North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

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Summary

The six parties to the North Korean nuclear negotiations concluded an agreement on February 13, 2007, that specifies two Phases of implementation. The phases provided for a freeze of North Korean nuclear installations at the Yongbyon site, a subsequent disablement of all North Korean nuclear facilities, and a North Korean declaration of “all nuclear programs.” The Agreement also establishes working groups of the six parties on subjects such as U.S.-North Korean normalization of relations, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, energy and economic cooperation, Japan-North Korea normalization of relations, and a North Korean peace and security mechanism. The Six Party Agreement was negotiated following a North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the imposition of sanctions against North Korea by the United Nations Security Council, and mounting congressional criticism of Administration policy. The nuclear test signaled progress by North Korean in reprocessing plutonium since 2002 for six to eight atomic bombs.

The Agreement also came about because of changes in Bush Administration policy. Tactically, the Administration ended its unwillingness to negotiate bilaterally with North Korea and actively sought bilateral meetings; the details of the Agreement were negotiated at these meetings.

The implementation of the Initial Phase of the Agreement, which had a 60-day deadline, has been delayed because of North Korean demands for access to foreign banks to deposit $25 million from frozen accounts at the Banco Delta in Macau — the object of U.S. financial sanctions since September 2005 because of Banco Delta’s involvement in North Korean criminal counterfeiting. Implementation of Phase Two, which has no timetable, likely will involve new rounds of negotiations, especially between the Bush Administration and North Korea over issues in contention like the definition of disablement, the U.S. claim that North Korea has a secret highly enriched uranium program, verification of any disablement or declaration of nuclear programs, and issues unresolved in the working groups.

This report will be updated periodically.
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Background to the Six Party Agreement of February 2007

North Korea’s Nuclear Test

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a statement on October 16, 2006, that the explosion was very small, less than one kiloton (3-4 percent of the explosion power of the Nagasaki plutonium atomic bomb). U.S. officials also stated that the bomb tested was a plutonium bomb. Some experts consequently postulated that the test was not totally successful and that only a portion of the plutonium in the bomb had been detonated. Some experts speculated that North Korea may have tried to test a small scale atomic bomb. Most believed that North Korea had not reached the technology level to test the prototype of a small nuclear warhead.¹ The test comes after North Korea conducted multiple tests of missiles on July 4, 2006, in which the test of a long-range Taepodong missile failed but the tests of short range Scud and medium-range Nodong missiles were successful.

Most experts also were in agreement that North Korea has 40 to 50 kilograms of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium that it has extracted from its operating five megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Using six kilograms per weapon, this would be enough for six to eight atomic bombs.²

United Nations Sanctions

The international reaction to the nuclear test was uniformly harsh. Even China openly criticized North Korea, a break from Beijing’s past policy of not criticizing North Korea in public. President Bush warned North Korea of “consequences” if North Korea transferred nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to other governments or terrorist groups. Some observers, however, noted that his statement seemed to be a retreat from the past Administration position that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons was unacceptable.³ The Bush Administration’s diplomacy focused

³ Shanker, Thom and Sanger, David E. Making good on Bush’s vow will require detective (continued...)
on securing a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, calling on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. It imposed several sanctions:

*Cargo Inspections.* It requests (but not orders) countries to inspect cargo to and from North Korea to prevent trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and related materials.

*Arms Embargo.* It bans trade with North Korea on battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles.

*Trade Restrictions.* It bans trade in materials related to ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction. It also bans the sale of luxury goods to North Korea. (North Korean leader Kim Jong-il was estimated by the U.S. military in 2003 to spend $100 million annually in importing luxury goods.)

*Asset Freezes.* It calls on countries to freeze funds and other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by people connected with North Korea’s unconventional weapons program.

*Travel Ban.* It imposes a travel ban on people connected to North Korea’s weapons program.

**Resumption of Six Party Talks, December 2006**

Following the nuclear test, strenuous Chinese diplomacy produced a meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan on October 31, 2006. North Korea agreed to a U.S. proposal that resumed six party talks would include a U.S.-North Korea bilateral “working group” to address the issue of U.S. financial sanctions against Banco Delta in Macau and North Korean illegal activities.

The negotiations resumed on December 18, 2006. They ended on December 22, 2006, without progress. North Korean negotiators refused to negotiate on the nuclear issue until the Bush Administration agreed to end its financial sanctions against Banco Delta. Moreover, North Korea restated its previous conditions for dismantlement of its nuclear programs, including the demand of August-September 2005 that light water nuclear reactors be completely constructed in North Korea before North Korea would begin to dismantle nuclear programs — in essence a 10-15 year delay between the signing of a nuclear settlement agreement and the beginning of a physical dismantlement process. During that time, too, North Korea demanded that the United States supply it with heavy oil. North Korea also called for the talks work.

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3 (...continued)

to negotiate “nuclear disarmament” in Northeast Asia, which Pyongyang has defined as the acceptance by the United States of major reductions and limitations on its military forces and military operations in South Korea and Japan (for example, an end to U.S.-South Korean military exercises and an end to the introduction of new U.S. military units and weaponry into South Korea). During the six party meeting, Kim Gye-gwan made clear that even if the Bush Administration agreed to lift financial sanctions, it would have to make concessions on these North Korean conditions for a freeze and/or dismantlement of nuclear programs. Kim also indicated that any North Korean agreement to freeze its nuclear facilities would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to only monitor the freeze rather than agreeing to full IAEA inspections.

Prior to and during the six party meeting, Christopher Hill called on North Korea to take initial steps to implement its pledge in the September 19, 2005 Six Party Statement, which stated the goal of termination of North Korea’s nuclear programs. The steps proposed by Hill included a freeze of the operating nuclear facilities at Yongbyon (a nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing plant), a shutting down of the site of the October 9, 2006 nuclear test, admittance of the IAEA into North Korea with full rights of inspection, and a full disclosure by North Korea of nuclear programs and nuclear weapons to the IAEA. Hill stressed that North Korea must take these steps within a short time frame — “a lot shorter than a year.”

**Bush Administration Changes in Negotiating Tactics**

Despite this deadlocked Beijing meeting and the U.N. sanctions, the Bush Administration changed its negotiating tactics after the North Korean nuclear test, which led to the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement. The Administration abandoned its opposition to bilateral talks with North Korea and actively sought bilateral meetings with Pyongyang. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill used these meetings, in late November 2006 and mid-January 2007, to negotiate the details of the Six Party Agreement.

**Congressional Actions**

In late September and early October 2006, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation on North Korea. P.L. 109-364, the Defense Authorization bill for 2007,

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requires the President to appoint a Policy Coordinator for North Korea within 60 days of enactment and report to the President and Congress within 90 days on policy recommendations. It also requires the Bush Administration to report to Congress every 180 days in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on the status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. P.L. 109-353, the North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006, states that the policy of the United States should be to impose sanctions on “persons” who transfer missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction or goods or technology related to such weapons to and from North Korea.

As a result of the Democratic Party’s victory in congressional elections in November 2006, leading Democratic Members of Congress issued statements calling on President Bush to carry out fully the provisions of the Defense Authorization bill. They also called for bilateral U.S. negotiations with North Korea, including sending Assistant Secretary of State Hill to Pyongyang.9


Main Features of the Agreement

1. An Initial phase with a 60-day timetable.

- North Korea is to freeze (“shut down and seal”) its nuclear installations at Yongbyon, including the operating five megawatt nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant.

- North Korea will “invite back” the IAEA to monitor the freeze at Yongbyon. This is the same role that the IAEA had from 1994 until December 2002 under the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework.

- As these arrangements are made, North Korea is to receive 50,000 tons of heavy oil. South Korea reportedly will finance this shipment.

- North Korea “will discuss” with the other six parties “a list of all its nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods” from the five megawatt reactor (which North Korea claims to have reprocessed into nuclear weapons-grade plutonium).

- North Korea and the United States will “start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.” The United States “will begin the process of removing” North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and

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“advance the process of terminating” economic sanctions against North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act.

- North Korea and Japan will “start bilateral talks” toward normalization of relations on the basis of settlement of “outstanding issues of concern” (which Japan interprets to include the issue of North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens).

- Although unstated in the agreement, a defacto component of the Initial Phase was Christopher Hill’s pledge to resolve the issue of U.S. sanctions against Banco Delta and the freezing of North Korean accounts within 30 days of February 13, 2007.

**Implementation of the Initial Phase.** There was little implementation of the Initial Phase by the 60-day deadline of April 13, 2007. Although the Bush Administration agreed to an unfreezing of North Korea’s accounts at Banco Delta within the 30 days pledged by Hill, North Korea reportedly demanded assurances from the Bush Administration that the U.S. Treasury Department would not penalize any foreign banks that received transferred money from North Korea’s Banco Delta accounts. It refused to carry out its commitments under the Initial Phase until it received such assurances. The Bush Administration reportedly rendered assurances in late April 2007 that it would not penalize banks in Italy and Russia if North Korea transferred its Banco Delta money to them.\(^{10}\) This was a major U.S. concession and apparently a major gain for North Korea, for it appears to negate the U.S. strategy since September 2005 to pressure foreign banks to cease financial transactions with North Korea.

2. **“Next Phase” or Phase Two.**

Following the initial phase is a “Next Phase” without a timetable or deadline specified for implementation. (This will be referred to as Phase Two.)

- North Korea is to make “a complete declaration of all nuclear programs.”

- A “disablement of all existing nuclear facilities.”

- North Korea is to receive “economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil, including the initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil.”

3. **Five Working Groups.**

Ongoing with the Initial Phase and Phase Two is the establishment and functioning of five working groups to negotiate key issues. Agreements reached by

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the working groups “will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.” The working groups will deal with the following subjects:

- Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
- Normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations;
- Normalization of North Korea-Japan relations;
- Economy and energy cooperation; and
- Northeast Asia peace and security mechanisms.


Negotiation in a separate forum of a “permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” by the “directly related parties.” In the late 1990s, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China negotiated unsuccessfully over a Korean peace agreement.

North Korea’s Nuclear Programs

Plutonium Program

Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at Yongbyon, 60 miles from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the facilities covered by the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. (For more information see CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by Sharon Squassoni) The key installations are as follows:

- **An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 electrical megawatts that began operating by 1987.** It is capable of expending enough reactor fuel to produce about 6 kilograms of plutonium annually — enough for the manufacture of a single atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut down the reactor or about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that North Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for reprocessing into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May 1994, North Korea shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000 fuel rods, which could be reprocessed into enough plutonium (25-30 kilograms) for 4-6 nuclear weapons. North Korea started operating the reactor again in February 2003, shut it down in April 2005, and said it had removed another 8,000 fuel rods.

- **Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical megawatts) reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon since 1984.** According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, these plants, if completed, would be capable of producing enough spent fuel annually for 200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture

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nearly 30 atomic bombs per year. However, when North Korea re-opened the plutonium program in early 2003, reports indicate that construction on the larger reactors was not resumed, but construction reportedly was resumed in June 2005.

- **A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several stories high.** The plant would separate weapons grade plutonium-239 from spent nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the structure of atomic bombs or warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected North Korean preparations to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant in February and March 2003. According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that North Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004, North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert, Dr. Sigfried Hecker, samples of what they claimed were plutonium oxalate powder and plutonium metal. Dr. Hecker later said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (January 21, 2004) that, without testing, he could not confirm whether the sample was metallic plutonium “but all observations I was able to make are consistent with the sample being plutonium metal.”

Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no attached power lines, which they would have if used for electric power generation.

Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the two reactors and the apparent reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology. It is believed that Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who died in July 1994, directs the program, and that the military and the Ministry of Public Security implement it. North Korea reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though not necessarily nuclear weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly Pakistan.

**Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program**

North Korea’s secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program appears to date from at least 1996. Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997, has stated that North Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade North Korean long-range missile technology for Pakistani HEU technology. Other information dates North Korea-Pakistan cooperation to 1993. The Clinton Administration reportedly learned of it in 1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy report of 1999 cited evidence of the program. In March 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he was waiving certification that “North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.” The Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* reported on June 9, 2000, the contents of a “detailed report” from Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment facility.

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inside North Korea’s Mount Chonma. Reportedly, according to a CIA report to Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire “centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.”

The CIA estimated publicly in November 2002 that North Korea could produce two atomic bombs annually through HEU beginning in 2005, other intelligence estimates reportedly project a bomb producing capability between 2005 and 2007. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, and Mitchell Reiss, head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Bureau until 2004, have stated that a functioning North Korean HEU infrastructure could produce enough HEU for “two or more nuclear weapons per year.” The Washington Post of April 28, 2004, quoted an U.S. intelligence official saying that a North Korean HEU infrastructure could produce as many as six atomic bombs annually. Administration officials have stated that they do not know the locations of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program or whether North Korea has assembled the infrastructure to produce uranium-based atomic bombs.

International Assistance

Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly in the development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea with a small research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However, North Korean nuclear scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since 1999, reports have appeared that U.S. intelligence agencies had information that Chinese enterprises were supplying important components and raw materials for North Korea’s missile program.

North Korea’s Delivery Systems

North Korea’s missile launchings of July 4, 2006, re-focused U.S. attention on North Korea’s missile program and Pyongyang’s apparent attempts to develop long-range missiles that could strike U.S. territories. North Korea succeeded by 1998 in developing a “Nodong” missile with a range estimated at up to 900 miles, capable of covering South Korea and most of Japan. North Korea reportedly deployed nearly 100 Nodong missiles by 2003. On August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-stage rocket, apparently the prototype of the Taepodong I missile; the third stage apparently was an attempt to launch a satellite. U.S. intelligence estimates reportedly

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14 CIA unclassified point paper distributed to Congress, November 19, 2002.


concluded that such a missile would have the range to reach Alaska, Guam, and the Northern Marianas Commonwealth. Media reports in early 2000 cited U.S. intelligence findings that without further flight tests, North Korea could deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast. Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on August 6, 2003, that North Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export of the long-range Taepo Dong-2 missile to Iran and the joint development of nuclear warheads. U.S. officials claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had developed a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach Okinawa and Guam (site of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that North Korea had produced the Taepodong II, which could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast.

However, the apparent failure of the Taepodong missile launched July 4, 2006, indicated that North Korea had not succeeded in developing such a long-range missile. However, evaluations of all seven of the missiles launched on July 4, 2006, by intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments reportedly have concluded that North Korea has increased the accuracy of its Scud and Nodong missiles and that the launches displayed the ability of North Korea’s command and control apparatus to coordinate multiple launchings of missiles at diverse targets.17

(For additional information, see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steve Hildreth.)

The Clinton Administration to press North Korea for new talks over North Korea’s missile program. In talks held in 1999 and 2000, North Korea demanded $1 billion annually in exchange for a promise not to export missiles. U.S. negotiators rejected North Korea’s demand for $1 billion but offered a lifting of U.S. economic sanctions. This laid the ground for the Berlin agreement of September 1999, in which North Korea agreed to defer further missile tests in return for the lifting of major U.S. economic sanctions. President Clinton formalized the lifting of key economic sanctions against North Korea in June 2000. North Korea continued the moratorium, but it appears to have used Pakistan and Iran as surrogates in testing intermediate-range missiles based on North Korean technology.18

State of Nuclear Weapons Development

A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, reportedly estimated that North Korea had produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and had validated the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.19 The initial estimate of

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19 Sanger, David E. North Korea’s bomb: untested but ready, C.I.A. concludes. New York (continued...
one or two nuclear weapons is derived primarily from North Korea’s approximately 70-day shutdown of the five megawatt reactor in 1989, which would have given it the opportunity to remove nuclear fuel rods, from which plutonium is reprocessed. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for about 12 kilograms of plutonium — sufficient for one or two atomic bombs. The CIA and DIA apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five megawatt reactor.\(^{20}\)

South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly were higher: 16-24 kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are based on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of plutonium from the 1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that North Korea removed fuel rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns. Russian Defense Ministry analyses of late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough for two or three atomic bombs. General Leon LaPorte, former U.S. Commander in Korea, stated in an interview in April 2006 that North Korea possessed three to six nuclear weapons before the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework.\(^{21}\)

Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant technological advances by North Korea toward nuclear weapons production. On March 10, 1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a 1990 Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear program. It was published again by Izvestiya on June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted that “According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.” The North Korean government, the report stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.

Additionally, a number of reports and evidence point to at least a middle-range likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994, the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms production” from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” U.S. executive branch officials have expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July 5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the [Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.” The most specific claim came in the German news magazine Stern in March

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1993, which cited Russian Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.

If, as it claims, North Korea reprocessed the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods in 2003 that it had moved from storage at the beginning of that year, North Korea gained an additional 25-30 kilograms of plutonium, according to Dr. Sigfried Hecker in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2004. Dr. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos Laboratories, had visited North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex in January 2004. U.S. officials and nuclear experts have stated that this amount of plutonium would give North Korea the potential to produce between four to eight atomic bombs. These estimates appear to be based on projections that a country like North Korea would need 6-8 kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. The IAEA has had a standard that a non-nuclear state would need about eight kilograms of plutonium to produce an atomic bomb.

The question of whether North Korea produced additional nuclear weapons with the plutonium that it apparently acquired after 2003 may depend on whether North Korea is able to develop a nuclear warhead that could be fitted onto its missiles. Experts believe that the one or two atomic bombs developed earlier likely are similar to the large-size plutonium bomb dropped by the United States on Nagasaki in August 1945. However, North Korea has few delivery systems that could deliver such a bomb to a U.S. or Japanese target. Thus, Pyongyang probably would not produce additional Nagasaki-type bombs but would retain its weapons-grade plutonium until it could use it to produce a nuclear warhead. Statements by U.S. officials reflect an apparent uncertainty over whether North Korea has achieved a warheading capability.

According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According to U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North Korea could produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004. Another report, in the Washington Post, April 28, 2004, stated that U.S. intelligence officials had “broadly concluded” that a North Korean uranium enrichment program would be operational by 2007, producing enough material for as many as six atomic bombs. However, U.S. officials have stated that they know less about the secret uranium enrichment program (HEU) than they know about the plutonium program. North Korea received designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges from Pakistan nuclear “czar,” A.Q. Khan, and has attempted to purchase overseas key components for uranium enrichment centrifuges; but some of these purchases have been

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Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill stated on September 28, 2005, that “where there is not a consensus is how far they [North Korea] have gone with this [the HEU program].”

For Additional Reading


CRS Report RL31785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin.


CRS Report RL33709, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni.


25 Albright and Hinderstein, Dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, pp. 35-36.

26 Parties concur N.K. has HEU material, but disagree on program’s progress: Hill. Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2005.