JSOU Reports

2004–2005
JSOU/NDIA
ESSAYS

JSOU Report 1
The JSOU Press
Hurlburt Field, Florida
2005
Joint Special Operations University
and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its Reports to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about Joint Special Operations. JSOU Reports advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the combatant command of Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Division where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational priorities:

- Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats
- Enhancing homeland security
- Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conventional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries
- Conducting proactive stability operations
- Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Division also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

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Comments about this report are invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Division, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this report may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-2763; FAX 850-884-4732. The Point of Contact for research support to SOF PME students and the JSOU/NDIA essay contest is James D. Anderson (james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil).

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Foreword

In 2004 and 2005 the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the JSOU/NDIA Essay contest. The grand prize winner is recognized each year at the annual Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) NDIA Symposium in early February. The winner also receives a $1000.00 cash prize at the symposium.

The competition is open to resident and non-resident students attending PME institutions and has produced some outstanding works on special operations issues. These essays provide insights on what our PME students consider as priority national security issues today affecting special operations.

JSOU/NDIA Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. Many submissions have hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that have proven useful to SOF commanders throughout United States Special Operations Command. Some entries submitted are a synopsis of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanced degree; others are written specifically for the essay contest. With either approach, these essays add value to the individuals’ professional development, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the special operations community as a whole.

The Joint Special Operations University is pleased to offer this volume of three essays each from the 2004 and 2005 contests. The JSOU intent is that this compendium will benefit the reader professionally and encourage future PME students to enter the contest.

This collection of essays is named JSOU Reports 1, and is the initial publication of the JSOU Press. Feedback is welcome, and your suggestions will be incorporated into future JSOU Reports.

Dennis P. Kilcullen
Chief, JSOU Strategic Studies Division
An Unconventional Look at Training and Education to Improve Conventional and SOF Integration

William J. Carty

Major Carty advises that doctrine for conventional forces concerning the employment of SOF is limited, and it fails to address SOF-Conventional force integration. He suggests that current doctrine and training should migrate from issues of coordinating and deconflicting Special Operations and conventional force activities toward an emphasis on fully integrating those operations—both in training and on the battlefield.

Recent operations employing Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces, which relied heavily on increased cooperation and mutual support, make it necessary that JFCOM, USSOCOM and the Services change their current planning and training frameworks to better reflect present and future employment scenarios. Previously, joint SOF and Conventional Forces planners properly focused on deconfliction of operations when needed, but combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) demonstrated that there was also a great degree of SOF/Conventional Force integration at all levels as well.

Role of Joint Pub 3-05

The capstone manual for employment of SOF is Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces. It serves as the overarching ref-
ference for application of SOF capabilities, and provides detailed information on SOF command and control, employment, and support at the operational level. As such, Service and subordinate manuals refer to JP 3-05 when developing added guidance for SOF employment, as well as being the reference for Theater and JTF commanders and below for SOF implementation. The newest edition of JP 3-05, released 17 December 2003, has gone a long way in addressing doctrinal shortcomings in the previous version, but areas in need of greater emphasis still remain, as well as the means of implementation for planning and training considerations in the joint and Service communities.

Joint Pub 3-05 states that, among other things, SOF missions are conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of Conventional Forces. Also on this topic, JP 3-05 states Special Operations can be conducted in support of a conventional force’s tactical objectives when doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that conventional force.

**SOF Now May Be the Supported Command**

Another change to the role of SOF in conflicts is the direct result of September 11th. USSOCOM transformed from a supporting command to a supporting and supported command, with the Commander, USSOCOM now having full responsibility for the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Within this context in JP 3-05, Special Operations are conducted as an independent campaign, as an overarching strategy incorporating the geographical combatant commander’s individual theater campaign plan. However, doctrine for conventional force support to SOF as conducted in Afghanistan is lacking or non-existent.

Throughout OEF, assets from Conventional Forces that SOF would have traditionally played a supporting role to regularly supported SOF. Army forces were used to secure SOF bases¹, and a US Navy aircraft carrier served in direct support of SOF operations².
Special Forces and Air Force SOF employed strategic and operational-level air assets in tactical roles. Rangers parachuted into objective Rhino long before the Marines occupied it as their base, and Army Special Forces seized the US Embassy and used an Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment attached from the Army 10th Mountain Division to clear it prior to turning it over to the Marines.

Lessons learned from SOF actions in Afghanistan were applied in Iraq, parceling out large portions of the Area of Operations (AO) to SOF forces, but this time in support of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Western Iraq fell almost exclusively to SOF, with SOF in the north again working with indigenous forces to set conditions for introduction of Conventional Forces. In the north, SOF and Peshmerga fighters routed terrorists and Iraqi forces alike, and went on to secure an area sufficient for the airborne introduction of the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade.

**Joint Command**

To facilitate these activities, SOF in theater is, by doctrine, placed under a Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), or under a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Commander for command and control (C2). JP 3-05 details the various levels of liaison that SOF is responsible for to better employ SOF C2 at all levels of command within the JTF. These include a Special Operations Coordination (SOCORD) Element to Army Corps and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCE) at the Division Level, and added liaison elements below these levels as necessary. All references to the role of these elements in the Joint Pub state that the purpose of these elements is to advise, deconflict and coordinate SOF activities with Conventional Forces command elements, and when necessary serve as a C2 element within the AO, exercising Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) of SOF. JP 3-05 addresses liaison between SOF and Conventional Forces as a SOF responsibility at all levels of the Joint Force, but has little information on reciprocal conventional liaison to SOF, which is needed when the supporting-supported roles are reversed as they were in OEF.
Need to Address True Conventional and SOF Integration

Current conventional Service doctrine on employment of SOF is limited. The most significant problem with current doctrine and recommended employment methods, at the joint and Service levels, both from SOF and Conventional Forces perspectives, is that the majority of doctrine and traditional planning has primarily focused on coordination and deconfliction of SOF and Conventional Forces assets. No official reference, traditional training, or formal planning framework exist that address true SOF and Conventional Force integration within the theater in any significant detail. Following current published doctrine and training within a JTF, SOF and Conventional Forces operations are conducted primarily in parallel, but this is not how it is occurring today, and current doctrine and training needs to reinforce what has been learned on the battlefield.

Even beyond the role of major combat operations, there were many changes to SOF and Conventional Forces integration, again indicating a shift in thinking at the operational level. All over Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF and Conventional Force Areas of Operation are overlapping, if not identical. SOF and Conventional Forces missions are regularly carried out in the same AOs. In cases where routine operations are occurring, a common operating picture of the presence of SOF and Conventional Forces in a single AO can prove very useful beyond just deconfliction and fratricide prevention. For instance, a SOF element confronted by an enemy threat that exceeds its capabilities to reduce could call upon a local Conventional Force unit rather than call for its present headquarters to launch a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for reinforcement. Correspondingly, a Conventional Force that runs into problems as a result of a cultural or language barrier could call upon a local SOF element to help resolve the situation.

Augmentation for specific missions is also becoming more common in both directions. This augmentation has resulted in task organizations and command relationships not traditionally exercised in
the past. Sensitive Site Exploitation and raids as special operations missions, and conventional raids and Cordon and Search Operations differ little in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Where they diverge is in the nature of the target and the level of associated risk. With the vast number of physical objectives, targets, and unique skill sets SOF and Conventional Forces possess, more of these missions are being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan by combined Conventional Forces and SOF, either in supporting roles or as a fully integrated force\(^4\). Without a doubt, the very best example of this are the efforts to capture all three Husseins in Iraq. In the attempted capture of Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul (during which they fought to the death), the 101st Airborne provided the cordon force, while SOF initially served as the search force.\(^5\) In the capture of Saddam Hussein, the 4th ID provided the cordon force, and again the search force came from SOF.\(^6\)

**Beyond Deconfliction and Coordination**

Doctrine, as previously discussed, reflects a traditional attitude of cultural separation and institutionalizes it. The premise that SOF liaison is for deconfliction and coordination, and not integration, indicates that regular or long-term integration of SOF and Conventional Forces below the JTF is not seriously considered an operational method. The lack of detailed discussion in conventional force manuals reinforces this shortfall, compounded by the assumption that SOF/Conventional Force liaison is a SOF responsibility, based on SOF doctrine and a lack of it for Conventional Forces. A clear example of this disconnect is in the Army’s newly published Stryker manuals where SOF liaison is specifically stated not to be for physical integration.\(^7\)

Recent examples of SOF and Conventional Force integration have met with success, but at the same time have not been without problems. Issues of organizational culture, lack of understanding of roles and capabilities, doctrinal shortcomings, and training deficiencies have created friction between SOF and Conventional Forces resulting in failures to exploit potential, missed opportunities, and in some cases, fatal errors. Anyone who reads current news articles or popular accounts of SOF in history will quickly find that a gap, if not a
chasm, can exist culturally between SOF and conventional forces. By their nature, the two are fundamentally different, with one primarily focused on unconventional warfare, and the other on conventional. As such, the communities of conventional and unconventional warriors view each other at times with unease, and in worst cases, disdain. However, in a world of scarce resources, cultures must adapt.

Resourcing is significantly impacting how SOF and conventional forces work together. SOF’s small numbers and high degree of specialization make it difficult to allocate internal resources for their own physical security. SOF elements find it necessary to locate within conventional force bases or use conventional forces in an attached or OPCON role for security purposes. This has created challenges for both elements when mission execution becomes necessary and many times informal relationships result in employment problems. A conventional force platoon sent to secure the base of an Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) in Afghanistan was given OPCON to the ODA. The ODA instructed the platoon that as part of the defense of the location, the platoon was to conduct local security patrols outside the perimeter, a requirement of this role. This proved completely unacceptable to the conventional unit’s headquarters and the patrols were discontinued. Another conventional force unit was sent to serve as the quick reaction force (QRF) for a SOF command element, but the release authority for the QRF was retained at the higher command of the conventional force element, and not delegated to the SOF unit it supported. This also in these cases, giving OPCON of these conventional forces to SOF took them away as an option for employment under the CFLCC, a burden not identified in prior planning.

Need for Increased Mutual Awareness

Additionally, there are times when SOF and conventional forces just do not understand what the other does, and thus do not seek to communicate and subsequently integrate capabilities. After action reviews from both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan indicate that had the conventional forces better understood SOF capabilities and employment considerations, they would have integrated them more and earlier. SOF also has seen more non-traditional integration of
conventional forces, as indicated in efforts to capture the Husseins, and they should not disregard this employment option for future operations. The focus needs to be on capabilities that will contribute to unity of effort and act as force multipliers at all levels. Merely understanding what the other force can and will do can go a long way to improving effectiveness.

**Need to Integrate Our Assets**

The first step to fixing problems and capitalizing on successes lies simply in awareness. Better communications between SOF and conventional forces on capabilities, limitations and employment options that are not only mutually supporting, but also integrated when the mission calls for it, will start a process for awareness and training that will better facilitate current and future operations. Joint Forces Command, USSOCOM, and the Services are aware of these issues and are seeking means to address them. However, traditional planning and employment for integration at the JTF level, with deconfliction and coordination at lower levels is no longer the reality. Training driven by the old doctrine of assumed separation of operations below the JTF level is not meeting the realities and needs of current operations.

This issue of integration stems from one of the greatest challenges confronting SOF, as with any other high demand/low density organization--there just are not enough assets to meet all the demands. The SOCOORD at the MEF or Army Corps level has the capacity for C2 of SOF, but only when augmented. A SOCCE at a division is often comprised of an augmented Army Special Forces company command element Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB), or a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit or Group (NSWTU/NSWTG). Traditionally in a theater of operations, there may only be at most two NSWTU/NSWTGs, and in an entire theater only nine SF companies are allocated under a regionally oriented Special Forces Group. Each NSWTU/NSWTG or ODB assigned as a SOCCE with its augmentees takes these already scarce resources out of operational roles and places them in a coordination and deconfliction role to serve as C2 elements with Marine or Army divisions. Allocating these elements
as SOCCEs has a significant manning and operational impact—the assets are just not available to meet demand.

SOF and conventional force integration of complementary capabilities is occurring in ways not seen before, yet is still not effectively addressed in doctrine. As such, with identified strengths and weaknesses and lessons learned from operations, this knowledge must be institutionalized. Situations where lack of knowledge resulted in less effective employment are not acceptable. On the job training and discovery learning while conducting operations is a worthy reflection of the US Armed Services’ agility and flexibility, but other mechanisms exist to better prepare commanders at all levels for what they will confront on current and future battlefields.

**Train Force Integration in PME**

Knowledge of capabilities and employment methods must be shared. All Services have professional military education systems that will support this. As most integration of SOF and conventional forces occurs within the land component, Marine, Army, and SOF training needs to incorporate instruction on this at all levels as it applies. Junior and mid-level Non-Commissioned Officer and Initial Officer Entry education courses should be teaching the basic capabilities and missions of SOF with whom they will interact with on the battlefield. The Marine Amphibious Warfare School and Army captain’s career courses, particularly in the combat arms, need to reinforce this instruction and further discuss how units at their level may be employed in an integrated role with SOF (to include Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units). This instruction could be as little as an hour, and reinforced with incorporation of SOF assets in practical planning exercises. The same holds true for instruction of SOF at this level at the Special Forces Course, Navy SEAL Course and AFSOC training of Special Tactics Squadron personnel. When a SOF element is placed under tactical control of a rifle company on the battlefield, or vice versa, it is late in the game to be figuring out how it should work.

Command and Staff Colleges should place greater emphasis on the role of integrated SOF employment not only at the JTF level, but examine employment options for integrated SOF and conven-
tional forces at lower echelons as well. Additionally, consideration in planning exercises for attaching Conventional Force elements to the JSOTF should be included. This could be further reinforced in Pre-Command Course training of battalion and brigade command designees. Conventional force cultural beliefs that SOF does not understand employment of conventional forces in a combined arms role are hard to validate given SOF unit performance with indigenous ground forces in Afghanistan. With awareness and prior formal training, a conventional force brigade commander could do the same with an SFODA or SEAL platoon. As reorganized packaged forces within the Army are implemented, stability and support operation deployments of conventional forces may include SOF elements, while as Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations or other crisis intervention scenarios arise, a SOF command for these missions can be task organized with conventional force elements for security and firepower. Integrated security, cordon and search, and sensitive site exploitation missions are already happening. All of these scenarios lend themselves to altered planning considerations in training institutions.

**Train and Exercise Force Integration**

Beyond instruction, practical training must also take place. Brigade Combat Training Program exercises to train brigade staffs, and Division Warfighter exercises in the Army can incorporate aspects of these scenarios for planning purposes, as can Mission Readiness Exercises. Potential exists for full practical implementation of SOF and Conventional Forces at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Army’s National Training Center (which is moving towards becoming the Joint National Training Center). The scenarios addressed throughout this paper can be trained in peacetime at these facilities, with SOF and conventional forces still able to achieve individual training objectives during rotations, but with the opportunity for integrated operations. Challenges to manning Observer Controller (OC) positions can be mitigated through the use of existing JRTC OCs, joint augmentation by Air Force and Navy SOF personnel, as well as contracted retired SOF personnel for “focused rotations” on SOF integration as necessary, similar to those used for training the initial Stryker Brigade. Providing JSOTF and CFLCC forces to each
other in theater, even at the tactical level, is still a joint, Service and SOF operational concern that must be addressed in doctrine and training.

Additionally, options exist to gain a second order effect through the use of role players for indigenous force personnel in these exercises. SOF can be employed to train these personnel for integration and employment by the conventional force rotational units. If support personnel who traditionally do not train on battlefield combat tasks were used as role players, the SOF personnel would have the comparable challenge of training non-combat forces for combat employment, while the conventional units would have this element as a planning and employment consideration. Drawing these role players based on rotational schedules from division, corps, and theater support units (similar to the 507th Maintenance Company), or even Reserve Officer Training Corps and Service Academy Cadets, would provide the added benefit of training these units in combat tasks and field craft to which they would not otherwise be exposed. This would be consistent with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (GEN Peter Schoomaker, former USSOCOM Commander) Warrior Ethos initiative and the Marine Corps principle that “Every Marine is a Rifleman”. Conceptually this has been going on for years, as these are the exact types of units currently used in this capacity as “guerillas” at Fort Bragg for Special Forces students training in unconventional warfare. It is an issue of scale.

With this greater knowledge of SOF units and procedures, conventional units could send liaisons to SOF command elements, lessening the burden on the already high demand SOF elements to provide liaisons “out of hide.” This would give the added benefit to the conventional force providing headquarters of having access to information and resources that they normally would not. When the idea of conventional forces sending liaisons to Special Operations forward bases was raised recently at the JFK Special Warfare Center, despite Operational Security considerations the idea received wide acceptance.\(^1\) A possible solution to provide consolidated training for conventional force personnel designated as potential SOF liaisons is to have a course on the topic offered at the Joint Special Operations University, or taught by mobile Joint Training Teams from SOC JF-
COM. The target audience for these courses is the MEF and Corps headquarters and their subordinate operational planners. Another option is to use SOCOORD personnel in Army Corps to provide this training “in house.” Any steps taken to improve interoperability of SOF and conventional forces will pay dividends on the battlefield.

Integration of SOF and conventional forces is happening on the battlefield now. Recent changes to doctrine necessitate changes in education and training to reinforce the successes and mitigate shortcomings and risks found in current SOF and conventional force integration. JFCOM can drive this with initiatives in these areas with the support of the Services, USSOCOM, and the training proponents and centers. Implementation of this training and education will increase employment options for Combatant Commanders, JTF Commanders, and unit leaders at all levels. The changing nature of conflict under the GWOT, limited resources, broad operational scope, and increased operational tempo require all assets be employed to the greatest effect and as efficiently as possible. More effective integration of SOF and conventional forces is a step towards this end.

Notes
by author, annotated telephone interview, 9 December 2003, Infantry Hall, Fort Benning, GA.


11. Afghanistan Lessons Learned, p. 122
Preparing USG Strategic Communication to Meet the Global Insurgency

Randall K. Stagner

Colonel Stagner believes that the US Government is not using strategic communications effectively in support of national interests and that, failing to successfully engage the word in the war of ideas, the United States will have to rely mainly on the diplomatic, economic and military elements of power. Among his recommendations, Stagner would designate Department of State as the USG lead for strategic communications.

The Struggle of Ideas

“Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.” – President Bush, September 2001

“Unless we are able to master all means of warfare, we stand the risk of suffering great and sometimes decisive defeat.” – V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 10, p. 139

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Government (USG) has lost its ability to effectively use the power of information to influence foreign target audiences in support of...
our national interests. What happened to USG Strategic Communication (SC) in the decade after the fall of the Soviet Union? And more importantly, what must be done to reestablish our prowess in SC? As suggested above, the failure to successfully engage the world in the struggle of ideas has real and adverse consequences.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the fault points of the USG SC and suggest a way ahead. To that end, this paper will define and describe SC interagency components within the USG. With an understanding of SC’s history and terminology, the breaks in the pipeline of SC and the tenuousness of its current status will become clear. Likewise, the call for change in the conduct of USG SC also will become clear.

USG SC must be organized, resourced and led for success. Failure to reenergize the power of information will increase our reliance on the other tenets of national power: diplomatic, military and economic. With the clear and present danger inherent in combating terrorism on a global scale (in essence, a global insurgency), the lack of an effective information component will correspondingly increase the amount of blood and treasure required to compensate for this deficiency. The President must formally empower his interagency information warriors to propose, plan and coordinate SC on behalf of the Nation.

What is Strategic Communication?
USG SC is any activity that influences a foreign audience in support of US policies and objectives. The major components of USG SC are public diplomacy (PD), public affairs (PA), and military information activities. This paper will only address those SC interagency elements which specifically seek to influence foreign audiences.

Historical Context of USG SC
The nature of interagency coordination with regard to USG SC can be best described as ad hoc. The United States historically formed
organizations in times of crisis to support the informational needs of the moment, only to disband them once the crisis was resolved. With minor adjustments from crisis to crisis, these organizations typically were formed from representatives of the State and War (Defense) Departments and later were joined by the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the now defunct United States Information Agency (USIA).

**World War I.** During the First World War, President Wilson created the Creel Committee (April 1917 to June 1919) to, among other things, foster understanding and support for US war efforts abroad. The committee established a number of overseas offices to distribute influence products to include feature motion pictures. World War I also saw the establishment of a military psychological warfare capability that included the dropping of millions of surrender leaflets to German soldiers. However, the strategic communication experience gained through the Creel Commission would be lost and the USG information effort would start anew with the advent of World War II.

**World War II.** In preparation for the Second World War, President Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William J. Donovan as its first director. Initially, COI contained two major divisions, Research and Analysis (R&A) and the Foreign Information Service (FIS), plus branches for secret intelligence and sabotage. Robert Sherwood became the head of FIS. Sherwood’s organization was charged with explaining the objectives of the United States throughout the world. The Voice of America sprang from FIS and sent its inaugural broadcast to Europe in German in February 1942.

On 13 June 1942, President Roosevelt established the Office of War Information (OWI) and transferred FIS from COI to OWI. COI was dissolved and its responsibilities transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). OWI’s offices abroad were collectively named the United States Information Services (USIS). OSS retained responsibility for covert information operations while OWI was responsible for all overt information programs. This split in informational effort would be resolved with a March 1943 executive order which tasked OWI to coordinate its programs with the military services.
OWI suffered from a suspicious Congress and public with regard to its exact purpose. A mistake in the concept for OWI lay in its domestic information activities, which smacked of propaganda - never a popular concept for Americans (although one supported even today by government officials and private citizens frustrated with “biased media”). This misperception of purpose would adversely affect the important foreign information program. It is important to note this event, because the lesson not learned will bedevil USG SC activities again—as seen with the debacle of the Office of Strategic Influence in 2002.

**Cold War.** With the end of WWII, the Cold War brought new challenges, not the least of which was a global struggle of ideology. In response to Soviet propaganda, the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) “provided that our information programs would be established with a view to promoting mutual understanding between the United States and the people of other countries. It was frankly designed to counter Communist vilifications of the United States and distortions of its policies.” (Library of Congress, The US Ideological Effort, p. 7)

In the spring of 1950, President Truman called for a “Campaign of Truth” to counter Soviet propaganda, which had intensified in the preceding months. The Korean War would see several national-level information coordinating committees formed. NSC 59/1 established the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in March 1950. This was followed in April 1951 by the Psychological Strategy Board, which was itself followed in September 1953 by the Operations Coordinating Board. The Operations Coordinating Board continued to function until 1961.

**Vietnam.** According to the Defense Science Board report on Managed Information Dissemination (October 2001), “the conflict in Vietnam produced no less than four national level psychological operations committees between 1966 and the end of the US involvement in 1973.” It would be 25 years and another major conflict before the next strategic communication committee would be established.

**The First Gulf War (Desert Storm).** The Reagan Administration created National Security Decision Directive 77 (NSDD 77), which contained the authority for a Special Planning Group (SPG) comprised of
members of the NSC, DOS, JCS, OSD and the USIA. From the SPG, the Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee was established to provide national-level support for the Gulf War. This committee, also known as “3PD,” was charged with ensuring thematic consistency through the interagency. The results of this effort were mixed, but from that experience the idea for a permanent NSC-chaired organization was proposed. At the end of the war, however, the committee ceased work and was dissolved.

Haiti. In response to the 1994 Haitian crisis, an NSC-led group was assembled to coordinate information support activities. Despite some minor tactical errors (leaflets dropped into the Caribbean, radios dropped without batteries), this ad hoc effort once more demonstrated the importance of coordinating themes, messages, and information dissemination activities across the interagency. In an attempt to formalize this effort, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy recommended in an October 1994 memorandum that the NSC create a standing committee to coordinate all such future information requirements. Despite this endorsement, no standing committee was established.

The Organization of USG SC Today

The Role of the President. Leadership for USG SC begins with the President of the United States. According to the October 2003 Report on USG PD, Changing Minds, Winning Peace (the Djerejian Report), “There can be no success without the seriousness of purpose and interagency coordination provided at the direction of the President of the United States.” (Djerejian Report, p.59) It is the President’s message (his policies) that USG SC is responsible for propagating to the world. Without this leadership, the organizations responsible for crafting and disseminating the message are left to figure out what needs to be done in support of national objectives or do nothing at all.

With the present organization of USG SC, the current Bush Administration has not provided the leadership guidance necessary for a coherent, effective and, ultimately, successful SC program to flourish. As pointed out in the September 2004 Defense Science Board
report on SC, “There has been no Presidential directive on strategic communication since the Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information (PDD 68) issued April 30, 1999.” (DSB 2004, p. 24) This lack of attention for SC continues to adversely affect the Nation’s ability to use information as an effective tool in achieving our national objectives while protecting its interests.

**The Office of Global Communications.** The organization tasked to bring the President’s message to the interagency is the Office of Global Communications (OGC). The OGC formally came into being in January 2003 just prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), although it was working de facto months prior to the executive order that established it. Executive Order 13283 directs the OGC to “…(use) the most effective means for the United States Government to ensure consistency in messages that promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.” To accomplish its mission, the OGC is expected to work with the various USG departments and agencies as well as within other interagency coordinating mechanisms. The OGC has no tasking authority.

The OGC has not been successful in meeting its charter. According to the Defense Science Board, “…the OGC evolved into a second tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination.”(DSB 2004, p. 25) This was a major reason for the disruption of a coherent White House message during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). OIF should have been an excellent vehicle for the OGC to prove its worth, but instead its focus on domestic issues sidelined what should have been a key player in USG SC.

**The Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee.** On 10 September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice signed a memorandum establishing the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (SC PCC). Its mission is fairly straightforward. According to the memorandum, “The Strategic Communications PCC will coordinate interagency activities, to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President’s message across the globe.”
The SC PCC is co-chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations and by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Establishment of the SC PCC was one of the top recommendations of the 2001 Defense Science Board report on Managed Information and was hailed as the first concrete step to enhancing SC throughout the interagency. Assistant Secretary-level participation would provide the legitimacy and visibility heretofore missing from USG SC discussions. Unfortunately like the OGC, the SC PCC has no tasking authority.

Although the SC PCC started out well, it fell into disuse during OIF when it should have been the driving force within the interagency to harness the power of information on behalf of the Nation. Most of the work was “powered down” to sub-committees of the SC PCC. In particular, the Iraq sub-committee headed by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) for Near East Affairs (NEA), DOS, was the focus of USG SC support as the Nation went to war in Iraq.

The Iraq sub-committee of the SC PCC was a vibrant assemblage of SC personnel from across the interagency, but it suffered from a number of distracters. There was a clear conflict of responsibilities with another PCC, the Combating Terrorism Information Strategy PCC, which was established through a classified memorandum. The Senior Director for Strategic Communications and Information Office of Combating Terrorism, NSC, chaired the CTIS PCC and also attended the SC PCC and the Iraq sub-committee meetings. Conflict arose from the fact that the CTIS PCC was well established before the inception of the SC PCC. The CTIS PCC was, in fact, addressing a number of issues that would have belonged to the SC PCC and the Iraq sub-committee by extension. As the same agencies covered both PCCs with no clear lines of responsibility between them, redundancies and gaps formed in the overall SC plan to support OIF.

The OGC provided additional difficulty for the sub-committee. OGC personnel attended the Iraq sub-committee, but without a specific White House SC strategy. In the absence of a White House SC strategy, no concerted public diplomacy strategy for Iraq would be developed. Despite the absence of an overarching SC strategy, USCENTCOM theater information operations personnel, specifically
psychological operations, planned and executed a brilliant IO campaign for OIF. Unfortunately, some senior military personnel would later “tar” the theater IO effort with the broken “brush” of SC. The absence of a USG SC strategy for post-conflict Iraq would prompt the Secretary of Defense to initiate SC planning within his own department.

From the SC PCC, there remains one bright spot—the Strategic Communications Interagency Fusion Team (SCIFT). The Fusion Team exists to coordinate, de-conflict and synchronize the efforts of all USG agencies that produce and disseminate messages designed to engender foreign support for our national objectives. This SC support organization has met constantly and consistently since its inception shortly after the establishment of the SC PCC. Lead by the State Department, the Fusion Team is the one place in the interagency where all SC elements can “show their wares” and know what other departments and agencies are producing in support of collective SC effort. Before the Fusion Team, different USG departments would concurrently produce SC materials on the same program without knowledge of the other’s effort. The ability to cross-level USG SC efforts, at least at the operator level, has proved valuable to all Fusion Team participants.

The SC PCC has not met since spring of 2003 and its authorities now fuel the PCC on Muslim Outreach. The new PCC is co-chaired as ordered for the SC PCC but its charter is notably more focused.

A Workable Solution for USG SC

A visiting Polish colonel once asked me how, if starting from scratch, he should organize a national informational effort. I explained that the organization would be dependant on the peculiar aspects of planning, coordinating and, most importantly, leading information activities. I recommended a formal organizational structure, as ad hoc interagency organizations tended to waste time and effort trying to determine the administration of the effort instead of addressing the informational needs of the national crisis at hand. In today’s 24/7 news cycle, there is no time to “whip up” a SC strategy with a pickup team after events begin to unfold. Additionally, a successful informational effort starts with the nation’s leader and, therefore, there
must be a single person directly responsible to and empowered by that leader. This, I explained, is the only way to ensure the consistency of the leader’s message from the strategic to the tactical levels of dissemination. I still feel that the advice I provided is valid for his native Poland, but I have a somewhat different recommendation for USG SC—put real power for planning, coordinating and, to a degree, leading the nation’s information effort down into the Departments of State and Defense.

“Information Czar” The lack of a strong White House proponent for SC has been noted by a number of different reports and SC professionals. The 2003 GAO report on Public Diplomacy, the Djerejian report, and the 2004 DSB Report on SC, among others, have decried the lack of this critical element in USG SC. This is not to say that the President does not understand and appreciate the power of information, especially with regard to the War on Terror. It is clear, however, that the White House OGC is not resourced (as of December 2004, there are only five full-time members) to properly plan and coordinate USG SC. With regard to an “information czar,” a special advisor to the President would be no more effective than the OGC.

The DSB, for example, envisions a NSC deputy who would serve as the President’s principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic communication. He would additionally chair a new national-level committee, the Strategic Communication Committee (SCC). The SCC would subsume the duties of the OGC and the SC PCC. According to the DSB, the President would empower the chair of the SCC with the authority to assign operational responsibilities to various departments and agencies to meet USG SC requirements. The DSB proposals are the most comprehensive and far reaching of the most recent stack of SC/PD reports. If the DSB recommendations were accepted in their entirety, I believe that their implementation would have a major positive impact on USG SC. I am not, however, encouraged that such complex and resource-intensive recommendations will come to fruition. An “information czar” without the recommended authorities and structure detailed by the DSB would be no more effective than the current OGC.
Recommendations

1. First, designate the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, DOS, as the USG lead for SC through executive order to SECSTATE. The U/S for PD/PA already leads USG PD, a major component of SC. DOD and CIA information warfare planners already look to State PD for coordination on SC issues. In addition to the U/S’s role in PD, her office also includes the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) Bureau which provides for, among other activities, educational exchanges to influence foreign views of the US. The State Department has a close relationship with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) whose work greatly influences the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences around the world. In short, the U/S for PD/PA is a central point in USG SC to coordinate and synchronize informational activities.

Although no additional structure is needed for this recommendation, the new Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for PD and PA (PPR) under the U/S for PD/PA must be resourced and expanded to accept the new responsibilities of its U/S. Minimally, personnel would be detailed from DOD, CIA and USAID in sufficient quantities and grade to achieve a proper lash up with their parent organizations.

All USG SC department and agencies would receive USG SC operational requirements from the U/S for PD/PA and coordinate their efforts through the PPR. Departments and agencies would synchronize the execution of their activities with the PPR. As daunting as this effort sounds, the bulk of the operational planning would still occur in the departments.

2. Second, reestablish the SC PCC with the U/S for PD/PA as the only chair. The NSC would continue to participate as a member of the PCC but will no longer co-chair. Sub-committees for specific regions of interest would continue to be formed and the SCIFT would continue to meet.

3. Third, the OGC must focus more on its SC responsibilities, work with the White House/NSC on the President’s SC guidance and provide the same to U/S for PD/PA as the USG lead for SC. The U/S
must be able to receive such guidance in a timely manner, which will require direct contact with the President on occasion. The OGC should only require a slight increase in resources to better accomplish its mission, if fenced from other White House communications duties. To that end, the OGC may need to be placed directly under the White House Chief of Staff.

Conclusion

Having informed my target audience, and provided discussion and recommendations, the last question is, of course, so what? The evidence that USG SC is broken is overwhelming. USG SC clearly lacks the leadership and organization required for success. So what if nothing is done? I invite you to read a few lines from the 9/11 Commission Report:

“Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.” (9/11 Commission Report, p. 377)

And if that is not enough, then I refer you to the beginning of this paper with the quote from Lenin. The leaders of the once powerful Soviet Union can tell you why you cannot rely on military might alone.
The Baghdad Boom

An Analysis of the Privatization of Violence

Todd J. Seniff

Commander Seniff finds that private corporations employed for security and force protection missions have evolved into active combat. Because lean forces cannot provide adequate security in theater, the hostile environment provides a welcome niche for the Private Military Company. Seniff challenges us to consider, are we hiring mercenaries, or do these freelance fighters have a place within the international law of armed conflict?

Violence—its control, dispensation, and legitimacy—is perhaps the paramount issue dominating both the international and domestic political systems today. And so, while the legitimacy of the U.S. led international coalition’s dismembering of the Hussein regime in Iraq in 2003 is still hotly debated both within the U.S. government and around the world, so is the use of non-state affiliated armed forces to perform military services in direct support of the reconstruction phase of the operation. The two are linked in a mutually supportive relationship that is proving to re-define not only how wars are waged but also how national armies are manned and equipped.

In today’s world of globalization and consequent privatization, many aspects of waging war are being “outsourced”, from supply of logistics to intelligence gathering and analysis, to providing security and force protection. Dr. Kevin O’Brien of Rand Europe, and others in academia, refer to this relationship as the “privatization of vio-

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lence” (and alternately the “privatization of war”)

but in the colloquialism of the genre the more evocative “Baghdad Boom” seems to hit the right combination of pith and panache.

The thesis of this paper, then, is to suggest that, while there is a vast spectrum of services that can and are being outsourced to private corporations on the modern coalition battlefield, the services at the security and force protection end of this spectrum are unwittingly being pushed over the line into active combat. This is a dangerous trend as it has complex political and legal ramifications and pitfalls and requires the contractor performing these services to be a privatized soldier. Privatized soldiers have heretofore been called mercenaries which, under the Geneva Convention and other international legal conventions, are illegal. As an illustrative case, we will examine this trend in Iraq where the situation on the ground, an insurgency, has blurred the line between active combat and service support. It is the aim of this analysis, then, to focus on the role of the Private Military Company (PMC), and its role in the modern battlespace. “War-fighting and security has traditionally been the domain of the state” yet the evolving paradigm of outsourcing for these capabilities raises some very serious issues vis-à-vis the law of armed conflict in the international domain.

Origins of Privatization

Certainly the presence of contractors on the battlefield is not a new phenomenon. It has been a practice of armies for thousands of years to hire non-combatants to perform the more menial tasks associated with maintaining an army in order to free up the men at arms to concentrate on their main task of soldiering. Recently, however, the distinction between the combatant and non-combatant has become somewhat imprecise. In Iraq, for example, contractors who have been hired to perform security tasks during the reconstruction phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom have become engaged in combat. In this chaotic milieu opportunity abounds for private enterprise, for companies with a tolerance for risk and employees of a certain
caliber and nature. Enter the PMC, an entity which is organized as a corporation and provides, under the obligation of a contract, high risk services that run the gamut of military operations. Onto the legitimate backbone of the contractor industry comes mission creep that is on the verge of, or perhaps has already crossed the line into, the realm of hiring out for active combat operations.

**The Environment**

To frame the analysis, it is useful to first define the current environment in which the phenomenon is occurring. For the purposes of this examination, the focus will be on post-Gulf War II Iraq where the coalition forces are attempting to rebuild the infrastructure of the country amid daily attacks by insurgents. The battlespace is one without lines; a series of non-contiguous hot zones usually centered around population centers, religious sites and supply routes. It is the classic operating area of the insurgent: a clearly recognizable occupation force, a society trying to function “normally”, a populace deeply fractured along tribal and religious lines as well as plenty of urban areas and porous borders which facilitate recruitment and sanctuary.

The problems associated with protecting one’s force in this type of environment are exacerbated by a movement within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that is focused on transforming the force from a cold war behemoth to a lean, tailored fighting force which takes advantage of the efficiencies and synergism inherent in superior agility, professionalism, firepower and technology to overcome its paucity in numbers. While this theory has been proven to be effective in the combat phase of an operation (eg. OIF), the current situation in Iraq seems to prove that such a lean force is incapable of providing adequate security in a hostile reconstruction phase of the conflict. And so, while the argument as to the proper force structure of DOD is raging, this environment has created the perfect niche for the PMC.

**Doctrine**

This incident has brought to the fore an issue that, in the United States at the very least, has not been adequately studied, debated
nor regulated before being put into practice. In a classic example of putting the cart before the horse, in Iraq alone there are roughly 20,000 members of the privatized military industry, most armed with the latest weaponry, fulfilling their contractual obligations to various governmental agencies, defense contracting companies, dignitaries and political leaders, as well as the Coalition Provisional Authority, for enormous sums of money without oversight, control measures, coordination or doctrine.

This point is illustrated in microcosm by viewing the U.S. treatment of the issue within DOD. The effort at standardization and doctrine development has only occurred at the individual military component service level and has not been addressed in policy or doctrine at the Joint Chiefs level. To be fair, however, the DOD, or more specifically the J4 Logistics directorate at the Joint Staff, is attempting to assimilate the various and sundry service centric doctrines with the aim to develop a joint publication. These documents (DODI 3020.37, JP 4-0 Logistics Ch. 5, FM 3-100.21, FM 4-100.2 to name a few) however, speak to the issues associated with hiring and deploying contractors in general and do not adequately address the issue of the PMC and its associated mission creep. And they certainly do not even begin to attend to the issue in a combined, coalition setting. This is interesting considering that unilateral military action, while definitely reserved as a right given certain circumstances, is quickly becoming an option of the past.

**Populating the Industry**

Typical to an industry enjoying such an exponential rate of growth, there is a lack of quality control. The PMC industry is incredibly diverse with respect to quality, legitimacy and respectability,\(^4\) a situation which belies the lack of regulation, vetting and licensing within the international and domestic communities. Some of the PMCs, those at the higher end of the quality and expense spectrum, have a well established vetting process and hire only former Special Operations(SOF) soldiers. The gene pool of people with these qualifications is finite and so, with the demand for security contractors at a fever pitch, PMCs are forced to widen their vetting aperture.
Incentives such as $1000/day pay and relaxed grooming standards hint at a mercenary mindset, and that not only can the skills of a person be bought for money, but also his or her allegiance. In juxtaposition to this set of values, Samuel Huntington perhaps best codifies what it is that motivates a professional soldier (replace the term “officer” here with “soldier”):

*The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steady ing and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society.*

Currently there are no statistics that address the issue of retention, at least within the U.S. Special Operations community. Are the PMCs siphoning off the best, brightest and most experienced soldiers in the U.S. DOD? The U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command is enjoying the highest retention rate in years, this despite the fact that the PMC Blackwater USA, having been started by and currently run by former U.S. Navy SEALs, has a certain appetite for men with this experience and caliber. Perhaps it is a fair assessment to make that, with demand on the rise and a high premium being placed on maturity, experience and a certain set of skills by the PMCs, it is only a matter of time before the professional coalition militaries, especially in the more specially trained communities therein, will start to feel the effects on their force structure. In a contest between pecuniary advancement and high moral ground, the advent of the PMC may be a harbinger of a fundamental shift in societal values.

**Accountability**

In the military environment, there is a rigid chain of command designed to ensure accountability, clear lines of control and management, discipline and oversight in all matters. At the theater, or regional level of command, the supported Combatant Commander
(COCOM) is the single person responsible for “accomplishing the mission and ensuring the safety of all deployed military, government civilians, and contractor employees in support of U.S. military operations.” Professional military soldiers are accountable to their nation and subsequent chain of command through an oath to loyalty, with discipline and conduct enforced by legal rules and regulations.

These rules and regulations do not extend to the contractor on the battlefield, thus depriving the COCOM the imperative management tool over them. “Military commanders do not have, however, the same authority or control over contractors and their employees and only has command authority in accordance with the Department of State (DOS) rules and regulations...Only the contractor can directly supervise its employees [with the] military chain of command exercise[ing] management control through the contract.” So while the COCOM is responsible for contracted personnel’s safety while in his area of responsibility, he can only ensure their conduct through the contracting officer responsible for writing the contract.

Licensing and Regulation

Licensing and regulation are currently much debated subjects. The United Kingdom, having enjoyed an annual revenue increase in British PMCs from $350M to $1.8B, is currently in the throes of deciding on the correct method of regulation. A Green Paper, commissioned by the House of Commons entitled “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation”, is a seminal work on the study of today’s PMC. Instead of outlawing industry which has existed in the UK for a long time, it recommends conditions for regulation and licensing of PMCs not only within the UK but also on the international stage, calling for an international body responsible for the oversight and policing of the industry. Other countries who are traditional homes to PMCs and their predecessors in the mercenary era of the 1960s, such as South Africa, are also attempting to convert formerly infamous institutions into legitimate corporations capable of competing in an international environment of increased scrutiny and oversight.

Within the United States, however, the instrument of control and licensing of the export of military services has been in place since 1968 in the form of the “US Arms Export Control Act”. Under the au-
authority of the Department of State, the Office of Export Controls sets the standards, licenses and enforces the regulations. This measure realistically only serves to keep the honest PMC honest, its only teeth lie in the fact that it extends not only to U.S. based PMCs but also to anyone carrying a U.S. passport thereby curbing the desire for a PMC to move its operation offshore to avoid domestic regulation. While having legislation requiring licensing is an important step in the right direction towards regulation, follow through in the form of oversight should also be a requirement and is what is lacking in the U.S. system. Currently, in the U.S. there is no centralized oversight agency chartered with ensuring contractors perform or meet their contractual obligation.  

The Law of Armed Conflict

Mercenarism is illegal in international law. There are several documents in international law which attempt to define what constitutes being a mercenary: UN General Assembly International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989); Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1977); the Organization of African Unity (OAS) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. None of these documents seem to be clear enough for any type of enforcement and all are obviously obsolete given the paradigm of the post 9/11 world. They were written to outlaw the white legion, the human detritus that, in the 1960s and 1970s, surfaced in Angola and Rhodesia and sold their services to any institution that would pay them.

Yet, in lieu of an enforceable definition which delineates between the illegal institution of mercenarism and the, as of now, legitimate institution of the PMC, there are obvious law of war distinctions between professional (national) and private soldiers. For instance, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) provide for the status of members of an armed force present within the territory of another nation, yet they do not provide for contractor personnel. If contractor personnel are for any reason detained in a foreign country, the U.S. DOD or DOS could not bring the SOFA to bear. The contractor would be subject to the host nation laws. In the event a contractor is taken prisoner, pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, he or she is considered “civilians accompanying the force” and so, while considered neither a combatant nor non-combatant so long as they wear a distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, they are granted prisoner of war status.\textsuperscript{12}

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are, however, a very prickly subject when discussing PMCs. The general rule of thumb for ROE is the inherent right to self defense, governed by a sometimes obtuse caveat that a threat is met with the appropriate level of response. Consider this concept in the context of the situation in Iraq today. Should contractors bear arms? And if so, are there or should there be limitations on the size of the caliber, range, cyclic rate, destructive power, killing potential or any other unit of measure of their weapons? The Joint Pub for Logistics clearly states that contractors, as a general rule, should not be armed, but concedes that in limited cases “the issuance of such weapons [for security purposes] must be authorized under procedures approved by the geographic commander.”\textsuperscript{13} And yet, with the security and force protection services PMC personnel are providing, it is imperative that they carry weapons. Given this, what are their ROE? Is it the same as the coalition forces? Everyone has the right to self defense and it seems that much of the combat in whichPMC personnel are engaged can be categorized under this catch-all. Can they assist adjacent coalition forces if they are engaged?

This seems to be a crux point in differentiating between PMC personnel and mercenaries, as well as between professional forces and private: defense, but no offense. PMC personnel can be engaged in active combat as long as it is in self defense. They cannot be hired to conduct offensive combat, in the United States anyway, but if they are hired to conduct security and are fired upon, then they quickly slide down the slippery slope into active combat. This is precisely where the lines have become indistinct and, in a conflict that was initiated based on a strategy of preemption as a form of defense, the U.S. policy looks a tad disingenuous.

If contractors do get into combat, what is the legal responsibility of the standing military authority to provide quick reaction forces? Joint Pub 4-0 states that force protection is the responsibility
of the contractor.\textsuperscript{14} In response to several instances in Iraq where PMC personnel were attacked, resulting in pitched battles where support from adjacent coalition forces was requested to no avail, the resourceful companies have begun to expand their operations to form quick reaction forces of their own which, complete with air power, will be able to solve their own force protection issues. This last development, coupled with the desire of the PMCs to carry larger caliber weaponry, pushes them right to the brink of being a private army unto themselves.

**Recommendations**

The key take away from this analysis is that, in the post cold war, unipolar world where national militaries are streamlining and downsizing and a globalized market economy has increased the appetite for, if not completely legitimized, the privatization of many goods and services which were sacrosanct not fifteen years ago, PMCs are not only here to stay but their role in modern warfare will most likely increase. Security is basically an unregulated and undefined industry, spread across the globe into areas not unlike the ungoverned wild west of Dodge City, driven by aggressive, risk tolerant privateers fighting for a treasure chest of many billions of dollars. In order to put this 800 pound gorilla into the cage where it belongs, the international community needs to become fully engaged. What is the correct forum for this discussion and what is the correct format for the legislation? It has been argued previously in this paper that the United Nations has become almost a completely ineffective institution. Indeed, its glacial bureaucracy has become one of the root causes of the burgeoning privatization of aid and security industries. As Dr. O’Brien points out: “as long as the international community is unable-or unwilling-to provide a regional security solution, this demand for support will continue to be met from the private sector.”\textsuperscript{15} Dr. O’Brien goes on to argue that rewriting the existing conventions, both the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. General Assembly International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, with up to date language crafted with an eye to the future, “should be the central pillar of any regulatory regime...
to standardize a common approach to law enforcement, legislative, juridical and security considerations\textsuperscript{16} with respect to PMCs.

Within the United States there exists a need for Joint doctrine that will formalize the current deficiencies of control and accountability of PMCs while deployed to an area of operations. This doctrine should unambiguously cede control of all personnel in the employ of the government to the supported Combatant Commander and his respective military chain of command. These control measures should include penal authority, as well as the ability to govern the actions of the PMC personnel in the interest of aligning their efforts to meet his objectives and conform to his policies. And, in order to ensure quality control and to police the industry, there needs to be an oversight agency, either in DOD, DOS or as an independent organization, chartered with setting and maintaining standards and codes of conduct. This effort, however, should not be conducted in a U.S.-only vacuum but rather vetted through the international authorities with the aim of crafting doctrine acceptable in the combined arena.

**Conclusion**

The 800 pound gorilla analogy is apt here. Any industry that has grown into a multi billion dollar international venture within three to five years certainly fits the correlation. One needs only to look at the dot com bubble of the latter 1990s for a like comparison. The privatization of violence is especially tricky due to the questionable legitimacy of its nature and its international scope. Even in today’s environment there is such a broad spectrum of quality in the PMCs that it will not take much of a nudge for some to turn rogue, to regress to the less than savory mercenary organizations of the 1960s where repression of civil rights and weak governmental overthrow was the modus operandi.

Fast forward ten to fifteen years to a world where Iraq and Afghanistan both enjoy stable, functioning democratically elected governments, police and militia forces capable of supplying adequate internal security, and economies that are able to function on their own merit. The PMC bubble, those halcyon days of OEF/OIF where the environment was permissive for massive PMC growth, has popped. Neither the U.S. government nor other coalition governments are
doling out billions of dollars to outsource for security. The PMCs will want to survive and will evolve, or devolve, into whatever form they need to be to fit into the supply and demand chain. They will supply whatever services will keep them liquid and alive. Make no mistake; big business does not dissolve easily. And when the allegiance is to capitalism and profit and not to issues of moral high ground like preservation of sovereignty, protection of human rights and regional stabilization, then there will be an irresistible urge for the cassus belli to be fortune.

It could be argued that this is a pessimistic view of the industry and that PMCs are just as interested in sovereignty and regional stability as the international community because it is precisely in this environment, and by preserving its stasis, is where they earn their money.

Evolve or devolve? It is now that this question should be addressed and managed before the train has fully left the station.

Notes
3. Ibid., 3.
8. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
Examining Changes in Character and Conduct of War as a Basis for a SOF-Centric Strategy

Arnold J. Abraham

Mr. Abraham argues that our dominant position in the world could be maintained even if we cut 20-30 percent of our fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and tanks. Resources could be shifted to increase capabilities in the diplomatic, economic and informational elements of power, suggesting that DoD should be part of a strong team rather than the sole effective player in national security affairs. As for DoD, “the road to transformation leads right to SOF.”

During the critical period between World War I and World War II, Giulio Douhet noted, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” Douhet’s observation holds true today, and should form the basis of military force structure and planning. This paper examines trends since the 1991 Gulf War that amount to a dramatic change in the character and conduct of war. Based on these changes, a proposed force strategy is presented. Special Operations Forces are revealed to be the component of existing forces best suited for the new face of war, and thus the linchpin to the nation’s future defense capabilities.

The first step in the analysis is to examine the technical and societal changes that have directly and indirectly contributed to the need for a transformation of U.S. military forces. An underlying change in both technology and society is the explosive growth of information technology. On the military side, information technology has led to

Mr. Arnold J. Abraham, OSD, wrote this essay while attending National War College, Class of 2004.
unprecedented capability for precision strikes enabled by real-time comprehensive intelligence and supported by robust command, control, and communications networks. Together this allows for massed effects to replace the traditional need to mass forces and for refined targeting to the point where it can drive strategies. Perhaps more significantly, the impact of information technology on society has created a “global village.” With modern mobile telecommunications, there are few remaining places on the planet where something can happen without it being brought into our lives. Sometimes called the “CNN effect,” this phenomenon focuses media coverage anywhere on the globe on a moment’s notice and creates a national attention span which is often limited to sound bites. Another side effect of this technology is that we can now see the humanity of our worst enemies. Even as we mourn our losses, we are forced to recognize the impact of collateral damage inflicted on innocents caught up in conflict.

The New Character of War

Resource Limitations. Juxtaposed to these technological and societal changes, there have been five major conflicts involving U.S. forces since the 1991 Gulf War: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. With the exception of Somalia, each resulted in the U.S. achieving its objective with relatively little effort applied to the task (compared to the potential level of force available) and minor costs incurred in terms of both blood and treasure lost. Each of these engagements included severe restrictions on our fighting forces. The conflicts with Serbia were characterized by limitations in rules of engagement to minimize the threat to our aircrews and the declaration that ground forces would not be introduced. The more recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were fought under constant high-level political and public pressure to minimize the size of the deployment and subsequent employment of forces. In Somalia, the determination was made that the objective was so limited in value that it did not warrant the cost incurred and was thus abandoned rather than seeking additional means to achieve it.

Based on these cases, we observe that for the United States, war is greatly self-constrained. Only very small portions of the nation’s resources are applied. While there is much talk of the immense size
of the U.S. defense budget relative to the rest of the world, spending for the last decade has remained in the range of 3-4% of total GDP. During World War II, almost 40% of the GDP went to defense in an economy driven to support efforts that required the mobilization of all available resources for the cause. Over 16 million served in uniform and virtually the entire populace was energized to support the war. As a further sign of how much things have changed, in the past even a “limited war” like the Korean conflict saw defense spending rise to approximately 15% of GDP. In contrast, fighting the global war on terror while also defeating the “axis of evil” and maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent is not likely to cause spending to rise beyond 4% of GDP. On the personnel side, there has been increased use of reservists, but the military significantly downsized since the 1991 Gulf War, and there are still tight constraints on its overall size. For the past decade and for the foreseeable future, war has been and will continue to be a niche activity that simply does not involve or impact (other than emotionally) the vast majority of the nation.

Some would argue that the September 11th attack is evidence against this trend. It was an unprecedented horrific attack on our homeland that killed thousands of innocent citizens and galvanized the entire nation to war. Yet in actuality it proves the case. Calls by many common men for the opportunity to contribute went unanswered by the U.S. government and, outside select military communities, life for America today goes on much as it did before – with the exception of inconveniences during airport travel. Even though the adversary openly threatens our very way of life, what we see today is far from the “total war” of the last century.

Limited Acceptable Violence. Perhaps even more significant than the limitation on overall resources committed to the cause, is the apparent limit on the level of acceptable violence when the United States is at war. Where the U.S. once fought wars that cost tens of thousands of our young men’s lives, we now truly agonize over each
and every casualty. The Kosovo conflict represented the culmination of this trend, being fought in such a way as to achieve over 30,000 sorties flown without a single pilot being lost.\textsuperscript{3} Our nation tolerates the loss of over 40,000 lives in traffic accidents each year but to suffer anywhere near that number of military casualties would be considered disastrous beyond all reason.\textsuperscript{4}

A second trend line can also be drawn showing a decline in casualties inflicted. The days of fire bombing cities and killing 40,000 – 80,000 men, women, and children in a single attack are long gone. In their place we see detailed planning to avoid collateral damage and media frenzy if even a single bomb goes astray. While passions remain high for some, bloodlust seems to die out quickly in other elements of American society. Even while continuing to retrieve remains from the World Trade Center, we faced cries to practice restraint in our handling of captured terrorists.

There are three reasons behind this specific constraint. First, technology allows us to refine our efforts and still achieve objectives. Second, civil society has “matured” to the point it finds it very difficult to condone violence. Both of these are closely intertwined with the advances in information technology noted earlier. Lastly, despite recent terrorist rhetoric, the U.S. has not actually confronted a threat of sufficient magnitude to overcome the first two tendencies. If the nation faced such a challenge, as it did during the Cold War with the threat of nuclear annihilation, then the calculus for inflicting and incurring casualties would be radically altered.

Absent the re-emergence of a peer competitor, the statistical trend in casualty figures can be expected to continue. Thus, the U.S. not only takes significant efforts to limit its losses, but also to greatly restrain damage wrought upon the enemy – because the American public cannot tolerate much exposure to either. A key example was the “highway of death” that helped precipitate the end of the first Gulf War.” Miles of vehicles destroyed by airstrikes on the road out of Kuwait left the impression of a massacre that caused concern over
public will to continue the fight and contributed to premature termination of the conflict.

**Focus against Adversary Leadership.** The limited character of war as described above causes a distinct shift in critical centers of gravity. In previous eras, conflicts have targeted fielded forces, industrial capacity, and the will of the people. Today, the most effective target for U.S. forces is adversary leadership. Focusing efforts against adversary leadership allows us to take advantage of our technological advances to avoid unnecessary contact with enemy forces and minimize wider damage against the target country. A decapitation strategy offers the ultimate goal in limited war, where a particularly evil individual or small group of uncooperative actors can be singled out for elimination while the rest of the nation is not engaged. The opening strike of Operation Iraqi Freedom was a hallmark of this new trend, but it was also seen in the attempts to bring pressure on Milosevic by targeting his crony support structure during the Kosovo conflict.

Our ability to hold the adversary leadership at risk leads them to perceive an entirely different character of war. Knowing that any strike against the U.S. could result in retaliation that seeks their own death, they see war as total. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is non-existent in the eyes of our adversaries. Yet, since the only center of gravity potentially vulnerable to their attacks is the will of the American people, there are some restraints on their conduct. Their objective is to cause enough pain to change our perceived cost benefit calculation and abandon the fight, but not too much pain to enrage us to the point where we insist on victory at any cost. Again, 9/11 can be used to illustrate this trend. Usama Bin Ladin struck against what he saw as a valid target, but some argue he miscalculated by generating such a massive counter-attack. On the other hand, the nation has yet to mobilize sufficient resources to finish the job.

**Global Scope.** The final descriptor for the new character of war is that it is global. Whereas geography has long been a predominating factor from the strategic to tactical scale of war, it now matters less. As noted earlier, information technology has broadened our fo-
cus to encompass regions beyond traditional geopolitical concern. Other advances in technology have made it possible for U.S. forces to engage anywhere on the planet within hours. On the opposite side of the equation, adversaries recognize the relative strength of our fielded forces and seek opportunities elsewhere – in the continental United States or even previously uninvolved third party states. It is no longer meaningful to think of conflicts as contained to a particular region in the face of growing concern over vulnerability in the homeland, missile proliferation, WMD proliferation, and cyber-threats to our globally integrated and networked society. We have lost the protection of our oceans, but at the same time can move and supply our forces over desert, mountain, and jungle with unparalleled ability.

The New Conduct of War

From the end of the 1991 Gulf War through today, the best overall descriptor is that war is being conducted asymmetrically. For the most part, we have not seen and should not expect to see major force-on-force engagements. The demise of the Soviet Union means there are virtually no capital ships to challenge our navy, our fighter pilots fly practically unopposed over enemy skies, and there will be no clash of armor in the Fulda Gap. Adversaries have come to realize the bold USAF challenge of “You Fly, You Die” is not hype, as evidenced by the absence of even a single sortie flown by the Iraqi Air Force in the latest conflict.

The superior equipment and training of U.S. forces assures it is almost impossible for adversaries to challenge them in a symmetric manner. The imbalance in resources reinforces this point as the U.S. accounts for 43% of the total global military expenditure. Yet as the attack on the USS Cole proved, there are alternative approaches to counter the U.S. Navy rather than building comparable vessels that cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Asymmetry is the natural result of a clash between strong and weak, and thus it recently has been and will continue to be the prevailing attribute in the conduct of war with the United States.
Another attribute of today’s war is the importance of deception, surprise, and intelligence. These concepts, which were downplayed by Clausewitz but portrayed as paramount by Sun Tzu, have once again come to the fore. Factors such as ensuring proper force ratios, alignment and positioning of troop formations are now far outweighed by the ability to catch the enemy off guard. This is a natural side effect of asymmetric battle, as a series of limited but intense engagements replace extended maneuvers played out over the course of long days and months of fighting.

Having dominated the realm of conventional forces and tactics, whenever U.S. forces are employed they achieve decisive results in relatively short duration high-intensity engagements. The combination of precision, intelligence, and strategic agility allows the U.S. military to rapidly overcome adversary forces when they present themselves for battle. However, recognizing their shortfall in this capacity, our adversaries continue to seek alternative methods to fight. Long drawn out conflicts between large field armies is an anachronism of past centuries, while unconventional conflicts such as insurgencies and the global war on terror are the wave of the future. As seen by continued fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan today, our adversaries will melt away only to come back as insurgent elements and present an enduring hazard. Even as it becomes easier for us to achieve quick tactical successes, complete victory in conflict seems to be a more and more elusive goal.

From Trends to Transformation

It is now evident that the 1991 Gulf War was the start of a turning point in the history of war. A U.S. military force of almost a half-million faced a veteran force of defending Iraqis of roughly equal number. Iraq attempted to engage in a traditional conflict based on their long experience at war with Iran—but after a debilitating air campaign and 100 hours of ground fighting, the U.S. decisively defeated what had been one of the world’s largest armies. Our ability to dramatically outmaneuver and outfight a well-prepared and equipped adversary was a lesson learned by the United States and the entire world audience. As a result of that experience and the continued
technological and societal changes detailed in this paper, the character and conduct of war has changed.

To date, the U.S. has continued to enjoy victories in the face of these changing conditions. Yet it remains essential that these changes should be fully understood in order to make the proper adjustments in force structure and strategy that are being described as transformation. For while it is still possible to win wars without optimizing force strategies, it is clearly not the preferred method. The optimal force mix must always maintain an ability to meet a spectrum of challenges, but it must also be continuously be re-balanced to adapt to new environments.

True transformation requires adjusting force structure and operations to meet what we expect future war to be like. Such a prediction can be made by examining current trends that have already begun to impact the character and conduct of war. What those trends portray is a limited war of asymmetric forces with short sporadic engagements, often drawn out over long periods of time. It is a struggle where we try to leverage our superior technology to defeat adversary leadership before the enemy can overcome our public will to fight.

**A Future Force Strategy**

The first conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that the U.S. must approach national security in a holistic manner. It is no longer possible for us to expect the military alone to achieve complete victory against our adversaries. The public will not tolerate the amount of death and destruction that such a strategy entails. Instead of expecting to overwhelm our opponents and force them into total submission in a manner similar to World War II, military force must be applied as part of an orchestrated approach to resolve crises.

In order to lay the groundwork for effective use of military power, it is necessary to build up our capability to apply diplomatic, economic, and information power. In the last few years, the defense budget rose from approximately $250 billion to $400 billion. During the same period, the U.S. budget for international affairs rose from approximately $10 billion dollars to almost $30 billion. While the percentage increases are similar, the total dollar figures reveal a significant imbalance in our investment among the various elements of
national power. The question we must answer is whether or not the money is being spent in the most effective manner, given the expectations regarding the character and conduct of war we will fight.

An alternative approach would begin by reallocating a sizable portion of the recent increase, away from defense to the equally critical areas of international affairs, intelligence, and homeland security. The DoD budget would still be quite healthy, while the tens of billions added to these other functions would facilitate truly transformational change. Our Foreign Service corps could be tripled in size from five to fifteen thousand. Public Diplomacy programs that have been struggling and largely ineffective in the global war of ideas could be completely reinvented with a ten-fold increase in resources. Our ability to sway hearts and minds could be complimented with billions of dollars more foreign economic and military aid. In the realm of homeland security, the nation’s critical infrastructure could be protected, while we develop a robust cyber defense capability. Lastly, significant increases in human intelligence and analytical capabilities could be made to better match the challenges we now face.

After shifting these resources the DoD would be part of a strong team rather than the sole effective player in national security. Even so, significant internal changes would be needed to strengthen DoD’s ability to adapt to the environment as laid out earlier. There is one component of the DoD that currently aligns very closely with the expected needs. Special Operations Forces (SOF) exist to conduct the types of missions that have now become the mainstay of war. Their ability to move quickly and undetected behind enemy lines to overcome discreet targets with precision is unmatched. As Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed, this capability is a true force multiplier and can directly offset the need to deploy additional forces. Similarly, SOF specialties in areas such as civil affairs and psychological operations are essential to the persistent challenges of peacekeeping, nation building, and counter-insurgency. When core competencies in foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and special reconnaissance are added to the mix, it becomes clear that the road
to transformation leads to right to SOF. These forces should become the centerpiece of the DoD.

With approximately 46,000 personnel and $6 billion in resources, Special Operations represents less than 2% of the DoD. Yet, it is clear that these forces have been, and will continue to be, the first to get the call. Making an appropriate investment in SOF will likely require draw downs in other areas. Again, the key to making these tradeoffs is to examine the actual and expected combat requirements. As the earlier analysis reveals, conventional capabilities such as fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines, field artillery and tanks are simply not in demand to the degree they once were. It is hard to argue that our dominant position cannot be maintained even if these weapon systems were cut by 20-30% from their current levels. Resources of this magnitude would permit dramatic increases in SOF, doubling or tripling currently available forces.

Expansion even beyond that level may be ideal in theory, but impossible in practice. Increases to SOF must be approached carefully to avoid the point of diminishing returns and ensure their unique training and exceptional character is not diluted. Other forces must be built-up where they have a comparative advantage. For example, military police strength needs to be increased significantly and a constabulary force established to relieve over-taxed units performing occupation duties. Together, with continuing existing emphasis on precision bombing and strategic airlift, we can have a military force that is more truly matched to the strategic environment.

**Conclusion**

While it is impossible to be certain what future conflict will entail, we can make reasonable predictions based upon evident trends. In doing so, this paper has argued for a need to re-evaluate our investment towards national security. If the character and conduct of war is to continue in the manner predicted in this paper, then much of our investment is misplaced. At the core of our national security is risk management and it is imperative that alternatives be carefully considered.
Notes
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References
Morphing War
Counter-narcotics, Counter-insurgency, and Counter-terrorism Doctrine in Colombia

David C. Becker

Mr. Becker suggests that building a better army for Colombia will not help much to attack the real threat—civil insecurity and the lack of territorial control that demand more assistance to the police rather than the military. He advises that the grassroots response needed to fight a criminal/terrorist war best comes from local law enforcement. Police offer crime control and civil defense, and help to build government presence and institutions in rural and urban areas.

“The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” — Carl von Clausewitz

Because of the Global War on Terror, US policy in Colombia recently abruptly changed from a strict focus on controlling the flow of drugs to the US to a broader policy of support for Colombia’s battles with insurgent and paramilitary forces. Although we have expanded US counter-insurgency aid and training to the military, we have misunderstood the kind of war and the doctrine and tactics we need to use. The correct tactics are more anti-terrorist and anti-bandit than anti-revolutionary. Civilian insecurity and lack of territorial control demand more assistance to the police, rather

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than more assistance to the military. This will be more effective in Colombia, and better for maintaining long term support from the US.

**FARC: Predators, Not Proletariat**

Years of assistance and pressure from the US and other Western countries to improve counter-narcotics efforts and stop the flow of drugs out of Colombia has not improved the situation for the average Colombian.

Infamous drug lords are no longer the main threat, but ample funding from violent crime and drug smuggling made guerrillas independent of outside financing or internal contributions to where they became a serious threat to the state in the late 1990’s. Two left wing groups started as peasant movements. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC – approx. 18,000 men) grew substantially in the last 10 years, as has the National Liberation Army (4,000). The most rapidly growing force, reports Janes’ *Sentinel Security Assessment*, is the right wing paramilitary association United Self Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC- 18,000). The AUC grew up as civil defense militias to protect cattle farmers from guerrilla rustling. It was only a few hundred men 10 years ago. It now protects coca fields and laboratories, despite protestations of piety.

While guerrillas started in 1964 with ideological support from Cuba, they are no longer truly Marxist and they are no longer popular, even in the rural areas. Since losing all vestiges of outside support 15 years ago, they have resorted to various predatory methods of financing, according to Alfredo Rangel in the Journal of International Affairs. They are involved with extortion of large and small businesses and ranchers selling protection against destruction or kidnapping (with about 3,500 kidnappings, Colombia accounted for around 75 percent of ALL kidnappings in the world in 2002 reports the US Department of State).

In the last 10 years, guerrillas took the role of drug supplier and facilitator. The FARC receives at least $470 million dollars a year in...
revenues from taxes on illicit growers, profits from drug labs making cocaine, or in protection payments for shipments in transit to other countries.

To handle all this business each FARC front (of about 100 men) must be self-supporting and send back funds regularly to the headquarters. Those who do not; lose their positions. If there are accusations of corruption, they lose their lives, according to news reports. Forcible recruitment is common, especially of children under 16 years old who are living in the rural areas controlled by guerrillas. Other volunteers join because of the promised regular paycheck. This cutthroat capitalism erases any vestige of Marxist Leninist “popular revolution” thought from the actions of any front commander, and makes the FARC increasingly a predator on the proletariat as well as upper classes.

Guerrillas are the major threat, but not the only one. Right wing groups have a grudging respect and support, especially in the rural areas, despite their horrific massacres of suspected guerrilla sympathizers and families (matched tit for tat by the guerrillas), but only because they provide protection from the even more predatory FARC. One view of the complicated Colombian reality suggests that after dismantling the guerrilla threat the paramilitary threat and presence will fade away. This is wishful thinking. Over time, the “paras” are developing their own reasons to remain in existence (drug money, a salary, or a simple lust for power) even if they do not pose the same threat to the average citizen now.

**Counter-Narcotics Funds for a Virtual Counter-Insurgency?**

President Alvaro Uribe elected in 2002 on a promise to prosecute the war, committed to spend 4-6% of GDP on defense into the indefinite future. In other words, Colombia is beginning to take a serious look at the insurgency issue and confront the budgetary realities of a civil war. This willingness to pay a fair share of the costs of a military expansion made it much easier for US supporters to urge a change to a broader definition of US national interests in support of counterinsurgency versus a more narrowly self serving interest in merely stopping the flow of drugs to the US.
US policy in Colombia under the Clinton Administration was designed to go after drug traffickers while steering away from support for the military in its counter-insurgency effort. This reflected the generally bad human rights reputation of military units and their cooperation with vicious paramilitary forces.

As the guerrillas became stronger and more entwined with drug trafficking, the Armed Forces became interested in tapping into US funds for counter-narcotics training and equipment. This was just as the US Congress became more willing to consider lifting certain restrictions on support to the military. Starting with two “anti-drug brigades” that were dedicated solely to anti-narcotics missions (search and destroy, support for police units, clearing guerrillas from areas for spray operations and rural development operations), the Army received training from US Special Forces. Best of all, Congress approved funding for 72 Blackhawk and Huey helicopters. However, this counter-narcotics support was not enough for a nationwide counter-insurgency campaign. Lobbying continued by Colombia (with support from some Congress members), to get more funds with fewer restrictions. Support grew for the idea that a narrow drug enforcement approach was not dealing with the real issue – the attack on the state by destabilizing armed forces. A state under attack on so many fronts was naturally going to be a good place for other criminal activities such as drug cultivation or smuggling.

The Tipping Point: Counter-Terror Support for Counter-Insurgency Operations

After the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the requests for more funding and a focus on counter-insurgency quickly converted into an ostensible “counter-terror” requirement supported by the Bush Administration. The FARC obligingly and indiscriminately blew up a car, house, mule, and even bike bombs in various cities, making President Uribe’s case for him. Congress did not need much urging, and on March 21, 2002, lifted the restrictions confining expenditures to drug enforcement. This allowed the Armed Forces to use the “anti-drug brigades” and Blackhaws anywhere in the country, against narcotics trafficking and against guerrillas. But no new funds were voted, setting up a “new unfunded mandate” that had to be met by drawing down on the drug enforcement efforts of the police, explained former Ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson, in October, 2003.
(In)Security and the State

The guerrillas have not survived because they are popular, strong, smart, and tough, but rather because the Colombian state has allowed them to continue as pseudo-Marxist bandits. When the Army defeated the guerrillas in the mountains in the early 60’s, the remnants moved deeper into the jungles. For many years, Colombia wrote off its rural hinterlands, true frontier areas where settlers arrived with nothing and began to farm. Law and order, much less health care and services, never followed the settlers. As one local expert commentator, Alfredo Rangel, notes “in reality, part of the guerrilla’s success, entrenchment, and longevity is attributable to its having been the first to build finished, politically and administratively delineated spaces in these territories.” Over time, they rebuilt with the aid of drugs, extortion, and kidnapping. Reliable estimates show guerrilla presence in up to 600 of 1075 municipalities (i.e. counties) in the country, according to an Inter American Development Bank report in 2000. A conservative estimate suggests 200 of those 600 are sufficiently dominated that guerrillas influence contracts provided by the town and skim 5-10 percent to fund guerilla operations —arguably an adequate measure of presence and control, Rangel adds. Under threat from the FARC, half the elected mayors in Colombia were forced to resign or govern from neighboring departmental capitals, rather than live in their own town.

At this point, the Army has approximately 55,000 professional soldiers (volunteers) and 100,000 regular soldiers (draftees). At the same time, police went from 79,000 professional police to total 100,000 by the end of 2003. This is not enough force to win a counterinsurgency war using the standard counterinsurgency doctrine of a 10 to 1 advantage required to prevail over the 20-25,000 guerrillas and the 18,000 paramilitaries. A fair assumption is that the military will need double the present professional forces. It will also need equipment. Some foresee a force of 400 helicopters, plus other aircraft, as well as other transport, Marcella says. This tracks with the US experience in El Salvador, a country the size of a county in Texas, which had 60 US-donated Huey helicopters by the end of the war. (Colombia is five times Montana’s size.) On the positive side, the
Uribe administration is also creating a national locally based militia, a network of informants, and lightly armed police counterinsurgency units to support the Army.

**Right War, Wrong Tactics?**

For the US, the goals of the new Uribe Administration strategy are appropriate, and fit well with US long-term interests in peace and stability as well as the goal to control the flow of drugs to the US. However, is increased spending and manpower going to be efficient and effective in the long term? A larger, better equipped and trained Colombian military is the obvious step and one that our military and special forces advisors have stressed during the last several years, despite lack of US funding to help and encourage reforms. The Army can certainly use assistance and training; even critics agree that the Army is “resource-strapped” and note the need for improved security.

However, the means selected (building the military) and the ways (mobility, small units, and firepower) rely heavily on an analysis of the counterinsurgency environment that assumes that the solution is a military “force on force” situation. The Colombian Army may become a better hammer, but Colombia may not be a nail.

As guerrilla theory expert Andrew J. Joes put it in *Saving Democracy*, “Counterinsurgency is not a subset of conventional war. In an insurgency Clausewitz’s center of gravity is the civilian population…in the loyalty or at least secure control of the population.”

Building a better army may be what the US knows how to do, for which we have planned, trained and have US advisors available. However, it may not attack the real threat—pervasive criminal and terrorist insecurity for the general population. Columbia’s insurgency is not a classic revolutionary insurgency any longer. It is closer to banditry or even more like a mafia, with low support from the population. While there was a time a few years back when the FARC was able to mass forces and successfully conduct attacks on battalion sized military units, it was more due to the low training, poor leadership and poor Armed Forces tactics rather than FARC skill and underground support network.
A truly dedicated revolutionary army, ala the FMLN in El Salvador, is more concerned with becoming unpopular with its supporters, and even risks greater fighter casualties to avoid collateral damage. The FARC guerrillas, for their part, demonstrate an unwillingness to suffer casualties, preferring stand off weapons that cause indiscriminate damage (homemade gas pipe bombs), possibly because too many casualties in a virtually mercenary force make you very unpopular with the troops.

Even with manpower and equipment limits “the newly invigorated armed forces have driven the guerrillas back into their mountain and jungle strongholds. Instead of concentrating many hundreds of guerrillas for attacks, the FARC have broken down into smaller groups again...they no longer take on security forces directly, but concentrate on destroying infrastructure,” Janes Assessment reports.

This war requires a different approach. “The government response to an insurgency should take as its fundamental assumption that the true nature of the threat lies in the insurgent’s political potential rather than his military power, although the latter may appear more worrying in the short term,” writes British General Gavin Bullock. He says, “Commanders should seek ‘soft’ methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of minimum force necessary is a well proven counterinsurgency lesson.”

Support Your Local Police

Interestingly, large guerrilla attacks on much smaller police units in some towns were never as successful as attacks against the Army. Although not as well armed, police are all volunteers, have a lifetime career path, and are high school graduates. Usually untrained in small unit military tactics, they are generally better led. As one observer noted, “With stronger ties and support of the civilian population, the police often would be warned of attack, and could prepare their defense, or even be protected by rings of grateful civilians,” notes US Embassy Police Advisor Paul Mahlsted. Even when overwhelmed by superior numbers, there are few cases where police units surrendered before firing their last bullet.
The situation appears to be reverting to the early stages of an insurgency, often characterized by terrorist acts, attacks on infrastructure, and always the criminal attacks on individuals. It calls for a different and non-military approach.

**More Police.** Colombia needs a sharp increase in police forces to provide the force structure needed for a terrorist and criminal threat. We have not done much in this arena. Police support by the US in the past has been limited to counternarcotics assistance for elite counter narcotics units and some work with other specialized units. Only 4,000 police are in counternarcotics units receiving US support. The vast majority of police in the rural areas have received little assistance. Estimated US financial and training and equipment support in 2004 is dedicated half to the Army ($158 million of which $147 million alone is going to support US supplied helicopters), and half to the police ($147 million). Of the police amount, $120 million is dedicated to counternarcotics efforts, and $13 million is for rebuilding secure rural police posts to allow police to return to 160 towns.

Police are at least as undermanned as the military. Most of the 100,000-man police force is dedicated to other duties typical for normal police units in any country; even while simultaneously defending against guerrilla attacks and providing security to government officials. The government partially recognizes the problem. Police expect as much as a 25% increase in staff as part of the Uribe policy. That is probably not enough in a country with high general crime rates and the highest homicide rate in the world. The homicide rate for Colombia is .77 per 1000 citizens, compared to South Africa at number 2 with .5 per 1000, or the US, .05 per 1000.

The national ratio of police to civilians is 2.22 to 1000 citizens. By comparison, this puts it a bit below average in a survey of 48 nations by the UN, virtually all of which do not have threats to civil security faced by Colombia. Hong Kong has 4.53 police officers per 1000 residents, as an example, and Portugal has 4.87. Countries with the same level of per capita income as Colombia, such as Thailand (3.46), South Africa (2.81) Slovakia (3.73), demonstrate that an increase in the Colombian police force of 50 to 100 percent is justifiable. This would still leave the total number of police (200,000) at below 4.5 per 1000.
Policing is a Civilian Effort. This essentially civilian effort would have more impact on the image of state weakness or strength than increasing the military. Sheer numbers are not the whole solution of course, training, equipping and supporting would be a continuing budget and quality control issue, but the average police unit certainly uses less equipment and spends more time in the field than the average military air mobile brigade. Colombian police are well-trained and modern in approach by Latin American standards, an observation implicitly supported by human rights activists, who, while they complain about individual rights violations by the police in Colombia, do not level the “wholesale” arguments that they focus on the military.

There are several logical advantages to relying on police to carry more of the counterinsurgency load. Police units are more attuned to working with the community, and collecting intelligence directly from the community. Most military units remain more isolated by the very nature of their training and culture, as well as their fewer but larger bases outside of town. In addition, the public sees the average Colombian policeman as a more effective public servant. The policeman is supposed to be talking to the public as part of his position, making establishing contacts much easier. He (or she - female police officers are often a plus) is better accepted because he/she is a direct service provider – resolving local disputes, catching dogs, issuing documents, directing traffic, etc. This contact is the essence of counter-insurgency political work, if done well and respectfully by the officers. The police have a reputation for this; the Army will have to work to establish it.

Reinforcing the police will serve several ends. Stronger and more numerous police units will deny access to the guerrillas in the areas where they work, providing the “clear and hold strategy” that is needed in a guerrilla war, following behind the Army in the most conflictive zones, but also entering and occupying the “reinforced police stations” that are part of the present expansion concept. At the same time, they provide a direct personal service to the citizens in those towns, the ability to control crime and enforce contracts, something lacking in many parts of the “Wild West” areas of Colombia. (Hundreds of hamlets have never had police and want them.)
The Follow-on Effort. It is not too early to start looking at the aftermath of victory – ensuring a better peace. Experience in Central America, Bosnia, Kosovo and Africa has shown that the follow-on to peace agreements is usually an upsurge in chaos and violent armed crime due to demobilization of both the guerrillas and the soldiers. If there is not a negotiated solution and a quick clean end, the war will wind down in a protracted manner, which means that the need for small local police-type forces will be even more necessary. Unlike the Army, when the war is over the police will still have an enlarged role to fill in society.

This approach benefits the Colombian military also. The US military deployed in several countries (Bosnia, Kosovo) where an exit strategy had to be delayed while a respectable local civilian security force was constructed. We should help the Colombian military avoid doing tasks for which they did not train and are not equipped. This will avoid human rights scandals as well.

Admittedly, this reorientation of emphasis from military to police deliberately ignores the strong arguments that greater economic assistance by the US and better social programs by the Colombian government builds credibility and support among the population. While true, development alone will not definitively squash the guerrillas.

In the same way, justice sector reforms are important to overall victory as well—arrests not followed with convictions can lead to extra-judicial violence, and do not stop the guerrillas. However, to “fight” a low scale terrorist/criminal war you need a grassroots response that best comes from local law enforcement.

Using the police offers a “two-for-one” concept—better civil defense AND better crime control leads to more support for the government and makes it even easier to take on the guerrillas. Dedicated and adequate police forces are a better method than the military alone for supporting local state services and building a competent respected state structure. We need to shift our training and resources to where they will do the most good in a terrorist environment.
Some observers think the US is more comfortable with providing trainers for military purposes, and the military are more comfortable looking at clean military “force on force” issues, rather than messy political ones, declares Michael McClintock in his 1992 book on *US Guerrilla Warfare*. We, and the Colombians, need to avoid the comfortable typical military to military answer in counterinsurgency—low tech and personal is a better way to solve the insecurity problem. Neglecting to build up the police, diverting our funds to military counterinsurgency efforts, not looking at the long term needs of the country, not fixing the immediate problems of citizens in rural and urban areas—these problems will come back to haunt us unless we take steps to make sure we are not fighting the wrong war in Colombia.
Countering Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology

Matthew T. Nilson

Major Nilson suggests a counter-indoctrination system to neutralize the spread of the Jihad ideology. The objective of such a system should be to influence and persuade the vulnerable population from within, through duplicating the fundamentalists’ Islamic education system. Because of its resident Psychological Operations expertise, USSOCOM will play a leadership role in countering Islamic Fundamentalist ideology.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Government outlined a strategy—the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—to combat the threat posed by terrorist organizations. This strategy to counter terrorism outlined four tenets, which are: to defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny state sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defend U.S. interests at home and abroad (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2003).

The third tenet, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, is of particular interest because this tenet attempts to address the root causes of terrorism. Unfortunately, no comprehensive theory has emerged that explains the al-Qaeda phenomenon currently plaguing the security of the United States. Yet, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined two specific objectives to eliminate the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism: (1) partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the (re)emergence of terrorism; and (2) win the war of ideas.

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The first objective deals with the socio-economic factors that cause instability and not the religio-cultural conditions that destabilize society. This objective’s primary focus is to provide political, economic, and military aide to weak states to increase their internal stability. The second objective addresses delegitimizing terrorism, supporting moderate Muslim governments to reverse the spread of extremist ideology, and to finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In effect, the second objective is an attempt to develop a counter-ideology strategy against terrorism espoused by radical Muslims like Osama bin Laden. These radical Muslims embrace an Islamic fundamentalist ideology. The question remains, how can the United States win the war of ideas without addressing the tenets of Islamic fundamentalism? Further, which government agency or agencies will be responsible for countering religious ideologies?

Unfortunately, these questions are very complex and deviate from conventional psychological operations, which are a vital part of the United States’ information strategy. The organization responsible for conducting Psychological Operations is the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC)—a subordinate unit of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). To win the war of ideas, the National Command Authority may task USSOCOM, as the lead planning agent, to develop a counter-ideology strategy to defeat Islamic extremism. Furthermore, to develop an appropriate counter-ideology strategy, a historical analysis is necessary to understand the context in which the Islamic fundamentalist movement flourishes. Therefore, this paper will address the historical resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the 20th Century, outline the ideological tenets of Sunni inspired terrorism, develop a counter-ideology strategy to Islamic fundamentalism; and address USSOCOM’s strategic role in counter-ideology operations.

**Origins of Modern Jihad**

Although terrorism is a tactic or technique to incite fear, any individual, group, or organization can use terrorism as a means to
an end. However, the current trend of terrorism has a long history based on an underlying Islamic ideology that embraces the concept of Jihad or “holy war.” Islam recognizes two interpretations for Jihad. The first type of Jihad is an internal jihad within oneself—the battle to follow the word of Allah as told by the prophet Mohammad. The second type of Jihad, and the one espoused by Islamic radicals, is the external Jihad against the apostate Muslims and infidels (Knapp, 2003, pp. 82-85). Both types of Jihad have been around for centuries, but the father of modern Jihad is considered to be Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was an Islamic scholar of Shariah Law at Al-Azhar University in Cairo Egypt. While teaching at Al-Azhar University, Sayyid Qutb wrote numerous books on the Quran, and he became a prominent member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, Qutb’s imprisonment by Nasser, the Egyptian President, inspired an extreme version of Islam that is the ideological basis of today’s Jihad and Takfiri movements. In prison Sayyid Qutb wrote numerous letters, and completed a book called *Milestones*—it is also important to note that some of Qutb’s ideas were drawn from the terminology and theories of Maulana Maududi the founder of the Pakistani fundamentalist group Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). While Qutb was in prison, an organization known as the Tanzim was created (Qutb, 2000, pp. 7-9). This group would later evolve into the organization known as Al-Jihad or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is currently led by Osama bin Laden’s Lieutenant Ayman Al-Zawahiri and is dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian Government. Later, the Tanzim was linked to circles studying Qutb’s prison letters and writings, and these writings, along with the writings of Maulana Maududi, have inspired today’s Islamic fundamentalist movement. In fact, many of the Muslims who strongly follow the teachings of Qutb are referred to as Qutbees.

These teachings would spread throughout the Islamic world after the death of Sayyid Qutb in 1966—Qutb was executed for his alleged involvement in the assassination attempt of President Nasser (El-Kadi, 2004). However, in 1970 Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt, and he released the remaining members of the Muslim Brotherhood. These members would relocate to other Muslim, European, American, African and Asian countries, and in these Islamic Diaspo-
ras is where terrorism has found its base of support and has emerged as a global threat. During the 1970s, Sayyid Qutb’s students taught Jihad in Islamic universities, mosques, and madrassas in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In fact, Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Mohammad Qutb, was Osama bin Laden’s professor and mentor at King Abdul Azziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In 1979, Islamic clerics and scholars recruited Muslims to participate in the Soviet-Afghanistan War. In Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden would inherit the Maktab al-khadhamat—the precursor to Al-Qaeda—from Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood member Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Islamic fundamentalists, like Osama bin Laden, embraced Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, and when the United States occupied Saudi Arabia to support Operation Desert Storm a perceived injustice against Islam occurred. As a consequence, the revolt against Islamic secular states and the West exploded in an attempt to eliminate the apostate Muslims in power and prevent the infidels from occupying the Islamic holy lands. To wage this war, bin Laden developed a vast terrorist network to attack and hopefully expel the infidels from the land of Islam.

**Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology**

The impact Sayyid Qutb and Maududi’s writings have on the Islamic world are comparable to the effect Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ Communist Manifesto had on Europe, Asia, and Central America. These two distinct social movements developed and propagated within the academic world—although Islamic fundamentalism spread through Islamic universities, whereas Communism spread through European and the Western style universities. Yet, the Islamic fundamentalist ideology is vastly different because the Islamists base their ideology on religio-cultural principles, which are opposed to the separation of church and state; whereas, Communism is a socio-economic ideology opposed to the capitalistic system of class rule.

To begin to understand the Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology it is important to understand Sayyid Qutb’s writings. The concepts espoused in his books, Social Justice in Islam and Milestones, are the ideas propagating through Islamic universities, local village madrassas, and mosques. The basic tenets outlined in Milestones, for
example, are: 1) the whole world is in a state of Jahiliyyah, or ignorance of divine guidance; 2) Society can only be governed under the sovereignty of a divine God and not by the sovereignty of other men; 3) no political system or power should hinder the preaching of Islam; 4) God requires the enforcement of the divine law (Shariah Law); 5) the Jihad Movement is offensive in nature and necessary to free the faithful from the servitude of men.

Qutb counters the pro-western Muslim viewpoint that Jihad is internal and defensive in nature, and he argues that Jihad must be pre-emptive to ensure the Islamic way of life is protected. In Qutb’s opinion, Jihad is not only necessary to protect the homeland from invaders, but also to establish God’s authority on earth. To support his argument, Qutb quotes passages from the Quran to show the offensive nature of Jihad, Qutb (2002, pp. 69-70) states:

*But the Islamic movement does not need any arguments taken from the literature, as it stands on the clear verses of the Quran:*

*They ought to fight in the way of God who have sold the life of this world for the life of the Hereafter; and whoever fights in the way of God and is killed or becomes victorious to him shall We give a great reward. Why should not you fight in the way of God for those men, women and children who have been oppressed because they are weak and who call ‘Our Lord! Take us out of this place whose people are oppressors, and raise for us an ally, and send for us a helper’. Those who believe fight in the cause of God, while those who do not believe fight in the cause of tyranny. Then fight against the friends of Satan. Indeed, the strategy of Satan is weak. (3: 74-76)*

*Say to the unbelievers that if they refrain, then whatever they have done before will be forgiven them; but if they turn back, then they know what happened to earlier nations. And fight against them until there is no oppression and the religion is wholly for God. But if they refrain, then God is watching*
counter their actions. But if they do not, then know that God is your Ally and He is your Helper. (8: 38-40)

Fight against those among the People of the Book [Christians, and Jews] who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and his messenger have forbidden, and who do not consider the true religion [Islam] as their way of life, until they are subdued and pay Jizyah. The Jews say: ‘Ezra is the Son of God’; and the Christians say: ‘The Messiah is the Son of God’. These are mere sayings from their mouths, following those who preceded them and disbelieved. God will assail them; how they are perverted! They have taken their rabbis and priests as lords other than God, and the Messiah, son of Mary; and they were commanded to worship none but One God. There is no deity but He, Glory be to Him above what they associate with Him! They desire to extinguish God’s light with their mouths, and God intends to perfect his light, although the unbelievers may be in opposition. (9:29-32)

Counter-Ideology

First, to win the war of ideas, the tenets listed above must be addressed and countered in an effective way. To counter the Islamic fundamentalist ideology two things must occur. First, a counter-indoctrination system must be developed, which is similar in structure and method as that used by Islamic fundamentalist. This counter-structure includes the development or co-option of a series of universities, mosques, and madrassas that preach the counter-ideology. The influence and trust developed by these scholars and clerics over their audience is overwhelming. Not only do these clerics and scholars have a cultural, religious, and geographic advantage, but they also have an institutional advantage. The authoritative nature of religion and academia creates an environment that can easily manipulate adherents. Without a counter-structure the effectiveness of message dissemination and internalization will be greatly hindered.
Fundamentalist clerics and scholars live with the people, share a similar cultural identity, and have more credibility when discussing the Quran. These factors greatly enhance the level of trust shared between student and teacher. Consequently, the United States cannot even begin to win the war of ideas without a counter-structure in place that creates bonds of trust between Muslims and Americans. Without a counter-structure that uses the same methods of recruitment, targets the same vulnerable population, and use the same institutional advantage, the counter-message will not be internalized. Further, this counter-structure has a strategic advantage in that this counter-structure will compete for the same economic and support resources as the fundamentalists. When done effectively, the influence of Islamic fundamentalist will dwindle as the resources transfer from the fundamentalist network to the moderate counter-structure. In theory, this transfer of resources will directly reduce the charitable funds siphoned to terrorist groups—an added benefit.

Second, the context of the counter-ideology must be Islamic in nature. Radically replacing an Islamic methodology with a Christian dogma will isolate the population and strengthen the bonds between Muslims and the Islamic fundamentalists thereby reinforcing religious crusade rhetoric. Furthermore, promoting the principles of democracy may not curb the adversarial tenets of fundamentalist doctrine. The core principle of Islamic fundamentalism is that faith cannot be divorced from practical life to include the political, social, and economic aspects of society. The dichotomy of Islamic fundamentalism is that many of the principles of democracy, such as the principle of social equality, a representative government, and a respect for the individual within a community may be congruent with Islamism. However, the principles of equality only apply to Muslims who live in the land of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam).

In and of itself, democracy may not be an effective counter to an Islamic theocracy. A democracy is a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people, but is indirectly exercised through a system of representation with delegated authority periodically renewed. An Islamic theocracy, on the other hand, is a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by God, but is indirectly exercised through a system of legislation that follows Sha-
rialah Law. The Islamist argument is not about majority rule or representation by the people, but about Islam and the Western ideals of the separation of church and state. Islamist believe in the unification of society and God—the antithesis of the separation of church and state. Marketing democracy as the counter-frame to Islamic fundamentalism neglects the core issues. Therefore, to have a successful counter-ideology strategy both the structure and message must be congruent and target the appropriate audience.

**USSOCOM’s Role**

To win the war of ideas, the supposition presented is that a counter-structure and counter-message must be developed. The question remains as to which organization will be responsible for developing the counter-structure and propagating the counter-message. In the U.S. military, only USSOCOM has the assets responsible for conducting psychological operations. The objective of psychological operations is to convince the target audience to act in a manner favorable to the United States. Therefore, the development of a counter-structure and counter-message may fall within USSOCOM’s purview. Although this task would incorporate numerous governmental agencies, to include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Education, a portion of this strategy would fall within the responsibilities of USSOCOM’s psychological operations group. This situation is not without historical precedence, in the American Indian War the United States Government used religion as a strategic tool to reframe the beliefs of an indigenous population. The Office of Indian Affairs used Protestant missionaries to change the belief system of various Indian tribes.

However, to effectively market the U.S. counter-ideology, USSOCOM may incur new responsibilities including the building, funding, and monitoring of Islamic mosques and madrassas, and the training and indoctrination of Islamic clerics. This new role may become a necessity as it appears that the moderate voice in the Islamic world is mute. Additionally, any attempt by the government to aggressively quell Islamic fundamentalism may destabilize the government’s support base. For example, countries like Saudi Arabia may not have the popular support or the will to diffuse Wahabbism—an extreme
form of Islamic fundamentalism. Therefore, USSOCOM’s ability to act through, by, and with Islamic moderates may be limited in scale, which may necessitate the organic development of an Islamic counter-structure. The development of this Islamic counter-structure will require the assistance of U.S. Islamic scholars and professors of Middle Eastern Studies. Yet, the oversight of this unique inter-agency working group could remain inside USSOCOM because of USSOCOM’s civil affairs and psychological operations (CA/PSYOP) capability. The operational and intelligence link between USSOCOM as lead planning agent and the clandestine counter-structure will challenge traditional special operations, but no other military organization has the capability to prosecute a counter-ideology campaign.

However, this strategy does have some fundamental drawbacks. First, this strategy extends past the norms of traditional psychological operations by attempting to duplicate a religious education system. Most U.S. military leaders and planners are not familiar with the intricacies of Islamic doctrine, and are not apt to adapting such an unorthodox strategy. Second, the political ramifications of a U.S. military organization covertly or overtly running an Islamic school may not be feasible. However, the advantages in information collection, resource control, and economic self-sustainability is significant enough to at least consider this strategy as a viable option.

Conclusion

The historical resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has manifested itself into political violence directed at the United States. One of the root causes of Islamic terrorism against the U.S. is the ideological teachings of Islamic scholars like Sayyid Qutb. This new resentment towards Western ideals is spreading through Islamic universities and mosques due to these institutions’s authoritative structure. The presupposition posited in this essay is a method to neutralize the spread of the Jihad ideology by developing a counter-indoctrination system. This system’s objective is to influence and persuade the vulnerable population from within by duplicating the fundamentalist’s Islamic educational system. This counter-structure will attack the ideological support infrastructure by competing for the same resources, and harnessing the same institutional, geographic and cultural advan-
tages as the Islamic fundamentalists. The advantage to this system is that success can be measured in the counter-ideology struggle. That is, data can be collected on membership within U.S. funded madrassas and mosques. Additionally, this counter-ideology method has the added benefits of indirectly targeting the terrorist’s funds and identifying potential terrorist sympathizers. Without a counter-structure, that amply delivers an appropriate counter-frame to Islamic fundamentalism, the ability of terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda to gain support in the Islamic world will increase.

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