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14. ABSTRACT The prosperity of the United States is dependent on the maritime transportation system to support its economy. Though much work has been done to implement the various national strategies, there is a seam in the maritime domain between homeland security and homeland defense. The seam exists on a continuum between the definitions of maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. It impacts state and local governments, the private sector, and many other federal agencies. It is essential for the United States to clearly define the form and function of the security and defense agencies charged with protecting America's maritime interests: the policies, structures, and processes, to properly ensure the security of the maritime domain. A Combined Joint Interagency Task Force at U.S. Northern Command could be the answer to eliminating the seam. A JIATF-North could be rapidly developed, exercised, and implemented at minimal cost to address this critical vulnerability and reduce the risk of a terrorist organization exploiting the seam between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense.					
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**Protecting America's Maritime Domain:
An Interagency Solution**

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

17 May 2005

CAPT Ivan Luke

Abstract

The prosperity of the United States is dependent on the maritime transportation system to support its economy. With over 95,000 miles of our maritime borders and 361 ports that receive containerized cargo, the maritime domain presents a critical vulnerability that terrorists could exploit to cause harm to the United States and reduce our political and economic freedoms. National strategic level documents provide clear guidance to assist commanders at the theater strategic and operational level what the desired end state should be, as well as constraints and restraints on how to get achieve the strategic objectives specified. Though much work has been done to implement the various national strategies, there is a gap or seam in the maritime domain between homeland security and homeland defense.

This seam is structurally between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. It impacts state and local governments, the private sector, and many other federal agencies. The seam exists on a continuum between the definitions of maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. It is essential for the United States to clearly define the form and function of the security and defense agencies charged with protecting America's maritime interests: the policies, structures, and processes, to properly ensure the security of the maritime domain.

A Combined Joint Interagency Task Force at U.S. Northern Command could be the answer to eliminating the seam. A JIATF-North could be rapidly developed, exercised, and implemented at minimal cost to address this critical vulnerability and reduce the risk of a terrorist organization exploiting the seam between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense.

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Preface

The difference between homeland defense and homeland security was never a significant issue prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Now, understanding the difference between these and having institutions for all instruments of national power to interact are essential to winning the war on terrorism, preventing a future terrorist attack, or recovering from an attack should one occur.

While no one can predict when or where another terrorist attack is most likely to occur in the future, the maritime transportation system of the United States is one of the more vulnerable places significant damage could be inflicted. This was highlighted during the Commandant of the Coast Guard's visit to the Naval War College on 22 March 2005. His description of the continuum between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security, and the lack of a clear structure, process, or policy to sort out a proper response to a threat in the maritime domain, was the basis for this paper. Within a few days of the Commandant's visit, *Jane's Defence Weekly* interviewed Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Assistant Secretary McHale also spoke of the need to create a system to deal with a threat that existed between the extremes of maritime homeland defense or maritime homeland security.

The senior Coast Guard advisor, CAPT Ivan Luke, also assisted in framing the issue, and helped with the development of the thesis. The research for the paper could not have been completed without the able assistance of the Naval War College Staff.

INTRODUCTION

The President of the United States has established a desired end state and set of strategic objectives in his national strategy documents. These include political and economic freedom; peaceful relations with other states; and respect for human dignity. The Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Coast Guard have developed subordinate strategies to align with and accomplish the President's strategic objectives. One of the essential elements to achieve the desired end state of political and economic freedom is the need for a safe and secure maritime environment both globally and at home. This is implicitly and explicitly stated throughout these documents. Despite the strategic clarity however, there is still much work to be done at the operational level to ensure the strategic objectives are achieved, particularly in the maritime domain.

One of the reasons it is so challenging at the operational level to fully accomplish the strategic objectives in the maritime domain is that it takes coordination across the U.S. government and with our partners and our allies internationally to fully realize the desired end state. For the U.S., there is currently a seam between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense in creating a secure maritime environment. The U.S. Coast Guard has been tasked with the responsibility of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for maritime homeland security.¹ The recently created Combatant Command U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has the responsibility for homeland defense, including maritime homeland defense. Part of the challenge in reducing or eliminating the seam between these two concepts is in defining a particular situation or event as one or the other. In reality, a maritime security/defense event could exist anywhere along a continuum from clearly a homeland defense mission to clearly a homeland security mission. It is the portion of the

continuum between those two defined points that could create a very wide seam or grey area for our enemies to exploit in the maritime domain. If such a threat were not responded to appropriately, it could jeopardize the maritime interests of the United States.

Given the limited resources available and the blurred lines of responsibility, it is incumbent upon the lead federal agencies to develop, test, exercise, and codify the process, command structures, and policies necessary to ensure continued freedom in the maritime domain of legitimate merchant ships and the denial of seaborne instruments of terror by our enemies. The solution must align with current strategy documents and seek to accomplish the strategic objectives that lead to a clearly articulated end state. A review of the national level strategy documents should also provide some constraints and restraints for any solution. The essential elements pertaining to the maritime domain from the national strategy documents are that the solution should: be a combined effort to assure our friends and allies that they are stakeholders and are critical to the success of our strategy; be interagency to ensure the seams between military intervention, law enforcement, and international treaties and agreements cannot be exploited by our enemies; be joint to capitalize on the offensive capabilities of Department of Defense assets and the broad authorities and capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard; and be capable of responding rapidly to an uncertain situation with the right agency at the right time with the right assets, anywhere in the maritime domain.

A REVIEW OF STRATEGY

“America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”

President George W. Bush, 29 January 2002²

A review of all pertinent national strategy documents provides a valuable framework for developing operational level solutions to providing security in the maritime domain.¹ It also serves to identify critical factors and constraints which assist the operational level commander in achieving his objectives. A brief overview of each strategy document follows, with emphasis on those strategies and objectives which pertain more directly to the maritime environment. Gaining a thorough understanding of the national strategic objectives is fundamental to developing a sound form and function at the operational level to better secure the maritime interests of the United States. The overarching document at the strategic level is the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*. All other strategy documents support and compliment the NSS.

The National Security Strategy. *The National Security Strategy* has three stated goals or desired end states: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.³ It further states eight objectives to achieve these goals: champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers

¹ *NSPD-41/HSPD-13 defines Maritime Domain as all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. The Maritime Domain facilitates a unique freedom of movement and flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and conveyances to transit with anonymity not generally available by movement over land or by air. Individuals and organizations hostile to the United States have demonstrated a continuing desire to exploit such vulnerabilities.*¹

of global power; and transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.⁴

Since the United States is a nation surrounded on two sides with vast oceans, each of these objectives could be loosely linked to having a safe and secure maritime domain both domestically and globally in order to meet the stated goals. However, some are absolutely reliant on eliminating any confusion or any ambiguity on the difference between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. Specifically: strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism...; prevent our enemies from threatening us... with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform America's national security institutions....⁵

National Strategy for Homeland Security. *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* supports the NSS and focuses primarily on prevention of another terrorist attack on the United States. The strategic objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in priority order are to: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.⁶ The six critical mission areas to support the strategic objectives are: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism; protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism; and emergency preparedness and response.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* "focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our border."⁷ It supports and compliments Section III of the NSS, specifically to "Strengthen Alliances to

Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends.”⁸ The intent of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* is to “stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.”⁹ The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* articulates a four pronged plan using all instruments of national power. It seeks “to *defeat* terrorist organizations...; *deny* further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists...; *diminish* the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit...; and *defend* the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad by both protecting our homeland and extending our defenses to ensure we identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.”¹⁰

These goals and objective complement and reinforce the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. From the maritime security perspective, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* specifically addresses illegal drug trafficking as a means that terrorist use to get funding; discusses that though terrorism isn’t new, the threat today and in the future is different than in the past, including the threat of terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and defines domain awareness within the air, land, sea, and cyber space as one of the essential objectives under the goal of defending the United States.¹¹ The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* also expands the more traditional list of instruments of national power to be applied from Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) to include Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (FILE).¹²

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS)* strategic goals are to: “Secure the United States from Direct Attack; Secure Strategic Access and Retain Global Freedom of Action;

Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships; and Establish Favorable Security Conditions.”¹³ It seeks to accomplish these objectives through the following four ways: Assure allies and friends; Dissuade potential adversaries; Deter aggression and counter coercion; and Defeat adversaries.¹⁴ The themes of protection, freedom of action (including the maritime domain), working with other instruments of national power (DIME-FILE) and the interagency, as well as international partners emerge from the NDS.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 (NMS)* signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further details how the NDS will be implemented. As eloquently stated in the foreword, “This document describes the ways and means to *protect* the United States, *prevent* conflict and surprise attack and *prevail* against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends. Success rests on three priorities: ...we must win the War on Terrorism; ...enhance our ability to fight as a joint force; and ...transform the Armed Forces....”¹⁵

Essential element pertaining to the maritime domain include the combining military actions overseas and at home to protect the U.S.; describing how the first line of defense is abroad; the necessity of integrating military capabilities with other government and law enforcement agencies, particularly for consequence management; the importance of strong alliances and coalitions; and integrating all instruments of national power to prevail against adversaries and “set conditions for an enduring victory.”¹⁶

Other key elements of the NMS which pertain to the maritime domain are the Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). The current JOCs are Homeland Security, Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations.¹⁷ The strategic principles for

Commanders outlined in the NMS are Agility, Decisiveness, and Integration.¹⁸

Implementation guidelines include countering threats close to their source by working with international partners and other government agencies; protecting strategic approaches; defensive actions at home including integrating the military with civilian responders in a streamlined chain of command; and achieving decision superiority.¹⁹ These characteristics are important to crafting an operational level solution to ensuring a safe and secure maritime domain. The NMS stresses integration and unity of effort throughout the document in order to achieve the objectives to protect, prevent, and prevail

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 is on Maritime Security Policy. It “establishes U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhanced U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests.”²⁰ NSPD-41/HSPD-13 also provides some important definitions and assigns the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security with the responsibility to jointly lead a collaborative interagency effort to draft a National Strategy for Maritime Security within 180 days of December 21, 2004. The essential policy actions of the directive include defining Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA),² establishing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration; working domestically with state and local governments as well as the private sector; coordinating efforts and outreach internationally, developing a response to the maritime threat; developing maritime

² NSPD-41/HSPD-13; pp. 5. “ Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. It is critical that the United States develop an enhanced capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain as early and as distant from our shores as possible by integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems into a common operating picture accessible throughout the United States Government.”

infrastructure recovery standards; developing maritime transportation system security improvements; and developing an international maritime commerce security plan.²¹ Though the National Strategy for Maritime Security is in draft form, it will not be used in this paper due to it being For Official Use Only in its current form.

Summary of Strategy and Policy Guidance for the Maritime Domain. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 distills down what the President is looking for with regard to a maritime strategy. It requires the departmental level of the government to work together to establish the best plan for securing the maritime interest of the U.S. (interagency); it requires coordination with the state and local governments and the private sector (coordinated); and it requires engagement internationally for maritime commerce (combined). Pulling out the themes from the NSS and the other strategy documents above, similar ideas emerge:

- Combined efforts to assure our friends and allies;
- Interagency to reduce seams between various instruments of national power; and
- Joint to capitalize on the capabilities and authorities of all uniformed services;

The operational level solution should be able to conduct an integrated response, have unity of effort at all levels, foster strong alliances--domestically and internationally--; have common objectives; and support the strategic objectives leading to the desired end state. The above analysis allows operational level alternatives to be generated and tested which will align with the various strategies and reduce or eliminate any seams between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN.

With the above strategy and policy analysis as background, an examination of the commercial maritime domain is important to understanding the scope of the challenge to protect U.S. maritime interests. According to an independent task force sponsored by the

Council on Foreign Relations, “[95%] of all non-North American U.S. trade moves by sea and arrives in 361 ports around the nation. [Forty-three percent] of all the maritime containers that arrived in the United States in 2001 came through the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The cost to the economy of closing these ports totals approximately \$1 billion per day for the first five days, rising exponentially thereafter. Nearly one-quarter of all of California’s imported crude oil is offloaded in one geographically confined area. A U.S.S. *Cole*-style incident involving a ship offloading at that locale could leave Southern California without [any] refined fuels within just a few days.”²² The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported in November 2002 that more than 5,400 commercial vessels made approximately 60,000 port calls in 2001, and over six million loaded marine containers entered U.S. ports.²³ Current growth predictions indicate that container cargo will quadruple in the next twenty years.²⁴ The Brookings Institute reported in 2002 that a weapon of mass destruction shipped by container or mail could cause damage and disruption costing the economy as much as \$1 trillion.²⁵ With economic and financial stakes so high, it is not unreasonable to view the maritime interest of the United States as critically important to U.S. national security.

The Seam. The *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* glossary states,

*“In understanding the difference between homeland security and homeland defense, it is important to understand that U.S. Northern Command is a military organization whose operations within the United States are governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement activities. Thus, its missions are limited to military homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies.”*²⁶

Homeland Security is defined as a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize

the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”²⁷ The specific terms *maritime homeland security* or *maritime homeland defense* have not been defined as yet, leaving the boundaries of each up to the imaginations of the reader or the agency responsible. Identifying who is responsible for a complex maritime security/defense event is one of the biggest sources of friction. As simple as that may seem, a standardized lexicon and taxonomy of the new maritime security and defense environment is essential as the roles and responsibilities are developed at all levels.

Without going into an exhaustive Center of Gravity analysis, the importance and security of the Maritime Transportation System should be evident from the above analysis. As framed in the task force report, *America-Still Unprepared, Still in Danger*,

*“Immediately following the September 11 attacks, federal authorities ordered the closing of U.S. airspace to all flights..., shut down the nation’s seaports, and slowed... traffic across land borders to a trickle. Nineteen men wielding box cutters forced America to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the United States. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems, that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.”*²⁸

In November of 2004, Usama bin Laden made clear the intentions of his Al Qaeda organization when he stated,

*“This is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the [M]ujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat.... So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”*²⁹

His overt objective is to bankrupt the United States and its allies. Given the enormous impact an interruption in global shipping would have on the global and the U.S. economy, it

is reasonable to see the maritime domain and the maritime transportation system as a critical vulnerability.

Current Efforts in the Other Instruments of National Power. Securing the maritime interest of the United States involves action at the federal, state, and local levels, interaction and coordination with private industry, as well as cooperation internationally from allies and trading partners. Some of the recent initiatives include the Maritime Transportation Security Act, which increased the security of U.S. ports. The U.S. Coast Guard has initiated the acquisition of a nationwide Automatic Identification System to track vessels in ports, waterways, and coastal areas.³⁰ Diplomatic efforts to seek security agreements with other nations are taking place, using forums such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO).³¹ The focus for much of the cargo security system is at the beginning of the supply chain. Initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which places U.S. Customs inspectors at ports of embarkation overseas; the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which focuses on efforts by importers to enhance security procedures along the supply chain; and Operation Safe Commerce which focuses on using new technology to help shippers ensure the integrity of containerized cargo are just some of the current efforts to prevent a terrorist attack in or from the maritime domain.³² While all these efforts reduce the risk of a terrorist incident against U.S. maritime interests, there is still a critical seam between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security.

Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense stated that U.S. territory is at greatest threat from the sea, in a recent interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly*. The worst scenario would be “a nuclear bomb or similar device” smuggled into a

U.S. port on a commercial ship from his perspective. Assistant Secretary McHale stated it was not an unreasonable requirement that a ship should be subject to an inspection to determine the presence of weapons of mass destruction prior to entering port.³³ However, given the vast amount of tonnage entering the United States everyday by sea, it would be virtually impossible to meet that requirement.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Thomas Collins, also highlighted difference between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security during his speech at the Naval War College in March 2003. He described a scenario in which a vessel was heading to the United States and there was questionable intelligence on it carrying a WMD. He described the continuum of alternatives from the homeland defense solution of destroying the vessel at sea to a law enforcement action of boarding it at the dock.³⁴ Neither of those alternatives is necessarily the best choice depending on the actual threat. This scenario shows the need for a clear process, command structure, and policy to be in place to deal with just such a contingency.

There were recently two exercises held at the Naval War College which both addressed a similar maritime threat. One was run by NORTHCOM, *Ardent Sentry 2005*, and the other by the Department of Homeland Security, *Topoff 3*.³⁵ While these exercises ended up being coordinated to avoid conflicts in scheduling, the fact is that they weren't planned to coincide. They did require some of the same forces to conduct the exercise however, which is an interesting anecdote supporting the supposition that there is a seam in the system. An actual terrorist event, or near simultaneous terrorist events, which occur in two or more locations and which would require some of the same units and assets for response, protection,

and recovery, will require a clear unity of command/unity of effort to improve the chances of achieving a successful outcome. There are at least two models which are currently being used that provide a good starting point to meet this need.

The [Joint Interagency Task Forces] have provided a good model for constructing [Counter Terrorism (CT)] organizations – the enemy is elusive, well-financed, and ruthless. It takes unusual and persistent cooperation to be effective. Intel is a big factor, and we've used the [Counter Drug] organizations as templates for CT.

Adm. Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
February 21, 2002³⁶

JOINT INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

Because the maritime domain is so vast and there are so many organizations associated with it, joint interagency cooperation is an essential part of the solution. Joint interagency cooperation would not only improve MDA, but also reduce the risk of a terrorist attack in the maritime domain. There are two examples which provide the basis for crafting a robust system for protecting U.S. maritime interests.

The first example that has been successful in the counter-narcotics mission is the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) model. JIATF East (JIATF-E) was combined with JIATF South in 1999 as a subordinate command of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Key West, FL. JIATF-E conducts “counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.”³⁷ JIATF West (JIATF-W), a subordinate command of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), was recently moved from Alameda, CA to Hawaii to be collocated with PACOM. JIATF-W's mission is “to conduct

counter-drug detection and monitoring operations and support U.S. country teams, partner nation counter-drug forces, and interdiction operations within the PACOM [Area of Responsibility (AOR)] to disrupt narcotics-related trafficking organizations. JIATF-W provides intelligence and training support to disrupt transportation of illegal drugs in SE and SW Asia and supports intelligence-cued Counter Narco-Terrorism detection and monitoring operations.”³⁸ JIATF-W also “provides counter-drug assistance and support in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AORs”.³⁹

A second model being employed by the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) is the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG).⁴⁰ Requested by then CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks in October 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld authorized a JIACG for the purpose of combating terrorism. As the review of strategic guidance suggests, this is exactly what the NSS calls for, and what the various lesser strategy documents purport to seek to accomplish—interagency coordination to reduce vulnerabilities between agencies and build on the entire strength of the federal government. In December 2003, DoD funded JIACGs for all nine COCOMs, but limited the interagency staff to State Department, FBI, and Treasury. While this is a good beginning,⁴¹ the COCOMs need the ability to adapt their particular JIACGs to their geographic respective area of responsibility. For example, once CENTCOM had established the first JIACG in November 2001, General Franks used it to set up a Joint Interagency Task Force Counterterrorism (JIATF-CT) which included 30 military billets plus members from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Diplomatic Security Service, Customs Service (now the U.S. Customs and Border Protection service), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense

Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service, New York's Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as representatives from the Justice, Treasury and State Departments.⁴² The commander's ability to select the appropriate agencies to address the specific needs of his Area of Responsibility (AOR) was important to the initial success the JIACG/JIATF-CT enjoyed. The JIACG is focused more at the theater strategic level however, with the JIATF being focused more at the operational level.

Joint Pub 1-02 defines Interagency Coordination as the following: *“Within the context of the Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between element of the Department of Defense and engaged [U.S.] Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”*⁴³

The one thing lacking from the review of strategic intent in the JIATF model is recognition of the combined nature necessary to incorporate international partners. Currently, NORTHCOM personnel strength is only 1200 civilians and uniformed service members from all five uniformed services. Three joint task forces are assigned to NORTHCOM: Joint Task Force Civil Support; Joint Task Force North; and Joint Headquarters National Capital Region.

A third alternative would be to create a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJF-HQ). This group would be the quick response/reaction headquarters capable of planning and executing homeland defense missions. It would need to be modified from existing models to incorporate an interagency element, perhaps as a Standing Joint Interagency Forces Headquarters (SJIF-HQ). The interagency portion would provide the built in authorities and

connections to appropriate agencies to execute along the spectrum of homeland defense and homeland security threats. Although not specifically delineated in current joint doctrine publications, this construct could be tested and evaluated in short order in conjunction with meeting the NSS/NDS/NMS guidance in a resource constrained environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It could be argued these alternatives are unique to the NORTHCOM mission and therefore don't fit a standardized paradigm of joint forces doctrine for counter-terrorism, homeland defense, or homeland security. Though this statement is true, it is a fallacious argument since NORTHCOM has a unique mission with only 1200 civilian and active duty members.⁴⁴ One of the strengths NORTHCOM must draw upon is the ability to coordinate both vertically within the DoD and horizontally across the interagency, state and local, and even with the private sector for homeland defense and civil support concerns. A transformational alternative could be the best solution for eliminating the current seam between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security.

*“With the inextricable link between terrorists, drugs, and arms trafficking, counter-drug and arms interdiction operations are critical to our efforts. Joint Interagency Task Force - East (JIATF-E) is integral to our operations.”*⁴⁵ General James T. Hill, United States Southern Command, 12 March 2003

The key to address the seam between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense is to implement a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force North (CJIATF-N). CJIATF North would be a subordinate command under NORTHCOM. It could be designated the executive agent for counter-terrorism and the coordinating agent for homeland security. If successful, it could be placed into the next budget cycle as a fully funded part of

NORTHCOM. CJIATF-N could reduce the vulnerability of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) and improve MDA. As was discussed earlier, shutting down the MTS in response to a terrorist event would have catastrophic results on the United States. Similarly, stopping a major portion of the system to react to a potential terrorist event would also have serious implications. That is why it is important to give NORTHCOM flexibility in building a combined, interagency team, since many of the stakeholders are not just federal, but state and local governments, private industry, and the international trading partners of the United States.

Structure, Processes, Policies. A CJIATF-N would provide the unity of command/unity of effort which is essential in dealing with complex contingencies, especially in the maritime domain. Currently, a U.S. Coast Guard flag officer is assigned as JIATF-E and as JIATF-W. If this part of the JIATF model were followed, it would provide NORTHCOM with a DHS flag officer not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act, allowing a seamless transition between homeland defense and homeland security in the maritime domain.

CJIATF-N would also be able to develop the plans, processes, procedures, policies and agreements to significantly improve security in the maritime domain. As a standing force, plans could be written and exercised to provide continuity with all elements of national power, as well as with state and local governments. The relationships developed with private maritime industry officials and key maritime trading partners would provide significant benefits in preventing or responding to a maritime terrorist incident.

CONCLUSION

The security of the maritime domain and the ability to know what is in the maritime domain—Maritime Domain Awareness—is essential for the “political and economic freedom” of the United States. Significant efforts by all the elements of national power (DIME FILE) are going into reduce the threat of a maritime terrorist threat. It is essential for the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to create, test, and implement a combined, integrated, joint interagency force which can develop the plans, processes, and policies to protect the interest of the United States in the maritime domain.

Creating a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force at U.S. Northern Command would provide the United States with a flexible, integrated, trained, rapid response capability at the operational level to a wide range of maritime threats. The CJIATF-N concept aligns with current strategy and policy documents, would eliminate the seam between maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense, and would be NORTHCOMs executive agent for maritime counter-terrorism and homeland security. It is a combined, interagency, and joint transformational approach to a complex problem which provides unity of effort at all levels, fosters strong alliances; incorporates common objectives; and supports the strategic objectives leading to the desired end state of economic and political freedoms.

NOTES

¹U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Headquarters, *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington, DC: December 2002), 31.

² The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: February 2002), 15.

³ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: September 2002), 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

⁶ The White House, *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington, DC: 16 July 16, 2002), vii.

⁷ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 2.

⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 5.

⁹ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid., 11-12.

¹¹ Ibid., 7, 10, 25.

¹² Ibid., 1. Note “DIME” and “FILE” were added by author and not part of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.

¹³ Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: March 2005), iv.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*, (Washington, DC: 2004), iii.

¹⁶ Ibid., 1-3.

¹⁷ Ibid., 8.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 9, 17.

²⁰ The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13(NSPD-41/HSPD-13) Maritime Security Policy*, (Washington, DC: 21 December 2004), 1.

²¹ Ibid., 5-9.

²² Gary Hart, Warren B. Rudman, and Stephen E. Flynn, *America-Still Unprepared, Still in Danger*, (Washington, DC: 2002), 17-18.

²³ JayEtta C Hecker, “US GAO Testimony,” U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, *Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges*, 106th Cong, 1st sess., 18 November 2002, 2-3.

²⁴ Dave Eberhart, “Container Ships – The Next Terrorist Weapon?” *NewsMax*, 15 April 2002. <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/14/151335.shtml> [14 May 2005].

²⁵ Michael E O’Hanlon and others, *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 7.

²⁶ *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security*, 31.

²⁷ *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 2.

²⁸ Hart, et al, 17.

²⁹ Usama bin Laden, "Full Script of bin Laden's Speech," 01 November 2004, <<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm>> [5 May 2005]

³⁰ Thomas Collins, "State of the Coast Guard Address, Making History," (Washington, DC: 21 Apr 2005).

³¹ Hecker, 10.

³² Ibid., 11.

³³ "Interview with Paul McHale, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (23 March 2005): 34.

³⁴ Thomas Collins, "Address to the Naval War College," (Newport, RI: 22 March 2005).

³⁵ CAPT Ivan Luke, <ivan.luke@nwc.navy.mil> "FW: ORDER P 302127Z MAR 05 COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH." [E-mail to David Throop <david.throop@nwc.navy.mil>] 5 April 2005.

³⁶ Dennis C. Blair, "Asia-Pacific Security After September 11th--Remarks at 2002 Pacific Symposium," (National Defense University, Washington, DC: 21 February 2002).

³⁷ Joint Interagency Task Force South Home Page, <<http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.html?cgMiss>> [15 May 2005].

³⁸ Joint Interagency Task Force West Home Page, <<http://www.pacom.mil/staff/jiatfwest/index.shtml>> [14 May 2005].

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue Thirty-seven: 10.

⁴¹ Ibid., 12.

⁴² Ibid., Pp. 13.

⁴³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JointVision 2020*, (Washington, DC: June 2000), 18.

⁴⁴ U.S. Northern Command Home Page, <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_operation> [16 May 2005]

⁴⁵ James T. Hill, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Statement on Special Operations Forces*, 107th Cong, 2d sess., 12 March 2003.

<<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-03-12hill.html>> [15 May 2005].

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