it: fewer references to documents cited out of context or documents that are no longer relevant. At the same time there seemed to be some confidence in discussing the broad parameters of China’s modernization, in vague terms only, to be sure. The key insights suggest a wide-ranging discussion at a broad level of strategic analysis about the role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary era within the region, precisely the goal of this conference.

The entire group celebrated a successful meeting with a dinner cruise following the close of the conference.

Appendix I: Conference Agenda, Participant List and Biographies

U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase III: Conference Agenda


4-6 November 2007, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Waikiki, Hawaii
Sunday, Nov. 4

6:30pm Opening Reception and Dinner—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3

Monday, Nov. 5

8:30am Continental Breakfast—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 1 & 2

9:00am Welcoming Remarks and Introductions

First Day: Perceptions of Security Environments

9:30am Panel I: Comparing National Perceptions of Security Environments

What is the nature of the international security environment with regard to strategic forces today? What threats are most important within it? How has this changed in the past two decades? What roles do domestic factors (political, cultural, or economic) play in influencing these threat perceptions and their relative prioritization?

12:00-1:30pm Lunch—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3

1:30pm-5pm Panel II: Comparing Perspectives on the Specific Threat of Proliferation

What are each side’s views about the dangers posed by North Korean, Iranian, and South Asian proliferation? What concerns does each side have regarding non-state actors and WMD? What is the prospect for cascading proliferation either in Asia or globally? In general, how important is this set of problems to each side relative to other issues (as discussed in the first panel)?

6:30pm Reception and Dinner—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3

Second Day: Unilateral, Bilateral, and Multilateral Responses

Tuesday, Nov. 6

8:30am Continental Breakfast—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 1 & 2

8:30am Panel III: Responding to this Environment: Strategic Forces and Policies

How does each side see its strategic forces, operational concepts, and political commitments specifically contributing to addressing its concerns about the contemporary security environment? How does each side’s on-going strategic modernization program address these problems?
10:45am-11:00am Break

11:00am-12:30pm Panel IV: Responding to this Environment: Alliances and Extended Deterrence

How does each side see alliances and extended deterrent commitments addressing the contemporary security environment? In general, what is the role of positive security guarantees in the contemporary era? What aspects of existing alliance and extended deterrence relationships does each side view positively and negatively? How might Chinese and American policy in this regard play a role in reducing dangers in regions outside of Asia?

12:30-1:30pm Lunch—Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3

1:30pm Panel V: Responding to this Environment: Treaties, Regimes, and Informal Coalitions

What role is there for formal, multilateral institutions to address these threat environments? How can the existing non-proliferation regime contribute? What informal, multilateral tools (e.g., PSI, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism) might be used? What does each side see as the record for these various categories of multilateralism? What synergies might there be between formal and informal multilateral tools? How might the two sides cooperate to advance multilateral approaches to the contemporary strategic environment?

3:30-4:00pm Closing remarks and next steps

4:00pm Conference Adjourns

U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase III: Conference Participants

Chinese Participants

- R. Adm. Yang Yi, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- S. Col. Chen Zhou, Strategic Studies Dept, Academy of Military Science
- Dr. Yang Mingjie, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
- Prof. Li Bin, Tsinghua University
- Dr. Gu Guoliang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- Prof. Pang Zhongying, Tsinghua University

American Participants

- Dr. Christopher Twomey, Co-Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Dept. of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
- Prof. James Wirtz, Dept. of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
- Dr. Brad Roberts, Research Staff, Institute for Defense Analyses
- Mr. Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS
- Mr. Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS
- Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Ms. Elaine Bunn, Senior Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Dr. Phil Saunders, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
RADM Michael McDevitt (ret.), Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analyses
Mr. Michael Gerson, Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analyses
Dr. Jeffrey Larsen, Larsen Consulting Group

List of U.S. Observers

CAPT Dave Swain, USN, Division Chief, J5, Directorate for Strategy and Policy, Strategic Deterrence and Strike Policy, Joint Staff
Mr. Ed Smith, Special Advisor to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
Mr. George Look, Director, Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State
Mr. Robert Witajewski, Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State
Ms. Thy Nguyen, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State
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Ms. Christina Hatfield, Conference & Travel Coordinator, Pacific Forum CSIS

References

1. Traditionally, track I has referred to formal, official diplomacy or statecraft. Track II is purely academic and think tank analyst exchange. Track 1.5 refers to "something in between," which often involves policy-minded and -connected academics with officials participating in their personal capacity or policy advisors just outside the formal government structure. Please see the attached participant roster for further detail on the degree of unofficial U.S. governmental involvement in the meeting itself.
2. Of note: the Chinese participants noted that the term anquan in Chinese includes both sustainment on the one hand and “safety and security” on the other hand. American participants noted that there is arguably an interest in American support of Chinese efforts on safety and security, and perhaps in some contexts on surety as well. However, sustainment is an issue that neither side is likely interested in promoting in the other. Clearly, these concepts are differentiated in the nuclear scientist community in China. However, the existence of such a terminological grey areas merits careful attention in future discussions among strategists. Clarification of relevant terms sometimes “lost in translation” can be important, often unanticipated consequences of dialogues at any level.

3. One Chinese presenter repeatedly referred, in this context, to the academic constructivist literature.

4. There, there was a policy of geographic “extended deterrence” to the Western Europeans that also relied on a “first use” policy of nuclear response.

5. This is a formulation that would draw the United States, Japan, India, and Australia into a closer partnership.