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THESIS

**STRATEGIC CHANGE AND THE JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE: IDEAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

by

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September 2007

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**STRATEGIC CHANGE AND THE JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE: IDEAS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were a watershed event in this country's history that significantly affected law enforcement agencies and organizations at all levels, including the FBI and the multidisciplinary Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The terrorist attacks served as a catalyst for evaluating cultural, psychological and organizational processes, policies and procedures that influenced the FBI and impacted the JTTF program. In 2006 a comprehensive study was conducted to investigate whether FBI provided JTTF members with the necessary tools to support their investigations. The study identified a number of deficiencies. In order to adapt and combat an emergent asymmetric threat, the JTTF must identify and analyze specific actions and best practices necessary to prepare, execute, and support strategic change and innovation and overcome obstacles that impede the process. It is also necessary to identify and implement best and/or smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures that ensure the skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the JTTF program. The implementation of standardized written procedures that detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies in participant stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
	A. PROBLEM STATEMENT	1
	B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH	2
	C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	4
II.	BACKGROUND ON CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR	9
	A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS.....	10
	B. RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC CHANGE	15
	C. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND STRATEGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.....	22
	D. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION.....	28
III.	CTD SURVEY RESULTS	31
	A. METHODOLOGY	31
	1. Participants.....	31
	2. Procedure.....	34
	3. Data Analysis.....	36
	B. SUPPORT AND TRAINING.....	37
	1. Substantive Training	37
	<i>a. International Terrorism Training</i>	<i>38</i>
	<i>b. Domestic Terrorism Training.....</i>	<i>41</i>
	<i>c. Weapons of Mass Destruction Training</i>	<i>44</i>
	<i>d. Muslim-Arab Culture Training.....</i>	<i>47</i>
	<i>e. Legal Training.....</i>	<i>50</i>
	<i>f. Training Comments by JTTF Members.....</i>	<i>52</i>
	2. Investigative Tools	53
	<i>a. National Security Letters</i>	<i>53</i>
	<i>b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Requests</i>	<i>55</i>
	3. Database Access and Training.....	57
	<i>a. Database Access</i>	<i>57</i>
	<i>b. Database Training</i>	<i>62</i>
	<i>c. Database and Systems Comments by JTTF Members.....</i>	<i>67</i>
	C. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION	67
	1. Participation in Investigations.....	67
	2. Sources and Source Training.....	69
	3. Access to Support Personnel.....	71
	4. Briefings Provided by FBI Field Office	74
	5. Field Office Leadership and Management Skills.....	75
	6. Final Comments by JTTF Members.....	78
	D. REVISION OF THE MASTER JTTF FIELD MEMBERSHIP ROSTER	79
IV.	IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY RESULTS	81

V.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	87
A.	TRAINING DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION.....	88
1.	Curriculum and Implementation	92
B.	MENTORING/FIELD TRAINING OFFICER PROGRAM.....	95
C.	LESSONS LEARNED/BEST PRACTICES PROGRAM	96
D.	OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.....	101
E.	COLLABORATION IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES (CHICAGO CASE STUDY).....	103
VI.	CONCLUSION	107
A.	SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS	107
B.	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.....	108
C.	DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.....	110
APPENDIX A:	NJTTF REGIONAL MAP	111
APPENDIX B:	RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO THE JTTF TELEPHONE SURVEY	113
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	129
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	133

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	JTTF members selected for the survey (705) compared to those who completed the survey (447), by agency membership.....	34
Figure 2.	International terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any IT training" and 409 for "FBIHQ IT training," "FBI FO IT training," and "non-FBI IT training."	38
Figure 3.	Quality ratings for international terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 327 for "FBIHQ IT training," 231 for "FBI FO IT training," and 205 for "non-FBI IT training."	39
Figure 4.	IT training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	40
Figure 5.	IT training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, and 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.	41
Figure 6.	Domestic terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any DT training" and 364 for "FBIHQ DT training," "FBI FO DT training," and "non-FBI DT training."	42
Figure 7.	Quality ratings for domestic terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 296 for "FBIHQ DT training," 119 for "FBI FO DT training," and 108 for "non-FBI DT training."	43
Figure 8.	T training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	43
Figure 9.	DT training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.	44
Figure 10.	Weapons of mass destruction training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any WMD training," and 301 for "FBIHQ WMD training," "FBI FO WMD training" and "non-FBI WMD training"	45
Figure 11.	Quality ratings for weapons of mass destruction training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 164 for "FBI HQ WMD training," 105 for "FBI FO WMD training," and 147 for "non-FBI WMD training."	46
Figure 12.	Figure 12 WMD training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	46
Figure 13.	WMD training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.	47
Figure 14.	Muslim-Arab culture training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any MAC training" and 348 for "FBI HQ MAC training," "FBI FO MAC training," and "non-FBI MAC training."	48
Figure 15.	Figure 15 Quality ratings for Muslim-Arab culture training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 179 for "FBI HQ MAC training," 210 for "FBI FO MAC training," and 136 for "non-FBI MAC training."	49

Figure 16.	Figure 16 MAC training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	49
Figure 17.	Figure 17: MAC training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.....	50
Figure 18.	Legal training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV....	51
Figure 19.	Legal training by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.....	52
Figure 20.	NSL requests by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	54
Figure 21.	NSL requests by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 245 for non-FBI members.....	55
Figure 22.	FISA requests by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	56
Figure 23.	FISA requests by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 245 for non-FBI members.....	57
Figure 24.	447 JTTF members' access to databases and systems.....	58
Figure 25.	447 JTTF members' access to databases and systems compared to training received.....	63
Figure 26.	JTTF Members who have been assigned as either primary or co-case agent (from survey of 447) and those who have participated in file review sessions (from survey of 350).....	68
Figure 27.	Source training by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....	70
Figure 28.	Figure 28 Source training by agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 201 for FBI JTTF members and 245 for non-FBI JTTF members....	71
Figure 29.	JTTF Members access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical coverage.....	72
Figure 30.	JTTF Members' access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical support by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region I.....	73
Figure 31.	Frequency of briefings to TFO Management by FBI.....	75
Figure 32.	447 JTTF members' ratings of FBI field office management on leadership skills. Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing data were not included.....	76
Figure 33.	Figure 33 JTTF Members' ratings of FBI field office Management on leadership skills. Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing data were not included.....	77

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Training comments.	53
Table 2.	JTTF members with various database accesses, training on those databases, and opinions regarding the usefulness of those databases.....	59
Table 3.	JTTF members database accesses by region.....	60
Table 4.	JTTF members database accesses by status and agency membership.....	62
Table 5.	JTTF members' database accesses compared to training received.....	64
Table 6.	JTTF members with database training compared to membership status.	65
Table 7.	JTTF members' database training by agency membership.....	66
Table 8.	Database and systems comments.	67
Table 9.	Support personnel comments.....	74
Table 10.	Final comments.....	78

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I dedicate this work to the devoted local, state, and federal law enforcement partners on the JTTF whose efforts keep our homeland safe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were a watershed event in this country's history and a transformational event for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The attacks provided the impetus for the FBI to reexamine traditional roles and responsibilities and initiate the organizational and cultural changes necessary to refocus resources to combat emergent asymmetrical threats. The need for change was magnified by the failures manifested by the 9/11 attacks. The FBI fell under intense criticism from Congressional investigatory committees and independent commissions. Most notable was the 9/11 Commission, which cited the FBI and the intelligence community with failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. Bureaucratic and cultural obstacles were exposed in the FBI's failure to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The attacks exposed deficiencies concerning information sharing, coordination, and collaboration issues between law enforcement and intelligence community partners.

The above issues have likewise impacted the multidisciplinary Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Under the purview of the FBI, local JTTFs are recognized as the primary domestic mechanisms for collecting intelligence, investigating suspicious incidents, and coordinating local terrorism investigations. The JTTF is also the principal conduit for sharing information and intelligence with state and local law enforcement. Post 9/11, local JTTFs have experienced dramatic change and explosive growth with task force involvement tripling in a five-year period. During that time local JTTFs expanded from approximately thirty-five to 102 locations nationwide, with state and local law enforcement participation on JTTFs growing exponentially as well. By the fall of 2006 JTTF participation grew to include approximately 4,459 part-time and full-time personnel representing multiple federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In light of this brisk growth and extraordinary change, the JTTF mission of detecting, disrupting, and preventing terrorist attacks in the United States is contingent upon optimal collaboration and participation.

The rapid expansion of the JTTF Program has not been without challenges. Most state, local, and federal agencies that contribute resources and personnel to JTTFs are traditional law enforcement agencies that focus on the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters. Like the FBI, most if not all of these agencies are also facing cultural and transformational challenges post 9/11 while grappling with new roles, responsibilities, and priorities. In as much as personnel detailed to the local JTTFs have varying degrees of counterterrorism training, education and/or experience prior to assignment, is the FBI and JTTF providing the tools and training necessary to optimized participation? Are procedures and processes in place to adequately familiarize newly assigned TFOs with FBI and Department of Justice investigative guidelines, classification policies, security issues, and administrative processes? Are task force officers (TFOs) provided proper orientation and mentoring to ensure they can efficiently document, draft, and disseminate intelligence and information generated in conjunction with counterterrorism investigations? Is the current training and education curriculum provided by the FBI adequate and is it applied in a systematic, fair, and consistent manner? Finally, is FBI executive leadership capable of implementing strategic change to transform and culturally institutionalize innovative processes that consistently and uniformly develop and cultivate the core capabilities and tools necessary to achieve JTTF goals and objectives?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

In response to the criticism and challenges identified above, a shift and/or transformation concerning the FBI's strategic focus was promulgated by FBI Director Robert Mueller immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This transformation was driven by a detailed strategic plan to establish objectives, priorities and delineate an organizational mission.¹ The urgency to shift strategic focus was reinforced by and

¹ Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI transformation in strategic focus and reorganization included the following elements: (1) refocusing FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning the FBI workforce to address these priorities; (3) shifting FBI management and operational environment to enhance flexibility, agility, effectiveness, and accountability; (4) restructuring FBI headquarters; and (5) reengineering internal business practices and processes.

articulated in the *2004 - 2009 FBI Strategic Plan*.² As part of the transformation process, and in response to the passage of the Patriot Act and implementation of new Attorney General Guidelines, numerous new policies and programs that impacted local JTTFs were executed. In light of new responsibilities, rapid growth, and expanded participation many of these policies, procedures, and programs were implemented in an incremental fashion, often in response to a problem, crisis or criticism. As such, the implementation and application of these policies and procedures has been disjointed, inconsistent, and less than optimal. These inconsistencies and deficiencies were detailed in an external review conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in 2003 and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 2005. In late 2006, the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) initiated a comprehensive survey which corroborated previous findings and identified additional shortcomings.

This research is significant in as much as it includes the only survey focused solely on the JTTF Program, which adhered to research guidelines and methodology accepted by the scientific community. The 2006 CTD survey was the first comprehensive internal evaluation of the JTTF program. The survey sought to establish a baseline or benchmark to assess the efficacy of core JTTF tools, capabilities, and processes. Eight core areas were identified and evaluated, including: (1) substantive training; (2) investigative tools; (3) database access and training; (4) participation in investigations; (5) sources; (6) access to support personnel; (7) information sharing in leadership and management; and (8) the effectiveness of FBI Field Office (FO) management. The aforementioned areas of review were identified as core competencies and necessary tools needed to optimize effectiveness and accomplish task force goals. Survey results were used to create a baseline whereby deficiencies that impede participation and collaboration could be identified and subsequent recommendations could be devised to improve the system.

² Federal Bureau of Investigation, *2004-2009 Strategic Plan* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).

Once survey results were analyzed and deficiencies recognized, relevant literature and studies were reviewed to identify practices that foster strategic change and promote collaboration in a multidisciplinary environment. This review included critical analysis of processes and systems that would enhance and sustain transformation, culturally institutionalize innovation, and promote consistency concerning core competencies. Before significant progress can be made in conjunction with organizational transformation, a number of questions must be resolved. Should the FBI discard the practice of incremental change in response crisis and/or criticism? Once a baseline is established and deficiencies identified will the FBI use the psychological and organizational drivers necessary to initiate and sustain systemic strategic change and innovation? What processes must be adopted to secure the necessary cooperation and collaboration of JTTF partners to make these changes work in a multidisciplinary environment? Are processes and procedures in place to identify both internal and external organizational practices that optimize effectiveness and participation? Finally, under its current organizational structure, is the FBI prepared to identify and adopt best and/or smart practices, especially plans, policies, and procedures which ensure that the skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the JTTF Program?

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research was to investigate whether Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Division (CTD) is providing local JTTF members with the necessary tools to support their investigations. Identified tools included access to support personnel, training and development, database access, level of involvement in counterterrorism investigations and source development, and effective leadership and management. This research also sought to explore strategic change and innovation to identify drivers that organizations such as the FBI can utilize to optimize JTTF participation, develop core competencies, and fulfill organizational objectives. Key practices and initiatives that promote multidisciplinary collaboration and coordination were also analyzed and evaluated.

The research that forms the basis of this thesis focused on the transformational period subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks which significantly impacted law enforcement agencies and organizations at all levels, including the FBI. The terrorist attacks were a catalyst for evaluating cultural, psychological, and organizational processes, policies and procedures that influenced the FBI and impacted the JTTF. Intense scrutiny and critical analysis by Congress, the DOJ, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), external commissions, and panels and agencies, and the virulent threat from al Qaeda, has created a sense of organizational urgency to transform. The aforementioned panels and commissions identified deficiencies that, if not corrected, would hinder strategic change efforts. Although organizational and strategic change had been initiated prior to 9/11, the terrorist attacks set in motion dramatic reforms articulated in the 2002 FBI Strategic Change Program. As this process evolved, the FBI adopted the Balanced Scorecard methodology in 2006 as a management tool for implementing the Strategy Management System (SMS). Taking a cue from other private and public sector companies and agencies, the FBI sought to align day-to-day operations with broader strategies, generate feedback, and measure progress toward achieving long term goals.³

This research analyzes what processes are necessary to initiate and sustain organizational change and identify and overcome obstacles that impede the process. Both external and internal surveys and studies were researched to identify areas where change is needed within the JTTF program. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to examine FBI strategies, procedures, processes, and organizational structure post 9/11. External reviews and studies from Congressional commissions, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), DOJ IOG, GAO, and others identified deficiencies and made recommendations for improvement. Reviews by NAPA and DOJ OIG, and an internal survey by the FBI counterterrorism division, were particularly applicable to this research in as much as they examined investigative tools, core processes, capabilities, and other essential functions that directly impact the JTTF. These studies recommended

³ Remarks prepared for delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the FBI Organizational Changes Press Conference, held July 26, 2006 in Washington, D. C.

transformational change within the FBI and cited embedded organizational and cultural impediments that would hinder change. Research also identified structural obstacles that might inhibit JTTF participation, collaboration, and information sharing.

In a broader context, this research explored strategic change and transformation in large organizations with entrenched bureaucratic cultures, evaluated the psychological and organizational factors necessary to initiate and sustain transformational strategic change, and identified barriers that impede optimal performance and participation. Included were studies of organizations that have successful programs in place to harvest best practices and lessons learned from both internal and external sources. Organizations that have used the Balanced Scorecard methodology to implement strategic change were also analyzed. Literature and case studies revealed that strategic change in large organizations is a complex process which often fails. In bureaucratic cultures, especially government organizations like the FBI, existing processes are often entrenched and employees are resistant to change and innovation. Initiating change and institutionalizing innovation can be especially complicated in a multi-agency context such as the JTTF program.

A comprehensive internal survey conducted by the CTD in 2006 and 2007 specifically addressed eight core JTTF functions and tools, and identified inconsistencies and areas in need of improvement. The CTD survey was of particular relevance in as much as it was based on interviews of over 450 current state, local, and federal JTTF participants.

In addition to the research, literature review, and surveys identified above, the author's personal experience as an FBI agent for the past twenty-three years also contributed to this thesis. During the last four years the author has served as a counterterrorism supervisor and the JTTF coordinator of the Chicago Field Division JTTF. Personal experience gained through supervising divergent personnel resources from multiple state, local, and federal agencies has been invaluable. Moreover, duties that include managing and allocating JTTF resources, budgetary matters, liaison, information sharing, and responsibilities concerning the organization and administration of the JTTF Executive Board have also afforded a unique perspective. This personal

involvement in the JTTF Program, both locally and nationally, has provided insight concerning impediments and deficiencies, as well as opportunities for implementing innovative programs and initiatives that promote core task force functions and capabilities by extending participation and involvement in counterterrorism matters to state and local law enforcement not represented on the JTTF.

In the fall of 2006, the author was selected by CTD Executive Management for special assignment to collaborate with Cassandra Cochran PHD at the NJTTF. Cochran is the principal investigator and architect of the JTTF telephone survey. The author's selection was based on his experience as a counterterrorism supervisor and JTTF coordinator in a major FBI Field Office. He contributed to the research portion of the project by contacting and interviewing approximately thirty task force members. His primary contribution was to collaborate with principal investigator Cochran to formulate recommendations for CTD Executive Management to rectify deficiencies identified in the survey. The author relied on field experience as the JTTF Coordinator, formal education (at the Naval Postgraduate School), and input from NJTTF and local task force personnel in formulating recommendations that would be practical and applicable to local JTTFs.

Based on analysis and review of literature, external surveys, and studies, and the results of the JTTF Telephone Survey, this thesis proposes recommendations to address deficiencies within the JTTF Program. Recommendations focus on the following areas: (1) role definitions for JTTF members, (2) revision of the master JTTF field membership listing, (3) substantive training and database training, (4) a mentoring/Field Training Agent program for TFOs, (5) Lessons Learned/Best Practices program, (6) implementing systems to ensure oversight and accountability, (7) source development and training, and (8) future surveys of the JTTF Program/Evaluation of JTTF Program changes. Please refer to the recommendations section of this report for further details.

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II. BACKGROUND ON CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Research in this chapter examines efforts by the FBI to transform itself subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This includes critical analysis of strategic initiatives undertaken by the FBI and JTTF to develop core competencies and skills necessary to deal with emergent threats. The review includes external studies that evaluate FBI policies, procedures, and programs. Deficiencies, gaps, and areas in need of development are identified and specific recommendations for improvement are suggested.

To analyze effectiveness and success in facilitating interagency collaboration, this chapter looks at the steps taken by organizations that have successfully navigated strategic change to become more competitive. Useful information and valuable lessons were gleaned from both public and private organizations that have used innovative practices to successfully navigate strategic change. Key drivers necessary to initiate and sustain change are evaluated and obstacles that inhibit the transformation process are identified, as are the psychological and structural mechanisms needed to initiate the transformation process.

In addition to exploring strategies and processes for initiating change in an organizational context, the research focuses on integrating these strategies and processes into the Balanced Scorecard framework. In 2006 the FBI implemented the Strategy Management System (SMS) in the CTD. To facilitate this process, the FBI sought to emulate the Balanced Scorecard methodology which has been successfully used by a number of companies and organizations to cultivate innovation and align core processes with primary objectives. This chapter seeks to identify and analyze specific actions and best practices necessary to prepare, execute, and support strategic change and innovation.

An analysis of the collaborative process in a multidisciplinary context identifies key elements necessary to foster collaboration and practices that sustain cooperation. Leadership, coalition building, and the cultivation of new ideas and innovative practices also play an essential role in organizational transformation and strategic change.

Implementing mechanisms that identify and capture best practices and lessons learned from both internal and external sources is also important and can be used by the FBI and JTTF to successfully navigate the transformation process.

A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS

Reorganization and strategic change in the way the FBI handled counterterrorism and intelligence investigations was well under way prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In May of 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh identified national and economic security as the FBI's top priority and the prevention, disruption, and defeat of terrorist operations as the primary objective.⁴ These goals were articulated in the *1998-2003 Strategic Plan*, which included the reorganization of the Counterterrorism Division and the creation of the Investigative Service Division.

A shift and/or transformation concerning the FBI strategic focus was promulgated by FBI Director Robert Mueller immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This transformation was driven by a detailed strategic plan to establish objectives and priorities that align with the organization's mission.⁵ The need to shift strategic focus was reinforced in the FBI's *2004-2009 Strategic Plan*.⁶ In 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller, in testimony before the House of Representatives, conceded that GAO and NAPA criticisms concerning FBI efforts to transform were fair. Specifically, Director Mueller acknowledged that efforts to revamp core processes, including strategic planning, human resources, technology management, and performance metrics, needed to be strengthened.⁷

⁴ "Statement for the Record, Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation," Congressional Statement, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 24 March 1999 <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress1999/freeh324.htm> (15 August 2007)

⁵ Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the FBI transformation in strategic focus and reorganization included the following elements: (1) refocusing FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning the FBI workforce to address these priorities; (3) shifting FBI management and operational environment to enhance flexibility, agility, effectiveness, and accountability; (4) restructuring FBI headquarters; and (5) reengineering internal business practices and processes.

⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation. *2004-2009 Strategic Plan*.

⁷ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Testimony before the committee on appropriations subcommittee on the Department of Commerce, justice, and state, the judiciary and related agencies*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2003.

Prospective FBI transformation efforts have been driven by a detailed strategic plan that recognizes the importance of human resource recruitment, counterterrorism training, and needed improvements concerning information technology. To be successful in counterterrorism and intelligence efforts the FBI, and consequently local JTTFs, would need to develop a skilled workforce capable of meeting transformational needs.⁸

To facilitate strategic change, the FBI hired NAPA in 2005 to evaluate transformation efforts. Consistent with 9/11 Commission findings, the NAPA study recognized that the FBI would increasingly need to rely on extensive joint operations with other federal, state, and local law enforcement entities through task forces such as the local JTTFs.⁹ NAPA assessed the FBI counterterrorism strategy and recommended the FBI increase emphasis on human resource planning through recruitment, training, and development of requisite capabilities and skills. This process would require FBI executive management to focus on long-term, multi-year planning, and the strategic management of personnel resources, rather than relying on incremental decision-making. To accomplish this transformation process, NAPA recommended FBI personnel receive training to facilitate goals and adopt a performance-driven management system.¹⁰

A formal evaluation of the JTTF program was conducted in 2005 by the DOJ OIG. The review was conducted in light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, in as much as the DOJ had shifted significant resources in a concerted effort to redefine the department's mission, objectives, and priorities to address the top priority: counterterrorism.¹¹ The review sought to evaluate the performance of existing terrorism task forces (that had expanded rapidly in response to the 9/11 attacks) and the creation of new task forces to include the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the U.S. Attorneys' Anti- Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC).

⁸ National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), *Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges*, (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Public Administration, January 2005), 20

⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).

¹⁰ NAPA, *Transforming the FBI*, 22.

¹¹ NAPA, *Transforming the FBI*, i.

The OIG evaluated various DOJ terrorism task forces against strategic goals, including the prevention of terrorism and the promotion of national security. The JTTF and NJTTF were among the task forces reviewed.¹² The OIG sought to determine whether task force functions were duplicative or overlapped and examined the adequacy of task force guidance and oversight, to include the availability and/or use of meaningful performance metrics. OIG methodology consisted of document reviews, interviews, field office visits, a web-based survey, and other observations.¹³

The OIG identified a number of positive attributes concerning local JTTFs and the NJTTF. The OIG survey determined that the JTTF and the NJTTF had improved information sharing, collaborative partnerships, and investigative capabilities in conjunction with DOJ counterterrorism efforts. The study concluded the various task forces and councils were not duplicative, had separate functions, and relationships with other federal, state, and local agencies and private entities had improved. By expanding law enforcement community members with security clearances, the GAO found participation broadened and information sharing opportunities enhanced.¹⁴ The expansion of the JTTF, to include a larger segment of state, local, and federal participants, provided a “force multiplier” by expanding participation, skills, and experience to support DOJ counterterrorism efforts.¹⁵

The OIG also identified a number of deficiencies in the system and made recommendations for improvement. Audit results suggested many TFOs had no previous counterterrorism experience prior to placement on the JTTF and the FBI lacked a uniform national training plan. In addition to a lack of experience, the DOJ survey determined the majority of new task force personnel had no prior domestic or international terrorism

¹² The Deputy Attorney General’s National Security Coordination Council (NSCC), U.S. Attorneys’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC), and the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTF) were also reviewed.

¹³ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspection Division, *The Department of Justice’s Task Forces*, I-2005-007 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2005), i.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ii.

training or education. Once assigned to a local JTTF and/or the NJTTF, a significant number of TFOs still had not received basic counterterrorism training. Of more concern was the fact that many of these TFOs went untrained for months, and in some circumstances years, after assignment. The survey determined the median time JTTF personnel went without receiving training was 390 days.¹⁶ This is inconsistent with FBI Director Mueller's statement that, by the end of 2003, basic counterterrorism training would be provided to every JTTF member.¹⁷

The OIG found that, in light of the prolific growth of the JTTFs and the lack of experience and counterterrorism training on the part of new members, standardized training and a well-defined training plan were essential.¹⁸ The survey determined that existing JTTF training was in most cases determined locally by the respective FBI Field Offices and as such was oftentimes inconsistent and inequitable. For example, some FBI Field Offices offered web-based multimedia instruction concerning international and domestic terrorism matters, while other field offices sent task force members to basic counterterrorism courses at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Likewise, a number of field divisions proactively developed training and education programs that addressed cultural sensitivity, terrorism financing, and terrorism investigative strategies, while other field divisions failed to develop or implement any kind of independent training agendas.¹⁹

A significant number of state, local, and non-FBI TFOs interviewed by the OIG complained about the absence of formal procedures and lack of notification regarding training opportunities. Many task force participants were generally unaware of available training programs. Task force personnel also complained that FBI agents assigned to the JTTF were given preference concerning training opportunities.²⁰ The OIG determined

¹⁶ *The Department of Justice's Task Forces*, I-2005-007 69.

¹⁷ *Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks: The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since 2001*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 14, 2004).

¹⁸ DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, *The Department of Justice's Task Forces*, 64.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁰ DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, *The Department of Justice's Task Forces*, iv.

that lack of training notification and perceived training inequities might cause resentment, impact work productivity, and undermine collaboration in the task force setting.²¹

The OIG also concluded the FBI had no structured, system wide program in place to orient new task force members. The OIG considered orientation important in as much as 55 percent of the approximately 5,085 task force members assigned to the JTTF were from outside the FBI. The survey found that 40 percent of both FBI and non-FBI task force members assigned to the JTTF and NJTTF had not received program orientation. Those who did receive orientation claimed it was provided primarily through on-the-job training and advice from other task force members, rather than through a formal orientation program. It was likewise determined that when orientation was provided, it was – at best – inconsistent, sporadic, and varied widely amongst the local JTTFs.²²

Because most of the non-FBI task force personnel were from traditional law-enforcement backgrounds, the GAO recommended the FBI provide orientation and training concerning terrorism investigations, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and human source (HUMINT) development.²³ The OIG concluded that state, local, and other federal law-enforcement members would benefit from timely, relevant, and comprehensive orientation that encompassed FBI policies and procedures.²⁴

The OIG also concluded the FBI had not adequately defined, in writing, the mission, roles, and responsibilities of the respective JTTF participants. Moreover, as of 2005, the JTTF was not adequately utilizing resources to interact and share information with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote areas. The study also found the FBI had not developed outcome-oriented performance measures for the JTTF as an entity or for individual participants. Likewise, the JTTF and NJTTF had not developed sufficient criteria to assess strategies, operations and resources.²⁵

²¹ DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, *The Department of Justice's Task Forces*, 74.

²² *Ibid.*, iv.

²³ *Ibid.*, 76.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 65-84.

Pursuant to the survey, the OIG report provided three primary recommendations to improve the efficiency and operations of the counterterrorism task forces. First, the OIG determined the FBI should develop and implement a national training plan for the JTTF. In order to ensure optimal efficacy the OIG suggested the FBI conduct an initial needs assessment and thereafter tailor curriculum to meet those needs. It also recommended the FBI assign responsibility for developing and managing the program, establishing minimum mandatory training standards and time frames for completion. As part of the process, task force participants would be required to complete introductory training within ninety days of joining the task force and would complete designated minimum training hours annually. Responsibility for training notification would be assigned to the field, with the objective of targeting and eliminating training inequities for FBI and non-FBI task force members.

Secondly, the OIG recommended the FBI develop a formal, standardized orientation program for all new JTTF and NJTTF members and provide the orientation within thirty days of assignment. Finally, the OIG advised the FBI to develop performance measures for their Counterterrorism Task Force.

B. RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC CHANGE

Due to the rapid growth and increase in responsibilities of the JTTF, the consistency and effectiveness of the local JTTF offices varies nationwide. To increase effectiveness and facilitate interagency collaboration, the JTTF can apply steps taken by business organizations that have successfully navigated strategic change to become more competitive. Although change for the sake of change does not ensure improvement, by identifying the areas of weakness that hinder the process, change can be implemented to eliminate obstacles and promote uniformity.

Transformational initiatives that facilitate change in large organizations are often difficult. Factors that impede transformation can be both psychological and structural. To be successful, a transformation program must have vision and an implementation strategy that recognizes and overcomes embedded organizational and psychological impediments that favor the status quo. First, employees may fear proposed changes will worsen the

situation. This fear stems from the comfort and perception of competence that develops from the repetitive performance of job tasks. Second, in bureaucratic organizations such as the federal government, consistency is valued and employees need systemic and sustained reassurance that management is committed to the prospective change. Third, a sense of commitment to the current course of action and/or strategy is established through sustained exposure over time. Finally, behavior can become culturally embedded in the organization, creating the false impression that the current course of action is preferable over change.²⁶

Bureaucratic organizations, by their very nature, promote resistance to change by developing structures, training, culture, and incentives to induce employees to conform to organizational mandates. Adaptability and innovation are often viewed as disruptive to the existing political hierarchy and balance of power. Innovation and the generation of new ideas are restrained by standard operating procedures, rules, hierarchy, and specialization, all of which limit employee experiences and flexibility. This type of organization, and government in particular, is often more adept at punishing errors than rewarding excellence. The tendency to punish failure discourages risk-taking behavior that may result in failure.²⁷ Because bureaucratic goals and objectives are often divergent and vague, accurate performance metrics to gauge success are lacking. The absence of clear performance metrics can diminish accountability and responsibility, which in turn encourages adherence to existing rules and procedures. Because change is associated with risk and failures are magnified, employees have few incentives to champion innovative initiatives.²⁸

Change in a large bureaucracy is often easier when it involves incremental changes and innovative approaches that modify or improve existing practices.²⁹ Based on the premise that people are resistant to change, the literature advocates two primary

²⁶ Steven Kelman, *Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 24-25.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁸ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 30.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

organizational strategies to initiate and convince employees they should embrace new behaviors and ideas. These involve a campaign of “shock and awe” that focuses on extreme measures to induce employee cooperation, coupled with a series of penalties and/or rewards. Both of these approaches operate under the premise that employees are inherently resistant to change.³⁰ These strategies ignore important demographic, hierarchical, and psychological factors that can be used to create an atmosphere conducive to organizational change. In large organizations, particularly bureaucratic organizations such as the government, change is often a political process which is initiated by executive leadership. This process can provide opportunity for those in middle management and among the rank-and file to demonstrate leadership qualities.

To initiate organizational change it is necessary to identify and enlist the support of key individuals who are either discontented with the status quo or are predisposed to innovation and new ideas. These individuals can cooperate and form a core constituency to unleash change by communicating and promoting transformational ideas and programs. Initially, these individuals will most likely constitute a small minority but, if cultivated, can serve a critical role in helping to set in motion the processes necessary to implement transformational initiatives.

Initially, personal commitment and relentless pressure from top leaders is a critical driver of the transformation process.³¹ Therefore, it is incumbent on senior leadership to create a sense of urgency in the organization to facilitate change. After identifying potential deficiencies in core organizational functions, senior leaders must find ways to communicate information concerning the need for change and promote transformational initiatives. Without this leadership support on multiple levels, along with a communication of current deficiencies, a sense of urgency will not be produced and the change process will lose momentum and perish.³²

³⁰ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 6.

³¹ Michael Hammer and Steven A. Stanton, *The Reengineering Revolution* (New York: Harper Business, 1995), 34.

³² John P. Kotter, *Leading Change: Why Transformational Efforts Fail* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corp, 2006), 2-4.

During the transformation process, employees fall into four broad groups: the change vanguard, early recruits, fence-sitters, and skeptics or critics.³³ The first group, the change vanguard, is comprised of senior leadership. Literature suggests that leaders who embody the change vanguard are motivated by trust and idealism, are ideologically inspired, and are discontent with the existing system.³⁴ To effect significant transformation, it is important for the coalition to include key individuals who are not part of the senior management team but have good reputations and have established a level of trust within the organization. These individuals are the initial recruits who often share a desire for job autonomy and a sense of empowerment.³⁵ They are not necessarily content with the existing system and are predisposed to enjoy change. Common personality characteristics include the ability to think in the abstract, which leads to innovative ideas. These individuals are also efficacious, value new experiences, and believe that they are in control.³⁶ Other psychological and personal attributes of this group include a desire for autonomy, a higher education level, and a sense of venturesome-ness. These traits make it easier for them to envision innovative alternatives to those organizational systems currently in place.³⁷ Fence-sitters and skeptics are characterized by a strong psychological aversion to change.³⁸

Other potential pools for coalition recruits include individuals who derive satisfaction from countering conventional opinion and employees who are experiencing high levels of job stress and so can be convinced that autonomy and change might lessen their job burdens.³⁹ It is also advantageous to recruit the support of opinion leaders. Opinion leaders can exert a robust influence over the attitudes and behaviors of work-

³³ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 65.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁶ Everett M. Rogers, *The Diffusion of Innovation*, 4th Ed. (New York: Free Press, 1995), Chapter 8.

³⁷ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 74.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 70.

³⁹ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 69.

group peers, generating support for change throughout the organizational hierarchy.⁴⁰ Without the recruitment of these individuals, it is unlikely that transformational change can be accomplished.

Once a solid guiding coalition is in place, it is essential to develop a strategic vision of the future that is easy to communicate and understand. Without a cohesive vision and/or strategy, transformational efforts can become entangled in confusing and ineffective projects that are not focused on the core objectives. Symbolic actions and straight forward communication conduits can often be used by organizational leaders to communicate vision and focus attention on transformation processes.⁴¹ Complicated plans and directives not easily incorporated into the primary strategy and/or vision will confuse and may alienate employees. It has been suggested that if understanding and interest in the organizational vision cannot be effectively communicated by leaders in five minutes or less, the transformational process will encounter significant difficulties.⁴²

Another common error in the transformation process is underestimating the need for pervasive and sustained communication throughout the organization. Without sustained communication efforts, support for the transformational vision will wane and cynicism concerning the efficacy of the program will grow. Transformation often requires that employees make short-term sacrifices to enable change. Multi-channel communication through words and behavior on the part of senior executives and coalition-team employees will help convert fence-sitters and silence cynics.⁴³

Once the change process has been implemented, momentum must be sustained. In large organizations, the change process may last several years. To accomplish the required tasks, senior executives and line managers must establish goals and clear performance metrics to track improvements, reflect objectives, and reward employees.

⁴⁰ Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovation*, 273.

⁴¹ Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Management as a Symbolic Action" in *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Volume 3, edited by L.L Cummings and Barry M. Staw (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1981), 1-52.

⁴² Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 8-9.

⁴³ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 10.

Formulating short-term achievable goals – or “wins” – creates an atmosphere whereby psychological and operational change can gain momentum and feed on itself. Early achievements and positive experiences provide a mechanism for leaders to communicate positive feedback. Positive feedback is defined as a process whereby “the change in one direction sets in motion reinforcing pressures that produce further change in the same direction.”⁴⁴ Studies of government procurement reform determined that positive initial experiences have a strong correlation to sustained support for change.⁴⁵ This phenomenon is called “tipping point contagion and path dependence.”⁴⁶ Theories suggest change typically starts slowly and then reaches a critical mass or tipping point whereby new practices spread throughout the organization and becomes self-reinforcing. This process is dependent on a number of drivers including the creation of early goals and/or wins, successful experiences, and positive feedback. Creating short-term goals and benchmarks also promotes the analytic thinking necessary to clarify or even revise the organizational vision to foster a continued sense of urgency in the transformation process.⁴⁷ Once these processes are in place, expectations that shape employee behavior become self-fulfilling prophecies and subsequent behaviors fulfill initial predictions of success.⁴⁸

Other psychological processes that have an impact on attitudes towards transformation include gradualism, or the iterative introduction of processes that lead to change. An example of this phenomenon is the “foot in the door” technique that is used extensively in the business world by salesmen. The idea is that if individuals can be induced to make small, seemingly inconsequential changes, they will be psychologically inclined to subsequently engage in much larger and more consequential actions.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Robert Jervise, *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 125.

⁴⁵ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 113.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁴⁷ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 14.

⁴⁸ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 421-36.

⁴⁹ Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, *The Person and the Situation: Perspectives on Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), 50.

Socialization and peer support are other potentially powerful determinants of organizational change. This is particularly applicable to the influences within an employee's immediate workgroup. Specifically, peers influence individuals in a group setting in three primary ways: through pressure to conform, access to information, and through persuasion.⁵⁰ Peer influence can manifest in a number of ways and can be either positive or negative. Perceptions are important and supporters and/or detractors can have a corresponding influence on the level of support in the workgroup. Leaders also play an important role because they are perceived to be in an authoritative position and may influence attitudes among those in the group who defer to those in authority. Sustained communication and perceived leadership support for change can negate the notion that the change initiative is transient. This leadership support also makes it more difficult for critics to attack change initiatives and can energize individuals in the organization who are sympathetic to or support transformational programs.⁵¹

Transformational processes are mechanisms to create feedback and subsequently influence attitudes that are self-reinforcing and are primarily driven by influences inherent in the workplace. Significant change often takes years to accomplish and until innovative processes and changes are embedded into the organizational culture, progress and reforms are fragile and subject to regression.⁵² Ultimately, change in an organization must become rooted in the values, culture, and social norms of the organization or it will erode and fade with the passage of time and the turnover of key stakeholders and guiding coalition members. The institutionalization of change in corporate culture is accomplished through proactive measures that illustrate the benefit of new ideas, initiatives, and innovation, and their impact on organizational performance. This process involves a conscious decision to ensure adaptive approaches are indoctrinated in and

⁵⁰ Kelman, *Unleashing Change*, 127.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁵² Kotter, *Leading Change*, 15.

conveyed to new generations of management. This strategy can be incorporated into the hiring process and in evaluation for promotion and advancement.⁵³

C. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND STRATEGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In 2006, the FBI began using the Balanced Scorecard methodology as a management tool and implemented the Strategy Management System (SMS) within the Counterterrorism Division. Taking a cue from other private and public sector companies and agencies, the FBI sought to align day-to-day operations with broader strategies, generate feedback, and measure progress.⁵⁴ The FBI recognized that successful companies and organizations have implemented the Balanced Scorecard methodology for strategic planning to increase transparency, improve participation, facilitate accessibility, and establish balance. To achieve operational excellence, high-performance organizations apply multiple strategies to cultivate innovative approaches. To be successful, local JTTFs must also promote innovative approaches that align with rewards and incentives, which in turn will link innovation to performance and participation. The JTTF must encourage new ideas, assess their effectiveness, and adopt ideas that are useful in achieving organizational goals. Innovative ideas can be used to improve existing programs, develop new programs, target limited resources, and create strategic collaborative partnerships with other organizations.⁵⁵

Although Balanced Scorecard methodology has been adopted by a number of private and public organizations, success is impacted by senior executives' organizational commitment. This commitment includes establishing structural elements that promote education and strategic learning. To foster and sustain innovation, the JTTF must have senior leaders who establish a clear and compelling vision, generate support for that

⁵³ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 16, 17.

⁵⁴ Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *FBI Organizational Changes Press Conference*, July 26, 2006 Washington, D. C.

⁵⁵ Debra Knopman and Susan A. Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management in Public and Private Organizations: Case Studies and Options for the EPA* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Science and Technology, April 2003), vii.

vision, and personally participate in the change process. To accomplish this, executive leadership must create an environment in which creativity and innovation can flourish and best practices and lessons learned can be institutionalized. This process includes establishing an organizational culture and management system which support innovation.⁵⁶

Innovation in the framework of the Balanced Scorecard has been studied in the context of both private and in public organizations. In 2003, at the request of Congress and the NAPA, the RAND Corporation studied innovation in both the private and public sector. The study was conducted on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which sought to capture characteristics of innovative organizations, identify elements of change management that enabled these organizations to innovate, and ultimately suggest options for implementing innovation and change within their own agency.⁵⁷ RAND identified structures and processes required to initiate, implement, support, and sustain innovation throughout an organization or government agency. Innovation was defined as organizational changes in culture, output, and business processes that collectively help an organization become more effective in fulfilling its core mission.

As part of the research process RAND selected and studied six innovative public and private organizations. RAND analysts then identified systems of change management within these organizations, including specific actions necessary to prepare, execute, and support innovation.⁵⁸ Principles and best practices gleaned from the RAND study can be used by the FBI and JTTF in the transformation process.

Pursuant to the study, RAND identified an integrated system of activities that categorize primary domains encompassing the Balanced Scorecard approach. The primary domains include the following: (1) mission and strategy, (2) employees and organizational capacity, (3) business processes, (4) budget and finance, and (5) external

⁵⁶ Knopman and Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management* , vii.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid , 3.

relationships. In selecting potential candidates to study, RAND identified decentralized corporations and organizations that sustained innovative processes over a five-year period. Candidates were also organizationally complex, in as much as they exhibited a multilayered structure, were engaged in a multifunctional mission, and worked in close partnership with both public and private external organizations. Candidates were also geographically distributed and had multiple stakeholders with diverse and divergent interests. Finally, candidates had an asymmetric risk of success and failure, regulatory-like functions, and a predictable leadership continuum. The federal agencies selected were the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), United States Customs Service (USCS), and the Veterans Health Administration (VA). Companies selected in the private sector included Marriott International, du Pont and Procter & Gamble. The aforementioned organizations were selected because they all have multiple organizational levels, are multifunctional, and – because of size – are beset by some degree of organizational inertia.⁵⁹

In the initial phase RAND examined the transformation process, including the underlying causes of change, factors that made the organization innovative, and specific activities utilized in the transformation process. RAND also analyzed common themes amongst candidates, including the status of the organization and internal processes used to manage change and innovation. Identified innovation drivers were: timelines for innovation; related actions; barriers and support to change; human, budgetary and other resources utilized; and key enabling actions to promote the change process. Other factors examined were evaluation methods and measures, information sharing, and the integration of innovation and change into organizational practices, to include staffing, training, and budget.⁶⁰

Innovative organizations use performance-driven management systems for guiding and stimulating innovation. This involves gathering information on preferences, interests, and the satisfaction of external parties and stakeholders. These organizations

⁵⁹ Knopman and Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management*, 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

make changes that focus on the organizational mission and permeate all business functions. In the first domain benchmarks, performance metrics and evaluation systems are put in place to measure the progress and efficacy of new approaches.

The second domain covers an organizations' capacity to identify activities and processes that ensure proper training and skills development. The quantification of organizational capacity is necessary to create a multifunctional problem-solving culture that excels at incorporating knowledge from both external and internal sources. This domain rewards innovators and cultivates those managers and leaders who are open to change. It also assigns accountability to senior management, while providing employees the flexibility needed to effectuate change.

A third domain involves business processes. These processes create ownership and accountability that guide change and performance improvement. Implemented business processes establish structured procedures for generating ideas, testing those ideas, aligning innovation to strategy, and adopting those ideas to contribute to mission success. Budget and funding provisions must be in place to provide the foundation for furnishing the resources necessary to support innovation at all levels.⁶¹ Finally, the organization must establish and cultivate collaborative relationships with external constituents to provide the organization with the capability to harvest opportunities. These opportunities often include lessons learned and best practices from outside sources

In light of the above, the JTTF must perform three integrated actions to innovate: prepare for change, support change, and execute change. All of the aforementioned processes must be completed for innovation to be successful. The first step is recognizing the need for change and generating leadership support by building a coalition of key stakeholders. These key stakeholders must then engage in the process by implementing an action plan that establishes benchmarks to monitor progress, developing short- and long-term goals, and assigning accountability. Likewise, potential impediments must be identified, addressed, and overcome to ensure success.⁶²

⁶¹ Knopman and Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management*, 4.

⁶² Knopman and Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management*, 5.

The second component necessary to sustain innovation is supporting change. This process involves maintaining multilateral communication, while providing the requisite training to develop the skills necessary to create change and perform new tasks. In this phase incentives are provided and personnel are rewarded for innovative action. The ability to innovate is tied to rewards in the form of raises, bonuses, recognition, and autonomy. Innovative capabilities are manifested through openness to new ideas, enhanced problem-solving capacity, and an appreciation for individuals who challenge the status quo. It is likewise necessary for the organization to provide adequate resources to generate novel ideas, training, and educational opportunities to develop new skills.⁶³ Through these actions the organization can create and cultivate a climate for innovation consistent with the organization's culture and mission.

The final step is executing change. This process involves evaluating progress through pilot studies and other means. Pilot studies are an important part of the development process that facilitates the incorporation of lessons learned during the implementation process. Execution can be accomplished through leadership teams, special planning and budgeting processes, or project review and management programs. If a structured execution plan is not implemented, organizational personnel will not have a conduit to provide innovative ideas for future development and ultimately the system will wither and die.⁶⁴

To incorporate change in the context of the SMS, the JTTFs must implement a comprehensive framework that will translate the JTTF vision and strategy into a coherent and linked set of performance measures. To be effective, these measures should incorporate both outcome metrics and performance drivers specifically related to those outcomes. By identifying and defining outcomes, and the drivers of those outcomes, the organization can channel the energies, abilities, and knowledge inherent in the

⁶³ Knopman and Resetar, *Innovation and Change Management*, 5

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

organization to achieve both short-term and long-term goals.⁶⁵ These SMS measures can be used in a variety of ways to include aligning individual, organizational, and geographical initiatives to achieve a common goal.⁶⁶ If properly constructed, it is hypothesized that the aforementioned components will provide the unity of purpose needed to help the organization focus on an integrated strategy.⁶⁷

As part of the SMS, FBI JTTF managers and key stakeholders must identify critical internal processes that are essential for the organization to excel. These processes will have the greatest impact on the organization's mission and objectives.⁶⁸ This process is fundamentally different than traditional approaches utilized to monitor and improve existing organizational processes. Optimally, the Balanced Scorecard methodology cultivates the identification and implementation of new and innovative processes necessary to excel. In addition, the organization will direct resources to those core processes critical to the organization's strategy to succeed. Likewise, the JTTF Program must incorporate innovative processes to meet the organization's existing and emerging needs. This is accomplished through integrating objectives and measures to address both short-term and long-term goals.⁶⁹

Education, training, learning, and growth represent the foundation for current and future JTTF success. This learning and growth emanate from several sources including personnel and organizational procedures. The JTTF can use SMS to identify gaps in existing capabilities. Subsequently, procedures can be put in place to optimize performance. To fill the gaps and accomplish the targeted outcomes, specific skills and capabilities must be developed through learning and training to achieve desired results. Objectives and measures should be linked and mutually reinforcing in a cause and effect

⁶⁵ R. S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton, "Linking the Balanced Scorecard to Strategy," *California Management Review* (Fall 1996): 56.

⁶⁶ R.S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton, "Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System," *Harvard Business Review* (January/February 1996): 57.

⁶⁷ Kaplan and Norton, "Linking the Balanced Scorecard," 58.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

relationship. For example, proper training concerning the use and utility of various FBI databases would translate into increased efficiency in conjunction with intelligence collection and investigations. These outcomes can only be achieved through education and training that effectively develop—and continually improve – task force personnel skills.⁷⁰

D. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

As a multi-agency task force, it is useful for the JTTF to identify organizational processes that enhance collaboration and eliminate or minimize barriers. It is also necessary to conceptualize and measure processes that are essential components of collaborative capacity: the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes. Using the data and theories of other collaboration scholars and practitioners, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) researchers Susan Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Thomas constructed an audit to measure an organization’s collaborative capacity. The audit identified characteristics that contribute to interagency collaborative capacity.⁷¹

The NPS audit determined that effective collaboration incorporates the following elements: (1) a common shared vision, (2) a sense of joint responsibility, (3) accountability, (4) information sharing, and (5) clear metrics for gauging success. Impediments to interagency collaboration include: (1) a lack of information sharing, (2) a lack of common missions, (3) unclear roles and responsibilities, (4) mistrust, and (5) other factors.⁷² Collaborative capacity occurs when organizational members develop new frames of reference for existing problems and capabilities.⁷³

As organizations become more dependent on one another, the success of multi-agency networks, such as the JTTF, become increasingly important in efforts to increase

⁷⁰ Kaplan and Norton, “Linking the Balanced Scorecard,” 65.

⁷¹ S. Hocevar, E. Jansen and G. F. Thomas, *Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security*, Technical Report NPS-GSBPP-04-008 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004)..

⁷² Hocevar, et al., *Building Collaborative Capacity*, 5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 83.

performance and accomplish homeland security prerogatives. Collaboration and interagency cooperation is both necessary and imperative. Collaboration is defined by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) as a joint activity that produces more value than can be produced when organizations act alone.⁷⁴ This complex interagency collaborative capacity is characterized by high task uncertainty, multiple participants, virtual communication, and diverse organizational goals. The GAO determined that in a multi-agency context, collaboration can be sustained by adopting the following practices: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems.⁷⁵

To accomplish its mission, the JTTF must implement these and other collaborative processes to leverage dispersed resources, identify and transfer best practices, streamline information sharing, cross pollinate innovative ideas, and maximize scarce resources.⁷⁶ Successful collaboration also involves initiatives that integrate and collaborate with non-JTTF participants to include, but not be limited to, stakeholders representing smaller state and local law enforcement departments, public health, first responders, and private industry.

If the JTTF is to increase collaborative capacity, internal conditions must be created whereby driving forces are greater than restraining forces. Executive leadership must be committed to the process and motivated to create a culture where collaboration

⁷⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Results-Oriented Government, Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, October 2005).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁷⁶ M. T. Hansen and N. Nohria, "How to Build Collaborative Advantage," *MIT Sloan Management Review* 46, no. 1(2004): 22-30

flourishes.⁷⁷ Enabling factors include strategic transformation driven by a common goal, such as the improvement of information sharing processes and/or the implementation of a cohesive training program. Accomplishing a shared objective involves the willingness to adapt the collaborative effort to reflect the organizational needs and interests of participating organizations. As an example, for processes such as information sharing and communication, the JTTF must implement procedures to ensure pertinent information is disseminated in a timely fashion to interagency partners.⁷⁸ As part of the process on a structural level and to fulfill its mission as an interagency task force, the JTTF must be internally consistent throughout the program and align objectives with key stakeholder participants.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Hocevar, et al., *Building Collaborative Capacity*, 8.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

III. CTD SURVEY RESULTS

A. METHODOLOGY

1. Participants

The present study represents one of the few survey research projects where the population was both known and had the potential of being completely identified. The population was all Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) members nationwide throughout the 102 JTTF locations. Membership was operationally defined as any individual assigned to the JTTF, regardless of status (i.e., full-time, part-time, or liaison) or membership agency (e.g., federal, state, or local). Survey selectees included both law enforcement and JTTF participants who serve an intelligence function.⁸⁰

Selections for the study were made using the master JTTF listing database housed at the NJTTF, into which the 101 JTTF locations nationwide input their JTTF members. At the time the survey began there were 4,589 members in this master listing. The target sample for the study was 10% of all members, or 459. However, 15% (638) were initially contacted to compensate for those members we would be unable to survey for whatever reason. Surveyees were randomly chosen for participation. After completion of the first sample, it was determined a second sample was needed to reach our goal of 459 participants. This brought the total sample to 705. At the conclusion of the study, data was successfully obtained on 447 JTTF members. In addition to overall trends, comparisons were made by region of the country, JTTF membership status (i.e., full-time vs. part-time), and JTTF agency membership (e.g., FBI vs. non-FBI).

One month prior to conducting the random selection, each JTTF coordinator was contacted and asked to update the membership and contact information. In order to obtain complete data on 10% of the population, a 15% random sample selection was utilized. For the random sampling procedure, a master list of the 4,589 members was created in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. It was determined that 15% of the population was equal to

⁸⁰ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

689 individuals. An equation was entered into Excel requesting the program to randomly select 689 individuals from the master list. The procedure employed was a true random sample, in that weighted selections were not made and it was possible for individuals to be chosen more than once. That is, all participants had an equal chance of being selected and selection was not influenced by other factors, such as field office size or agency membership. The resulting list of 689 individuals was scanned for duplicate selections. Once duplicate selections were removed, the final list of participants contained 638 individuals.

The final target sample for the present study was 459. The only inclusion criterion was that each individual be a JTTF member in any of the 101 JTTFs nationwide. Exclusion criteria consisted of the following: (1) the individual refused to complete the survey, (2) the individual was on extended leave or temporary duty assignment (TDY) and would not return until after the data collection period, (3) the individual was no longer a JTTF member, or (4) attempts to contact the individual during the data collection period were unsuccessful. As noted above, efforts were made prior to conducting the random selection procedure to minimize the number of individuals on the master list who might meet exclusion criteria. Approximately 638 JTTF members were contacted regarding the present study. As of March 23, 2006, data had been entered for all 638 participants, of which 225 produced invalid data due to meeting exclusion criteria. Data had been collected on 413 participants, or 8.9% of all JTTF members, which fell forty-six short of the initial goal of 459.

In order for results to be generalizable and valid, it was determined that a second random sample was needed to try and obtain survey data on forty-six additional individuals. Eighty additional participants were randomly chosen from the same master list of 4,589 JTTF members. After duplicate selections were removed, sixty-seven additional JTTF members were contacted to complete the survey. This brought our total sample to 705 participants.

When all data had been collected and entered from both samples, valid survey data had been obtained on 447 individuals. There were 258 participants that met exclusion criteria with four (2%) refusing to complete the survey, seventeen (7%) on

extended leave or TDY who could not be contacted, 210 (81%) were no longer JTTF members, nineteen (7%) were not successfully contacted, and eight (3%) met exclusion criteria for other reasons. Although we were still twelve surveys short of meeting our goal of 459, data was successfully obtained on approximately 9.7% of all JTTF members. It should be noted that as a result of the JTTF Telephone Survey, it was discovered that member listings for the 101 locations were inaccurate. Some of the individuals contacted for the survey indicated they had not been a JTTF member for as long as one year; therefore, the actual number of JTTF members is *lower* than 4,589. Depending on the actual total number of JTTF members nationwide, data obtained on the 447 members may actually meet or surpass the minimum 10% criteria.

Of those selected for participation 705, 37% (261) were FBI agents, 30% (213) Federal Task Force Officers (TFO), 10% (72) State TFOs, 22% (156) Local TFOs, and 1% (one) Other. Approximately 33% (231) were part-time and 67% (474) had full-time status. Approximately 19% (137) were from Region I, 22% (154) were from Region II, 37% (260) were from Region III, and 22% (154) were from Region IV (See Appendix A for the Regional Map). Of those successfully surveyed (447), 45% (201) were FBI agents, 26% (116) federal Task Force Officers (TFO), 9% (42) state TFOs, 19% (87) local TFOs, and 1% (one) Other. In other words, 45% were FBI personnel and 55% non-FBI personnel. Approximately 22% (100) were part-time and 78% (347) had full-time status. Approximately 21% (91) were from Region I, 23% (103) were from Region II, 31% (140) were from Region III, and 25% (113) were from Region IV. Approximately 55% of those surveyed were assigned to a field office versus an annex or resident agency.




Figure 1. JTTF members selected for the survey (705) compared to those who completed the survey (447), by agency membership.

On average, participants had 14.45 (8.42) years of law enforcement experience, with a range from 0.67 to 45 and a median of 13.63 years of experience. FBI special agents averaged 8.48 years of law enforcement experience, compared to 12.34 years for federal TFOs and 14.26 years for state and local TFOs. Approximately 28% (fifty-six) of the FBI special agents had other non-FBI law enforcement experience compared to 34% (thirty-two) of the federal TFOs. The average amount of time assigned to the JTTF was 3.48 years.

2. Procedure

The principal investigator (PI) served as primary research consultant to Counterterrorism (CTD) executive management regarding the development of survey questions, although the topic-area content for the survey was developed by CTD executive management independent of the PI. The PI provided guidance to CTD executive management to ensure questions were posed in a non-leading manner, and that answers to questions could be quantified. All questions were presented in some type of forced-choice format. The forced-choice format varied amongst yes/no, Likert scale ratings, and multiple-choice formats. For the multiple-choice formats, an “other” option

was provided in the event a participant's response did not fit into the response set provided. In addition, CTD executive management mandated that both quantitative and qualitative information be collected from participants. Therefore, a comments section was provided at the end of each major section of the survey for participants to add to or elaborate on positive or negative feedback not addressed by survey questions.

CTD executive management made the final decisions regarding the inclusion and editing of survey questions. Survey questions were selected to determine if the FBI CTD provided JTTF members the necessary tools to accomplish their mission. Identified tools included substantive training, investigative tools, database access and training, participation in FBI counterterrorism investigations, sources, access to support personnel, information sharing via briefings provided by FBI field office management to TFO agency management, and leadership and management skills.

Substantive training was divided into four primary areas: international terrorism training; domestic terrorism training; weapons of mass destruction training; and Muslim Arab culture training. Survey participants were also queried concerning legal training. Investigative tools requests for national security letters and whether survey participants had participated in preparing a FISA requests. Participants were also surveyed concerning access to and training in using primary FBI databases, including the FBI intranet, automated case support, the data extraction and extension project, the sensitive compartmented information operational network, Guardian, choice point, telephone applications, the investigative data warehouse, LEXIS-NEXIS, law enforcement online, and JWICS/SIPRINET.

The survey also asked JTTF members about participation in FBI counterterrorism investigations with regards to source development and operation. Survey participants were also questioned concerning leadership and management skills of FBI field office managers, information sharing between the office managers, and TFO agency management and access to FBI support personnel.

Selected survey participants were contacted via telephone by members on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for data collection, regardless of membership (i.e., FBI or non-FBI). The survey was conducted via telephone for several reasons. First, it was believed that participants would be more honest due to: (1) the direct and more personal form of communication, (2) the potential for developing a rapport between the surveyor and surveyee, and (3) the opportunity to capitalize on the sense of camaraderie that exists between law enforcement personnel. Second, it was thought the NJTTF members conducting the surveys would be more successful at obtaining additional information for the comments sections if speaking directly to the participant. That is, there was a concern that participants might be inclined to skip questions if asked to complete the survey via email or postal mail. Finally, it was thought the response rate would improve, both in total responses and efficacy, when telephoning participants directly, rather than waiting for participants to return the survey via email or postal mail.

3. Data Analysis

Given this was the first JTTF Telephone Survey conducted, the purpose was to gather baseline information and identify problem areas within the JTTF Program. Hypotheses were not developed beforehand. Therefore, all analyses and results are ad-hoc. Three separate independent variables were used for the comparisons: region of the country, JTTF membership status (i.e., full-time vs. part-time), and JTTF agency membership (e.g., FBI vs. non-FBI). The FO divisions were divided into four regions (See Appendix A): Region I contained nine FOs (New York, Boston, Albany, Buffalo, Newark, New Haven, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore); Region II included seventeen FOs (Norfolk, Richmond, San Juan, WFO, Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbia, Knoxville, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit, Memphis, Milwaukee, Springfield, and Louisville); Region III had eighteen FOs (Birmingham, Denver, Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Dallas, El Paso, Kansas City, San Antonio, Houston, Jackson, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Miami, Mobile, Tampa, Minneapolis, and Omaha); and Region IV contained twelve FOs (Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Honolulu, Las Vegas, Portland, Anchorage, Los Angeles, and Seattle).

The purpose of this research was to gather baseline information regarding program evaluation and to determine where additional resources are needed for the continued success of the JTTF Program. The consumers of this information are CTD executive management at the FBI; therefore, the report is tailored towards their needs and level of understanding. This research is not intended to further science, develop new theories, or to be published in a scientific journal. Therefore, the results section of this report is heavily weighted towards descriptive statistics for ease of comprehension by the target audience

CTD executive management requested that qualitative data be gathered in addition to quantitative data. For this reason, a comments section was provided following the training, database/systems, and support personnel sections of the survey. A final comments section was also placed at the end of the survey. These comments sections were completely open-ended, in that participants could add any comments they wished regarding the JTTF program or working with the FBI. Comments were organized into categories based on recurring themes. Each theme was assigned a number and counts were tallied. This procedure was employed for all comments sections throughout the survey.

B. SUPPORT AND TRAINING

1. Substantive Training

On average, 79% of JTTF members sampled had received some type of counterterrorism training. Specifically, 91% received international terrorism (IT) training, 81% received domestic terrorism (DT) training, 67% had training in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 78% received Muslim-Arab culture (MAC) training. The most popular reason given for those who had not received training was “It was not offered to me,” followed by “time constraints,” and “lack of awareness regarding training opportunities.”

a. *International Terrorism Training*

Concerning the 91% of those surveyed who reported receiving IT training, 80% reported receiving FBIHQ-sponsored IT training, followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored IT training at 56% (231) and non-FBI sponsored-IT training at 50% (205).




Figure 2. International terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any IT training" and 409 for "FBIHQ IT training," "FBI FO IT training," and "non-FBI IT training."

For FBI HQ-sponsored IT training, 56% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 11% rated it "exceptional," and 6% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 27% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored IT training, 53% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 16% rated it "exceptional," and 5% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 24% missing data. The mean rating was 3.76 (between "good" and "above average") as compared to a mean rating of 3.64 for FBI HQ-sponsored training. For non-FBI-sponsored IT training, 52% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 16% rated it "exceptional," and 3% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 29% missing data.




Figure 3. Quality ratings for international terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 327 for "FBIHQ IT training," 231 for "FBI FO IT training," and 205 for "non-FBI IT training."

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing IT training received by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region I were most likely to receive IT training at 96%, followed by 95% in Region II, 93% in Region IV, and 85% in Region III.




Figure 4. IT training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis also revealed statistically significant differences when comparing IT training received by membership status. Specifically, 76% of part-time members received IT training, as compared to 96% of full-time members. Survey results revealed that JTTF agency membership impacted IT training received. Ninety-six percent of FBI agents surveyed received IT training, compared to 86% of federal TFOs, 81% of state TFOs, and 95% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs into a non-FBI group yielded a more powerful statistical comparison. The non-FBI group was then compared to an FBI group (consisting of FBI JTTF members), yielding significant disparities: 96% of FBI Agents on the JTTF received IT training compared to 89% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 5. IT training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, and 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.

b. Domestic Terrorism Training

Overall, 81% of those surveyed reported receiving DT training. Of those who reported receiving DT training, 82% reported receiving FBI HQ-sponsored DT training, followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored DT training at 33% and non-FBI-sponsored DT training at 30%.




Figure 6. Domestic terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any DT training" and 364 for "FBIHQ DT training," "FBI FO DT training," and "non-FBI DT training."

For FBI HQ-sponsored DT training, 53% respondents rated the training as "average" or "above average," 12% rated it "exceptional," and 7% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 28% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored DT training, 53% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 14% rated it "exceptional," and 3% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 29% missing data. The mean rating was 3.67 as compared with a mean rating of 3.54 for FBIHQ-sponsored training. For non-FBI-sponsored DT training, 50% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 10% rated it "exceptional," and 2% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 38% missing data.




Figure 7. Quality ratings for domestic terrorism training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 296 for "FBIHQ DT training," 119 for "FBI FO DT training," and 108 for "non-FBI DT training."

When comparing regions of the country, 86% of those surveyed from Regions I and II received DT training, compared to 78% in Regions II and III. Analysis failed to yield significant differences between regions on quality of DT training.




Figure 8. Training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing domestic terrorism training received by membership status. Approximately 73% of part-time members received DT training, compared to 84% of full-time members. JTTF agency membership played a factor concerning DT training received; 84% of FBI agents received DT training, compared to 73% of federal TFOs, 79% of state TFOs, and 86% of local TFOs. When comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF regarding DT training, 85% of FBI agents on the JTTF received training, compared to 78% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 9. DT training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.

c. Weapons of Mass Destruction Training

Overall, 67% of JTTF members reported receiving WMD training. Of these, the highest number (55%) reported receiving FBI HQ-sponsored WMD training, followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored WMD training at 35% and non-FBI-sponsored WMD training at 49%.




Figure 10. Weapons of mass destruction training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any WMD training," and 301 for "FBIHQ WMD training," "FBI FO WMD training" and "non-FBI WMD training".

For FBI HQ-sponsored WMD training, 48% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 24% rated it "exceptional," and 3% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 24% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored WMD training, 55% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 19% rated it "exceptional," and no ratings of "below average" or "poor" were given (with 26% missing data). The mean rating was 3.90, as compared with a mean rating of 4.01 for FBI HQ-sponsored training. For non-FBI sponsored WMD training, 45% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 18% rated it "exceptional," and no ratings of "below average" or "poor" were given, with 37% missing data. The mean rating for non-FBI-sponsored WMD training was 3.97.




Figure 11. Quality ratings for weapons of mass destruction training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 164 for "FBI HQ WMD training," 105 for "FBI FO WMD training," and 147 for "non-FBI WMD training."

When comparing regions of the country, 67% of those surveyed from Regions I and III received WMD training, compared to 72% in Region II and 63% in Region IV.




Figure 12. Figure 12 WMD training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

When comparing JTTF membership status, 63% of part-time members received training compared to 68% of full-time members. Analysis failed to yield significant differences regarding WMD training and JTTF membership status. When comparing JTTF agency membership, 64% of FBI agents received WMD training, compared to 62% of federal TFOs, 74% of state TFOs, and 79% of local TFOs. When comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF regarding WMD training, 64% of FBI agents on the JTTF received training compared to 70% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 13. WMD training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.

d. Muslim-Arab Culture Training

Overall, 78% of survey participants reported receiving MAC training, with 52% receiving FBI HQ-sponsored MAC training, followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored MAC training at 60%, and non-FBI-sponsored MAC training at 39%.




Figure 14. Muslim-Arab culture training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for "Any MAC training" and 348 for "FBI HQ MAC training," "FBI FO MAC training," and "non-FBI MAC training."

For FBI HQ-sponsored MAC training, 47% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 26% rated it "exceptional," and 4% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 23% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored MAC training, 48% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 26% rated it "exceptional," and 3% rated it "below average" or "poor," with 23% missing data. The mean rating was 3.98 as compared with 4.04 for FBI HQ-sponsored training. For non-FBI-sponsored MAC training, 40% rated the training as "average" or "above average," 26% rated it "exceptional," and 2% rated it "below average," with 32% missing data.




Figure 15. Figure 15 Quality ratings for Muslim-Arab culture training received. Sample sizes are as follows: 179 for "FBI HQ MAC training," 210 for "FBI FO MAC training," and 136 for "non-FBI MAC training."

When comparing regions of the country, 86% of those surveyed from Region I received MAC training, compared to 78% in Region II, 70% in Region III, and 81% in Region IV.




Figure 16. Figure 16 MAC training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences in Muslim-Arab culture training received when measured by JTTF membership status. Specifically, 58% of part-time members received MAC training, compared to 84% of full-time members. When comparing JTTF agency membership, 83% of FBI agents received MAC training, compared to 69% of federal TFOs, 79% of state TFOs, and 78% of local TFOs. When comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF, 83% of FBI agents on the JTTF received training compared to 74% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 17. Figure 17: MAC training received by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.

e. Legal Training

Regarding other types of training, 70% of JTTF members surveyed reported they have received legal training. Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing legal training received by region: at 87%, JTTF participants in Region I were most likely to receive legal training, followed by 83% in Region II, 69% in Region IV, and 54% in Region III.




Figure 18. Legal training received by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing legal training received by membership status. Specifically, 29% of part-time members received legal training, compared to 82% of full-time members. When comparing JTTF agency membership, 93% of FBI agents received legal training, compared to 44% of federal TFOs, 50% of state TFOs, and 63% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs into a single non-FBI group yielded a more powerful statistical comparison: ninety-three percent of FBI agents on the JTTF received legal training, compared to 52% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 19. Legal training by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.

f. Training Comments by JTTF Members

A comments section was placed at the end of the training portion of the survey, allowing participants to freely express any comments they had related to training. A total of 173 comments were made. Regardless of the type of training, 29% of all comments suggested that additional training is needed. Table 1 (below) lists the most common categories for comments and their frequency.

COMMENT	FREQUENCY
Training has been good/improved over the years	22
More training is needed overall	19
More Muslim-Arab Culture/Arabic training is needed	10
Training needs to be more available	8
Virtual Academy training is poor	7
Exercise-based/hands-on training is needed	7
Computer-based training is not sufficient	7
Quantico training is too tough to get into or travel to	7
Need more formal classroom training	6
Need to increase travel funds for training	6
Training needs to be improved	5
More advanced, topic-specific training is needed	5
Need more DT training	5
Training has been poor	4
Regional training is needed	4
Need more WMD training	3
TFOs need access to Virtual Academy	3
Need more FISA training	2
Other	43
TOTAL	173

Table 1. Training comments.

2. Investigative Tools

a. *National Security Letters*

Regarding investigative tools, approximately 50% of JTTF members surveyed stated they have requested a National Security Letter (NSL) analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing how many JTTF members have requested NSLs by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region II were most likely to have requested a NSL at 61%, followed by 54% in Region I, 52% in Region IV, and 37% in Region III.




Figure 20. NSL requests by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing NSL requests by membership status. Specifically, 18% of part-time members have requested a NSL compared to 59% of full-time members.

When comparing JTTF agency membership of those surveyed to how many JTTF members have requested NSLs, 74% of FBI Agents have requested a NSL compared to 23% of federal TFOs, 38% of state TFOs, and 37% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs into a single non-FBI group increased yielded a more powerful statistical comparison. Specifically, 74% of FBI agents on the JTTF have requested NSLs, compared to 30% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 21. NSL requests by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 245 for non-FBI members.

b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Requests

Regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 29% of JTTF members surveyed reported they have prepared a FISA package. When comparing regions of the country, 37% of those surveyed from Region II have prepared a FISA package, compared to 35% in Region I, 23% in Region III, and 26% in Region IV.




Figure 22. FISA requests by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing the number of JTTF members who have prepared a FISA package by membership status. Nine percent of part-time members have prepared a FISA package, compared to 35% of full-time members. When comparing JTTF agency membership of those surveyed to how many JTTF members have prepared a FISA package, 51% of FBI agents have prepared a FISA package, compared to 12% of federal TFOs, 5% of state TFOs, and 15% of local TFOs. Combining the TFOs into a single non-FBI group yields a more powerful statistical comparison: fifty-one percent of FBI agents on the JTTF have prepared a FISA package, compared to 12% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 23. FISA requests by JTTF status and agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 245 for non-FBI members.

3. Database Access and Training

a. Database Access

With regard to database access, 88% of JTTF members had access to the Internet, 85% could access the FBI Intranet, and 80% had access to Automated Case Support (ACS). Those accesses least available to or least utilized by JTTF members included the Data Extraction and Extension Project (DEEP), with 21% having access; Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION) also at 21%; and access to the SIPRNET or JWICS at 28%. At least half of those surveyed reported having access to Guardian (66%), Choice Point (65%), Telephone Applications (62%), Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) at 60%, Lexis-Nexis (58%), and Law Enforcement Online (LEO) at 56%. The relatively low access to IDW and Guardian is disturbing, given that these databases do not require a Top Secret operating system. Guardian is utilized by the field to enter or retrieve information regarding suspicious activity or threats. It is important that all JTTF members have access and training on this system.

IDW is also a very important database for JTTF members because it has the capability to simultaneously search many different databases for information and so can be a very useful investigative tool. Only 60% of those surveyed had access to IDW, while 66% could access Guardian.




Figure 24. 447 JTTF members' access to databases and systems.

Table 2 (below) details those JTTF members who have access and, for those with access, what percentage have used the system, received training, and found the system useful in conducting investigations.

Database/System	Access (N = 447)	Training	Used	Useful to Investigations
FBI Intranet*	85% (n = 378)	N/A	96%	93%
ACS	80% (n = 358)	68%	95%	91%
Telephone Applications	62% (n = 278)	51%	91%	85%
IDW	60% (n = 266)	58%	92%	89%
Guardian	66% (n = 297)	69%	85%	66%
DEEP	21% (n = 93)	45%	52%	19%
SCION	21% (n = 94)	66%	68%	63%
SIPRNET / JWICS	28% (n = 123)	48%	72%	63%
Internet	88% (n = 393)	N/A	94%	92%
Lexis Nexis	58% (n = 261)	62%	88%	85%
ChoicePoint	65% (n = 289)	59%	93%	90%
LEO	56% (n = 249)	48%	62%	43%

Table 2. JTF members with various database accesses, training on those databases, and opinions regarding the usefulness of those databases.

Comparisons were also made of database access by JTF members according to region of the country, as illustrated in Table 3 (below). The most notable trend was that JTF members in Region III had the lowest access rate for all databases (except LEO), compared to JTF members in Regions I, II, and IV. Analysis of the results shows significant differences in database access by region. The only databases

that failed to yield significant differences regarding access by region were: SCION, Lexis-Nexis, and LEO. Also of note is that Region I was the only region where 100% of JTTF members had access to the FBI Intranet. This is one database that all full-time and part-time JTTF members should have access to, in order to access FBI policies, guidance, and information; Virtual Academy; and classified email.

Database / System ACCESS	Region I (N = 91)	Region II (N = 103)	Region III (N = 140)	Region IV (N = 113)
FBI Intranet	100% (n = 91)	90% (n = 93)	68% (n = 95)	88% (n = 99)
ACS	93% (n = 85)	86% (n = 89)	66% (n = 92)	81% (n = 92)
Telephone Applications	77% (n = 70)	71% (n = 73)	46% (n = 65)	62% (n = 70)
IDW	66% (n = 60)	70% (n = 72)	44% (n = 62)	64% (n = 72)
Guardian	78% (n = 71)	83% (n = 85)	46% (n = 64)	68% (n = 77)
DEEP	21% (n = 19)	34% (n = 35)	16% (n = 22)	15% (n = 17)
SCION	23% (n = 21)	28% (n = 29)	17% (n = 24)	18% (n = 20)
SIPRNET / JWIC	24% (n = 22)	36% (n = 37)	19% (n = 26)	34% (n = 38)
Internet	93% (n = 85)	93% (n = 96)	79% (n = 111)	89% (n = 101)
Lexis-Nexis	68% (n = 62)	65% (n = 67)	50% (n = 70)	55% (n = 62)
Choice Point	75% (n = 68)	71% (n = 73)	52% (n = 73)	66% (n = 75)
LEO	54% (n = 49)	66% (n = 68)	55% (n = 77)	49% (n = 55)

Table 3. JTTF members database accesses by region.

Comparing database access and JTTF membership status provided a different view. Full-time members had significantly higher access numbers on all databases than part-time members, as shown in Table 4 (below).

It should be noted that, when comparing membership status, some of the previously mentioned trends continued. For example, even for full-time members, only 72% had access to IDW and 78% had access to Guardian. Other databases yielded very high access numbers (such as ACS at 95%). When considering full-time members only, database access needs improvement. Full-time members, who spend the majority of their assignments working investigations, should have access to the majority of all relevant databases. Access to core databases such as IDW, ACS, Guardian, and FBI Intranet should be within the 98-100% range. Even for part-time members, some of whom work cases, certain access numbers should be higher for the core databases.

Comparisons were also made between database access and JTTF agency membership. For simplification and to increase statistical power, responses were divided into two groups: FBI and non-FBI. Table 4 (below) illustrates differences in database access for FBI JTTF members compared to non-FBI JTTF members. FBI JTTF members were more likely to access to all databases and systems than non-FBI JTTF members, with some percentage differences as high as 50%. Analysis yielded significant differences regarding database access by agency membership for all databases and systems. (Please refer to Table 4 for specific comparisons.) This is a very important finding in as much as JTTF members from non-FBI agencies are supposed to work investigations, contribute their knowledge and experience, and be an integral part of the task force. The fact that non-FBI JTTF members had less access to all databases is inconsistent with the JTTF concept.

Database / System ACCESS	Full-Time Members (N = 347)	Part-Time Members (N = 100)	FBI (N = 201)	Non-FBI (N = 245)
FBI Intranet	98% (n = 341)	37% (n = 37)	100% (n = 201)	72% (n = 177)
ACS	95% (n = 331)	27% (n = 27)	99% (n = 199)	65% (n = 159)
Telephone Applications	74% (n = 258)	20% (n = 20)	90% (n = 180)	40% (n = 98)
IDW	72% (n = 249)	17% (n = 17)	80% (n = 160)	43% (n = 106)
Guardian	78% (n = 271)	26% (n = 26)	84% (n = 169)	52% (n = 128)
DEEP	25% (n = 88)	5% (n = 5)	35% (n = 70)	9% (n = 23)
SCION	25% (n = 88)	6% (n = 6)	33% (n = 67)	11% (n = 27)
SIPRNET / JWICS	31% (n = 107)	16% (n = 16)	41% (n = 82)	17% (n = 41)
Internet	95% (n = 329)	64% (n = 64)	99% (n = 198)	79% (n = 195)
Lexis-Nexis	63% (n = 219)	42% (n = 42)	71% (n = 143)	48% (n = 118)
Choice Point	72% (n = 250)	39% (n = 39)	83% (n = 167)	50% (n = 122)
LEO	60% (n = 208)	41% (n = 41)	66% (n = 133)	47% (n = 116)

Table 4. JTTF members database accesses by status and agency membership.

b. Database Training

On average, only 45-69% of those with access to all of the above listed databases received training on their utility and use. In addition, those surveyed reported that some of these databases were not useful in supporting their investigations (i.e., DEEP

and LEO). There was no single database or system for which 75% or more of those surveyed received training. Those databases for which at least 50% of those surveyed had access and received training include: Guardian (69%), ACS (68%), SCION (66%), Lexis-Nexis (62%), IDW (58%), and TA (51%).




Figure 25. 447 JTTF members' access to databases and systems compared to training received.

Database access and training comparisons were also made for JTTF members according to region of the country. Table 5 (below) illustrates the differences in database training by region. The most notable trend was that Region II had the highest training percentages for all databases, except SIPRNET/JWICS and SCION, compared to Regions I, III, and IV.

Database / System TRAINING	Region I Access (N = 91)	Region I Training Received	Region II Access (N = 103)	Region II Training Received	Region III Access (N = 140)	Region III Training Received	Region IV Access (N = 113)	Region IV Training Received
ACS	93% (n = 85)	67% (n = 57)	86% (n = 89)	80% (n = 71)	66% (n = 92)	62% (n = 57)	81% (n = 92)	63% (n = 58)
Telephone Applications	77% (n = 70)	43% (n = 30)	71% (n = 73)	58% (n = 42)	46% (n = 65)	46% (n = 30)	62% (n = 70)	56% (n = 39)
IDW	66% (n = 60)	58% (n = 35)	70% (n = 72)	58% (n = 42)	44% (n = 62)	50% (n = 31)	64% (n = 72)	64% (n = 46)
Guardian	78% (n = 71)	72% (n = 51)	83% (n = 85)	73% (n = 62)	46% (n = 64)	59% (n = 38)	68% (n = 77)	70% (n = 54)
DEEP	21% (n = 19)	47% (n = 9)	34% (n = 35)	49% (n = 17)	16% (n = 22)	36% (n = 8)	15% (n = 17)	47% (n = 8)
SCION	23% (n = 21)	71% (n = 15)	28% (n = 29)	66% (n = 19)	17% (n = 24)	58% (n = 14)	18% (n = 20)	70% (n = 14)
SIPRNET / JWICS	24% (n = 22)	55% (n = 12)	36% (n = 37)	41% (n = 15)	19% (n = 26)	62% (n = 16)	34% (n = 38)	42% (n = 16)
Lexis-Nexis	68% (n = 62)	60% (n = 37)	65% (n = 67)	67% (n = 45)	50% (n = 70)	63% (n = 44)	55% (n = 62)	56% (n = 35)
Choice Point	75% (n = 68)	57% (n = 39)	71% (n = 73)	68% (n = 50)	52% (n = 73)	60% (n = 44)	66% (n = 75)	49% (n = 37)
LEO	54% (n = 49)	47% (n = 23)	66% (n = 68)	59% (n = 40)	55% (n = 77)	47% (n = 36)	49% (n = 55)	38% (n = 21)

Table 5. JTF members' database accesses compared to training received.

Comparing database training and JTF membership status provided a different result. An unexpected finding was that for those full-time and part-time members who had access to the various databases, part-time members were more likely to have received training than full-time members on some of the databases, such as TA, IDW, SIPRNET/JWICS and LEO. Other previously discussed trends were repeated with regards to the percentage of JTF members who received training on the databases and systems. For example, even when only considering full-time members, the percentage of

those who both had access to and received training on the databases ranged from 40-70%. These numbers should be considered low, as some databases are old DOS-based systems that require training in order to operate, even for intermediate PC users. For example, only 69% of full-time members surveyed reported receiving ACS training and 50% received TA training. This number is considered low in as much as it is difficult to teach oneself ACS and TA. Please refer to Table 6 (below) for specific comparisons.

Database / System TRAINING	FT Members With Access (N = 347)	FT Members with Access Who Received Training	PT Members With Access (N = 100)	PT Members With Access Who Received Training
ACS	95% (n = 331)	69% (n = 227)	27% (n = 27)	59% (n = 16)
Telephone Applications	74% (n = 258)	50% (n = 129)	20% (n = 20)	60% (n = 12)
IDW	72% (n = 249)	58% (n = 144)	17% (n = 17)	59% (n = 10)
Guardian	78% (n = 271)	70% (n = 190)	26% (n = 26)	58% (n = 15)
DEEP	25% (n = 88)	47% (n = 41)	5% (n = 5)	20% (n = 1)
SCION	25% (n = 88)	67% (n = 59)	6% (n = 6)	50% (n = 3)
ADNET / SIPRNET / JWICS	31% (n = 107)	46% (n = 49)	16% (n = 16)	63% (n = 10)
Lexis-Nexis	63% (n = 219)	65% (n = 142)	42% (n = 42)	45% (n = 19)
Choice Point	72% (n = 250)	61% (n = 152)	39% (n = 39)	46% (n = 18)
LEO	60% (n = 208)	48% (n = 99)	41% (n = 41)	51% (n = 21)

Table 6. JTTF members with database training compared to membership status.

Comparisons were also made between database training and JTTF agency membership. For simplification and to increase statistical power, responses were divided into two groups: FBI and non-FBI. Consistent with database access, Table 7 (below) illustrate differences in database training for FBI JTTF members compared to non-FBI JTTF members.

Database / System TRAINING	FBI Members With Access (N = 201)	FBI Members With Access Who Received Training	Non-FBI Members With Access (N = 245)	Non-FBI Members With Access Who Received Training
ACS	100% (n = 201)	83% (n = 166)	72% (n = 177)	44% (n = 77)
Telephone Applications	99% (n = 199)	50% (n = 100)	65% (n = 159)	26% (n = 41)
IDW	90% (n = 180)	52% (n = 93)	40% (n = 98)	62% (n = 61)
Guardian	80% (n = 160)	70% (n = 112)	43% (n = 106)	88% (n = 93)
DEEP	84% (n = 169)	17% (n = 29)	52% (n = 128)	10% (n = 13)
SCION	35% (n = 70)	66% (n = 46)	9% (n = 23)	70% (n = 16)
SIPRNET / JWICS	33% (n = 67)	51% (n = 34)	11% (n = 27)	93% (n = 25)
Lexis Nexis	71% (n = 143)	64% (n = 91)	48% (n = 118)	59% (n = 70)
Choice Point	83% (n = 167)	59% (n = 99)	50% (n = 122)	58% (n = 71)
LEO	66% (n = 133)	45% (n = 60)	47% (n = 116)	52% (n = 60)

Table 7. JTTF members' database training by agency membership.

c. Database and Systems Comments by JTTF Members

A comments section was placed at the end of the database portion of the survey where participants could freely express any opinion they had relating to database access and training. A total of 216 comments were made regarding database access and training. Table 7(below) lists the most common categories for comments and their frequency.

COMMENT	FREQUENCY
Database training is needed	35
Do not have access to FBI systems or databases	23
Need more Unclassified computers	19
LEO is problematic / not useful	18
There are too many databases	14
ACS is not user friendly / is problematic	11
IDW is the most useful system	11
Additional accesses are needed	8
We are required to maintain too many passwords	6
Passwords expire too quickly / too many problems with passwords	4
Our location needs a SCION system	4
DEEP is problematic / not useful	4
Guardian is redundant with ACS leads	3
Other	60
TOTAL	216

Table 8. Database and systems comments.

C. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

1. Participation in Investigations

Approximately 68% of those surveyed reported having been assigned as primary case agent on an FBI counterterrorism investigation. Of those surveyed, 65% reported having been assigned as co-case agent on an FBI counterterrorism investigation. Even if

you consider only full-time JTTF members, only 80% have been assigned as primary case agent and 78% as co-case agent in an FBI counterterrorism investigation. Furthermore, 22% of JTTF members (ninety-seven) had never been assigned as either primary or co-case agent in a counterterrorism investigation, thirty-one of whom were full-time JTTF members. This indicates that even some full-time members are not being assigned to work investigations. Of these ninety-seven who have never been assigned as either primary or co-case agent in a counterterrorism investigation, four were FBI agents and the remaining ninety-three were TFOs. The aforementioned statistic reflects that TFOs are being assigned to cases at a disproportionate rate compared to FBI agents. Of those who have been assigned as primary or co-case agents in an investigation, 91% reported they participate in file review sessions with their supervisor. This indicates there is still a small portion of JTTF members assigned as case agents in counterterrorism investigations that are not participating in file review sessions.




Figure 26. JTTF Members who have been assigned as either primary or co-case agent (from survey of 447) and those who have participated in file review sessions (from survey of 350).

2. Sources and Source Training

Approximately 47% of JTTF members surveyed reported they currently operate at least one source. Approximately 59% of those surveyed have operated a source in the past. Approximately 37% of those JTTF members surveyed have never operated a source during their JTTF assignment, 88 of whom are full-time members. Seven FBI Agents indicated they have not operated a source while on the JTTF. The average number of those sources at the time of the survey was 2.48, and the number of sources operated per JTTF member ranged from one to twelve.

Only 55% of JTTF members have received training on how to operate a source. Regarding full-time JTTF members, only 65% have received source training. FBI agents were much more likely to receive source training than non-FBI agents (85% vs. 31%). Of those JTTF members surveyed who did receive source training, 57% rated the training as “average” or “above average,” 13% rated it “exceptional,” and 10% rated it “below average” or “poor,” with 20% missing data.

Although TFOs are not allowed to operate a source, they may assist with issues related to the source(s) such as spotting, identifying, and recruiting individuals who might be suitable as sources. (In this respect, it may be beneficial for TFOs to have at least some basic source training.), Furthermore, part-time members are less likely to be involved with sources and more likely to work significantly fewer investigations than full-time members. For these reasons, comparisons were not made regarding source training and JTTF membership status. Comparisons were made regarding source training by region and agency membership.

Analyses revealed statistically significant differences when comparing source training by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region II were most likely to receive source training at 69%, followed by 63% in Region I, 58% in Region IV, and 38% in Region III.




Figure 27. Source training by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.

When comparing JTTF agency membership, the survey revealed that 85% of FBI agents received source training, compared to 25% of federal TFOs, 40% of state TFOs, and 36% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs a single non-FBI group yielded a more powerful statistical comparison: 85% of FBI Agents on the JTTF received source training, compared to 31% of non-FBI JTTF members.




Figure 28. Figure 28 Source training by agency membership. Sample sizes are as follows: 201 for FBI JTTF members and 245 for non-FBI JTTF members.

3. Access to Support Personnel

Over 70% of JTTF members surveyed reported having adequate access to the following support personnel: Intelligence Analysts (IA), 84%; Financial Analysts (FA), 70%; the Field Intelligence Group (FIG), 86%; surveillance support, 78%; and technical support, 86%. Access to financial analysts was lowest overall and access to technical support was highest.




Figure 29. JTTF Members access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical coverage.

Analyses revealed significant differences regarding access to support personnel by region. JTTF members in Region I had the greatest access to support personnel in all categories (i.e., IAs, FAs, FIG, surveillance, and technical), whereas JTTF members in Region III reported the least access to support personnel. Analysis revealed significant differences between regions. Specifically, Regions I (93%) and II (92%) had greater access to IAs than Regions III (75%) and IV (80%). A similar trend was found regarding access to the FIG, where Regions I (97%) and II (90%) had greater access than Regions III (75%) and IV (87%).




Figure 30. JTTF Members’ access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical support by region. Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region I.

A comments section was placed at the end of the personnel access portion of the survey where participants could freely express any comments they had related to support personnel. Surveyees indicated that although they may have access to support personnel that did not necessarily mean there were a sufficient number of support personnel available to accomplish the task at hand. For example one surveyee mentioned he had access to IAs but that his location only had one IA for the entire location. This trend is reflected in the comments section below. A total of 191 comments were made regarding support personnel. Approximately 52% of those comments indicated a need for additional support personnel. Table 9 (below) lists the most common categories for comments and their frequency.

COMMENT	FREQUENCY
Need more financial analysts	44
Need more intelligence analysts	34
Support staff is good quality/helpful	24
Analysts are poorly trained and lack knowledge to do the job	16
Need more surveillance support personnel	15
Need intelligence analysts embedded on the squads / the ability to task them directly to assist with casework	15
Need more technical support	7
Have a sufficient amount of support staff	4
FIG is slow to respond to requests	3
Do not understand the role of the FIG or what they do	3
Other	26
TOTAL	191

Table 9. Support personnel comments.

4. Briefings Provided by FBI Field Office

The collection and sharing of information is an essential function of the JTTF. Briefings provided by FBI JTTF management to the management of participating agencies is a primary information-sharing mechanism. Of those non-FBI JTTF members surveyed, approximately 73% reported that their agency's management is routinely briefed by FBI Field Office management, compared to 21% who were not sure if their agency's management is regularly briefed by the FBI and 4% who reported their agency's management was never briefed by the FBI, with 2% missing data. Of those who reported their agency's management is routinely briefed by the FBI, 6% reported the briefings occur daily, followed by 27% weekly, 32% monthly, 29% quarterly, 2% semi-annually, and 4% annually. It was reported that the SSA conducts the majority of these briefings (29%), followed by the ASAC (21%), SAC (12%), and other individual(s) (7%), with 31% missing data. Figure 31 (below) details the frequency of these briefings.




Figure 31. Frequency of briefings to TFO Management by FBI.

5. Field Office Leadership and Management Skills

Overall, the majority of JTTF members surveyed rated their FBI Field Office management (i.e., SSA, ASAC, and SAC) favorably. For those JTTF members who rated their SSA as “below average” or “poor,” lack of managerial and communication skills were the reasons provided most often. For those who rated their ASAC and/or SAC as “below average” or “poor,” lack of contact was the most common reason provided, followed by lack of managerial and communication skills. One noticeable trend was that as the supervisor’s responsibility increased, the number of JTTF members who could not provide a rating due to limited or no contact with that supervisor also increased. That is, JTTF members were most likely to state they could not give a rating due to lack of contact for SACs, followed by ASACs, and then SSAs.

Approximately 48% of those surveyed rated their SSA as “average” or “above average” on leadership skills, with 39% being rated as “exceptional” and 5% being rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on leadership skills due to insufficient contact with their SSA and 1% refused to give a

rating, with 2% missing data. Approximately 46% of those surveyed rated their ASAC as “average” or “above average” on leadership skills, with 25% being rated as “exceptional” and 6% being rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on leadership skills due to insufficient contact with their ASAC 21% and 1% refused to give a rating, with 1% missing data.

Approximately 38% of those surveyed rated their SAC as “average” or “above average” on leadership skills, with 27% rated as “exceptional,” and 4% rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on leadership skills due to insufficient contact with their SAC (28%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 1% missing data.




Figure 32. 447 JTTF members’ ratings of FBI field office management on leadership skills. Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing data were not included.

Approximately 50% of those surveyed rated their SSA as “average” or “above average” on management skills, with 37% being rated as “exceptional,” and 5% rated as

“below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on management skills due to insufficient contact with their SSA (6%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 2% missing data.

Approximately 46% of those surveyed rated their ASAC as “average” or “above average” on management skills, with 24% rated as “exceptional” and 6% rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on management skills due to insufficient contact with their ASAC (21%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 2% missing data.

Approximately 38% of those surveyed rated their SAC as “average” or “above average” on management skills, with 26% rated as “exceptional” and 5% rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on management skills due to insufficient contact with their SAC (28%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 2% missing data.




Figure 33. Figure 33 JTTF Members’ ratings of FBI field office Management on leadership skills. Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing data were not included.

6. Final Comments by JTTF Members

A comments section was placed at the end of the survey where participants could freely express any additional comments they had, relating to the FBI or the JTTF program and not already mentioned. A total of 400 additional comments were made. Table 10 (below) lists the most common categories of comments and their frequency.

COMMENT	FREQUENCY
FBI Field Office Management are competent/supportive/responsive	61
JTTF is a good program/has been a positive experience	38
TFOs need training when they first arrive at the JTTF	26
High turnover of FBI Management is a problem/negatively impacts the JTTF Program	18
Surveyee is a part-time member without accesses who only attends JTTF meetings	18
FBI Field Office Management are not supportive/incompetent/not responsive	17
Surveyee has little to no interaction with FBI Management	16
Need a "how-to" manual or SOP guidebook for 315 investigations	16
Need a TFO mentoring/orientation program	12
JTTF location has a brand new SSA, ASAC, or SAC	11
JTTF is a good information sharing/liaison environment	10
Training is needed on how to operate sources	10
Need more staff/JTTF members	10
Information sharing is poor	7
TFOs are underutilized	7
New FBI Agents lack counterterrorism training and investigative experience	6
FBI needs to improve liaison with other agencies	6
Need more funding for equipment and tools to aid investigations	5
TFO clearances need to be completed before they arrive at their JTTF assignment	4
TFOs should complete 1-week of training at Quantico	3
A Best Practices program is needed	2
Other	97
TOTAL	400

Table 10. Final comments.

D. REVISION OF THE MASTER JTTF FIELD MEMBERSHIP ROSTER

At the time the telephone survey began, the master JTTF membership listing, which is housed at the NJTTF and to which all 102 JTTF locations contribute their membership listings, consisted of 4,589 members. Local JTTF coordinators are responsible for maintaining and updating a JTTF roster for their respective locations. Information on the roster reflects the participant's parent agency, and its status on the JTTF (i.e. full-time, part-time, or liaison). It was discovered this master listing was grossly inaccurate for two reasons. First, there was no delineation between part-time and liaison JTTF members. As a result of the telephone survey, it was discovered that a large portion of members listed as part-time actually held liaison status, serving as points of contact or only attending monthly meetings held by the JTTF. These liaison-type members were not working investigations, did not have access to FBI databases or systems, and some did not have unescorted access to the FBI building. A second problem was that, of the 705 JTTF members contacted for the survey, 30% were no longer on the JTTF. It appeared JTTF locations were adding new members to their lists without deleting members no longer assigned to the JTTF.

To establish uniform membership designations across the 101 local JTTFs, the NJTTF sent an electronic communication on March 13, 2007, requesting all JTTF locations to send the NJTTF updated listings of their JTTF members, in accordance with the guidance and criteria delineating parameters for full-time and part-time members. By standardizing and defining membership criteria, the NJTTF identified minimum standards for JTTF participation. An accurate designation of membership status is a necessary precursor to the delineation of roles and responsibilities. It was determined that the following minimum conditions must be in place for an employee to be considered a full-time participant on a local JTTF: appropriate security clearances; full access to FBI computer systems, including FBI databases; assignment of work area within the JTTF space; majority of work time dedicated to JTTF investigations and assignments; required to report to JTTF space for work; and, in the case of state and local members, eligible to receive overtime reimbursement.

Part-time participation includes the following criteria: appropriate security clearances (or assignment to the JTTF pending clearance); limited computer access; although spending the majority of time conducting investigations and providing support to the parent agency, the TFO must maintain a caseload with the JTTF; must not be solely on-call and/or in telephone contact with the JTTF; must maintain workspace at JTTF site; and must report to JTTF space to complete work. All other personnel who do not meet these criteria were designated liaison status and maintain contact with the JTTFs for information exchange and support on an ad hoc basis.

As of May 9, 2007, forty-seven of the fifty-six field divisions had responded to the request for updated listings. Based on the new criteria, total JTTF membership decreased by 30%, with full-time membership down 11% and part-time membership decreased by 78%. Nine field divisions had yet to complete their new listings. The total number of JTTF members (full-time and part-time) has decreased from 5,031 to 3,522.

Selecting formal criteria to establish membership status was an important precursor to delineating roles and responsibilities. To facilitate this process the NJTTF initiated, in collaboration with federal partners that participate on local JTTFs, a uniform memorandum of understanding (MOU). This document was finalized and executed during the spring of 2007. Local JTTF remain responsible for negotiating and executing MOUs with the executive management of state and local participants, subject to review and approval by FBI HQ.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY RESULTS

The results of this survey suggest FBI-CTD is not providing JTTF members with the tools they need to do their jobs effectively. Although the survey results were not dismal, they did reveal that not enough JTTF members – as a whole – receive sufficient substantive training, database access and training on how to use databases, and training on how to operate sources. Nor are there a sufficient number of support personnel to aid investigations. In addition, there were significant differences regarding the provision of these tools based on geographic region, JTTF membership status, and JTTF agency membership. Results suggest TFOs receive less training, access, and tools to aid investigations overall than FBI JTTF members. This is very problematic, as TFOs are tasked with the same responsibilities as FBI agents in counterterrorism investigations. TFOs are asked to work investigations, contribute their knowledge and experience, and be integral members of the task force. The fact that TFOs are less likely to receive substantive training, database access, and training, and yet may be assigned as primary or co-case agent in an investigation, goes against the JTTF concept. Part-time members, in general, receive fewer tools than full-time members. Although this is somewhat to be expected, if CTD wants part-time members to conduct investigations as part of their JTTF assignment, certain minimal tools must be provided (such as introductory training and database access). Finally, JTTF members in Region III seem to have the fewest tools afforded to them. In general, they ranked lowest on substantive training, database access and training, source training, and access to support personnel.

The CTD survey was significant in as much as it corroborated previous deficiencies identified by NAPA and DOJ OIG, in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Moreover, the survey highlighted the fact that inconsistencies previously uncovered had not been rectified and recommendations for improvement had yet to be fully embraced. Specifically, NAPA had recommended an increased emphasis on human resource planning, including a performance driven management system concerning training and development, and advocated that FBI management would need to adopt such a system to fully develop the capabilities and skills of task force participants.

The DOJ OIG had criticized the FBI for not adopting a national training plan to ensure that all JTTF's members had received basic counterterrorism training as promised by Director Mueller in 2003. As of 2006, the FBI training and development program for counterterrorism was still incremental in nature and applied in an inconsistent and disproportionate manner in relation to agency designation, membership status, and geographic region. Moreover, the training and development program was ill-defined and lacked the outcome-oriented performance measures necessary to assess training efficacy, strategies, operations, and resources.

Most, if not all, JTTF participants are from traditional law enforcement agencies. As such, many of these individuals have little if any training and/or experience regarding counterterrorism matters. Substantive training is necessary to understand the structure and modus operandi of both international and domestic terrorist organizations, groups, and threats. Training and development is also necessary to understand the cultural makeup and the destructive arsenal of weapons available to potential adversaries. Finally, legal training is needed so that JTTF members can conduct investigations in conformance with applicable laws and guidelines. In light of the above, the survey determined that, subsequent to assignment, a significant number of task force members are not receiving the full complement of basic substantive training offered by the FBI. Moreover, study results indicate that training opportunities are inconsistent and vary based on agency membership and geographic location.

Once basic training has been completed, it is essential that JTTF participants have a fundamental understanding of the available counterterrorism investigatory tools and procedures. In traditional criminal investigations standard tools include, but are not limited to, subpoenas, search warrants, and wiretaps. In the counterterrorism realm, standard tools include National Security Letters (NSLs) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requests. Counterterrorism tools are significantly different than their criminal counterparts. For this reason, JTTF members must be educated and trained concerning the relevance, application, and legal parameters vis-à-vis the use of these tools. The survey determined that a significant number of JTTF members have not requested a NSL and/or participated in preparing a FISA request. Again, although web-

based training is available on the use of NSLs and FISAs, accountability and oversight to monitor education and training concerning these tools is lacking. Moreover, the JTTF survey determined that FBI special agents participating on the task force are utilizing the aforementioned tools far more than non-FBI participants. The reason for this disparity was unclear and could be attributed to a lack of training, participation on cases, or a combination of the two.

Information is one of the most useful tools in the JTTF arsenal. To “connect the dots,” and determine relationships and patterns that may be indicators of prospective terrorist activity, JTTF participants must understand what databases are available and the significance of that information. JTTF members must have access in order to extract pertinent information. Properly utilized, these databases can provide valuable knowledge concerning individuals of interest to include travel, financial activity, and relationships with other individuals and organizations.

With regard to JTTF membership status, significant differences were found in access to and training on all databases. Part-time members and non-FBI members were significantly less likely to have access to all databases and systems. Percentage differences in access were significant, with 12% for part-time versus 68% for full-time members, and 34% for FBI versus 14% for non-FBI members. Even when considering only full-time members, access and training needs significant improvement. Full-time members, who spend the majority of their JTTF assignment working investigations, should have access to the majority, if not all, of these databases. Core databases such as IDW, ACS, Guardian, and FBI Intranet should be within the 98 to 100% range. Moreover, a large number of task force members who do have access have not received training concerning database tools and their utility. Access and training concerning database tools are imperative for the JTTFs to accomplish their mission.

The CTD survey also sought to evaluate other core processes essential to the success of the JTTF program. These processes include the participation by task force members in Preliminary Investigations (PI) and Full Field Investigations (FFI) and in the identification and recruitment of human sources (HUMINT). Unfortunately, the survey determined that non-FBI JTTF participants are assigned to JTTF cases at a

disproportionately lower rate, as compared to FBI personnel. In order to accomplish objectives, the knowledge, experience, and expertise of TFOs must be fully integrated into the JTTF program. This includes participation in investigations and source development. The recruitment and operation of sources is critical in establishing a working knowledge of the JTTF domain necessary to penetrate terrorist cells and organizations. Moreover JTTF personnel, regardless of agency membership, are not receiving adequate training concerning source development. Only 57% of full-time JTTF members have received source training. It is incumbent on the CTD to design and employ a comprehensive source training program.

Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the FBI re-allocated personnel and resources from traditional criminal investigations to counterterrorism to build an intelligence program responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).⁸¹ To fully integrate the FBI into the intelligence community, it has been necessary for the FBI to shift its primary focus from the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases to the detection, disruption, and dismantlement of terrorist groups and the prevention of terrorist attacks. A fundamental component in this process is the recruitment and development of human intelligence sources (HUMINT) to fill intelligence gaps and fulfill intelligence requirements.

It is critical to the JTTF mission that training and education programs are developed and implemented to cultivate the skills necessary to detect and disrupt non-traditional actors, including self-radicalized, autonomous cells and lone actors who derive their inspiration and/or ideology from existing terrorist organizations. HUMINT is essential because terrorists and their supporters often are not involved in criminal activity that would bring them under the scrutiny of law enforcement. Training and education concerning source development should include, but not be limited to, recruitment,

⁸¹ United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Statement of Gary M. Bald, Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation* 109th Cong., Session 1, September 21, 2005

management, vetting, validation, etc. Prospective JTTF HUMINT training programs would also cover applicable FBI and attorney general guidelines, policies, and procedures.

The CTD evaluation also addressed the perceived quality of field office leadership and management. The survey assessed collaborative processes including the frequency and consistency of information sharing between the FBI and agencies that participate on the JTTF. Seventy-three percent of TFO survey participants stated that collaborative mechanisms such as information sharing through routine FBI management briefings were being held on a consistent basis. A significant portion of the remaining survey participants, 23%, were unsure if briefings were held on a routine basis. Senior JTTF management routinely conducts briefings where information is shared through the JTTF Executive Board. In as much as Executive Board membership is primarily comprised of agency heads, it is not unreasonable that rank-and-file JTTF members might be unaware of these meetings.

Overall leadership and management skills were ranked high by survey participants.⁸² SSAs were ranked the highest in both leadership and management skill categories, with scores of 87% in both. ASACs were next highest, with scores of 71% and 70% respectively. SACs received scores of 65% and 64% respectively and all of the management categories scored less than 10% in the “poor” designation, indicating that surveyees were satisfied with JTTF leadership and management capabilities.

⁸² High scores represent designations of “average” and “excellent.”

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic change and the transformation necessary to culturally convert the FBI from a traditional law enforcement agency focused on the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters into a world-class intelligence agency whose primary mission is detecting and disrupting terrorist threats will take unprecedented focus and organizational commitment. Organizational cultures, especially government bureaucracies such as the FBI, change gradually.⁸³ Significant organizational and cultural obstacles must be overcome to accomplish this task. From an organizational standpoint, FBI executive management must lead the way by communicating a clear and compelling vision that succinctly articulates goals and objectives. This vision must prioritize training, development, and educational opportunities to build and cultivate skills and competencies needed to address new organizational objectives. Centralized planning and significant human capital investments will be imperative. To initiate and sustain strategic change, it is necessary for executive leadership to employ structural and organizational drivers that encourage innovative practices, new ideas, and the importation and adaptation of best practices and lessons learned from both internal and external sources.

Recommendations reflected herein were formulated to address areas in need of improvement within the JTTF Program, based on the results of the JTTF Telephone Survey and the external studies and surveys detailed above. Recommendations focus on the following areas: (1) role definitions for JTTF members, (2) a revised master JTTF field membership listing, (3) substantive training and database training, (4) a mentoring/Field Training agent program for TFOs, (5) a Lessons Learned/Best Practices program, (6) implementation of systems to ensure oversight and accountability, (7) source development and training, and (8) future surveys of the JTTF program/evaluation of JTTF program changes. Please refer to the recommendations section of this thesis for further details.

⁸³ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 91.

Although JTTFs have proven efficient, this research has determined that there is little uniformity system-wide and effectiveness varies based on location. To optimize effectiveness, it is necessary to identify and implement best and/or smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures which ensure that the skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the JTTF program. The implementation of standardized written procedures which detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies on the part of participant stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program. Comprehensive training and development programs are necessary to develop the skills and expertise to bridge the cultural gap between traditional law enforcement responsibilities and intelligence and national security priorities.

A. TRAINING DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

Personnel assigned to local JTTFs play an integral role in the Homeland Security mission of detecting, disrupting, and preventing terrorism. In achieving these objectives, the importance of training, development, and education cannot be underestimated. Prior to assignment to the JTTF, a significant number of state, local, and federal participants have had little, if any, formal counterterrorism education, experience, and/or training. To ensure the seamless integration of TFO personnel, education, training, and development resources are imperative. As such, it is incumbent on the JTTF to devise and implement education and training programs that provide the knowledge, skills, and competencies needed to optimize JTTF participation. Education and training must provide core capabilities necessary to effectively respond to current and future threats in accordance with organizational goals and objectives. The training plan should link education, training, and development with JTTF core values and the FBI strategic plan..

The implementation of a comprehensive training and development program is consistent with 9/11 Commission's recommendation that the FBI take necessary

measures to institutionalize a preventive counterterrorism posture. This process includes developing an institutional culture, with the requisite expertise in intelligence and national security matters, and the recruitment, training and retention of key employees.⁸⁴ The need for effective counterterrorism training and development was reinforced in May of 2002, during the second phase of the FBI's reorganization, when personnel resources from traditional criminal investigations were reassigned to counterterrorism and intelligence investigations. In making the aforementioned changes the FBI recognized that training and education would be necessary to close critical skill gaps.⁸⁵

Existing and prospective training and development scenarios were impacted in May 2006 when the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) announced the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard methodology as part of the Strategy Management System. The Balanced Scorecard methodological approach aligns key strategies with concurrent performance metrics in order to evaluate the success of resulting actions. It provides a strategic management framework that translates strategy into operational objectives, which in turn drive both behavior and performance. Organizational strategy is implemented and managed through the linkage of objectives, initiatives, and measures. An integral part of this process involves the implementation and use of learning and development tools.⁸⁶ As such, training goals and objectives must be consistent with human capital goals and appropriate performance measures and targets developed to evaluate the program.

To promote uniformity and consistency, a detailed implementation plan is imperative. The plan should address challenges and set quantifiable short- and long-term goals that align task force goals and objectives with the specific strategies designed to

⁸⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 425.

⁸⁵ David Walker, *FBI reorganization: initial steps encouraging but broad transformation needed* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 21 June 2002), 23.

⁸⁶ FBI Counterterrorism Division, *Implementing the Balanced Scorecard to Become a Strategy Focused Organization* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 2006), 1.

achieve them.⁸⁷ As such, the implementation should ensure that adequate funding is available for training programs and to establish training councils for oversight and accountability. Prudent budgeting is essential to provide resources necessary to achieve organizational goals. This process would include cultivating relationships with external sources to provide training and development opportunities. These resources include, but are not limited to, universities, the National Executive Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Homeland Security, and other public and private organizations.

Historically, the FBI has always sought to provide special agent and task force personnel with training and development opportunities. New special agent hires must complete a rigorous eighteen-week training and development program at Quantico, Virginia prior to field office assignment. Additional training and development programs are available through Quantico, regional sites, and at local field offices. Training is also available on-line through web-based programs on the FBI intranet via a program called Virtual Academy. In addition to existing programs, new training modules are routinely proposed and/or are under development. However, many of the training and development programs that impact the JTTF are disjointed, inconsistent, and created in an incremental fashion, often in response to a problem, criticism, and/or perceived deficiency. Moreover, as evidenced by the CTD survey, implementation and application of existing programs is often inconsistent and inequitable. A detailed implementation plan would alleviate the aforementioned inefficiencies by coordinating training and making the most efficient use of resources.⁸⁸

In a multidisciplinary task-force environment, strategic change and transformation involve a complex interplay between personnel resources, organizations, policies, and procedures. To deal with a continually evolving asymmetrical threat, training and development plans and strategies must be flexible in order to optimally educate and train scarce personnel resources. For the JTTF to be effective, the development and implementation of a cogent, comprehensive, and consistent training and development

⁸⁷ FBI Counterterrorism Division, *Implementing the Balanced Scorecard.*, 12.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

program is essential. Most, if not all, JTTF training-related activities are mission related and so impact both internal and external stakeholders. To insure that the program is inclusive, collaborative, and responsive to critical needs, input is needed from agencies that participate on the JTTF and key external homeland security stakeholders. This is a dynamic and inclusive process that solicits the points of view, experiences, insights, and priorities from divergent stakeholders, both internal and external. This is an iterative and flexible process, whereby useful ideas and best practices can be integrated and revised as necessary.⁸⁹

A comprehensive training and development program will play a critical role in FBI and JTTF transformation efforts. The development and implementation of quantifiable performance measures, with accompanying target metrics, are needed to evaluate whether the training and education curriculum is useful and linked to organizational goals and objectives.⁹⁰ An evaluation process that incorporates feedback from multiple perspectives is needed in order that adjustments and improvements can be made as necessary. Oversight and accountability can be provided by establishing training councils and/or committees that include the stakeholders identified above. The committees would be responsible for training evaluation, the identification and implementation of shared knowledge/best practices, and oversight of the training curriculum.⁹¹ Additional responsibilities would include training compliance, identification of training opportunities, and modification of curriculum as needed to ensure core competencies and skills are optimized. This process would include cultivating relationships that provide training and development opportunities with the external sources mentioned above.

Oversight and accountability responsibilities would include implementing a framework to evaluate, assess, and make strategic recommendations concerning the program. This audit process would identify specific results-oriented performance

⁸⁹ Dr. Charles A. Stevenson, *People, Organizations, and Processes*. Speech at the National War College, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2001, 34.

⁹⁰ FBI Counterterrorism Division, *Implementing the Balanced Scorecard*, 5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

measures linked to identified targets. In order to assess the efficacy of training courses and exercises, it is recommended that the training program design and use quantifiable standards, such as a matrix to evaluate training curriculum against organizational objectives. The evaluation framework can be segmented into four interrelated phases: planning/analysis, design/development, implementation, and evaluation. The evaluation process should be iterative, with input from management personnel representing CTD, JTTF field office coordinators, field office training coordinators, the NJTTF, and local, state, and federal stakeholders. The creation of a training council, comprised of the representatives identified above and those from local participating agencies, would be a valuable mechanism for fostering collaboration and coordination concerning training and development matters. Council oversight will help maximize training resources and identify best practices for integration into the training program.⁹²

A successful training and development program is a proactive endeavor whereby systemic processes are put place to forecast future needs, anticipate emergent issues, and incorporate best practices and lessons learned. The organizational structure must be conducive to aligning training and development processes with stated goals and objectives. On an organizational level, learning, training, and professional development must become culturally ingrained; this is only possible through the sustained commitment of executive management. This process includes formulating a clear and compelling strategic vision concerning training and development goals and objectives. Thereafter, executive management must succinctly and pervasively communicate this vision, and the importance of training and development, throughout the organization.

1. Curriculum and Implementation

To effectively participate, JTTF personnel must have a baseline understanding of international and domestic terrorist organizations and their support networks. It is also beneficial if personnel involved in JTTF activities are familiar with different cultural and religious nuances that might impact investigations. Training and development must also

⁹² FBI Counterterrorism Division, *Implementing the Balanced Scorecard*, 12.

cultivate the skills, awareness, and recognition necessary to prevent terrorist acts utilizing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN). This training should include an awareness and recognition of basic safety procedures and proper response protocols.

In light of the above, it is recommended that all JTTF task force participants receive minimum mandatory training concerning International Terrorism (IT); Domestic Terrorism (DT); Muslim and Arab Culture (MAC); and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Whenever practical, JTTF participants should attend basic In-Service Training pertinent to their area of assignment, as soon as possible, especially the Basic IT and Basic DT courses. Absent exigent circumstances, this training should be provided to all full-time JTTF personnel within the first ninety days of assignment, and to all part-time participants within the first six months. Depending on budgetary constraints, it is recommended that the basic training identified above be provided at the FBI Academy and/or other designated regional sites in close proximity to, or at, larger Field Divisions. If unable to attend basic In-Service Training, and/or in the event In-Service Training is unavailable, full-time members would be required to complete core web-based training through the FBI Virtual Academy. In light of the above it is recommended that the Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) and the Training and Development Unit (TDU) at the FBI Academy design and create web-based core modules covering Basic IT/DT, WMD, and MAC, accessible through the Virtual Academy.

In addition to the four modules identified above, training and education must develop a fundamental institutional knowledge of other core JTTF tools and processes including, but not limited to, investigative techniques, source development, legal issues, FISA, NSLs, administrative procedures, available databases, and classification and security issues. This process would provide education and training on how to investigate terrorist organizations within existing legal and procedural parameters. Progress has been made in this area and future curriculum and programs can draw and expand on identified best practices. As an example, the NJTTF and National Security Branch (NSB) devised and employed a computer-based training and orientation course of study through the FBI

Virtual Academy. The NJTTF course was intended for newly-assigned JTTF task force officers and special agent personnel. The curriculum was a collaborative effort designed by veteran task force officers and a FBI supervisory special agent assigned to the NJTTF in concert with the Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) and the Training and Development Unit (TDU) at the FBI Academy. As currently configured, the program consists of ten modules designed to provide JTTF personnel core information necessary to properly and lawfully conduct a domestic and/or international terrorism investigation. To promote uniformity, the modules were designed to provide standardized, trackable, self-paced training, accessible through the FBI Intranet.

As only 57% of full-time JTTF members have received source training, it is incumbent on the CTD to design a comprehensive source training program. It is critical to the JTTF mission that training and education programs are developed and implemented to cultivate the skills necessary to detect and disrupt non-traditional actors. HUMINT is essential because terrorists and their supporters are often not involved in criminal activity and therefore human reporting is necessary to ascertain motives and intentions.. Training and education concerning source development should include, but not be limited to, the recruitment, management, vetting, and validation of sources. Prospective JTTF HUMINT training programs would also cover applicable FBI and Attorney General Guidelines, policies and procedures.

FBI databases are a necessary and important tool in counterterrorism investigations. They contain critical background information concerning individuals of interest and can also provide vital information linking individuals and organizations. As such, an understanding of, and access to, database tools is essential. JTTF full and part-time personnel should receive mandatory training to establish an awareness of the relevance and utility of various computer databases. Full- and part-time participants would receive this training within the first ninety days of assignment to a JTTF. It is recommended that web-based module(s) of instruction be devised and implemented in Virtual Academy concerning the following key databases: FBINET/ Intranet; Automated Case Support (ACS); Telephone Applications (TA); Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW); Guardian Threat Tracking System; SIPRINET/JWICS; Lexis-Nexis; Choice

Point/Auto Track; and Law Enforcement Online (LEO). These training modules would be an accessible resource that can subsequently be referred to as needed during the course of investigations.

The NJTTF mandated all new personnel with less than one year of JTTF experience participate in core web-based training programs, and required that the training be completed within one month of gaining access to FBI computer systems. As detailed in the CTD survey, this has been problematic because a significant number of JTTF members have not been provided timely computer access subsequent to assignment. In response to the computer access problems identified in the CTD survey, in April 2007, the Intelligence Directorate Security Division approved the Counterterrorism Division's request for additional Automated Case Support (ACS) functionality and case query access for all non-FBI personnel detailed to local JTTFs. In light of the above, it is recommended that all JTTF members receive security clearances prior to formal participation on the JTTF and be granted computer access immediately after the security clearance process is adjudicated.

B. MENTORING/FIELD TRAINING OFFICER PROGRAM

Training and development should not be limited to web-based modules via the virtual Academy in structure classroom curriculum, but should also include practical experience through structured exercises and on-the-job training. In addition to providing valuable skills and knowledge to the recipient, on-the-job training would provide management with an important tool to assess the weaknesses and capabilities of task force participants. On-the-job training could be provided through a mentoring program, whereby experienced senior task force members would share responsibility with the task force supervisor and training coordinator in assisting new task force members in developing the necessary skills and competencies.

The existing FBI Probationary Training program can be used as a model. New SAs are assigned an experienced training agent (TA) when deployed to a field office. Thereafter the TA, field office squad supervisor (SSA), and field office training coordinator would share responsibility for ensuring that the new SAs acquire the

experience, skills, and competencies necessary to succeed on the job. It is the TA's responsibility to ensure the probationary SA successfully participates in a wide variety of core mission-specific tasks. The new SA is continually evaluated during the probationary period. Weaknesses and areas in need of improvement are identified and corrective actions are taken to rectify deficiencies. This process is an effective tool to ensure that new SAs develop the requisite competencies, skills, and abilities to successfully perform essential job functions. A similar mentoring program would benefit non-FBI task force personnel in providing structure guidance and on-the-job training.

Proper orientation, familiarization, access, and on-the-job training contribute to the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to succeed on the JTTF. Upon assignment, it is recommended that an experienced special agent and/or task force officer be designated as the Field Training Officer (FTO) responsible for providing the guidance, knowledge, and direction necessary to develop requisite skills and abilities. The FTO/mentor would be responsible for acclimating new TFOs to the JTTF. Additional FTO duties would include providing TFOs with the guidance and orientation necessary to familiarize TFOs with applicable investigative techniques, office orientation, security issues, computer resources, information sharing procedures, training and development opportunities, investigative techniques, asset and source policies, administrative matters, and other pertinent information. The FTO would work with the division's training coordinator and JTTF coordinator to see that the TFO completes the core training modules outlined above in a timely manner, and that training received is effective, complete, and responsive. The FTO would also identify and secure appropriate and relevant educational and training opportunities.

C. LESSONS LEARNED/BEST PRACTICES PROGRAM

To transform and navigate strategic change, it is critical that the FBI identify, memorialize, and implement best practices to expand the agency's institutional knowledge base. As part of this process, it is important to examine lessons learned and best practices in a systematic way to capture accumulated knowledge, insights, and procedures so these processes can be utilized to enhance job performance and institutional efficiency. This process is especially applicable in an organization

experiencing a significant shift in workforce demographics, whereby veteran employees are increasingly replaced by new personnel. The ultimate goal is to vest knowledge, best practices and lessons learned, in the organization rather than the individual. Methods used by other intelligence agencies and the military provide useful examples of programs to identify and capture best practices.

The process of capturing lessons learned has been examined and studied by other federal agencies, the military, and by the private sector. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recognizes the importance of identifying and adopting lessons learned. At the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), the CIA examines the ways that organizations capture, manage, and disseminate useful practices and how these principles can be applied in the intelligence community. The CSI solicits input and insight from scholars with expertise in knowledge management and organizational learning. Useful information is also procured from intelligence, military, and private sector professionals. The CSI goal is to craft a lessons-learned program that will ensure accumulated knowledge and insights are efficiently documented, analyzed, and communicated to individuals in the organization.⁹³ The CIA recognizes that the process of information and knowledge sharing must become an integral part of the organization's culture and mission.⁹⁴

For large organizations, transformation and navigating strategic change can be complex and problematic. Dr. David Garvin, professor of business administration at Harvard Business School, studied large complex organizations and how they learn and adapt to change in an organizational context. Dr. Garvin identified two types of organizations: performance organizations and learning organizations. Performance organizations promote a culture whereby positive performance is rewarded by promotion and/or incentives and mistakes result in adverse consequences or even dismissal. Learning organizations tolerate errors and mistakes as part of an iterative learning process. To be effective, companies, organizations, and agencies must balance the two

⁹³ Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), *Intelligence Lessons Learned*, Conference Report, Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005, 1.

⁹⁴ New Schools Venture Fund, Knowledge Management Initiative, *Capturing, Codifying and Sharing Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Education Reform* (Washington, D.C.: December 2003), 3.

models. Part of the learning organizational model incorporates the creation, acquisition, interpretation, transferal, and retention of knowledge. Many organizations possess one or two of the aforementioned attributes, but few assimilate and integrate the entire skill set. For example, creating knowledge is a process that encourages diversity; however, skills such as the transferal of retained knowledge require standardization, replication, and repetition. An organization must be flexible in order to modify behavior that incorporates acquired knowledge and insight.⁹⁵

To identify and incorporate best practices, organizations must engage in the following procedures: collect information and intelligence concerning the agency's operating environment, to include understanding the competitor and/or enemy; learn from the best practices of other organizations or through benchmarking; identify and learn from internal organizational successes and failures; experiment with new processes and approaches; encourage systematic problem-solving; and transfer knowledge and lessons learned throughout the organization.

Three of the aforementioned practices are particularly important in a law enforcement/intelligence agency context. The first is benchmarking, which is the search for best practices both internally and externally. The search for best practices should be a proactive exercise whereby stakeholders responsible for implementation are active participants in the search process.⁹⁶

The second key activity is learning from past experience. Few organizations allocate the time and expense and/or expend the energy to systemically review and analyze core processes and events in order to memorialize findings in a format that can be utilized by others in the organization. One exception is the U.S. Army, an organization adept at systematically reviewing events and conducting after-action reviews, which contribute to accumulated organizational knowledge. To facilitate this process, the U.S. Army formed the Center for Lessons Learned and uses small units and collection teams to collect useful information and intelligence. This information is thereafter memorialized

⁹⁵ CSI, *Intelligence Lessons Learned*, 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

and made accessible through formalized learning plans that catalog activities. These small teams and/or networks report their findings through verbal, written, and electronic media and document knowledge acquired through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities.⁹⁷ These activities are thereafter memorialized, blueprinted, categorized, and made available through formalized learning plans that catalogue activities.⁹⁸ This process enables the military to optimize achievements by identifying emerging issues and trends.⁹⁹

The third essential activity is the transference of knowledge. An organization can transfer knowledge through a variety of ways, including written, oral, and visual formats. Site visits and surveys are also valuable mechanisms to share information. Good lessons-learned/best practices programs are non-evaluative and non-prescriptive, but capture key insights which provide the decision maker flexibility to draw conclusions and implement changes. Lessons learned must focus on multiple core mission functions including, but not limited to, mission-critical support activities, recruitment, training, logistics, security, etc. The program should take a multidisciplinary approach so that valuable insights can be gleaned both internally and from external practitioners and subject matter experts.

Input and insight from mission managers are necessary to ensure lessons learned and knowledge acquired are relevant and actionable. Adequate resources and sustained executive support are necessary to build an effective lessons learned program that is not an ad hoc or one-time event; it is an iterative process in need of continual management support, and processes and procedures must be in place to capture and document successes and failures. Finally, lessons-learned strategies must be incorporated into formal training and made available to decision makers.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Edward Dickson, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism Response Section, *FBI Memorandum*, January 10, 2007.

⁹⁸ CSI, *Intelligence Lessons Learned*, 3.

⁹⁹ Dickson, *FBI Memorandum*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ CSI, *Intelligence Lessons Learned* 3.

In addition to capturing lessons learned internally, it is also important to identify and analyze lessons learned from external sources, including other government organizations as well as repositories in the private domain. To accomplish this task, it is necessary to identify and access lessons-learned sources that relate to JTTF organizational mission areas, compile pertinent examples, and analyze materials collected. First, critical JTTF mission areas must be delineated. Thereafter, a data-gathering template or matrix that reflects key mission areas can be created and used by collectors to streamline collection efforts. This matrix will provide an outline whereby narrative findings, best practices, and lessons learned can be organized into appropriate categories for analysis and retrieval. The axis of the matrix should encompass core JTTF functions and processes to include, but not be limited to: collaboration, information sharing, education/training, planning, and operational procedures.

Once the template has been created, collection teams can begin populating the matrix with pertinent information. This information can then be qualitatively analyzed to extract useful lessons learned from the captured materials.¹⁰¹ This information should provide a contextual framework for drawing inductive conclusions to identify and implement positive results and provide an opportunity for future analysis.¹⁰² Memorializing and quantifying lessons learned in a hierarchical matrix will ultimately provide the JTTF with a tool to recognize needs, identify gaps, and address potential deficiencies.

Numerous external sources and repositories for lessons learned can be queried by collection teams to identify additional practices relevant to JTTF core mission areas. Available source documentation can include exercise reports, after-action reports, red team reports, case studies, and relevant articles.¹⁰³ A number of repositories contain relevant and useful homeland security lessons learned:

¹⁰¹ CSI, *Intelligence Lessons Learned*, 2.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 4.

- (1) DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing website
- (2) National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
- (3) Center for Army Lessons Learned
- (4) Department of Defense Best Practices database
- (5) Department of Energy Lessons Learned database
- (6) Air War College
- (7) Naval Postgraduate School
- (8) Small Wars Centers for Excellence
- (9) Coast Guard Standard After Action Information and Lessons Learned System¹⁰⁴

D. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The implementation of standardized written procedures, which detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing, will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Following implementation, performance metrics and evaluation systems are needed to measure the progress and the efficacy of JTTF procedures. Currently there is no formal review and evaluation process for local JTTFs. The NJTTF provides policy and guidance on an ad hoc basis from FBI HQ in Washington, D.C. and must rely on input from coordinators in the field to evaluate progress.

To rectify this problem and facilitate a hands-on approach, I suggest the NJTTF establish and implement an on-site review process in coordination with the counterterrorism division's Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit (DTOU) and the International Terrorism Operations Sections I and II (ITOS I and II). This review process would be consistent with the new Strategy Management System. On-site review objectives would include the following:

¹⁰⁴ CSI, *Intelligence Lessons Learned*, 5.

- (1) Coordinate and streamline JTTF policies and procedures to ensure seamless coordination between substantive FBI HQ Sections and Units and local JTTFs.
- (2) Ensure that mandatory education and training programs are seamlessly implemented in a consistent and equitable manner across the JTTF regions.
- (3) Identify, capture, and analyze best practices/lessons learned for potential dissemination if appropriate throughout the JTTF system.
- (4) Identify and evaluate innovative programs and/or initiatives.
- (5) Identify problems and impediments respective to local JTTFs and recommend prospective solutions.

The NJTTF should also revise and implement the following outcome-oriented performance measures and/or metrics to evaluate local JTTFs and task force personnel:

- (1) Quality and timeliness of information sharing with and between task force participants, their parent agencies, and non-participant Homeland Security stakeholders.
- (2) Outreach initiatives to enhance JTTF information sharing and collaborative partnerships.
- (3) Intelligence collection and dissemination practices that enhance and/or augment JTTF efforts.
- (4) HUMINT source development and utilization in furtherance of JTTF cases.

Frequent transfers and turnover of JTTF Field Supervisors and Coordinators have had an adverse impact on continuity and consistency within the JTTF Program. To remedy the situation retired FBI Management personnel with JTTF experience could be hired as contractors on a regional basis to participate with NJTTF personnel on site surveys. These Regional Coordinators would be a conduit for information sharing and coordination between the local JTTFs and FBIHQ. Regional coordinators would also provide oversight and accountability concerning JTTF initiatives.

E. COLLABORATION IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES (CHICAGO CASE STUDY)

Effective collaboration, interagency cooperation, and the establishment of information sharing networks are necessary for the JTTF to achieve key objectives. Although traditional means are in place for information sharing and collaboration (including field office briefings, the JTTF executive board, and Law Enforcement Online), identifying and implementing best practices and lessons learned can have a profound impact on JTTF effectiveness. The Chicago Field Division Terrorism Liaison Officer program (TLO) is an example of a best practice that can be implemented in larger field offices.

As part of the FBI's transformation subsequent to 9/11, the reallocation of criminal investigators and investigatory resources to counterterrorism has resulted in diminished interaction with traditional community law enforcement. Because of this shift in focus, intelligence, domain awareness, and institutional knowledge assimilated through working criminal matters with local and state law enforcement has suffered. Intelligence gained through partnerships leveraged on local policing is no longer as readily available. Because of the extensive and pervasive domain knowledge inherent in community policing, local law enforcement is often the most logical and prevalent source of intelligence that could prevent a terrorist attack¹⁰⁵.

Local law enforcement personnel, especially street-level officers, are a primary resource for detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Information and intelligence from community law enforcement is a critical resource in efforts to identify, disrupt, and prevent attacks by autonomous, self radicalized cells and/or organizations. Although relationships with state and local law enforcement have been developed through the JTTF, community law enforcement resources have not been fully optimized concerning prevention efforts, intelligence collection, and HUMINT development.

¹⁰⁵ Heather J. Davies and Martha R. Plotkin, *Protecting Your Community From Terrorism, The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series, Volume 5: Partnerships to Promote Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, November 2005), 35.

Smaller departments involved in community policing are often precluded by size and budget from formal participation on JTTFs. These departments are fertile repositories for intelligence information. Initiatives must be devised for procuring information from smaller departments to identify suspicious activity which may be a precursor to a terrorist attack. Likewise, local resources have not been fully exploited for HUMINT development and intelligence collection purposes. In many instances, local law enforcement personnel assigned to community agencies and departments do not have the requisite training to detect terrorist indicators, including information concerning suspicious activity that could be of intelligence value to the JTTF, FBI, and intelligence community (IC).

The Chicago TLO program was implemented in the fall of 2004 to augment the Chicago JTTF by engaging and integrating local and state law enforcement into the homeland security mission. A primary objective of the TLOC program is to enhance collaboration with local and state law enforcement agencies not represented on the JTTF. The program was designed to enlist community departments in prevention efforts by providing training to develop the skills and expertise to enable local law enforcement to identify and report suspicious activity that might be indicative of a terrorist attack. The program encourages networking and provides a conduit for reporting information. Over 400 state and local departments in the Chicago FBI field division territory were contacted and solicited to participate in the program. Over 300 departments and agencies currently participate and selected personnel receive extensive JTTF-sponsored training in terrorism and homeland security matters.

The program has been successful in as much as participating TLOs have been an excellent resource for detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Local TLOs provide intelligence and tactically assist the Chicago JTTF in numerous investigations that impact their community or jurisdiction. The TLO program has provided the JTTF an avenue to collect and analyze information generated through routine law enforcement activity for intelligence collection purposes and HUMINT development.

The TLO program is an iterative process where training is provided and TLO members are tasked by the JTTF to export this knowledge back to their agencies and

communities. TLOs also assist with intelligence collection; for example, Chicago-area TLOs were provided a template and requested to identify key infrastructure assets within their community. Once these critical infrastructure sites were identified, TLOs were tasked with establishing liaisons and developing information sharing conduits with critical infrastructure personnel to include, but not limited to, public health officials, first responders, and private industry stakeholders. Community outreach initiatives such as the program detailed above enables TLOs to educate and sensitize community stakeholders concerning Homeland Security prerogatives. By expanding the JTTF network, TLOs have become an effective “force multiplier” in terrorism prevention efforts.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS

This research analyzed external evaluations of the JTTF Program by NAPA and DOJ OIG in 2003 and 2005 respectively. It also details a comprehensive internal survey conducted by the CTD in 2006-2007. The CTD survey was significant in as much as it corroborated the fact that inconsistencies previously chronicled in external evaluations had not been rectified and recommendations for improvement had yet to be fully embraced. Specifically, recommendations to revamp core strategies, improve human resource planning, and develop the training necessary to build on requisite core capabilities and skills needed to accomplish task force objectives had not been achieved. Research determined the JTTF training and development program is ill-defined and lacks the outcome-oriented performance measures necessary to assess training efficacy, strategies, operations, and resources.

In sum, research results suggest FBI-CTD is not providing JTTF members with the tools they need to do their job effectively. The JTTF survey determined JTTF members received insufficient substantive training, database access and training, and source training, and availability and access to support personnel is not sufficient to aid investigations. In addition, there were significant differences regarding the provision of these tools according to geographic region, JTTF membership status, and JTTF agency membership. Results suggest TFOs receive less training, access, and tools to aid investigations overall than FBI JTTF members. The aforementioned findings run counter to the JTTF concept in as much as TFOs are tasked with the same responsibilities as their FBI counterparts concerning counterterrorism investigations. Moreover, these inequities are an impediment to optimum participation and utilization of the unique knowledge, skills, and experience that non-FBI task force members can contribute.

Research determined that, on an organizational level, the JTTF lacks systemic processes to identify and capture lessons learned and best practices to encapsulate accumulated knowledge, insights, and procedures so these processes can be utilized to

enhance job performance and maximize efficiency. Finally, performance metrics and evaluation systems are needed to provide oversight and accountability and measure the progress and the efficacy of JTTF programs.

B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

To optimize effectiveness, it is necessary to identify and implement best and/or smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures which ensure the skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the JTTF Program. The implementation of standardized written procedures which detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies in participant stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program.

Key practices and lessons learned from successful strategic change initiatives undertaken by public and private organizations can be used as a model to facilitate FBI transformational efforts.¹⁰⁶ These include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Ensure that the top leadership drives the transformation;
2. Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals;
3. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities;
4. Set implementation goals and a timeline;
5. Dedicate and implement a team to manage the process;
6. Use a performance management system to define responsibility and establish accountability;
7. Establish a communication strategy;
8. Involve employees; and
9. Seek input and collaboration from internal and external stakeholders.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for the Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies*, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Nov. 14, 2002).

The JTTF can emulate best practices from high-performance organizations that reinforce transformation efforts through performance management systems. These systems align organizational objectives with individual employee performance expectations. Successful organizations create linkages between individual performance and organizational success. By engaging in these activities, organizations can create a results-oriented culture that is collaborative in nature.¹⁰⁸ Desired outcomes, core values, critical individual competencies, and agency transformational objectives must align with the strategic plan. Moreover, planning and budget processes must also integrate the strategic plan and resource needs.¹⁰⁹ As part of the process, education training and development must be tailored to align workforce needs, goals, and objectives with mission-critical functions. This process includes implementing a long-term strategic human capital approach that integrates training and development opportunities with anticipated future critical needs and skills.¹¹⁰

To achieve strategic objectives pursuant with the Strategy Management System, training development programs must be prioritized to develop the skills and competencies necessary to facilitate transformation and achieve operational objectives. To ensure consistency, the JTTF training program must include a core curriculum that is coordinated, implemented, and applied in a uniform manner throughout the 102 local JTTF locations. Education and training must be evaluated and assessed in conjunction with strategic practices and organizational goals. This process must be collaborative, flexible, adaptive, and address specific needs. An evaluation process that incorporates feedback from multiple perspectives is needed so adjustments and improvements can be

¹⁰⁷ U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *FBI reorganization: progress made in efforts to transform, but major challenges continue*, GAO-03-759T (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, June 2002), 3.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Results oriented cultures: creating a clear linkage between individual performance and organizational success*, GAO-03-488 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March 14, 2003), 2.

¹⁰⁹ GAO, *FBI reorganization*, 4.


¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

made as necessary. An effective education and training program will ensure skills and competencies are developed in the JTTF workforce that support and align with FBI and Homeland Security strategic goals.

C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

On a macro level, the psychological and structural processes necessary to initiate and sustain transformation and organizational change in the homeland security domain is fertile ground for additional research and study. Performance metrics, oversight and accountability, best practices, and collaborative processes can be evaluated and improved. On a micro level, a follow-up JTTF survey should be conducted to evaluate implemented recommendations and core processes. A sufficient amount of time should be allowed for changes to take effect. It is recommended that future surveys include questions from the current survey in order for post-survey analysis to be conducted to allow a statistical measurement concerning the effectiveness of program changes relative to identified deficiencies.

APPENDIX A: NJTTF REGIONAL MAP



Region I: New York, Boston, Albany, Buffalo, Newark, New Haven, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore

Region II: Norfolk, Richmond, San Juan, WFO, Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbia, Knoxville, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit, Memphis, Milwaukee, Springfield, and Louisville

Region III: Birmingham, Denver, Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Dallas, El Paso, Kansas City, San Antonio, Houston, Jackson, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Miami, Minneapolis, Mobile, Omaha, and Tampa

Region IV: Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Honolulu, Las Vegas, Portland, Anchorage, Los Angeles, and Seattle

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**APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO THE JTTF
TELEPHONE SURVEY**

**FBI
JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF)
TELEPHONE SURVEY**

Field Office: _____

Date of Survey: _____

Agency (Check One):

- _____ FBI SA
- _____ Federal TFO
- _____ State TFO
- _____ Local TFO
- _____ Other (e.g. Tribal, Private)

Status: _____ Part-Time Member
_____ Full-Time Member.

How long have you been a Law Enforcement Officer? _____ Years _____ Months

- A. Time as an FBI Agent _____ Years _____ Months
- B. Time as a State/local law enforcement officer _____ Years _____ Months
- C. Time as another government agency law enforcement officer _____ Years
Months

2. **How long have you been assigned to your current JTTF?** _____ Years _____ Months

3. **Are you assigned to a JTTF Annex/RA?** _____ Yes _____ No

4. **Have you received the following subject-matter counterterrorism training:**

- A. **International Terrorism** _____ Yes _____ No

If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area:

- _____ It was not offered to me
- _____ Time constraints
- _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities
- _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level
- _____ Other

Source of training:

FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Field Office training _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Non-FBI training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

B. **Domestic Terrorism** _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area:

- _____ It was not offered to me
- _____ Time constraints
- _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities
- _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level
- _____ Other

Source of training:

FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy? _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Field Office training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Non-FBI training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

C. **Weapons of Mass Destruction** _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area:

_____ It was not offered to me

_____ Time constraints

- _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities
 - _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level
 - _____ Other
-

Source of training:

FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy? _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Field Office training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Non-FBI training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

D. **Muslim/Arab Culture** _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area:

- _____ It was not offered to me
- _____ Time constraints
- _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities
- _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level
- _____ Other

Source of training:

FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy? _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____
(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

Field Office training _____ **Yes** _____ **No**

If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended:

5. Since your assignment to the JTTF, have you received FBI legal training? _____ Yes
No

A. Have you requested a NSL? _____ Yes _____ No

B. Have you prepared or helped prepare a FISA request package? _____ Yes

No

6. Since your assignment to the JTTF, have you received access to the following computer systems:

A. **FBINET Intranet** _____ Yes _____ No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been

granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you used this resource? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____ Yes

No

B. **ACS (Automated Case Support)** _____ Yes _____ No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been

granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, have you used this resource? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____ Yes

No

C. **TA System (Telephone Applications)** _____ Yes _____ No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No

If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

D. **IDW (Investigative Data Warehouse)** _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been

granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No

If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

E. **Guardian / E-Guardian** _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been

granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No

If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

F. **DEEP (Data Extraction and Extension Project)** _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system

_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No
If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

G. **SCION (Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network)** _____Yes
No

If no, do you have a SCIF at your location: _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology
_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No
If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

H. **SIPRNET / JWICS** _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology
_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No
If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

I. **Internet (e.g., Google)** _____Yes _____No

If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:

_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology
_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes
No

J. **Lexis Nexis** _____Yes _____No
If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:
_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology
_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No
If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes
No

K. **ChoicePoint / Autotrack** _____Yes _____No
If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:
_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology
_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted
_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No
If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No
If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes
No

L. **LEO (Law Enforcement Online)** _____Yes _____No
If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system:
_____ Did not know about this system
_____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology

_____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been granted

_____ Other

If yes, have you received training on this system? _____Yes _____No

If yes, have you used this resource? _____Yes _____No

If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)? _____Yes

No

Other Comments:

7. **Have you ever been assigned as the primary case agent in a FBI CT investigation(s)?**

_____Yes _____No

8. **Have you ever been assigned as a co-case agent in a FBI CT investigation(s)?**

_____Yes _____No

9. **Do you participate in file review sessions with your JTTF Supervisor? _____Yes**

No

10. **Do you currently operate a FBI-symboled source/asset(s) who is reporting on counterterrorism matters or assist in operating a source?**

_____Yes _____No **If yes, how many currently?** _____

A. Have you ever operated a symboled source(s) or asset(s) during your JTTF assignment or assisted with operating a source? _____Yes _____No

B. Have you received FBI training on how to operate a symboled source(s) /asset(s)?

_____Yes _____No

If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training: _____

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

11. **Do you have adequate access to the following investigative support:**

- Know A. Intelligence Analysts _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know B. Financial Analysts _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know C. Field Intelligence Group _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know D. Surveillance Support (e.g., SOG, SSG) _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know E. Technical Support (e.g., TTA) _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't

12. **Do you have adequate number of the following investigative support:**

- Know A. Intelligence Analysts _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know B. Financial Analysts _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know C. Field Intelligence Group _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know D. Surveillance Support (e.g., SOG, SSG) _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't
- Know E. Technical Support (e.g., TTA) _____ Yes _____ No _____ Don't

Other Comments:

13. **(If TFO) How often is your agency's management briefed by the FBI Field Office Management?**

- _____ Daily
- _____ Weekly
- _____ Monthly

- _____ Quarterly
- _____ Semi-annually
- _____ Annually
- _____ Never

If never, please explain: _____

To your knowledge, who from the FBI conducts these briefings the majority of the time:

- _____ FBI SSA
- _____ ASAC
- _____ SAC
- _____ Other _____

14. **Overall, has the JTTF Field Office Management provided appropriate leadership and management?**

(Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional)

	Leadership	Management
A. SSA	_____	_____

Please explain basis for rating below 3:

- _____ General lack of contact with management
- _____ Management not familiar with subject matter of investigations
- _____ Lacks managerial skills, communication skills, etc.
- _____ Other

B. ASAC	_____	_____
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Please explain basis for rating below 3:

- _____ General lack of contact with management
- _____ Management not familiar with subject matter of investigations
- _____ Lacks managerial skills, communication skills, etc.
- _____ Other

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