

DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM AND TERRORISM IN CONTEMPORARY PAKISTAN

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DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM AND TERRORISM IN CONTEMPORARY PAKISTAN

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will come to order.

Let me first apologize to our distinguished witness, but the floor schedule slipped, and we just cast our last series of votes.

It is also a very good day because, given the spectacular speech of the President of France, I think we are on the verge of a renaissance of Franco-American relations of unprecedented proportions, which augurs well for Europe, the United States and for the stability of the entire world.

Today's hearing could not be more timely. A few weeks ago when I called this hearing, we planned to deal with the state of political affairs in Pakistan and how the United States could best help to provide stability and security in the region. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte was invited to testify on the situation of terrorist elements finding sanctuary in the border areas of Pakistan. We asked that he analyze the effectiveness of current United States foreign policy toward Pakistan. We also requested the Secretary to give us his assessment of the strength of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. We suggested that he offer an evaluation of the current political leadership in Pakistan.

Secretary Negroponte, we were quite pleased that you accepted our invitation to testify back then. Given what has happened since Saturday, we are delighted that you did not break our date. No doubt, your prepared testimony has evolved over the last few days.

From the perspective of the United States, what happens in Pakistan is of tremendous importance. The political crisis there has broad implications for our country, for Afghanistan and for all the nations in the region. Today, we will address some of those concerns.

Because I believe we need to have a serious dialogue between the administration and the members of this committee, we will just have very brief opening statements from the chair and ranking members of the full committee and of the subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

As a last word, I just wanted to note that President Musharraf has reached out to officials in our Government, both in the admin-

istration and in the Congress. He placed a call to me just yesterday, and I find it noteworthy that, in this time of crisis, he is seeking a dialogue from both the administration and the Congress.

I now turned to my esteemed colleague and friend, the ranking member of the committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any remarks she would like to make.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you as always, Mr. Chairman. And I join you in welcoming our distinguished Deputy Secretary of State to our committee.

General Musharraf's recent actions are deplorable. His express commitments have proven to be only empty promises. He has betrayed the trust of the United States and, more importantly, of the Pakistani people. He suspended the Constitution and dismissed most of the Supreme Court judges. This, in addition to the arrest of over 500 lawyers, opposition politicians and human rights activists, can only be described as a devastating blow to Pakistani democracy. New restrictions have also been placed on the print and broadcast media.

By taking Pakistan off the path toward democracy and civil rule, General Musharraf has further jeopardized social stability, not enhanced it. This is what Asma Jahangir had to say about the current situation in Pakistan. She is the former *Time Magazine* Asian Hero, a member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and a former special rapporteur of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights. She says:

“The President said he had to clamp down on the press and the judiciary to curb terrorism. Those he has arrested are progressive, secular-minded people, while the terrorists are offered negotiations and ceasefires.”

In light of the anti-military-crew restrictions contained in United States law, it would be appropriate for the administration to place our security assistance programs to Pakistan under review. Yet, it would be counterproductive to suspend assistance that directly benefits the Pakistani people or which supports counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and other extremist elements. Al-Qaeda and other extremists are launching increasingly bold attacks against the Pakistani state and society. They seek to destabilize Islamabad and use Pakistan as a base of operations to strike the United States and the West.

It remains, as the chairman has said, in our Nation's long-term interest to forge an enduring strategic partnership with a democratic, stable and prosperous Pakistan that remains a strong partner in the campaign against Islamic militants and which maintains responsible controls over its nuclear weapons capabilities. What happens in Pakistan has implications for our homeland security.

And I am particularly grateful that Ambassador Negroponte, given his previous role as Director of National Intelligence, is appearing before us today to share his insight and to discuss options for the United States and for our allies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let us be clear at the outset. What the world has witnessed since General Musharraf declared emergency rule last Saturday is, most emphatically, not about fighting terrorism. It most certainly is about General Musharraf's keeping his job or, should I say, both jobs. The pictures from Islamabad do not show any al-Qaeda or Taliban terrorists being arrested, but they do show, all too vividly, a brutal crackdown on opposition politicians, lawyers and human rights activists.

Press reports do not tell us the Pakistani Army is tracking down al-Qaeda or Taliban terrorists along the border with Afghanistan, but they do tell us of the removal of seven Supreme Court justices, of the closure of the independent media outlets, of the suspension of the Constitution and of the postponement of January's parliamentary elections.

Ever since 9/11, the Bush administration has ignored democratic development in Pakistan and has turned a blind eye to General Musharraf's manipulating the political process to ensure his continued terror in office. He has made and then broken repeated promises to step down as Army Chief and to restore a legitimate, civilian, democratic government to Pakistan. At every turn, the Bush administration has given him a pass.

Even on the subject of nuclear proliferation and the potential that nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists, the danger described by this administration as the most serious threat facing the United States, President Bush is willing to take Musharraf at his word when he says the A.Q. Khan network has been rolled up and is not a threat anymore.

The administration has accepted all of this in the name of Musharraf's commitment to fighting terrorism, a commitment which, in my view, has always been halfhearted at best. Always focused on al-Qaeda, but not on the Taliban. Always willing to arrest high-profile al-Qaeda operatives just at the right moment, but will let the Taliban move freely back and forth across the border with Afghanistan. And never quite willing to give up the idea that, someday, the Taliban will be useful to him in countering Indian or Iranian influence in the region.

When the Bush administration welcomed Musharraf's verbal expressions of support in the fight against terror, it never pushed him to develop support for his fight amongst his own people. So, when it came time to confront al-Qaeda in the tribal areas, Musharraf had no political support to do so, and instead, he made deals with al-Qaeda-supporters in North and South Waziristan. Those deals were a disaster and only served to strengthen our enemies.

We now have the worst of all possible worlds. Our ally is an isolated and deeply resented leader who is less popular with his own people than is Osama bin Laden. Instead of arresting the terrorists who posed an existential threat to his regime, if not the country, he is arresting the very people with whom he could have worked to generate the political support necessary to rid Pakistan of extremists.

With \$10 billion worth of U.S. assistance since 9/11, our great and good ally in the war on terror told us to go take a hike again last weekend while he imposed martial law, but this time, Mr.

Chairman, we should not turn the other proverbial cheek. This time, there should be consequences.

We should stop the delivery of any further F-16s to Pakistan and cut off all further, other United States assistance until the state of emergency is lifted, the Constitution is restored, the fired Supreme Court justices are reinstated, opposition politicians and civil society activists are released, independent media is allowed to reopen, a caretaker government is appointed to hold free and fair parliamentary elections, and General Musharraf steps down, as promised, as Chief of the Army Staff.

It is time, Mr. Chairman, for the United States to have a relationship with the people of Pakistan, not just its military and certainly not just General Musharraf.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.

The chair will be ready to recognize Mr. Pence of Indiana and will do so when he arrives.

It is a pleasure to have with us today one of this Nation's most experienced and accomplished diplomats. Ambassador John Negroponte began his service to our country in 1960 when he became a Foreign Service Officer. Between then and 1997, when he left the Foreign Service, he held three Ambassadorships: To Mexico, to Honduras and to the Philippines.

Between 2001 and 2004, Ambassador Negroponte served as our Permanent Representative to the United Nations, a position he relinquished in order to become Ambassador to Iraq. After serving as our first Director of National Intelligence, he took up his current assignment as Deputy Secretary of State.

Ambassador Negroponte is a graduate of Yale. He speaks five languages and is the most distinguished member of our foreign policy establishment.

We are delighted to have you, Mr. Ambassador. The floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. NEGROPONTE,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and other members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

First of all, I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, that I have submitted a statement for the record, which has been circulated, I believe.

Chairman LANTOS. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. This is a summary version of those remarks.

First of all, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss our relationship with Pakistan.

Pakistan is a country vital to our interests. Its cooperation is critical to our and NATO's cause in Afghanistan, and it is contributing heavily to our efforts in the war on terror. Pakistan is a country founded with a democratic mandate that has made fitful progress toward the ideal of democratic, civilian rule.

Until recently, Pakistan seemed to be on a path toward civilian, democratic rule. We strongly counseled against emergency rule, but Pakistan's leadership did not follow our advice. Over time, we have had a tumultuous relationship with Pakistan, marked by many ups and downs. After 9/11, President Musharraf made the strategic decision to partner with us. We are together with the Pakistani Government and people in resisting al-Qaeda and the Taliban and in creating a more prosperous, democratic and stable Pakistan.

Chairman LANTOS. The witness will suspend.

Any hand signals will result in the individual's being ejected from the room. The wearing of hats is not allowed in a committee hearing. You will remove your hat, or you will be ejected from the room.

Remove this man from the room. This is a committee hearing, and decorum will be maintained.

Please resume, Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Many Pakistanis say the United States has not been a consistent partner over the years, but there is no question that we Americans have a stake in Pakistan. And I think there is nothing more important, at this time, than for the United States to be closely engaged and committed to helping the Pakistani people fight violent extremism and to create a more stable and democratic Pakistan.

I hope, at the same time, that the Pakistani people understand that we strongly disagree with their Government right now about its recent decisions and about the right way to build a democratic state, but that disagreement should not translate into disengagement.

As President Bush said on Monday, November 5th, President Musharraf's new emergency powers undermine democracy. President Bush called on President Musharraf to restore democracy quickly to ensure that elections take place as scheduled and to resign his position as Chief of Army Staff as he had promised to do. But the President also pointed out that President Musharraf has been an indispensable ally in the global war on terrorism, a leader who extremists and radicals have tried to assassinate multiple times.

Since 9/11, Pakistan's Government and security forces have captured or killed more al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban militants than any other country. Under President Musharraf's leadership, Pakistan became a more moderate and prosperous country. Due to sound economic policies, Pakistan has enjoyed an average 7 percent economic growth rate since 2001.

The events of recent days notwithstanding, civil society and media groups have also strengthened under the present Government. A rapid increase in television and Internet media outlets has helped spark a broader and more participatory national debate about the direction of the country. Human rights and other civil society groups play a more influential role in the political process than they have in the past.

Pakistan is, undoubtedly, a more moderate and prosperous country since President Musharraf came to power. Despite this progress, we continue to believe that only civilian democracy can ensure a secure and prosperous future for Pakistan.

On November 5th, President Musharraf repeated his commitment to resign as Chief of Army Staff. We urge him to do so before he takes the oath of office to his second term, and we stand with the Pakistani people in expecting that he fulfills this promise. President Musharraf's resignation as Army Chief, in itself, will not represent a full transition to civilian rule in Pakistan, but it is an important step along that path.

A crucial gauge of Pakistan's progress toward democracy will be the upcoming parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Aziz said on November 5th that the elections would take place as scheduled in January 2008. We, again, stand with the Pakistani people in urging their Government to uphold its commitment to this important democratic benchmark. Whether the elections are free, fair and transparent remains to be seen.

We are doing our part through assistance programs geared toward improving electoral mechanisms. Secretary Rice said that we would be reviewing our assistance programs to Pakistan to see what actions or restrictions might be triggered by statute. And she said that, while we did so, we needed to keep in mind that we have an obligation to protect the American people. She noted that much of our assistance in Pakistan contributes directly to our national interests and to the counterterrorism mission.

Thanks to bipartisan congressional support, our assistance to Pakistan is accomplishing a great deal for the American and Pakistani people. Our programs are empowering Pakistan's moderate center to resist and to eventually defeat a violent, antidemocratic minority.

Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan since 2005 has had a profoundly positive impact on the people of Pakistan, generating goodwill that has lasted to this very day, we envision our Federally Administered Tribal Areas Program laying the foundation to permanently open this challenged environment to government and opportunity.

We have a wide range of programs planned for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, including security and law enforcement training, development and economic growth initiatives, democracy and human rights efforts, and ongoing infrastructure projects. These programs, along with the reconstruction opportunity zone legislation that we have consulted about with Congress, are critical to achieving our objectives in the war on terror.

Likewise, our international military education and training and Fulbright exchange programs are building essential bridges between our countries' leaders and people. Cutting these programs would send a negative signal to the people of Pakistan. The safety of our citizens and the stability of the region depend on nurturing the ties that we have begun to form.

A long-term partnership with the Pakistani people is the only option for the United States. We cannot afford to have the on-again, off-again interactions that have characterized our relationships in the past. Pakistan's future is too vital to our interests and to our national security to ignore or to downgrade it. Our challenge is to deal with the Government in a way that supports the Pakistani people and that helps them strengthen the influence of the moderate center in its fight against violent extremism.

With strong congressional support of the United States-Pakistan relationship since 2001, we have helped the Pakistani people move down the path of moderation, stability, democracy and prosperity. We are asking for congressional support in renewing our commitment to a long-term partnership with the Pakistani people. There is not a mission in the world more deserving of our considered patience and steady engagement.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to try and answer any questions that you or other committee members might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan has been in the news a great deal during the past several months, and not without reason. Events in Pakistan deserve our country's full attention. What happens in Pakistan directly affects our vital interests.

Pakistan is a nation with 160 million people, the vast majority of whom are Muslim. A nuclear-armed country with a historical rivalry and record of armed conflict with India, Pakistan sits on the crossroads between South and Central Asia. It shares a 1,600-mile-long border with Afghanistan, where we and our NATO allies have so much at stake. Pakistan's continued cooperation is vital to our cause in Afghanistan. It is a country founded with a democratic mandate, that has made fitful progress toward the ideal of democratic civilian rule. Under President Musharraf, Pakistan has become a more moderate, more prosperous partner, than it has been at some points in its past, with a government that shares many of our most basic strategic imperatives. Until recently, Pakistan seemed to be on a path toward civilian democratic rule. However, as you all are well aware, on November 3 the government of Pakistan implemented a state of emergency that impedes Pakistan's democratic development and transition to civilian rule and compromises its tradition of an independent judiciary.

We strongly counseled against emergency rule, but Pakistan's leadership did not follow our advice.

Let me review our rather unusual and tumultuous history with Pakistan over the last half-century. We had very close cooperation after Pakistan's independence in the 1950s through CENTO and SEATO. That gave way to a period of inaction in the 1960s. There was President Nixon's famous tilt towards Pakistan and then, of course, some of his successors tilted away. We had a very close period of partnership with Pakistan against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s but then we parted ways over Pakistan's unwelcome advancement of its nuclear weapons program.

After 9/11, President Musharraf made the strategic decision to throw in Pakistan's lot with us. And we are together with the government of Pakistan and, more significantly, with a great majority of the Pakistani people, in wanting their country to be peaceful and stable and wanting their country to resist al Qaeda and the Taliban. The single greatest change to the way we see our strategic interests is the newfound realization that what happens in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, is now vital to our most important national interests.

We can't escape the fact that Pakistan is important to the United States as we try to fight violent extremists and terrorist groups and stabilize Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many average Pakistanis believe the United States has been very inconsistent in its engagement with their country over many decades and very inconsistent in our commitment to support their democratic aspirations. And I think the answer is that there's nothing more important at this time than for the United States to be consistently engaged and committed to try to do the right thing with Pakistan and help that country to become more stable and democratic.

And so I hope that the Pakistani people will see us as a reliable friend and a reliable partner. I hope they'll understand as well, and the government will understand, that as a good friend, we need to speak frankly from time to time with them and about them. We strongly disagree right now with the government's recent decisions and feel those decisions are contrary to the steps needed, to build a stable democratic state. As President Bush said on Monday, November 5, we had stressed

before President Musharraf decided to issue the Proclamation of Emergency that emergency measures undermine democracy. President Bush called for democracy to be restored quickly, for elections to be held as scheduled and for President Musharraf to resign his position as Chief of Army Staff. But the President also pointed out that President Musharraf has been indispensable in the global War on Terror, so indispensable that extremists and radicals have tried to assassinate him multiple times.

The bottom line is, there's no question that we Americans have a stake in Pakistan. It needs to be a long-term stake, and, as the 9/11 Commission has documented, we need to sustain our engagement if we are to effectively assist the majority of the Pakistani people to realize their desire for a more moderate, stable and democratic state. The period of estrangement in the 1990's and the Pressler, Symington, and Glenn Amendments created a strategic disconnect between our two countries. A generation of U.S. and Pakistani leaders, including our military leadership, did not cooperate closely with one another, and we suffered the consequences. As the 9/11 Commission Report described, those amendments, while well intentioned, limited our ability to fully address counterterrorism with Islamabad before the 9/11 attacks.

Many Pakistanis are skeptical of our stated commitment to a long-term partnership based on common democratic objectives, and this skepticism makes it difficult for our governments to focus on the fight against terrorism and progress toward a more democratic future for Pakistan. We cannot afford to return to our past estrangement. Partnership with Pakistan and its people is the only option. As we assess our relationship with Pakistan, we need to protect our vital, long-term interests in Pakistan by helping the Pakistani people ensure Pakistan's progress toward democracy and civilian rule.

I'd like to talk now about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001. Since that time, the Government of Pakistan has been an indispensable leader in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Pakistan's Government and security forces have captured or killed hundreds of Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban militants, including some of the most senior terrorists from these groups, since 2001. Pakistan has become a more moderate and prosperous country. According to an October 2007 International Republican Institute poll, 74% of Pakistanis believe religious extremism is a problem in Pakistan that needs to be confronted, a ten percent increase since just June 2007. In 2002, a Pew Research poll found that 33% of Pakistanis believed suicide attacks were sometimes justified. In 2007, that figure had dropped to 9%, with 72% of Pakistanis saying suicide attacks were never justified. In 2006, Pakistan's National Assembly passed the Women's Protection Bill, landmark legislation in Pakistan's history that aims to protect female rape victims. Pakistan has enjoyed an average of 7% economic growth since 2001, due in part to President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's sound economic policies.

These successes were in no small measure due to the growth of civil society and media groups under President Musharraf. A rapid increase in television and Internet media outlets helped spark a broader and more participatory national debate about the direction of the country, and human rights and other civil society groups played a more influential role in the political process than they have at many points in the past. Pakistan has undoubtedly made progress toward becoming a more moderate, stable, and prosperous country since President Musharraf came to power, and that is why we are so concerned that the backsliding inherent in the state of emergency be reversed before it damages these positive trends. Only full democracy can build a sustainable, long-term consensus on a bold counter-terrorism agenda and a moderate, prosperous future for Pakistan.

It is for this reason that we are urging the government to return to laying the foundation for a sustainable transition from military to civilian rule, and fulfilling its commitments to do all it could to ensure that upcoming parliamentary elections occur on time and reflect a free, fair, and transparent political process. The current state of emergency calls into question these commitments, but we should work to achieve their fulfillment, not pre-emptively write them off.

For example, President Musharraf repeated his commitment November 5 to resign as Chief of Army Staff before he re-takes the presidential oath-of-office. We strongly urge him to keep his commitments about the timing of elections and resigning as Chief of Army Staff, and we stand with the Pakistani people in expecting that he fulfill those commitments. President Musharraf's resignation as Army Chief will not in itself represent a full transition to civilian rule in Pakistan, but it would be a key important step in the right direction.

Another important gauge of Pakistan's progress toward democracy will be the upcoming parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Aziz said on November 5 that the elections would take place as scheduled, in January 2008. We again stand with the

Pakistani people in urging their government to uphold its commitment to this important democratic benchmark. The Government has repeatedly stated that it will do all it can to ensure these elections are free, fair, and transparent. We are doing our part through assistance programs geared toward improving election practices in Pakistan. One thing is certain, the United States and others in the international community will be watching the upcoming elections closely.

We are also hoping that government efforts to reach understanding with opposition political parties will bring about a broader and more participatory political process leading up to the parliamentary elections. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 18 after eight years in self-imposed exile. She leads one of the major national political parties in Pakistan, and her intention to contest parliamentary elections in January will add to the democratic choices available to Pakistani voters.

Secretary Rice talked about our relationship with Pakistan on November 4, shortly after President Musharraf declared the state of emergency. She said that we would be reviewing our assistance programs to Pakistan in the context of statutes governing provision of aid to that country; and, she said that while we did so we needed to keep in mind that we have an obligation to protect the American people. She noted that much of our assistance in Pakistan contributes directly to our national interests and to the counter-terrorism mission, whether addressing terrorism and security concerns directly, or whether addressing the underlying social, economic and political conditions that terrorists and violent extremists exploit.

Thanks to bipartisan Congressional support, our assistance to Pakistan is accomplishing a great deal for the American and Pakistani people. Our programs are empowering Pakistan's moderate center to resist and eventually defeat a violent minority. This minority is seeking to undermine a peaceful, law-abiding citizenry. The Agency for International Development's economic development programs are laying the foundation of a sustainable economy in areas that previously had little hope and were vulnerable to extremist infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on the people of Pakistan—generating good will that has lasted to this very day—we envision our Federally Administered Tribal Areas program laying the foundation to permanently open this challenged environment to government and opportunity.

We have a wide range of programs planned and in fact just getting started in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, including security and law enforcement training, development and economic growth initiatives, and on-going infrastructure projects. The goal is to make these regions inhospitable to violent extremists. These programs, along with the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation we have consulted about with Congress, are critical to achieving our highest short and long-term objectives in the War on Terror. Our International Military Education and Training and Fulbright exchanges programs are building essential bridges between our countries. These programs buttress our efforts in the War on Terrorism, and are essential to maintaining forward momentum in building a long-term, broad-based relationship with the Pakistani people. Cutting these programs would send a negative signal to the people of Pakistan. The safety of our citizens, and the stability of the region, depend on our nurturing positive ties to the people of Pakistan and using them to push the military government to allow its citizens to enjoy democratic freedoms to which they are entitled rather than leaving violent extremism as the only political alternative.

I believe that given the long-term nature of our relationship, it is important that our assistance programs continue to help the Pakistani people through this difficult current period and solidify our long-term relationship.

Long-term partnership with the Pakistani people aimed at building a stable, democratic society is the only option. We cannot afford to have on-again, off-again interactions that characterized our relationship in the past. Pakistan's future is too vital to our interests and our national security to ignore or to down-grade. Our challenge is to effectively support the Pakistani people and to help them strengthen the influence of the moderate, democratic center and fight violent extremism. With strong Congressional support of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001, we are helping the Pakistani people move down a difficult but necessary path of moderation, stability, democracy, and prosperity. We are asking for Congressional support in renewing our commitment to long-term partnership with the Pakistani people. There is not a mission in the world more deserving of our persistence and considered patience.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, Ambassador Negroponte.

Let me first ask my friend, the gentleman from Indiana, if he would like to make an opening statement.

Mr. PENCE. Mr. Chairman, my statement would be to say how grateful I am that you called this hearing at such a time as this. I welcome the Ambassador.

Out of deference to my colleagues here who are gathered, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, the first question I would like to raise is: What is the administration's judgment about the feasibility of having truly free and fair elections in the immediate wake of what is essentially martial law, including the sacking of Supreme Court and other high court justices and the mass jailing of opposition political figures and human rights activists?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our view is that the electoral timetable that has been envisaged—that is to say, holding the elections for a new legislature sometime around January of this coming year—should be adhered to.

We think that, as President Musharraf and those in his Government have indicated, if these emergency measures are lifted in the very near future—and one assurance that we have been repeatedly given is that they will be lifted as quickly as possible—then we do believe that there is still time to organize reasonably fair and free elections. And that is something that we are very much prepared to try and support through the various aid programs that I mentioned and that we think are still possible.

Although, obviously, Mr. Chairman, the longer this emergency situation goes on, the more difficult, I think, the political atmosphere will become.

Chairman LANTOS. Led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, several administration officials have indicated that our aid program to Pakistan will undergo a review. Now, I presume that review has not yet been completed, but may I ask: What are the conceptual alternatives you are considering in adjusting the aid program or in terminating aid?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Again, as I mentioned, our strong preference, Mr. Chairman, is that the Government terminate the emergency condition as soon as possible and get the country back on track toward the constitutional process and the elections that were envisaged. The sooner that happens, it will be not only the better in terms of Pakistan's political development but, I think, the less likely it will be that some agonizing reappraisal, if you will, of our assistance programs will be required.

As you know, there are a number of statutes that govern assistance to Pakistan. At the moment, we are undertaking a review, but we really have not gotten to the point where we are looking at the various alternatives available to us. It is more a cataloging of the assistance programs, having a look at what is and what might not be affected by the statutes concerned.

Our judgment at the moment is that there is nothing that is automatically triggered by the current situation, that everything is covered at the moment by appropriate waivers. But, obviously, if this situation continues on more indefinitely, it will undercut the political support for continuing at least certain aspects of our assistance programs.

Chairman LANTOS. Shortly before she left for Pakistan, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited me, and we had a lengthy meeting. During the course of that meeting, it became clear to me, as it had to others, that she was thinking of developing some kind of a partnership with President Musharraf. She had hopes of working with him on a wide range of issues. Indeed, she asked me to call the President to arrange for security upon her arrival, which I did, and I was assured that that security would be forthcoming. Recent statements by former Prime Minister Bhutto indicate a change of view.

Could you enlighten us as to what the administration's dialogue with Prime Minister Bhutto indicates as to her present intentions?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. First of all, with respect to the former Prime Minister's security, this is an issue that she has brought to our attention as well, Mr. Chairman, and it is something that we have raised with the Government. Of course, it is the Government of Pakistan that has the full responsibility for providing security for Ms. Bhutto, and our understanding is that they are making every appropriate effort to provide her with the requisite security.

As far as what dialogue we might have had and continue to have with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, first of all, I would say that we at the Embassy in Islamabad have tried to keep our lines of communication open with all moderate political leaders in Pakistan, including Ms. Bhutto. We have also tried to encourage the moderate center, as I referred to in my remarks, and we think it is highly desirable that the body politic in Pakistan coalesce around this moderate center as opposed to polarizing toward extremes. So we continue to believe that individuals like Ms. Bhutto can play an important role in the political future of Pakistan and that dialogue between individuals such as herself and the Government of Pakistan are to be encouraged.

Chairman LANTOS. One of our ongoing complaints against the Government of Pakistan has been its less-than-wholehearted commitment to fighting Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorism. What is the administration's current appraisal of the effectiveness of the Government of Pakistan's effort to put an end to terrorism by the various groups that I indicated and others?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. As I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman, no country has done more in terms of inflicting damage and punishment on the Taliban and on the al-Qaeda since 9/11. The record is quite impressive. And of course, during my time as Director of National Intelligence, I had the opportunity to observe this kind of activity quite close up. So I think that we need to commend the Government and the security forces of Pakistan for the work that they have done in that regard.

Nonetheless, there is still room for increased cooperation between us, and more, obviously, can be done, particularly in terms of extending better control to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, which is probably from where most of the violent extremism in Pakistan emanates.

To that end, we have been very supportive of the Pakistani Government's recent plans to develop the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. That is why we have \$150 million in our budget for economic and social assistance programs in that area. We see the sort

of medium- and longer-term plans to socially and economically develop that part of the country as part and parcel of the war on terror and the efforts to also rout these people out with security forces.

Chairman LANTOS. It has not been on the front burner visibly lately, but can you enlighten us as to what is our effort at the moment to bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think a lot of the effort has to be credited to the Governments of India and Pakistan, themselves. We had a more visible role back in 2002 when the two countries almost came to blows. I think they were successfully pulled back from the brink, thanks, in part, to the diplomatic efforts of one of my predecessors, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage.

Since that time, they have established a comprehensive dialogue between them. They have worked on different aspects of the India-Pakistan relationship: Trade, transportation, confidence-building measures, and even some dialogue on the areas of serious dispute between them, such as Kashmir and a couple of the other border disputes.

I would say that substantial progress has been made. And if Pakistan can get past the current political crisis that it confronts and if the situation can be stabilized, there is the hope of further progress in normalizing India-Pakistan relations.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, once again, for being here.

Two issues: The armed forces and analogies to Iran pre-1979.

What can you tell us about the views of General Musharraf among senior members of the Pakistani armed forces? Are they concerned that his actions are discrediting the Army, and would they prefer a genuinely civilian leadership?

On the Iran question, do you see any analogies between the United States support for General Musharraf and the current situation in Pakistan and the situation in Iran before the fall of the Shah in 1979?

Some have said that the U.S. has over-relied on a leader who has made efforts to modernize but who has a shrinking base of support. Others say, well, if you use that analogy of Iran, you could say that we should have stayed with the Shah, and Iran would be a better place now.

If you could comment on both of those issues, armed forces and Iran.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Thank you for your question.

On the second question first, I want to stress here, perhaps sometimes one uses the term—one uses the name of the leader of a country as a shorthand for one's entire relationship with a country. And I think sometimes we all tend to fall into that pattern.

But it is not about supporting one political leader. It is about helping a country, helping institutions, certainly helping the transition to a democratic rule and the carrying out of elections. I mentioned the fact that we have electoral assistance. It is about helping develop the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. That is why we have this substantial program. It is about supporting the Paki-

stani Army and the Pakistani Government because of the work that they have done to support us in Afghanistan, and that is a significant part of our military assistance.

Having said that, of course, we do have a respect and an admiration for the courageous leadership of President Musharraf and particularly of the decision that he took in late 2001 when he made a very, very strong statement about the war on terror in cooperation with us with respect to Afghanistan.

So it is a combination of factors, but it is not exclusively limited to the support for one individual.

As far as the armed forces are concerned, I cannot speak for how they feel about the situation at this particular moment. I think what I would say is that my understanding is that they care about stability in their country. They want to be able to carry on with their mission. I think they, as others, including ourselves, would acknowledge that the current situation is a distraction from their very high-priority security mission. To the extent that this situation is prolonged, it will undercut these other security objectives. And nobody wants to see that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have tremendous respect and admiration for people who have faith, but our foreign policy should not be faith-based. I have tremendous respect for loyalty, and the President's willingness to stand by his man in some cases is admirable, but it defies the fact that sometimes there should be consequences. The truth of the matter is that we are not doing this because we have the interests of the Pakistani people at heart but because we are trying to protect a necessary thug.

I remember when I was a young boy, very young, and my mother was trying to stop me from doing something I should not have been doing, she said, "You had better stop that by the time I count to 3." She went, "1, 2, $2\frac{1}{2}$, $2\frac{3}{4}$, $2\frac{5}{8}$, $2\frac{3}{16}$, $2\frac{3}{32}$." I went on to be a math teacher, and I learned my mother had infinite patience. But if I did something that was seriously wrong, there were no fractions for the infraction; there were consequences.

Should there be consequences to the markers we lay down, such as we want to establish democracies in the Middle East, and then tolerate this kind of behavior when it suits us? Is that the lesson we are teaching?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. First of all, Congressman, I cannot agree with your characterization of the leadership of Pakistan. I think that the President is a committed individual who has been working very hard in the service of his country.

You mentioned the notion of loyalty, and we certainly have—the President has and we have a good relationship with President Musharraf and with his Government. That does not mean that we do not speak out when we think a mistake has been made. As I said in my comments, we strongly disagree with the move they undertook.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know that we strongly disagree with it, but to think that he is doing this in the interest of his peo-

ple, they know better. He has not been arresting the terrorists on television in the past week.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I am not saying he did this.

Mr. ACKERMAN. He is dragging away opposition—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Mr. ACKERMAN.—and Supreme Court judges and is trashing the Constitution and is disregarding the law that he wrote because he did not like the other law. He replaced the Supreme Court with—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. That is not an acceptable situation, Congressman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, but don't there eventually have to be consequences?

Listen, I have been a fan and a supporter, and I want him to succeed. It is important for our security interests in the Middle East. But in the end, you are going to have the story of Iran. You are going to be supporting a guy like the Shah, who was tough on terrorists and who did things that we needed, and, in the end, the results were absolutely and totally disastrous. And not one Iranian thought that we were supporting him because it was in their interests.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would offer the comment that this is a very delicate situation, that basically the political future of Pakistan is for the people of Pakistan to decide. We favor their moving in a democratic direction. We think it is in their best interest to do that, both in the interest of the political development of their country and in terms of the war on terror and in support for our efforts—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there any human rights violation he could conceivably commit that would change your mind, that would drop our support and that would get some other phone numbers of some other generals who could be equally helpful?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I would say this, in reply to that, Congressman: I think that the longer the situation goes on in its present form, the more difficult it is going to become. And that is why we believe it is so important that this state of emergency end as absolutely soon as possible so as to not confront us with the kinds of choices that you were describing.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Secretary, I very much want to be won over. With President Musharraf, who has done some great things, I have to see some movement on his part to try to make better what he has made very bad.

I yield back.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to say that I agree with my colleagues about having a solution that will meet with our goals of freedom, democracy, human rights and all of those things we believe in. But, you know, one of the things that concerns me is that you have to look at the world the way it is and not the way you want it to be sometimes. I think Bobby Kennedy said that a long time ago.

The gentlelady from Florida and the gentleman from New York just both alluded to the situation that took place in Iran some time ago, and I think we ought to all take a hard look at history. We

were the ones who led the fight to get the Shah out. We led the fight to get the Shah out, and we helped bring the Ayatollah back. Now, I do not think anybody, in retrospect, would say that was a good thing. Iran is now a radical terrorist state, in large part due to what we did when the Shah was there. Now, I am not saying that the Shah did the right thing. I am not saying that there were not human rights violations. But, you know, we have to look at the world the way it really is.

Right now, Pakistan is a friend and an ally of the United States. There are internal problems. There is just no question about that. We want to do what we can to work with them to solve these problems and to make sure that the things that we believe in prevail. But to start putting tremendous pressure on President Musharraf, who has been our friend and ally and who has helped us in the fight against terrorism, could lead to the same thing we saw back when the Shah was removed. We force Musharraf out, we beat the hell out of him and see him removed; what do you think is going to happen? I mean, we all want to see democracy. We all want to see freedom and human rights. But we might very well get the same thing we saw back when the Shah was removed, and I do not think we want to see that.

We are in a nuclear age. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. We cannot allow a radical Islamist fundamentalist government to take place over there. Musharraf is a stabilizing force, as far as the entire area is concerned, when you look at the world picture. So I think we have to be very, very careful about this. Sometimes free elections do not give us exactly what we want.

I remember Gaza, when we said we have to have free elections in Gaza. We did not get exactly what we wanted there. I do not think anybody thinks we got what we wanted there. Yet, we pushed on Israel to get rid of—I am talking about the West Bank. We pushed on Israel to give Gaza back to the people over there. What happened? The minute it was over with, the opposition started lobbing rockets into Israel, and we have a very unstable situation over there right now as well.

So I want to see things change in Pakistan. I want to see moderation occur. I want to see human rights and democracy and all of the things we have been talking about. We must realize one thing, and that is, if we are not careful, we are going to see the same thing happen that happened in Iran. And Pakistan is a nuclear power.

We cannot allow the same thing that happened in Iran to happen in Pakistan, and we have to be very careful. This Congress has to be very careful in the way we address this and in the things we say, because we may end up getting the same thing that we got in Iran. And that is something we do not want, especially in the nuclear age.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you again for coming to testify before this committee. And I want to say that we dearly appreciate your service to our Nation.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, Section 508 of the sanctions law, under the Foreign Operations Act, stipulates that whenever a military coup takes place in any country, our Government places sanctions against that country and we make demands that that country should return to democracy and have elections.

Two recent examples were the military coups that took place in Fiji and Thailand. We immediately placed sanctions against these two countries and demanded that they return to democracies and call for new elections, et cetera. I visited recently with the leaders of Thailand. Let me tell you that they were so disappointed when we did this to them, given the fact that, in their own unique and political way, they are able now to make plans to hold elections. Yet, after 8 years, we have not made such demands against General Musharraf.

I want to quote for you an article written by former Prime Minister Bhutto that appeared in today's *New York Times*. She quoted President Bush in his second inaugural address as saying:

“All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know that the United States will not ignore your oppression or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.”

My question is: Do you believe we are applying a double standard here? Do you believe we should revisit Section 508 of the sanctions law and establish a more equitable and fair process so that we can be more consistent with our basic fundamental values, principles of freedom, of democracy, and not just for us but for the world?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Congressman, Pakistan has been under, I guess they call them, “coup sanctions” since President Musharraf came to power in 1999. But, as you know, in October 2001, Congress recognized the urgent need to provide assistance to Pakistan to respond to the terrorist threat, and it passed the Pakistan Waiver Act. So that provided the President with the authority to waive the coup restrictions to enable the United States Government to provide assistance to Pakistan.

This is really the balancing act that we are involved in here as we speak, which is, on the one hand, we want to show our concern for democracy and for political development in that country. On the other hand, there is the criticality of providing Pakistan with assistance because of the fact that it neighbors Afghanistan, which is a critical partner in the war on terror. I think that this is just a situation that we are just going to continue to have to manage going forward.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My concern, Mr. Secretary, is that it has been 8 years since this gentleman took over the Government. He ousted two former Prime Ministers.

Osama bin Laden, by the way, who was responsible for 9/11, is still not captured. I believe, as long as he lives, there is going to be created a much greater participation and willingness of those extremists who believe in the same things, which is destroying our national security.

And I just kind of wanted to ask you—we are making an exception. So you are saying, then, let us just forget about democracy

and freedom for now, and let us continue having this gentleman being the military dictator that he is.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. By no means are we saying let us just forget about that aspect of the situation.

In fact, I just was passed a note. Our own President, at a press conference just a few moments ago, said—this was a message to President Musharraf—“You cannot be the President and the head of the military at the same time.” President Bush just said that at his press conference with Mr. Sarkozy. So I think that, you know, we are all pushing the democracy message.

While it may not be the optimal moment to defend the political record of the Government of Pakistan, I would like to make one point, which is that, in those years that you have referred to, Congressman, there have been some improvements in the human rights and civil society situations. For example, the press is freer; there are more radio and TV stations and so forth.

Again, it is hard to make that case at this particular moment in time. I recognize that.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here.

I have had the opportunity to visit President Musharraf twice in Islamabad. Actually, it is my view that the challenges that he has been facing are just so extraordinary—the madrassahs, the lack of ability to provide security in Waziristan and in the frontier. And I know that you have been proposing this in your statements.

What can we do to help him adjust to and indeed provide for a peaceful and a democratic solution to the dilemma that he is in now?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, certainly, we are sending him a strong message about how we think the democracy agenda is important. I think we are also saying that we think it is in his own and in the self-interest of his country and in the self-interest of the security and of the stability of Pakistan in the long-term.

I think the other thing we can do is—I think we should continue these important programs that are helpful both in the war on terror and in helping to encourage development and moderation in the country of Pakistan. This is a country that needs our assistance in many different ways to help modernize its society. So I think we want to send both the President and the people and the Government of Pakistan the message that the United States wants to be a reliable partner. We do not want to have wild swings up and down—ups and downs in the relationship, and that we want to be a consistent, reliable partner who is committed to their security, to their economic development and to a democratic evolution of their country.

Mr. WILSON. Another interest I have is, as the co-chair of the Caucus of India and Indian Americans, what do you see as the relationship between Pakistan and India under the current circumstance?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. It has gotten better since 2002. They have developed this comprehensive dialogue between them on var-

ious aspects of the relationship. They have been discussing some of their border disputes. There has been some good discussion there. There have been efforts to restrain the movement of terrorists across the borders.

So I think that, all in all, the India-Pakistan relationship is about as good as it has been in recent years. And if the current political situation in Pakistan can stabilize, I see the perspective of even greater progress in the India-Pakistan relationship.

Mr. WILSON. A concern that I have is that a destabilized Pakistan could, indeed, interrupt the progress that you have mentioned, including travel between the countries and the increase in trade between the two countries. Is there anything that India could do to help in terms of working toward stability?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think perhaps most importantly is not to try in any way to take advantage of the situation, and I do not see any indications that they are, so I think that is positive. If you will look back at the historical record, there were times when they did try to take advantage of political instability in Pakistan, so I think this is a net plus.

To the extent that they can try and keep the relationship on an even keel, I think that that would be a positive contribution.

Mr. WILSON. Again, I very much appreciate your pointing out that there has been success in the reduction of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan into India. That is just crucial toward the development between these two very important strategic allies of the United States.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. That is my understanding of what has happened.

Mr. WILSON. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I listened to Mr. Ackerman's criticism of Musharraf, and I agree with what he said. I listened to Mr. Burton talk about how we had better be careful because we do not want a repetition of what happened in Iran, and I agree with what he said. The question is: How can they both be right? They both are.

The truth, Mr. Negroponte, is that we are really caught between a rock and a hard place. It is very difficult and it is very hard for us to maneuver. I listened to your testimony, and I gleaned from it that we are trying to send a strong message because what Mr. Musharraf has done is unacceptable. On the other hand, we worry about what might come after him, which might be far, far worse.

When Benazir Bhutto returned triumphantly, she was almost assassinated, and many of us, of course, worry about future attempts on her life. It would, obviously, be a tragedy, not only a personal tragedy to her but a blow to Pakistani democracy, if anything were to happen to her.

Have we made it clear to Mr. Musharraf that her protection is a priority?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. We have, sir. We have inquired about her security with the Government. That has been a subject of a number of discussions between ourselves and the Government. Although, as I said earlier, it is the responsibility of the Government

to provide the necessary protection to Ms. Bhutto, and we are satisfied that they are doing what they can in that regard.

Let me make a point, though, that on her return, when the horrific bombing occurred, I think that most people would attribute that event to extremist elements. And I think that many of us feel that this is the kind of situation that al-Qaeda and other like-minded extremists might seek to exploit.

Now, we even do have some indications that they see an opportunity here, and so I think we have to be wary of behavior by al-Qaeda and others at this particular juncture. It is a very delicate time, and I think there is the danger that they will continue to try and exploit this kind of a situation.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I agree, but it is true that we have wished—someone said before that Osama bin Laden still has not been captured, and that is a symbol of how many of us feel that Mr. Musharraf has not gone after the terrorists and the al-Qaeda people as much as he is going after his democratic opposition right now. And that is something that really, really, really bothers us.

As to the national elections, you know, you mentioned that you hoped that he would resign as Army Chief of Staff, and we have urged him to do so. What repercussions are there if he does not resign? I mean, obviously, if he does not resign, it shows that he is moving the wrong way toward democracy. Democratic elections really cannot be free unless Benazir Bhutto and also Mr. Sharif, in my opinion, are allowed to come back and to participate.

Do you agree with that, about Mr. Sharif? Are we taking a position on Sharif's being allowed to return from exile?

Also, what if he does not resign as Army Chief of Staff? Would our administration's position change?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, let me answer the question about the repercussions and what if he does not take off the uniform.

I just mentioned that our own President now publicly, firmly on record has urged him to take off the uniform. I think we feel that, if he does not, especially having committed to do so on several occasions, the principal repercussions will be political inside of Pakistan itself. There are various political actors who feel it is important to hold the President to that commitment, and if it is not kept, I think you are going to see a strong reaction from those different elements.

So I think that is probably the principal repercussion, but it will also be an issue for us. We are hoping that—you are asking me a hypothetical, and hopefully, it does not turn out to be the case. Although, I suspect, if it does turn out to be the case, I will be up here more often.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I was wondering if I could have him answer my question about Mr. Sharif and if we have taken a position on his being allowed to return.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I am sorry, I wasn't trying to avoid that. That is an issue between the Government of Pakistan and Mr. Sharif. Apparently, you know, there had been dialogue between them before about the terms and conditions under which he had been released from detention a number of years back and that

he had committed to staying out of the country for a decade. I think we will just have to see how that issue evolves.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis. Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, how would you assess the relative strength of the various factions: The moderates, the military, and the extremists? Who has the upper hand? What is your sense of how much strength is in each of those pockets?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think that is a very—I think a very good, but a very difficult question to give you a precise answer to. I think as a general rule, and we were talking about this as I was preparing for the hearing, that the extremists are not many in number, but of course they tend to use more extreme methods to achieve their objectives. So they are dangerous in that regard.

I think that the large majority of Pakistanis probably want to pursue a moderate path.

I think at this juncture and given the political and security developments in that country, I would say either side predominates as between the military on one hand and the civil political forces on the other. I think the important thing is that they work together. I think they cannot go without each other over the longer term, and that partnership between them is really the answer to achieving a modicum of political stability and progress in that country.

Mr. INGLIS. Is it possible, though, that the partnership is the other way; some indication that perhaps the military isn't exactly what you would expect, that perhaps that really they have extremist elements, is that the—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. There have been times in the past when the military, particularly during the period of the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, that there were ties between the jihadist elements in Afghanistan and the Pakistan military that developed over the years, which led to some of the kinds of relationships and associations to which you are referring. But I think that has taken a turn in a more moderate direction; I think markedly so during the course of the past year, because there is growing concern amongst the military and other elements of Pakistani society about what they call Talibanization, both in the tribally administered or federally administered tribal areas, as well as the lowland areas.

You have noticed there has been some increase in suicide bombings and extremist activities. And that has been a cause of concern on the part of President Musharraf, the military, and I believe the society as a whole.

Mr. INGLIS. What is your—I am trying to approach things from a slightly different way. What is your assessment of the moderates' insistence to commitment to democratic principles? Is that strong enough that they will by moral authority bring that in, or is it a questionable kind of motivation?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Pakistan has grown a lot in recent years. I talked about the 7 percent economic growth rate. I think civil society has grown, particularly in the major urban areas. There are some very highly educated, Western-trained elements in the society. So I think that—and of course we live in an informa-

tion era. So that it is hard to suppress the flow of information back and forth between countries and throughout society. So I think that these elements are probably in a position of increasing strength.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just going to make some observations and in this time remaining I would be interested in your response. It is my own belief that the vast majority of Pakistanis fit under the term "moderates." You have quoted polls and there is no doubt that again upwards of 70 percent of Pakistanis reject terrorism, reject the Taliban, reject extremists in their society.

I wonder if we are using the right definition in terms of extremism. It is clear, at least from my perspective, and you use the term "encourage moderation," encourage the moderates; yet from all reports, it is the moderates, the democratic elements within Pakistan, that are being attacked by the Musharraf Government and that is the bottom line; they are under assault. And I am very concerned that we are going to once again align ourselves not with the democratic elements within that society, but with a despot, a militarist, if you will.

To call the 70 community leaders who were arrested in the hall while they were munching on cookies and having tea extremists, I think, is a mistake. They belong to the Human Rights Commission in Pakistan. Those that were detained included a college Dean, a poet, an economics professor, and a board member of the International Crisis Group which many of us on this dais are very familiar with. They do outstanding work.

You talked about the growth of the media in Pakistan, I am sure you are aware of an anchor, Mr. Hamid Mir, with Pakistan's independent TV network Geo, said Tuesday that that station's chief executive had been taken to a safe house operated by the country's intelligence service and accused of anti-Pakistani activities. I would suggest that the extremists are part of the Musharraf Government that are perpetrating those kinds of human rights violations, let alone rejecting their own constitution.

You also talked about in your prepared remarks, you referred to a Pew poll. That is a recent poll that was done by the International Republican Institute that mirrored the figures that you provided to us. At the same time they go on to indicate—and this is prior to the emergency delegation—that 83 percent of the Pakistani people rejected any kind of emergency order such as has been promulgated by this government. Eighty-three percent.

What is particularly disturbing, however, is the attitude of the Pakistani people toward the United States—and I didn't see that in your prepared statement—but some 15 percent that have a positive view of the United States and our policies. In fact, 64 percent of that poll indicates that they have a particular concern in terms of the United States being a threat to Pakistan, which exceeds the 45 percent that feel that way about their long-term rival, India.

I am very concerned, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ambassador, that we are going on a path here that will have consequences far beyond just Pakistan but all over the Islamic world in how we are viewed

that will undermine our national security, that will hold us up as the epitome of hypocrisy if we don't make a clear stand for democracy and the democratic forces in Pakistan.

If you wish to comment, take whatever time I have left.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I guess I would just comment on the last part of your statement, Congressman, which is I certainly don't see it as what we are saying up here is an act of hypocrisy, I think we have been rather candid about the rather difficult situation and the difficult challenge we face here. Somebody used the phrase "between a rock and a hard place." We are talking about at least two very important sets of interests here. One is the advancement toward some kind of democratic rule in that country and the other is protecting vital security interests of the United States in a country—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time Mr. Ambassador, I think the Pakistani people—

Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry, your time has expired. Let the Ambassador finish.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Just to finish my sentence, Mr. Chairman, that is all. Which is, that in a country where there are individuals, either al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates whom we know are plotting harm to the homeland of the United States and to the United States' interests around the world, this is a very serious matter.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank the Ambassador for all the great service that he has provided over my many years here in Washington. He has been involved in several of the issues of the day at a time when great threat was upon us, and he helped pull America through and I am grateful for that.

I disagree with my colleague from Massachusetts about the hypocrisy. But I would suggest that there is a certain lack of courage on the part of this administration and others, other administrations as well, to fully try to believe in the democratic ideals that we express.

And let me just note: Who cares if General Musharraf takes off his uniform? It is time for him to go. I don't care if he is in his uniform or out of his uniform, it is time for him to go. He has been a political juggler and has failed at that. He has been a political juggler instead of a leader. He has been a chameleon instead of a bold opponent to radical Islam or even a champion of moderation in his own country, and yet we are sticking with this failure when there is an alternative.

We have got other leaders there. Benazir Bhutto is there and available as an alternative. Musharraf and his ISI and the military have been the best friends of the radicals in Pakistan for as long as my memory. I have been deeply involved in that since the Afghan war with the Soviets. They created the Taliban, you know that, you just mentioned it in passing. They were the ones who permitted this madrassahs school system that creates radicalist Islamists instead of educated school children who can lead decent life; a heroin empire that now exists and undermines everything

we are trying to do. It is time for us to drop this guy and go to the real forces of moderation in that society.

The fact is the military has been the enemy of the moderates in Pakistan and been the friend of the radical Islamacists who are our enemies.

We have been sold a bill of goods that this guy is somehow like the Shah of Iran, who was the opponent of radical Islamacists. He is not. Behind the scenes, this is the man who oversaw this great expansion of radical Islamic power in that part of world. It is time for us to let him go, and it is time for us to start supporting the moderates and have the courage to understand if we really stand with democracy, in the end it will work out for us. If not, none of the moderates will ever believe in the United States in the long run anyway.

I would be very happy for you to disagree with me and show me where I am wrong, but that is coming from the heart.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think where I would answer you on that, Congressman, is with your point about their support, their alleged support for the radical elements. I believe that with the occurrence of 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan, and now particularly, as I mentioned to Congressman Inglis in reply to his question, with the Taliban and extremist elements starting to operate in the federally administered tribal areas, and even in the lowlands, I think there's a strong realization about the extremist threat in that country.

And I think that it is a threat that President Musharraf has been and continues to seek to face up to. So that would be my first point. And I think I would say likewise with respect to dealing with the issue of extremism and the madrassahs and so forth.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This man oversaw the creation of the whole system that created radical Muslims, rather than educated—he was there, he was in charge. So why are we sticking with him? Pardon me.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I stand by what I said, Congressman. I believe there has been a shift in attitudes and, as Congressman Delahunt was saying, I think attitudes in Pakistan are moderate and against this kind of extremist activity. And I think there is a general recognition in that society that that is a problem and it needs to be dealt with and dealt with effectively because otherwise it will impede the development of that country.

The only other point I would make is I am not sure if it is an appropriate way to characterize a situation as to whether we drop somebody as a leader or not drop them. Our support is to the people and the Government of Pakistan. Their political future is for the political forces and the political actors in that country to decide. And the only role we can play is that of providing encouragement and support. But I think this is something that they themselves are going to have to decide.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well said. Thank you.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu.

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday both the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* ran striking photographs on their front page. The front page above the fold, *New York Times*, was of a dark-suited attorney dressed

kind of like the way I am, getting tear-gassed. And the front page of the *Washington Post* was of another attorney being beaten by plain-clothes police. I just tried to imagine what it would take for some of my friends at Simpson, Thatcher, or Corvath to be out on Wall Street getting beaten by the cops. What would motivate them strongly enough to do that; and if that were to happen in our society, what that would indicate for the core support for whichever government had motivated dark-suited attorneys to get out in the street and get tear-gassed.

Now, we had a little bit of a challenge in 2000 with a disputed election, and when our Supreme Court voted 5 to 4, everybody saluted and we moved on. President Musharraf dissolved the Supreme Court and has put the chief justice under arrest.

I would like to think that we have moved beyond our Cold War doctrine of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Well, I don’t want to hold up the photographs, but I do want to turn to two quotes in today’s *New York Times*, which is, first of all, that the General is keeping the opposition political parties out of the political arena. As a result, a vacuum was filled by religious forces. Now, Musharraf is targeting the liberal forces of this country, yet they are the ones, the liberal forces are the ones who want to fight extremism.

And the statement that I want to focus on is “Expressions from the United States are taken seriously here and I feel the United States ought to put its foot down.” And this is said by a gentleman who is a corporate lawyer, whose firm has represented General Musharraf in the past.

What is preventing our Government from speaking more forcefully on behalf of the rule of law in support of the existing constitution of the State of Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think we certainly have been forthright; we have said we thought this—we strongly disagreed with it. We think that—

Mr. WU. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, it appears that that message has not gotten through if this gentleman is saying “Expressions from the United States are taken seriously here and I feel the United States ought to put its foot down.” I think the indication is that the United States is equivocating, or that the silence is deafening.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I was quoting earlier what our President had just said. I mention in my own testimony that we strongly disagreed with what Mr. Musharraf did, we think it was a mistake. I think my point is that we are trying to encourage the political process which has been derailed. We are the first to acknowledge that. The progress toward elected assembly and constitutional government has been derailed by President Musharraf’s action, and we are trying to encourage it back on track as quickly possible.

Mr. WU. Have we communicated this clearly to President Musharraf and to the news media in Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as clearly as I can right now. We have certainly had diplomatic exchanges with President Musharraf. And our Embassy, as a matter of fact, right in the aftermath of the move by the government, spoke up to express seri-

ous concern about the crackdown. So yes, I think our position is quite clear.

Mr. WU. So you think our public diplomacy has been effective and clear in this instance?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I can't argue that it has been particularly effective yet, because we haven't seen the kind of change that we would like to see occur, which is for the President to agree to take off his uniform before he gets sworn in for his second term and to publicly and explicitly and clearly set a date for legislative elections. That is the action we with like to see.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman's time has expired.

Gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service to our country.

When Secretary Rice testified 2 weeks ago, I asked her about Pakistan. I have been concerned about it, as I know you have for quite some time. They have been an effective, to some extent, ally on the war on terror, but they have produced characters like Ramsey Yousef, responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, his uncle, who was the master mind of September 11th, they were actively recruiting and training terrorists.

The London arrests primarily, again Pakistan. We think bin Laden is hiding by all accounts somewhere in the tribal regions in the Pakistan-Afghan border. A.Q. Khan developed the nuclear capability for Pakistan.

So you throw all these ingredients together, and of course an ISI which had a record of kind of playing both sides of the aisle at times, you throw the nuclear capability that they have, and it is a ticking time bomb.

I know the support from Musharraf has been important to create stability, but this power-sharing arrangement which I know Ms. Bhutto is interested in achieving and I know that you, as I understand, support it. I want to read from *The Wall Street Journal* yesterday, which said that she was supposed to share power after the elections with Mr. Musharraf on the assumption that a liberal civil military coalition government would be able to better tackle the war against religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. That is in danger of a shipwreck.

Can you comment on what you are doing to help in this power-sharing arrangement and what we are doing to help Ms. Bhutto?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. What I would say, first of all, we have encouraged over time in recent months the dialogue between the government and Ms. Bhutto. We also remain in close contact with her so that we have the best possible understanding of her perspective on things, and, needless to say, we stay in touch with the government. So while we are not the centerpiece of this process, we have certainly played a role of encouragement and sought to be facilitator where we could.

Mr. MCCAUL. As a follow-up, Ms. Bhutto in this article alleges that an ISI officer was responsible for the attempted assassination attempt, an ISI brigadier who is a close friend of Mr. Sharif. Do you have any information?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I do not. As I said earlier, I believe that this was a terrorist attempt by an extremist element such as al-Qaeda or some related group.

The other point I would make to your earlier comment about cooperation in the war on terror, yes, there have been issues in our cooperation. But I would say, on balance, it has been strong. And, I said in my opening statement, the record of Pakistan having captured and disrupted terrorist activities in their country is substantial. Some of the most important al-Qaeda figures that were captured were captured in Pakistan.

I think the point is we want to encourage the positive behavior through a constructive relationship with the Government of Pakistan, and I think there is nothing to be gained by somehow estranging ourselves from them.

Mr. MCCAUL. Just to echo that, I know a lot of the—whether it was Ramsey Yousef or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the London arrests as well—were made with the cooperation of the Pakistani Government. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this timely hearing and thank the Ambassador for his presence here. Welcome.

I want to ask just a straightforward question and then some comments, and hopefully we can find an opportunity for a common agreement. I think the brief comment that I will make is that you can sense from Members of Congress here on this committee—and I have not heard all of the questioning—that there is consternation and concern about America's involvement in Pakistan.

My simple first question is: Are we in our foreign policy at this point propping up the Government of President Musharraf? Would that be your interpretation?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Mr. Musharraf's Government existed before we ever resumed assistance to the Government of Pakistan. So I would say that he arrived at office through the Pakistani political—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But if I may quickly, in this crisis would you characterize our actions as propping up his—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No, I would not.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me pursue a line of questioning on that basis.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Sure.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We have a difficult set of circumstances here. Pakistan has been noted as an ally. Even beyond the government, there is a vigorous middle class, a growing middle class in Pakistan, who I believe have reasonable alliance with the United States, along with a vigorous Pakistani American community. And I would make the point that we had maybe unfortunate results in Iran when the United States was involved; but on the other hand, we look at North Korea, completely oppressive, very few people on the street, yet we were able to negotiate a reasonable resolve around the nuclear. Which means that I hope we are not considering ourselves propping up the government but we would consider ourselves finding some resolution to a crisis.

I think that is where we need to be now with Pakistan, finding a resolution to a crisis and not being considered propping up a government. The only way you can top Musharraf, I would imagine, is for us to take up arms. I can't imagine anyone suggesting that. I am not interested in going into Iran and I am not interested in going into Pakistan. But what I would say is that you need a firmer, stronger, and determined approach.

I will give you letters. As you know I have been advocating for a diplomatic team, and I know that we have quality people on the ground, but a diplomatic team, an envoy. I would even suggest former President Clinton and there are others, including those here in the State Department as we speak. But a firm team that goes beyond the avenue we visited, and concretely announce and lay out some of the very issues that have been stated here.

One, some people don't care if he is a chief or not, but step down. That was one of his agreements. Restore immediately constitutional authority. Release those detained persons, lawyers, and obviously immediately set the elections going forward.

One thing that we have not been able to denote and a lot of people argue is whether or not the Pakistani military, for example, has been effective in helping us fight the terrorists. We have not been good in explaining that, from the Defense Department on down, because many people argue they are in bed with him.

I think they have done some forward-thinking efforts and there have been some successes as there have been some failures. But I think what I would like for you to answer one—I offer this suggestion as a team, Mr. Secretary, I would like not to hear that this one has been over and that one has been over, because there is a difference when you have a concerted effort and a pronouncement.

Then I think it should be a demand, it should be a requirement, short of holding back funds, that Musharraf respond affirmatively to our suggestions because of the relationship that we have had with that government on behalf of the Pakistani people. I yield to you.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, if I understood the kind of agenda you laid out, I don't think I have any quarrel with that. We are talking about the same thing. We said we think he ought to take off his uniform, that elections ought to be scheduled, and these draconian measures that they have taken in recent days need to be scaled back. So I don't think that you and I have any problem on the substance.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you entertain a special team going over to reinforce in a stronger manner? And then would you entertain the whole question of our funding, which has to be considered, not something that I necessarily advocate, but would you consider that so that he would listen, short of military action?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, the difficulty on the funding part is, of course, who would be hurt if you cut the funding. And the concern we have is it will hurt programs and activities and interests that are important to us in spite of whom—or notwithstanding who happens to be President of Pakistan, whether it is in the border regions, or economic it is development activities that help the Pakistani people. So that is the difficulty we think we face

with respect to contemplating funding cuts in a country so critical to our security interest at Pakistan.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I thank the chairman, and I have a letter for you.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, I would like to go to one of your statements here in your report. You said, "President Musharraf has been indispensable in the war on terror." I would like to make the observation—I chaired the Africa Subcommittee for a number of years—we made a mistake, in my opinion, during the Cold War in considering certain individuals indispensable. We never said they were indispensable, but we considered them indispensable. We personalized—we personalized our foreign policy in that way.

In my view, and I was in Pakistan earlier this year, met with President Musharraf at the time, and went up to the border region and into the frontier. I can tell you the one thing that is indispensable in Pakistan is the rule of law. The rule of law has been, frankly, overturned.

And I think the international community, including this Congress, are waiting to see if there is any hope that the elections that were scheduled for January are going forward, and not only going forward, but whether or not civil society, the representatives of the class of society that are interested in human rights, whether or not the lawyers, the candidates, the human rights activists, are going to be released from jail so that those elections are, frankly, meaningful, so that they are actual elections.

If that happens, then I think Pakistan can resist the fall into the abyss. But if it does not happen, if instead the military in the country does not understand where public opinion is inside the country and where world opinion is, if there is a failure to comprehend the damage done to civil society and the perception that the struggle which should be against the jihadists is instead turned against the representatives of civil society, that the troops that should be out there tracing down the leads on the 800 Pakistani civilians killed by suicide bombers over the last few months and by attacks from radical elements, are instead in the business of jailing the people that are involved in evolving that society into a representative democracy, then I think Pakistan is on a perilous course. And I think that that is the issue and the message that should be delivered, rather than that any one person is indispensable.

We appreciate the role that the military in Pakistan has played in taking on radical elements. Our hearts go out for the thousands killed in that effort and their family members, the grieving spouses and families of Pakistani soldiers who were killed in the fight on the frontier provinces. But at the same time, now is the time for everybody who is clear-eyed about the future to understand the steps that need to be taken. And those steps are the return to the rule of law.

And I would ask, do you feel this message is being adequately conveyed at this moment to the Government in Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I was hoping you wouldn't ask me a question, Congressman, because I thought your statement was so good. I just hope they are listening to it.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.

The follow-up that I would also ask is recently there were some very troubling reports—and this is on a different subject—but Pakistani troops were surrounded and surrendered to militants in some of the same tribal areas that I visited there. And I wonder about the preparedness out in that area. When I met with troops there, there was a feeling on their part that they were out-gunned by the militants.

There was also a request that we do something on another subject, and that is the funding that comes into the madrassahs to train the next generation of young men that go out and commit suicide bombing or other attacks, and the fact that so much of that money comes from the Gulf States.

And so I would just like to ask you, are we doing all we can do to cut off that flow of money from the Gulf States, from Saudi Arabia and other countries? And whether the security effort that is going on right now against civil society is distracting from the effort against the militants, the jihadists, as we saw this week, in terms of this report that Pakistani troops had surrendered.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think that there is no question that the current political events are a distraction, there is no denying that. And if that were to go on for a prolonged period of time, I think it could have an effect at seriously undermining the security efforts in the border regions.

In addition to that, as you I think correctly note, there have been some serious security problems up in the tribal areas due to intensified efforts by the Taliban and other extremists. And I think so far the record in containing that activity and bringing it under control has been mixed. I mean we must recognize that the Pakistani military has transferred many thousands of people up into that northwest frontier area and away from the Indian border. But the situation remains challenging and it is an area in which we want to intensify our cooperation with the Pakistani Government; for example, by supporting their development plan for the FATA area, but also by trying to find ways that we can support increased effectiveness of their security forces, whether through military support, increased intelligence cooperation, and so forth.

On the funding and the flow of funds from the gulf areas, I guess in a general way I confess to not having looked at this issue prior to coming up to the hearing. But in a general way, what I think I could safely answer to you is that ever since my time as Director of National Intelligence, I have noticed and I have worked on an increased priority to following the money with respect to support for international terrorism. So the amount of resources and effort that we dedicate to interrupting the flow of funds to international terrorists has substantially increased over the years, and I think we are becoming increasingly more effective at that, although it is a very challenging problem.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, let me ask you this. How close are we to a civil war in Pakistan? The reason I am asking that is, eerily, we look like

a similar situation in Iraq, a strong man in Saddam Hussein, but kept things in order, so to speak.

Here in Pakistan, what would be the consequences with Musharraf—let's say he does step down, who then controls the military?

And, secondly, especially what makes this different from, let's say, Iraq and that situation is the fact they have nuclear weapons. So then who controls the nuclear weapons? You have got a volatile situation with the returning from exile of two Prime Ministers who are very popular, who have allegiance of followers in and of themselves. We have already had tracks of over 800 assassinations; we have lost 800 lives in recent suicide bombings. One of these had been targeted at former Prime Minister Bhutto. We have elements of Islamic radicalism. We have cells of terrorism which already have been identified, and probably the strongest country on Earth with influence with al-Qaeda is Pakistan.

So if you could, within that purview, answer the question: Do you fear civil war, could it not break out? If so, what does that portend with a country with atomic and nuclear weapons? And in the order of business within Pakistan, if Musharraf does resign and steps down as head of the military, who then takes his place? And is that person one who controls the nuclear weapons?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Congressman, I honestly believe that, first of all, stability in Pakistan is important. But as this discussion this afternoon has demonstrated, we all feel that it is stability, but in the context of forward movement on the democracy agenda. In fact, we believe, the United States believes, that it is through democracy that you are most likely to achieve enduring stability in that country.

And as you mentioned, the ingredients for instability are there and that is a cause for concern. But I think civil war—or the prospects of civil war—is a very strong term, and I don't think that that could apply to any foreseeable scenario in Pakistan. But the very fact that you raise that term and raise that concern, it seems to me, just serves to reemphasize the importance of getting this constitutional process back on track, and that is what we are so keen on achieving.

Now, you asked me when President Musharraf takes his uniform off, who will take his place? Well, actually the Pakistani military is a pretty well-organized institution and they have succession planning there, and the individual who just became Vice Chief of the Army, I believe, is the individual who would most likely then be moved up to becoming Chief of the Army, which is the position—Chief of Staff of the Army—which is the position that Musharraf occupies.

So I think there is plenty of succession planning that is going on in the Pakistani military, and I believe also that they have their nuclear weapons under effective control.

Mr. SCOTT. By that control, do you mean does it become military control or political control?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No, I mean effective technical control. They are not sloppy about that.

Mr. SCOTT. Would former Prime Minister Bhutto—what are the possibilities of a joint sharing of power?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. In a way, that is what some of the dialogue between them directly and indirectly has been about in recent months. And I think the issue is that they need to find some kind of understanding that permits both of them to make a contribution. There is room for both in the political process to help the country move forward politically, and I think that that is the kind of dialogue that needs to be encouraged.

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you.

To what extent do any of the primary opposition candidates that appear on the scene, either Mr. Sharif or Ms. Bhutto, to what extent do they actually enjoy any popularity within the country, considering especially the fact that both of them left the country—I mean, under certain dubious circumstances, but under charges of corruption and whatever? I guess another way of putting it is, do you believe those charges were true originally? Do you think that we can anticipate anything better should there become some sort of power-sharing arrangement? And I guess to what extent do they, as I say, have any political cachet within the country itself—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, of course, the best measure or one of the measures of that would be how many of their people they can get elected to the legislature. And they did have legislative elections in 2002, and some of the supporters of these political players were elected to the Pakistani legislature. I think they each have a reservoir of political support in Pakistan. How effective they would be if either one were to come to power, I don't know. That would be just purely speculation on my part. But I don't have any doubt in my mind that they enjoy a certain amount of political support, which would obviously have to be tested by the electoral process.

Mr. TANCREDO. And so you think the corruption charges that were originally brought to light were not significant anymore?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I honestly don't know.

Mr. TANCREDO. To what extent do you believe that the cooperation that we have received on various fronts and that has been thoroughly discussed to a large extent here today, to what extent do you believe that that cooperation is coming about as a result of Musharraf's desire to retain the economic opportunities that we provide, for the economic advantages we provide for him, but also just in terms of is it just doing what is barely necessary is what I am trying to figure out here. Is he just doing the minimum? And where does his heart really lie to the best of your knowledge?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, I believe that the Government of Pakistan, including President Musharraf, act out of their perception and their definition of their own national interest. I have no doubt about that.

Secondly, I believe that since 9/11, particularly the major speech that President Musharraf gave with regard to the war on terror—I believe it was in November 2001—I think since that time he has basically said he wants to work with us in dealing with this problem. And I think he has been doing that and his security forces have been doing that to the best of their ability. I don't think it is being done for the purpose of obtaining this or that kind of for-

eign assistance. I think it is done in the interests of their country as they see them.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no other questions.

Chairman LANTOS. Gentelady from California, Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the Ambassador for the amount of time you have spent patiently addressing our concerns.

One of my concerns is I don't understand our policy. Musharraf had vowed to resign his military commission following reelection. But he will become even more politically vulnerable as a civilian President, and he is not expected to drop his Army uniform until his election is confirmed. And the Bush administration is quietly encouraging such arrangement, at both sustaining Musharraf's role and of strengthening moderate political forces in Islamabad. Well, it seems to me that the fugitives we were looking for after 9/11, al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his top executive al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be in western Pakistan.

In all these years that we have centered the war on terror in Iraq, where we have lost thousands of our people and spent millions of dollars, and here we have this crisis and we are hoping that this one person will be able to assist us in finding the real enemy.

So my question to you, Ambassador, is: What is our policy? Is he the only one? Is he indispensable? And I think my colleague, Sheila Jackson Lee, pointed to one way to deal with this. Put an envoy, coalition, together of people and try to give a bottom line that if we are going to continue to pump millions of dollars in and expect you to go in and find our enemy, the real enemy, or so it was said, Osama Bin Laden, then you have got to give up the uniform and be President or have free elections and take the consequences.

I don't understand what we are doing. And why are we spending all this time trying to figure out their problems, and we have all our men and resources and women over in Iraq? Can you explain?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, you raised the issue of indefensibility, and I think I said earlier we sometimes fall into a trap here when we talking about one individual as a symbol the leadership of the whole country. And we are grateful for the role that President Musharraf has played, and he has played an extremely important role, as I was expressing earlier.

Our support is for the Government and people of Pakistan, it is for the security forces, it is for the Army.

Ms. WATSON. Excuse me, we understand that.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes.

Ms. WATSON. But why is it you are not trying to identify someone else? Or should we go around Musharraf and send money—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well—

Ms. WATSON. Hold on. And send money—I can't figure out what we are doing. We are trying to encourage. Has it done any good? Oh, no. Have their forces been able to find—has intelligence been given to us where we could go in and find our real enemy?

And you know we might be powerful, but we certainly are not influential there or in the world today. So trying to encourage has not done any good. So what is the policy going to be? How long are

we going to play this game? And why are we still over in Iraq if this is the center, if we think this is where the real enemy is located?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, I think we are fighting this fight on several fronts.

Ms. WATSON. Okay, I will buy that.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I wouldn't pronounce this policy a failure. We are trying to encourage this, let's see what happens. I think we are all very eager to see these measures rolled back.

Ms. WATSON. How long before they have to face some consequences? How long do we have to say to the American people, you have to continue to give your sons and daughters and your taxpayers' money to Iraq?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. The longer the situation goes on in Pakistan in its present form, I think the more difficult the situation will become in Pakistan itself. I don't think it is for us necessarily to determine the consequences. I think the political actors in Pakistan themselves will have something to say about that.

Ms. WATSON. Why do we keep pumping—

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador for being here.

Obviously a primary policy goal to reach at this point is to help them, and, as much as we can, ourselves contain al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and there are many, many impediments for getting there. I think having broader support of the Pakistani people for their government certainly would be one, and sort of underlines Musharraf's authority.

The question I have to get your opinion on is whether or not in any way that we can—and I am sympathetic to the notion that we have a limited ability to simply force Musharraf or anybody in Pakistan to do whatever we want. I think that is one of our approaches. Some of the criticism of Pakistan policy has focused on that, and I think that is a mistake, because one of the things that makes Pakistan very angry at us is the notion that they are our puppet to do our will.

When I visited Pakistan, more than once they made the point, Don't forget we represent Pakistan. Your interests are nice but they are not ours, and you guys seem to forget that with great frequency and try to jam it down our throat. And that creates less cooperation, not more.

So all the talk about cutting off aid and doing all these other things to force them—I mean, I understand the desire, but the result is it pushes many Pakistanis away from us.

The question is, if there was greater democracy in Pakistan, if there was greater freedom—you know, we can draw the comparison you can push democracy in some places and wind up in a war situation. Certainly the feeling is that is what happened in Palestine.

Here it seems it seems like if there was greater democracy, you would have that Pakistani middle class more supportive of their government, which would strengthen their hand to deal with those who are sympathetic to the Taliban.

Do you agree with that, as opposed to the notion of we just have to back Musharraf and make him as strong as possible regardless of the impact on the democratic issues?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think I would agree with the proposition that some understanding between the Pakistani military and civic society about how to go forward, an electoral political process, moving toward greater democracy, these would be helpful in dealing with the different challenges that Pakistan faces, including extremism. I think it would be a positive thing.

Mr. CARNAHAN. It strikes me that ought to be our policy. And it also strikes me that we really need to back off a little bit on all of the threats. And I am not saying you, I am talking about us.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Back off of what?

Mr. CARNAHAN. All of the threats. Don't do this, I am going to cut off your money. We gave you \$10 billion in the last 5 years, what have we got for it?

I understand the sentiment, where it is coming from, but somewhere from our Government has to be a statement of what you said earlier in answer to Ms. Watson's question: We are with the Pakistani people and we have a long-term commitment to that region.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We understand that you need our help and we are not just going to yank it on a whim or when we feel like it. Because in Pakistan they very much believe that we are simply using them and will discard them again in a moment's notice, and that undermines the ability to get the broad-based support within Pakistan to take on the Taliban. Their answer is the Taliban is going to be here forever; you guys kind of come and go.

So we need to make that longer-term commitment, but I think part of that has to be a commitment to all the Pakistani people and not just Musharraf in terms of how we approach that.

Last question. As I understand it, most of the people in Pakistan don't vote. It is actually a relatively small percentage—well, 33 percent to 40 percent, and there are a lot of other folks who don't.

How do you judge how they view what is going on with Musharraf? You have the rioting lawyers, if you will, the middle class who are upset about that, and then you have the vast majority in Pakistani who more in poverty. How are they viewing the situation both in terms of their feelings about Musharraf and their sympathies for al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I am not certain, but—

Mr. CARNAHAN. I am clear on that point. I just need your opinion.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I, clearly, am not. However, I put some polling data in my statement. I do think that most Pakistanis are moderate, and they do not favor extremism.

I suspect that once you get out of the more urbanized areas that people are probably not as intensely interested in politics as they might be in the capital and in the major cities, and that political activity of that kind—legislation, elections and so forth—is probably of limited interest to many average Pakistanis.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Probably most, I would guess.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would not know what number to attach to that, but I think most people want to get on with their lives. They want to live a better life, and—

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is where the economic piece comes in or where our support can—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. It is where stability comes in, too.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Never before have lawyers been so popular. Shakespeare must be turning over in his grave.

One question we have is: Do we have a Pakistan policy, or do we have a Musharraf policy?

Let me ask a specific hypothetical. What if Musharraf imprisons Bhutto? Is it clear that, at that point, we would cut off aid?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. As to your first question, do we have a Musharraf policy or do we have a Pakistan policy, I think the answer to that is we have a Pakistan policy.

Mr. SHERMAN. That was a rhetorical question—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Mr. SHERMAN.—as I knew what the answer would be.

Now, what do we do—

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. The other one is a hypothetical that I think raises a prospect that, in my mind, would create an extraordinarily dramatic political situation in that country.

Mr. SHERMAN. Hardly—you know, there were no UFOs in that question.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Do you want my answer to the hypothetical? I am reluctant to do that, but I think it is a very—it is a worst-case hypothesis.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is hardly worst-case. I mean, Bhutto has, in effect, said that there are elements of the Musharraf Government who are responsible for the attempt on her life. It does not seem unlikely or extreme—it certainly does not seem beyond discussion that Musharraf would imprison her at this time.

One concern I have, Mr. Chairman, is how we are going to advocate democracy in Pakistan when there has been so little rule of law and democracy in the area of foreign policy here in the United States. You cannot think about Pakistan without thinking of how our committee was treated on the F-16 issue and how other Cabinet members, not Ambassador Negroponte, have, in effect, testified before Congress that not even the procedural aspects of the Iran Sanctions Act will be followed because the administration does not think that laws are binding.

But I should give you a chance to comment. I realize that is a little bit outside the scope of these hearings. Can you give a reason why the administration regards the Iran Sanctions Act as merely a consultative body rather than a legislative body?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I am afraid, Congressman—

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, you do know there is an Iran Sanctions Act. You do know you are supposed to at least identify those corpora-

tions investing more than \$20 million in the Iran oil sector, which you do know the State Department has simply refused to do for 6 years or 7 years throughout the term of this administration. You do know that is a violation of law. And the idea that the rule of law is something we are going to preach in Pakistan is a little difficult under all of these circumstances.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I am afraid—I am sure you will understand that I did not come prepared to answer that question.

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope you would furnish an answer for the record.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I will certainly do that.
[The information referred to follows:]



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 23 2007

Dear Mr. Sherman:

At the November 7 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Pakistan with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, you raised a question concerning the Department's implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA).

ISA has been a useful tool in our effort to discourage investment in Iran's petroleum sector, and more broadly in our Iran diplomacy. ISA reflects the depth of concern that the Administration and Congress share about Iran, and provides an invaluable reference point for us continually to raise those concerns with companies and with other governments. Our Ambassadors in relevant countries are engaged in a vigorous diplomatic effort to prevent new investment. In light of these efforts, and of investment conditions in Iran, Iran has had difficulty in recent years in finalizing agreements to bring oil and gas fields on stream.

Meanwhile, we have succeeded in building an unprecedented coalition to counter Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and have brought about two unanimous UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran. A third Resolution is under consideration. We are also pressing for additional measures to be adopted by individual countries, outside the UN context. It is critical to sustain the coalition, and our multilateral approach.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is any other way in which I can be helpful in this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jeffrey T. Bergner".

Jeffrey T. Bergner
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable
Brad Sherman,
House of Representatives.

Mr. SHERMAN. Has my time expired, or do I still have—
Chairman LANTOS. You have about 1 minute and 8 seconds.

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay.

If we have a policy for the Pakistani people, why have we provided, not so much economic aid, not so much aid to help the fight against al-Qaeda—where, in the northwest frontier provinces, the Pakistani forces still have bolt-action rifles—but why has such a significant portion of the aid been of the military devices that will be useful to the Army of Pakistan in confronting India or another conventional force? What do the F-16s do either for the war against terror or to raise living standards among the Pakistani people?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Well, first of all, with respect to security assistance of various kinds, which is, admittedly, a substantial part of the assistance, we have also given and are giving and would like to continue giving considerable economic and social and development assistance as well.

Mr. SHERMAN. But the military aid is the—

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired, so I will not take any additional questions.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. But if I may, in a couple of sentences. I think if you look at the actual breakdown—and I have the whole breakdown here since fiscal year 2002 right through 2008—I think you will find that it is a blend of assistance that touches on all areas and, I think, quite a logical arrangement of assistance. And I think it is touching on all of our interests in Pakistan.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Ambassador, I know I speak for every member of the committee in expressing our deep appreciation to you. You have been patient with a very lively, knowledgeable and articulate crowd, and we are most grateful to you.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this hearing to examine the increasingly deteriorating political situation in Pakistan. These are troubling times for democracy in Pakistan. President Musharraf declared a state of emergency this past weekend, effectively suspending the constitution, closing independent media outlets and arresting scores of political protesters. We can not trade the American policy goals for the promotion of the democratic process in Pakistan.

A central policy goal of the United States has been to increase Pakistan's ability to function as an ally in counterterrorism efforts. However, under the guise of securing border areas, President Musharraf has used his position to silence social and political groups who speak out against the increasingly authoritarian nature his government.

Musharraf himself has proven to be an impediment to the process of democratization in Pakistan. Continued unbridled support for the Musharraf government further damages our already struggling image abroad and undermines any remaining influence that we have in the region—we must not allow this to continue. The over \$4 billion dollars in direct aid we have given Pakistan over the past 6 years must come under direct review and assurances should be made that civilian rule will be restored immediately.

Prior to the recent actions of President Musharraf, we had seen positive signs of democratization in Pakistan. There had been an increasingly active civil society and the Supreme Court had become increasingly autonomous, signifying the establishment of an independent judiciary—a development in any democracy. There is also a need for free and transparent elections which are held regularly and which are competitive. These important developments can not be sacrificed for our own national interests. We need to hold true to our values as Americans and hold our allies to the very same standards. We can not ignore oppression abroad, nor can we excuse it.

Mr. Negroponte, I am eager to hear your assessment on the current state of Pakistan. Thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule to appear before us today. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing on democracy, authoritarianism, and terrorism in contemporary Pakistan. This hearing could not have come at a better time as the country's democratic institutions and rule of law are under tremendous strain as a result of General Pervez Musharraf's state of emergency declaration. Tensions in Pakistan have been building for some time now as the people of Pakistan agitate for a return to democracy. Even the country's judicial branch has ruled against Musharraf's efforts to retain power. The stark images of the widespread government crackdown against lawyers and other pro-democracy activist are eerily similar to those coming out of Burma.

We in Congress must not allow the anti-democratic forces in Pakistan to use the fight against terrorism as an excuse to clamp down against their own people. So, while I recognize the importance of America's support for Pakistan's fight against terrorists, we must not shirk from reminding are friends that continued abuse only strengthens the hands of the very terrorists we are seeking to defeat. Mr. Chair-

man, I commend your stalwart support of democratic movements worldwide. What is going on now in Pakistan is deplorable.

I look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary Negroponte.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MIKE PENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, I welcome our distinguished witness, thank him for his service and look forward to his insight.

One commentator noted this week, QUOTE “in its 60 years of existence, Pakistan has never managed to establish stable constitutional rule.” End QUOTE. But, while frequently consumed with turmoil and controversy, the recent vexing events in Pakistan are even more troubling than usual and offer more questions than answers. *Foreign Policy* magazine’s blog said this week that the present situation is reminiscent QUOTE “of the last days of the Shah [of Iran]. This could get much, much worse before it gets better.” Unquote

The re-imposition of martial law by Gen. Pervez Musharraf has led former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to describe November 3, 2007 QUOTE “as the blackest day in the history of Pakistan.” end QUOTE. Or, was it at least *partly* a tragic necessity against the forces of jihad we all oppose? While we all can see the wisdom of fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban, what does the reaction to the so-called “revolt of the lawyers” have to do with the war on terror? Is it really worth martial law?

Unquestionably Gen. Musharraf has enemies. Unquestionably, some of his enemies are our enemies. And, yet, in rejecting Secretary Rice’s request last week not to impose martial law, Musharraf has overreacted. To what extent is his use of military and police forces to quell domestic *political* rivals and not al Qaeda and the Taliban undermining the War on Terror? Is disrupting Benazir Bhutto’s political rally a wise use of limited resources in the War on Terror?

More broadly, what exactly is the most pressing concern right now facing US interests in Pakistan? Is there something short of the blunt instrument of cutting off aid (some \$11 billion since 9/11) that we should consider? How does our witness reconcile our laudable goal of self-governance with strength of Pakistani Islamist parties and political forces? Ultimately, given its pivotal location amidst dangerous actors, is Pakistan’s leadership a net plus in the war on terror? As I said, I have more questions than answers.

Mr. Chairman, none of us should pretend that we have a quick fix for the situation in Pakistan. I have great appreciation for the difficult task our witness faces in addressing this issue, and I look forward to our discussion on how best to proceed in Pakistan.

