

## Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Pen-and-Pad Briefing on the Department's Fifth Anniversary

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**Secretary Chertoff:** All right. You know, I've talked a lot about the various things we do; the kind of five major strategic goals. I'm not going to repeat, you know, what I've previously said. I think we've done a lot in each of those.

I'm going to take a little more time on one thing, which is to try to once and for all correct the record on P-28, which seems to be -- I'm thinking I'm -- you know, you guys watch "The Wire"? What's the guy's name, Templeton? Is he the -- I'm thinking of creating a Templeton Award, which maybe I'll award on my last week. The first Templeton Award -- we'll see where it goes.

Anyway, here's the bottom line. The approach that we take to managing the borders -- driven by the landscape, the flow, the particular challenges that there are in any one of the locations -- and if you've been in the southwest border, you see it's enormously different, from the standpoint of terrain, where the cities are located, where the highways are located.

Part of our strategy is obviously the ports of entry, which is why we've been improving the documentation requirements, we eliminated oral declarations, we've eliminated most of the 8,000 kinds of documents that were formally presented at the border. And I'm hoping that next June we will have a Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative implemented that Congress does not delay again, so that we can really have an equality assurance about the nature of the documents we're being presented with at the ports of entry.

Between the ports of entry, we're obviously concerned about smuggling, whether it be human smuggling or drug smuggling. And there we use a combination of low-tech, medium-tech and high-tech. The low-tech is obviously the fencing, which we currently have about 304 miles deployed along the border. We are on track to have about 670 miles of fencing by the end of this year.

That will mean that the vast majority of the land between the Pacific Ocean and the Texas-New Mexico border will be covered with some kind of a barrier, unless there's a natural barrier in place like a mountain or something -- and it gets pretty close to that, maybe 90 percent of that. So that's going to be dramatic improvement from a low-tech standpoint.

But then we have SBInet. So what is SBInet? Contrary to one misunderstanding, P-28, the Boeing project in Sasabe, is not SBInet. It is part of SBInet. It is to SBInet what a single cruiser is the United States Navy. It is part of the fleet, but it is not the entirety of the fleet.

So what is SBInet? Well, part of it is unmanned aerial vehicles. We now took our fourth unmanned aerial system for delivery two or three weeks ago. And I've seen them work their cameras. They enable us to scan a large amount of terrain, to identify and lock on to a group of people being smuggled across, or smuggling across, so that we can direct Border Patrol to intercept.

A second part of this is ground-based radar systems. These, again, I've seen it with my eyes. These are little radar -- little radar stations in vehicles that we can mobilely deploy at various parts of the border to give us a radar image of what is crossing the border, so that we can see an incursion and we can, again, direct the Border Patrol to identify it and apprehend the people coming across. We currently have about six of these. We're looking at 40, by the end of the year, deployed around the various parts of the border.

Third are simply unattended sensors; sensors embedded in the ground. We're going to have between 7,500 and 10,000 by the end of this year. We've got about 7,500 now, I think. That's the third part of SBInet.

The fourth part of SBInet was a concept of taking -- marrying together cameras and radar, and having an

automated way to have the camera track where there's a radar hit so that a single agent could cover 28 or 30 miles with a single common-operating picture, as opposed to having individual agents sitting in individual ground-based radar cars.

In order to see if this concept worked, and then in order to see how it would operationally impact behavior, we contracted for P-28, which was the first stage of this proposal; the idea being that if we liked it, we would then use more of it at various parts of the border, although it was never conceived that one -- this would simply expand from sea to shining sea. It was always understood this was going to be a solution in some areas, not in others; it depends on the terrain.

Last June, the report came back that on some of the basic technical interface and some of the basic technical operation, the system was not performing the way it should be. And so although we had hoped to take a conditional acceptance, which would have given us the ability to operate the system, we didn't do it; we didn't feel the system was ready.

I spoke to the CEO of Boeing and I said in, you know, pretty plain terms, "We're not satisfied with the system. If this is too complicated or too sophisticated for the border, tell us. If we can't do it, if it's not a workable thing, tell us. I don't have any, you know, predisposition for one thing or another. We'll say, hey, the experiment failed, and we'll move on and do something else."

He said, no, they've used this kind of thing before; they believe they can make it work. And then to his credit, he really retooled the team. He said he removed people, he sent new people down, and then they made significant progress in correcting the problems until in December, we felt the system was workable enough to take conditional acceptance, which would allow us to operate it and road-test it in real life.

And we did that for a couple of months, and then we took final acceptance a couple of weeks ago, when we concluded that all the outstanding material problems with the equipment were resolved. The few items that we deemed immaterial we got a credit for. All the correction on the technology was undertaken at Boeing's expense. In other words, we didn't pay them to correct things that didn't work; they had to eat that out of their own hide.

When that was done and we had a workable functional system -- and it does work, because I've seen it work -- then the next question is, is this the optimal system? And I asked the Border Patrol two questions: Does this add value? And again I said, "If you say to me, you know, we've tried it, it works, but, frankly, we're just as happy with other stuff, I say, that's okay, I don't care. You know, it's no skin off my nose. If you feel it adds value, then we'll continue to pursue it." And the people I talked to, which included not just the chiefs but others who were involved, said it did add value, but it did not -- it was not optimal; it wasn't as good as it could be.

And to make it as good as it could be they needed to make some changes to the software to give it some features it didn't have. It also probably turned out to be the case that some things that we had worked hard to get fixed didn't -- weren't really worth it.

I'll give you a concrete example. They spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to get all this stuff in the common-operating picture, like the video feed and everything, into each of the cars. And then someone said to me, "You know, we've been thinking about it. We don't really know if you need the video feed in the car. You clearly want to have the map with the icons, but when you're driving along, you don't want to be watching a video. What you want is a map with icons to tell you where you're going, where the incursion is, and then you can take a radio relay that will tell you, you know, there are nine people there, they appear to have guns, et cetera, et cetera."

So that operational improvement, which is what we sometimes call COP 0.5, that's the next step, as is further deployment of this in other parts of the southwest border, starting in Tucson sector, when we begin to -- we expect to begin a further deployment of this this year.

I have read in the newspapers that there is a three-year delay, and for the life of me, I cannot figure out where that comes from. I have looked at the GAO report, and I think there's a way to misread the report. But to come up with that conclusion -- but I think you can't really actually read it to say we're delaying for three years.

What it said was we were going to -- we intended to complete the first phase this year, and we're not going to complete the first phase this year -- although we are going to begin the next phase this year. And then it said the whole thing would be completed by 2011. But that's, I don't think, terribly different from what we originally

conceived of. I mean, there's no doubt that the process of working out some of the kinks delayed this by, you know, five to six months. But to say it's three years, I just -- I don't know where that comes from.

So here is the bottom line. This is a workable, successful system; not an answer for every square mile of the border, but useful in some parts of the border, depending on the landscape. And even as we have done the process of testing this, we have continued all the other elements of SBInet, like the UAVs and the ground-based radar and the sensors. So we haven't lost time overall; we've proceeded on multiple tracks.

Why do I spend a lot of time on this? Because this is where -- how you find real solutions to a problem. The problem is how do you manage the border to reduce the risk of incursions? And the answer is you use all of the tools of the toolbox, everything from fencing to hi-tech. If something doesn't work, you either fix it or you move to something else. You keep on a disciplined time line, but you don't let the time line overwhelm the reality. And we should take an honest assessment of where we are.

But it's neither honest for me to come out and say everything works perfectly, this was a dream come true from the very beginning, but nor is it honest to say everything is a failure, we haven't accomplished anything. That's just incorrect. It may serve some people's personal agenda to argue that we should not use any technology or we should use only technology. I'm in that kind of pragmatic, "let's use whatever works in a cost-effective way" mode.

The final thing I'll say about this, because in a way it's a microcosm of where the department is I think this whole -- what we've done at the border is a great illustration of where the department is. Until 2006, when we unrolled our SBI program, we did not have a fully disciplined, strategic plan for managing the immigration process. The people who were responsible for detention at ICE had not really built a plan together with the people at CBP who arrested people. The Coast Guard was not fully linked up with Customs and Border Protection in terms of their strategies. Everybody pursued their own task, and they did it without seeing the impact of that on someone else in the system. It's a little bit like hiring a bunch of cops to make arrests, but not ever bothering to hire prosecutors and courts to try people in, so when you arrest them, you have to release them because you can't put them in jail.

So we built an integrated system to plan SBI, and that's what SBI was: it was bringing all of these groups to the table to do an integrated plan. We then built what we'd never had in the department -- metrics -- so that every week, I get how much fence is built, how much technology is deployed, how many Border Patrol agents have been recruited, how many arrests have been made, how many people have been released after they've been arrested, and we can track and manage and see when there are problems in the pipeline.

And finally, as we've moved forward with the deployment, we've used these tools to make sure that we continue to synchronize together and we measure a positive result, which is a decrease in the flow and, from a variety of standpoints, a pretty clear indication we are moving in the right direction. It's not going to be done -- we're not going to have cured the problem this year, but we will have made a very substantial stride this year.

So that's kind of my opening thing, and I don't want to restrict you to that; it just happens to be kind of what's on my mind, and it's a good emblematic issue.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, on the Hill this morning you were asked what you feared the most, when you talked about a private aircraft --

**Secretary Chertoff:** From a WMD standpoint, yes.

**Question:** -- right, private aircraft with a nuclear bomb. And you went on to say, that's why we are in the process of requiring new and stringent security measures for private aircraft. There are some already where pilots have to apply for waivers. Is there something additionally?

**Secretary Chertoff:** This is a different -- yes, we want to have -- these are for overseas flights from Asia and Europe -- to require advance notification of the -- and we've got a regulation coming out very shortly to address this -- advance notification of who the crews are, so we can make sure we're -- we've checked them, and who the passengers are.

And then where we want to go the next level is to ultimately have every private plane that's making a trans-oceanic crossing either check the identify of the people on the plane and scan the plane for radiation before it leaves its fixed-based operator, or if they're leaving from a location that doesn't -- where we don't have the capability to do that, to have them land at a spot, an intermediate stop, on the way to the United States, where

we will do the scanning and we will also pre-clear them through Customs and Immigration. So they won't have to do it twice, but we will essentially move the Customs and Immigration screening process overseas, as opposed to have it here.

This would very dramatically reduce the risk that if someone -- if they got a hold of a nuclear bomb, would rent a private jet and then fly the bomb into the United States.

**Question:** What about planes from Canada and Mexico?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Canada -- we've spoken to the Canadians and we are hoping that they will synchronize a system that is identical or very similar to ours so that we know that you can't go into Canada with respect to - without passing the same muster.

I think as we're going to -- we need to also work with the Mexicans, as well. I don't think we're -- the likelihood, at this point, that someone's going to find a nuclear bomb in Latin America and fly it from Latin America is that great, but I agree there is a concern -- although it's somewhat further down the road -- that someone could smuggle a bomb into Latin America and then try to fly it from Latin America.

But from a risk management standpoint, we want to first address that threat which would come in through the shortest and most direct route, and then once we've got that dealt with we'll need to think about more indirect routes where, by definition, because they're indirect, the risk is somewhat low.

**Question:** What's the time frame?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Well, we'll get the regulation on the screening out very soon, and we are already having some negotiations and discussions with fixed-based operators about doing some kind of scanning overseas.

**Question:** Is there some specific threat information?

**Secretary Chertoff:** No, I'll tell you exactly what it is. I've spent three years talking about people putting nuclear bombs in containers and cargo ships, and we have now got to the point where you basically scan all those containers. But in thinking about what I would do if I were a terrorist, and in consulting with other people, including people in the industry, it occurred to me that, why would I put the bomb in a container if I can rent the jet and put it in the jet?

And so it's one of these deals where I don't want to spend all the money locking one door and have this door right next to it be wide open, flapping in the breeze. That doesn't make any sense. So what we do in general is we look at all of the threats and we say, where have we -- do we see that we are not reducing risk at the same level compared to every other level? We want to make sure that when we reduce risk, we're doing it for all the threats, not just for the one that happens to be discussed in the news.

**Question:** Where would this intermediate screening point likely be? Somewhere in Europe?

**Secretary Chertoff:** There would probably have to be one in Europe or one in Asia, or it might be we could do -- we've looked at the possibility of maybe doing something in Alaska if you're coming from Asia.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, if I can just talk about other deadlines, you had mentioned you're going to have a new No-Match Letter strategy, or rule, coming up soon?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Yes. Again, it's -- at OMB, we want to -- we're close to being able to issue a revised regulation.

**Question:** Do you think this month?

**Moderator:** I don't know if we could say this month.

**Secretary Chertoff:** Within a few weeks.

**Moderator:** -- a few weeks, yes.

**Secretary Chertoff:** It's never as fast as I would like, but I would say within a few weeks we'll get a new regulation out, and then that should, I think, address the judge's concerns, although I'm -- I can predict with virtual certainty that the plaintiffs will still attack that regulation. But I think we're pretty comfortable, and we're

still pursuing the appeal to do a track strategy.

**Question:** And then the other deadline on e-Verify -- when do you plan to have your contractors start using that system?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Again, it's in the regulatory process. I feel badly for OMB because we're kind of giving them -- we give them a lot of work. But I think, again, this spring I would hope we have something out there.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, as you head toward less than a year left in your job, what are the things that you want, need, to get done before you walk out the door?

**Secretary Chertoff:** I think we need to get the cyber security strategy up and running, and begin the process of implementing that. We need to live up to our commitments with respect to the border security strategy I've described. We need to move forward to the next stage of REAL ID. We need to make some progress on now getting every US-VISIT air exit in place and our Electronic Travel Authorization in place so we can begin to let the Visa Waiver Program countries participate in that, and that's going to raise the general level of security.

If we get that stuff done, plus some further integration in the department, I think we will be able to say that we have left this department in very sound condition for the next leadership team. They'll still have more work to do, but we'll have given them kind of a very good framework within which to operate.

**Question:** Can I ask you about Project 28 again, in the sense -- the GAO report does cite the SBI program manager as saying that they expected to complete the first phase of -- all of the first phase of the projects by the end -- of the technology projects by the end of the calendar year 2008. And then it goes on to say that however, in February they estimated the first phase would be ended --

**Secretary Chertoff:** That's not exactly --

**Question:** -- in 2008, and then 2011 for the rest.

**Secretary Chertoff:** All right, let me have -- I'm not -- the one thing I won't do is -- if you're going to try to hit me with something, we're going to have to look at it. So I'm going to tell you -- because I read this carefully. You have to listen to it. You have to read it carefully:

"We reported in October 2007 that SBI program officials expected to complete all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of calendar year 2008. However, in February 2008, the SBI program office estimated that the first planned deployment of technology will occur in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector by the end of calendar year 2008, with the remainder of the deployments to the Tucson, Yuma and El Paso sectors completed by the end of calendar year 2011."

So by the end of 2011, all of the deployments will be done. Not just the first phase -- all of it. And what happened here is somebody, when they wrote the report, ignored first phase and conclusion and just took two dates and said, well, one's 2008, one's 2011; therefore, there is a three-year delay. I'm not saying there's no delay. I think if you read your report, they said there's about a five-month delay. But I'm saying it's simply inaccurate to say there's a three-year delay. That's just wrong.

**Question:** So that -- what happens in between the Tucson projects and then the Yuma and the other one? Why is that --

**Secretary Chertoff:** At each -- because you go one -- look, because we start in 2008 with more of Tucson, then in 2009 we go to Yuma, then in 2010 we go to El Paso. So you're scaling up each of these things, but it's what we call spiral development, and those of you who were at our kick-off press conference remember we actually used the term. At each stage, as you learn new lessons from deploying in a different area, you are going to make adjustments for the subsequent one. This is why, for example, we are now at Microsoft Word 6.0, because they didn't just use 1.0 over and over. Each time they get a new issue, they improved it.

**Question:** Okay. And this report also mentions that problems getting survey access (inaudible) for the fence itself could delay that beyond the end of 2008.

**Secretary Chertoff:** There's no question that there's a challenge. I think that's the word they used. There's a challenge with legal actions trying to slow us up, and that's always been true. I mean, we've set a deadline, we are on track to do it, but if we get a flurry of legal actions and we wind up getting tied up, that may delay us somewhat. That's why we find -- that's why, for example, people said, well, why did you finally go and get

eminent domain to get into the -- to survey the properties? The answer is we gave everybody a fair opportunity -- we talked to them. But what we weren't prepared to do was simply let it drift for months and months and months, because then we would have had that problem with the deadline.

So if there's one cultural message that should come out of this process -- is we are willing to listen, we are willing to adjust, but we do set a deadline because that discussion has to occur within a reasonable period. And if it merely becomes an opportunity to delay and delay and delay, we will at some point say, you know what, time's up, we're now going to go to the next step and move forward.

And that's, I think, exactly right. I think you owe people to have an open mind and listen, but I think the desire to try to satisfy everybody and endlessly discuss is exactly why every day I turn on the television I hear somebody complain that the government can't get things done -- and that's because we lack the willpower to execute on things within a reasonable time frame. But this project is not going to suffer from a lack of willpower to execute.

**Question:** Can I just follow up on something (inaudible) before I ask you a big picture question? When do you want to have -- by when do you want to have the new rules for screening private planes in place and working?

**Secretary Chertoff:** I think we'd like to have at least the advance notifications about the crews and the pilots in the middle of the year, this year. This is what I'd like to see. And then -- I mean, everything with the administrative process takes ages, because everything has to be commented and re-commented on. But I'd like to see us move forward with some pilots on overseas scanning later this year.

**Question:** And how far in advance do you want the notice? A matter of hours, like you do with commercial flights?

**Secretary Chertoff:** No, I think we'd probably try to synchronize it with commercial flights. I think with most private planes, you kind of -- a) you ought to know who your crew is -- and there aren't that many flights going trans-oceanic per day; I think it's like 400 a day. You ought to know who your crews and your passengers are. And then --

**Question:** Four hundred private flights a day?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Yes, that's what I'm told --

**Question:** From Asia and Europe?

**Secretary Chertoff:** From Asia and Europe. And you ought to be able to -- I mean, that's a rough estimate; that's what I'm told. You ought to be able to get that information. And if there's a last-minute addition, then have somebody send that to us at the last minute.

So then I heard somebody raise an objection, "Well, what if you're in a place where there is no Internet; you can't send in on line? And I have to confess, I'd really like to find that -- you can land the plane, a sophisticated jet, and you don't have Internet? That's really hard for me to accept.

In terms of the scanning, again, we want to start piloting that, no pun intended, this year as well.

**Question:** Does that take a big thingy, or is it something you can hold in your hand? Do you have to run the plane through a carwash type of thing?

**Secretary Chertoff:** No, no, no, you could do it with a handheld radiation monitor. And plus you also want to verify that the person who is on the plane is who is represented on the manifest. And that's a very easy thing to do.

**Question:** But just to be clear, when you say "advance notice on the pilot and the crew," how far in advance?

**Secretary Chertoff:** It might be an hour or something like that; not terribly long.

**Question:** Now the big picture question. You mentioned a lot of these goals in answer to another question about things that you would think if they get done would be an accomplishment. And it strikes me that many of them you do at the sufferance of Congress and they could easily change it the moment you're gone.

**Secretary Chertoff:** Yes.

**Question:** How much of a problem is that? And secondly, how much of a challenge has it been to find and keep good people in key positions?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Well, first of all, I think all of the stuff I've said I want to do this year I think we actually can do. In other words, I think we have the budget; the '08 budget funded all these things. Obviously the '09 budget hasn't come yet and that would affect the first quarter of fiscal year '09. And I think they're all within our authority to do. So I don't think to get this stuff done we need a lot more congressional work. I think we've laid the groundwork for that.

Obviously a future administration can undo things. And I think a lot of what I'm going to try to do here is make a persuasive case for why adhering to the course we've set makes a lot of sense. And if one reverses course and decides that, you know, the problem is overblown, there really isn't a big terrorist threat, 9/11 was a onetime shot -- if that's your belief and you can persuade the country to go in that direction, then you're going to have to be accountable for that.

As far as people are concerned, I think we have moved extraordinarily able career people into senior positions at all of the major components and operating elements. And I think our senior political leadership -- not that they're politicians, but that they are politically appointed -- are exceptionally able.

And let me just -- I want you to look at the heads of the seven major components of this Department. And I'm willing to stack them up against anybody in terms of actual, real world experience. The head of Secret Service and the head of the Coast Guard are both career professionals who rose through the ranks. The head of ICE I think has done a bang-up job, an exceptional job; and her number two is a career person. The head of Customs and Border Protection is a career Secret Service, up-through-the-ranks guy who became director of the Secret Service. The head of CIS, again, is an experienced manager with a lot of -- who has NSC experience. The head of FEMA, 35 years in the fire department, rising to chief of Metro Dade. The head of TSA had a lot of background from the Department of Transportation and is an outstanding manager.

I think they stack up professionally against anybody that's ever held a comparable job in the administration. So they're supported by a good cadre of career people. Our deputy nominee again served in senior positions in the Clinton administration -- not a partisan guy; a guy who was a senior guy at the Navy in management under the Secretaries of Defense under Bill Clinton.

So I think it's a great team. I'm realistic; we may get a little bit of attrition right at the end, but I think we've got a good team in place for a while.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, a REAL ID question, can you explain what happens for states who don't have this waiver deadline? Some report has been that certain individuals -- I guess the people in Montana, for instance -- would face extra screening going to an airport --

**Secretary Chertoff:** What's going to happen is this. Now, first let me make it clear. I'm not bluffing about May 11, and even if I were inclined to be a bluffer, which I'm not, the law makes it clear. The law passed by the Congress is: On May 11th, if you don't get a waiver, then you're going to have -- a driver's license will not be acceptable for federal purposes as an ID.

For most people, probably that means they'll come with another federally acceptable ID. If you don't have one, it's going to mean you're going to probably wind up being secondary or be delayed as people verify your identity. So it's going to be a hassle factor. I guess people from those states are going to have to start thinking they may have to get to the airport a little earlier than they would otherwise.

**Question:** How many states have not had the waiver?

**Secretary Chertoff:** I think five -- I think five have not yet sent in the waiver, and we've got, I guess, until the end of March.

**Question:** And you're going to absolutely enforce that at airports on May 11th, unlike at the borders right now where there was sort of this grace period?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Well, I think you will be asked questions and I think -- I'm sure there will be a little tolerance right at the beginning, if there's confusion. But it's a law. I mean, basically I don't have a choice. I

mean, the people who say, don't do it -- they're saying, break the law. I'm not going to break the law.

Now, it doesn't mean if you don't have a -- you know, if you don't have ID now when you come to the airport, it's not that you won't fly, but you're going to spend some time explaining yourself. So I think what's going to happen is it's going to be more hassle starting on May 12th for people who don't have an alternative ID.

**Question:** Do you think that will probably end up being just two states?

**Secretary Chertoff:** I hope it's no states. But to me, the law is clear. And I think for people in states that are being adamant about not participating, if I were them I would start making sure I carry my passport, or if you have a PASS card, if you get one of those, that would be good; military ID will be good. There will be other things that will be fine, but I think that citizens of those states are going to find themselves looking for other kinds of ID to carry when they get on an airplane.

**Question:** You were asked yesterday by Senator Specter about the whole visa -- you know, denying visas to countries -- citizens of countries who aren't cooperating in terms of accepting their criminal aliens. Are you amenable to that? And you were talking about working with Congress in terms of legislation --

**Secretary Chertoff:** Well, we did, on a couple of occasions, have some countries that were really recalcitrant, and we actually did exert a little pressure. And to be fair, they had a desired effect -- they took a lot of people back.

You know, I said there was a problem with China. It's not that the Chinese say they won't take people back, they're just very slow. And, you know, I have spoken to the Chinese, I had a meeting with them about this last year; we've raised it in a number of contexts. I think we're going to have to figure out how we address this issue. And if Congress is going to turn its attention to it, I'm happy to work with them on it.

**Question:** Do you see that as being, like, the core of any type of immigration legislation that would pass?

**Secretary Chertoff:** I mean, one thing we did say in the VWP program is, to become part of the Visa Waiver Program you do have to satisfy us that you will take back your own citizens. Now, most of the countries that want to get into it have routinely done it. And most countries actually do take people back. So it's only a very few countries that have really been a problem.

**Question:** Back to the fence, just to clarify, when will the entire fence be done, physical and virtual?

**Secretary Chertoff:** Well, 670 miles should be done by the end of this year. We will probably build some additional physical fencing beyond that. I can't tell you what an exact number is. I suspect that physical fencing will -- if there's going to be more than the 670, whatever that number is, it will probably be done the following year.

On the technology, I think we're certainly -- I'd like to say in the next couple of years we'll basically get most of that done. Now, will there be continuous improvement? Probably. There will probably be adding and retooling after that. But I think a lot of this can be done in the next couple years, during '09 and '10 fiscal years.

**Moderator:** All right, thanks, guys.

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