HOMEGROWN TERROR:
THE UNITED KINGDOM AS A CASE STUDY

by

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June 2007

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# Homegrown Terror: The United Kingdom as a Case Study

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**Abstract:**
This thesis proposes to shed light on the causes for and recurrence of such terrorist phenomena as the London transit bombings. This thesis makes three central claims: that a British policy of multiculturalism enables the actions of a new generation of "homegrown" jihadis; that the evolution of jihadi thought through the ages has resulted in a situation in which Islamic extremists find justification for indiscriminate targeting such as occurred in the London transit bombings; and that various socio-economic factors at the very least serve as indicators of likely problems – if they aren’t actually causal.

**Subject Terms:** Homegrown terror, jihadi, multiculturalism, United Kingdom, subway bombings, 7-7, 7-21, airline bomb plot, London bombers, Muslim extremism, London transit bombing, evolution of jihad, Islamic extremism, transnational jihad, spread of terrorism, terror in the west, bin Laden, Zawahiri, terror and religion, global jihad
HOMEGROWN TERROR: THE UNITED KINGDOM AS A CASE STUDY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of terror, said Lenin, is to terrify. He might have strengthened the observation, while weakening the aphorism, by remarking that its greater purpose is to sabotage the orderly administration of government by forcing those who govern into a defensive position in which nothing can be accomplished without the continual, crippling presence of an armed guard. Its secondary effect, if not its purpose, is to induce a counterterrorism that serves the rebel cause better than any stratagem the rebels themselves could devise.¹

A. OBJECTIVES AND KEY CLAIMS

The overall objective of this thesis is to shed light on the causes for and recurrence of such terrorist phenomena as the London transit bombings. This thesis makes three central claims: that a British policy of multiculturalism enables the actions of a new generation of “homegrown” jihadi; that the evolution of jihadi thought through the ages has resulted in a situation in which Islamic extremists find justification for indiscriminate targeting such as occurred in the London transit bombings; and that various socio-economic factors may at least indicate likely problems – if they aren’t actually causal.

Attacks on the scale of 7-7, 7-21, and the 2006 airline plot appear to be somewhat unique to the United Kingdom, at least as terrorism has manifested itself in Western countries to date. This is not to say that attacks of a similar nature have not or will not occur in the future in other Western nations. Quite to the contrary – the authors see this as a trend that is a clear warning that Western governments must address key policies and grievances concerning their growing Muslim populations. Failure to do so will only result in an increasing discontent, disparity, and isolation of this key population – as has already occurred in the United Kingdom. Our focus on the United Kingdom is based on the occurrence of three high profile attacks or plots within a significantly short period of time.

In the case of the United Kingdom, the three case studies are not the simple manifestation of frustration over the British government’s Middle East policy

(specifically regarding Iraq), as some would argue. This is as simplistic and uninformed as the unreasoning fear that all Muslims in the United Kingdom are against the West. While Middle East policy may have contributed to these events, the basis of the events is somewhat more complex and likely originates from policies implemented and immigration patterns beginning nearly 30 years prior. Multiple factors, including a policy of multiculturalism, a lack of integration of key ethnic groups into a highly homogenous society, enormous socio-economic disparity between key populations, the isolation of key groups within these populations, and finally the acculturation of small groups within the greater British society has resulted in a smaller but separate and distinct society that has isolated itself within the greater society of Britain and subordinately within the greater Muslim society. This is where the root source of the overall problem lies.

B. METHODOLOGY

In order to understand the ideology of the modern jihadi, it is necessary to analyze the development of jihadi thought throughout Islam’s history. We conducted an extensive review of literature that elaborates on or explains the basis of jihad, the results of which can be seen in Chapter II. We contend that the evolution of jihadi ideology is a prime contributor to jihadi willingness to attempt to influence non-Muslim nations and leadership, and to do so through the active targeting of non-combatants. Without this ideological evolution, such attacks as we are now seeing might not be taking place.

The purpose of Chapters III, IV and V is to analyze the basis for jihadist recruiting of Westerners. Specifically, we wanted to determine what factors, if any, could be useful in predicting who might attack the country in which they were born (or at the bare minimum, the country in which they were raised for a significant portion of their lives). Chapter III serves to elaborate on the socio-economic underpinnings of Muslim unrest in the UK. The data seems to support the belief that Muslims in the UK react differently than members of other minority religions when presented with an opportunity to “join” Western society. Chapter IV details the British government’s contribution to Muslim dissatisfaction through its implementation of multiculturalist policies. These policies, implemented with the best of intentions, seem to have served the agenda of those who are willing to work the entire system for their own personal objectives.
Chapter V ties these two concepts together, and provides insight into Muslim isolation – one of the apparent results of melding well-meaning multiculturalism with adverse socio-economic conditions.

The case studies developed in Chapter VI are meant to validate the salience of the concepts in the preceding chapters. Due to the relatively small sample size (only 40 individuals were included in the population of plotters, actors, and participants of the events) it is difficult to establish causality. In comparison to the total Muslim population of the United Kingdom, which numbers over 1.5 million (Figure 1), this admittedly seems extremely small. While additional individuals might possibly have been included, specific individuals were excluded in some cases as we decided that simple knowledge of one of the three plots prior to their taking place or discovery by law enforcement did not necessarily constitute participation. As open source information was the only information included in this study, consistency between media sources on the role of each individual was yet another determining factor for inclusion or exclusion of specific individuals. For example, in order to be included, information generally had to be confirmed by multiple sources. And, while additional actors might have been included, it would not have changed the overall statistical significance of the terror groups in comparison to the population of British Muslims as a whole.

It is important to point out, as our sample size of only 40 individuals clearly does, this thesis does not postulate that all Muslims in the United Kingdom are terrorists or that they intend to support or conduct terrorists attacks. What this thesis does attempt to do is to consider what contributing factors led the Britons who comprise the majority of our sample set to attack their own countrymen, and subsequently, what factors may influence others to follow in their footsteps.

Upon further analysis, it is apparent that the tactics of the groups supporting further alienation of the Muslim population from the greater populations of the countries in which they live are similar to those of the insurgent who recognizes the overall struggle is not for territory or cities, but rather for entire populations. Multiple groups and organizations, some more overtly aggressive than others, have clearly stated their intent to establish (or re-establish, depending on one’s perspective), a caliphate to govern the
world’s Muslims. These organizations are attempting to capitalize on the ripe environments that have been provided them through years of liberal social policies such as multiculturalism. Many of these organizations have chosen terror and the government’s inevitable response to this threat as their key tactic – exactly as described by Robert Taber in this chapter’s opening quotation.

Some may question our focus on the Muslim population of the United Kingdom, suggesting other religious or ethnic populations also in the United Kingdom may be living in or experiencing similar economic and other social conditions as described in this document, specifically in Chapter II. Our response is straightforward and unabashed: members of no other population have conducted such overt and egregious attacks against their own country in succession over such a short period of time. Neither the UK’s Muslim population, nor the UK’s population as a whole, will benefit from a failure to discuss this uncomfortable issue. It is our belief that the only way to address the underlying issues is through honest and open discourse.

Others may question our exclusion of other political and religious violence that has occurred in the United Kingdom, specifically the issue of Northern Ireland. Although this violence is clearly politically and religiously motivated, it is also clearly related to historical grievances between the two parties and is bounded by the geography over which these grievances have evolved. As will be discussed in the course of this thesis, attacks conducted in the name of Islam against the West are not bounded by geography and are not necessarily tied to any one particular motive other than the perceived defense of Islam against the apostate or the infidel.
II. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD

A. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD

*Jihadis* have traditionally concentrated their efforts on what is to them the “near enemy” – generally defined as the apostate leaders of Muslim states. In the past several decades, however, there has been a slow but steady shift in operational ideology to targeting the “far enemy” – generally defined as the infidel leaders of non-Muslim states, without whose support the apostate leaders of Muslim states would not be able to rule. It is a simple process to draw a line from the philosophical shift directly to some of the more spectacular Islamist attacks against Western targets, including the USS Cole bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Sudan. These attacks were the result of outsiders to Western culture conducting attacks against the West, with the goal of removing support to local apostate Muslim regimes. But what can we make of the recent spate of attacks on Westerners by Westerners, such as the London Underground bombings and the Madrid train bombing? In this chapter, we attempt to accomplish two primary goals: first, describe this philosophical shift; and second, describe how the philosophical shift from the near enemy to the far enemy has supported the expansion of radical Islam in the West.

B. IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR JIHAD

In order to get to the end result, or transnational *jihad* conducted by Westerners, we must first go back to the roots of *jihad*, and the need for it. The concept of *jihad* has a long, respectable history in the Islamic world, but recent developments (of the last half-century or so) have worked to morph the concept from what was initially a worthy individual pursuit (and sometimes a worthy group pursuit) into something potentially much more sinister. The underpinnings can be found in the writings of such historic Islamic scholars as Taqi al-Din Ahmad Taymiyya and Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and their introduction of new ways of interpreting concepts like *jahili* and what it means to be “apostate.” These were merely steps on the path, however. The real transformation of *jihadi* ideology begins somewhat prior to the Islamist revolution of the 1940s and 50s. The period of major transformation ends with the widespread adoption of philosophies
espoused in the writings of such notables as Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, among others. Just as with any group (extremist or otherwise) there have since been – and continue to be – minor evolutionary changes in the ideology. However, the seminal works of Mawdudi and Qutb have had a profound effect on Islamist thinking worldwide.

The Islamist view of the world is that most, if not all, current Muslim nations are in a state of jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah, as originally described in the Quran, “refers to the period of ignorance in which the Meccans lived prior to the revelation [by Muhammed].”\(^2\) We say “traditionally” because, as with so many other Islamic concepts, jahiliyyah has been redefined over the ages. For example, Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791) “rejected the depravity of the prevailing popular beliefs and practices of the tribes of the [Arabian] peninsula. He claimed they had reverted back to a state of jahiliyyah. As idolators, they deserved death for abandoning Islam.”\(^3\) Here, Wahhab undertook a quantum leap in Islamic philosophy by asserting that it was possible for Muslims to revert back to a state of jahiliyyah. Previously, jahiliyyah had been considered to be a very specific period in history, with a well-defined end point.

Another eminent Islamic thinker, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Taymiyya (1263-1328), offered his view on Muslims killing Muslims. He reasoned that although the Mongols had converted to Islam, “since the Mongols continued to follow the Yasa legal code of Genghis Khan instead of the sharia, they were not real Muslims, but apostates who should be punished with death according to the sharia.”\(^4\) So, under certain conditions, it became acceptable for Muslims to kill other Muslims. Later, Sayyid Qutb (who readily acknowledged borrowing from Mawdudi on this point) melded these concepts with Mawdudi’s redefinition of jahiliyyah as being “. . . not a period of time. It is a condition that is repeated every time society veers from the Islamic way whether in the past, the present or the future.”\(^5\) Thus, we have the final step – the idea that reverting to a state of jahiliyyah is a relatively common occurrence. The problem (for non-Islamists) with this

\(^5\) Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 85.
new definition, is that it applies across the board to all cultural attributes that exist which run counter to Islamic teaching. In fact, about the only acceptable cultural attributes are the universals of science and technology (but not the philosophical interpretation of scientific findings). With this restructuring of the concept of jahiliyyah and the strict requirement for the implementation of sharia, it is now possible to declare almost any Muslim nation or ruler to be jahili or apostate, and subsequently require their death. The struggle against jahili rulers is the point where jihad begins to play a role.

Muslims have traditionally considered jihad to have two dominant meanings: greater jihad and lesser jihad. Specifically, greater jihad refers to “the personal struggle that all Muslims go through to resist temptation, to become more righteous individuals, and to build a better Muslim community,” while the lesser jihad “is commonly translated as ‘holy war,’ and refers to the protection of the Muslim community through a call to arms.” The former is of great personal interest to most Muslims, but the latter is one of our topics of concern, so unless otherwise stated, the use of the term “jihad” can be taken to mean “lesser jihad.”

Historically, the call to serve has hit a note with Muslims worldwide, but most Muslims choose to execute their “obligation” through the application of money. For example, a 2002 report to the United Nations Security Council stated, Saudi Arabia has contributed at least $500 million (US), “about 20% of the Saudi GNP,” to al Qaeda in the last decade alone. However, a small, vocal minority in the Islamic world fulfills the obligation by taking part in violent activities. This explains the involvement of all walks of Muslims in the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Throughout this discussion concerning political and religious violence, it is critical to point out there is no differentiation in Islam between politics and religion. In fact, Islam in its truest form is a system which governs, often in extreme detail, every aspect of an individual’s life – including how they should worship, eat, sleep, interact with non-believers, and are

6 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 85-86.
governed. While we will discuss this in greater detail later, it is vital at this point to understand that in Islam, politics and religion are inseparable. Religion acts as the overriding authority that guides political actions, policies, and decisions. As will be seen, this factor is key to understanding the difficulties inherent in negotiations between Islam and the West, and may in fact suggest that the two systems are altogether incompatible.

The relationship between politics and religion in Islam is also critical to understanding the convergence of the two concepts of jahili and jihad – a key aspect of the evolution of jihadi thought. Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt attempted to apply Leninist principles to Islamic ideology in order to foment revolution in the Muslim world, and specifically in Egypt. Some extreme forms of Islam, to include Wahhabi and Salafi variants, view states that don’t live under sharia as being jahiliyyah, and leaders who don’t govern accordingly to be apostate. Thus, the basis for the Islamic revolution is the recognition that the rulers are jahili. Further, the ideologues’ dedication to the Salafi or Wahhabi brands of Islam precludes their involvement in the political process as a means of achieving their goals, since working politically inside a jahili system is anathema to jihadi ideals. In Qutb’s manner of thinking, “Reform was no longer sufficient since it did not deal with the root of the evil that permeates society. Only a radical transformation, a totally new beginning . . . the categorical destruction of the old system, can guarantee the flourishing of God’s system.” From a Western perspective, Sam Harris explains this succinctly when he states “Muslims tend to view questions of public policy and global conflict in terms of their affiliation with Islam. And Muslims who don’t view the world in these terms risk being branded as apostates and killed by other Muslims.”

Islam in the extreme does not concern itself with the separation of church and state. As far as radical Islamists are concerned, the church is the state.

C. JIHAD REDEFINED

Just as with charismatic lay leaders in any other environment, jihadis frequently are largely unqualified to offer religious advice, but that doesn’t stop them from doing so. Most of them have received no formal religious instruction, but they are nevertheless

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11 Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 78.
eager to expound on matters of faith. This is a matter of some contention between the **ulema** (Islamic clergy or religious scholars) and the ideologues, with the former feeling strongly that discussion of religious matters should be left to those who know what they are talking about – the religious scholars.13 There is a recurring theme in extremist Islam – the idea that one can take an ancient, well-known concept, with which most Muslims are comfortable, and add to its meaning based on requirements to respond to recent trends. Current **jihadi** thought continues along these lines, of imbuing the meaning of longstanding, traditional Islamic concepts with new attributes. While there are many translations of the Quran into languages other than Arabic, and there is an ongoing rift between followers of Sunni and Shia Islam (among others) it is generally understood that there is only one version of the Quran. Still, there is a need to accommodate each new aspect of the ever-changing modern world. Further, because there is no one figure in the Islamic world with equivalent status to the Catholics’ Pope, for instance, Muslims are left to their own devices to apply Quranic instruction to their own daily lives. Where the issues become too grand, intricate, cumbersome, or confusing, Muslims look to their **ulema** to help guide their thinking. But again, because of the lack of a single figurehead, it is possible for charismatic leaders – both **ulema** and lay (those with little to no religious training) – to exert widely varied influence on the thinking of the Islamic masses. Sayyid Qutb typifies this trend. Although he is said to have memorized the Quran by the age of ten,14 he never received any formal religious training. Still, his momentous 30-volume Quranic commentary “*Fi zilal al-Qur’an*” (*Shades of the Quran*) is widely available, and “has become the standard by which the Quran’s message is interpreted in many mosques and homes throughout the Muslim World.”15 This is a sure sign of its popularity and acceptance in otherwise highly censored societies, and exemplifies the respect which is given to Muslims with a popular message – whether **ulema** or lay.

In accordance with this grand tradition of “putting new wine into old bottles,”16 modern **jihadis** have worked hard to transform the concept of **jihad** in three important

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14 Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 68.
15 Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 68.
ways: by raising it to a status comparable to that of the five traditional pillars of Islam; by rejecting the strict interpretation of *jihad* as defensive in nature; and by decreeing that *jihad* is an individual responsibility (*fard ‘ayn*).\(^\text{17}\)

In describing *jihad* as “the absent duty,” Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag struck a strong cultural chord with Muslims. In one fell swoop, he was able to both equate *jihad* with the five pillars (or duties) of Islam and to tap into the deep cultural relevance that most Muslims associate with *jihad*. His ability to co-opt these two core Islamic concepts and blend them into one easily remembered meme was a stroke of brilliance. It is not doctrinally sound according to classical Islam, which held that “*jihad* was a collective duty that could be activated only if outside enemies threatened or invaded Muslim lands.”\(^\text{18}\) Still, it sounds good, and it is something that the greater Muslim community, or *umma*, can readily pick up. Farag built on that with the theme of apostate local rulers, saying “‘They are Muslim only in name, even if they pray, fast, and pretend that they are Muslims.’ Therefore, waging jihad against these apostates is a personal duty of every Muslim who is capable of fighting, until the former repent or get killed.”\(^\text{19}\) Notably, it was Farag who coined the terms “the near enemy” and “the far enemy,” though he stressed the need to address the near enemy before all else.\(^\text{20}\)

Qutb felt the nature of *jihad* was a “movement to wipe out tyranny: ‘If we insist on calling Islamic *jihad* a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of the word “defense” and mean by it the “defense of man” against those elements which limit his freedom. Those elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well as of political systems . . .’”\(^\text{21}\) So, *jihad* becomes a movement to save man from everything but Islam – but only that Islam as defined by enlightened extremists, not the more popular, forgiving *jahili* Islam practiced by the masses. Thus, what appears to be offensive *jihad* is actually defensive. According to Qutb, any contact between Western religions (specifically Christianity and Judaism) was cause for defensive aggression because “they always seek

\(^{17}\) Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, 3.


\(^{20}\) Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, 44.

\(^{21}\) Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 12.
to turn Muslims away from their faith.”22 This concept is key when we come to jihad conducted in the West by Westerners. While unprovoked attacks may appear to be offensive in nature, according to this convoluted line of reasoning, they are actually defensive since they are conducted in response to attacks (or an ongoing attack, or a potential attack) on the faith – as opposed to actual physical attacks on members or symbols of the faith. The logical, extreme conclusion is that the mere presence of any ideology other than Islam is tantamount to an attack on Islam, or stands as a barrier to the dawah (“call” to Islam), and according to Qutb, “must be eradicated first by force that it may become possible to address the human heart and mind after being freed from chains.”23 It must be noted, however, that Qutb’s feelings on this topic might have been greatly affected by his imprisonment and torture at the hands of a more or less secular regime.

By describing jihad as an individual struggle, on par with the struggle for devoutness, jihad was moved from the realm of collective duties (fard kifaya). To be cynical about it, community responsibilities could be said to be (in the mind of the common Muslim) “something my neighbor will take care of.” To make it an individual responsibility negates the individual’s ability to say “I’m doing my part” if he is not personally engaged in active jihad. The Muslim attitude toward fard kifaya is wonderfully illustrated in reactions to the Afghan war:

It is worth mentioning that a consensus then existed among Muslim clerics and scholars that doing jihad against the Russian invaders [in Afghanistan] was legitimate (defensive) and could be considered a “collective” duty. Leading mainstream religious figures in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and elsewhere issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling on Muslims to join their Afghan coreligionists in resisting Russian aggression. Tens of thousands of Muslims responded to the jihad call from their religious authority. Thousands of radical Islamists and jihadis also migrated to Afghanistan to train and prepare for the coming wars against “impious” Muslim rulers.24

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22 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 80.
23 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 82.
24 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 81-82.
Note that “tens of thousands” responded, but only “thousands” migrated to Afghanistan. Further, those who did migrate were apparently more interested in Afghanistan as a “school of hard knocks” from which they could return home and conduct more appropriate jihad against local rulers.

D. EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY

Core jihadi ideology is unpalatable to most Muslims. Extremist jihadis have suffered a failure to appeal to a broad mass of Muslim humanity because of the extreme nature of their beliefs – their values are just too far outside the mainstream to become widely accepted. Jihadi ideologues favor the strict implementation of sharia law as the basis for governance, and they praise Afghanistan (after the installation of the Taliban) as a model of Islamic society – even while deriding the Afghans for their lack of adherence to the strict Wahhabi branch of Islam. Some of the jihadis’ primary goals include the establishment of a caliphate throughout dar al-islam (House of Islam, or Muslim lands) that would “make the Shariah the law of the lands;”25 the overthrow of apostate Muslim leaders; the removal of Jews from Palestine; and the removal of “crusader armies” from the Arabian peninsula. While most Muslims agree in principle with some of the less extreme jihadi goals, there is little support or desire for the institution of a backward and repressive fundamentalist regime – as in Afghanistan – in their own countries.

Just as Lenin argued that it was necessary to utilize a highly dedicated “vanguard” as the catalyst to revolution, Qutb argued similarly. Qutb believed that “[Western style political institutions] continue the myth that the nation is the source of authority. Since the nation is made up of ‘millions of emaciated, ignorant, hungry people who toil night and day in search of food and who can spare no time in exercising what is called “the right to vote” and “freedom of choice,”’ they follow the bidding of their masters who control their source of livelihood.”26 To put a fine point on it, Qutb felt that “The vast majority of Muslims are too caught up in and corrupted by the system of unjust and anti-Islamic rule to know how and when to take up arms against the state.”27 The point that everyday Muslims might also take from this is that Qutb felt that most Muslims were too

25 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 44.
26 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 72.
blinded, stupid, or ignorant to know what was best for them, and needed “enlightened”
individuals to lead them down the path of righteousness – a typical conceit echoed by
many so-called revolutionaries.

The unfortunate reality for *jihadis* in Muslim nations is that *jihad* against apostate
rulers has historically resulted in jail, death, or both. For example, Qutb joined the
Muslim Brotherhood on his return to Egypt from the United States. He and the
Brotherhood actively supported COL Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers in their
revolution, and continued to do so immediately afterward. However, when it became
obvious that Nasser was intent on establishing a secular state – rather than the Islamic
state that Qutb advocated – Qutb turned from them and eventually expanded on his
earlier idea of violent overthrow of apostate rulers, with Nasser as the new target. Of
course, Nasser took offense and jailed Qutb. Years of prison and torture did little to
soften Qutb’s stance on apostate rulers, and his writings upon release from prison
reflected that. Nasser soon jailed him again and, after a summary trial, Qutb was
condemned to death and quickly hanged.28 Thus he became a martyr for his beliefs,
gaining further stature even in death.

The next step in the evolution is nationalist *jihad* in areas like Palestine and
Chechnya, which is mostly about land, rather than ideology. And yet, this “property-
oriented” *jihad* is ideologically legitimized through the application of the concept of
“*waqf,*” which is “an inalienable religious endowment in Islam, typically devoting a
building or plot of land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes.”29 Hamas used a
novel approach to applying *waqf* in Palestine, arguing that “all of Palestine is *waqf* given
by God for use by Muslims until the Day of Judgment.”30 Robinson tells us that this is
“innovative in two ways. First, *waqf* is not endowed by God . . . but by humans. . .
Second, Hamas conflates *waqf* with sovereignty. . . *Waqqf* is a private donation, not a
declaration of sovereignty.”31 Hamas’ brilliance here lies in the implied application of

28 Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 78.
2006).
Qutb’s well-known concept of “hakimiyyah,” or the sovereignty of God. For Qutb, “the confession of faith reiterated daily by Muslims – that ‘there is no God but God’ – is a revolution against human sovereignty of any shape or form . . . There is no governance except for God, no legislation but from God, no sovereignty of one [person] over the other because all sovereignty belongs to God.”\(^{32}\) Therefore, if a parcel of land is God-granted \textit{waqf}, it implies God-granted sovereignty. It is truly a masterstroke to tie ancient concepts with new ones, especially those espoused by very popular Muslim writers.

The next step brings us to transnational \textit{jihad}, which began in earnest in Afghanistan. There was, again, a convergence of concepts in Afghanistan: the infidel invader, the \textit{mujahedeen} brothers requiring assistance, and the willingness of Arab leaders to support the \textit{jihad} (through \textit{fatwas} from the \textit{ulema}). In reality, the \textit{ulema} were frequently in bed with the “corrupt leaders,” and could be counted on to offer support in political matters. The Afghan \textit{mujahedeen} were doing well enough, but it didn’t hurt the Afghans when Saudi (and other) clerics issued \textit{fatwas} urging \textit{jihad} to support them. Promoting the \textit{jihad} in Afghanistan was a matter of sheer practicality. With \textit{jihadis} off fighting (and hopefully dying) in distant lands, they would not be able to cause problems for the national leaders back home.

The Afghan \textit{mujahedeen}, while not wildly successful against the Russians, were “successful enough.” The Russian retreat from Afghanistan seemed to confirm the superiority of the Islamic way, and gave ideologues such as bin Laden the opportunity to beat the drum of \textit{jihadi} victory against the “far enemy.” While the success story is somewhat true, bin Laden and others of his ilk avoid some inconvenient truths. They frequently gloss over or ignore the extensive participation of Western nations, who had their own reasons for wanting the Russians out of Afghanistan. They overstate the contributions of the relatively small \textit{jihadi} (non-Afghan) contingent. Many Afghan-Arab \textit{jihadis} spoke Arabic, not Dari or Pashto, and as a result they were consigned to less important positions. In fact, they might be referred to in Western parlance as “strap-hangers” – people merely along for the ride, and of little to no importance. Finally, the ideologues tend to minimize the capabilities and accomplishments of the Afghan

\(^{32}\) Esposito, \textit{Voices of Resurgent Islam}, 89.
mujahedeen. With the bulk of the fighting force being local mujahedeen, there really can be no question of who “won the war.” Still, all the rhetoric feeds the developing concept that jihadis can target the far enemy in order to remove support for apostate local rulers. While it is true that Russia could be considered the far enemy in the Afghan conflict, mujahed success there did not result in the removal of support to (and subsequent failure of), a local jahili government – another inconvenient truth that is given short shrift by the ideologues.

From jihadi “success” against the Russians in Afghanistan, it was a short ideological step to the active targeting of the perceived source of so much of the Muslim world’s troubles – the United States. Some time after 9/11, bin Laden boasted that he was the “only one in the group’s [al Qaeda] upper hierarchy who had anticipated the magnitude of the wound al Qaeda inflicted on America . . . His goal, for at least five years, had been to goad America into invading Afghanistan, an ambition that had caused him to continually raise the stakes – the simultaneous bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in August 1998, followed by the attack on an American warship in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000.”33 Apparently, bin Laden hoped to accomplish similar goals with the Americans in Afghanistan as had been accomplished with the Russians before them.

Thus, we have a convergence of novel and broadly accepted concepts feeding into a new way of thinking about jihad. Jihad is no longer defensive against just physical attack, but defensive against the existence of that which is not Islamic. Jihad is no longer merely local in nature, as there are Muslims in Islamic states who require the help of the “broader umma” in their struggle against both jahili rulers or infidel invaders intent on taking Muslim lands. Finally, jihad applies to actions against Western regimes that support apostate local rulers.

E. THE EVOLUTION OF JIHAD THEORY

After defeating the Russians, returning Afghan War jihadis brought with them a broader understanding of the concept of jihad. The evolution seems obvious in retrospect.

First, jihadis were unable to muster support for change within the umma – as evidenced by the lack of a popular Islamic uprising in most Muslim countries – and so concentrated their efforts on the rulers. Failing the overthrow of their jahili governments at home, they ventured out to conduct jihad in solidarity with their repressed Muslim brothers in Afghanistan (with the encouragement of their national and religious leaders). The Afghan War returnees brought home with them the concept of “success” in relation to targeting an enemy – success which had previously eluded them in their (Muslim) home countries. These factors, among many others, have combined to ease the transition from a purely local focus for the jihad to a more transnational view. This transnational focus has led to a number of attacks outside the Islamic sphere, perpetrated by transplanted jihadis living in the West, and with the goal of removing support to apostate Muslim rulers – concepts that were unheard of in earlier times. These high-profile attacks served as the stepping-off point for jihadis born and raised in the West to begin conducting their own attacks. Still, without everything that had gone before, the high-profile attacks might never have taken place.

Bin Laden (among others) has done his best to popularize the notion of targeting the far enemy by playing up the role of “Afghan Arabs” in both Afghanistan and Somalia.\(^{34}\) However, not all radical Islamists espouse targeting the far enemy. In fact, despite bin Laden’s astounding success in developing and executing 9/11, it appears that most jihadis are content to continue targeting the near enemy.\(^{35}\) Further, there is evidence that many jihadis view bin Laden’s emphasis on the far enemy to be sheer folly.\(^{36}\) They are concerned about the results of targeting an enemy who is so much more powerful than the typical apostate Muslim ruler.

Ultimately, desperation borne of frustration and failure at home (both in provoking the umma and in overthrowing the regimes), along with misrepresented theories of success in Afghanistan and an amazingly permissive environment in the West, have combined to lead some jihadis to adopt the tactic of targeting the far enemy.


\(^{35}\) Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, 118.

The Muslim diaspora, combined with an evolved understanding of jihad and other key Islamic concepts, set the conditions for attacks perpetrated by jihadis from the West. For example, it is now acceptable to conduct jihad everywhere (and this is the extension of transnational jihad) because now that Muslims live in a global community (perhaps a transnational umma), they have to struggle everywhere.\footnote{Gilles Kepel, \textit{The War for Muslim Minds} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 254.} It is no longer a question about offensive jihad in order to take ground, but rather it is about defensive jihad at any locale in response to affronts to the faith by that which is “not Islam.”

Along with the extensive repackaging of other concepts comes the redefinition of acceptable targets. Traditionally, attacks on civilians and various sorts of non-combatants have been taboo. Attacks on civilians are now acceptable, according to both Zawahiri and bin Laden.\footnote{Lawrence, \textit{Messages to the World}, 140-141 and 164-165.} There exists a consensus (at least between bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their adherents) that targeting civilians is acceptable because, according to Zawahiri, “in democratic countries the people elect their governments, [so] they become responsible for the action of these governments and so effectively lose the protection afforded by civilian status.”\footnote{Maha Azzam, “Al Qaeda Five Years On,” \textit{Chatham House Middle East Program}, September 2006, 6.} Herein lies the explanation for the evolution of targets from the military (USS Cole), to those representative of the enemy state (U.S. embassy bombings), to the symbolic (9/11), and finally, to the merely pedestrian, or ordinary civilian targets (Madrid transit bombings on March 11, 2004, and London transit bombings on July 7, 2005).

Additionally, European homogeneity is conducive to “borderless” attacks. To many Muslims, Europe is seen not as a colorful assortment of small states, but rather as a monolithic entity that makes up a large portion of what they view as “the West,” with the rest of the West for the most part being the United States. Especially now, with the removal of travel restrictions and the development of a “borderless” Europe, it is easy to comprehend the vision of Europe as “one big target.” Unless a jihadi has a specific goal, such as forcing the outcome of an election (as in the Madrid transit bombings), one place is as good as the next – they’re all the same.
Finally, there is a convergence of transnational jihadi thought (instigators) with willing local participants, catalyzed by the presence of veteran jihadis from other locales. Sometimes the veteran jihadis act as the instigators, but more frequently it is the ideologues (who may or may not be veteran jihadis themselves) assuming that role. Many of the willing local participants are recruited from among the ranks of second and later generation immigrants, many of whom wish for a return to the halcyon days of Islamic purity – as though such a thing ever truly existed.

F. SUMMARY

Ultimately, it is an amazing convergence of factors which has led to the expansion of radical Islam in the West. Some relatively mundane shifts in Islamic philosophy, combined with other, more radical shifts, have brought about an overall revolution in jihadi ideology. Whether this new ideology has caught on with the Muslim world at large is moot – it has caught on with enough of the Muslim world. It is that revolution in philosophy, combined with an appropriately permissive atmosphere (as found in the UK, for instance) that has led to the dramatic expansion of radical Islam in the West. Until now, conditions simply did not exist in which this situation could develop as it has. International support to corrupt Muslim leaders, jihadis with a strong sense of success against a powerful opponent, a new vision on whom to attack, a revised ideology, and a continued (or increased) Western presence in Muslim lands – these are the building blocks of Islamic expansion.
III. ROOTS OF CULTURAL STRIFE IN BRITAIN / A COUNTRY DIVIDED

A. BRITISH POPULATION

It would be impossible to address multiculturalism and the related cultural divides in the UK without considering the associated social and economic data. The 2004 Draft UK Report On Young Muslims, released in April 2004, remains a key source for comment and discussion on Muslims living in the UK. This report draws heavily on the 2001 Census, the 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey, and the 2004 Annual Population Survey as the data and statistics used to formulate recommendations to deal with issues of race and religion in the UK.

Several key observations can be made from the Draft Report, and while these observations will be highlighted in the following pages, it is important to summarize them quickly. First, Muslims (numbering approximately 1.54 million) are the second largest religious group in the UK, with at least one million more adherents than the next largest group (Hindus, numbering just over 552,000). Christians comprise the largest religious group in the UK with more than 37 million followers. It is also important to recognize that those stating no religion and those choosing not to state a religion were significant populations, consisting of 7.7 million and 4 million people, respectively. The total population of the UK as of the 2001 Census was just over 52 million (Figure 1). Also in 2001, it was determined that nearly 92% of the population in the UK was white, with the remaining 8% comprised of various other ethnic groups. The largest of the ethnic groups were Indians, followed by Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, and Bangladeshis, respectively.40 (See Figure 1 for the breakdown of religion by ethnic group)

Second, in addition to being the second largest group, Muslims are demographically the youngest of all religious groups, with just over 70% of the Muslim population being under the age of 34 (Figure 7).

Third, Muslims consistently rank among the lowest of all groups in terms of social and economic status, including unemployment, education, and living conditions. Muslim households are also among the largest in terms of both immediate family and multiple families dwelling in the same accommodations.

Fourth, Muslims rate amongst the highest of all the minority groups, specifically in consideration of their status as the second largest religious population, where the question of religion relates to personal identity and where nationality is much less relevant.

B. RELIGION

As stated, Christians are clearly the largest religious group in the UK. Further, while Muslims comprise the second largest, there are two other significant groups in the religious spectrum whose numbers, while less than Christians, exceed those of Muslims. These intermediary groups are those claiming “no religion” (7.7 million) and those choosing not to state their religion (just over 4 million). The total numbers for population by religious group in England and Wales were as follows:
Figure 1. Religion by Ethnic Group, England and Wales – Percentage of Base (After Ref 2001 Census, UK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Any other religion</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Religion not stated</th>
<th>All People</th>
<th>Base (in millions)</th>
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<td>38.79</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>96.81</td>
<td>11.62</td>
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<td>78.41</td>
<td>94.54</td>
<td>90.89</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34.90</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<td>1.88</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.74</td>
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<td>0.237</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<td>0.079</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
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<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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<td>73.65</td>
<td>96.18</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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<td>1.14</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.55</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base (in millions) 37.34 0.144 0.552 0.259 1.55 0.329 0.151 7.71 4.01 52.04

C. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

The 2001 Census reported that, on the whole, individuals from non-Christian religions were more likely to live in England than either Scotland or Wales. Overall, non-Christians comprised 6% of the population of England, while only 2% of the Welsh and 1% of the Scottish populations were non-Christian.\footnote{Office for National Statistics, 2001 Census, “Geographic Distribution,” Statistics.Gov.UK, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=956 (accessed December 10, 2006).}

As stated, the second largest religious group in the UK was Muslims. Of this population, approximately 77% were concentrated around four regions. These regions were London (38%), West Midlands (14%), the North West 13%, and Yorkshire and the Humber (12%).

As a whole, non-Christian groups, including Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims, tended to be concentrated in London or other large urban areas, while Christians and those stating no religion tended to be spread throughout the less urban or more rural areas. Proportionally, London possessed the lowest population of Christians. While 71% of the entire UK population claims to be Christian (Figure 1), only 58% of the London population identify themselves as Christian.\footnote{Office for National Statistics, “Geographic Distribution.”} As a greater whole, this 58% comprises only 10% of the entire Christian population in the UK. As the discussion of the Christian population points out, when viewing Figure 2, it is significant to note, percentages represent the portion of each religious group living in London and does not represent the percentage of the London population that each group comprises.
Within London, there were clear lines in relation to locality between all religious groups, but these divisions were starkly evident between the two largest religious populations: Christian and Muslim.

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Population clusters concerning these two religious groups in particular become increasingly relevant as we consider employment statistics and living conditions in these areas later in this chapter.

D. COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity appears to play a role in one’s propensity to conduct attacks on one’s own country. Nearly 70% of Muslims surveyed described their national identity as British, English, Scottish, or Welsh. Only Hindus and Buddhists were less likely than Muslims to describe their national identity as “from the UK.” Christians, Jews, and those stating “no religion” were the most likely to describe themselves as having an identity from the UK. While only 70%, this left Muslims as the third least likely religious group to identify themselves with their nationality versus their religion. It is also significant to remember that Hindus represented the third smallest religion – Muslims outnumbered them by nearly one million. Also, Buddhists represented the smallest religious group identified by the survey and Muslims outnumbered them by more than one and a quarter million.

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46 Guardian Unlimited, “Special Reports (January 21, 2005).”
In every religious group, individuals born inside the UK were more likely to possess a national identity than those born outside the UK. In the case of Jews, Christians, and individuals identifying with “no religion,” 99% claimed a national identity. In the case of other religious groups, 93% of Buddhists and Sikhs, 91% of Muslims, and 89% of Hindus born inside the UK claimed a national identity. Once again, Muslims were one of the least likely groups to identify themselves as British and were more likely to describe themselves as Muslim.

E. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

Of the Muslims surveyed in 2001, only 46% had been born in the UK. The remaining Muslims surveyed had been born in Asia, Africa, or Europe. Hindus were the least likely of all religious groups to be born in the UK, with only 37% born in the country. Buddhists were immediately behind Muslims, with 45% of their population being born inside the UK.50

Figure 6. Muslims Living in the UK, Country of Birth (After Ref Office for National Statistics)\textsuperscript{51}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>Bangledesh</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. AGE AND GENDER

Of all the religious groups, Muslims had the youngest age profile and were the only group where men outnumbered women. When the census was conducted in 2001, approximately 34\% of Muslims were under the age of 16 and just over 70\% were under the age of 34, while less than 10\% were over the age of 65. Men outnumbered women by 52 to 48\% of the total Muslim population. The surveyors attributed the young age and the disproportionate representation of men to women to the group’s immigration history and the gender structures of the Indian and Bangladeshi communities.\textsuperscript{52} The immigration history is highly relevant and will be discussed later in this paper.


G. EDUCATION

Before discussing education statistics in the UK, it is important to have at least a general understanding of how achievement is measured there. The British education system measures the ability or employability of individuals in relation to the qualifications they possess. These qualifications are generally broken down into three categories: academic, vocational, and skill based. Within this system there are nine levels of qualifications, including the basic entry level.

The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is the primary qualification achieved by youth aged 14-16. Children in the UK are required to attend school until the age of 16, by which time individual students have typically completed their GCSE courses and accompanying exams. Once completed, the GCSE results determine an individual’s potential for staying in school to attend Advanced Level (A

53 Office for National Statistics, “Age & Sex Distribution.”


Level) courses. This applies in cases of those desiring to attend a University or vocational school. For those who do not desire to attend either a University or vocational school, GCSEs can still be critical as many employers desire at least some level of competency in the skills the GCSE evaluates. It is not legally possible for students to leave school prior to age 16 and thus, at least attempting GCSE courses and exams. However, the statistics discussed below clearly show a significant number of students are slipping through the cracks and leaving school early with no measurable qualifications whatsoever. In defense of the UK, this shortcoming is common in many countries including the United States. What is significant to this discussion, specifically, is the high percentage of Muslim youth who are not completing their education and therefore not gaining necessary GCSE qualifications.

In 2004, Muslims of working age were the least likely of all groups to have any qualifications (33%) and were also the least likely to have degrees or some other equivalent qualification.56 Still, Muslims born in the UK were more likely to have degrees or equivalent qualifications than Muslims born outside the UK. Specifically, Muslims under 30 and born in the UK were nearly twice as likely to have degrees as those born outside the UK. However, the number of Muslims possessing degrees was still significantly lower than that of other minority groups.57

In 2004, there were 371,000 school-age Muslim children between 5 and 16 years of age. Of the nearly 7,000 state-maintained faith schools in England, 99% were Christian, capable of handling 1.7 of the 5.1 million Christian children; four were Muslim, capable of handling 1,100 children; two were Sikh, capable of handling around 600 of the total 64,000 Sikh children; finally, Jewish schools were capable of handling 13,000 of the 33,000 Jewish children.58 Data was not discovered providing the number of private faith based schools available. Yet it is significant to note that state funding is provided to support 33% of the Christian school-aged population, but only .2% of the Muslim school-aged population. Once again, Muslims, the second largest religious group,

57 Office for National Statistics, “Education.”
58 Office for National Statistics, “Education.”
comprise nearly 3% of the total UK population (Figure 1). This is a statistically small amount spent on one of the most significantly underperforming populations. The potential ramifications become more significant when one considers the overall youth of the Muslim population (Figure 7) and the Muslim population’s relative family size, as will be discussed shortly. Finally, one shortcoming of this data is that it does not account for Muslim youth who attend non-faith-based public schools.

H. ECONOMIC STATUS

The 2001 census found that Muslim households were the largest in Britain with an average size of 3.8 people. Additionally, 34% of Muslim households were likely to include more than five people. Sixty-three percent of Muslim households included at least one dependent child with 25% containing three or more. In comparison, percentages of Sikh, Hindu, and Christian households containing three or more dependent children were fourteen, seven, and five, respectively. The larger households were attributed to the younger age of the Muslim population and the intentions of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women to have more children than Indian and White women. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis respectively make up 42.5% and 16.7% of the total Muslim population (59% combined) (Figure 1). By ethnicity, the average intended number of children for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women was 3.4 and 3.6 respectively, while the average intended number of children for Indian and White women was 2.4 and 2.1, respectively.59

In 2001, multiple family households comprised 7% of all the households in Britain. In the Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu populations, multiple family households made up between 19% and 21% of all the households. These households were likely to be comprised of a single extended family.60

Additionally, 32% of Muslim households were considered to be living in overcrowded accommodations, the highest average of any groups surveyed. Muslim households were also the most likely to lack central heating as well as sole access to a

60 Office for National Statistics, “Households.”
bathroom per apartment or accommodation (commonly known in the U.S. as “single-family dwellings”). Further, the London Health Commission published 2002 data showing the percentage of unfit dwellings by borough in London. When comparing the map shown in Figure 8 with the map shown in Figure 4, there is significant correlation between the predominantly Muslim areas and the percentage of unfit dwellings.

Figure 8. Percentage of Unfit Dwellings by Borough, April 2002

![Map showing percentage of unfit dwellings by borough, April 2002](image)

The 2001 data showed that Muslims and Buddhists were the least likely of all groups to own their own homes, with only 52% and 54%, respectively, owning the house they lived in. In addition, 28% of all Muslim households were living in social rented housing. Social rented housing in the UK is equivalent to low income housing in the United States.

I. UNEMPLOYMENT

In 2004, it was reported that both Muslim men and women held the highest rates of unemployment, with 13% and 18%, respectively. These rates were three times the

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63 Office for National Statistics, “Housing.”
unemployment rates of Christian men (4%) and nearly twice the unemployment rate of the next closest non-Christian group. For women, the rate was nearly four times the rate of unemployment for Christian and Jewish women and was double the rate of the next closest non-Christian group.64

Figure 9. Unemployment Rates by Religion and Sex, 200465

While unemployment rates in all religious groups were highest among those individuals under 25 years of age, Muslims in the age group of 16-24 were the most likely of all groups to be unemployed and more than twice as likely as Christians in the same age group to be unemployed.66 This is particularly significant, as depicted in Figure 7, as this age group represented a major portion of the Muslim under 34 age group, which comprised somewhere around 70% of the total Muslim population.

While Muslim males over 25 were more likely than Muslim males under 25 to be employed, their rate of unemployment was still three times that of Christians in the same

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31
age group, with an 11% versus a 3% unemployment rate in this age bracket. Once again, Muslims under 34 represented the majority of the Muslim population in the UK.

Muslim men and women of all age groups were more likely to be economically inactive, meaning they were unavailable to work or not seeking work due to being a student, being disabled, or caring for family or a household. Among Muslim men of working age, 31% were economically inactive, versus 16% of Christian men. The survey explains this was partially due to the high number of Muslim men who were students, but also points out that among older men of working age, Muslim men maintained a higher level of economic inactivity at least partially due to poor health. The study does not describe whether the poor health is due to living conditions. However, as depicted in Figure 8, living conditions in Muslim areas were among the worst in London. The survey also does not explain the disparity between the number of Muslim men claiming to be students versus the low number of Muslims achieving degrees and qualifications as discussed earlier in the education section.

Women in every religious group were more likely than men to be economically inactive, but once again Muslim women were the most likely of all groups to be inactive. The rate of economic inactivity among Muslim women was 69%, as compared to around 40% in the next highest age group. Of all the religious groups surveyed, Christian women were the least likely to be economically inactive, at a rate of 25%.

Included in the 2004 London Health Commissions report were the “by ward” unemployment percentages. Once again, when compared to the Muslim populated areas in Figure 4, there is a clear correlation.

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J. SUMMARY

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Muslims, while the second largest religious group, consistently rank as one of the lowest segments of the population in socio-economic status and educational achievement. These factors, combined with the exceptionally young age of the Muslim population, manifest themselves as several unique variables that do not seem to have effected or influenced other smaller religious populations. In his December 2006 speech, Prime Minister Blair made the following statement:

The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to allow people to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were those of solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right

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to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British and black, British and white.\(^71\)

While the vision of a multi-cultural Britain may have been one of harmony and unity, the data just described paint a very different picture. It is a picture that shows clear racial and ethnic lines of separation. Subsequently, as ethnicity clearly relates to and is intertwined with religion (Figure 1), it follows that there is a religious line of separation as well. Subsequent chapters will address issues of multiculturalism and isolation of the Muslim population from the greater British population. During these discussions it is critical to keep in mind the current state of Muslims in the UK as well as the role that policies such as multiculturalism have played in creating the situations outlined in the previous discussion.

IV. MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

A. WHY MULTICULTURALISM?

The purpose of terrorist activity is to cause fear in the population of a given society so as to achieve a desired political outcome. Threats of violence from outside group are generally greeted with less of a sense of surprise, as opposed to attacks on a group by its own members. Internal threats bring about a sense of betrayal and lack of control, whereas external threats, while not welcomed, are certainly more expected. As a result, the level of fear inflicted is increased significantly when the threat of attack comes from individuals within a society. Consider the actions of British police on July 22, 2005, following the failed bombings just the day prior. The failed July 21 attempt by individuals who were suspected of being British citizens, coming on the heels of the successful attacks by British citizens exactly two weeks prior, created a sense of fear and confusion throughout the UK. On July 22, 2005, London police (who, with the exception of specific situations, are normally unarmed) shot dead 27-year-old Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell Underground tube station in front of horrified onlookers. The shooting itself summarizes the fear and confusion following the two recent subway attacks. The police pinned Menezes to his seat and fired multiple point blank shots into his head and torso, in fear that he had a bomb under his unusually baggy coat, which they had identified as an oddity for a warm July day. Multiple explanations were given as to why or how police were able to make such a tragic decision, but in the end it was disastrously clear that Jean Charles de Menezes was no terrorist and had no connection with either of the previous attacks.

In the case of 9/11 in the U.S.A., all 19 of the individuals carrying out these attacks were of Middle East descent, from areas with a well-established dislike for the West. Other significant attacks prior to 9/11, including the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the USS Cole bombing, and bombings at two US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, were similarly planned and executed by individuals born and raised in the Middle East, Africa, or other non-Western countries.
However, the extremist methodology seemed to shift with the successful attacks on the London mass transit system by British citizens on July 7, 2005. Subsequent attacks conducted later in July were unsuccessful, but were again attempted by primarily British citizens with both single and dual citizenship. Yet another attempt was the unsuccessful plan to destroy as many as a dozen intercontinental flights in August of 2006 – once again by predominantly British Muslims. What has brought about this change in the national origin of recent terrorists? It is our contention that a British policy of multiculturalism is one of the key contributing factors enabling the actions of a new generation of “homegrown” *jihadis*. This is supported by Home Office data suggesting increasing numbers of British Muslims see themselves as Muslims first and British second – if at all – as they are no longer required to view themselves as Britons, or even British Muslims, but rather are encouraged to view themselves as Muslims who live in Britain.

B. MULTICULTURALISM DEFINED

Precise and agreed-upon definitions of exactly what multiculturalism is and what it is intended to achieve are almost as numerous as are the number of supporters and detractors. The word seems many times to have a different meaning for everyone, and on its web site the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), established in 1976 under the Race Relations Act, freely admits this. For this reason, this thesis utilizes the following definition as the initial basis for discussion: multiculturalism is “the practice of giving equal emphasis to the needs and contributions of all cultural groups, esp. traditionally underrepresented minority groups, in a society.”

In his December 2006 speech on multicultural Britain, Prime Minister Blair provides the British perspective on this definition, also addressing the need to approach the issues of integration and multiculturalism as two clearly distinct but related issues:

Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. It isn’t about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and duties that go with being a member of our society.


Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about. That is what is legitimately distinctive.

But when it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that point no distinctive culture or religion supercedes our duty to be part of an integrated United Kingdom.74

Given this perspective, the CRE expresses the benefits of pursuing a policy of integration over multiculturalism, given the Commission’s grievances with the policy of multiculturalism as follows:

The reinforcement of a particular group identity is emphasised at the expense of the common identity that comes from a consciousness of membership of the wider society.

The belief that all cultures are of equal value and must be publicly recognised as such, and that wider society should accommodate other cultures and beliefs without expecting any reciprocation.

The concept of a group is closed and ‘essentialist’: groups are defined by adherence to cultural traditions or definitions of ethnicity that are assumed to be unchanging (even if these are disputed within or among groups).

Policy and decisions governing public expenditure are based on assumptions that the interests of members of a particular group are defined more by their membership of that group than by any other factor, and that group organisations act as representatives of the interests of members of a particular community, even when they lack any democratic mandate.

Greater emphasis is given to representation through identity-specific community organisations or identity-based political activity than to ensuring participation by members of minority groups in the common democratic and decision-making structures of the wider society.75

The basis for the desire for multiculturalism can be difficult to ascertain, but the basis for it in present-day England appears to stem from a desire to not insult immigrants by requiring them to “become British.” Rather, they are allowed to retain a large majority

74 Blair, “Our Nation’s Future.”

75 Commission for Racial Equality, “Diversity and Integration.”
of aspects of their culture as they existed prior to immigration. This results in a political condition that can be broadly described as “multiculturalism.” Well-meaning and generous, to be sure, but not the foundation for harmonious inter-cultural relations. In her book *Londonistan*, Melanie Phillips describes multiculturalism in the UK:

> Where previous ties of obligation had bound individuals to each other and to the state, the new culture of entitlement imposed instead an obligation on the state to deliver individual demands that were presented as rights. Since radical egalitarianism meant that all lifestyles were of equal value, the very notion of a majority culture or normative rules of behaviour became suspect as innately exclusive, prejudiced or oppressive. Moral judgments between different lifestyles or behavior became discrimination; and prejudice, the term for discrimination between lifestyles, became the sin that obviated the moral codes at the heart of Judaism and Christianity, which had formed the bedrock of Western civilization.76

To be unabashedly parochial about it, the success of British culture provides the foundation and impetus for the successful immigration of people of any other culture to the UK, so British culture deserves the biggest seat at the table. As the Prime Minister states above, “It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values.”77 In this instance, all cultures do not come equally to the table, and to assume that they do is to delegitimize the power and stability provided by a central marker – almost guaranteeing the “rule” of chaos. This situation is commonly known in anthropology as “cultural relativism.” Keesing describes cultural relativism as “...a viewpoint which *looks at standards of behavior as relative to each cultural tradition*. The values expressed in any culture, the relativist says, are to be both understood and valued only according to how the people concerned set up their view of life [emphasis original].”78 Cultural relativism is an excellent tool for anthropologists conducting a detailed academic study. However, when put into practice on a societal level, it provides the basis for cultural strife. Cultural relativism, or multiculturalism, is meant for use as a tool to assess aspects of a culture – while maintaining that culture as an object apart from any other. Attempting to “level” cultures against each other is then sheer folly, as

77 Blair, “Our Nation’s Future.”
members of any one culture will never assess any other culture to be a match for their own – whether the assessment is based on the most miniscule difference or the most lofty cultural ideal.

The generous welcome from liberal Western democracies who want to receive oppressed peoples, but not offend them through forced assimilation into their host country’s native culture, offers the *jihadis* a taste of the political means they can use to achieve their goals – by using the almost excessive freedoms available in the democratic system to push their own agenda. As Harris states:

> Throughout Europe, Muslim communities often show little inclination to acquire the secular and civil values of their host countries, and yet they exploit these values to the utmost, demanding tolerance for their misogyny, their anti-Semitism, and the religious hatred that is regularly preached in their mosques.\(^79\)

Many Muslims have moved into permissive Western societies that have adopted an overeager application of multiculturalism. Unfortunately, while the local government seems willing to accept Muslim immigrants at face value, the same cannot always be said of the immigrants, who sometimes find the cultural differences almost too much to bear. This is especially true of those Muslim immigrants with more extreme beliefs. As expected, Muslims in the West today have experiences similar to Qutb’s during his visit to America, and they (especially those of extreme ideology) recoil from it. Extremists view what they see as the West’s moral decay as an attack on Islam, and thus find an excuse to justify the conduct of contrived, defensive attacks against the West (as described in Chapter I). The disdain that many Muslim immigrants have for their adopted society has resulted in self-imposed segregation from (but within) that society. They dislike their new surroundings, but not enough to return to their previous surroundings.

The cultural and religious isolation of European Muslims has resulted in large swathes of the European landscape being redefined as Islamic enclaves. Additionally, multiple generations of Muslims have now grown up in Europe. They have, as have so many other immigrant groups, managed to carve out a “society within a society”. This is not unprecedented: Jews in the UK have established cultural centers, and even have their

\(^79\) Harris, *Letter To A Christian Nation*, 84.
own legal system for civil matters, which mirrors the official legal system. Recently, Muslims in the UK have begun applying *sharia* to civil cases as well.\(^8^0\)

Many Western societies gladly welcome new members through immigration, so long as the new members conform to the expectations outlined by the societies’ legal codes. Typically, these new members are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with established social customs of their adopted land – the “when in Rome” concept. However, one must understand that at all times, culture is evolving as a result of both internal and external influences. The immigrants may not ever fully assimilate, so their understanding of what the “Romans” are doing – and why they should do it too – is, at some level, going to affect what the “Romans” are doing. Further, long time residents (through multiple generations) will frequently lose the original intent of certain aspects of their imported ancestral culture. Of course, this is a vastly oversimplified description of cultural evolution, but it remains valid. Problems arise between locals and immigrants when locals, in the interests of multiculturalism, allow immigrants the wholesale retention of their foreign culture, rather than requiring some degree of assimilation on the part of the newcomers. In that case, the locals run the risk of having their own culture laid aside in favor of whatever else comes along. The use of the word “risk” presupposes that the locals attribute some value to their own culture, and do not wish to see it usurped by newcomers. Chalmers Johnson discusses this in his book, *Revolutionary Change*, when he enumerates four conditions, “any one of which if realized would terminate a social system. These four conditions are . . . biological extinction . . . apathy . . . war of all against all . . . absorption of the society into another society.”\(^8^1\) While biological extinction and war of all against all are unlikely in cases of cultural mingling as a result of immigration, one can make an argument that willing acceptance of multiculturalism is a substantial manifestation of cultural apathy. Unwillingness to care about or strive on behalf of one’s own culture can then result in its subordination or absorption by another culture. Johnson doesn’t require that the target culture be absorbed by external forces, nor


does he suggest it could occur from the inside. In a case where the target culture actively engages in undermining its own relevance, it would hardly seem to matter.

It is also important to recognize that as a former colonial power, Britain in many ways either was or felt it was obligated to accept immigrants from its former colonies as many of these individuals were for all practical purposes legally already British. While on its surface, a policy of multiculturalism may seem the ideal method of achieving an integrated and enlightened Western democratic society, this methodology presents serious questions and issues. These questions and issues range from: displays of religious and cultural identity such as dress and prayer that may affect schools and places of employment, participation in the political process and methods of displaying political disagreement or discontent, and even the application of common law. Some of these issues are easily remedied through tolerance and acceptance, but others require significant consideration and may in fact challenge the very core of Western democracy by providing special status and conflicting standards to one religious or ethnic group in an attempt to provide equality to all.

Once again, in his December 2006 speech, Prime Minister Blair addressed this issue specifically, stating the following:

. . . we must demand allegiance to the rule of law. Nobody can legitimately ask to stand outside the law of the nation. There is thus no question of the UK allowing the introduction of religious law in the UK. Parliament sets the law, interpreted by the courts. All criminal matters should be dealt with through the criminal justice system. There may be areas where, in civil proceedings, parties consent to arbitration by a religious body. But these are arrangements based on consent and, in all cases, parties will have recourse to the UK courts.82

The Prime Minister’s statement seems entirely reasonable and fair: accommodating and even embracing towards the minority culture by allowing their handling of certain, lesser, civil proceedings. On deeper inspection, however, this strategy fails to recognize the fundamental differences in the approach of the two sides on this issue. The Prime Minister and the British government approach the issue of application and law from the Westphalian model, which prizes the sovereignty of the state within its borders and does

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82 Blair, “Our Nation’s Future.”
not recognize outside influence in these matters. The Islamic argument, on the other hand, once again views no separation between religion and the government. As already discussed, Islam in its true form is as much a religion as it is a form of government – where the sovereign himself is subordinate to the religious leadership. This is the interpretation of the Muslim extremists calling for *sharia* law or the return to a true or pure Islam.

Furthermore, a possibly even more significant, the Western distinction between civil and criminal law does not exist in Islamic law. In fact, actions that most Western countries would address with civil penalties – if they cared to address them at all – carry a much harsher penalty under *sharia* – to include dismemberment and even death. This is not to suggest religious courts would begin applying these extreme punishments under religious law. Rather, this highlights that it is impossible to argue that it is permissible to allow the application of religious laws in lesser civil situations when the religious community does not recognize a difference between civil and criminal law. From the zealot’s point of view, a victory in one situation is a step towards victory overall and therefore justifies the application of religious law in every situation. Also from the zealot’s point of view, this is a battle that has been and will continue to be waged over hundreds or even thousands of years.

C. INTEGRATION OF CULTURES INTO BRITISH SOCIETY

What does Britain require of new immigrants? Very little other than payment for a visa. The entry procedures in the 1990s were “lax and sloppy . . . [the system] instead showered newcomers with a galaxy of welfare benefits, free education and free health care regardless of their behavior, beliefs or circumstances.”83 The judicial system does its part to fan the flames by refusing (for the most part) to authorize the extradition of known terrorists.84

Once again, the British Prime Minister’s own words seem entirely welcoming to immigrants and do in fact mention the concept of integration:

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If you come here lawfully, we welcome you. If you are permitted to stay here permanently, you become an equal member of our community and become one of us. Then you, and all of us, who want to, can worship God in our own way, take pride in our different cultures after our own fashion, respect our distinctive histories according to our own traditions; but do so within a shared space of shared values in which we take no less pride and show no less respect. The right to be different. The duty to integrate. That is what being British means. And neither racists nor extremists should be allowed to destroy it.85

However, in practice, this concept has proven much more difficult to implement. Any more, there no longer seems to be a question of “integration” of immigrants into British culture, but rather it appears now that British citizens are expected to integrate immigrant cultures into their own. This is best illustrated through a couple of examples from the realm of education:

In the early 1980s, Ray Honeyford, a Bradford headmaster . . . protested Bradford council’s policy of educating ethnic minority children according to their own culture, predicting that the move would create divisions between white and Asian communities. Concerned that “we were getting nine-year-olds who had never sat in the same class as a white child,” Honeyford wanted to teach English as a first language and teach the history, culture and customs of this country [Britain], so that children of all cultures and creeds could identify with and participate in the society of which they were part. He was accused of racial prejudice and hounded out of education . . . He wrote later that he was told he had been forced out because his attitudes were “racist” and his insistence on integrating Asian children was “dangerous and damaging.”86

Sometime later, a group of parents in Dewsbury, Yorkshire, had the following experience:

In 1987 . . . parents of twenty-six white children refused to send them to an overwhelmingly Muslim state-run primary school, and taught them instead in a room above a public house.

The parents did this because they wanted their children to be given Christian education, to be taught to a high standard especially in English, and to avoid what they saw as prejudice by teachers who were thought to be privileging Asian and Muslim culture. The school . . . pursued instead

85 Blair, “Our Nation’s Future.”
86 Phillips, Londonistan, 64.
the “multifaith” approach in accordance with government policy . . . that schools should educate children in the values shared between cultures and to appreciate cultural diversity.87

As these two examples clearly show, the notion of immigrant integration is a concept that has been in serious trouble in the UK for some time now. While the goal of minority inclusion is unquestionably desirable, doing it at the expense of the majority is inappropriate. Integration is not “zero sum” – unbiased acceptance of difference requires nothing more than respect, and there is no need to undermine, denigrate, or disregard one culture in order to make room for another.

A recent report from the BBC discusses the expansion of legal pluralism in the UK. According to the article, the Jewish Beth Din civil court has been active for some time, and both it and an Islamic tribunal hear civil cases, while a Somali court also hears criminal cases. In most instances, the official police and court systems are happy for the help, as they are typically overburdened. The article goes on to state some academic lawyers see these alternative legal systems as an inevitable – and welcome – consequence of multiculturalism.88

What is not stated is that such a permissive policy of minority self-policing could serve to undermine official British institutions. These unofficial courts may provide some relief to an overburdened British court system in the short term, but could ultimately lead to an inability of the British government to take action in cases where it desperately needs to. As the article states:

The [unofficial] court cannot force anyone to come within its jurisdiction. But once someone agrees to settle a dispute in the Beth Din, he or she is bound in English law to abide by the court’s decision.

This is because under English law people may devise their own way to settle a dispute before an agreed third party.

Crucially, the legislation does not insist that settlements must be based on English law; all that matters is the outcome is reasonable and both parties agree to the process.89

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87 Phillips, Londonistan, 57.
88 Bowen, “The End Of One Law For All?”
89 Bowen, “The End Of One Law For All?”
Some people have misgivings about the courts, as expressed by Cassandra Balchin, a convert to Islam and spokeswoman for the group Women Living Under Muslim Laws, who says “Very often traditional forms of mediation can disadvantage vulnerable groups, such as women, within a community. I’m concerned about how much choice the weaker party would have in submitting to the governance of these alternative forums.”\textsuperscript{90} This is a valid concern when dealing with a culture that, by most modern standards of behavior, remains decidedly backward in its treatment of women and minorities.

D. HISTORICAL ISSUES

From a recent historical perspective, the immigration of Muslims to the UK began in the 1950s and never stopped. The peak of this migration was in the early 1970s, with some decrease around the 1973 energy crisis, following increased immigration restrictions intended to protect British jobs. While the restrictions have consistently become stricter, they have in no way halted immigration. Traditionally, the majority of immigrants coming to the UK were male industrial workers with the intent to return home. However, as a result of increasing restrictions, many of these individuals opted to remain for fear they would not be able to return to the UK if they did return home. As a result of so many male immigrants remaining in the UK, Britain implemented “family reunion” policies, allowing specific family members who had not immigrated to join their families in the UK, further increasing the immigrant population. Additional reasons for the increasing populations include the trend for European countries to grant citizenship based on the individual’s place of birth (\textit{jus soli}) versus the parent’s country of citizenship (\textit{jus sanguinis}).\textsuperscript{91} Linked to this issue is the significantly higher birth rate in immigrant communities, as discussed previously in Chapter III.

The UK transitioned from a policy of \textit{jus soli} to a policy of \textit{jus sanguinis} following the British Nationality Act of 1981. The act significantly reduced the number of individuals eligible to claim citizenship. Under the act, individuals could claim citizenship if either: the individual was married to a UK national for three years; the

\textsuperscript{90} Bowen, “The End Of One Law For All?”

individual was born in the UK to parents who were permanent residents and lived in the UK for his first ten years. However, other loopholes in the policy still allow a significant number of children born to non-citizen parents to gain citizenship.

E. HISTORICAL VIOLENCE

Just as the 1950s, 60s, and 70s witnessed racial violence in the United States, the period from the 1970s, 80s, 90s and, as with other countries in Europe, even into 2005 and 2006, has seen racial tension in the UK. While race may have only been one factor among many, there have been a number of riots clearly involving racial issues. In many cases, race was the significant motivator in a series of riots taking place since the late 70s, building through the 80s and 90s, and continuing into the current decade.

Figure 11. Instances of Racially Motivated Violence

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<th>1970s</th>
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<td>August 1976 – Notting Hill Carnival Riot</td>
<td>April 1979 – Southall Riots</td>
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<td>1980s</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1980 – St. Pauls Riots in Bristol</td>
<td>April 1981 – Brixton Riot</td>
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<td>September 1985 – Handsworth Riots</td>
<td>September 1985 – Brixton Riot</td>
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<td>1990s</td>
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<td>June 1995 – Manningham Riot</td>
<td>December 1995 – Brixton Riot in December</td>
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<td>May 2001 – Oldham Riots</td>
<td>July 2001 – Bradford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005 – Birmingham Riots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these riots were related to race, involving either the Black or Asian communities, if not both. In fact, the majority of the riots did involve members from both communities. This is both significant and understandable as Black and Asian communities in the UK are not the same as Black and Asian communities in the United States. As depicted in Figure 1, the Black community in the UK is comprised

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predominantly of individuals of African and Caribbean descent, while the Asian community is comprised of individuals from predominantly Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi descent. The majority of these riots were centered in or around London, in ethnically isolated areas, many of which were in or near the densely populated areas depicted in Figure 4 (Muslims in London).

F. WHY ISLAM, AND WHY NOW?

While there have been historical challenges to the authority of the British government, they can arguably be said to have existed in a vacuum. In fact, the “never again” reaction to the racial violence of the past is the likely source of so much of the present-day multicultural bias. In a desperate attempt to avoid replays, Britons have rejected assimilation and instead gone to the other extreme of absolute accommodation. Present-day Muslim extremists have thus found a more permissive environment in which to operate. In some respects, the British government has handed radical Islamists the “keys to the city.”

Along with the more permissive environment that democracy provides as compared with the more oppressive or watchful environments found in the Middle East, extremists are able to hide behind the shields of multiculturalism and discrimination in order to gradually gain additional maneuver space for their cause. In many cases, protection for their right to exist, operate, and recruit is being provided by the very government they oppose. While the traditional misconception of the poor and underprivileged being recruited by extremists may finally be finding some truth, as evidenced by the clear social and economic disparity that exists, minority groups from all social classes in the West are able to find something in the emerging Islam in Western cities. As Roy states, “What is at stake is more the reconstruction or recasting of a lost identity than the expression of a depressed social or economic situation.”


At the same time, it would be difficult to eliminate the current social and economic situation faced by this group as a key reason for that lost identity. Additionally, it is little coincidence the increased relevance of the Muslim population in the 1990’s coincides with the coming of
age of the children of immigrants to the UK from the 70’s and 80’s. Once again, Muslims under 34 represent just over 70% of the total Muslim population (Figure 7), the youngest religious group in the UK.

Roy goes on to describe four categories of what he refers to as “Protest Conversions” of Western European converts to Islam. The first category is the politicized rebels, who see Islam as a cause that fascinates or excites them due to its radical nature and anti-imperialistic doctrine. The second is the religious nomads, who find Islam following experimentation with several other religions. The third is the former addicts and petty thieves and criminals. These individuals find a support system both physically and emotionally. The final category is the Blacks, Latinos, and persons of mixed race, who see inclusion in radical Islamic groups as a rebuke of racism and a means to counter a system they feel discriminates against them.94

Looking at the socioeconomic conditions such as education, unemployment, housing, welfare, and so on, as discussed in Chapter III, in an environment rife with significant disagreement over Western policies and actions in the Middle East, it is clear that any of the four categories explained by Roy could be used to describe a significant portion of the Muslim population in the UK. While that is not to say the entire population of Muslims in the UK are radicals waiting to attack their own government, it does help to place into perspective the issues faced regarding the divide between cultures.

But why concentrate on Muslims instead of Buddhists, Christians, Socialists or Democrats? The answer is as simple as it is straightforward: no other group in the UK (religious, social, or political) has consistently acted in such an aggressive or inhospitable manner. Only Muslims have been afforded, and consistently taken advantage of, the opportunity to disregard compliance with the norms of the society of which they are a part. According to Anthony Glees, a professor at Brunel University in London, “It’s political correctness gone mad.”95 Glees continues:

94 Roy, Globalized Islam, 317.
What it has done is to imply that the Muslim community, or the community of Muslims, has some kind of special status in the UK. They’ve never done this for blacks. They’ve never done this for Jews. They’ve never done this for anybody. The government is treating a section of the British people differently than others, and that’s precisely what needs to be avoided.\(^{96}\)

It is exactly this “privileged” position that enables members of this special interest group to carry on as they do. Certainly, the majority of Muslims in the UK don’t have such violent tendencies, as indicated by the reaction of the wife of one of the July 7 bombers. Jermaine Lindsay’s wife, Lewthwaite Lindsay, denied Jermaine’s involvement until authorities produced forensic evidence to confirm his identity. She later went on record stating she abhorred the attacks and that her husband’s mind had been poisoned by radicals.\(^{97}\) Unfortunately, those unscrupulous few who do have such tendencies are not averse to abusing their position of privilege to further their own twisted aims.

Islamist Abu Izzadeen provides a further, detailed description of the clash between Western democracy and Islamic ideology:

There’s always a clash of civilisations, there’s always a clash of ideals. And because Islam is not written by a man, I can’t change it. But because democracy’s written by a man, they can change it to accommodate the Muslims. I’m born here. I have the right to call for Islam, wherever I am. And that’s a problem for the British society and establishment; that the community here, the new generation of Muslims, are born in the UK. We have a British passport, and British citizenship but our allegiance is only to Islam.\(^{98}\)

This attitude – that Islam operates outside and above political channels, that Islam cannot be argued with because it reflects the “reality” of the true faith – is given strength by the very freedom of the society it wishes to subsume.

G. SUMMARY

Multiculturalism is the belief that all cultures in a society are equal and must therefore be treated identically in all aspects including education, law enforcement, and

\(^{96}\) Frammolino, “Britain’s Muslim Outreach Hits a Rough Patch.”


politics. Therefore, any imposition of the majority culture over a minority culture is seen as racism that must be immediately quashed. Regarding the integration of Muslim immigrants into British society, the past forty years have witnessed a trend towards multiculturalism and accommodation replacing earlier traditions of assimilation. This trend has resulted in significant divisions in British society, creating a situation where the minority culture now appears able to dictate the standards by which nearly all society will be educated and governed, gradually removing traditional British identity and values. This shift has enabled the recruitment of second and third generation British citizens to radical Islamic ideology and has provided significant support to such activities as the July 7, 2005 attacks on the Underground.
V. ISOLATIONISM

A. ALONE IN A CROWD

Following several key events such as the July 2005 bombings in London and the October 2005 riots in France, the question must be addressed: has multiculturalism worked or has it supported the creation of barriers of isolation between Muslim and non-Muslim culture within the very societies it was intended to unify? Furthermore, what role does this isolation play in the willingness of Western Muslims to attack their fellow countrymen in the name of Islam?

In the previous chapter, we state that in fact, multiculturalism is a key issue in the difficulties faced in the UK today. However, it is important to recognize the situation is far more complex than a simple argument such as “multiculturalism created the isolation that subsequently supported acts of terrorism against Western society.” While we argue that multiculturalism played a key role in the isolation of Muslims from Western society, specifically in the UK, it is clear that multiple other related and intertwined factors, including education, social and economic status, and various religious influences, resulted in Western Muslims seeking to regain a cultural identity they had lost. In the end, multiculturalism may be as much a catalyst as it is a root cause. We also ask the key question, have we confused multiculturalism with acculturation? That is, are we correctly defining the problem as the emphasis of the equivalent relevance of all cultural groups – and specifically the underrepresented – instead of identifying the issue as the mere adaptation of individuals or groups to a culture, and the subsequent influence of those cultures on one another?

With respect to the isolation of the Muslim population in Britain, the social and economic data presented in Chapter III provides clear evidence that this isolation exists. While other ethnic groups may occasionally rate lower in economic status or social achievement, no other group scores as consistently low as the Muslim population. Neither does any other group appear to be as isolated as this single group. Furthermore, no other group has repeatedly conducted high profile attacks directly against the government in the name of their ethnic group or religion – as small groups of Muslims have done.
Simultaneously, it is not only Muslims in Britain who appear to be isolated. Islam itself is struggling with what Olivier Roy has dubbed deculturalization, or the transformation to a globalized and stateless religion. This statelessness plays directly into the theory of acculturation where the group forms an identity within the state, but is neither connected to the state or with the group it ultimately identifies itself with. These groups have ultimately formed a hybrid that identifies with a greater group (Islam), yet they maintain highly unique traits and experiences. These factors have converged to result in the situation faced today in the UK.

B. ISOLATIONISM DEFINED

The “Draft Report on Young Muslims and Extremism” states the problem with Muslims in the UK is:

. . . a feeling that parts of the Muslim community, particularly younger men, are disaffected. This includes some that are well educated with good economic prospects. Al Qaida [sic] and its off-shoots provide a dramatic pole of attraction for the most disaffected.99

In the age of the Global War on Terror, it is all too easy to limit the negative sphere of influence to al Qaeda and company. Bin Laden and his counterparts have clearly influenced terrorists around the world. However, it is debatable whether al Qaeda remains as monolithic and capable as it was once perceived. Further, it is doubtful that al Qaeda is truly driving and coordinating terrorist recruiting efforts around the world, at least on the level that some would suggest. What is far more realistic is that as their translated name – The Base – suggests, al Qaeda has once again morphed, as it has multiple times throughout its existence, into a base of ideological support, rather than the training, logistical or financial base it once may have been.

Olivier Roy credits the developing issue to one of globalized Islam, where Muslims – particularly those living in the West – have essentially developed into Muslims without a state. They are essentially members of a deterritorialized religion in a

religion that has been historically linked to territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{100} The entire discussion of \textit{dar al-islam} (House of Islam, or Muslim lands) and \textit{dar al-harb} (House of War, or non-Muslim lands) is dependent on territorial boundaries. Also at issue is that Islam in its truest form is as much a form of government as it is a religion, which corresponds to the fundamentalist’s call for a \textit{sharia} state. With the exception of the Taliban, no Muslim government has come close to implementing a “true” Islamic state (one based on \textit{sharia} law), but throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, Muslim identity has been nonetheless directly related to state and politics.

Dr. Aldeeb Abu Sahlieh, of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, ties the issue of isolation to a much deeper and religiously historical expectation regarding immigration of Muslims living in an infidel country. According to Sahlieh, this issue harkens back to the migration of Muhammed from Mecca to Medina and the reference to those Muslims remaining in Mecca as “immigrants.” Sahlieh provides the following Quranic reference to explain:

> Those whom the angels take in death while they wrong themselves, the angels will say, “What was your stand?” They will say, “We were abased in the land.” The angels will say, “Was not God’s earth wide, so that you might have emigrated in it?” Such as those, their abode shall be Gehenna; how wretched a destination! Except the feeble among men and women and children who can contrive nothing, and are not guided to a path. (4:97-98)

These two verses urge each Muslim living in an infidel country to leave it and join the Muslim community, unless he is unable. Other verses express the same sense (4:100; 9:20). The purpose of this migration was to protect them from persecution, to weaken the infidel community, and to participate in the effort of war of the new community. Therefore the Qur’an uses together the terms: those who believe, and those who emigrate and strive in the way of Allah (2:218; 8:72, 74, 75; 8:20; 16:110).\textsuperscript{101}

It would be inappropriate for us to discount the relevance of Sahlieh’s argument regarding the deeper religious nature of Islamic isolationism in the West. Further, we must bear in mind that his detailed argument is based upon multiple references steeped in

\textsuperscript{100} Roy, \textit{Globalized Islam}, 2.

\textsuperscript{101} Aldeeb Abu Sahlieh, “The Islamic Concept of Migration,” \textit{The International Migration Review}, Spring 1996, 2.
the many Islamic schools of jurisprudence, combined with the discussion and relevance of *dar al-islam* and *dar al-harb*. Still, we will not address this aspect of the argument for three significant reasons.

First, the authors of this document are non-Muslim and therefore not conversant with Islamic theology. Subsequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, for them to adequately address the theological issues involved in this discussion. While relevant to the intended purposes of this paper, this topic is better dealt with by religious scholars such as Sahlieh and other experts in this area of study.

Second, much of the discussion as presented by Sahlieh is based on or around Quranic discussions of immigration from a non-Islamic country to an Islamic country. Since our discussion centers around Muslims willing to either continue migrating to Western nations, or continue living in the West as minorities, it would appear that while this argument may have some relevance, it is not the driving factor supporting isolation.

Finally, Gilles Kepel states in his book *The War for Muslim Minds* that as early as the late 1980s, “the brothers [Muslim Brothers] and their heirs have no longer considered Europe a land of unbelief, but a land of Islam: Muslim children have now been born on European soil and are citizens of those countries.” Building on this declaration, the European Fatwa Council expressed its view that *sharia* law should now be applied to European Muslims. Both the *jihadist* and the pietistic branches of Salafism reject the inclusion of Europe in the land of Islam. Nonetheless, both Britain and Canada are examples of two countries that either allow limited application of *sharia* law or are considering allowing the implementation or integration of *sharia* law for Muslim communities and their citizens. The reality is that many Muslim groups have much greater religious and personal freedom in the West than in their Muslim countries of origin.

C. THE ROOTS OF ISOLATION

As stated, this paper will not address in detail the historical religious guidance on the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims living in non-Muslim countries. While the data discussed in Chapter III suggests multiple factors, it must at least be

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mentioned how easily individuals could argue, and often do, that the lack of participation of Muslims in these societies is clearly related to religious teachings that discourage interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet even after a thorough analysis, this would clearly be an oversimplification. However, as the social and economic data suggests, this argument cannot be discounted completely as Muslims did rate amongst the highest of all the minorities regarding the role of religion in personal identity.103

Looking closer at the role of identity, nearly three quarters of Muslims living in the UK saw religion as a significant aspect of their individual identity. Only two-thirds of other minority religious groups such as Sikhs and Hindus felt the same. The most significant group of Muslims to equate religion with personal identity were those in the 16-24 age group. Of this group, 74% said religion was key to their personal identity. For other groups surveyed, 63% of the Sikhs, 62% of the Hindus, and 18% of the Christians surveyed identified religion as a key factor in their personal identity. Additionally, in the 25-49 and over 50 age groups, both Muslims and Sikhs were the groups most likely to equate religion as an important part of their personal identity.104

The above statistics become more relevant when considered in comparison with levels of civic participation amongst the same groups. Civic participation should be a sign of both inter-cultural and cross-cultural interaction between these groups.105

Participation of Muslims in civic activities was significantly less than the participation of nearly all other faith groups, with only 30% of the Muslims surveyed engaged in some form of civic activity in the 12-month period prior to the survey. The survey did point out that two minority groups, Hindus and Sikhs, scored lower than Muslims in their amount of civic participation, at 23% and 28%, respectively.106

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105 Civic participation was defined as follows: signing a petition, contacting a local councilor or official from the council, attending public meetings or rallies, contacting an MP, taking part in a public demonstration or protest, contacting a public official from central government.

again, however, the population represented by these two groups is significantly less than the Muslim population (Figure 1).

Muslims in the age group 16-24 were the second least likely of all groups to volunteer, with only 24% having done so. The average for their age group as a whole was 29%. Hindus and Sikhs scored the highest in this age group with 31% and 32%, respectively. The only group to score lower than Muslims aged 16-24 were Hindus over 50. The group most likely to volunteer were those surveyed in the age group of 25-49, with Muslims ranking third behind those claiming no religion and Christians, and followed by Sikhs and Hindus, respectively. The 25-49 age group was also the most active group of all Muslims.107

Figure 12. Participated in Civic Activity in Last 12 Months by Age and Religious Affiliation (totals are percentages for each age group) (After Ref Draft Report on Young Muslims and Extremism)108

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td>408</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-49</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 +</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td>593</td>
<td>4,541</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These statistics support concerns that younger Muslims are slowly becoming the most isolated group and potentially the most susceptible to extremism. Similar findings were discovered in reference to informal volunteering within the community. This is also significant, as previously discussed; Muslims under 34 represent just over 70% of the total Muslim population (Figure 7). It is also significant as trends suggest the younger age groups are traditionally the most civically involved. This is true in every case except


when concerning young Muslims. While individual statistics appear to be relatively consistent between groups, the cumulative effect of the Muslims’ generally lower numbers appears to manifest itself in a higher likelihood of terrorist activity from within this group.

Roy discusses the issue of acculturation and points out there is a significant difference between an individual who is acculturated into a society versus an individual who is truly integrated – and one does not imply the other has occurred. In fact, acculturation may produce an effect opposite to that of the intended effects of multiculturalism, resulting in “the creation of dynamic and fluctuating subcultures, one of the most visible being a so-called ‘Muslim youth culture.’”

According to Roy, Muslims of foreign descent living in Europe can be described using five levels of identity:

1. the transposition of an original, well-bonded solidarity group (based on geographical origin and/or kinship);

2. a larger ‘ethnic’ or national identity, based on a common language and culture, which can include solidarity-group identity, often duplicated with a common citizenship;

3. a neo-ethnic definition of Muslims, set by their genealogical ties with any kind of Muslim society, whatever their personal faith and religious practices, as sharing common sociocultural patterns in the anthropological sense (attitudes and values, but not language and literature);

4. definition of a Muslim identity based exclusively on religious patterns, with no reference to a specific culture or language; and

5. acculturation along Western lines, occasionally keeping the faith inside the home or, for some specific categories of youth, leading to the creation of a Western subculture, a marginal urban youth culture, sometimes recast into an ethnically described category (like the beur in France), but where today’s ‘ethnicity’ has little to do with their father’s culture.

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111 Roy defines the term beur as “French slang (not derogatory) for Arab, but refers exclusively to young ethnic Arabs born in France and never to older ethnic Arabs living in France, nor to peoples from Arab countries. It expresses well the idea that there is an ‘ethnic’ category whose definition is more social and generational than based on a different culture and region. (There are neither rich nor old beur.)”
Within the past several decades, Muslims in the West have increasingly found themselves living as a minority in predominately Christian cultures. Disparate social and economic conditions, the absence of a unifying Muslim identity, and limited identity with their country of citizenship have resulted in a sense of isolation from both the state and from traditional Islam. In this case, the state – while based on Judeo-Christian laws and principles – remains thoroughly secular. Contrast this with Islam, which is inherently linked to the state, and the potential for conflict is readily apparent. At both the individual and group levels, the reconciliation process has resulted in the deterritorialization of Islam.¹¹³ This deterritorialization has led to the development of at least a perceived identity with the greater Islamic community first, and an identity with the nation in which they reside as a much less significant piece of their personal identity. This loss of identity clearly correlates with the data discussed in Chapter III.

In many cases, the result of this separation is the further social and economic isolation from the greater non-Muslim population. In its more extreme manifestations, the result is neo-fundamentalism, or “a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statistic dimension in favour of the ummah, the universal community of all Muslims, based on sharia (Islamic Law).”¹¹⁴ It is this neo-fundamentalism that seems to be manifesting itself specifically in the second, third, and fourth generations who, at least partially due to the multicultural environment in which they were raised, and seeing no attachment to British national identity, attempt to capture their personal identity as Muslims by either discovering Islam for the first time or returning to a pure Islam (an Islam that is heavily influenced by the Salafi and Wahabbi schools of thought). These schools are also an Islam that is linked heavily to the greater Islamic community versus individual Islamic states.

Two key groups that are active in the UK today include Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiron. While the groups claim no linkage to one another, there are many individuals studying this subject who claim linkages do exist despite the lack of any indisputable evidence.

¹¹³ Roy, Globalized Islam, 2.
¹¹⁴ Roy, Globalized Islam, 1.
In their own words, the group Hizb ut-Tahrir explains why the group was established:

Hizb ut-Tahrir was established in response to the saying of Allah (swt),

“Let there be among you a group that invites to the good, orders what is right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are successful”
[TMQ 3:104]

Its purpose was to revive the Islamic Ummah from the severe decline that it had reached, and to liberate it from the thoughts, systems and laws of Kufr, as well as the domination and influence of the Kufr states. It also aims to restore the Islamic Khilafah State so that the ruling by what Allah (swt) revealed returns.115

In Arabic, Kufr refers to the unbeliever and in this context is difficult to interpret in any other way than to mean Western governmental and legal systems, specifically the British system. The group goes on to explain its intent to bring Muslims of the world under Shari’ah law.116

Additionally, the group provides a three-stage process by which it intends to accomplish this goal. Once again the stages can clearly be interpreted to undermine the legitimate authority of the government.

The First Stage: The stage of culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party, so that they form the Party group.

The Second Stage: The stage of interaction with the Ummah, to let the Ummah embrace and carry Islam, so that the Ummah takes it up as its issue, and thus works to establish it in the affairs of life.

The Third Stage: The stage of establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world.117

The group Hizb ut-Tahrir is equally outspoken against both Western and what it sees as apostate or illegitimate Muslim regimes. What is significant about this group is that due to their “non-violent” stance they enjoy a legal status in Britain that they are not

116 Hizb-Ut-Tahrir.org, “Hizb Ut Tahrir.”
117 Hizb-Ut-Tahrir.org, “Hizb Ut Tahrir.”
afforded in many other European or even Muslim countries. This legality lends to their credibility and popularity both inside and outside the UK. Their legality in the UK has enabled the group to reach out to a worldwide audience from a legal British base of operations. In reality, this group is one of many that are seen as supporting additional isolation between Muslim and non-Muslim populations around the world.

In relation to Western governments, the group’s rhetoric seeks to separate the Muslim population from the Western populations in which they reside. The group is very careful to maintain its level of rhetoric just short of civil disobedience – a key that could affect the legality of the group’s existence in Britain. In their own words:

Within a western context Hizb ut-Tahrir does not make the dismantlement of the un-Islamic structures an issue. We recognise that the default position is that the political institutions are not from Islam. While we believe Muslims should not participate in these institutions, we do believe that Muslims can use all legitimate means to ensure their voices are heard.118

While the group may not call for the dismantling of non-Islamic Western governments, it is difficult to interpret this language in any other way than to mean support for undermining legitimate governments. This is accomplished by encouraging Muslims not to participate in or support the governments under which they live and in the case of the British system, the government that has gone to great lengths to accommodate them and provide freedoms a significant number of Muslims throughout the world do not enjoy.

Additionally, when discussing the umma, as it does in stage two of its plan, the group in no way differentiates between a Western umma and a non-Western umma. This is because the umma is traditionally interpreted as the greater body of Muslims or the Islamic world, or community, as a whole. While it may sound alarmist, it is difficult to avoid comparing the stated strategy and intentions of an organization such as Hizb ut-Tahrir with what David Galula describes as a “cold revolutionary war.” Galula describes this type of insurgency as a precursor to what he calls a “hot revolutionary war,” and during this phase the organization’s activity does in fact remain non-violent and legal.

Additionally, the eventual transition from cold to hot is gradual and therefore confusing to identify when it is actually taking place.119

The first two steps in Galula’s process involve the creation of a central core or leadership followed by the development of a united front against its opponent. Essentially, this is what Hizb ut-Tahrir is describing in its three-stage process. Many of the allies in the united front will have varying levels of allegiance with the core group, with many being shed once the group gains the prominence necessary to act independent of these groups.120 This process may also involve first blind terrorism, for publicity, followed by more selective terrorism intended to isolate portions of the population from one another. This selective terrorism draws support from the desired portion of the population while driving a wedge between this desired population and the greater population.121

To state that a group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is managing a global insurgency is clearly a bridge too far and would be completely inaccurate. However, the efforts and clearly-stated intent by multiple organizations claiming to act on behalf of the umma cannot be ignored as these groups are taking root and achieving incremental success towards their goals in countries that enable their existence.

Al Muhajiroon, also with a distinct presence in the UK, is more specific in their feelings toward the isolation of Muslims from Western society, as pointed out in the 2004 Draft Report on Muslim Extremism. The group was founded by Palestinian jurist Tagi-ad-din Nabhani, with the organization in the UK founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad.122 The report summarizes statements made by the group at their conferences in order to explain their intentions and methodologies as follows:

1.) A Fatwa that those who join the British army are apostates and those who fight in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere against Muslims are apostates because of their war against Muslims.

120 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 30-32.
121 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 39-40.
2.) That integration with the Kuffar (Non-Muslims) and their kufr (non-belief) is not allowed and no one should be proud to [be] British or become MP’s, MI5 members, government officials, etc. Indeed to join these bodies is an act of apostasy.

3.) To urge Muslims world-wide to work for the establishment of the Khilafah, a vital issue for Muslims today following 79 years living without an Islamic state.

4.) To urge Muslims to support the Jihad wherever it is taking place, whether in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, etc- against the aggressors, usurpers and occupiers in those regions.

5.) To call Muslims to do all they can to free the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.

6.) To call the Queen, the British establishment and the public to embrace Islam.

7.) To explain that Muslims living in the US and UK are generally under a Covenant of security in that, in return for their life and wealth being protected they cannot attack the lives or property of the host nation. But those outside the UK & US do not have such a covenant with the UK and the US.

8.) To tell Muslims not to be intimidated by the many new laws introduced against them, such as those related to terrorism, immigration or by the raiding of their mosques and homes.

9.) To dignify and honour [sic] the Magnificent 19, who sacrificed their lives for Allah on 9/11.

10.) To expose the moderate munafigeen (hypocrites) who start to cry for the British government, and yet claim they are defending Islam.123

Interestingly, the organization existed openly in the UK from the mid-80s until August of 2005, when it announced it had voluntarily disbanded following an announcement from Prime Minister Blair in August 2005 that the group would be placed on the list of known terrorist organizations. Few believe the group has actually disbanded and in reality has actually assumed multiple other names and remains quite active.

D. SUMMARY

While multiculturalism may have played a key role in developing the current culture of isolation perceived by many Muslims in the UK, it has become a coequal in maintaining and even increasing the level of isolation with the reality of life that many Muslims face in the UK. Without a doubt, Muslims in the UK comprise a significant portion of the lower class of society. Multiculturalism, combined with socio-economic status, education, cultural issues, and perceived injustices perpetuate the Islamic population’s separation from the rest of society. Government policy concerning the Global War on Terror at home, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan, justifiable or not, further perpetuates the isolation of this community and feeds fear, hatred, dissatisfaction, and distrust that clearly exists. Admittedly, both Christian and Islamic concerns, customs, dress, and practices, further complicate the issue.

Finally, Islamic groups and organizations, some well-meaning and some neo-fundamentalists, continually encourage the isolation of the Islamic community as a whole from within Western society, therefore enabling the small minority to successfully plan and carry out acts of violence that drive a wedge further between these two cultures. The individuals capitalize on the isolation described in this paper to further drive a wedge between Muslims living in the West and their non-Muslim counterparts.
VI. CASE STUDIES

What follows are three case studies of terrorist events in the UK. They are offered in chronological order, beginning with the successful London bombing of July 7, 2005. The second study outlines the personalities and events around the so-called “7-21 bombing,” in which the bombs failed to detonate. The final study elaborates on the details of the unsuccessful plot to blow up multiple U.S.-bound airliners in August of 2006. It is important for the reader to understand that the nature of each of the cases has affected our ability to accurately characterize each situation. In the first case, all of the bombers died, and with the exception of two others – one of whom is in custody in Egypt – no one else is implicated in the attack. This includes the bombers’ family members. Because of this, the British Home Office was able to produce a detailed report (“Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005”)124 outlining the events based on interviews, forensic, and post-hoc investigation, both up to and resulting from the bombing.

Differing standards in the release of pre-trial information between the UK and the United States have been evident since the first event on July 7, 2005. A key issue is the UK’s strict limitations on the release of pre-trial information intended to enable and ensure a fair trial. However, due to the highly visible nature of all three of these attacks, British authorities have clearly made the decision to be more forthcoming concerning these three events than in previous investigations. However, despite the level of information sharing, due to the fact that trials are either currently underway or have yet to begin, the majority of detailed information on the 7-21 attempted bombing and the airline plot have been derived from public forums and open-source documents, primarily media reports.

Policy differences in information sharing have affected the level and type of cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the UK and the U.S. During the initial 7-7 investigation, British officials expressed frustration over United States law

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enforcement agencies’ willingness to provide detailed information – information that British authorities were completely unwilling to discuss, due to legal restrictions.

A. LONDON, 7-7

1. The Plot

On the morning of July 7, 2005, four young men boarded vehicles in the London mass transit system and blew them up.

Due to the closed, tightly-knit nature of their group, relatively few other individuals have come to be associated with the four bombers. Also, because they kept their intent hidden from even their family members, the majority of the facts in the case have come to light through intensive forensic investigative efforts. Finally, though there appear to be some “loose” links to al Qaeda (based on visits to Pakistan and al Qaeda claims of responsibility), these are tenuous at best. What seems more likely is that the four bombers were working independent from – but in the spirit of – al Qaeda.

At 0850 on July 7, 2005, Shehzad Tanweer detonated the first bomb on an eastbound Circle Line sub-surface Underground train, number 204, traveling between Liverpool Street and Aldgate. The blast killed eight people (including Tanweer) and injured 171. Within 50 seconds, two other bombs exploded on two additional trains. Mohammad Sidique Khan detonated bomb number two on the second carriage of a westbound Circle Line sub-surface Underground train, number 216, traveling between Edgeware Road and Paddington. The blast killed seven people (including Khan) and injured 163. Jermaine (Jamal) Lindsay detonated the third subway bomb on a southbound Piccadilly Line deep-level Underground train, number 311, traveling between King’s Cross St. Pancras and Russell Square. The blast killed 27 people (including Lindsay) and injured over 340.125

It is suspected that the fourth bomber, Hasib Mir Hussain, was meant to take the northern line from King’s Cross in order to form the fourth arm of a “cross of fire” with the explosions, symbolically centered around King’s Cross station. However, the northern line was delayed – and subsequently shut down as a result of the three other blasts. Further, Hussain appears also to have bought a nine-volt battery in the interim, so

there is speculation that his detonator was not working properly. Regardless, he boarded a surface transit bus, and at 0947 he detonated his bomb in Tavistock Square on the No. 30 Dennis Trident 2 double-decker bus travelling from Marble Arch to Hackney Wick. The blast killed 14 people (including Hussain) and injured over 110.126

The gruesome tally for the day: 52 dead commuters, an additional 700 injured, and four dead bombers.

Other casualties included telephone networks (which were quickly overwhelmed with emergency calls), the public transport system, and (at least temporarily) the financial markets. Vodafone’s mobile phone network reached capacity at about 10:00 a.m. and initiated the ACCOLC, the “access overload control scheme.” Other mobile phone networks also reported failures. The Underground system was completely closed for the rest of the day, as were the Zone 1 bus networks. Tourist river vessels were pressed into service to ease the strain on remaining operational bus lines. Other than the affected lines, most of the Underground was running again the next morning (July 8, 2005). There were immediate reactions in many of the world’s financial markets, with the pound dropping to a 19-month low against the U.S. dollar, and markets in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain closing about 1% down on the day. However, the end of the day saw only a 1.36% decline from the previous day’s close in London – which was itself a three-year high.127

These four bombs comprise the deadliest single act of terrorism in the UK since Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 270. It was also the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World War.128

2. The Prelude

There has been speculation regarding links between the bombers and another alleged al Qaeda cell in Luton, which was broken up in August 2004. That group was uncovered after al Qaeda operative Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan was arrested in Lahore, Pakistan. His laptop computer was said to contain plans for tube attacks in

London, as well as attacks on financial buildings in New York and Washington. The group was placed under surveillance, but on August 2, 2004, the New York Times published his name, citing Pakistani sources. The leak caused police in Britain and Canada to make arrests before their investigations were complete. The U.S. government later said they had given the name to some journalists as background, for which Tom Ridge, the U.S. homeland security secretary, apologized.129

When the Luton cell was broken up, one of the London bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan (no known relation to Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan), was briefly scrutinised by MI5, who determined that he was not a likely threat and he was not put under surveillance.130

What follows is a timeline of the events leading to, and including, the bombings:

15 July 2004: Hasib Hussain arrives at the Karachi airport on Saudi Arabian Airlines flight SV-714. No information is available on his departure from Pakistan.131

19 November 2004: Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Sidique Khan fly into Karachi on Turkish Airlines Flight 1059, arriving November 19, 2004. The pair departs Karachi a week later on a train to Lahore.132 It is presumed that this is when the two of them made their “martyrdom videos,” which were presented to the world much later. This is also the time-frame during which al Zawahiri claims they would have attended an al Qaeda training camp.

8 February 2005: Khan and Tanweer leave Pakistan on February 8, 2005, on Turkish Airlines Flight 1057.133

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133 CNN.Com, “2 London Bombers visited Pakistan.”
Late June 2005: Magdy El Nasher (alleged bomb-maker) leaves England for Cairo. Mohammed El Nasher later tells CNN his older brother Magdy arrived in Egypt June 30 and has been staying with him and his parents.134

Early July 2005: A few days before the bombing, Tanweer rents a Nissan Micra from a local car-rental agency.135

7 July 2005: Tanweer, Khan, Hussain, and Lindsay are believed to pick up the bombs from a house in the Burley area of Leeds, hiding them in large rucksacks. They then drive to Luton, Bedfordshire in the Nissan, which Tanweer leaves parked in Luton railway station car park.136

7 July 2005, 0748: The four enter Luton station (captured on CCTV).137

7 July 2005, 0748: The four go to London by Thameslink train.138

7 July 2005, 0830: Bombers recorded on CCTV arriving at King’s Cross station.139

7 July 2005, 0850: Three bombs explode on Underground trains.

7 July 2005, 0947: Bomb explodes on transit bus.

134 CNN.Com, “2 London Bombers visited Pakistan.”
1 The four men arrive at King’s Cross Thameslink station from Luton. They go to the tube station and fan out on different lines.

2 Shehzad Tanweer takes the Circle line eastbound. Bomb explodes between Liverpool St and Aldgate.

3 Lindsey Jermaine takes the Piccadilly line south. The train blows up before the first stop at Russell Square.

4 Mohammad Sidique Khan takes the Circle line westbound. Bomb explodes at Edgware Rd.

5 Hasib Hussain may have tried the Northern line but he ends up on the No. 30 bus. Bomb explodes at Tavistock Square.

3. **The Aftermath**

7 July 2005, 1000: Hasib Hussain’s family reports him missing just after 1000. Hussain’s family was completely in the dark as to his radical streak. After they hear of the blasts in London (and having been told by Hussain that he would be attending a religious function in London at that time), they call the “casualty line” to report him missing when they can’t reach him on his cell phone.

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7 July 2005, 1200: At around 12:10 p.m. on 7 July, BBC News reports that a website known to be operated by associates of al-Qaeda has been located with a 200-word statement claiming responsibility for the attacks. The news magazine Der Spiegel in Germany and BBC Monitoring both report that a group named “Secret Organisation — al-Qaeda in Europe” has posted an announcement claiming responsibility on the al-Qal3ah (“The Castle”) Internet forum. The announcement claims the attacks are a response due to the British involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The letter also warns other governments involved in Iraq (mentioning specifically Denmark and Italy) to withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. A Saudi commentator in London notes that the statement is grammatically poor, and that a Qur’anic quotation is incorrect. This has been disputed.¹⁴²

09 July 2005: A second claim of responsibility is posted on the Internet on 9 July, claiming the attacks for another al Qaeda-linked group, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade. The group has previously falsely claimed responsibility for events that were the result of technical problems, such as the 2003 London blackout and 2003 blackout in the Northeastern U.S. They have also claimed authorship of the 2004 Madrid train bombings.¹⁴³

12 July 2005: Police raid six properties in the Leeds area: two houses in Beeston, two houses in Thornhill, one house in Holbeck and one house in 18 Alexandra Grove, Hyde Park. One man is arrested.¹⁴⁴

13 July 2005: The police raid a residential property on Northern Road in the Buckinghamshire town of Aylesbury.¹⁴⁵

14 July 2005: Magdy El Nasher is captured at his family’s home outside of Cairo. Nasher is alleged to have helped the bombers build their explosive devices.¹⁴⁶

1 September 2005: Al Qaeda officially claims responsibility for the attacks in a videotape aired on the Arab television network al Jazeera.\footnote{Wikipedia, “7 July 2005 London Bombings.”} On the tape, Mohammad Sidique Khan says:

I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our drive and motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God and following the footsteps of the final prophet messenger.

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.\footnote{Wikipedia, “7 July 2005 London Bombings.”}

The tape has been edited and also featured al Qaeda number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, in a way intended to suggest a direct link between Khan and Al Qaeda. There has been no report that Khan said anything linking the bombing to al Qaeda.\footnote{Wikipedia, “7 July 2005 London Bombings.”}

06 July 2006: On the eve of the first anniversary of the attacks (6 July 2006), Al Jazeera airs another taped message from one of the bombers – Shehzad Tanweer. He says:

For the non-Muslims in Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this. You are those who have voted in your government who in turn have and still continue to this day continue to oppress our mothers and children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of more than 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah.

We are 100 per cent committed to the cause of Islam. We love death the way you love life. I tell all you British citizens to stop your support to your lying British government and to the so-called war on terror. And ask yourselves: why would thousands of men be ready to give their lives for the cause of Muslims?
What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks which will intensify and continue to until you pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Until you stop all financial and military support to the US and Israel and until you release all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh and your other concentration camps. And know that if you fail to comply with this then know that this war will never stop and that we are willing to give our lives 100 times over for the cause of Islam. You will never experience peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.150

The film again features commentary from the al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. He says Tanweer’s beliefs explain why he was drawn into al Qaeda, and why he and Mohammad Sidique Khan “wished that they could carry out a martyrdom operation.” Al Zawahiri adds that Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammad Sidique Khan attended an al Qaeda camp. It was known that the two had visited Pakistan, and visited madrassas, but the claim that they been trained at an al Qaeda camp is new.151

4. The Players

Name: Mohammad Sidique (Sid) Khan152
Age: 30 (October 20, 1974), born in Leeds
Role: Edgware Road bomber, suspected ringleader153
Date of Death: July 7, 2005
Place of Death: UK
Nationality: British / Pakistani154
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan155
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda
Family Ties: Youngest of six children, married (Hasini Patel), one daughter.
Employment: Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing;156 Reportedly had previously served as teaching assistant at Hillside Primary School, Leeds,157 dismissed from job in 2004 due to poor attendance158

155 Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.
**Name:** Hasib Mir Hussain

**Age:** 18 (September 16, 1986), born in West Yorkshire

**Role:** Tavistock Square (bus) bomber

**Date of Death:** July 7, 2005

**Place of Death:** UK

**Nationality:** British / Pakistani

**Country of Family Origin:** Pakistan

**Other Affiliation:** al Qaeda

**Family Ties:** Youngest of four children.

**Employment:** Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing.

**Address:** Colonso Mount, Holbeck area of Leeds, Lived with parents

**Additional Information:**
Left school in July 2003 with seven GCSEs
Traveled to Pakistan to visit relatives and also went on Hajj in 2002
Completed College level advanced business course in June 2005

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**Name:** Shehzad (Kaka) Tanweer

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160 BBC News, “Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan.”

161 BBC News, “Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan.”

162 BBC News, “Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan.”


164 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.

165 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.


168 BBC News, “Profile: Hasib Mir Hussain.”


171 BBC News, “Profile: Hasib Mir Hussain.”
Age: 22 (December 15, 1982), born in Bradford, West Yorkshire\textsuperscript{173}
Role: Aldgate bomber
Date of Death: July 7, 2005
Place of Death: UK
Nationality: British / Pakistani\textsuperscript{174}
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan\textsuperscript{175}
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda
Family Ties: Second of four children (eldest son)
Employment: Working in his father’s fish and chips shop at the time of the 7-7 bombing.\textsuperscript{176}
Address: 51 Colwyn Road, Beeston, Leeds
Additional Information:
- Traveled to Pakistan with Khan in November 2004\textsuperscript{177}
- Suspected to have visited Pakistan in 2003 as well when he attended a madrassa\textsuperscript{178}
- Graduate of Leeds Metropolitan University in sports science\textsuperscript{179}
- Outspoken in support of radical Islam\textsuperscript{180}

Name: Jermaine (Jamal) Lindsay\textsuperscript{181}
Age: 19 (September 23, 1985), born in Jamaica
Role: King’s Cross bomber
Date of Death: July 7, 2005
Place of Death: UK
Nationality: Jamaica\textsuperscript{182}
Country of Family Origin: Jamaica\textsuperscript{183}
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda
Family Ties: Only child, married (Samantha / Sherafiyah), one child

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\textsuperscript{173} BBC News, “Suicide Bombers ‘Ordinary’ Lives.”
\textsuperscript{174} Bakker, \textit{Jihadi Terrorists in Europe}.
\textsuperscript{175} Bakker, \textit{Jihadi Terrorists in Europe}.
\textsuperscript{177} BBC News, “Suicide Bombers ‘Ordinary’ Lives.”
\textsuperscript{178} BBC News, “Profile: Shehzad Tanweer.”
\textsuperscript{179} BBC News, “Profile: Shehzad Tanweer.”
\textsuperscript{180} BBC News, “Profile: Shehzad Tanweer.”
\textsuperscript{182} Bakker, \textit{Jihadi Terrorists in Europe}.
\textsuperscript{183} Bakker, \textit{Jihadi Terrorists in Europe}.
Employment: Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing. 184 Drew unemployment benefits 185
Address: Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire;
Additional Information:
Family moved to the UK in 1986 186
raised in West Yorkshire from 1999 until 2003 187
Converted to Islam in 2000 188
Outspoken in support of al Qaeda 189
His name is alternately spelled “Germaine.”

Name: Magdy el Nasher 190
Age: 33 (as of July 16, 2005)
Role: Suspected bomb-maker
Date of Arrest: July 14, 2005
Place of Arrest: Cairo, Egypt
Nationality: Egyptian
Country of Family Origin: Egypt
Other Affiliation: Islamic Society at Leeds University
Family Ties:
Employment:
Address:
Additional Information: Owned the bomb factory (flat) in Leeds
Awarded Ph.D. in Chemistry from Leeds Metropolitan University (2005)

Name: Haroon Rashid Aswat 191
Age: 31 (as of July 21, 2005)
Role: Not clearly defined
Date of Arrest: Late July, 2005
Place of Arrest: Zambia (Deported to UK on August 7, 2005) 192
Nationality: British (born in India)
Country of Family Origin: India

186 BBC News, “Profile: Germaine Lindsay.”
188 BBC News, “Profile: Germaine Lindsay.”
189 BBC News, “Profile: Germaine Lindsay.”
190 CNN.Com, “2 London Bombers Visited Pakistan.”
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: (Family: Batley, in Yorkshire)193
Additional Information: AKA: Abu Ubaid

Police sources have told newspapers that Aswat made some 20 mobile phone calls to two of the suspected bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, one just hours before the blasts. He was monitored entering Britain at Felixstowe, Suffolk in late June 2005 and then departing via Heathrow hours before the attacks.194

Aswat is believed to have helped set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon in the United States in 1999.195

Terrorism expert John Loftus said that Rashid was an MI6 informant and had been for many years. According The New Criminologist, it has been confirmed by leading U.S. and French intelligence asset/agents.196

He was believed killed in Afghanistan, as his identification papers were found on the body of a Taliban fighter.197

5. Conclusions

There is almost nothing in their backgrounds to indicate a radical, terrorist bent, yet these four men perpetrated the most egregious terror attack in the UK since Lockerbie. Their lives and problems were typical of the majority of Britons, with the exception of how they chose to end them. These six individuals do however fit many of the socio-economic categories highlighted in chapter two. Three of the terrorists appear to have been born in the United Kingdom and at least four of them possessed either single or dual citizenship. Those possessing dual citizenship also claimed Pakistani citizenship, which supports data suggesting half of this group were ethnically Pakistani. Concerning age, all of the individuals were under thirty-four, with three of the terrorists under the age of 24. Finally, three of the terrorists were definitely unemployed at the time of the attack; one individual was employed in what was classified as an unskilled job. The employment status of the remaining two individuals is unclear.

194 Wikipedia, “Haroon Rashid Aswat.”
195 Wikipedia, “Haroon Rashid Aswat.”
196 Wikipedia, “Haroon Rashid Aswat.”
197 Wikipedia, “Haroon Rashid Aswat.”
A key concept in understanding the relevance of this bombing is that despite all the ensuing detailed forensic investigation, only two people – other than the bombers – have been implicated in the plot. While anecdotal, it is illustrative of Sageman’s point about the evolution of al Qaeda since 9-11 – that is, it’s now a loose network of ideologically-aligned radicals. Even the Home Office Report echoes Sageman’s thoughts, stating “the process of indoctrinating these men appears principally to have been through personal contact and group bonding.”\(^{198}\) The official assessment appears to be that these men were ideologues with little (or no) connection to al Qaeda. According to what they understood of Islam, they were doing something good for the cause. Of course, any strategist worth his salt could point out that attacks such as this, while spectacular and attention-getting, will only serve to sour popular support in the long run. It is that popular support, rather than outright fear, which they need in order to be ultimately successful.

The bombers’ comments in their martyrdom videos lend further credence to Sageman’s proposal that al Qaeda has morphed from a tightly-controlled multi-national terror organization (if it ever was anything approaching that), and into something more akin to a loose network of ideologically linked radicals who are willing to use the hardline Islamist philosophy to justify their own desire for action of any kind. It is telling that at no time in their videos do Khan or Tanweer mention that their actions are done in the name of al Qaeda. Rather, it is left to al Qaeda operatives to edit the tape later and add their *imprimatur*.

B. LONDON, 7-21

1. The Plot

As stated on July 22, 2005, in reference to the actions of the day prior:

Perhaps, the most disconcerting aspect of the incidents is that they took place just two weeks after the worst terrorist attack on English soil killed 56 people, setting off a massive international investigation and putting London on its highest security level since September 2001. Those responsible for yesterday’s incidents managed to operate in spite of a police hunt for the possible support base behind the July 7 bombs. They also managed to evade a big increase in visible policing on the public

transport system and outside other key buildings, including the use of bomb sniffer dogs and enhanced patrols of armed officers.199

The events of July 21, 2005, seem to have unfolded as follows:

- 12:25 p.m. – Three suspects enter Stockwell subway station in south London on their way to their targets.
- The first bomber, Ramzi Mohammed, wearing a sweatshirt with New York in large letters across the chest, attempts to detonate his backpack on a Northern Line train making its way to Oval station. The bomb fails to detonate and the man escapes in the Brixton area.
- The second bomber, Ibrahim Muktar Said, is suspected to have entered the No. 26 bus at 12:53 p.m. but disembarks 12 minutes later after failing to detonate his backpack.
- The third bomber, Yassin Hassan Omar, attempted, but fails to detonate his backpack aboard a Victoria Line train heading north.
- The fourth bomber, Hussein Osman, is suspected of following a separate route to his destination, the Hammersmith and City Line near Sheperd’s Bush station, where he also tries and fails to detonate his bomb.
- A fifth Backpack, carried by Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, is discovered in the Little Wormwood Scrubs Park not far from the location where the fourth bomber fled. The intended target for this device is unclear.

The public, the media, and the investigators all immediately noted similarities between the 7-7 bombings and the attempted bombings of July 21, 2005.

The attacks came two weeks to the day after the July 7 bombings and seemed intended to duplicate them. Besides involving backpack bombs, they were nearly simultaneous, and the targets again were three subways and a double-decker bus distributed roughly in a cross pattern centered on the heart of London. That configuration could evoke the “flaming cross” described in a claim of responsibility on an extremist Islamic website after the first attacks.200


These similarities gave rise to fears and questions as to whether or not the July 21 bombers had acted in tandem with the 7-7 bombers or if the attack was simply a hastily developed copycat attack:

According to John Wyatt, a bomb disposal expert and security adviser, the “most worrying aspect” of the incidents is that they point to a second cell, operationally separate to that involving the July 7 attacks, although perhaps linked to the same organisation or beliefs. “Whether this was a deliberate attempt at a copycat attack that failed is difficult to rule in or out. But the incidents do confirm there are people still around prepared to strike at London again.”

Other similarities between the attacks existed, including the targets themselves. Both of the attacks targeted three subway cars and a red double-decker bus, the bus being perhaps one of the most internationally recognizable features of London. Also similar was the discovery in the 7-7 investigation of unexploded bombs in a car at a train station in London. A fifth device was abandoned in the July 21 case as well.

However, there were differences in the construction of the bombs used in the separate attacks possibly suggesting separate bomb makers. “Unlike the bombs used in the deadly July 7 attacks, the devices found two weeks later featured a classic signature of suicide attackers: hand-triggers requiring the bombers to ignite the explosives,” an unnamed Italian official said. During the course of the investigation, video and eyewitness accounts would describe the would-be bombers appearing to dig through or reach into their backpacks just prior to minor explosions.

Surprisingly, the reassuring part of the attack was that the bombs used on July 21 failed to detonate. As a result, the backpacks found at the Sheperd’s Bush, Warren Street, and Oval Tube stations along with the fifth discarded backpack later discovered at the Little Wormwood Scrubs Park, and yet another found in one of the bombers residence, would be combined with CCTV and eyewitness accounts, allowing investigators to

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201 Burns, “Gaps Exposed, But Vital Clues Left Behind.”


quickly begin piecing together the events of July 21. This critical evidence would not only enable the rapid identification of the individuals involved, a luxury that was not allowed to investigators in the investigation of the 7-7 attacks, but if the attacks were related, the evidence would provide insight into the attacks of 7-7.

In piecing together why the bombs did not explode, investigators initially seem to have begun with the general assumption the bombs used on July 21 were constructed by the same bomb maker. From this point, experts suggest the likelihood that either an error in construction was repeated in each device or the same faulty material was used throughout the construction process. “Starting from the premise that the four bombs were assembled by the same expert from the same stock of explosives, it’s very imaginable that the same error was repeated in the assembly of each device or that in fact the explosive was of bad quality,” said Claude Moniquet of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels think tank. Yet another possibility was that if the two attacks were related, the explosives could possibly have been built either by the same bomb maker or at similar times:

If surviving members of the same network attempted a follow-up attack, their bombs might have malfunctioned because they contained the same explosive prepared for the first attacks, experts said.

U.S. and European law enforcement officials have said it appears that triacetone peroxide, or TATP, was used in the first blasts, and that explosive mix is volatile and deteriorates with time.

With these home-grown explosives, it could have gotten old on them,” a U.S. law enforcement official said.

Within a week of the second bombing, investigators confirmed the materials used to construct the bombs in both the 7-7 bombings and the July 21 failed attempts were similar. Both sets of bombs were referred to as TATP, made from a mixture of bleach, drain cleaner, acetone, hydrogen peroxide, and mineral acid. Investigators also began to consider the plastic containers used to encase the explosives. Investigators saw

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204 Daniszewski and Rotella, “4-Bomb Plot Puts London Back on Edge.”

205 Daniszewski and Rotella, “4-Bomb Plot Puts London Back on Edge.”
similarities between the containers used in the two attacks and felt it was yet another clue the two events were related.\textsuperscript{206} It is unclear how useful this piece of information was or still is in the overall investigation.

The end result of the second bombing was the detonators for the bombs did explode, but the main charges did not. Speculation once again arose that the materials for the second bombing were the same as those used in the first and that degradation was the likely reason for the failure.\textsuperscript{207}

2. The Players

Throughout the investigation multiple sources, including the bombers themselves, suggested the entire plan was an elaborate hoax to build upon the fear created following the 7-7 attacks and make a statement concerning the West’s involvement in the Middle East and Muslim affairs. However, such indicators as the construction of the bombs and other activities prior to the attacks suggest otherwise.

Yassin Hassan Omar was reportedly married at the North Finchley Mosque just four days prior to the attacks. Life changing rituals are typical actions for suicide bombers in the period leading up to a martyrdom operation. Interestingly, Omar had previously criticized the mosque for what he saw as its failure to espouse radical Islam. Additionally, the wedding was described as well above those usually seen in the mosque, which usually consist of attendance by only the guardian and two witnesses. This wedding was a significantly larger event, including a celebratory feast for friends and family.\textsuperscript{208}

Hussein Osman, also known as Hamdi Isaac, initially fled to Italy where he was detained and eventually extradited back to the UK. It was learned that Osman was


\textsuperscript{208} Fleishman and Rotella, “London Bomb Suspects Stood Out as Radicals.”
associated with international terrorism, although the links in his association were not published. It was also discovered from an unnamed Saudi official that Osman made a phone call to Saudi Arabia just prior to his arrest in Italy.

While in Italy, Osman reportedly provided Italian authorities a confession and description of the events leading up to July 21. He maintained that Ibrahim Muktar Said was the group’s leader and the plan was only to frighten the people of London, not kill them. Osman maintained the backpacks contained a mixture of flour and other materials that were not intended to explode. He also maintained, according to an unnamed Italian official, “Ibrahim designated the targets and built the knapsack bombs . . . a very basic design . . . Muktar prepared all five backpacks in 24 hours . . . and they were ready to go.” The pair, Osman and Ibrahim, according to reports, initially met at a gym in Notting Hill where Ibrahim showed Osman videos of the war in Iraq and explained that something had to be done. Concerning the claim that the explosives were never meant to explode, prosecutor Nigel Sweeney stated:

. . . forensic scientists had tested the mixture, and “in every experiment this mixture has exploded.”

The detonators contained triacetone triperoxide, an explosive used by Palestinian suicide bombers. The explosives were packed in plastic tubs, with screws, bolts and other pieces of metal taped on the outside as shrapnel . . . the hydrogen peroxide was a concentrated form.

. . . the components for the bombs were bought beginning in April 2005, proving the attacks were “not some hastily arranged copycat” of the July 7 transit bombings.

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211 Fleishman and Rotella, “London Bomb Suspects Stood Out as Radicals.”

212 Sullivan, “Italians Turn Over Suspect in Failed London Attack.”
. . . police had found extremist Islamic literature in the suspects’ apartments, and several had attended the Finsbury Park Mosque to hear speeches by now-jailed radical preacher Abu Hamza al Masri.213

Neighbors described Issac as a muscular man who wore Islamic robes, even as he rode his bike. He is reported to have regularly attended the Finsbury Park Mosque in South London, a significant distance from his apartment near the Oval subway station. As described by the Stockwell mosque leadership, Issac is known for his attempt, along with others referred to as extremists, to take over the mosque in Stockwell, South London.214

During the course of the investigation, police found numerous items including extremist literature, videos, and homemade films. One of the items discovered is what is believed to be the suicide note signed by Ramzi Mohammed himself. The note is reportedly in Arabic and reads:

First of all, I beg God to accept this action . . . and that he admits me to the highest station in paradise, for verily he grants martyrdom to whomever he wills.

Secondly, to my family, don’t cry for me, but instead rejoice in happiness and love. What I have done is for the sake of God, for he loves those who fight for his sake. 215

The following is a list of known suspects in the attempted bombing:

**Name:** Ibrahim Muktar Said216  
**Age:** 27 (January 1978)  
**Role:** Attempting to detonate device on a number 26 bus in Hackney  
**Date of Arrest:** 29 July, 2005  
**Place of Arrest:** Not stated  
**Nationality:** British / Eritrea217  (Applied 2003 / naturalized Sept 2004)  
**Country of Family Origin:** Eritrea218

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217 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.

218 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.
Other Affiliation:
Family Ties:
Employment: Drawing welfare (under multiple identities)\textsuperscript{219}
Address: Shared apartment with Yassin Hassan Omar in New Southgate, north London
Additional Information:
Born in Eritrea and came to the UK in 1992 at age 14
Arrived in Britain 1990s\textsuperscript{220}
1996: Sentenced to a total of five years in jail for robbery, attempted robbery, and handling stolen goods\textsuperscript{221}
Discovered Islam in the same penitentiary as Richard Reid\textsuperscript{222}
Arrested together at their apartment on July 29, 2005
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life\textsuperscript{223}
Trial began January 15, 2007

Name: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu\textsuperscript{224} (Real name possibly Sumaila Abubakari)\textsuperscript{225}
Age: 32
Role: Connected to unexploded bomb in Little Wormwood Scrubs Park
Date of Arrest: Not stated
Place of Arrest: Not stated (voluntarily contacted police)\textsuperscript{226}
Nationality: British / Ghana\textsuperscript{227}
Country of Family Origin: Ghana\textsuperscript{228}
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: No fixed address\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{219} Fleishman and Rotella, “London Bomb Suspects Stood Out as Radicals.”
\textsuperscript{222} Fleishman and Rotella, “London Bomb Suspects Stood Out as Radicals.”
\textsuperscript{224} BBC News, “London Attacks.”
\textsuperscript{225} BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
\textsuperscript{226} BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
\textsuperscript{227} Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe..
\textsuperscript{228} Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe..
**Additional Information:**
Came to Britain in 2003 from Ghana using the name George Nanak Marquaye\(^ {230}\)
Charged with conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life\(^ {231}\)
Trial began January 15, 2007

**Name:** Hussein Osman (Hamdi Isaac)\(^ {232}\)
**Age:** 27
**Role:** Attempting to bomb the Hammersmith and City Line train at Sheperd’s Bush
**Date of Arrest:** July 29 2005
**Place of Arrest:** Rome (Brother-in-laws apartment)
**Nationality:** British / Ethiopia\(^ {233}\)
**Country of Family Origin:** Ethiopia\(^ {234}\)
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** None stated
**Employment:** Drawing welfare (under multiple identities)\(^ {235}\)
**Address:** no fixed address\(^ {236}\)

**Additional Information:**
Born in Ethiopia
Youngest of five brothers\(^ {237}\)
Moved to Italy in 1989\(^ {238}\)
Moved to Britain in 1996\(^ {239}\)
Posed as a Somali in order to gain residence\(^ {240}\)
Married to Yeshshimebet Girma, daughter of an Ethiopian diplomat\(^ {241}\)
Extradited to the UK in September 2005
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life\(^ {242}\)

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230 BBC News, "‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants."
231 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
232 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
233 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.
234 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.
236 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
237 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
238 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
239 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
240 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
241 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
242 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
Flown from Rome to London on Sept 22, 2005 where he was immediately arrested and charged
Trial began January 15, 2007

**Name:** Yassin Hassan Omar

**Age:** 24 (January 1981)

**Role:** Attempting to detonate device on the London Underground Victoria Line between Oxford Circus and Warren Street (The bomb was discovered still in the rucksack, inside his house)

**Date of Arrest:** July 27, 2005

**Place of Arrest:** Birmingham, UK

**Nationality:** Somali

**Country of Family Origin:** Somalia

**Other Affiliation:** None stated

**Family Ties:** None stated

**Employment:** Drawing welfare

**Address:** Shared apartment with Muktar Said in New Southgate, north London

**Additional Information:**
Born in Somalia
Arrived in UK in 1992 at the age of 11
Grant exceptional leave to remain in Britain in May 2000
Received GNVQ (vocational equivalent to 4 GCSEs) in intermediate science
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life

**Name:** Ramzi Mohammed

**Age:** 23

**Role:** Attempting to detonate device on the tube near Oval station

**Date of Arrest:**

**Place of Arrest:**

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244 BBC News, “Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”


246 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.

247 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.


250 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”

Nationality: Somali
Country of Family Origin: Somalia
Other Affiliation:
Family Ties: Brother Wharbi Mohammed
Employment:
Address: North Kensington, West London
Additional Information:
Arrested together at their apartment on July 29, 2005
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life
Trial began January 15, 2007

Name: Adel Yahya
Age: 23 (September 1979)
Role: Unclear
Date of Arrest: Not clearly stated
Place of Arrest: Not clearly stated
Nationality: British / Ethiopia
Country of Family Origin: Ethiopia
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: Tottenham area of north London
Additional Information:
Born in Ethiopia
Attended both City and Islington College and London Metropolitan University
Departed Britain in June 2005 (six week prior to attempted bombing) and arrested upon return on December 19, 2005 from Ethiopia
Charged with conspiracy to endanger life by an explosive substance

252 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*...
253 BBC News, “Court shown Dramatic 21 July Film.”
254 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
255 BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
256 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.
257 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*.
258 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
259 BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
260 BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
261 BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.”
262 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
263 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.”
Trial began January 15, 2007

**Name:** Whabi Mohammed  
**Age:** 22  
**Role:** Also suspected of abandoning rucksack containing a bomb in Little Wormwood Scrubs Park.  
**Date of Arrest:** Not clearly stated  
**Place of Arrest:** Not clearly stated  
**Nationality:** Somalia  
**Country of Family Origin:** Somalia  
**Other Affiliation:** none stated  
**Family Ties:** Brother of Ramzi Mohammed  
**Employment:** None stated  
**Address:** None stated  
**Additional Information:** None stated

**Name:** Haroon Rashid Aswat  
**Age:** 30  
**Role:** Suspected of coordinating role in attacks  
**Date of Arrest:** Not clearly stated  
**Place of Arrest:** Zambia  
**Nationality:** British  
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated  
**Other Affiliation:** None stated  
**Family Ties:** None stated  
**Employment:** None stated  
**Address:** None stated  
**Additional Information:** Indian descent  
Born in Dewsbury, Yorkshire


265 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.*

266 Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.*


268 Barber, *et al.*, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”

269 Barber, *et al.*, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”

270 Barber, *et al.*, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”

271 Barber, *et al.*, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Former top aide to Abu Hamza al-Masri\textsuperscript{272}  
Police may no longer be interested in questioning\textsuperscript{273}

3. The Trial

The trial of the failed bombers began in January of 2007 and will be ongoing at the completion of this thesis. With the four bombers from the 7-7 attacks dead, these six men from the July 21 attack are the first to stand trial relating to any of the three major plots in the UK. Despite the ongoing trial, the prosecutions case thus far does provide some insight into the actions and preparations of the six men.

Prosecutors allege Ibrahim Muktar Said, the ringleader as stated by Osman in his confession, traveled to Sudan in 2003 as well as Pakistan in December 2004. Both trips are alleged to have been to either conduct training or to actually participate in \textit{jihad}.\textsuperscript{274} Ibrahim also reportedly took a month-long trip to Saudi Arabia in 2003.\textsuperscript{275} The time of the year and the purpose of the trip were not provided.

As it turns out, a police officer at Heathrow Airport spent four hours questioning Ibrahim at the airport just prior to his nine-month trip to Pakistan. Additionally, only a few months prior to his trip, he had been detained for distribution of “inflammatory” material on Oxford Street.\textsuperscript{276} The prosecution contends planning for the July 21 attack began not long after his return from Pakistan in sometime March 2005:\textsuperscript{277}

At that time, according to the prosecution, the suspects began assembling material to fashion an explosive made of hydrogen peroxide mixed with flour. The detonators were made of a high explosive called triacetone

\begin{footnotes}
\item 272 Barber, \textit{et al.}, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
\item 273 Barber, \textit{et al.}, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
\item 277 Cowell, “Britain Tries 6 in Bomb Plot that Fizzled.”
\end{footnotes}
triperoxide, or TATP, and would be set off by an electrical current from a
nine-volt battery.

The main explosives were to be packed in plastic containers surrounded
with “screws, tacks, washers or nuts,” Mr. Sweeney said, adding that
when the attempts took place, one of the men, Mr. Asiedu, lost his nerve
and “dumped his bomb in a wooded area.”

But Mr. Ibrahim, Mr. Osman, Mr. Omar and Mr. Mohamed set off with
bombs on July 21, three of them on subway trains and one on a bus, the
prosecutor said, a configuration of targets similar to that of July 7.

In all four cases, the detonators exploded but the main charges did not,
because the hydrogen peroxide was not sufficiently concentrated . . .

The men bought 284 bottles of hydrogen peroxide – sold in a diluted form
– and sought to make it more concentrated by warming it or boiling it over
a stove at Mr. Omar’s apartment using two saucepans and a frying pan on
an electric cooker . . .

The men purchased the peroxide using a cover story that they needed it for
stripping wallpaper or bleaching wood . . . they also made a suicide video
at Mr. Mohamed’s home in West London.

When the bombs failed, Mr. Osman fled to Italy while Mr. Omar left
London disguised as a woman in a burqa, taking a bus to Birmingham on
July 22 . . .

The jury has also been shown CCTV footage showing Ibrahim attempting to
detonate his bomb on the bus, followed by panicked passengers fleeing. The prosecution
explained how Osman fled the Warren Street station after the failure of his device to
explode. Osman reportedly ran into a woman in Muslim dress and demanded that she
take him home. When the woman refused, Osman reportedly chastised her for not
helping another Muslim in need.

The actions of Ramzi Mohammed were also caught on video and were played for
the jury:

278 Cowell, “Britain Tries 6 in Bomb Plot that Fizzled.”

279 Kevin Sullivan and Karla Adam, “Jury Sees Tape from London Bomb Scare: Video is Said to
Show Suspect on Subway Trying to Fire Device,” The Washington Post, January 17, 2007,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1195584981&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD
(accessed February 24, 2007).
The black-and-white images are jerky and hard to make out, but a man can be seen standing on the Northern Line subway as it heads toward central London. He is carrying a large backpack and wearing a hooded shirt with the words “New York” written across the front.

Minutes later, the man turns so that his pack is wedged next to a young mother and her baby carriage. He lurches forward, and suddenly the screen is filled with passengers leaping from their seats and plunging to the other side of the car. The man is left standing, arms outstretched, swaying. His backpack lies in a heap on the floor, oozing a yellow, foamy substance.

From these public video camera images, several witnesses were able to identify Ramzi Mohammed, a 25-year-old resident of West London. So, it turns out, were the police.280

4. Conclusions

Although there are numerous unanswered questions in this case, what does seem apparent is that we are facing an entirely new terrorist threat. In the words of M.J. Gohel, head of the Asia-Pacific Foundation:

This trial once again reiterates that we are now facing a new generation of al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, individuals born or brought up in the West, solid middle-class background, normally no criminal record, possessing all the Western social skills, and crucially, valid Western passports for ease of travel, making these individuals almost impossible to profile.

Whilst we are sealing borders and watching airports, al Qaeda is recruiting individuals from within [our own] nations.281

Or as Marc Sageman more poignantly puts it:

There is no such thing as al Qaida as it existed before we went to Afghanistan and destroyed it.

We won the war against the old al Qaida, but we’re not winning against the global social movement that al Qaida was part of, because more and more kids are joining the movement.282

280 Murphy and Stobart, “The World: No Strangers to the Police.”
281 Murphy and Stobart, “The World: No Strangers to the Police.”
Still, there are some disturbing and striking similarities between the 7-7 and the July 21 bomb plot that cannot be ignored and must be addressed. As Mr. Gohel states further:

Firstly, this particular cell was mainly composed of Muslims from the Horn of Africa. The previous plot was mainly Pakistani origins. Yet both plots are nearly identical, virtually almost in every respect. And on top of that, [members of each] . . . cell had gone to Pakistan

This would seem to suggest that there was somebody who was orchestrating both of these plots . . . though we are capturing the foot soldiers, as it were, the people who are perpetrating and launching these atrocities here, we are not actually catching the mystery men, the people who are recruiting them, financing them, training them.283

That being said, the socio-economic characteristics of this group fit the expected results less than the 7-7 bombings and the airline plot, but similarities remain. Once again, all eight of the individuals were under the age of thirty-four, with four of the individuals also under the age of twenty-four. This group differed in that the place of birth of four of the individuals was indeterminable, and none of the remaining three were born in the United Kingdom. However, as pointed out earlier, at least two of these individuals spent at least half of their lives, beginning as children, living in the UK. While place of birth was not clearly stated, at least one individual possessed single British citizenship – suggesting the possibility he was born in the United Kingdom. Of the remaining seven, four possessed dual British citizenship. Also different in this case, while one of the terrorist’s ethnicity was indeterminable the remaining seven were of predominantly North African ethnicity.

C. THE AUGUST 2006 AIRLINE BOMB PLOT

1. The Plot

The New York Times began with the following disclaimer in an article published on August 28, 2006, “Residents of the UK are requested not to read, download or disseminate this article. This request arises from British laws that prohibit publication of

283 Murphy and Stobart, “The World: No Strangers to the Police.”
information that could be deemed prejudicial to defendants charged with a crime.” 284 Whether or not the warning served its purpose is unknown, but the statement highlighted the key journalistic and legalistic differences between the United States and the UK in the war on terror discussed in the introduction to this chapter. In addition, the article did provide one of the most detailed accounts, as of the date it was published, of events leading up to the August 10th arrest of several suspects allegedly involved in the plot.

Police surmised the plot to blow up as many as ten airliners over the Atlantic Ocean had been planned and preparation had been underway since sometime prior to the July 2005 attack on the London mass transit system. The suspected intent of the plot was to mark the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Later in November 2006, the realities of the plot became even more sinister as the public learned the group intended to blow up the planes over United States cities rather than over the Atlantic – in order to maximize casualties. At the 2006 Infosecurity conference in New York, the head of the FBI’s New York offices, Mark Mershon, stated “The plan was to bring them down over U.S. cities, not over the ocean.” 285 The intent was clearly thought through to maximize both the human and economic impact on the United States.

A key question throughout the investigation remains just how many of the suspects were involved in the early planning stages and how many were brought into the plot closer to the suspected date of execution. In addition to questions about the numbers of suspects involved in the case, there are questions about the actual source or inspiration of the attack, and if this source a disgruntled citizen of the UK or possibly an al Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan.

Throughout the investigation, much speculation has taken place suggesting the similarities between the August 2006 bomb plot and the 1995 al Qaeda plot named Operation Bojinka. The 1995 plot planned by Ramzi Yousef in Manila was intended to


blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific Ocean. While many similarities between the two plots do exist, one key difference was the use of suicide bombers. Operation Bojinka was to utilize explosives placed under seats by bombers. The explosives would be set to detonate on a later flight. This plan allowed the bombers to be far away from the explosions when they took place, not only allowing them to live, but also making the identification of the bombers infinitely more difficult. Planning for the operation went as far as to actually test a bomb on a flight, resulting in the death of a Japanese passenger. The plot was later discovered following a fire in the would-be attackers’ apartment during the bomb-making process. The link between the death of the Japanese tourist and the plotters was subsequently made.

The 2006 investigation drew together counter terrorism and law enforcement officials from throughout Europe to find any suspects who might still be at large as well as to determine the overall extent of the plot. In early August, German Deputy Interior Minister, August Hanning, admitted links had been discovered between Muslim extremists located in Germany and individuals detained in the UK.286 Of particular concern were potential links between terrorists in Europe and friends, relatives, or other acquaintances of the 9/11 Hamburg Cell who may still have had direct ties to al Qaeda.287

Investigators reportedly investigated possible links between the airline plot suspects and Said Bahaji. Bahaji is a Moroccan German who is one of the few surviving member of the al Qaeda Hamburg cell who has never been captured and prosecuted. The suspicion is that e-mails may have been sent in 2004 and 2005 from one of the suspects to Bahji’s wife, Nese, who was still living in Hamburg in 2006.288 As Sageman states in

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287 Crawford, et al., “Politics & Economics.”

his book, *Understanding Terror Networks*, family ties, either through blood or marriage, are often the strongest links in terms of trust in terror organizations and networks.

The unanticipated trigger for the arrests of airline plotters in the UK was the arrest of Rashid Rauf in Pakistan on or around August 9. Rashid Rauf, a British citizen who holds dual British-Pakistani citizenship, fled the UK following the stabbing death of his uncle in 2002; he was a suspect in the murder. The murder was suspected to have been some form of honor killing related to a dispute over an arranged marriage. While he was never charged in the murder, the case was never solved. Rashid was arrested in Bahawalpur, located in Punjab province, on the August 9, 2006. Rashid was immediately suspected of having contact with organizations linked to al Qaeda:

According to Pakistani officials, Mr. Rauf is affiliated with Jaish-e-Mohammed, the militant Islamic group that is closely linked to Al Qaeda and that is battling Indian rule in the mountainous region of Kashmir. The group has been officially labeled a terrorist group by the United States government and is believed to be responsible for the kidnapping and murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Its precursor organization, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, trained in Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. American and Pakistani officials believe that Mr. Rauf trained in camps of Al Qaeda in the late 1990’s or later, when that group and other militant organizations operated freely in Afghanistan.

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291 CNN.Com, “Terror Plot: Internet Cafes Raided.”


293 Cowell, *et al.*, “Suspect Held in Pakistan.”
Rashid’s sister-in-law is married to the brother of Jaish-e-Mohammed’s founder, Maulana Masood Azhar.\textsuperscript{294} Once again, as was discovered in the 9/11 and many other terrorist plots, family ties tend to serve as some of the strongest ties in these organizations.

Shortly after the arrest of Rashid Rauf, “The plotters [in the UK] received a very short message to ‘Go now,’ “ said Franco Frattini, European Union’s security commissioner, briefed by British home secretary, John Reid, in London. “I was convinced by British authorities that this message exists.”\textsuperscript{295} Concerning the decision to act on August 10, 2006, a senior British official reportedly stated, “The aim was to keep this operation going for much longer . . . It ended much sooner than we had hoped.” Rather than risk the suspects destroying evidence, dispersing, or possibly accelerating plans to carry out an attack, authorities chose to act immediately, arresting all suspects.\textsuperscript{296} There has been discussion and reportedly many disputes over the British tendency to monitor a suspected terror network over an extended period of time versus the preference in many other European countries and the United States to act on the information much more quickly. One reason given by British authorities for wanting to watch and wait is the knowledge that they have the ability to detain suspects for up to twenty-eight days without charging them. The time period is much shorter in much of Europe and the United States and therefore leaves much less room for authorities to maneuver, at least in a legal sense.

Just prior to the raids on the August 10, sometime on August 9, at least two of the would-be suicide bombers recorded their martyrdom tapes. Through the media and the Internet, these types of tapes have become the all-too-familiar last testament of those who are about to sacrifice themselves in \textit{jihad} against what these individuals and the organizations sponsoring them consider the enemies of Islam. The tapes reinforced the claim that the intent of the attack was “revenge against the United States and its


\textsuperscript{295} Van Natta, \textit{et al.}, “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”

\textsuperscript{296} Van Natta, \textit{et al.}, “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
‘accomplices,’ Britain and the Jews.”297 One of the individuals on the tapes stated, ‘‘As you bomb, you will be bombed; as you kill, you will be killed,’’ adding the hope that God would in turn be ‘‘pleased with us and accepts our deed.’’298 Investigators reportedly made an ideological link between this statement and the November 12, 2002, message from Osama bin Laden.299 In bin Laden’s message, referring to the multiple attacks made by Muslims against multiple targets throughout the previous year, bin Laden stated:

How long will fear, killing, destruction, displacement, orphaning, and widowing be our soul destiny, while security, stability, and happiness is yours?

This is injustice. The time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come.

With God’s will, the Islamic umma has started to strike back with its own sons, who have given their pledge to god that they will continue the jihad with word and deed so long as they have eyes to see or blood in their veins, in order to establish truth and eradicate falsehood.300

In all, at least seven martyrdom tapes were discovered during the course of the investigation. Just one day after the initial arrests, sources in the United States reported the primary actors were prepared to conduct dry runs of the attack as early as August 11 and 12.301 Other sources reported the men had conducted Internet searches to determine flights to various United States cities with similar departure times.302 Later in the investigation, however, British authorities clarified the earlier claims by primarily United

297 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
298 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
299 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
300 Lawrance, Messages to the World, 175.
States sources claiming the plotters were much farther from an executable plan than many sources had initially suggested.

In addition to speculation about the readiness of the cell to execute the plan, speculation began to arise about the actual structure of the cells. An unnamed European intelligence official described the cell as consisting of an inner and an outer cell:

. . . the alleged plot consisted of an inner cell of active terrorists and an outer cell of logistical supporters who were only loosely informed of the attack plans. Members of the outer cell purchased supplies, rented apartments and transferred money needed by members of the inner cell, the official said. Members of the inner cell planned the attacks and at least some were preparing to participate in the missions. Both the inner and outer cells had been actively preparing the attack for more than six months but all the members may not have known each other.303

By the end of the day on the August 10, police had arrested 21 suspects following what was later learned had been a months-long investigation and observation of the suspected terrorist cell. The initial investigation was initiated following tips from the general public shortly after the July 2005 attacks. Reportedly, several Walthamstow residents contacted police concerning “a small group of angry young Muslims.”304 The resulting investigation was given the name, “Operation Overt.”305 The investigation had reportedly been underway since at least December of the previous year.306 Additional warnings and confirmation that a plot of some form existed came in late June or early July of 2006 following the detention and questioning of a Pakistani man crossing the Afghanistan / Pakistan border. The man reportedly provided information on a British-based plot to destroy several commercial airliners.307


304 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”

305 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”

306 CNN.Com, “Agent Infiltrated Terror Cell, U.S. Says.”

Operation Overt resulted in 24-hour surveillance of several individuals living in Walthamstow that included bugging apartments, tapping of phone lines, surveillance of bank transactions, monitoring of internet activity and e-mail traffic, in addition to monitoring the physical movements of the suspected individuals. The initial focus of the investigation was reportedly to determine what, if any, links existed between the individuals being monitored and the 7-7 subway bombers, rather than the existence or planning and preparation for any new plot. In fact much of the initial investigation appears to have been related to the 7-7 subway bombings:

A senior American law enforcement official said that the British disruption of the plot to down airliners began with the follow-up investigation after last summer’s suicide attacks on the London subways, which killed 56 people, including the 4 bombers. “MI5 tracked everyone involved in the London attacks,” the official said. “Their past movements, phone calls and e-mails, everything. It was comprehensive in much the same way that the F.B.I. conducted the post-9/11 investigation.” The investigation led authorities to the suspects in the current plot and allowed them to insert an undercover officer, the official said.

It was determined that in June 2005, one month prior to the London attacks, a 22-year-old paid $260,000 cash for an apartment on Forest Road in Walthamstow. The apartment was later referred to as the “bomb factory” by authorities and was frequently visited by six men who became suspects in the investigation.

Agents from MI5 were reportedly successful in installing both audio and video equipment and in a secret search of the apartment conducted prior to August 10, 2006, agents reportedly discovered proof that the suspects had been experimenting with explosives to include the sports drink Lucozade and batteries that had been hollowed out. However, the focus of the investigation did not appear to be limited to the suspect’s homes. As a part of the raids on August 10, police also raided a local Internet café in Walthamstow, Haji Telecom, taking 27 hard drives and two disks that had been

308 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
309 Cowell, et al., “Suspect Held in Pakistan.”
310 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
311 Van Natta, et al., “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary.”
left by customers.\textsuperscript{312} The manager of the café was not arrested and did not appear to be a part of the investigation.

Several possible links to Pakistan and the plotters were discovered in addition to the arrest of Rashid Rauf. At least two of the suspects travelled to Pakistan sometime following the 2005 earthquake as relief workers. Speculation from multiple sources suggests that while in Pakistan, the two individuals met with members of al Qaeda including Matiur Rehman, a man described as an al Qaeda explosives expert. After returning to Britain, the two suspects reportedly received wire transfers of money from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{313}

It is interesting to point out that on the August 9, just before the discovery of the airline plot was made public, Alexis Debat of ABC News published an article titled \textit{The Man Who is Planning the Next Attack on America}. The article was about Matiur Rehman.\textsuperscript{314} In an earlier report, Debat had described how Rehman came to be responsible for what intelligence officials refer to as the “Rolodex of Jihad” or the names, affiliations, and skills of all Pakistani individuals who had trained at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{315} As previously stated, Rashid Rauf is suspected to have attended al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan during this time period.

Three or four of the suicide bombers in the 7-21 attacks also made trips to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{316} It must also be stated that British security sources have questioned links


between Rehman and the airline plot suspects.\textsuperscript{317} The British government has acknowledged reports from Pakistani officials that Rashid Rauf admitted to meeting with a leading al Qaeda operative in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{318} The name of the operative was not given and it is unknown if this contact may have been Rehman. In the week that followed the initial announcement of the discovery of the plot, a Pakistani official went as far as to state, “We have reason to believe that it was al Qaeda sanctioned and was probably cleared by al Zawahiri.”\textsuperscript{319} Other sources claim the plot was sanctioned by a lower level al Qaeda member, al Zawahri’s son-in-law, albeit with the knowledge of al Zawahri.\textsuperscript{320}

In addition to determining any linkages to Pakistan, investigators are also concerned with whether the plot actually began in Pakistan or in Britain and who was the actual mastermind behind the plot:

But police have not determined whether the alleged plan was hatched by figures in Pakistan or by one or more of the suspects in custody. The difficulty of identifying a mastermind and nailing down potential links among the transit and alleged airline plots lies in the fluid nature of Islamic networks. Connections among suspects may or may not be vital. In 2003, for example, subway bomber Khan surfaced on the edges of an aborted plot in which suspects stockpiled explosives for a massive truck-bombing, but investigators did not keep him under surveillance because they saw him as a minor player.\textsuperscript{321}

The linkage of the 7-7 attacks and the airline bomb plot back to Pakistan would appear to fit the pattern of previous attacks:

. . . it could help fit the suspected plane bombing plot into a string of other cases in which Pakistani British radicals acquired expertise, inspiration or


\textsuperscript{321} Rotella, “The World: Britain Looks for Links to Transit Blasts.”
both from Islamic militant networks in their ancestral homeland. That pattern recurred in the transit bombings, an aborted truck-bombing plot here in 2003, and a plan that allegedly targeted U.S. financial institutions. It also surfaced in the failed follow-up transit attacks two weeks after the July 7 blasts, in which four East African immigrants have been charged. Although that case was initially seen as a copycat attempt, the discovery that at least one of the July 21 suspects also traveled to Pakistan suggests at least an indirect link, officials say.

In fact, some intelligence analysts in the U.S. and Europe wonder whether the alleged operatives, who included a 21-year-old who converted to Islam only six months ago, had the expertise to pull off the ambitious attack under pressure. In previous cases, the progress of plots by the homegrown militant cells in Britain depended on lead figures who went back and forth to Pakistan for training and direction.322

At least two of the suicide bombers from the July 2005 attack are known to have traveled to Pakistan prior to the attacks. In the case of the airline plot, at least one of the individuals is known to have traveled to Pakistan and many others are suspected to have done so. Member of the British Parliament Lord Nasir Ahmed, known as a leader to the British Pakistani community, told CNN that at least four of the alleged plotters traveled to Pakistan, telling their families they were going to help the quake victims.323 Lord Ahmed spoke on British Pakistanis traveling to Pakistan to assist with the earthquake relief:

. . . it was possible that those who went [to Pakistan] came into contact with the militant Islamic organizations that were doing the relief work on the Pakistani-controlled side of Kashmir, where most of the casualties were. Indeed, at the time, Jamaat ud Dawa was welcomed by people in the area for stepping in where the Pakistani government had failed. The group was praised as one of the few providing aid efficiently, while Muslims around the world complained that Pakistanis had been abandoned.324

Jamaat-Ud-Dawa is acknowledged by the United States Department of State as an alias for the group Lashkhar-e-Tayyiba (LET). Another known alias for the group is dara

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322 Rotella, “The World: Britain Looks for Links to Transit Blasts.”


Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK). Lashkhar-e-Tayyiba (LET) is designated by the United States as a known terrorist organization and has been banned by the Pakistani government.\textsuperscript{325}

Reports from Pakistani Police seem to further suggest the possibility that individuals traveling to Pakistan for the purpose of earthquake relief could have easily made contact with terror organizations:

According to sources in the Pakistani Police, some of the 18 persons of Pakistani origin detained by the British Police in connection with the investigation had traveled to Pakistan after the earthquake of October, 2005, to work as humanitarian volunteers in the relief camps run by the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the mother organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), in the POK and in the Balakote area of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). These sources say that during their stay in the relief camps, they were taken by the Jundullah, a Pakistani jihadi terrorist organization which is close to Al Qaeda, to its training camps in the Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan for training. They later returned to the humanitarian relief camps of the JUD.\textsuperscript{326}

Also of interest to the investigators was the suspected low cost that would be required to carry out the attack. Investigators used cost estimates for the 7-7 attacks of around $15,000 dollars, realizing that with the exception of plane tickets, the airline plot would not be significantly more expensive.\textsuperscript{327} The availability of British nationals willing to conduct the attacks, the absence of any need to pilot the aircraft, and the utilization of small explosives constructed from common household items would significantly reduce the costs to carry out such and operation in comparison to the attacks of 9/11.

Authorities in Pakistan also monitored and examined the transfer of a large sum of money from Pakistan to the UK. In the UK, The Charity Commission of England froze the bank accounts of the UK-based Pakistani charity Crescent Relief under suspicion that


money was diverted through Rashid Rauf to support the airline plot.\textsuperscript{328} Crescent Relief was co-founded in 2000 by Abdul Rauf, father of Rashid Rauf and Mohammad Mumtaz, Rashid’s uncle. Abdul emigrated from Pakistan to the UK where he operated a bakery specializing in Pakistani flat bread and cookies. Throughout his time in the UK it is claimed that Abdul maintained strong ties with Pakistan, specifically his village of Haveli where he is said to have financed the construction of a mosque.\textsuperscript{329} Maintaining close ties with their country of origin is not uncommon among Pakistani immigrants in Europe. Abdul was reportedly attending a wedding in Haveli around August 10, 2006, and there are conflicting reports to this day as to whether or not he was arrested by Pakistani authorities.\textsuperscript{330}

Crescent Relief came under suspicion following an attempt by an individual to make a wire transfer of $94,000 from the charity’s Barclays account to an account at Saudi Pak Bank. The individual failed to provide proper identification and the transfer was not completed.\textsuperscript{331} In addition to money transfers, a secretary working near the bakery’s warehouse in Dagenham reported suspicious activity in and around the warehouse, prompting additional investigations.\textsuperscript{332}

Other media sources were more specific in their accusations against Crescent Relief:

A UK-based Islamic charity organisation remitted a huge amount of money to three individuals in three different bank accounts in Mirpur, Azad Kashmir, in December last year with the sole purpose of helping its recipients and their organisations carry out the aircraft bombing plan in the UK, insider sources told Daily Times yesterday.

An investigation carried out by Daily Times showed that Muslim Charity of UK remitted not so long ago a huge amount of money under the head of “earthquake relief” to the accounts of three individuals in three different banks – Saudi Pak Bank, Standard Chartered and Habib Bank Ltd. One of

\textsuperscript{328} The Blotter, “UK Airline Terror Plot.”

\textsuperscript{329} Fisher, \textit{et al.}, “In British Inquiry.”


\textsuperscript{331} Fisher, \textit{et al.}, “In British Inquiry.”

\textsuperscript{332} Fisher, \textit{et al.}, “In British Inquiry.”
these banks is UK based and has its presence in Azad Kashmir because of a huge number of British citizens of Kashmir origin in UK. The money was transferred from UK to banks in Azad Kashmir through Barclays Plc.

What raised alarm among British sleuths specialising in finances was the fact that the entire money was remitted to three individuals, not to any organisation or organisations involved in the relief work.333

2. The Players

The following list is of known and suspected members of the airline bomb plot:334

**Name:** Abu Obaidah al-Masri 335
**Role:** Terrorist Operations Planner (named by Pakistani authorities)
**Nationality:** Egyptian
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated
**Other Affiliation:** al Qaeda

**Name:** Shamin Mohammed Uddin336
**Age:** 36 (Nov 22, 1970)
**Role:** Member
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006
**Place or Arrest:** UK
**Nationality:** British
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** None stated
**Employment:** None stated
**Address:** Stoke Newington, London, UK
**Additional Information:**
Eldest of 19 suspects identified by Bank of England

**Name:** Assan Abdullah Khan337

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Age: 22 (Oct 24, 1984)  
Role: Member  
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006  
Place or Arrest: UK  
Nationality: British  
**Country of Family Origin:** Pakistan\(^{338}\)  
**Other Affiliation:** None stated  
**Family Ties:** Brother of Abdula Ahmed Ali  
**Employment:** Trainee Probation Officer  
**Address:** London, UK, E17  
**Additional Information:**  
Lived in Walthamstow

**Name:** Muhammed Usman Saddique (Uzi)\(^{339}\)  
Age: 24 (April 23, 1982)  
Role: Member  
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006  
Place or Arrest: UK  
Nationality: British  
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated  
**Other Affiliation:** None stated  
**Family Ties:** None stated  
**Employment:** Worked in pizza restaurant  
**Address:** Walthamstow, London, UK, E17  
**Additional Information:**  

**Name:** Nabeel Hussain\(^{340}\)  
Age: 22 (March 10, 1984 – Waltham Forest, UK)  
Role: Member  
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006  
Place or Arrest: UK  
Nationality: British  
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated  
**Other Affiliation:** None stated  
**Family Ties:** Brother of Tanvir and Umair (also detained)  
**Employment:** Hospital worker  
**Address:** London, UK, E4 / Ilford, Essex, UK

\(^{338}\) Barber, *et al.*, “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”  
Additional Information:

Name: Abdul Waheed (Don Stewart-Whyte)  
Age: 19 (as of Aug 13, 2006) born in Eastbourne, East Sussex  
Role: Member  
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006  
Place or Arrest: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK  
Nationality: British  
Country of Family Origin: UK  
Other Affiliation: None stated  
Family Ties: Half-brother of model Heather Stewart-Whyte (claims never met)  
Employment: None stated  
Address: None stated  
Additional Information: Converted to Islam six months prior to plot discovery

Name: Abdul Rauf  
Age: 52 (as of Aug 25, 2006 – Born in Pakistan)  
Role: Family Member, Co-founder London based Crescent Relief  
Date or Arrest: Mid August 2006 (unclear if he has in fact been detained)  
Place or Arrest: Pakistan  
Nationality: British / Pakistani  
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan  
Other Affiliation: Crescent Relief  
Family Ties: Father of Tayyib and Rashid Rauf  
Employment: Bakery owner  
Address:  

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347 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Co-founded Crescent Relief charity in London in 2000
Crescent Relief claims he is no longer affiliated with the charity

Name: Shazad Kuram Ali (Kuram Ali)348
Age: 27 (June 11, 1979)
Role: Member
Date of Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place of Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: Crescent Relief
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK
Additional Information:
May have visited Pakistan in 2006

Name: Rashid Rauf349
Age: 25350
Role: Member
Date of Arrest: Aug 9, 2006
Place of Arrest: Bahawalpur, Pakistan
Nationality: British / Pakistani
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan351
Other Affiliation: Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda
Family Ties: Brother – Tayib Rauf; Father – Abdul Rauf; Uncle – Maroon Rauf
Employment: Not stated
Address: Not stated
Additional Information:
Charged in Pakistan with Terrorism, Forgery, Carrying Explosives
Dec 2006, Pakistani judge declared terrorism charges unfounded but did not
dismiss other charges

Name: Maroof Rauf352
Age: 20 (1987)

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350 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
351 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 (while reported in The Daily Mail on 11 Aug 06, the British gov’t has not acknowledged his arrest)
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Possible brother of Tayib and Rashid Rauf
Employment: Not stated
Address: Not stated
Additional Information: None

Name: Mohammed Yasar Gulzar353
Age: 26 (1981)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: August 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: Not stated
Country of Family Origin: None stated
Other Affiliation: Not stated
Family Ties: Not stated
Employment: Not stated
Address: Not stated
Additional Information: Aug 29, 2006 – Charged with conspiracy to murder, intending to smuggle explosives into the UK

Name: Waseem Kayani354
Age: 29 (April 28, 1977)
Role: Associate
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: None stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: Taxi driver
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK
May have been released from police custody

Attended religious meetings with other suspects

**Name:** Nese Bahaji\(^{355}\)
**Age:** Not stated
**Role:** Hamburg cell family member (wife)
**Date or Arrest:** Not arrested
**Place or Arrest:** Not arrested
**Nationality:** Not stated
**Country of Family Origin:** None stated
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** Wife of Said Bahaji, member of 9/11 Hamburg cell
**Employment:** None stated
**Address:** Hamburg, Germany
**Additional Information:**
Married to Said Bahaji in 1999
Reportedly in e-mail contact with several airline plot members / plotters
Under surveillance by the German government

**Name:** Abdulah Ahmed Ali (Abdullah Ali Ahmed Khan, Abdullah Anmed Ali / Ahmed Abdullah Ali)\(^{356}\)
**Age:** 26 (Oct 10, 1980)
**Role:** Member
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006
**Place or Arrest:** UK
**Nationality:** British
**Country of Family Origin:** None stated
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** None stated
**Employment:** None stated
**Address:** None stated
**Additional Information:**
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing acts of terrorism

**Name:** Umar Islam (Umar Brian, Brian Oliver Young, Brian Young, Omar Islam)\(^{357}\)
**Age:** 20 (April 23, 1978)
**Role:** Member
**Date or Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006
**Place or Arrest:** London, UK

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Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: None stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK; Plainstow, London, UK; London, UK, E7; London, UK, E15
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006
Married with one child
Parents of Caribbean origin
Changed name from Brian Oliver Young

Name: Waheed Arafat Khan (Arafat Waheed Khan)358
Age: 25 (May 18, 1981)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British / Pakistani
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan359
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Brother of Assan Abdullah Khan; also described as brother of Abdula Ahmed Ali
Employment: None stated
Address: London, UK, E17
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006
Some news reported his wife and baby were also arrested

Name: Assad Sarwar (Assad Ali Sarwar)360
Age: 26 (May 24, 1980)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated

359 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Brother Amjad Sarwar
Employment: None stated
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK; Birmingham, UK

Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006
Brother denied he had any links to terrorism

Name: Osman Adam Khatib
Age: 20 (Dec 7, 1986)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: None stated
Address: London, UK, E17

Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006

Name: Ibrahim Savant (Oliver Savant)
Age: 26 (Dec 19, 1980)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Iran
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: None stated
Employment: Accountant
Address: London, UK, E17; Stoke Newington, London, UK, N16

Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts

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363 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006
Born Oliver, changed name to Ibrahim as he became more religious
Married

**Name:** Waheed Zaman (Wassem Zaman)³⁶⁴
**Age:** 22 (May 27, 1984)
**Role:** Member
**Date of Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006
**Place of Arrest:** Walthamstow, Greater London, UK
**Nationality:** British
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** None stated
**Employment:** Biomedical science student
**Address:** Walthamstow

**Additional Information:**
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006
Head of the Islamic Society at London Metropolitan University
Sister denied he had any links to terrorism

**Name:** Abdul Muneem Patel³⁶⁵
**Age:** 17 (April 17, 1989)
**Role:** Associate
**Date of Arrest:** Aug 10, 2006
**Place of Arrest:** UK
**Nationality:** British
**Country of Family Origin:** Not clearly stated
**Other Affiliation:** None stated
**Family Ties:** None stated
**Employment:** None stated
**Address:** London, UK, E5

**Additional Information:**
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with possession of terrorist materials
Appears to be the 17-year-old male repeatedly mentioned in news reports
According to charges had book on how to build bombs, suicide notes and wills,
and a map of Afghanistan that could be useful to an individual preparing an act of terrorism

**Name:** Tanvir Hussain³⁶⁶

Age: 26 (Feb 21, 1981)
Role: Member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Possible brother of Umair and Nabeel Hussain
Employment: Mobile Phone company
Address: Leyton, London, UK, E10
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006

Name: Cossor Ali (Cossar Ali, maiden name – Anwar)367
Age: 22 (Dec12, 1982)368
Role: Wife of Abdula Ahmed Ali
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Wife of Abdula Ahmed Ali
Employment: None stated
Address: London, UK, E17
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations
Charges suggest she had some knowledge of the plot in 2005
Reportedly has an infant child

Name: Umair Hussain369
Age: 25 (Oct 9, 1981)
Role: Family member
Date or Arrest: Not stated
Place or Arrest: Not stated

Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: Not stated
Family Ties: Brother of Mehran and Nabeel Hussain
Employment: Not stated
Address: London, UK, E14; London, UK, E1; Live in Chingford
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 24, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations
Acquitted due to lack of evidence Nov 1, 2006
His charges indicate authorities believe he was not a central player in the plot

Name: Tayib Rauf
Age: 22 (April 26, 1984)
Role: Family member
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006
Place or Arrest: Birmingham, UK
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Brother of Rashid Rauf; son of Abdul Rauf
Employment: None stated
Address: Birmingham, UK
Additional Information:
Released without charge Aug 23, 2006

Name: Mehran Hussain
Age: 25 (Estimated)
Role: Family member
Date or Arrest: Not stated
Place or Arrest: Not stated
Nationality: British
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated
Other Affiliation: None stated
Family Ties: Brother of Umair and Nabeel Hussain
Employment: None stated
Address: None stated
Additional Information:
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations

371 Barber, et al., “Police Shift Focus to Finding Organisers.”
Charges suggest he had knowledge of the plot starting 23 Sept, 2005
Charges dismissed on Nov 1, 2006 due to lack of evidence

3. Conclusions

As the largest group of the three, this one understandably possessed the largest variation in age. Three of the individuals’ ages were indeterminable, though two others were found being over the age of 35. The remaining 21 individuals were under the age of 34, with 11 under the age of 24. Twenty of these 26 individuals were determined to have been born in the United Kingdom with five individuals’ place of birth being indeterminable, with only one person – the oldest member of the group – clearly born outside the United Kingdom. Twenty of these individuals possessed single British citizenship and three individuals possessed dual Pakistani citizenship. This suggests, but is unconfirmed, that two additional individuals may have been born in Pakistan. The ethnicity of the majority of this group is unclear, as the ethnicity of 18 of the individuals was undetermined. However, at least six were of Pakistani decent.

The majority of these individuals lived in Walthamstow or High Wycombe. Walthamstow is located is east London while High Wycombe is a suburb located approximate 30 miles northwest of London. A few remaining suspects lived in Birmingham.

The Muslim community in Walthamstow was described as a large community of more than 17,000 Pakistani immigrants, “many of whom immigrated from two regions, Meerpur in Kashmir and from around Jhelum, according to Mohsin Kahn, the managing director of the Daily Ausaf, a newspaper edited in Pakistan that has an office in Walthamstow.”

At least three of the suspects detained in early August were women and the majority were described as middle-class. At least one detainee was a student and had been the head of the Islamic society at his university in London.

Several of the suspects appeared to be financially well off and had ready access to cash. Suspect Tayib Rauf, who was released from custody early in the investigation, reportedly paid $189,000 in cash for a home in Birmingham in March 2004. In May

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2004, then 24-year-old suspect Khuram Shazad Ali purchased a home in High Wycombe for $378,000. It is unclear if he purchased the home from his father. However, three weeks later, the Ali family purchased a home in the same immediate area for $359,000.374

D. COMPARISON OF CASE STUDIES

The critical question that must be asked is “What has caused 40 people out of a population of 1.5 million Muslims to act in such a manner?” The answer to this question is unfortunately still unclear, although it is possible to state that, of the other minority religious groups in the UK discussed in this paper, none have acted or struck out so egregiously as have these 40 members of the Muslim community. The majority of these other groups, although significantly smaller, are similar in many of the economic and social criteria discussed in Chapter III. Although, as previously stated, none of these groups consistently rate as low as does the Muslim population. As stated initially, this thesis has deliberately ignored the issues of violence related to Northern Ireland. Our decision to discount this significant portion of British history was not out of disregard for the impact it has had on the United Kingdom, but rather due to the fact that the history and circumstances surrounding “The Troubles” is on the whole a completely different situation. We contend that the Irish were specifically targeting the British with their terrorist violence. The Islamic terrorists of concern here, on the other hand, were not concerned with targeting the UK in particular, but rather they targeted the UK as a convenient portion of “the West.”

In his December 2006 speech, the Prime Minister attempted to define the issue of integration in relation to the 7-7 bombing as follows:

I always thought after 7/7 our first reaction would be very British: we stick together; but that our second reaction, in time, would also be very British: we’re not going to be taken for a ride.

People want to make sense of two emotions: our recognition of what we legitimately hold in common and what we legitimately hold distinct. When I decided to make this speech about multiculturalism and integration, some people entirely reasonably said that integration or lack of it was not the problem. The 7/7 bombers were integrated at one level in

terms of lifestyle and work. Others in many communities live lives very much separate and set in their own community and own culture, but are no threat to anyone.

But this is, in truth, not what I mean when I talk of integration. Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. It isn’t about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and duties that go with being a member of our society.

Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about. That is what is legitimately distinctive.

But when it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that point no distinctive culture or religion supercedes our duty to be part of an integrated United Kingdom. 375

The reality, however, is that while the individuals involved in these plots may have lived the majority of their lives in Britain, they had very little in common with the greater British community and had much in common with the isolated community to which they belonged. In the case of these 40 individuals, policies intended to promote unity through diversity resulted in isolation. The clear examples of this isolation were discussed in Chapter III.

There are highly relevant comparisons to be made between the three plots that lead us in the direction of understanding what would cause citizens of a Western country to attack their own countrymen. First and foremost, the issue of religion must be addressed. It should be clear by now that all forty of the individuals were Muslim. As already discussed, Muslims were the third least likely religious group to identify themselves as British versus their religion. A key assumption is that these individuals saw themselves as Muslims first and Britons second, if at all.

While additional evidence may come to light at a later date, it should also be clear that all of these individuals, with the exception of Don Stewart-Whyte, Jermaine Lindsay,
and possibly a third individual, were from Islamic families. Whyte was born in the UK and was raised Methodist, converting to Islam only six months prior to the discovery of the airline plot. Lindsay was born in Jamaica, immigrated to the UK in 1986 and converted to Islam along with his mother sometime in 2000. While the remainder may not have been fervent Muslims throughout their life, there was a tendency in multiple cases where the individual became increasingly more religious in the time leading up to the attack or participation in the plot. This is a commonality that cannot be ignored and is a trend discussed by Edwin Bakker in his 2006 study of 28 Euro centric networks.\textsuperscript{376}

At least 23 of the individuals were born in the UK, with nine individuals’ places of birth being undeterminable. The 7-21 case is the only case of the three where it appears none of the individuals were born in the UK, although four of the eight individuals’ places of birth were not determined. However, one of the individuals in the 7-21 case was a British citizen, and four held dual citizenship with Britain and another country. Additionally, at least two of these individuals immigrated to the UK at relatively young ages (one at 11 and one at 14), which suggests that they should have been somewhat integrated into British culture. However, their willingness to participate in the plot demonstrates their lack of integration on a cultural or moral level and supports the theory of isolation from the greater British community.

Figure 14. Participant’s Place of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>7-7 (6)</th>
<th>7-21 (8)</th>
<th>Airline Plot (26)</th>
<th>Total (40)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Not Clearly Stated</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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In each of the cases, there appear to be at least loose ties to Pakistan. In the case of the 7-7 bombing, three individuals were of Pakistani descent. In the case of the airline plot, Bakker, \textit{Jihadi Terrorists in Europe}.\textsuperscript{376}
plot, six individuals were clearly of Pakistani descent, with the media repeatedly reporting that the majority of the suspects involved – as many as 17 or more – were Britons of Pakistani origin. In addition to ethnicity, one or more members of each group traveled to Pakistan in the time leading up to the attack or the discovery of the plot. Still, it is not uncommon in the Pakistani community for families to maintain close ties with their country or even village of ancestral origin, as in the case of Abdul Rauf. Even so, there is an undeniably strong participation by or linkage to the Pakistani Muslim communities in two of these three events. This is not completely surprising, as 42% of the British Pakistani community is Muslim (Figure 1), the largest ethnic concentration in the Muslim community. Additionally, 18% of the Muslims in the UK were born in Pakistan and 39% in Asia as a whole. Only 46% of the Muslims in the UK were born in the UK (Figure 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 15.</th>
<th>Participant’s Ethnicity</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7-7 (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Clearly Stated</td>
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<td>Egyptian</td>
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<td>Eritrean</td>
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<td>Pakistani</td>
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<td>Somali</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Regarding age at the time of the event, 35 of the 40 individuals fell into the 16-34 age category, with three individuals’ ages being unclear. Only two individuals fell into the 35-64 age category. Of the individuals in the 16-34 age category, 18 were in the category of 16-24 and 17 were in the category of 25-34. As already stated, this is not entirely surprising, as Muslims in the UK have the youngest age profile of all religions, with 70% of the Muslim population being under the age of 34.
The age profile was seen as relevant when compared to measures such as rates of volunteerism. Stated more specifically: the age groups less involved in their community would be expected to be more prone to violence against it. Muslims in the 16-24 age category – the largest group of participants – were the second least likely to be involved in civic activities. Only Hindus over 50 were less civically involved. Conversely, Muslims in the age group 25-49 were the third most likely group to volunteer behind those claiming no religion and Christians respectively (Figure 12). While this age category does include 17 participants in the three plots, it is more difficult to compare this second age group as the volunteerism data covers a 24-year age gap. This is a significant span and if the data were available, we feel there would be differences in the level of volunteerism when compared against smaller age spans or at least against the same age categories used to describe the age profiles of specific religious groups (Figure 7).

Among UK Muslims of working age, 33% had no qualifications, and Muslims born in the UK were twice as likely as Muslims born outside the UK to possess qualifications. Of the three groups just discussed, just over half were clearly born in the UK, yet only six individuals definitely possessed any qualification or had attended at least some college. While it is possible more than six of these individuals did possess either educational qualifications or had attended at least some college, this information was not mentioned in any of the data reviewed in the development of this thesis. It is important to note here, the biographical data available for the 7-7 and 7-21 events was the most detailed of the three occurrences. These two events also contained the most significant numbers of British citizens.

Concerning employment, Muslim men and women had the highest rate of unemployment in the UK. Of the individuals included, 25 of the individuals’ employment
could not be confirmed, six were employed in what were considered skilled jobs, two were employed in unskilled jobs, six were unemployed (three of whom were drawing welfare benefits under multiple identities), and one was a student at the time of his arrest.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

There can be no question that the *jihad* is global, and is directed at anyone who stands in the way of the radical Islamist dogma. Targeting of non-Muslims has been a reality since the beginning of Islam, but the indiscriminate targeting of *anyone* – to include noncombatants and other Muslims – is a new technique.

Though *jihadis* have traditionally come from Muslim nations, the new breed of transnational jihadis are as prone to be members of the local community as they are to be outsiders. Therein may lie the roots of their radicalization: they may have the same sense of impotence in fighting the establishment as their brothers have in their restrained Muslim societies. But in the case of transnational terror in non-Muslim nations, it is only the ideology that is transnational – the terror is home-grown. And, rather than being grounded in political repression, economic and social repression are what give it a voice.

While economic repression opens the door, multiculturalism helps to swing it wide. By lending inordinate and unwarranted legitimacy to minority cultures, multiculturalism in turn instills an inappropriate sense of cultural superiority which can manifest in a desire to stay segregated from the majority culture. Multiculturalism enables the environment that allows specific minority groups to evolve in a vacuum, absent from the influence of the rest of society. This situation allows the minority culture to develop apart from the majority, and it allows the minority culture to maintain its sense of superiority without having to confront the reality of its true standing in society. The end result is a sub-culture that evolves with completely different norms and mores that are in many ways incompatible with the greater society.

This evolution, at least in the case of the Muslim population of the UK, has resulted in the acculturation or creation of a youth culture that is further economically disadvantaged, in addition to being out of touch with the greater British culture that surrounds it. Special privilege for a minority group virtually ensures they will develop a sense of entitlement (deserved or not), and provides the inroad for delegitimizing the “parent” culture. This sense of entitlement, absent a requirement for any sort of
reciprocity, is at the heart of the issue at hand. The situation is further compounded by the relative youth of the entire Muslim population.

Societies that encourage multicultural extremism are, simply put, hastening their own demise. The extremists among the interlopers have no qualms about imposing their cultural demands on those around them. In fact, the extremists have identified and seek to maximize the advantages that a multiculturalist system provides them. As cultural chauvinists, they have no need to care about that which they supersede. In fact, multiculturalism in practice practically encourages this type of behavior. And, while the parent culture certainly doesn’t need to quash all “other” forms of ethnic difference (à la Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World*), it is critical for a culture to maintain some level of common identity. It is for this reason that organizations such as the Commission for Racial Equality have recently begun pushing for a policy of integration to replace the previous policy of multiculturalism. However, there are signs that this integration is not occurring. Indications include reports in March and April of 2007 that many British schools were dropping study and discussion of the Holocaust and the Crusades from their curriculum for fear of offending Muslim and other cultures. The idea that an education system would somehow attempt to alter or ignore significant historical events to accommodate specific ethnic groups supports only further acculturation and ensures integration will not take place any time soon. Several significant events have shaped the 20th and 21st centuries, but few as much as the Second World War and the Holocaust. Ignoring one of the key lessons of the 20th century is especially frightening considering the religious undertones of the threats faced by societies in the 21st century.

The solution to this dilemma may prove elusive, especially when one considers that a key aspect to any solution is the education and integration of today’s Muslim youth. These youth are the product of a system of multiculturalism and this cannot be ignored – especially when considering many of these youth already have, or are preparing to have, families of their own. While the immediate impacts and lessons learned concerning the situation in the UK have indeed been painful, the long-term impact will not truly be felt for another 20 to 30 years. It is at that point – when the children of today’s disaffected British Muslim population begin to come of age – that the effects of the past 30 or more years of multiculturalism can truly be assessed. The difficulty of
society injecting itself into the lives of this critical population is immense and may prove impossible. However, the failure to do so will virtually ensure more home-grown terrorist plots at a significant cost to society as a whole.
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