Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and Options for Congress

Summary

This report will examine logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq primarily administered through the United States’ (U.S.) Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. It was established on December 6, 1985 with the publication of Army Regulation 700-137.

LOGCAP has been used in a variety of military contingency operations and provides for the awarding of contingency, or bridging contracts, or for the inclusion of contingency clauses in peacetime contracts. LOGCAP contracts have been previously awarded for work in Rwanda, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, Ecuador, Qatar, Italy, southeastern Europe, Bosnia, South Korea, Iraq, and Kuwait. LOGCAP contracts are “costs-plus award fee” contracts, meaning that there is a fee paid based on contract costs, in addition to the potential for incentive fees based on performance.

There has been a substantial shift in the types of contracts for troop support services, the size of the contracts, and the apparent lack of effective management control over the administration of the contracts and the oversight of the contractors. Some observers have noted that costs-plus contracts have characteristics that can make oversight difficult. Others note that the very nature of the types of contracts employed in Iraq, combined with the challenges in contract administration, serve as major factors which make contract administration difficult. Given the size and scope of the contracts in Iraq, and the challenge of managing billions of DOD-appropriated dollars, many have suggested it appropriate to inquire whether these types of contracts can be managed better.

The 110th Congress has introduced several bills to ensure proper accountability and oversight in federal contracting, particularly for DOD contracts in Iraq. The proposed Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585, contains provisions which, as an example, would broaden legal protections to DOD contractor employees who disclose information believed to demonstrate instances of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement; require the Secretary of Defense to provide a plan for addressing skill shortfalls in the DOD acquisition workforce; provide for periodic independent management review of DOD contracts; prohibit the use of congressional earmarks for awarding no-bid contracts and non-competitive grants; and establish a commission on wartime contracting that would investigate contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, the Gansler Commission has studied the state of defense acquisition and made a number of recommendations for structural changes.

In this report, four broad areas will be discussed, including (1) contract administration; (2) contract costs, the development of contract requirements, and the use of no-bid, sole-source contracts, and costs-reimbursement contracts; (3) transparency; and (4) the acquisition workforce. This report will be updated as warranted.
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Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and Options for Congress

Introduction

Purpose and Scope

This report will examine logistical support contracts for troop support services (also known as service contracts\(^1\)) in Iraq, primarily administered through a smaller program, the United States Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) and a larger program, the United States Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).\(^2\) This report will focus primarily on contracts involving Department of Defense (DOD) appropriated funds, although some projects involve a blending of funds from other agencies.\(^3\)

Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

The U.S. Air Force has a smaller contingency contracting support program for services in Iraq. The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) administers logistical support contract for services in Iraq. AFCAP is the largest contingency support contract ever awarded by the Air Force. AFCAP is an “umbrella” contract, similar to the U.S. Army’s LOGCAP. It was designed to provide an on-call capability for troop sustainment and support. The program was established in 1997 to contract for a wide-range of non-combatant, civil engineer services during wartime, contingency, and humanitarian efforts. AFCAP provides for contractor support to relieve active duty and air reserve personnel. AFCAP provides capabilities in the area of food service, lodging, carpentry, plumbing.

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\(^1\) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 37, Subpart 37.1 defines “service contracts” as contracts that directly engage the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.


\(^3\) For a fact sheet on the application of federal procurement statutes to contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, see CRS Report RS21555, Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statutes, by John R. Luckey; for a discussion on Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) contracting issues, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff. For a discussion on private security contracting see CRS Report RL32419, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Nina M. Serafino. For a discussion of war-related costs see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
electrical, mechanical, air conditioning, laundry plant operations, fire protection emergency management, project and program management.

Initially, AFCAP began as a five-year, $475 million program; now it is a 10-year, $10 billion program. AFCAP is managed by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency at Tyndall Air Force Base, and the Air Force Services Agency in San Antonio, Texas. The contract consists of administrative task orders which have been awarded to six companies: Washington Group International, CH2M Hill Global Services, URS/Berger JV, Bechtel National, DynCorp International and Readiness Management Support. The AFCAP contractor maintains a core staff in theater to plan, organize, and acquire resources on an as-needed basis.4

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

LOGCAP was established by the U.S. Army on December 6, 1985 with the publication of Army Regulation 700-137. LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors who perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. The use of LOGCAP contracts augments combat support and combat service support to military forces in theater.5

On October 1, 1996, LOGCAP management was transferred to the U.S. Army Material Command. In September 2006 the Army Sustainment Command (ASC) was created to serve as the “logistics integrator” for the contingency contracting and sustainment needs of the military worldwide. ASC oversees about 65,000 contractors and manages about $25 billion in contracts.6

LOGCAP Contracts (1992-2007)

The first LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP I) was awarded on August 3, 1992 to Brown and Root Services of Houston, Texas (also know as KBR). The contract was reportedly competitively awarded and consisted of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for one year with four option years. The Army Corp of Engineers reportedly held a competition to award the second LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP II). The contract, a cost-plus award fee contract for one base year followed by 4 option years, was

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5 LOGCAP contracts have been previously awarded for work in Rwanda, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, Ecuador, Qatar, Italy, southeastern Europe, Bosnia, South Korea, Iraq, and Kuwait. Under LOGCAP, private sector contractors are used to provide a broad range of logistical and other support services to U.S. and allied forces during combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian and training operations.

6 [http://www.aschq.army.mil/home/missionvision.htm].
awarded to Dyncorp on January 1, 1997. The third LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP III) was awarded in 2001 to Halliburton/KBR.7

LOGCAP III, a ten-year contract (one base year, followed by nine option years), was awarded to Halliburton/KBR to perform a variety of tasks. Initial press reports indicated that the 2001 LOGCAP III contract would be for the development of a contingency plan for extinguishing oil well fires in Iraq; however, subsequent press reports include such tasks as providing housing for troops, preparing food, supplying water, and collecting trash. This contract was awarded under a cost-plus-award-fee, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract.8 The 2001 contract was based on specific task orders which are issued individually, and only for those services that DOD felt were necessary to support the mission in the near term. During 2003, the Halliburton/KBR LOGCAP III contract rose to more than $3.5 billion. According to one press account, Halliburton/KBR reportedly earned a fixed 1% profit above costs on LOGCAP III, with the possibility of an additional 2% an incentive bonus,9 while another press account reported that the Halliburton/KBR LOGCAP III contract is a cost-plus, award fee contract that earns a 2% fixed fee with the potential for an extra 5% incentive fee.10

The fourth LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP IV) was executed with a different strategy. Instead of a single contractor, the contract called for multiple contractors. Competitions were held and the contracts were awarded based on what represented the best value to the government.11 In best value source selections, the government may make trade offs to make contract selections on factors other than costs or technical superiority. The use of multiple LOGCAP contractors is reportedly intended to reduce the government’s risk. Under the new strategy, the three performance contractors may compete for individual LOGCAP task orders, creating a competitive environment meant to control costs and enhance quality.

LOGCAP IV Contract Award

The planning contract is awarded to Serco. In August 2006 the Army held a competition to select a logistical planning and program support contractor for LOGCAP IV. Two proposals were received and in February 2007 the ASC selected Serco, Inc., of Vienna, VA. This contract will have a minimum value of $613,677 with a contract period of one base year followed by up to four one-year options with

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7 KBR was formerly known as Brown and Root Services. Brown & Root Services was the original LOGCAP contractor.

8 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, also known as IDIQ contracts, supply an indefinite quantity of supplies, goods, or materials, for an indefinite period of time. See FAR, Part 16, Types of Contracts.


10 See the Center for Public Integrity’s website at [http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/] under the section for Windfalls of War, U.S. Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.

11 FAR, Part 15. Contracting by Negotiation.
a maximum annual contract value of $45 million and a maximum contract value of $225 million.\textsuperscript{12}

The ASC news release announcing the award selection described the range of logistical and program services provided under the contract. The following information was taken from the press release on the ASC website.

- augmenting the Army’s capability to develop and update worldwide management and staffing plans for contingencies
- working with LOGCAP IV performance contractors, which have not yet been selected, to assure that they understand these plans
- helping theater planners integrate LOGCAP into their plans
- assisting planners in incorporating a broad range of contracted logistics support
- developing scopes of work officially referred to as procurement work statements;
- preparing independent government cost estimates which are compared against the contractor’s bids to assure valid costs for task orders
- conducting analysis of how the performance contractors will do the work outlined in the task orders’ scopes of work
- analyzing performance contractors’ costs
- working with the Army to measure LOGCAP IV contractor performance, and
- recommending process improvements in above actions.\textsuperscript{13}

**ASC Selects Performance Contractors.** The Army conducted a competition to select up to three performance contractors for services similar to those rendered under LOGCAP III.\textsuperscript{14} Solicitations were issued in October 2006 and six


\textsuperscript{13} ibid, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{14} From the Army’s FY2008 Budget Estimates for the Global War on Terrorism: LOGCAP augments combat support and combat service support force structure by reinforcing military assets with civilian contract support. The program provides primarily base life support services to the forces in theater. Base life support services provide a full spectrum of services, including food service, power generation, electrical distribution, facilities management, dining facility operations, pest management, hazardous and non-hazardous waste management, latrines, water systems, billeting management, fire fighting and fire protection services, and laundry service operations. In Iraq, the program provides for the Multi-National Force -- Iraq base logistics support, base camp reorganization, the International Zone, Camp Bucca Prisoner of War base operations support, and contractor support management in theater. In Afghanistan, the program manages base operations support for the Coalition Joint Operations Area -- Afghanistan, and the Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, and Salerno airfields. In Kuwait, the program manages Camps Spearhead, Udari, Arifjan; theater Retrograde operations; the theater-wide transportation mission; theater oil analysis and test facilities; management and diagnostic equipment, and bulk fuel operations. (continued...)
proposals were received. In June 2007 the ASC selected three companies to serve as performance contractors - DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX. LOGCAP IV contracts are awarded as Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) with one base year followed by nine option years. Each contract has a maximum value of $5 billion per year, with a collective maximum value of $15 billion yearly. The contracts have a lifetime maximum value of $150 billion.

**Congressional Interest**

The 110th Congress has conducted a series of hearings on Iraq contracting activities. Policymakers are concerned about Iraq contracts for several reasons, including the expense and difficulty of managing logistical support contracts; allegations and reported instances of contract waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement cited by many public agencies and private organizations; and DOD’s capacity to manage contracts. Some have raised questions as to whether DOD has the right mix of acquisition workforce personnel trained and equipped to manage the large-scale contracts. As a result of these concerns, Congress has extended the tenure of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) through passage of the Iraq Reconstruction and Accountability Act. Legislative initiatives in H.R. 1585, the proposed FY2008 Defense Authorization bill, would provide additional oversight and accountability for DOD contracting during combat operations.

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14 (...continued)


16 The SIGIR replaced the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG). As provided for in P.L. 108-106, the SIGIR provides an independent and objective audit, analysis, and investigation into the use of U.S.-appropriated resources for Iraq relief and reconstruction. The SIGIR, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., was appointed as CPA-IG on January 20, 2004. He reports to both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, provides quarterly reports and semi-annual reports to Congress, and has offices in Baghdad and Arlington, VA. For a summary of the history of U.S. reconstruction assistance in Iraq, see CRS Report RL31833, *Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance*, by Curt Tarnoff.

17 P.L. 109-440 directs that the Office of the Inspector General shall terminate 10 months after 80 percent of the funds appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction funds have been spent.
Background

Awarding of Defense Contracts

In most cases, federal government contracts are awarded under “full and open competition.” However, there are exceptions, particularly during times of war.

**Full and Open Competition.** In general, authorities that govern the awarding of most federal government contracts can be found in the United States Code (U.S.C.) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984\(^\text{18}\) explicitly states that the federal government “shall obtain full and open competition through use of the competitive procedures in accordance with the requirements of this title and the *Federal Acquisition Regulation.*”\(^\text{19}\) The FAR and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) outline seven circumstances which permit DOD to use other than full and open competition in the awarding of federal government contracts.\(^\text{20}\)

Two of the seven circumstances give the Secretary of Defense the authority to use other than full and open competition: (1) when the Secretary of Defense determines that DOD’s need for a property or service is of such an “unusual and compelling urgency” that the United States would be seriously injured unless DOD is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals; and (2) when the use of full and open competition would compromise national security.

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\(^{18}\) 41 U.S.C. 253. CICA can also be found in Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 137, and was included in Section 805 of the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136).

\(^{19}\) 41 U.S.C. 253 (a)(1)(A).

\(^{20}\) The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation and AIDAR are supplements to the FAR. See DFARS, Subpart 206.3, and AIDAR, Subpart 706.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition. The exceptions are: (1) There is only one responsible source available to fulfill the contract requirements; (2) the federal agency’s need for these goods or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the federal government would be seriously injured if this contract were not awarded; (3) the federal government needs to ensure that suppliers are maintained in the event of a national emergency, or to achieve industrial mobilization, or to establish or achieve or maintain an engineering, development, or research capability; (4) The federal government has an international agreement to make this acquisition through means other than through full and open competition; (5) a statute specifically authorizes or requires that the contract be made through a specific source; (6) The use of full and open competition may compromise national security; (7) The public interest would be better served by use of other than full and open competition. The procedures for submitting written justifications to use other than full and open competition, including review requirements and delegation of authority, are outlined in DFARS, Subparts 206.303-1 and 206.304, and AIDAR 706.3. For a more detailed discussion on the seven exceptions to the use of full and open competition, refer to CRS Report RS21555, *Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statutes*, by John R. Luckey.
**Emergency Contracting Authorities.** Title 41, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 428a grants special emergency procurement authority to heads of executive agencies where it is determined that a procurement is to be used in support of a contingency operation, or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack.

**Contingency Contracting.** Contingency contracting differs from emergency contracting. The first usually describes situations where urgent requirements are necessitated by disasters, while the second usually describes military, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations. DOD has developed initiatives to strengthen DOD contracting operations, particularly in contingency contracting situations. Section 817 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a joint policy for contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations, no later than one year from the bill’s enactment. Sections 815 and 854 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 required DOD to report to Congress on contingency contracting requirements and program management, and to develop instructions to implement a contingency contracting program. The report was issued in October 2007.

**Rapid Acquisition Methods.** Section 811 of the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200, P.L. 108-375) grants the Secretary of Defense limited rapid acquisition authority to acquire goods and services during combat emergencies. Also, Title 10, Section 2304 outlines the use of indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) task orders, sealed bidding, certain contract actions, and set-aside procurement under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. 637(a)], as examples of ways to expedite the delivery of goods and services during combat operations or post-conflict operations.

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23 P.L. 109-16.


Audits, Investigations, and Reports

Role of Federal Agencies. No one federal agency has the sole mission to audit, investigate, or oversee DOD-appropriated funds for troop support services under LOGCAP. There are many agencies who share the responsibility, including the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Army Audit Agency (AAA), and the DOD Inspector General.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). A perceived lack of transparency in the earliest Iraq contracts and numerous media reports led to the appointment of the Special Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (now SIGIR). SIGIR Stuart Bowen audits and investigates contracts for Iraq reconstruction and relief funds, although some projects involve a blending of IRRF funds with DOD appropriated funds. The SIGIR’s additional investigations into LOGCAP contracts have largely described LOGCAP contracts as lacking transparency, oversight, and financial accountability, and his investigations documented some cases of waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the SIGIR has produced more than 150 reports, audits, or investigations of reconstruction-related activities. As a result of SIGIR’s work, estimates are that audits, investigations, and inspections have resulted in significant benefits to the federal government.

In June 2007, the SIGIR released a report based on its partial audit of Task Order 130 that was awarded to KBR on April 27, 2006 to provide support services to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and at other Iraq sites. This report found substantial deficiencies in both KBR’s ability to provide enough data for the SIGIR to perform an adequate audit and investigation; gross overcharges for fuel and food services; SIGIR also found that the government’s oversight and management of the contract was grossly inadequate, and also contributed to SIGIR’s inability to appropriately and completely audit and investigate the government’s ability to provide oversight and management.

26 For a discussion of contract funds for Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction projects, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff, updated September 4, 2007. Also, for a discussion on federal procurement statutes as they affect Iraq reconstruction projects, see CRS Report RS21555, Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statutes, by John R. Luckey.


28 Senator Collins Works To Extend The Term of the Office that Oversees Billions in Iraqi Reconstruction Dollars. Press Release of the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 13, 2006. Also, see SIGIR website [http://www.sigir.mil/] for audits reports.

Overall, the SIGIR has recommended that the federal government should “generally avoid the use of sole-source and limited-competition contracting actions.” In the opinion of the SIGIR, the use of sole-source and limited competition contracting in Iraq should have ended sooner, and that contracts issued previously under limited or sole-source competition should have been re-competed.

**Latest SIGIR Review**

The latest SIGIR review of LOGCAP is a continuation of a past review of LOGCAP Task Order 130 (awarded on April 27, 2006 with an estimated value of $283 million) and a review of LOGCAP Task Order 151 (awarded on June 6, 2007 with an estimated value of $200 million), both awarded to Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) for support services to the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq staffs located at the U.S. Embassy-Iraq, and at other Chief of Mission sites within Iraq located in Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah and Kirkuk. SIGIR conducted its review at KBR sites in Baghdad, and involved interviews with personnel responsible for the administration or oversight of these Task Orders, including personnel from DCMA, DCAA, and DOS; personnel with the Joint Area Support Group-Central appointed as the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTRs); the LOGCAP Task Order 151 Support Officer; personnel at the Army’s Logistic and Budget Offices, and KBR managers and operational personnel.  

Because these task orders provided support to both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) missions in Iraq, DOD and DOS agreed that the reimbursement of costs associated with these task orders would be shared 60% by DOS and 40% by DOD. The total cost of these four task orders is approximately $1.5 billion.

Overall, the SIGIR’s audit and investigation found improvements in the oversight of the management of Task Orders 130 and 151, by both government agencies and KBR. However, the report identified areas where the government should increase its management and oversight, and made specific recommendations for improvement in the government’s ability to manage the contract.

**Department of Defense Inspector General.** Thomas F. Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Defense, testified at the September
20, 2007 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on “Accountability During Contingency Operations: Preventing and Fighting Corruption in Contracting and Establishing and Maintaining Appropriate Controls on Materiel." In his testimony, he described DOD’s past and present efforts to provide oversight for contracting for combat support services during contingency operations.

To date, over $550 billion has been appropriated to the Department of Defense in support of the men and women of our Armed Forces in Southwest Asia and the fight against terrorism. To provide oversight, we have over 225 personnel working on 29 audits and 90 investigations that address a wide variety of matters to include contracting, accountability, and required documentation. Additionally, we are working with other DoD organizations, such as the Army Audit Agency, the Army Criminal Investigation Command, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, to evaluate and provide recommendations for actions addressing these critical mission support areas.

Later on in his testimony, Inspector General Thomas Gimble described the formation of a new partnership to combine the efforts of multiple federal agencies to combat allegations and instances of waste, fraud and abuse in contracts for Iraq reconstruction activities.

More recently, as a result of the magnitude of alleged criminal activities within the Iraqi theater, a group of Federal agencies has formalized a partnership to combine resources to investigate and prosecute cases of contract fraud and public corruption related to U.S. Government spending for Iraq reconstruction. The participating agencies in the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF) are DCIS; Army CIDs Major Procurement Fraud Unit; the Office of the Inspector General, Department of State; the FBI; the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; and the Office of the Inspector General, Agency for International Development.

The ICCTF has established a Joint Operations Center which is a case coordination cell and criminal intelligence element aimed at achieving maximum interagency cooperation to successfully prosecute fraud and corruption cases in support of the war effort in Iraq. The mission and objectives of the ICCTF are a shared responsibility of the participating agencies. Case information and criminal intelligence are shared without reservation and statistical accomplishments will be reported jointly.

As a result of closed and ongoing investigations, five Federal criminal indictments and ten Federal criminal information have been issued, and two Article 32 hearings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice have been conducted. As a result of the investigations, nine U.S. persons and one foreign person have been convicted of felonies, resulting in a total of approximately fifteen years of confinement and eleven years of probation. Four individuals and one company were debarred from contracting with the U.S. Government; nineteen companies and persons were suspended from contracting; and two contractors signed settlement agreements with the U.S. Government. In all, $9.84

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34 Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, before the House Armed Services Committee, September 20, 2007.

35 ibid, p. 1.
million was paid to the U.S. in restitution; $323,525 was levied in fines and penalties; $3,500 was forfeited; and $61,953 was seized.\textsuperscript{36}

**Government Accountability Office (GAO).** GAO has identified DOD contract management as a high risk area; as such, GAO monitors DOD’s performance and provides periodic updates.\textsuperscript{37} GAO has conducted many studies of Iraq contracting, including several studies of logistical support contracts.\textsuperscript{38} Since 2003, GAO has issued a number of Iraq-related reports and testimonies to Congress.

The Comptroller General appeared in July 2007 before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to discuss four specific challenges facing federal agencies in the oversight and management of contracts. There he made several important observations:

Managing risks when requirements are in transition requires effective oversight. DOD lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. The challenges faced in Iraq are a symbol of systematic challenges facing DOD. DOD cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which it relies on contractors to support its operations. Information on the number of contractor employees, and the services they provide, is not aggregated within DOD or its components. DOD recently established an office to address contractor support issues, but the office’s specific roles and responsibilities are under study. DOD and its contractors need to clearly understand DOD’s objectives and needs. To produce desired outcomes with available funding and within required time frames, they need to know the goods or services required, the level of performance or quality desired, the schedule, and the cost.\textsuperscript{39}

**Potential Oversight Issues**

Potential contract oversight issues that Congress may choose to examine include various aspects of contract administration such as contract costs, development of contract requirements, costs-reimbursement and sole-source contracts; transparency and the size, shape, and skill diversity of the acquisition workforce.

\textsuperscript{36} ibid, pages 11-13.


Contract Oversight. Because of several cases in which high profile weapons acquisition programs have been hobbled by escalating costs and technical shortcomings, Members may want to review the management of individual programs and the evolution over the past decade or so of DOD’s acquisition management process with an eye toward using the FY2008 funding bills to strengthen the government’s hand in dealing with industry. As an example, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael G. Mullen have declared that the Navy intends to reclaim some of the authority over ship design it has ceded to industry and Members may look for ways to jump-start that effort as they deal with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Similarly, Members intent on imposing congressional priorities on the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) may question the amount of managerial discretion the Army has vested in the Lead System Integrator. In this case, a private entity — a team of Boeing and SAIC — were hired to manage a large, complex program that consists of more than a dozen vehicles and sensors linked by a computer network. One rationale for the outsourcing to industry of management roles previously filled by Pentagon acquisition managers is that DOD no longer has the in-house expertise needed to manage such complicated acquisitions. Some Members may want the Defense Department to come up with a long-term plan to restore enough in-house expertise to make the government a smarter customer.

Contract Administration

Contract administration includes contract management and contract oversight. FAR Part 37 makes it clear that “agencies shall ensure that sufficiently trained and experienced professionals are available to manage contracts.” The burden rests with the federal government to ensure that enough appropriately-trained professionals are available to manage the contracts. This is essential, particularly before the requirements generation process, when the government determines the scope of work to be completed. Contract management is described in The Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) “Guide To Best Practices for Contract Administration,” where it is noted that “The technical administration of government contracts is an essential activity....absolutely essential that those entrusted with the duty ensure that the government gets all that it bargains for...and they must be competent in the practice of contractor administration.”

Over the past few years, the size, shape, and complexity of service contracts have grown with the technical requirements of the new contracts. However, the size of the federal contractor workforce has not grown. There is now an imbalance - there are fewer federal contracting officials to manage the large-scale contracts, such as LOGCAP, and in some cases the government has sought to hire contractors to do the job that federal employees used to perform. For example, in their investigation of LOGCAP contracts, GAO reported that military officials utilizing LOGCAP had little understanding of LOGCAP, or their contract management responsibilities.

40 FAR Part 37.

Logistical support units which were intended to help military commanders had no prior LOGCAP, or contracting, experience.\footnote{Logistical support units write performance statements of work, prepare independent government cost estimates, and review contractor estimates on behalf of the government. See GAO-04-854. Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Strengthen Oversight. July 21, 2004.}

Two former OFPP administrators, Steven Kelman and Allan Burman, think that the current situation creates a crisis of sorts. Here they offer their assessment:

Hiring contracting officials is hardly the way to dress for political success - who wants to bring in more “bureaucrats?” — but there can’t be well-managed contracts without people to manage them. The current situation creates a vicious circle: Overstretched people make mistakes, producing demands for more rules, creating additional burdens, giving people even less time to plan effective procurement and manage performance.\footnote{Burman, Allan and Kelman, Steven. “Better Oversight of Contractors,” \textit{The Boston Globe}, January 16, 2007, p. A9.}

It is important that both civilian and military procurement sectors in DOD have qualified and experienced contract professionals. In the case of service contracts, having professionally-trained contracting personnel could be even more critical than contracts for tangible goods. With tangible goods, there is an identifiable product. In the absence of a product, it becomes even more important that the contractor maintain both awareness and involvement to exercise good stewardship of DOD-appropriated dollars.

\textbf{DOD Contracting Officials.} Contracting officials are expected to make tough decisions. As an example, Ms. Bunnatine Greenhouse, formerly the highest ranking civilian at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), raised important questions on the rationale for giving KBR contracts without competition. She objected to the awarding of the no-bid contract award to KBR, and to the five-year term of the contract.\footnote{Schnayerson, Michael. “Oh, What a Lucrative War,” \textit{Vanity Fair}, April 2005, p. 9.} The basis for her refusal to approve the proposed five-year, sole-source contract between KBR and the U.S. Army [for the Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract] was because: (1) KBR had been paid $1.9 million to draft a contingency plan to design the “guts” of the contract, how it would work, the budget, and other details; and (2) selecting KBR for the five-year contract would violate procurement protocol, as (reportedly, Ms. Greenhouse stated) contractors who draw up a contingency plan cannot be allowed to bid on the job to execute the same plan.\footnote{For additional information, see CRS Report RL32229, \textit{Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions About Contracting}, by Valerie Bailey Grasso (Coordinator).} She stated that bidding on the contract would give KBR an unfair advantage over any competitors. When pressured to sign the KBR contract, Ms. Greenhouse added the following contract language: “I caution that extending this sole source effort beyond
a one-year period could convey an invalid perception that there is not strong intent for a limited competition.” The contract was later investigated by the SIGIR.47

Various media reports suggested that in the case of Bunnatine Greenhouse, a trained and experienced senior DOD contract management official was demoted and dismissed for doing her job and asking difficult questions.48

Another senior DOD civilian testified that he made a decision to award Halliburton/KBR a task order under the LOGCAP contract, without conducting a competition. Michael Mobbs, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, testified that he made the decision to award KBR the contingency planning contract over the objections of an attorney with the Army Materiel Command. The attorney had determined that the oil-related task order was outside of the scope of the LOGCAP troop support contract. Later, GAO concluded that the lawyer’s position was the correct one, and that the work “should have been awarded using competitive procedures.”49

**Development of Contract Requirements.** LOGCAP contracts have often by-passed the process to define realistic funding, appropriate time frames, and other important requirements — through the use of “undefinitized” contract actions. Undefinitized contract actions50 do not require that the DOD contracting official write a complete performance work statement before the work is performed. Some proponents of undefinitized task orders say that they give the contractor more flexibility in getting work started sooner. However, recent DCAA audits have found that these undefinitized task orders gave KBR a significant cost advantage. Auditors found that DOD contracting officials were more willing to rely on KBR’s costs estimates, estimates which were later found to be greatly inflated. According to

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46 Vanity Fair, p. 149.

47 It should be noted here that the KBR sole-source contract, according to the SIGIR, complied with applicable federal regulations for sole-source contracts, according to the SIGIR. The SIGIR concluded that “the justification used was that KBR had drafted the Contingency Support Plan (CSP), had complete familiarity with it, had the security clearances necessary to implement it, and the contract needed to be immediately available to implement.” Lessons In Contracting and Procurement. Iraq Reconstruction. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. July 2006, p. 20.


50 Also referred to as undefinitized task orders.
DCAA auditors, rarely did DOD contracting officials challenge these cost estimates. The estimates can become the baseline from which KBR establishes their costs.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the SIGIR stated that contracting personnel must be provided with an adequate description of a customer’s needs. The inability to properly define and prepare requirements appears to be a significant oversight challenge in the Iraq contracting process.\(^{51}\)

**Use of Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts.** FAR Subpart 16.5 defines indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts.\(^{52}\) In the case of ID/IQ contracts, task and delivery orders are issued; these orders do not define a firm quantity of goods or services.\(^{53}\) Task orders are the “to do” portion of the contract, the contractor’s action list. LOGCAP contracts allow task orders to be approved as needed, without being subject to competition among multiple contractors. Each task and delivery order acts, in fact, like a single contract, allowing billions of dollars of work to be performed on a non-competitive basis. Task Order 59 is the largest single task order, to date, on the LOGCAP III contract. It was issued in May 2003, and includes various discrete functions, supporting up to 130,000 U.S. troops. Task Order 59, as an example, has resulted in charges to the government of about $5.2 billion dollars, for the 12-month period from June 2003 through June 2004.

**Costs and the Use of No-Bid and Sole-Source Contracts.** In general, most authorities believe that government contract costs are influenced significantly by the degree of competition; that having several competitors will drive down cost. However, questions can be raised to help identify LOGCAP contract costs drivers, their impact on the overall contract costs, and whether contract costs in a war zone are inherently uncontrollable. DOD has argued that Iraq contracting costs are expensive because of the uncertainty of war-related requirements for goods and services. Government contingency contracting in times of war often favors using programs such as LOGCAP, enabling contracting officials to move quickly to secure contractors, who in turn can be deployed quickly into the combat theater.

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\(^{51}\) Testimony of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 7, 2006.

\(^{52}\) FAR Subpart 16.5 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, also known as IDIQ contracts, supply an indefinite quantity of supplies, goods, or materials, for an indefinite period of time. See FAR, Part 16, Types of Contracts. There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts: definite-quantity contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity contracts. The appropriate type of indefinite-delivery contract may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304d and section 303K of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, requirements contracts and indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as delivery order contracts or task order contracts.

\(^{53}\) Indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as delivery order contracts or task order contracts.
Much has been written in the media about the use of sole-source contracting in Iraq.\textsuperscript{54} While full and open competition is the standard for government contracting, full and open competition has not been the standard for contracting for troop support services under LOGCAP. Of the $145 billion in non-competitive contracts awarded by the federal government in 2005, $97.8 billion was awarded in “no-bid” contracts. Of that $97.8 billion in contracts, $63.4 billion was awarded under the rationale that only one contractor could supply the needed goods or services. The remaining $34.4 billion was awarded in no-bid contracts under a variety of other exceptions to full and open competition. $8.7 billion was awarded for emergency situations, and $2.9 billion was awarded for circumstances where a statute authorizes or requires restricted competition.\textsuperscript{55} Finally, $47.2 billion in contracts was awarded in cases where the competitive range was limited to a small group of companies (called “limited” competition).

The Special Investigations Division of the House Government Reform Committee issued a report called “Dollars, not Sense: Government Contracting Under the Bush Administration.” According to the report, in 2000 the federal government awarded $67.5 billion in non-competitive contracts; that figure rose to $145 billion in 2005, an increase of 115%. While the contracts awarded were larger, the value of contracts overseen by the average government procurement official rose by 83% (between 2000-2005).

\textbf{Cost-reimbursement Contracts.} Cost-reimbursement contracts can be: (1) cost-plus award fee; (2) cost-plus incentive fee; or (3) cost-plus fixed fee.\textsuperscript{56} In 2000, the federal government spent $62 billion on cost-plus contracts; in 2005, that figure increased to $110 billion. Nearly half of all costs-plus contracts ($52 billion) were cost-plus award fee contracts. LOGCAP is the single largest cost-plus award fee contract, and is valued at about $16.4 billion.\textsuperscript{57} In costs-plus contracts, contractor’s fees rise with contract costs. Increased costs means increased fees to the contractor. There is no incentive for the contractor to limit the government’s costs.

\textbf{Use of Overhead Fees.} The SIGIR’s past investigations into reconstruction contracts revealed that, in some contracts, overhead expenses accounted for more than half of the costs that Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) billed the federal government. A recent audit report, \textit{Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts}, found that relatively high overhead costs were charged, and these costs were significantly higher than work by other companies in Iraq. Overhead costs for these contracts ranged from 11\% to 55\% of projected contract

\textsuperscript{54} Sole-source contracts are contracts which are not subject to competition.

\textsuperscript{55} Dollars, Not Sense: Government Contracting Under the Bush Administration. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform - Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, p. 7-9.

\textsuperscript{56} Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the approval of the contracting officer.

\textsuperscript{57} Army Field Support Command, Media Obligation Spreadsheet, April 20, 2006.
budgets. For example, the SIGIR found that in five KBR projects, administrative costs outdistanced the costs of the project itself. For example, the report cites a project where administrative costs totaled about $52.7 million, while the actual project costs were about $13.4 million. In another case, the combined administrative costs for five contractors totaled about $62 million, while the direct construction costs totaled $26.7 million.\footnote{Powers, Mary Buckner. Congress Moves To Reinstate Iraq Contracting Overseer. Engineering News-Record, Vol. 257, No. 19, p. 13. November 13, 2006.} The SIGIR found that overhead expenses accounted for more than half of the costs that Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) billed the federal government.

Overhead fees can also result as a part of fees passed from one contractor to another. One such example is the case of Blackwater Security Firm’s contract for private security services in Iraq. Blackwater’s contract paid workers who guarded food trucks a salary of $600 a day. The company added overhead costs and a 36% markup to its bill, then forwarded the bill to a Kuwaiti company. The Kuwaiti company then added costs and profit, then sent the bill to the food company. The food company did the same, and finally sent the bill to KBR. KBR passed its cost to DOD. Yet the U.S. Army stated in a congressional committee hearing that it had never authorized KBR to enter into a subcontracting relationship with Blackwater. The matter remains pending.\footnote{“Watching War Costs,” The News & Observer, Raleigh, NC, December 9, 2006. Retrieved January 21, 2007 at [http://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitViewTagged].}

**Transparency.** Transparency allows the federal government to better administer contracts and oversee contractors. For example, the federal government has had difficulty getting certain contractors to provide important information on their invoices and billing statements. The SIGIR released a series of audit and investigative reports which drew attention to barriers that hampered the government’s efforts. In one report, Bowen reported that it was difficult to complete the investigation into the KBR contracts because KBR “routinely and inappropriately marked their data as proprietary.”\footnote{“Commentary: Watching War Costs,” The News & Observer, Raleigh, NC, accessed on January 10, 2007 at [http://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitViewTagged].}

Another problem with a lack of transparency is the relationship between the federal government, the prime contractor, and the subcontractors. The federal government has a contractual relationship with the prime contractor, not with the subcontractors. Thus, the government cannot provide full accountability for taxpayer dollars. While these agreements are between private companies, the monies are from public funds.\footnote{Powers, Mary Buckner. Congress Moves To Reinstate Iraq Contracting Overseer. Engineering News-Record, Vol. 257, No. 19, p. 13. November 13, 2006.}
Acquisition Workforce. According to DOD, its acquisition workforce has been reduced by more than 50 percent between 1994-2005.\(^6^2\) In future years, between 2006-2010, half of the federal acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire.\(^6^3\) It appears that DOD does not have sufficient numbers of contractor oversight personnel, particularly at deployed locations. This limits DOD’s ability to assure that taxpayer dollars are being used in a judicious manner. For example, in recent testimony before Congress, a GAO official reported that if adequate staffing had been in place, the Army could have realized substantial savings on LOGCAP contracts in Iraq.\(^6^4\) The GAO official also stated that one DCMA official, who is responsible for overseeing the LOGCAP contractor’s performance at 27 locations, reported that he was “unable to visit all of those locations during his six-month tour to determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract’s requirements.”\(^6^5\)

Earlier mandates to reduce the size of the DOD acquisition workforce reflected Congress’ view that the workforce had not been downsized enough — that reductions continued to lag in proportion to the decline in the size of the overall defense budget, in general, and to the acquisition portion of the defense budget, in particular. At that time, Congress and DOD were at odds over the need for further reductions in the defense acquisition workforce. Reducing the defense acquisition workforce had been viewed by the Congress, in the past, as a necessary requirement for eliminating wasteful spending, and providing DOD with increased funding for other priorities.

\(^6^2\) In 1998, the House National Security Committee asked GAO to review DOD’s progress in achieving a 25-percent reduction in the acquisition organizations’ workforce, examine the potential savings associated with such reductions, determine the status of DOD efforts to redefine the acquisition workforce, and examine DOD’s efforts to restructure acquisition organizations. GAO concluded that “DOD has been reducing its acquisition workforce at a faster rate than its overall workforce and is on schedule to accomplish a 25-percent reduction by the fiscal year 2000. However, potential savings from these reductions cannot be precisely tracked in DOD’s budget. In addition, some of the potential savings from acquisition workforce reductions may be offset by other anticipated costs. Such costs include those for contracting with private entities for some services previously performed by government personnel (i.e., substituting one workforce for another.)” U.S. Congress. General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisition Organizations: Status of Workforce Reductions. Report to the Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives. GAO/NSIAD-98-161. June 1998. 20 pages. For another source of data on the federal acquisition, see Report on the Federal Acquisition Workforce, FY2003-2004, Federal Acquisition Institute Report, Executive Summary, p. vii.


\(^6^5\) GAO-07-359T, p. 8.
Staffing shortages in the defense contracting personnel to oversee Iraq contracts have become part of a larger, systemic problem within DOD. In reducing the size and shape of the federal acquisition workforce, an unanticipated result was the increase in the growth of the private sector service contracts. With the growth in service contracting, the increase in the number of complex, billion dollar contracts, and the decline in the number of federal acquisition workforce employees, some assert that there are not enough DOD contracting officials, onsite in Iraq, who are available to manage the complexities of the new acquisition programs, or oversee private sector contractors.

It appears to some that DOD has downsized the federal acquisition workforce, particularly those that oversee large-scale contracts like LOGCAP, to dangerously low levels. They note that the past downsizing of the defense acquisition workforce has resulted in the loss of technical personnel and a talent drain on DOD’s ability to meet its mission and objectives. There are concerns over potential deficits and imbalances in the skills and experience levels of personnel who manage large-scale weapon acquisition programs and defense contracts.

The Gansler Commission. The Secretary of the Army recently commissioned a group headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler to study the “structural weaknesses and organizational deficiencies in the Army’s acquisition and contracting system used to support expeditionary operations.” Army’s contracting challenges, identify the issues, and develop solutions and recommendations to move forward. The Commission made the following observations:

The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Yet, only 3 percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer (GO) positions. The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, trained, structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the 21st Century deployed warfighters. Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are certified for their current positions. Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload increase and greater complexity of contracting, the Institutional Army is not

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66 The same observations were made about the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater contract. According to Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, the issue concerns “the capacity of our acquisition staffs to deal with the myriad definitization of task orders, particular line items, the ability to interact with the extensive amount of nodes that you have in Integrated Coast Guard Systems...I’m not sure that we understood going how much we had to be prepared to handle the work load in terms of capacity and competency in human capital, and that’s one of the main things I’m focusing on.” Cavas, Christopher P. Millions for Deepwater, No One to Spend It. U.S. Coast Guard Adds Acquisition Experts for Modernization. Defense News, Vol. 22, No. 2, January 8, 2007, p. 1.

supporting this key capability. Notwithstanding there being almost as many contractor personnel in the Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan Theater as there are U.S. military, the Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations and on mission success. What should be a core competence—contracting (from requirements definition, through contract management, to contract closeout)—is treated as an operational and institutional side issue.\(^{68}\)

The Commission’s report recommends that the Army makes systemic and fundamental changes in the way it conducts business, and has divided its recommendations into four major areas:

1. Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations).
2. Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations.
3. Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations.
4. Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations.\(^{69}\)

**Potential Options for Congress**

Congress may choose to consider the following options when examining DOD contracts for troop support in Iraq: (1) the implementation of the Gansler Commission’s recommendations; (2) the broadening of the jurisdiction of the SIGIR to include DOD contracts for troop support services (like LOGCAP contracts); (3) the convening of a study of the federal employee and contractor workforce; (4) the need for more detail from DOD to give Congress better information to perform its oversight role; and (5) the establishment of a dedicated office of the DOD Inspector General to conduct audits and investigation of DOD contracts;

**Option 1: Implement the Recommendations of the Gansler Commission**

Perhaps the most significant recommendation of the Gansler Commission is that the Army address some institutional and cultural issues that may provide an obstacle to moving forward. The Commission interviewed a number of knowledgeable Army officials and concluded with the following observations about the challenges that the Army will face in making significant improvements in its business operations, as described here in the report:

Those charged with getting the job done have provided valuable insight into the doctrine, policies, tools, and resources needed for success. Clearly, the Army

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\(^{69}\) ibid, p. 13.
must address the repeated and alarming testimony that detailed the failure of the institution (both the Institutional Army and the Department of Defense) to anticipate, plan for, adapt, and adjust acquisition and program management to the needs of the Operational Army as it has been transformed, since the end of the Cold War, into an expeditionary force. The Institutional Army has not adjusted to the challenges of providing timely, efficient, and effective contracting support to the force in Operation Iraqi Freedom (more than half of which is contractor personnel). Essentially, the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters. The personnel placed in that untenable position focused on getting the job done, as best they could under the circumstances—where support is needed in a matter of hours, or, at best, days. They used their knowledge, skill, limited resources, and extraordinary dedication to get contracts awarded. Alarmingly, most of the institutional deficiencies remain four-and-a-half-years after the world’s best Army rolled triumphantly into Baghdad.70

**Option 2: Expand the Jurisdiction of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**

Another option is to give the SIGIR the authority to audit and investigate DOD logistical support contracts in Iraq. The SIGIR has already established a presence in Iraq, and has issued more than 150 reports, including audits and investigations. His efforts have largely resulted in the arrest of five people, and the convictions of four of them, with more than $17 million in assets seized.71 The SIGIR has made several recommendations related to his audit and investigation of contracts under his jurisdiction. His observations and insights may be relevant and appropriate for the contract administration and oversight of DOD contracts for troop support services.72

**Option 3: Convene a Study of the Federal Employee and Contractor Workforce**

Congress may want to convene a study of the federal employee and contractor workforce. The study could examine three important questions: (1) Is there an appropriate balance of federal employee and contractor roles? (2) Is there an appropriate federal role and presence in the oversight area? and (3) Is the federal government attracting the right types of acquisition professionals?

Congress could require a separate report, from each military service, on the size, scope, costs, and structure of its acquisition workforce (including military, civilian, and contractor personnel).

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70 ibid, p. 16.

71 Senator Collins Works To Extend The Term of the Office that Oversees Billions in Iraqi Reconstruction Dollars. Press Release of the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 13, 2006.

72 As an example, the SIGIR recommends the creation of an “enhanced contingency FAR” to simplify the rules governing contingency contracting. SIGIR, Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, July 2006, p. 97.
Option 4: Require More Detail for Better Congressional Oversight

Congress could require DOD to provide more details for better congressional oversight. There are five questions that Congress could consider: (1) Should DOD move to limit sole-source or limited competition for Iraq contracts? (2) Should DOD use more fixed-priced contracting in Iraq? (3) Should task and delivery orders have certain dollar constraints? (4) Should task orders be subject to public notice? and (5) Should larger contracts be divided into smaller contracts, with better-defined, discrete tasks?

To create more transparency and openness in defense acquisitions regarding contract administration, costs, and performance, Congress could require a separate report from each military service. Each report could include data on the size, scope, costs, and structure of all contracts, particularly no-bid, sole-source, and costs-reimbursement contracts.

Congress also could require that specific criteria be met before certain contract arrangements can be approved by DOD or by Congress. In addition, Congress could require a periodic re-competition of certain types of contracts, like LOGCAP, that have the potential of spanning for many years. Congress could also require, for example, that task orders beyond a certain size be treated as a separate contract, and thus subject to competition among multiple contractors.

And finally, Congress could require that large defense contracts be subject to competition, and that a minimum of three contractors should be selected for contractors beyond a certain size. It appears, from available press accounts, that some contracts for services in Iraq could have been segregated and opened for competitive bidding. By administering smaller contracts, financial oversight might be easier. This may give small businesses more of an opportunity to compete for contracts in Iraq.

Option 5: Create an Office of Iraq Contract Management for Troop Support Services

One of the recommendations of the SIGIR is to “designate a single, unified contracting entity to coordinate all contracting in theater.”73 One way to accomplish this is to establish a Contingency Contracting Corp (a DOD initiative currently underway is studying the issue) that will deploy to Iraq and establish a standing presence. However, what additional resources might be necessary in order to provide better contract management and oversight of DOD-appropriated funds?

Given that the mission of the DOD Inspector General’s office is to promote “integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department’s mission and to serve the public

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73 Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, SIGIR, July 2006, p. 95.
interest”, should the DOD Inspector General have a stronger presence in Iraq? Given the many problems associated with LOGCAP contracts, oversight agencies like the DOD IG could have a pivotal role in preventing future contractor waste, fraud, or mismanagement.

Congress may want to consider creating an office for the audit and investigation of DOD contracts for troop support services in Iraq. This office could be under the authority of the DOD Inspector General, and be deployed to Iraq. The mission of this office could be to conduct regular audits and investigations of DOD contracts for troop support.

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74 From the DOD Inspector General’s website at [http://www.dodig.osd.mil/mission.htm].
Appendix A. Reports

During the last four years, the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, Army Audit Agency, Air Force Audit Agency, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have issued many reports on contracting issues in Iraq, including those that appear below.

Congress


Congressional Research Service


CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.


General Accounting Office


**Department of Defense Inspector General**


Semi-Annual Report to Congress. October 1, 2005-March 31, 2006


**Army Audit Agency**

(The website is restricted to military domains (.mil) and to the Government Accountability Office)

Appendix B. Current Legislative Initiatives on Iraq Contracting

Legislation in the 110th Congress

Several provisions contained in H.R. 1585, the proposed FY2008 National Defense Authorization Bill (the bill is now in Conference) focus on the management and oversight of contracts.75

- Section 871 would require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe, within 120 days of enactment, regulations on the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract or covered subcontract in a combat area. These regulations would include processes for registering, processing, and accounting for such personnel; authorizing and accounting for their weapons, and investigating the death and injury of such personnel and their discharge of weapons, and incidents of alleged misconduct. The regulations would also provide guidance to combatant commanders on orders, directives, and instructions to contractors and subcontractors performing private security functions relating to force protection, security, health, safety, relations and interaction with locals, and rules of engagement. Section 871 would also revise the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation to require all contracts and subcontracts for such personnel to conform with these regulations.

- Section 872 would allow the Secretary of Defense to procure products and services, including security services, in Iraq and Afghanistan under special conditions by allowing the head of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to acquire items, that are produced in Iraq or Afghanistan, for use by Iraqi or Afghani forces. This provision authorizes the acquisition of some items covered that are normally prohibited under the Berry Amendment, provided that the items are procured in Iraq or Afghanistan, in support of contingency operations; grown, reprocessed, reused, or produces in Iraq or Afghanistan; used only by the military, police, or security personal of Iraq or Afghanistan; and provided that contract bid proposals are requested from as many potential sources as practicable, as circumstances dictate.

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75 Excerpts from H.R. 1585 discuss the rationale for legislative initiatives focused on the oversight and accountability for contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: “The committee remains concerned about the level of oversight for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries present uniquely complex challenges for contracting and contract oversight, but U.S. efforts in these countries will continue to require significant contractor support. The committee believes that government responsibilities for a range of issues involving contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan are unclear. The committee believes that clarification of roles and responsibilities for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased oversight will enhance the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts in both countries.”
Below is a partial list of some, but not all, legislative initiatives proposed during the 110th Congress that would affect defense contracting.

- The Stop Outsourcing Security Act (H.R. 4102) would require that only U.S. federal government personnel provide security to all personnel at any U.S. diplomatic or consular mission in Iraq by six months after enactment. It also would require that the President report to specified congressional committees on "the status of planning for the transition away from the use of private contractors for mission critical or emergency essential functions by January 1, 2009, in all conflict zones in which Congress has authorized the use of force." Contracts with the federal government requiring personnel to perform mission critical or emergency essential functions may be renewed after that date only if the President reports to those committees that the relevant agency does not have adequate personnel to perform the duties stipulated in the contract. The President must also certify that all contract employees meet set standards, including having undergone background checks to ensure they do not have criminal records and have not been accused of human rights abuses, and that they would remain in the custody of the United States if they are accused of crimes by the host country. It also would provide for Congressional access to contracts under certain conditions and reports to Congress on Iraq and Afghanistan contracts.

- The Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007 (S. 674/H.R. 369) would require the Secretaries of Defense, State and the Interior; Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Director of National Intelligence, to report to Congress on the number of persons employed under Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and sub-contracts; total contract costs; numbers of injuries and deaths, and other data. S. 674 would require the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Interior; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Director of National Intelligence to provide information within 90 days of enactment on U.S. government contractors and subcontractors working in Afghanistan and Iraq, with particularly detailed requirements for information on private security contractors. This information would include the number of persons performing work in Iraq and Afghanistan under contracts and subcontracts; the companies awarded such contracts and subcontracts; the total cost of these contracts; and, a method for tracking the number of persons killed and wounded while serving under such contracts. Also, the bills contain provisions intended to improve coordination between the U.S. Armed Forces and contractors performing private security functions, and to clarify the legal status of contract personnel by expanding MEJA (similar to H.R. 2740 and S. 2147).
The Accountability in Government Contracting Act of 2007 (S. 680/H.R. 1362) would amend the Federal Procurement Policy Act to require the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to designate a member of the Senior Executive Service as the Assistant Administrator for Workforce Programs, and establish a government-wide acquisition intern program; require the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish an Acquisition Fellowship Program, establish a government-industry exchange program for acquisition professionals and federal agency acquisition and contracting training programs; and require agencies’ Chief Acquisition Offices to develop a strategic human capital plan. Also, the bill would amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 and defense contracting provisions to require task or delivery order contract awards that are anticipated to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold to be made on a competitive basis, and provide notice to all contractors offering goods or services under a multiple award contract, with specified exceptions; require agencies to meet specified notice requirements regarding sole source orders in excess of such threshold that are placed against multiple award contracts or blanket purchase agreements; require a statement of work for a task and delivery order valued over $5 million to specify the basis for selection; require agencies to provide contractors not selected for such an order a post-award debriefing; authorize protests of such orders valued over $5 million; include as a condition for use of noncompetitive contract procedures the public disclosure of justification and approval documents; limit the length of specified noncompetitive contracts for property or services available from only one source. The bill would set forth provisions which would be required for the award of a task or delivery order contract for services estimated to exceed $100 million, provide for the issuance of guidance on the use of tiered evaluations of offers for contracts and for task or delivery orders under contracts, require agencies to develop a plan to minimize the use of cost-plus contracts, as well as other provisions.

The Iraq Contracting Fraud Review Act of 2007 (H.R. 528) would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to review each Iraq contract for reconstruction or troop support to determine any contracting improprieties.

The War Funding Accountability Act (H.R. 714), would establish reporting requirements for the allocation of funds for Iraq military operations or reconstruction activities.

The Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act (H.R. 897) would require the Secretaries of Defense, State, Interior, and the Administrator of USAID to provide Congress with copies and descriptions of all contracts and task orders over $5 million for work to be performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• The Commission on Wartime Contracting Establishment Act (S. 1825) would establish a Commission on Wartime Contracting to investigate and report to Congress on federal agency contracting for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, the logistical support of coalition forces and the performance of security and intelligence functions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. It would require the Commission to assess the extent and impact of reliance on contractors, the extent of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement under such contracts, and the appropriateness of the organizational structure, policies, and practices of the Department of Defense and the Department of State for handling contingency contract management and support. A final report from the Commission is due no later than two years after the date of appointment of all Commission members.

• The Security Contractor Accountability Act of 2007 (S. 2147) would expand the coverage of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to include all persons "while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in a region outside the United States in which the Armed Forces are conducting a contingency operation." The bill would mandate that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) establish a "Theater Investigative Unit" for each contingency operation in which covered contract personnel are working to investigate suspected misconduct. The FBI and other agencies or departments affected by the bill would have 90 days to implement the provision, and the Department of Justice’ Inspector General would be required to report to Congress within 30 days of enactment on the investigation of abuses alleged to have been committed by contract personnel.

• The Security Contractor Accountability Act of 2007 (H.R. 369) would require the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to prescribe minimum hiring standards and issue equipment guidance for contracts regarding private security contractors and would require contractors to provide specified information on costs and personnel and update it during the period of contract performance. This bill also contains provisions intended to improve coordination between the U.S. Armed Forces and contractors performing private security functions, and to clarify and extend the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). It would extend MEJA to cover contractors "while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in a region outside the United States in which the Armed Forces are conducting a contingency operation." MEJA covers contractors only if employed by "the Armed Forces outside the United States," or if employed by other federal agencies or provisional authority, to the
extent their employment is related to the support of the DOD mission overseas.

- The Iraq Contracting Fraud Review of 2007 (H.R. 528) would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to review all defense contracts relating to reconstruction or troop support in Iraq involving any contractors, subcontractors, or federal officers or employees that have been indicted or convicted for contracting improprieties.

- The New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007 (H.R. 663) contains provisions regarding Iraq contracts on war profiteering, the recovery of funds from terminated contracts, and congressional oversight.

- The Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act (H.R. 897) would require the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide Congress with copies and descriptions of contracts and task orders over $5 million.