110th Congress
1st Session SENATE

REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ON

PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

- Ordered to be printed-

REPORT

ON

PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

- Ordered to be printed

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

United States Senate

110th Congress

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
RON WYDEN, OREGON
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE
RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
- **A.** ***Methodology*** 1
- **B.** ***Background*** 2
- **C.** ***Previous Reviews of Prewar Intelligence about Postwar Iraq*** 3
- **D.** ***Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq*** 5

CONCLUSIONS 6

APPENDIX A: ***National Intelligence Council: Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq*** 13

APPENDIX B: ***National Intelligence Council: Principal Challenges In Post-Saddam Iraq*** 52

APPENDIX C: ***Overview of Other Intelligence Assessments On Postwar Iraq*** 92

APPENDIX D: ***Distribution Lists For Principal Challenges In Post-Saddam Iraq and Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq*** 107

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Ron Wyden, Senator Evan Bayh, and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse 188

Senator Dianne Feinstein 190

Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond, Senator John Warner, Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Richard Burr 195

Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Richard Burr 205

Senator Saxby Chambliss, Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Richard Burr 223

COMMITTEE ACTION 225

PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ

Introduction

(U) On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously agreed to expand its inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. Among the additional areas the Committee agreed to investigate was "prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq."[1] This is the Committee's report on that aspect of its inquiry.

(U) This report describes the Committee's methodology for reviewing prewar assessments about postwar Iraq, provides brief background on the production of two principal prewar assessments published in January 2003, summarizes other intelligence assessments from 2002-2003, and provides the Committee's conclusions about the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments about postwar Iraq.

Methodology

(U) The Committee reviewed written intelligence assessments concerning conditions in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein that were published between April 19, 1999 (shortly after enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998) and March 19, 2003, the beginning of US combat operations in Iraq. For purposes of this report, the Committee considered the postwar period to begin with the removal of Saddam from power in April 2003.

(U) Documents provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community from this period represented a variety of intelligence assessments. They ranged from short articles included in the daily publications produced by Intelligence Community agencies for senior executives, to hard-copy slides from briefing presentations made by Department of Defense analysts, to fully coordinated, inter-agency intelligence assessments that were widely disseminated throughout the federal government. The Intelligence Community provided the Committee with [redacted] all-source assessments.

[1] See press release from U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2004.

(U) In addition to reviewing written intelligence reports, Committee staff also interviewed members of the Intelligence Community, and officials in the State Department, Defense Department, and Coalition Provisional Authority.

Background

(U) The Intelligence Community faced a challenging task in attempting to assess likely trends, challenges and events in post-war Iraq for three primary reasons. First, the requirement for intelligence assessments about the postwar environment represented a relatively small portion of the work on Iraq produced by Intelligence Community analysts during 2002 and 2003. The majority of assessments relating to Iraq focused on Saddam's connections to terrorism, the threat from weapons of mass destruction, and the capabilities of the Iraqi military. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), for example, produced a significant National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in October 2002 in response to a request from the Director of Central Intelligence for an examination of Saddam's near-term military objectives, strategy, and capabilities in a war against the US and Coalition forces.[2] The NIC also produced an NIE about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The CIA's Iraq analysts, according to one study, responded to "an average of 300 policymaker tasks per month in the lead up to and during" major offensive military operations.[3]

(U) Second, the predictive nature of the assessments about postwar Iraq meant that analysts had little intelligence collection upon which to base their judgments. Current and former intelligence officials told the Committee that intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing assessments about postwar Iraq because it was not an issue that was well-suited to intelligence collection. Accordingly, most prewar assessments cite relatively few intelligence sources. Analysts based their judgments primarily on regional and country expertise, historical evidence and analytic tradecraft.[4] Overall, the assessments appropriately qualified the scope and basis for their judgments.

(U) Third, analysts recognized that the policies and actions implemented on the ground in Iraq would make US and Coalition forces the "dominant influence" on the postwar environment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.[5] Essentially, the task of assessing the postwar environment in Iraq was complicated by the fact that the manner in which the main political, economic, humanitarian,

---

[2] NIC: *Saddam's Preparation for War: Intentions and Capabilities*, October 2002.
[3] Memo to the Director of Central Intelligence, *Lessons Learned from Military Operations in Iraq,* February 1, 2005.
[4] This report does not examine the quantity or quality of the intelligence sources underlying the intelligence assessments on postwar Iraq.
[5] NIC: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003, Scope Note.

and security issues inside Iraq unfolded would "depend heavily on the events leading to Saddam's removal." The effects of Saddam's ouster through Coalition military action "could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the damage it caused, and such other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the Coalition."[6]

Previous Reviews of Prewar Intelligence about Postwar Iraq

([redacted]) Two previous evaluations initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) reviewed the Intelligence Community's performance on Iraq, which included intelligence regarding the postwar situation.

([redacted]) One study, known as the Kerr Study Group report, was conducted by four retired senior intelligence officers in two phases. The group evaluated CIA and NIC assessments produced during 18 months prior to the war. The first phase reviewed national intelligence on the key questions related to Iraq up to the moment the war began. The second phase, published in 2004, compared that intelligence to new information in the aftermath of the war.[7]

([redacted]) The second evaluation, *The DCI's Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq,* reviewed the support provided by the Intelligence Community as a whole to policy and military decision-makers in the lead up to and during the active combat phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom.[8]

([redacted]) In order to acquire background on the issue, Committee staff interviewed the principal authors of the Kerr Study Group and the *Lessons Learned* review.

([redacted]) The conclusions reached by the Committee are independent of the findings by the Kerr and *DCI Lessons Learned* studies.

Prewar Assessments Coordinated Across the Intelligence Community

([redacted]) In January 2003, the NIC produced and disseminated two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) focused exclusively on the issue of the postwar environment in Iraq. Like National Intelligence Estimates, the ICAs summarize in one document the coordinated views of the Intelligence Community as a whole. The two ICAs were widely disseminated among senior policymakers and within the Intelligence Community. The distribution lists for each report are included in

---

[6] NIC, *Principal Challenges,* p. 1

[7] *Studies in Intelligence,* July 29, 2004. (Richard Kerr, et al, *Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community,* July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)

[8] *The DCI's Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq*, 11 February 2005.

Appendix D. The ICAs were produced in the same manner as an NIE, but their release did not require approval by the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Director of Central Intelligence.

(U) The scope notes of both reports said they were prepared "at the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East and South Asia." The NIO told Committee staff that he actually suggested the assessments to State and took the initiative to produce them on the basis of a positive reaction from State's Policy Planning Staff to his suggestion.[9]

(U) One ICA, entitled *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq*, identified and analyzed the medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in Iraq would necessarily face.[10] The second ICA, *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq*, addressed the regional impact of a US invasion of Iraq.[11]

(U) The Committee devoted particular attention to January 2003 ICAs because they were fully-coordinated across the Intelligence Community prior to their publication. Thus, the Committee believes that the ICAs represent the best available "baseline" of prewar intelligence assessments on postwar Iraq.

(U) The Committee's conclusions are based primarily on the two ICAs. In an effort to further inform the public debate on the role of intelligence assessments in the prewar period, the Committee requested that the Director of National Intelligence declassify both of the ICAs in their entirety. These declassified documents appear in Appendices A and B.

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

(U) In *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq,* the Intelligence Community analyzed the "most important political, economic, and social consequences of regime change in Iraq – in the context of current conditions in the Middle East and South Asia – for the surrounding region over a five-year period."

(U) The analysis was based on assumptions laid out in the paper's scope note. These included: "Saddam and key regime supporters are ousted as the result of a UN-sanctioned Coalition military campaign…; Iraqi territorial integrity remains intact and Iraq retains a defensive capability against its neighbors…; a US-backed

[9] SSCI Committee Staff Interview with NIO for Near East and South Asia.
[10] NIC, *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq*, January 2003.
[11] NIC, *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq,* January 2003.

government is established with a gradual devolution to Iraqi self-governance during the five-year timeframe."[12]

Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

(U) The second Intelligence Community Assessment of January 2003, *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,* examined "the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn."[13]

(U) According to the scope note, the assessment was not focused primarily on the "immediate humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction that would be handled by the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war." Instead, the assessment discussed challenges that would "demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam departs." Accordingly, the scope note also stated that the ICA made no projections about specific wartime scenarios or the policies of "an occupying force" in postwar Iraq.[14]

Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq

(U) In addition to the Intelligence Community Assessments (see Appendices A and B), individual agencies within the Intelligence Community produced dozens of more narrowly focused assessments about postwar Iraq throughout 2002 and early 2003. The Committee briefly summarized those assessments in Appendix C.

[12] NIC, *Regional Consequences*
[13] NIC, *Principal Challenges*
[14] NIC, *Principal Challenges*

CONCLUSIONS

([redacted]) Democracy

([redacted]) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that establishing a stable democratic government in postwar Iraq would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent challenge.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that building "an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of authoritarianism."[15] The greatest medium-to-long term challenge in Iraq would be the "introduction of a stable and representative political system."[16] The Intelligence Community noted that Iraqi political culture did "not foster liberalism or democracy"[17] and was "largely bereft of the social underpinnings that directly support development of broad-based participatory democracy."[18] Although the idea of free and democratic elections probably would be a popular concept with the vast majority of the Iraqi population, "the practical implementation of democratic rule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and no history of alternation of power."[19]

([redacted]) The Intelligence Community noted factors that favored the development of democracy: "the relatively low politicization of Iraqi Shiism" and "discredited" secular authoritarian nationalism.[20] This did "not mean, however, that the trend [political Islam] could not take root in postwar Iraq, particularly if economic recovery were slow and foreign troops remained in the country for a long period."[21] In addition, the Intelligence Community cited "the contributions that could be made by four million Iraqi exiles – many of whom are Westernized and well educated – and by the now impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class,"[22] but noted that opposition parties did "not have the popular, political or military capabilities to play a leading role After Saddam's departure without significant and prolonged external economic, political and military support."[23]

---

[15] NIC: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, p. 5
[16] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[17] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[18] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 13
[19] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 14
[20] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 15
[21] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 15
[22] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[23] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 17

([redacted]) Terrorism

([redacted]) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that al Qa'ida probably would see an opportunity to accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq war.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community stated that al-Qa'ida "probably would try to exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US personnel."[24] According to the Intelligence Community, "some militant Islamists in Iraq might benefit from increases in funding and popular support and could choose to conduct terrorist attacks against US forces in Iraq."[25] The Intelligence Community assessed that, "If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi countryside, al-Qai'da or other terrorist groups could operate from remote areas."[26] The Intelligence Community assessed that "To the extent that a new Iraqi government effectively controlled its territory, especially in northern Iraq, and was friendlier to US interests and backed by US military power, al-Qa'ida's freedom of movement inside Iraq almost certainly would be hampered. If al-Qa'ida mobilized significant resources to combat a US presence in Iraq, it could, at least in the near term, reduce its overall capability to strike elsewhere."[27] The Intelligence Community noted that "Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each other or the United States –Sunni against Shia; Kurd against Kurd; Kurd against Arab; any against the United States—probably also would encourage terrorist groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks within Iraq."[28] Additionally, rogue ex-regime elements "could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces."[29]

([redacted]) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that a heightened terrorist threat resulting from a war with Iraq, after an initial spike, probably would decline slowly over the subsequent three to five years.** The Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qa'ida probably would see an opportunity to "accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq war."[30] The lines between al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups around the world "could become blurred" in the wake of a US attack and counter attacks by al-Qa'ida and jihadists.[31] "The targeting by less capable groups

[24] NIC: Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, p.14
[25] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[26] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6
[27] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
[28] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[29] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 38
[30] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[31] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14

and planners operating on short notice would mean that such softer targets as US citizens overseas would become more inviting for terrorists."[32] The Intelligence Community also noted that al-Qa'ida "would try to take advantage of US attention on postwar Iraq to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan."[33] The Intelligence Community assessed that "if al-Qa'ida mobilized significant resources to combat a US presence in Iraq, it could --at least in the near term-- reduce al-Qa'ida's overall capability to strike elsewhere."[34]

(U) Domestic Conflict

(U) The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iraq was a deeply divided society that likely would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power prevented it. In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that "a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so."[35] The threat of Shia reprisals for their oppression under Saddam was a "major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force."[36] Sunni Arabs would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia would seek increased power. Although some Sunni who had extensive contact with Shia in urban life might be open to a representative political system, some reporting indicated that elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime that did not allow the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military security services and government.[37] Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam's departure by seizing some of the large northern oilfields, a move that would elicit a forceful response from Sunni Arabs.[38] According to the Intelligence Community, "score settling would occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's regime and those who have suffered the most under it."[39] The Intelligence Community assessed that "underlying causes for violence involve political reprisals more than ethnic or sectarian division."[40]

---

[32] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
[33] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
[34] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
[35] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[36] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
[37] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
[38] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[39] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
[40] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20

(U) Political Islam

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the United States' defeat and occupation of Iraq probably would result in a surge of political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that a "US-led defeat and occupation of Arab Iraq probably would boost proponents of political Islam"[41] and would result in "calls from Islamists for the people of the region to unite and build up defenses against the West."[42] Assessments concluded that "funds for terrorist groups probably would increase as a result of Muslim outrage over US action."[43] The Intelligence Community also underscored that "in some countries an increase in Islamist sentiment also probably would take the form of greater support for Islamic political parties that seek to come to power through legitimate means."[44]

(U) Influence of Iraq's Neighbors

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iraq's neighbors would jockey for influence in Iraq, with activities ranging from humanitarian reconstruction assistance to fomenting strife among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that the objective of most Middle Eastern states regarding a post-Saddam Iraq would be for the territorial integrity of Iraq to remain intact and for a new regime to become neither a source of regional instability nor dominant in the region. The Intelligence Community assessed that Iraq's immediate neighbors would have the greatest stakes in protecting their interests and would be most likely to pose challenges for US goals in post-Saddam Iraq.

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iranian leaders would try to influence the shape of post-Saddam Iraq to preserve Iranian security and demonstrate that Iran is an important regional actor.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that "the degree to which Iran would pursue policies that either support or undermine U.S. goals in Iraq would depend on how Tehran viewed specific threats to its interests and the potential US reaction."[45] The Intelligence Community assessed that the "more that Iranian leaders perceived that Washington's aims did not challenge Tehran's interests or threaten Iran directly, the better the chance that they would cooperate in the post-war period, or at least not actively undermine US goals."[46] The Intelligence

[41] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[42] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[43] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[44] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
[45] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 16
[46] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18

Community assessed that "some elements in the Iranian government could decide to try to counter aggressively the U.S. presence in Iraq or challenge U.S. goals following the fall of Saddam by attempting to use their contacts in Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent against the US presence and complicate the formation of a new, pro-US Iraqi government."[47] The Intelligence Community noted that elements in the regime also could "employ their own operatives against US personnel, although this approach would be hard to conceal."[48]

([redacted]) The Intelligence Community assessed that "guaranteeing Iran a role in the negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam Iraq might persuade some Iranian officials to pursue an overt and constructive means to influence reconstruction in Iraq."[49] [redacted] When possible, the establishment of "a mechanism for US and Iranian officials to communicate on the ground in Iraq could facilitate dialogue, [redacted]

([redacted]) WMD

([redacted]) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that military action to eliminate Iraqi WMD would not cause other regional states to abandon their WMD programs, or their desire to develop such programs.** The Intelligence Community assessed that for many countries in the Middle East and South Asia, WMD programs "would continue to be viewed as necessary and integral components of an overall national security posture."[52] The Intelligence Community cited several reasons that other regional states would not give up WMD, including the need "to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, enhance regional prestige, compensate for conventional military deficiencies, and deter threats from superior adversaries."[53] The Intelligence Community said "states also would be driven to acquire WMD capabilities or accelerate programs already in train with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before the programs could be destroyed preemptively."[54]

---

[47] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
[48] NIC: Regional Consequences, p.18
[49] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
[50] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
[51] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
[52] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 7
[53] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 7
[54] NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 26

(U) Security

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the Iraqi government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's police, security, and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace.** In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that "if responsibility for internal security had been passed from an occupying force to an Iraqi government, such a government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's police, security and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace."[55] The Iraqi Regular Army "has been relatively unpoliticized below the command level and, once purged of the security and intelligence officers embedded within it, could be used for security and law enforcement until police or a local gendarme force is established."[56] Over the longer term, the police and security forces "would need to be rebuilt and restructured if they were to gain the trust of the Iraqi people and avoid the excesses similar to those under Saddam's rule."[57]

(U) Oil

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iraq's large petroleum resources would make economic reconstruction a less difficult challenge than political transformation, but that postwar Iraq would nonetheless face significant economic challenges.** Intelligence assessments prior to the war differed on the likelihood that the Iraqi oil system would contribute to reconstruction efforts in the short-term. The Intelligence Community, for example, noted that "if Iraq's oil facilities were relatively undamaged by a war, Baghdad could increase crude oil production from 2.4 million barrels a day (b/d) to about 3.1 million b/d within several months of the end of hostilities."[58] Assessments noted that while Iraq could draw on its own oil resources for economic reconstruction, political transformation lacked an equivalent domestic resource. The Intelligence Community also assessed that aside from oil, Iraq's economic options would remain "few and narrow without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in reparations from the previous Gulf War, or something akin to a Marshall Plan."[59]

(U) Humanitarian Issues

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that major outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs.** In January

[55] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
[56] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
[57] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
[58] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 33
[59] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that a prolonged struggle to depose Saddam and install a new regime would be likely to cause more flight of refugees and internally displaced persons and to disrupt severely the distribution of food and health services. The Intelligence Community assessed that the "internal security situation would affect the humanitarian challenge" and that the impact on humanitarian needs of a war "would depend on its length and severity."[60] On the topic of refugees, the Intelligence Community reported that a Baghdad-centered military operation would displace 900,000 persons internally and create 1.45 million refugees.[61] Assessments emphasized that the Iraqi population depended heavily on the rations distributed by the government, and that securing the government's food warehouses after the war and implementing a food distribution system "would be critical to avoiding widespread hunger."[62] The civilian healthcare situation probably "would be severely damaged by the war and widespread civil strife."[63]

(U) Infrastructure

(U) **The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the new Iraqi government would require significant outside assistance to rebuild Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure.** The Intelligence Community reported that such basic services as electricity and clean water reached less than half the population prior to the war. The Intelligence Community assessed that the "difficulty of restoring such services as water and electricity after a war would depend chiefly on how much destruction was caused by urban combat."[64] Assessments noted that "civil strife would cause disruptions in electricity and water purification or distribution if generators, pumps or plants became damaged, seized or looted."[65] The Intelligence Community noted that "cuts in electricity or looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high."[66] Although Iraq's infrastructure already had suffered extensive degradation, the Intelligence Community reported that Iraqis had restored their physical infrastructure quickly after previous wars.[67]

---

[60] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 25
[61] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 25
[62] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 26
[63] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 28
[64] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6
[65] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 25
[66] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 28
[67] NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6

APPENDIX A

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ

MORI DocID: 1422242

SECRET/

EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs

Intelligence Community Assessment

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

ICA 2003-03
January 2003

SECRET/

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2007

~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

National Intelligence Council

ICA 2003-03

[redacted] Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

[redacted] *Prepared under the auspices of Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on* [redacted]

January 2003

~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

SECRET/

(U) Middle East and South Asia



UNCLASSIFIED

DI Cartography Center/MPG 762245AI 1-03

SECRET/

Scope Note

[redacted] At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) analyzes the most important political, economic, and social consequences of regime change in Iraq—in the context of current conditions in the Middle East and South Asia—for the surrounding region over a five-year period. The region considered includes Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Arabian Peninsula countries. Sub-state actors are included where relevant to specific issues. The ICA also puts expected developments in the context of broader, strategic implications for the United States.

[redacted] The analysis is based on a main scenario incorporating the assumptions below. Insofar as divergence from this scenario would create significant alternate consequences, those effects are noted throughout the assessment. Some judgments reflect the immediate impact of a war itself—particularly for regional stability and terrorism—but most deal with longer, post-war effects.

- *Saddam Husayn and key regime supporters are ousted as the result of a UN-sanctioned Coalition military campaign led by the United States in which Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are eliminated. Israeli military forces do not become overtly involved in the conflict.*

- *Iraqi territorial integrity remains intact and Iraq retains a defensive capability against its neighbors, at first through the US presence and then through the recreation of a credible conventional military force.*

- *A US-backed government is established with a gradual devolution to Iraqi self-governance during the five-year timeframe. Beginning with a US-led military occupation for at least the first year, the United States maintains a long-term but declining military presence in Iraq to ensure stability, assist humanitarian efforts, and aid the development of functioning political institutions.*

- *UN sanctions are lifted but with some residual Oil-For-Food mechanisms intact to facilitate aid distribution.*

[redacted] The ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts on the history, politics, and regional dynamics of the Middle East/[redacted]/Their comments were taken into consideration in the preparation of this paper.

[redacted] Possible developments within Iraq following a removal of Saddam are addressed in ICA 2003-04, *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq* (~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

Contents

	Page
(U) Scope Note	1
(U) Key Judgments	5
(U) Discussion	9
(U) Setting the Stage	9
(U) Popular Reactions	9
(U) Terrorism and Islamic Extremism	12
(U) Fueling Political Islam	13
(U) How Terrorists Might React	13
(U) Palestinian Groups—A Special Case	14
(U) State Sponsors of Terrorism	15
(U) Roles in a Post Saddam Iraq	16
(U) Broader Security Policies and Posture Toward the United States	19
(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction	25
(U) Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict	26
(U) Economic Consequences	27
(U) Prospects for Democratic Reform	29

Key Judgments

[redacted] Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

[redacted] **The repercussions within the Middle East and South Asia of ousting Saddam Husayn through military force would depend not only on the length and course of the war and post-war developments within Iraq but also on pre-existing conditions in the region.** These conditions include generally closed political systems, unfavorable economic and demographic trends, significant support for radical Islamist groups and ideologies, and widespread opposition to US policies—particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict—and suspicion of US motives in the region.

[redacted] **A US-led war against Iraq would precipitate immediate popular anti-US demonstrations in many countries in the region, but local security forces probably would be able to contain such disturbances.**

- A drawn-out war with numerous civilian casualties probably would produce more severe unrest than a quick and less bloody conflict.
- [redacted]
- The long-term presence of US troops in Iraq would be a target of future potentially violent demonstrations, fueled by perceptions that the United States was seeking to dominate the region and its resources and was hostile to Arab and Muslim interests.
- Although Saddam is unpopular with many Arabs, most do not wish to see a US military campaign against Iraq. Clear evidence that the Iraqi people welcomed the United States as a liberator, however, would help to dissipate public anger in the region, as would reduced Israeli-Palestinian violence and greater US engagement toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[redacted] **A US-led war against and occupation of Iraq would boost political Islam and increase popular sympathy for some terrorist objectives, at least in the short term.**

- A heightened terrorist threat resulting from a war with Iraq, after an initial spike, probably would decline slowly over the subsequent three to five years. Regime change in Iraq would be unlikely to affect Palestinian terrorism significantly.
- For many Arabs and Muslims, however, an Iraqi defeat would be a jarring event that would highlight the inability of existing regimes to stand up to US power.

- Increased popular Islamist sentiment would bolster both extremist groups and, in some countries, Islamic political parties that seek to gain power peacefully.

- Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups would try to exploit the war and the anti-American sentiments expressed during and after the conflict by accelerating their anti-US operations, and al-Qa'ida would try to take advantage of US attention on post-war Iraq to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan.

- The direct effect of regime change in Iraq on al-Qa'ida's operational opportunities inside Iraq would depend on the degree to which a new Iraqi government established control over its territory.

(S//NF) Neighboring states would jockey for influence in the new Iraq, with activities ranging from humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to fomenting strife among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups.

- Some elements in Iran could try to use their contacts in the Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent against the US presence and complicate the formation of a new, pro-US Iraqi government.

-

(S//NF) Governments in the region would adjust their foreign and security policies to accommodate US military preeminence without appearing to subordinate their policies to Washington.

- The defeat of Iraq probably would encourage some governments to continue close security relations with the United States and would enhance already strong US ties with other states.

- Over the long run, an outcome that installed a credible Iraqi regime and visibly improved Iraqi living conditions would increase the willingness of regional governments to cooperate with the United States.

- Much would depend, however, on how domestic populations in the region viewed the US role in Iraq. Some governments political reasons would de-emphasize public forms of cooperation with the United States even if they were willing to cooperate privately.

- Middle Eastern states would have increased interest in forging new political and security relationships as counterweights to strong US influence. The European Union, Russia, and

China would be potential partners. Within the region, Arab states and Iran would have added reason to expand relations with each other.

Regional states would maintain their current interests in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and programs for developing such weapons, despite worries about possible future US military action.

- Some states would continue to view WMD programs as necessary components of an overall security strategy for numerous reasons, including surviving in a dangerous neighborhood, enhancing regional prestige and influence, compensating for conventional military deficiencies, and deterring perceived threats from such stronger adversaries as Israel and the United States.

- States with developmental WMD programs would try to increase the secrecy and pace of those programs with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before they could be pre-empted.

Many in the Middle East would expect the United States to build on its victory over Iraq by taking a more active role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The willingness of regimes to cooperate with Washington on many issues would depend significantly on whether those expectations were met.

- Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would continue to depend on the willingness of both sides to make basic compromises and on outside help in initiating and sustaining a viable peace process.

-

The impact on regional economies would be mostly negative but variable, with much of the effect depending on how much damage the Iraqi oilfields sustained during the war.

- Oil prices probably would spike to at least $40 per barrel during—and in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of—a war because of uncertainty regarding the disposition of Iraq's oil resources. Prices could go substantially higher if a war overlaps with the strikes in Venezuela's oil sector, which have disrupted about 2.7 million b/d of exports. A quick return of Iraq's output to something near its current capacity of 3.1 million b/d, however, would put downward pressure on prices and could set off a battle for market share among Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, possibly leading to a collapse both of prices and of OPEC's cohesion.

- Syria, Jordan, and Turkey would lose critical spending power, jobs, and trade in non-oil goods made possible by their current heavily discounted oil imports from Iraq [redacted]

- Flows of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of refugees and losses in trade, worker remittances, and tourism [redacted] would slow economic activity throughout the region.

[redacted] **Whatever value Iraq would have as a democratic exemplar would rest on the stability and success of a new Iraqi government and on the degree to which democracy in Iraq were seen as developing from within rather than imposed by an outside power.**

- [redacted]

- The strength of the Iraq example would depend heavily on US success in ensuring that a new Iraqi government was not seen in the region as primarily a US creation.

- On balance, however, political and economic reform in other regional states would continue to face significant obstacles and would continue to be influenced as much by conditions, events, and debates within each country as by the example set by a more liberal and democratic Iraq.

Discussion

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

(U) Setting the Stage

(U) The ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn through military force would be one of the most significant events in the Middle East in recent years. The war itself, sudden political change in a major Arab state—with the departure of a leader who started two earlier wars—and an expanded direct role in the region for the United States all would have repercussions beyond Iraq. Governments, publics, and groups across the region would react to these changes.

(U) These reactions, however, would take place within a complex set of pre-existing political, economic, and social realities, most of which would not be affected by a change of regime in Baghdad. This regional context would be at least as important as the removal of Saddam in shaping behavior important to US interests. In some respects a war against Saddam would reinforce existing perceptions and patterns of behavior. In other respects the contextual factors would tend to temper or negate what otherwise might have been a result of Saddam's ouster.

(U) The most important aspects of the Middle Eastern context are:

- Unresolved conflicts and disputes involving Middle Eastern states. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most salient, with the greatest regional impact.
- Unpromising demographic and economic trends, including significant youth bulges and high unemployment in many countries, that offer most Middle Easterners little promise of a more prosperous life.
- Generally undemocratic and ineffective political systems ruled by entrenched elites.
- Substantial political extremism, chiefly in the form of radical Islamist groups and ideologies.
- Widespread popular distrust of the United States and disappointment with US policies in the region, primarily related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
-

(U) Popular Reactions

A US-led war against Iraq would precipitate immediate popular anti-US demonstrations in many countries in the region driven by perceptions that the United States was waging a broader war against Muslims and that Washington was driven primarily by motives other than reducing the security threat from Saddam Husayn. Local security forces probably would be capable of containing popular uprisings and have taken measures to increase their readiness. Some governments, however, would be more vulnerable, especially if the focus of the protests shifted from the United States to the local regime or if the United States acted unilaterally without the political cover of a UN resolution authorizing the use of force.

- Recent polling data from many countries in the region reveal strong opposition to a US war in Iraq, increased anti-American sentiment, and a widespread belief that the United States is anti-Muslim.

- Most governments would allow some open opposition to the war as a safety valve to deflect pressure but would act to prevent attacks against US assets or interests. Many regimes also would adjust their public postures to appear attuned to the opinion of the "street" and avoid being labeled US "puppets."

- Unrest would be more severe in response to a longer war with numerous civilian casualties but milder in response to a quicker and less bloody conflict.

Media coverage of large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties attributed to US operations, public revelations about operational or logistical support for US forces in Iraq, an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence, or the perceived failure of the local government to resist alleged US "hegemonic" intentions would increase the likelihood of violent protests,

Anti-Saddam sentiment—high in many states—would not necessarily correlate with favorable popular attitudes toward the United States.

- Public anger probably would dissipate if the Iraqi people were seen as welcoming the US presence.

- Reduced Israeli-Palestinian violence, greater US engagement toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the establishment of a Palestinian state also would calm restive publics and lessen the influence of Baghdad's portrayal of Saddam as a champion of the Palestinian cause.

The long-term presence of US troops in Iraq—particularly if the result of US unilateral action—and elsewhere in the region probably would be a subject for future potentially violent demonstrations fueled by perceptions that the United States was seeking to dominate the region and its resources and was fundamentally hostile to Arab and Muslim interests.

- Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is part of the Arab core, and the use of US military force against a fellow Arab Muslim country—absent a clear provocation—probably would be viewed with widespread antipathy.

-

(U) Arab Popular Opinion—1991 and 2003

Arab popular opinion is more anti-American than it was when the United States led a Coalition military campaign against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. Consequently, there is greater potential now than in 1991 for damaging popular responses to a US-led war. Several factors underlie the more negative attitudes of today.

The United States as Sole Superpower: The position of the United States as the preeminent global power makes it almost universally suspect and adds a sharper edge to all Arab grievances. Although at the time of Desert Storm the Soviet Union was fading fast and only months away from collapse, the memory of its ambitious global agenda and recently concluded aggression in Afghanistan was still fresh in Arab minds, diverting some attention from perceived US failings.

A More Serious Arab-Israeli Conflict: The first Palestinian *intifadah*, which began in 1987 and was ongoing at the time of Desert Storm, was tame in comparison with the current Israeli-Palestinian violence. Moreover, in 1991 expectations for realizing Palestinian national aspirations had not yet been raised and shattered, as they later would be with the Madrid and Oslo processes.

(continued on next page...)

(continued...) **(U) Arab Popular Opinion—1991 and 2003**

Independent Arab Broadcast Media. In 1991 there were virtually no regional alternatives to heavily controlled state broadcast media. Media in moderate Arab states tended to shy away from aggressive coverage of developments involving the United States, lest governments with close ties to Washington be subject to domestic blowback. The rapid growth over the past decade of independent Arab media—especially the Qatar-based al-Jazirah satellite television station—has contributed significantly to negative views of the United States. The daily spectacle of Israeli-Palestinian violence has been brought to Arab living rooms, sometimes with an inflammatory spin.

Greater Sympathy for Iraq. In addition to the distinction that Arabs would draw between a reversal of Iraqi aggression against another Arab state and a war initiated by the United States, 12 years of sanctions against Iraq have reinforced perceptions that Washington is anti-Arab. Although the UN Security Council has imposed these and other sanctions against Arab states, most Arabs view them as US-driven and aimed at weakening not just the Saddam regime but Arabs in general. Unlike in 1991, when key Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria openly supported military action to expel Saddam from Kuwait, none of these states is calling for or willing to directly participate in a US-led attack against Baghdad.

Stronger Islamist Movements. Islamist movements—including both the militant and relatively moderate varieties—were more inchoate and less influential in the region in 1991 than they are now. In particular, al-Qa'ida had not yet emerged as a prominent regional and global organization stoking hatred of the United States.

The scarcity until recently of polls in most Arab and Muslim countries makes rigorous tracking of trends in opinion difficult. Recent surveys, however, point to marked anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Gallup polls taken in early 2002, Pew polls taken in summer 2002, and a State Department-sponsored poll showed favorable opinion of the United States in that region to range from a high of 37 percent among Kuwaiti citizens to 25 percent in Jordan, 16 percent in Saudi Arabia, 12 percent in Iran, and six percent in Egypt. Adjectives that Middle Eastern respondents frequently apply to the United States in polls taken by Gallup are ruthless, aggressive, conceited, biased, arrogant, and easily provoked. Perceived US attitudes toward Muslims and Islam also influence opinion. State Department-sponsored polls taken in September 2002 in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan showed majorities of between 64 and 96 percent believing that the United States does not respect Islam.

(U) Terrorism and Islamic Extremism

Iraq's defeat and occupation at the hands of the United States would deliver to the Middle East one of the largest political-psychological shocks the region has seen since the Arab defeats by Israel in 1948 and 1967. Just as those events contributed in following years to the rise of radical regimes in the region and the growth of such social and political movements as Nasserism and Islamic extremism, US actions in Iraq probably would have similarly wide-ranging but largely unpredictable consequences.

(U) Fueling Political Islam

[redacted] A US-led defeat and occupation of Arab Iraq probably would boost proponents of political Islam. Amid feelings of confusion, despair, and a renewed sense of victimization, calls by Islamists for the people of the region to unite and build up defenses against the West probably would resonate widely even though Saddam had little popular support.

- An Iraqi defeat would highlight in the public mind the incapacity of current Arab regimes either to challenge the United States or to enact meaningful reforms.
- Islamists could point to secular Iraq's downfall as an example of the "mistake" of straying from Islam.
- Fear of US domination and a widespread belief that the US secret agenda was to make the region safe for Israel probably would attract more angry young recruits to political activism and the extremist ranks.
- In some countries, an increase in Islamist sentiment also probably would take the form of greater support for Islamic political parties that seek to come to power through legitimate means.

(U) How Terrorists Might React

[redacted] An Iraqi defeat probably would heighten popular sympathy for some terrorist objectives in the near-term, increasing the threat against US officials, facilities, and businesses that were closely associated with America and its allies—especially Israel.

- US action in Iraq against one of Islam's most oil-rich countries would tend to substantiate in some minds one of al-Qa'ida's most effective messages—that the United States is out to enrich itself at the expense of Muslims. Al-Qa'ida almost certainly would attempt to portray the war as not just against al-Qa'ida or Saddam but also against Islam as a whole.
- Funds for terrorist groups probably would increase as a result of Muslim outrage over US action. Besides direct contributions, more money would flow into Islamic charities that could be skimmed off for terrorist purposes.
- Some militant Islamists in Iraq might benefit from increases in funding and popular support and could choose to conduct terrorist attacks against US forces in Iraq.
- Israeli involvement in a war against Iraq would be a lightning rod for increased terrorist attacks against both Israel and Israeli and US interests worldwide.
- Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each other or the United States—Sunni against Shia; Kurd against Kurd; Kurd against Arab; any against the United States—probably also would encourage terrorist groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks within Iraq.

[redacted] Al Qa'ida probably would see an opportunity to accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq war. The group would be looking for conflict with Iraq and its aftermath—as with previous wars or crises—to divert US attention and resources from counterterrorist efforts; for US and allied security measures, particularly around "soft" targets, to suffer; and for many countries—including some US allies—to slacken efforts to hunt down al-Qa'ida and its associates within their borders.

- Iraq itself still might not be one of al-Qa'ida's favored locations for attacks, given the group's greater operational presence elsewhere.

- Al Qa'ida, nonetheless, probably would try to exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US personnel. Support for these operations would come from its network on the Arabian Peninsula and its Kurdish associates in northeastern Iraq.

- Al-Qa'ida—which has not given up its fight in Afghanistan—probably would try to step up its efforts to re-establish its presence there while the United States was diverted with concerns in postwar Iraq.

To the extent that a new Iraqi government effectively controlled its territory, especially in northern Iraq, and was friendlier to US interests and backed by US military power, al-Qa'ida's freedom of movement inside Iraq almost certainly would be hampered.

- If al-Qa'ida mobilized significant resources to combat a US presence in Iraq, it could, at least in the near term, reduce its overall capability to strike elsewhere.

The lines between al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups around the world, especially local militants, increasingly could become blurred in the wake of a US attack and counterattacks by al-Qa'ida and jihadists. The targeting by less capable groups and planners operating on short notice would mean that such softer targets as US citizens overseas would become more inviting for terrorists.

- Attacks could come not only from al-Qa'ida and other organized Sunni and Shia extremist groups but also unaffiliated Muslims as well as left-wing and anti-imperialist groups.

- In Turkey, the leftist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, formerly Dev Sol), although weakened over the past decade, could target US interests as it did during the 1990-91 war with Iraq.

The threat from terrorism resulting from a war with Iraq, after an initial spike, probably would decline slowly over the next three to five years. If effective counterterrorist operations continued, democratization and economic reform began to take hold in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, and Arab-Israeli tensions eased, the terrorist and Islamist appeal most likely would decrease. These developments would depend, however, on how quickly political and economic reforms were translated into tangible improvements in the daily lives of people.

- Terrorists probably would feel increasingly threatened if popular outrage against the United States began to subside and political and economic opportunities increased in Iraq or elsewhere in the region. These fears might lead to increased terrorism in the short-term as terrorists attempt "last-gasp" displays of strength to bolster support.

(U) Palestinian Groups—A Special Case

Regime change in Iraq would be unlikely to affect Palestinian terrorism significantly. The effects that a US-led war in Iraq would have on support for extremist causes in the rest of the Arab and Muslim worlds, however, also would be felt among the Palestinians.

- Iraq has increased its financial support and training for Palestinian terrorist groups over the past year, and some Iraqi payments to Palestinian groups have gone to the families of members of HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. These payments appear not to have had a significant effect on suicide bombings and other violent attacks against Israeli targets because the most important Palestinian terrorist group—HAMAS—does not depend on Iraqi encouragement or material assistance for its continued operations.

- Palestinian terrorist capabilities and popularity would depend more on Israeli actions than on what happens in Iraq.

- A favorable political and economic outcome in Iraq in combination with visible US engagement in a functioning peace process could, however, reduce both recruits and money for Palestinian terrorism over the longer term.

(U) State Sponsors of Terrorism

A quick US victory over Iraq would increase the fears of Syria and Iran that they would become targets of future US military operations. Neither regime would be persuaded to end its support for terrorism, although Damascus would feel increased pressure to clamp down on Palestinian terrorist groups based in Syria. Damascus and Tehran probably would avoid sponsoring terrorist attacks against the United States unless they believed US attacks on them were imminent.

- Tehran's longstanding view of Israel as a threat to Iranian interests, as well as continued ideological opposition to Israel's existence among many of Iran's clergy, would not change as a result of Saddam's ouster, leading Iran to sustain its funding of Hizballah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In addition, some Iranian leaders might continue this support in order to preserve their ability to influence events in the Levant and the peace process and also maintain a contingency capability to attack US interests through surrogates.

- For the Syrians, Hizballah would remain its most important lever in pressuring Israel for the return of the Golan Heights.

(U) Roles in a post-Saddam Iraq

The objective of most Middle Eastern states regarding a post-Saddam Iraq would be for the territorial integrity of Iraq to remain intact and for a new regime to become neither a source of regional instability nor dominant in the region. The posture of various regional actors competing for influence in Iraq would depend, in part, on whether activities in Iraq were backed by UN resolution and would range from constructive involvement in such areas as humanitarian aid and reconstruction to activities more detrimental to US interests, including political meddling or fomenting strife among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups.

Saddam's departure would offer potential for enhancing relations between Iraq and its neighbors. Some rivalries and suspicions would linger, however, and perhaps intensify depending on the nature of the new government.

Iraq's immediate neighbors would have the greatest stakes in protecting their interests and would be most likely to pose challenges for US goals in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Iran. Iranian leaders would try to influence the shape of post-Saddam Iraq to preserve Iranian security and demonstrate that Iran is an important regional actor. The degree to which Iran would pursue policies that either support or undermine US goals in Iraq would depend on how Tehran viewed specific threats to its interests and the potential US reaction.

- Iranian officials would be concerned that significantly increased autonomy for Iraqi and Turkish Kurds could incite secessionist moves by Iran's approximately 5 million Kurds or that the United States would encourage Iranian Kurds to revolt.

- Some within the clerical establishment also would worry that an autonomous Shia entity might be created in southern Iraq, which would be a political and religious rival for Iran.

~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

(U) Kurdish-Inhabited Areas



UNCLASSIFIED

DI Cartography Center/MPG 782248AI (R00180) 1-03

~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

- Greater autonomy for either of these groups, in Tehran's view, would increase their reliance on the United States at the expense of Iranian influence.

The more that Iranian leaders—reformists and hardliners alike—perceived that Washington's aims in Iraq did not challenge Tehran's interests or threaten Iran directly, the better the chance they would cooperate in the post-war period—or at least not actively undermine US goals.

- Guaranteeing Iran a role in the negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam Iraq—as it had at the Bonn conference for Afghanistan—might persuade some Iranian officials to pursue an overt and constructive means to influence reconstruction in Iraq. Giving Iran a say in this process also could give Tehran a stake in its success.

-

-

- The establishment—when possible—of a mechanism for US and Iranian officials to communicate on the ground in Iraq could facilitate dialogue,

Some elements in the Iranian government could decide to try to counter aggressively the US presence in Iraq or challenge US goals following the fall of Saddam by attempting to use contacts in the Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent against the US presence and complicate the formation of a new, pro-US government.

- Elements in the regime also could employ their own operatives against US personnel, although this approach would be hard to conceal.

[redacted]

[redacted] *Syria.* The Syrians would view the prospect of a US-backed regime in Iraq as a threat. Syrian officials distrust Saddam but oppose his overthrow by the United States in part because they believe that removing Saddam from power is part of a US plan to change the political map of the Middle East and encircle Syria. Damascus would prefer an Iraqi leadership that could help counter a perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian alliance but probably has limited ability to influence a successor regime in the near term. Syrian leaders would try to assert influence in a post-Saddam Iraq to prevent the United States from building a stable, pro-Western government there, although Damascus would carefully weigh the risks of such a policy.

- Damascus would continue to deepen its contacts with the roughly 30 Iraqi opposition groups represented in Syria in an attempt to maximize its influence in a post-Saddam Iraq.

- Syria might resist the temptation to meddle if given US assurances that Saddam's ouster would not lead to military action against Syria, a loss of trade with Baghdad, or the break up of Iraq. Syria also would want the United States to push for renewed Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations aimed at returning the Golan Heights to Syria.

[redacted]

(U) Broader Security Policies and Posture Toward the United States

[redacted] US-led regime change and a long-term US presence in Iraq would provoke the most significant security policy adjustments among Iraq's immediate neighbors. US antagonists such as Iran and Syria would face the challenge of accommodating US military preeminence without subordinating their regional interests to Washington. For US Arab allies, the post-Saddam era would raise strategic concerns that Iraq remained unified and a bulwark against Iran but also would raise fears that the expanded US presence in the region could spark domestic unrest in key Arab states.

- In the short term, governments in the region would try to balance domestic pressures against offending US interests. Overt government cooperation with the United States might suffer initially as authorities focused on domestic threats from jihadists who perceived new

opportunities for helping to bring about Islamic governments.

- Over the longer run, an outcome that installed a credible Iraqi regime and visibly improved Iraqi living conditions would increase the willingness of regional governments to cooperate with the United States.

Beyond adjusting regional ties, Middle Eastern states would be likely to have a strategic interest in forging new global political and security relationships as counterweights to US regional preeminence. Europe's longstanding bid for trade and investment ties in the region, support for Palestinian nationalist aspirations, and pursuit of regional policies that often are independent of Washington would provide Arab states and Iran ample ground for expanded relations with the European Union. Similarly, China's potential future stake in Middle Eastern energy resources, drive toward expanded military capabilities, and traditional arms relationships with key regional states would make Beijing newly attractive to regimes unwilling to accede to indefinite and unbridled US regional influence. Russia's influence in energy markets and its status as a major arms supplier and member of the quartet on the Arab-Israeli peace process could be reasons that regional states would seek closer ties to Moscow. Within the region, Arab states and Iran would have added reason to expand relations with each other, although longstanding suspicion of Iranian intentions would limit such relations.

- Regimes might be even more willing to consider new policies if Israel were involved in the conflict because many in the region would view such involvement as coordinated with Washington to increase Israeli dominance in the region.

Iran. A prolonged US military presence in a post-Saddam Iraq would further increase Tehran's perception that the United States is a threat.

- The longer US forces remain in Iraq, Tehran would become increasingly convinced that the United States was bent on encircling Iran and that Iran could become a target of US military operations.

- Iran would increase the tempo of its intelligence gathering against US interests in Iraq to learn more about US intentions toward Iran.

Iran's suspicions of US intentions, however, would not preclude attempts to engage Washington more closely to enhance Iran's sense of regional security.

Syria. The installation of a US-aligned regime in Baghdad probably would cause Syria to reassess but not significantly alter its core security policies and posture toward the United States. President Bashar al-Asad might moderate Syrian foreign policy somewhat if he assessed that such a change would help his regime retain power and make gains vis-à-vis the United States and Israel.

- Damascus probably would step up cooperation with Iran to enhance its ability to influence events in Iraq and maintain pressure on Israel from Lebanon as a reminder to Washington that it retained options if Syria perceived no movement on its regional objectives, especially the return of the Golan.

- Syria's cooperation with the United States against al-Qa'ida probably would continue. Syria views the counter-terror relationship as an important means of garnering US goodwill and would seek to preserve this avenue of communication unless Damascus concluded that it might become a target of US military operations.

(U) A Worse Scenario: Broader Rejection of the US Military Presence in the Middle East

Heightened regional suspicions about long-term US intentions following a US military campaign in Iraq, continued or increased violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, growing popular anti-American sentiment, increased terrorist threats against regional regimes, and a new interpretation of threats to their own security could combine to prompt Arab states to seek the ouster of US military forces from their soil.

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction

The elimination of Iraq's WMD capabilities probably would not cause other regional states to abandon either their existing WMD programs or their desire to develop such programs. For many of the Arab countries of the Middle East, Iran, and South Asia, WMD programs would continue to be viewed as necessary and integral components of an overall national security posture for several reasons, including to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, enhance regional prestige, compensate for conventional military deficiencies, and deter threats from superior adversaries, particularly Israel.

States also would be driven to acquire WMD capabilities or accelerate programs already in train with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before the programs could be destroyed preemptively.

(U) Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Many in the Middle East would expect the United States to build on its victory over Iraq by taking a more active role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The willingness of regimes to cooperate with Washington on many issues would depend significantly on whether the United States met those expectations.

A change of regime in Iraq alone would have little impact on the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would depend more on the political leadership on both sides and outside—primarily US—help in resurrecting a peace process. Most Palestinians view Saddam's rhetoric and actions championing the Palestinian cause as primarily symbolic and self-serving, but they applaud him anyway, especially because they see the actions of most other Arab leaders only as rhetorical.

- In addition to his payments to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, Saddam has established a volunteer militia to "liberate" Jerusalem, given speeches calling on Israel's neighbors to step up and defend the Palestinians, and moved military forces to Iraq's western region in 2000 ostensibly to deter Israeli military actions.
- Palestinians would continue to view such rejectionist groups as HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which do not rely on Iraq, as more effective than Baghdad in pressuring Israel.
- If Israel became militarily involved in Iraq or used the conflict as a reason to take harsher action against the Palestinians or move militarily against Hizballah, Syria, or Lebanon, anti-Israeli sentiment would rise in the region, making renewed peace negotiations even more difficult.

Regime change in Iraq probably would not have a major impact on Yassir Arafat's current policy vis-à-vis the United States. Arafat in the last two years has not made a serious and sustained effort to stop Palestinian violence primarily because he perceives that the risks of such an undertaking would not merit the domestic political capital he believes he would need to expend, according to various sensitive reports. Arafat does not believe Israeli Prime Minister Sharon will ever negotiate seriously with the

Palestinians and is pessimistic the United States would pressure Sharon into meaningful talks. As a result, Arafat—who feels his personal preeminence in Palestinian politics is unchallenged—probably would be content to let the security situation remain chaotic.

Palestinian views toward negotiating with Israel also might be affected by the degree to which they perceived that they continued to have support from other actors with the capability to pressure Israel—Hizballah, Iran, and Syria, for example.

Regarding Syria, an unambiguous US commitment to satisfy Palestinian national aspirations and revive Israeli-Syrian negotiations on the basis of the Madrid framework and UN resolutions would help ease Syrian suspicion toward the United States.

(U) Economic Consequences

The ouster of Saddam Husayn would have mostly negative but variable economic effects in the region, including potential decreases in oil revenues and non-oil trade, declines in tourism, and increased refugee flows.

World oil prices probably would spike to at least $40 per barrel during—and in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of—a war because of the uncertainty associated with a cutoff in Iraq's oil exports of roughly 2 million barrels per day (b/d). The impact on prices would depend on the level of damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure, industry expectations about the length of the disruption, the use of government-owned strategic stocks by consuming nations, and whether Venezuela's oil output remained disrupted by oil worker strikes. OPEC members would have the surplus capacity to offset lost Iraqi exports and have consistently pledged to compensate for Iraqi disruptions to stabilize the market, but a simultaneous loss of Venezuelan and Iraqi output would exceed their surplus capacity.

- OPEC ministers fear a prolonged period of high oil prices would harm the global economy, boost non-OPEC investment, and spur the development of alternative energy sources. OPEC producers with spare capacity also would be tempted to increase production to reap the windfall revenues from a spike in prices.

- Saudi Arabia's willingness to raise output would be crucial because Riyadh maintains more than half of global spare capacity—nearly 2 million b/d—and has strong influence over other Gulf exporters, which together hold another 1.2 million b/d.

- Prospects for a speedy resumption of Venezuelan output are unclear, and overlapping Iraqi and Venezuelan disruptions could remove a combined 5 million b/d from the world market, about equal to the disruption caused by the 1990-91 Gulf War and surpassing the 3 million b/d of surplus capacity in other OPEC producers.

Over the longer term, oil prices could weaken and fall to about $15 per barrel if Iraqi oil production and exports expand and Venezuela returns to normal, other OPEC producers were unwilling to surrender market share to Baghdad, and global economic performance remains modest. Sustained low prices probably would lead to worsening economic and political conditions for some key OPEC producers, who would see growing budgetary pressures in an environment of lower oil prices and volumes and a need to cut fuel and other subsidies to their people due to lost revenues. All of Iraq's neighbors would want assurances that the Iraqi oil sector would be managed to protect their interests and that Baghdad would quickly reintegrate into the OPEC quota system.

- A quick return of oil output to or near Baghdad's current capacity of 3.1 million b/d would put downward pressure on oil prices that could set off a battle for market share among Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other OPEC members, possibly leading to a price collapse and splits in OPEC's cohesion. The risk of a market share battle would grow if OPEC members believed Iraq was going to aggressively expand its capacity.

- Jordan, Syria, and Turkey would stand to lose critical spending power, jobs, and trade in non-oil goods made possible by the millions of dollars these countries saved annually from heavily discounted oil exports from Iraq.

Throughout the region, disruptions in trade and tourism plus flows of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of refugees almost certainly would cause a slowdown in economic activity. Worker remittances, a key source of revenue for many countries, probably also would fall.

- Trade with Iraq, including under the UN Oil-For-Food program, accounted for about 20 percent of Jordan's GDP in 2001 and roughly 13 percent of its foreign exchange. Jordan and Syria both depend on their "special" relationship with Iraq to trade their goods and services, which may not compete well in other markets.

- Egypt relies on expatriate remittances from workers in Gulf states, which could be curtailed because of a war, to help its balance of payments. In addition, tourism traditionally is Cairo's largest source of foreign exchange and accounts for about 11 percent of GDP and some 15 percent of total employment.

- Jordan, Iran, and Turkey—already burdened by significant refugee populations—would be hardest hit by an influx of new refugees.

- If Saddam carried out his threats to ignite oil wells or destroy dams or if a WMD catastrophe occurs, the resulting humanitarian crisis could affect millions of Iraqis in addition to Coalition troops on the ground in some areas. These potential scenarios, as well as the possibility of extended combat operations in major Iraqi cities, would cost the international

(U) Taking a Bite Out of Regional Economies

Tourism generates an important revenue stream for Egypt. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, revenues fell by $1.3 billion last fiscal year and could sustain a similar decline in the aftermath of an attack on Iraq. Egypt also relies on expatriate remittances from Gulf states as a major source of foreign exchange, which probably also would decline after an attack on Iraq.

(U) A study that Turkey presented to the EU in August 2002 shows that a conflict with Iraq would cut Turkish economic growth in 2003 from 4.9 percent to 3.1 percent—a loss of about $3 billion mostly because a $500 million decline in exports and a $1 billion (15 percent) drop in tourism revenues.

Jordan imports all of its oil from Iraq—worth more than $1 billion per year at market prices—at deep discounts and in exchange for Jordanian goods. Termination of supply without a ready substitute at a similar discount would force Amman to make painful budget cuts to finance other sources of oil. A war also would hurt Jordan's vital export and tourism sectors. Jordan also supplies goods to Iraq through the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program. OFF contracts—many of which are for re-exports rather than Jordanian-origin products—totaled $870 million (10 percent of GDP) in 2001.

community several billion dollars in reconstruction and humanitarian aid.

Regional perceptions of the economic uncertainties associated with a post-Saddam Iraq probably would lead many states to seek US assurances that their losses would be compensated and to request billions in US economic assistance including cash, civilian and military goods, debt relief, and increased access to US markets. US support for key political goals also could be sought.

-
-
-

(U) Prospects for Democratic Reform

The exemplar of a more politically liberal Iraq probably would not, by itself, be a catalyst for more wide-ranging political and economic change throughout the region, although it could raise expectations in the small numbers of reformers in the region for greater political liberalization. Reform in any Muslim country, however, would be more the result of conditions, events, and debates

within that country than events elsewhere in the region. Regardless of how positively regional leaders viewed their relations with the United States and might want to accommodate US goals of political openness, the Middle East will remain a difficult environment in which to advance democracy and liberalism.

- The concepts of democracy and representative government are alien to most Arab Middle Eastern political cultures—grounded in histories that derive mainly from subjugation to larger empires and then to European colonial rule.

- Many states lack such important components of democracy as the concept of a loyal opposition, vibrant civil society institutions, respect for rule of law, transparency, and a strong middle class.

Many rulers in the region recognize the potential role of reform in economic expansion but fear a spillover into politics. In response to pressure to allow more public participation, some Arab leaders have taken a few tentative steps in the past decade to open their political systems. Some states have consultative councils that serve primarily as safety valves with no practical authority. These councils would be unlikely to evolve into true power-sharing bodies unless supported by regime elites.

- Even if leaders were convinced that political reform were necessary, they would face such obstacles as entrenched interests of the secular and religious elites.

The closed and unreformed political systems in many Arab countries also reflect complex sets of deals, understandings, and patron-client relationships that are based on long-standing ethnic, sectarian, or tribal identities. Oil wealth has enabled some autocratic regimes to buy off their populations with a social contract that provides for the basic needs of the populace in return for maintaining the political status quo.

- Most regimes in the region so far have responded successfully to pressures to renegotiate fraying social contracts by the deeply ingrained habit of incrementalism—reforming and restructuring just enough to get by—and would be unlikely to break this habit easily.

Many leaders also have a long record of pulling back popular reforms—often by force—when they appear to empower groups beyond the traditional ruling elites. As long as radical Islamist sentiment remained strong in the region and secular, liberal alternatives remained weak, the possibility of Islamists winning free elections—as happened in Algeria a decade ago—would give some governments strong pause about opening up their political systems.

In the near-term, the use of US military force against Iraq may be more likely to stifle than nurture democratic movements in some regional states because governments would use political repression to quell violent public opposition to the war and perhaps to the local government's indirect association with it.

-

- After a conflict, the long-term presence of US forces in Iraq also could fuel

perceptions that the United States was there to reshape the region as part of a larger war against Arabs and Muslims. Such perceptions might heighten calls for more radical Islamic systems of governance, [redacted] which would cause regimes to clamp down even harder on oppositionists.

- Some regimes [redacted] would continue to cite ongoing Arab-Israeli violence as the reason to continue repressive policies and delay reforms.

[redacted] The manner in which a new government emerged in Baghdad, including involvement by the UN, and the relative success of policies such a government adopted would be important determinants of how it would be perceived by regional leaders and publics.

- A perception that democracy was "imposed" on Iraq would resurrect entrenched fears of colonialism and lessen further the likelihood that Iraq could serve as a model for political liberalization in the region.

- Confronted with a more liberal government in Iraq that was perceived as not imposed and as having improved the living standard for most Iraqis, an increasing number of Arabs probably would look inward at their own political culture and the reasons why it is dysfunctional, perhaps sparking more public debate about democratization. Lingering suspicion of the US role in the region, however, would tend to reinforce perceptions that the new Iraqi government was primarily a US creation.

SECRET/

34

SECRET/

A more democratic regime in Iraq could encourage civil society activists in *Syria* but also probably would stiffen regime resistance to reform. The Asad regime probably would view the example of a democratic regime in Iraq as a potential threat to authoritarian rule in Syria. Syrian officials privately would be concerned that removing Saddam could lead to instability in Iraq and increased demands for autonomy from minority groups in neighboring states, including the Kurds in Syria.

The country where regime change in Iraq would have the best chance to tip the political balance in favor of reform is *Iran* as both reformers and hardliners would probe for advantages.

- A quick and decisive Coalition victory in Iraq most likely would strengthen the hand of reformers favoring engagement and democracy-building at home as the most effective way to forestall a US attack.

- A prolonged and destructive war in Iraq probably would intensify the Iranian political divide. Hardliners could use the pretext of a potential US invasion to crack down and impose a state of emergency, tightening theocratic rule.

A post-Saddam Iraq also might serve as a haven for dissident Shia clerics opposed to the principle of clerical rule. Najaf and Karbala in Iraq are traditional seats of Shia Islamic scholarship to which dissident Iranian clerics could move—as did Ayatollah Khomeini prior to the 1979 revolution—to continue teaching and organizing outside Iran.

~~SECRET~~

The National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole.

Acting Chairman	Stuart A. Cohen
Vice Chairman for Evaluation	Mark Lowenthal
Acting Director, Senior Review, Production, and Analysis	William R. Heaton

National Intelligence Officers

Africa	Robert Houdek
At-Large	Stuart A. Cohen
Conventional Military Issues	John Landry
East Asia	Arthur Brown
Economics & Global Issues	Karen Monaghan, Acting
Europe	Mark Schwendler, Acting
Latin America	Fulton T. Armstrong
Near East and South Asia	Paul R. Pillar
Russia and Eurasia	George Kolt
Science & Technology	Lawrence K. Gershwin
Strategic & Nuclear Programs	Robert D Walpole
Warning	Robert Vickers

Unclassified

~~SECRET~~/

~~SECRET~~/

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

MORI DocID: 1422249

EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs

SECRET/

Intelligence Community Assessment

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2007

ICA 2003-04
January 2003

SECRET/

~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

National Intelligence Council

ICA 2003-04

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

[redacted] *Prepared under the auspices of Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on* [redacted]

January 2003

~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

Scope Note

[redacted] At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) examines the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn. It discusses the main political, economic, humanitarian, and security issues inside Iraq that are likely to demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam departs. In particular, it looks at the prospects for representative government in Iraq and at the ethnic, tribal, and religious forces that will affect its development.

[redacted] How these issues unfold would depend heavily on the events leading to Saddam's removal. The effects of his ouster through the invasion of Iraq by a Coalition military force could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the damage it caused, and such other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the Coalition. Subsequent occupation by a Coalition force obviously would make that force the dominant influence on events in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. This assessment makes no projections about specific wartime scenarios or the policies of an occupying force. Nor does it focus primarily on the immediate humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction that would be handled by the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war. Instead, it identifies and analyzes the medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in Iraq necessarily would face.

[redacted] The ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts in the history, politics, and regional dynamics of the Middle East- [redacted] Their comments were taken into consideration in the preparation of this paper.

[redacted] The regional repercussions of an ouster of Saddam, including postures of neighboring states toward a post-Saddam Iraq, are addressed in ICA 2003-03, [redacted] *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq* (~~SECRET~~/[redacted] January 2003.

Contents

	Page
(U) **Scope Note**	1
(U) **Key Judgments**	5
(U) **Discussion**	9
(U) **The Historical Legacy**	9
(U) **Saddam's Great Leap Backward**	11
Eroding Nascent Political Institutions	11
(U) **Iraq's Political Culture: Implications for Democracy**	13
Political Islam	15
Discredited Arab Nationalism	15
Opposition in Exile	17
(U) **Domestic Divisions and Conflict**	19
Shia-Sunni Strife	20
Kurdish Options	22
Inter-Tribal Conflict	24
(U) **Humanitarian Issues**	25
Population Displacement	25
Food and Water	25
Health Care and Sanitation	28
Existing Infrastructure	30
(U) **Financial Strains and Economic Opportunities**	30
(U) **Immutable Foreign Policy Interests**	34
(U) **Implications for Iraqi Security**	36
Weapons of Mass Destruction	36
Terrorism	38

Key Judgments

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

[redacted] The greatest medium-to-long-term challenge in Iraq if Saddam Husayn were ousted would be the introduction of a stable and representative political system in place of Saddam's apparatus of oppression. The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of authoritarianism.

- Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy. Iraq lacks the experience of a loyal opposition and effective institutions for mass political participation. Saddam's brutal methods have made a generation of Iraqis distrustful of surrendering or sharing power.

- The principal positive elements in any effort at democratization would be the current relative weakness of political Islam in Iraq and the contributions that could be made by four million Iraqi exiles—many of whom are Westernized and well educated—and by the now-impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class.

[redacted] Iraq would be unlikely to split apart, but a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.

- Sunni Arabs would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia would seek power commensurate with their majority status.

- Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam's departure by seizing some of the large northern oilfields, a move that would elicit forceful responses from Sunni Arabs [redacted]

- Score-settling would occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's regime and those who have suffered most under it.

[redacted] Iraq's large petroleum resources—its greatest asset—would make economic reconstruction less difficult than political transformation. Iraq's economic options would remain few and narrow, however, without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in reparations from the previous Persian Gulf war, or something akin to a Marshall Plan.

- Iraq's economic and financial prospects would vary significantly depending on how much damage its oil facilities sustained in a war. If they remained relatively unscathed and any administrative issues involving organization of Iraq's oil industry were resolved, it would be possible to increase oil production within three months from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d) to 3.1 million b/d.

- A less oil-dependent economy with a strong private sector would be required to generate the more than 240,000 new jobs needed each year to accommodate the rapidly growing labor force.

[redacted] Major outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs. Increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, combined with civil strife, would strain Iraq's already inadequate healthcare services, food distribution networks, and supplies of potable water.

- Most Iraqis depend on government food rations and are not equipped to deal with hoarding, looting, or price gouging. Rapid reconstitution of the distribution system would be critical to avoiding widespread health problems.

- Iraqis have restored their physical infrastructure quickly after previous wars. The difficulty of restoring such services as water and electricity after a new war would depend chiefly on how much destruction was caused by urban combat.

[redacted] The foreign and security policies of a new Iraqi government necessarily would defer heavily in the near term to the interests of the United States, United Nations, or an international Coalition but also would reflect many continuing Iraqi perceptions and interests. Those perceptions [redacted] would increasingly shape the Iraqis' policies as they reasserted their independence.

- These threat perceptions, along with a prideful sense of Iraq's place as a regional power, probably would sustain Iraq's interest in rebuilding its military. Unless guaranteed a security umbrella against its strategic rivals, Iraq's interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction would eventually revive.

- A new Iraqi government would have little interest in supporting terrorism, although strong Iraqi sympathy for the Palestinians would continue. If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi countryside, al-Q'aida or other terrorists groups could operate from remote areas.

~~SECRET~~/

(U) Iraq: Population Density



UNCLASSIFIED

DI Cartography Center/MPG 762441AI (R00987) 1-03

~~SECRET~~/

Discussion

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

[redacted] The ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn would pose a variety of significant policy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for governing Iraq. These include political transformation, controlling internal strife, solving economic and humanitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent foreign policy and security concerns. The greatest medium-to-long-term challenge would be in fashioning an even partially liberal, democratic, and stable polity in place of the system of oppression that Saddam has maintained. Political transformation is the task in which the underlying problems are most deeply rooted in Iraq's history and culture and least susceptible to outside intervention and management.

(U) The Historical Legacy

[redacted] Iraq's experience with democratic—or even representative—political institutions has been limited. Its experiments in pluralism ended long ago, and the socio-economic foundations for a more open political system that were laid in the 1960s and 1970s have collapsed.

- Iraq's most promising experiment with representative institutions took place under the Hashemite monarchy (1920-1958), when political parties operated more freely than at any other time in the country's history. Although personal ties, traditional patron-client relationships, and management by the regime greatly influenced the political process, the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies was a somewhat representative body.

- Formal suffrage requirements in Iraq were comparatively liberal during the monarchy. However, low levels of education and literacy, the absence of transportation and media networks, and the overweaning influence of tribal shaykhs in the countryside meant that, outside the cities or among rural elites, voting rates were low and the integrity of the ballot was questionable.

- Modern participatory mass politics was only beginning to emerge when the monarchy was overthrown in a military coup in 1958.

[redacted] Iraq's leaders have struggled to create an Iraqi national identity since the country was created following World War I out of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Sunni Arab minority has provided most of Iraq's leaders, continuing a traditional leadership arrangement established during Ottoman rule and sustained through the British mandate. Individual Kurds and Shias, as well as Christians and Jews, have held influential positions, but such exceptions were not indicative of Sunni power-sharing. Prior to 1968, the merchant class, the *ulema*, and some tribal shaykhs were influential in government and within their own communities.

[redacted] Despite its dictatorial rule over the last 35 years, the Ba'th Party initially made progress in developing institutions that might have supported the growth of democracy. Motivated by a pan-Arabist, socialist

Occupation and Transition: Likely Iraqi Attitudes

In the early months after a forceful ouster of Saddam, stability in Iraq would depend partly on the perspectives of Iraqis toward whatever interim authority—military or civilian, foreign or indigenous—was in control, as well as on the ability of that authority to perform the administrative and security tasks of governing the country. The potential for tension would exist between those two elements of stability: the type of authority most acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of Iraqis might not be the same type most capable of running a war-damaged Iraq.

That tension probably would be minimal during the first few weeks or months after a war. The top priorities of most Iraqis would be to obtain peace, order, stability, and fulfill basic needs such as food and shelter. Personal needs would take precedence over political. Prompt provision of such services as clean water also would help to refute the Saddam regime's propaganda that the US-led West had imposed sanctions to hurt ordinary Iraqis.

Once the most pressing needs became less of a worry for most Iraqis, however, politics and the nature of the ruling authority would become increasingly important to them. Iraqis would expect progress in transferring power from foreign occupiers—however much they had been welcomed as liberators—to indigenous leaders. Attitudes toward a foreign military force would depend largely on the progress made in transferring power itself as well as the degree to which that force were perceived as providing necessary security and fostering reconstruction and a return to prosperity.

Other recent instances of political reconstruction following intervention by a foreign force provide only limited lessons for Iraq, given the major differences between cases. Examples such as the Balkans and East Timor suggest that a foreign military presence might be acceptable to most of the population if it served a clear security need and progress toward indigenous rule continued. The attitudes of most Iraqis would be shaped far more by what they seeing foreign force doing in their own land than by foreign models. Some Iraqis, however, might point to Afghanistan as a model for how authority ought to be turned over to an Iraqi-led and -run government within two or three months of Saddam's ouster.

Iraq's history of foreign occupation—first the Ottomans, then the British—has left Iraqis with a deep dislike of occupiers. An indefinite foreign military occupation, with ultimate power in the hands of a non-Iraqi officer, would be widely unacceptable. [redacted] some senior Iraqi military officers who oppose Saddam find the idea of a western power conquering and governing Iraq anathema and a motivation to fight for Saddam where they otherwise would not. External opposition leaders have expressed similar sentiments. The Opposition Conference in December 2002 formally rejected "any type of occupation, foreign or local military rule, external trusteeship, or regional intervention." The Kurdish leader Jalal Talibani said more pointedly, "If we don't accept an Iraqi general, how are we going to accept an American general?"

ideology, and a desire to consolidate power, the Ba'th used social reforms, oil wealth, and secularist policies to bridge or paper over many of Iraq's ethnic and religious gaps and engender a sense of "Iraqi-ness."

- In the 1970s, with the help of mushrooming oil revenues, Baghdad invested in its human capital and infrastructure by supporting education and medical services throughout the country. In 1987, UNESCO recognized Iraq as having achieved a literacy rate of 80 percent.

- Baghdad coupled this investment with road building, electrification, and provision of fresh water in rural and urban areas. Although pockets of backwardness remained, the infrastructure contributed to a growing industrial sector and an increasingly urbanized population. At the same time, the regime cultivated rural areas by implementing land reform and establishing agricultural cooperatives.

- Shia actions during the Iran-Iraq War—their defense of Iraq in the name of Iraqi nationalism—demonstrated the extent to which a sense of national identity had been established along the Shia-Sunni fault line.

(U) Saddam's Great Leap Backward

[redacted] Over the last two decades, Saddam's military adventures against Iran and Kuwait have undermined the social, political, and economic gains previously made under the Ba'thists.

- At least 400,000 Iraqis died or were wounded in the Iran-Iraq War. Although the conflict spurred growth in Iraq's heavy industrial and military-related economic sectors, Baghdad diverted resources from social and educational programs to support the war effort.

[redacted] The economic readjustments during and after the Iran-Iraq War and the UN sanctions following the Gulf war exacted a substantial price. Iraq's obstinacy in evading its disarmament obligations has prolonged the economic problems, reducing the general population to a state of dependency while giving rise to previously unseen rampant corruption.

- In 1980, Iraq's per capita GDP was poised to overtake that of Greece. Now Iraq's GDP per capita is $2,500 while Greece's GDP per capita is estimated at $17,900.

- Such basic services as electrification and clean water currently reach less than half the population.

- UN figures indicate that literacy has dropped to 50 to 60 percent. Although school enrollments have risen since the Oil for Food (OFF) Program began in 1996, attendance has fallen and dropout rates have risen. A brain drain has continued, and most of Iraq's once thriving middle class has been impoverished.

(U) Eroding Nascent Political Institutions

[redacted] Saddam's policies increasingly have emphasized his own survival at the expense of the few representative political institutions Iraq had developed.

[redacted] On assuming power, Saddam gutted the Ba'th Party of independent political power and ideological authority and remade it into an instrument to ensure his survival. The Ba'th has become an instrument of internal security and control rather than a means of political mobilization. Saddam has

SECRET/

Iraq: Comparative Social Indicators Table

Demographics					
Total population, 2001 (millions)	23.8	66.1	69.5	2.0	284.8
Population growth rate, 1991-2001 (average annual percent)	2.9	1.4	1.9	3.8[a]	0.9
Urban population, 2000 (percent of total population)	77	62	45	98	77
Total fertility rate, 2001 (births per woman)	4.8	2.0	3.1	3.2	2.1
Life expectancy at birth, 2001 (years)	65[b]	68[b]	64	76	77
Infant mortality, 2001 (per 1,000 live births)	92[b]	52[c]	60	11	7
Education					
Literacy rate, 2000 (percent)	58[b]	77	55	82	100
Enrollment rates (percent)[d]					
Primary	85	98	101	77	102
Secondary	42	77	78	65	97
Post-secondary	12	18	20	19	81
Income					
GDP per capita, 2001(thousand US $)[e]	2,475	6,304	3,821	14,798	35,100

[a]Figure is average for 1996-2001.
[b]Estimate.
[c]1999 figure as reported to the UN by the Statistical Center of Iran.
[d]Enrollment rate is the total enrollment, regardless of age, divided by the population of the official age group which corresponds to a specific level of education. Data vary from 1995 to 1997.
[e]2000 purchasing power parity rates.

Sources: US Census Bureau and the UN, except as noted.

CONFIDENTIAL

DI Design Center/MPG 387988ID 1-03

SECRET/

emphasized the need to recruit younger members to the party, but real influence remains in the hands of a limited inner circle, and new recruits appear to view the Ba'th as an avenue for landing a job or even obtaining a ration card. Indeed, heavy-handed tactics used to increase the power base of the Ba'th Party have generated strong resentment toward the party in many sectors of society. The party probably would collapse with the regime, although some of its original ideals could find expression through former party members who might form networks for overt or covert political activity.

Saddam has manipulated and rearranged other Iraqi centers of power and political institutions, subordinating them to military/security organizations and to revitalized tribal structures.

- The degradation of Iraq's socio-economic structure, coupled with the reemergence of regional and tribal power bases since the Gulf war, has intensified traditional tribal, religious, and ethnic differences, undermining the progress made in forging a national identity. Rather than erase these fissures, Saddam has exploited them to solidify further his hold on power by nurturing the belief that only he can hold Iraq together.

- Although Iraq had a large, well-trained and competent cadre of technocrats and civil leaders, Saddam has tried to eliminate all those he suspects of nurturing a personal following in the military or in the civil sector.

(U) Iraq's Political Culture: Implications for Democracy

The undemocratic nature of Iraq's political culture means that any development of stable democracy there would be a long and probably difficult process. Saddam's brutal regime has left its mark on the Iraqi psyche. In addition to fostering pervasive fear throughout the society, the strong distrust between Iraqi groups is unlikely to dissipate quickly. The culture of brute power has direct implications for the forging of a democratic political system. In Saddam's Iraq, the surrendering of power leads to brutal subjugation. Once power is held in Iraq, it is rarely relinquished peacefully. When Saddam leaves the scene, any new authority will need to demonstrate and earn sufficient trust for Iraqis with any degree of power to become convinced they can safely hand it over or share it.

Iraq's political culture largely is bereft of the social underpinnings that directly support development of broad-based participatory democracy. The non-regime political elite has largely disappeared through exile or death. More than 70 percent of the population has been born or reached adulthood since Operation Desert Storm and know only war, sanctions, deprivation, and Saddam's rule. Few Iraqis have any firsthand experience with pre-Saddam Iraq.

Development of a new political culture more conducive to democracy would require building upon the now-impoverished but still talented Iraqi middle class. Despite their economic straits, many members of this social stratum—at least those who were adults before deprivations began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s—may retain attitudes similar to those of liberal bourgeoisie in developed democracies. The political attitudes of their offspring could be more problematic.

Stable democracy in Iraq would require development of a new system of political parties with nationwide

constituencies cutting across ethno-religious boundaries.

- Some small "political parties" operate inside the country (primarily in northern Iraq), but none appear to have a sufficiently broad base of support to assume the reins of power following Saddam's departure.

- The major Kurdish political parties are unlikely to develop any significant support among the Arab majority in Iraq.

- The Ba'th Party, having become a repressive instrument of Saddam's regime, has become discredited and is unlikely to serve as a model.

The idea of free and democratic elections, although somewhat alien, probably would be a popular concept with the vast majority of the Iraqi population. But the practical implementation of democratic rule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and no history of alternation of power. Those groups that retained a power base following Saddam's removal would be reluctant to voluntarily relinquish whatever influence they had until they felt sufficiently secure—on a personal as well as a group level. The experience of the Kurdish-controlled north, where neither Kurdish party has been prepared to concede power to the other, is instructive (see text box on page 16).

- Although Iraqis might be enthusiastic about casting votes, we do not know what their perception of "democracy" is. Many Iraqi citizens probably would continue to rely heavily on authority figures for their well-being and direction. The history of strong authoritarian rule has left most Iraqis heavily reliant on the central government. Unless Saddam's removal were followed by re-establishment of a strong and central authority, many Iraqis would begin looking toward more traditional regional, tribal, or religious authorities for support and guidance.

- Some Iraqis would be quick to blame economic problems and other difficulties in their daily lives on a breakdown of the previous order. There might be some longing for the more functional aspects of Saddam's authoritarian regime, similar to nostalgia for an undemocratic past observed in other states that have undergone major loosening of their political systems (such as South Africa and the former Soviet Union).

The lack of ingrained democratic traditions, innate distrust of other groups, and the tendency to substitute tribal, ethnic, or sectarian loyalties will impede the development of a stable democracy. Initial expressions of enthusiasm for democratic norms and procedures—not only from ordinary Iraqis, but from any new Iraqi government, which would want to stay in good graces with the US-led Western democracies—would not reflect a sudden alteration of that culture. A stable and democratic Iraqi political system, if one emerges, is likely to be the result of a long evolution that supplants traditional loyalties and practices.

- Democracy or representative institutions could provide a forum to adjudicate competing tribal or sectarian differences.

- However, forcing short-term political accommodations between competing interests before new patterns of trust had developed could be destabilizing. Iraq lacks traditions even comparable to that of the *loya jirga* in Afghanistan, which enables groups there to have some role in

making or at least ratifying such accommodations.

- Even with a long-term political evolution, sustained nurturing of democratic institutions would be needed to minimize the chance of drift toward the authoritarian patterns that have dominated Iraq's 80-year history.

(U) Political Islam

[redacted] A factor in favor of possible democratization of Iraq is the relatively low politicization of Iraqi Shiism—the country's majority Islamic creed—particularly in comparison to Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia and the Persian variant of Shiism practiced in Iran. This does not mean, however, that the trend could not take root in post-war Iraq, particularly if economic recovery were slow and foreign troops remained in country for a long period. Academic research indicates that the political vitality of Iraqi Shiism declined throughout the 20th century.

- Since the early 20th century, the Iraqi state has eroded the power and wealth of the Shia religious establishment, established clear boundaries between religion and politics, and generally promoted a secular vision of society.

- In the early 1900s, Shia clerics were primary motivating forces in the rebellion of both Shia and Sunni communities against the British. By the Shia rebellion against Saddam in the 1990s, they no longer played a lead role.

- Nevertheless, traditional religious elites, particularly in the Shia south and portions of Baghdad, have influence through such religious institutions as the Najaf Theological College and Husayniyas (community worship centers) as well as through the *ulema*, religious scholars. The Sadah, descendents of the prophet, play prominent roles in mediating disputes.

- Islamic non-governmental organizations, such as the al-Khoei Foundation, an international Shia religious, charitable institution based in London, also have influence in the Shia community of Iraq.

[redacted] No major fundamentalist trend within either the Shia or Sunni communities emerged under the Ba'th—possibly as a result of the regime's repression. Travelers to Iraq report that members of the younger generation are more attracted to fundamentalism than their parents were—perhaps in reaction to the failure of the Iraqi state as well as to the same developments that have boosted political Islam elsewhere in the region. A more politically open society could provide fertile ground for these nascent fundamentalist tendencies. The ability of fundamentalism to take hold in Iraq would depend in large part on how quickly Iraq recovered economically from the lingering effects of sanctions.

(U) Discredited Arab Nationalism

[redacted] Another favorable factor, and an unintended consequence of Saddam's rule, has been that one of the prime Arab alternatives to democracy—secular authoritarian nationalism—has been discredited. The appeal of this variety of authoritarianism would be likely to be restricted to a small minority that directly benefited from Saddam's regime.

(U) Kurdish Democracy—A Case Study

[redacted] Iraq's Kurdish groups point to their "democratic experiment" in northern Iraq as an example of how democracy can work in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Kurds have made progress in developing democratic institutions and aspects of a liberal society over the last decade, but habits and perspectives also necessary for democracy are lacking.

[redacted] When Saddam withdrew his forces from large portions of northern Iraq in 1991, traditionally rival Kurdish parties put their differences aside and worked with the international community to establish security, order and humanitarian relief in an extremely volatile environment.

[redacted] Elections were held in May 1992 for a regional assembly and to select a single regional leader. The elections seemed to herald a new beginning for a people whose rivalries had long hampered cooperation and who had known the worst excesses of a brutally repressive regime. The elections were conducted under largely peaceful conditions, with minimal accusations of fraud, and were heralded as a success. However, the parties were unable to live with the results.

[redacted] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masud Barzani won the election, 51 percent to 49 percent, but the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, refused to accept the outcome. In an effort to forestall fighting, backroom negotiations resulted in an agreement in which the KDP and PUK would have an equal number of seats in the Assembly (with a token number awarded the Assyrians) and the two parties would forge a "unity government" with shared responsibilities and a rotating prime minister. (Such smaller groups as the Assyrians and Communists were given ministerial portfolios, but the real power was distributed between the PDK and PUK.) Neither Barzani nor Talabani took an official post, leaving it to trusted lieutenants to assume the ministerial positions. Although follow-on elections to determine the leader of northern Iraq were scheduled repeatedly, they never took place.

[redacted] Barzani and Talabani continued to jockey for the preeminent position, and full-scale fighting between the two parties erupted in 1994. Combat continued intermittently until August 1996, when the KDP called on Baghdad to help wrest the provincial capital of Arbil from PUK control. The PUK's ouster resulted in the expulsion of the Iraqi National Congress and the withdrawal of the US and Coalition military presence from the north.

[redacted] Since 1996, the Kurds have worked toward gradual rapprochement, with only sporadic intervals of violence. Northern Iraq remains distinctly divided between KDP and PUK zones (with some smaller parties, most notably certain Islamist groups, controlling smaller areas of land). The relationship has reached a level of cautious cordiality—assisted in no small measure by the significant largesse both parties enjoy from the Oil-for-Food Program in northern Iraq and by revenues from smuggling and transit taxes.

[redacted] With the two militias geographically separated, the parties have managed to establish some "democratic" institutions within their respective areas. Substantial progress has been made in developing elements of civil society and enabling ordinary Kurds to live in non-authoritarian conditions. Efforts have been made to improve freedom of the press, there has been some movement on reforming the judicial systems and police forces, and local municipal elections have been held. The Joint Assembly that was elected in 1992 reconvened in October 2002 after not having met since 1994.

(U) Opposition in Exile

The external opposition does not have the popular, political, or military capabilities necessary to play a leading role after Saddam's departure without significant and prolonged external economic, political, and military support.

-

External Iraqi opposition groups have made limited progress in submerging their differences and developing a unified front. In 2002, several Iraqi external opposition parties held conferences designed to forge unity. At the meeting in December 2002, they called for a democratic and federal Iraq, formed an advisory committee of 65 members, and unanimously opposed a US-imposed post-Saddam political solution. They remained unsure, however, what their role would be in post-Saddam Iraq.

- The conferences could have done little without high-level US input. Inter-personal and organizational problems persist, and many oppositionists worry the US presence will make it difficult for them to gain traction with the Iraqi public.

- Internal divisions and inability to come to agreement led to a postponement of their scheduled mid-January 2003 meeting.

Most opposition parties are organized along geographical or ethnic lines, undercutting their ability to attract a widespread political base within Iraq and undermining attempts to forge a united opposition. Some Iraqi Sunni oppositionists criticize the West for compounding that tendency by supporting Kurds and Shia to the perceived exclusion of Sunni Arabs.

- The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—an Iranian-backed Shia Arab opposition group—has some following in the Shia tribal areas.

- At the December 2002 meeting, the al-Khoei Foundation played a pivotal peacemaking role between Shia factions. The al-Khoei Foundation, which has a large following in Iraq, promotes the separation of religion from politics.

- The two major Kurdish opposition parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have extensive support within their respective regions in northern Iraq, but they have mounted few successful joint ventures and have no base outside the north.

The opposition has made scattered attempts to unite various factions and groups. Such efforts seem to work only when they are formed as a counter to another political party or ethnic group. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has claimed to be an umbrella group for all opposition groups but the December conference made it clear that it can no longer claim that role.

- Although they are technically part of the INC, the PUK, KDP, SCIRI, and the Iraqi National Accord—an Iraqi nationalist group of former military and security officers—formed the Group of Four to meet informally outside the framework of the INC.

- The various Assyrian oppositionists have coalesced under a US-based umbrella group, ostensibly to protect their minority interests. Turkomen are represented by a

SECRET/

SECRET/

number of groups that do not operate under INC auspices.

Regardless of what political role the external opposition parties assumed, the return of individual exiles could aid the development of political institutions and civil society. The US Committee for Refugees estimates that four million Iraqis live outside Iraq. At least a quarter of them have left Iraq in the last ten years.

- Scattered reporting suggests that a relatively high proportion of these expatriates are middle class professionals or businessmen. Many of them reside in the West, where they have been exposed to democratic norms and values and possibly would bring those values back to Iraq.

- The more skilled exiles would be able to play significant roles in rebuilding Iraq. In so doing they could over time constitute a constituency for democracy.

(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict

Any new authority in Iraq would face a country with societal fractures and significant potential for violent conflict among domestic groups if not prevented by an occupying force. Some of the domestic divisions are emotion-laden but less visceral and extreme than in some countries in which ethnic conflict has been the basis for genocide.

The principal division is the three-way split among Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd, which is based on ethnicity and religion but to some extent involves a geographic concentration of each group in the central, southern, and northern regions of Iraq respectively. The geographic pattern is least distinct with the Shia, especially in Baghdad and other urban areas, where many Shia live alongside Sunnis. Other societal divisions, including ones based on tribal identities, would add to the challenge of maintaining domestic peace and stability.

- These divisions have not generated constant civil war during Saddam's tenure largely because of the de facto secession of the Kurdish north—protected by the northern no-fly zone—and severe repression by the regime. This suppression includes past use of chemical weapons against Kurds and draining of marshes in the south to help subjugate the predominantly Shia marsh Arabs. The lifting of the repression and the restoration of Iraq's territorial integrity would open the way for heightened competition for power among the different groups and new suspicions about what grabs for power other groups were making.

- Saddam has widened societal splits by exacerbating hostilities and suspicions among ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in an effort to co-opt some and subjugate others.

Despite these societal fissures, Iraq would be unlikely to split apart. Most Iraqis have national identity and pride in being Iraqi that transcends their ethnic and religious differences. More significantly, the alternatives are not attractive.

The harshness of the Saddam regime's methods would form the basis for another split: between those associated with the old regime—and its brutality and

favoritism—and those who have been its victims. The desire among many of the latter for reprisals against the former would be strong.

[redacted] If responsibility for internal security had been passed from an occupying force to an Iraqi government, such a government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's police, security, and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace. Those elements most closely associated with Saddam would have to be protected against immediate reprisals if they were to face a judicial process rather than vigilante violence. The Special Republican Guards, Special Security Organization, Iraqi Intelligence Service, Saddam Fedayeen, and Directorate of General Security are all associated with internal repression and surveillance. Local police and the Regular Army are less tainted by association with Saddam's rule and could assist in law enforcement.

- In the immediate aftermath of Saddam's removal, those Iraqi forces capable of putting down unrest and restoring order would tend to employ, if not otherwise checked, the familiar tactics used under the Saddam regime, meaning quick and possibly brutal repression.

- Over the longer term, the police and security forces would need to be rebuilt and restructured if they were to gain the trust of the Iraqi people and avoid the excesses similar to those under Saddam's rule.

- The Regular Army has been relatively unpoliticized below the command level and, once purged of the security and intelligence officers embedded within it, could be used for security and law enforcement until police or a local gendarme force is established.

[redacted] **Shia-Sunni Strife**

For the most part, Iraqi Shia and Sunni have lived peacefully together and do not have a legacy of sectarian strife. Nevertheless, the threat of Shia reprisals for the oppression they have suffered under Saddam's rule is a major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force. The underlying causes for violence involve political reprisals more than ethnic or sectarian divisions.

[redacted] The broader Iraqi Sunni Arab community does not publicize its views regarding a redistribution of power in Iraq. Anecdotal reporting indicates that some elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime that did not allow the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military, security services, and government. Other Sunni Arabs, especially ones having extensive interaction with Shia in daily urban life, might view power less starkly in sectarian terms and be open to a more representative political system. In any event, creation of a government that was both stable and more representative would require Sunni acceptance of an end to their longstanding domination of Iraqi politics.

- A decentralized or federal democracy with minority protections might better protect the Sunnis' interests but would still mean loss of their privileged status.

[redacted] Major sectarian fighting would be likely if the Sunnis retained their political dominance in Baghdad and most of central Iraq but neither they nor a foreign power controlled the south.

SECRET/

Iraq: Ethnic and Religious Flashpoints



a Represents fewer than 1 million people in Iraq and includes Christians, Persian Shias, and small numbers of other ethnic groups. These groups are scattered.

This map shows areas where ethnoreligious groups are traditionally concentrated. It is not meant to imply that an ethnic group is a majority in all.

SECRET/

SECRET/

- Spontaneous uprisings in 1991 showed that civil unrest in the south could quickly spin out of the control of local authorities and open the way to a bloodbath among stranded security and Ba'th Party officials and government troops. While Saddam was able to maintain control during Shia rioting in 1999, demonstrations in the capital illustrated Baghdad's vulnerability, which would be heightened if Iraqi security services were weakened after a change of regime.

- Rather than resulting in the dismemberment of Iraq, Shia revolts could lead to brutal Sunni military operations to reassert control over Shia-controlled areas, if Iraqi military elements retained the capacity to reassert control.

- A severely crippled Iraqi military might not be able to muster a forceful response, notwithstanding the galvanizing effect of a Shia uprising on Sunnis in central provinces.

- Oil facilities and export terminals in southern Iraq would be vulnerable to seizure by Shias.

[redacted] Shia groups might try to seize some economic assets, but they would be unlikely to stake a territorial claim on any specific portion of Iraq with the aim of establishing a separate "Shia state." To the contrary, statements by major Shia opposition groups with strong ties to the Iraqi Shia population suggest the Shias prefer to assert control over the state through majority rule or, at a minimum, to play an integral part in its governance.

(U) Kurdish Options

[redacted] Although the Kurds have consistently reiterated their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq under a federated system, they could choose to take advantage of a military confrontation, or confusion in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's demise, to wrest control of key areas in order to increase their own leverage within Iraq.

- If not prevented from doing so by an occupying force, the Kurds might try to take advantage of military action, Sunni-Shia strife, or a weak post-Saddam government—as they did in March 1991—by seizing key territory and economic facilities. In particular, Kurds could attempt to seize key oil facilities around Kirkuk and/or Mosul—which constitute nearly one third of Iraq's oil capacity—and then seek to have them included in an autonomy agreement with a new regime. Mosul and Kirkuk have been major sticking points in previous negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and the central government.

- Property disputes will erupt as Kurds and Turkomen try to reclaim from Arab residents homes lost during Baghdad's decades-old Arabization campaign. Large numbers of Arabs could be displaced in any violence that was allowed to break out, especially in the regions stretching from Mosul in the north, southeast through Kirkuk, to Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

- Kurdish parties, despite their efforts at rapprochement, still harbor political, territorial, and personal resentments and distrust of one another that could erupt into internecine fighting over how to deal with a new regime and/or over control over key territory.

- Armed Kurdish factions control territory and the smuggling of goods and people across the borders with Turkey and Iran.

SECRET/

(U) Iraq: Tribes and Subtribes*

SECRET/

DI Cartography Center/MPG 782440AI 1-03

SECRET/

Their ties to a range of illicit activities and groups provide them with extensive revenues. Many of these groups almost certainly will resist being disarmed and being put under the rule of law by a post-Saddam administration.

(U) Iraq's Tribal Structure

About 75 percent of Iraqis identify with a tribe, although many of these are urban residents who probably feel little allegiance to tribal leaders elsewhere in the country. At its most basic, a tribe is a group of people who trace their origin to a common ancestor. There are over 200 tribes in Iraq, some of which have both Sunni and Shia wings.

The importance of tribes to Iraqi society fluctuated during the 20th century. They reached a low point in cohesion and influence in the 1960s under the impact of the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy and the subsequent rapid modernization and urbanization of Iraqi society. After the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, Iraq's tribes experienced a significant revival. Their fighting prowess caused Saddam to laud their traditional values of courage under fire, manliness, and, increasingly as the repository of "sacred Arab essence."

Inter-Tribal Conflicts

Although many Iraqi tribes affiliate themselves with Saddam, for most the ties are based on self-interest. Almost all tribes probably would distance themselves from him as soon as they assessed his demise was inevitable and alternatives were available. Some tribes that remained opposed to Saddam might seek reprisals against those who supported him.

- Saddam's ruling elite is drawn largely from a handful of Sunni tribes.

Numerous tribe-based coup plots have occurred since 1991, suggesting that powerful Sunni or Shia tribes would seek to play a role in determining a successor regime.

- While some anti-regime tribal elements have joined the Iraqi opposition, some tribes could take unilateral actions aimed at shoring up their strategic positions within Iraq when Saddam leaves the scene.

- Key tribes could attempt to wrest control of economic targets—key oil facilities, dams, or other economic assets—either as bargaining chips or as assets that could be sold off. In 1991, Kurdish tribes in the north made sizable profits by selling to the Iranians machinery confiscated at various dams.

Once a successor regime had consolidated power, the tribes probably would seek accommodation with it. As in the past, tribal leaders could be expected to negotiate with a new regime for their own advantage. The tribes would offer a social structure that could be a stabilizing influence in some parts of the country.

(U) Humanitarian Issues

[redacted] The humanitarian situation in Iraq has improved considerably since implementation of the OFF Program in 1996, but most Iraqis remain vulnerable to disruptions in basic services, particularly food and potable water supplies. The impact on humanitarian needs of a new war would depend on its length and severity. A prolonged struggle to depose Saddam and install a new regime would be likely to cause more flight of refugees and internally displaced persons and to disrupt severely the distribution of food and health services.

(U) Population Displacement

[redacted] Some 1 million people are displaced in Iraq—700,000 Iraqis are internally displaced, and 230,000 Palestinians, stateless Bidoons, Iranians, and Turks are refugees in Iraq. In the northern region, many of the internally displaced have been moved a number of times as a result of Baghdad's Arabization campaign and have suffered arbitrary detention, expropriation of property, and destruction of their villages. They depend to some degree on international assistance, and many live in camps where their movement is restricted and they are not permitted to work.

[redacted] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expects a Baghdad-centered military operation would displace another some 900,000 persons internally and create 1.45 million more refugees. If Saddam withdrew his forces into major cities in an attempt to use the populace as "human shields," both civilian casualties and civilian flight could be much larger. These numbers would vary considerably depending on the geographic concentration of the war and its duration.

- Under the UNHCR's worst-case scenario some 50,000 Iraqis might flee to Kuwait, 20,000 to Saudi Arabia, 60,000 to Syria, 50,000 to Jordan, 270,000 to Turkey, and as many as 900,000 to Iran.

- Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons would stretch further Iraq's already strained food and medical supplies.

- Iraq's neighbors could try to influence the political dynamics in Iraq by forcing refugees back into Iraq, or threatening to do so in order to pressure the new government.

[redacted] The internal security situation would affect the humanitarian challenge. Civil strife would cause disruptions in electricity and water purification or distribution if generators, pumps, or plants became damaged, seized, or looted. Food stored in warehouses under the OFF Program would be a prime target for looters, and distribution would become paralyzed by fighting, refugee flows, criminal activity, or hoarding by the military.

(U) Food and Water

[redacted] Iraq's dependence on the ration basket distributed by the government makes the populace extremely vulnerable to the disruptions in supply. About 60 percent of Iraqis use the food basket as their primary source of food. The average Iraqi does not have the reserve food stocks or financial resources to cope with the panic buying, price gouging, and hoarding that would accompany a breakdown in the food distribution system.

- Revitalization of the food ration distribution system would be critical in the aftermath of war. UN officials have said that the OFF Program would be suspended during the war and reinstated

only when the UN regained control of the system.

- Since July 2002, Baghdad has issued double—and sometimes triple—food rations to all Iraqis. This could reduce the number of Iraqis needing food immediately after the war. The World Food Program estimates, however, that 4.9 million Iraqis could immediately require food because of displacement and the selling of food rations to earn money.

- Securing the government's food warehouses after a war and implementing an efficient and equitable food distribution system would be critical to avoiding widespread hunger.

- As of December 2002, Iraq had paid for some 5 million metric tons of foodstuffs to be delivered for 2003 under the OFF Program. This food, provided its delivery is resumed after the war, plus the upcoming spring harvest season, would provide enough of a supply of food. Distribution problems, access to milling facilities, and looting could hinder getting this food to Iraqi households.

The new government would require significant outside assistance to help rebuild Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure.

- Iraq's infrastructure already has suffered extensive damage. Both the long-term impact of economic sanctions and Saddam's manipulation of resources to shore up his regime have reduced the availability of spare parts and equipment.

Currently, most of Iraq's water treatment plants function well below designed capacity, resulting in shortages of potable water, highly polluted river systems, and increases in sanitation-related health problems. UNICEF estimates that only 41 percent of the population in rural areas has access to safe water, and 30 percent of the population lacks adequate sanitary services. Access also has declined in urban areas, including Baghdad. Underlying causes include unreliable electric power for water and sewage treatment plants, deteriorating water and sewage pipes, and shortages of supplies and equipment. Ongoing lack of spare parts, further damage during a war, and shortages of experienced personnel would make quick rebuilding of facilities difficult.

Iraq: Agricultural Resources Insufficient to Satisfy Needs

A scarcity of arable land, poor agricultural and irrigation practices, frequent droughts, soil salinity, and high evaporation have made Iraq a food deficit country. Only 15 percent of Iraq is arable, and more than 70 percent of this is cultivated. Baghdad imports between 60 and 70 percent of the country's food needs and relies heavily on imported seed for most crops.

Iraq grows a variety of grains, vegetables, and fruit. Grain—primarily wheat, the staple food, and barley—is Iraq's most important crop, totaling 1.9 to 5.0 million metric tons annually, depending on rainfall.

- Wheat and barley (a feed crop for livestock) are planted in the fall and harvested in May and June, mainly in the rain-fed plains and valleys of the north and northeast. Barley also is grown in the Mesopotamian Plain because of its salt tolerance. Rice and corn comprise 15 percent of total grain production.

- The US Department of Agriculture estimates grain production for 2002 reached 2 million metric tons (MMT), an 11 percent boost over the previous year, but still less than two-thirds the 1994 level of 3.3 MMT.

SECRET/



SECRET/

(U) Worst-Case Scenario

Humanitarian challenges will be shaped largely by the military conflict that unseats Saddam. In the worst case, Saddam uses chemical or biological weapons against his own people and Coalition forces and destroys Iraqi oil facilities and dams either to slow an attack or deny the benefits to any successor government.

- Blowing up oil wells or burning them would create significant air pollution and increase the number of people seeking refuge elsewhere.
- The release of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas associated with oil production in the north would add to the humanitarian problem.
- Destruction of dams would have a long-term impact on a subsequent regime, however, limiting future flood control, irrigation, and other projects.
- Existing medical facilities simply would be unable to cope with widespread use of chemical or biological weapons.

Deprived of oil revenues, Iraq would be dependent on the international community for food and medicine. The costs of reconstruction of the oil wells would be a further drain on scant resources.

(U) Health and Sanitation

Despite large infusions of humanitarian supplies under OFF, regime mismanagement, corruption, and misguided priorities have caused an overall decline in Iraq's healthcare delivery and sanitation infrastructure. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Health, an estimated $2 billion and 2 years would be necessary to restore and fully rehabilitate existing Iraqi hospitals to pre-1991 condition. The current Iraqi medical system is not structured to handle civilian wartime mass casualty trauma and public health problems.

- A few, primarily private, hospitals in larger towns and government and private outpatient facilities in smaller towns have closed because they lack supplies, personnel, and equipment. Medicines and medical equipment obtained through OFF have not been disseminated widely.
- Public health and preventive medicine currently are inadequate and will deteriorate during war. Sanitation-related diseases including diarrhea, typhoid fever, and cholera have increased along with the insect transmitted diseases malaria and leishmaniasis. Childhood vaccine preventable diseases—measles, pertussis, and diphtheria, also have increased.

The already poor civilian healthcare situation probably would be severely damaged by the war and widespread civil strife. Cuts in electricity or looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high. During hostilities, distribution of medical supplies and imports—already scant—will be cut off.

- Iraq's three main pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities—Samarra Drug Industries, Al-Kindi, and Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine—rely heavily on imported materials that would cease within days of the onset of hostilities. If these facilities were destroyed as suspected dual use BW sites, Iraq would require additional imports of the critical medicines and animal vaccines that they provide in the aftermath of the war.

SECRET/

SECRET/

- Civil unrest would threaten the continued presence of few UN or NGO workers who play key roles in humanitarian and medical programs in Iraq. This would be in addition to whatever suspension of outside assistance resulted from a military conflict.

- Iraqi aid workers would be unable to fill the gap of departing international humanitarian workers in the short term. They would not have sufficient training and supplies to carry out the work and in some cases would themselves become refugees or would flee possible reprisals due to their affiliation with the old regime.

[redacted] Iraq's already high incidence of disease would likely be exacerbated by the further degradation of infrastructure.

- If populations were displaced into overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions in cities or camps, epidemics of waterborne and respiratory diseases would be likely and would significantly complicate the ability of post-Saddam authorities to return calm to Iraq.

- Fatality rates would be highest in children under age five. Interruptions in routine UN-supplied childhood vaccine deliveries would increase the death toll.

(U) Existing Infrastructure

[redacted] The long-term disintegration of the domestic infrastructure to meet human needs is not inevitable. The military confrontations that have hurt Iraq's infrastructure over the past decade, coupled with long experience battling domestic insurgencies, have provided Iraqi technicians with considerable expertise in repairing damaged equipment with few resources.

- A surviving remnant of Iraq's civil authority could move quickly to repair damaged infrastructure, especially if outside assistance were available.

- The UN humanitarian presence in Iraq under OFF has helped to establish and streamline distribution plans and rationing systems that could provide a measure of continuity during the transition period for a new regime.

- Members of the Iraqi opposition and Iraqi expatriates have been studying the Iraqi infrastructure and examining what the most pressing needs of a new regime might be. Return of many of these expatriates and application of the expertise they have acquired in the West would be a valuable addition to meeting Iraq's humanitarian needs.

[redacted] Financial Strains and Economic Opportunities

[redacted] The combined effects of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars resulted in the destruction of important Iraqi economic assets. Baghdad has made some progress rebuilding Iraq's economic infrastructure, especially in the Sunni heartland, but it still functions below pre-Gulf war levels. Moreover, Iraq's longer-term financial prospects are clouded by the need to use oil and limited non-oil export revenues to pay reparations to victims of the invasion of Kuwait, finance high import and reconstruction costs, and service a large foreign debt load.

- Multiple studies from worst case to best case put Iraq's oil export earnings at $8-37 billion annually in the first year or two after sanctions are lifted, depending on the price of oil and potential damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure during conflict. If Iraq remains bound by the UN-mandated

compensation fund requiring that 25 percent of Iraqi oil revenues go to war reparations from Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and if claimants—primarily Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—do not waive their claims, Iraq would have $6-27.8 billion in revenue.

- The international community's response to Iraqi foreign debt will be critical to Iraq's ability to reconstruct its economy. We estimate that Iraq's total official foreign debt is about $120 billion, including about $40 billion owed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for loans during the Iran-Iraq war. Depending on refinancing terms, Baghdad may have to pay as much as $12 billion annually just to service the debt.

- Resolution of Iraq's foreign debt issues will be critical to attracting necessary foreign investment.

[redacted] Without debt forgiveness, a reduction in the war reparations ratio, or something akin to a Marshall Plan, Iraq's economic options are likely to remain few and narrow. Faced with the prospect of laboring under a vicious cycle of deficits and debt for years to come, a new regime almost certainly would ask the international community for debt forgiveness and economic assistance.

- Financial burdens of the magnitudes detailed above, if unrelieved, could impel a more promising successor government toward using repression, out of necessity to quell economically-driven unrest.

- Alternately, a successor government could exploit the economic strains to increase the resentment of the populace against the United States and the West portraying both as attempting to destroy Iraq.

(U) Oil Production Scenarios

[redacted] If Iraq's oil facilities were relatively undamaged by a war, Baghdad could increase crude oil production from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d) to about 3.1 million b/d within several months of the end of hostilities.

[redacted] Boosting production to the pre-Gulf war level of 3.5 million b/d would take an additional 12 to 18 months and cost $2 to 3 billion for oil well workovers and equipment maintenance in existing oilfields as well as drilling and completing new oilfields such as West Qurnah and Majnoon. At $22 per barrel of Iraqi crude production at 3.1 million b/d and assuming exports of 2.8 million b/d, Baghdad could gross $22 billion per year. Using the same assumptions, when oil production reaches pre-Gulf war levels of 3.5 million b/d, revenues would reach $26 billion annually.

- Continuation of war reparations would leave Iraq with $16.5 billion in revenue.

[redacted] In 1997 the Iraqi Oil Ministry developed an aggressive plan to expand oil production capacity to 6 million b/d within seven years of the lifting of sanctions. To achieve this pace of expansion, extensive foreign assistance would be required as well as about $15 billion to develop the 10 major oilfields.

[redacted] If Iraq's oil facilities sustained major damage through Coalition attacks or Iraqi attempts to destroy the oilfields, oil sector reconstruction costs could exceed $5 billion. Additionally, at least two years would be needed to restore production to pre-war output.

If a successor authority in Baghdad were perceived by investors as both politically and economically stable, Iraq's massive proven oil reserves—second only to Saudi Arabia—could be a significant lure to foreign investment. This could permit Baghdad to expand its oil output rapidly—by an average of 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) per year for several consecutive years—rivaling the recent pace of expansion in Russia and making Iraq the second largest oil exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia as early as 2005.

- The biggest prizes of the Iraqi oil patch are the "giant" oilfields with recoverable reserves of more than one billion barrels each. International oil companies have expressed interest in developing seven of these fields and have signed contracts for two.

Even with the attractiveness of the Iraqi oil sector, Iraq would need a stable central government and would have to refrain from unreasonable demands on foreign oil companies to realize its full potential as an oil exporter. Iraq would be capable of maintaining current production capacity of about 3.1 million b/d almost indefinitely with its indigenous resources and could even expand it slowly with help from oilfield service companies. Without extensive foreign investment, however, Baghdad would be unlikely to have the financial and technical resources to reach its announced goal of 6 million b/d in capacity.

A post-Saddam government also would need to focus on developing a strong private sector to set the stage for a less oil-dependent economy. A new government would need to stress fundamentals, such as developing a common currency, providing clear legal protection for private property, revitalizing the domestic financial sector to provide credit to fuel investment, and developing tax and trade policies that would encourage private commerce.

Iraq's rapidly growing and young population and current poor socioeconomic conditions will place added strains on the government. Iraq will need to create more than 240,000 new jobs each year for the next five years to accommodate the growing labor force—a difficult task for a country where currently as much as 50 percent of the labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Any significant demobilization of Iraqi military personnel would add to this already high rate of unemployment.

Immutable Foreign Policy Interests

The departure of Saddam Husayn—who has been a major cause of regional instability and enmity by twice launching wars of aggression against his neighbors—would offer the prospect of enhancing and stabilizing Iraq's relations with other states in the region. Dependence of a new Iraqi government on the United States, the United Nations, or an international Coalition that overthrew Saddam would heavily affect that government's foreign policies. Nonetheless, substantial elements of continuity in Iraqi foreign policy perspectives would remain. Iraqis would continue to perceive threats growing out of tensions that are grounded in more than Saddam's aggressive behavior and would seek assurance that these perceived threats were being countered. A government in Baghdad also would attempt to build on the relatively stable modus vivendi that Saddam has achieved with his neighbors over the past ten years.

Baghdad's primary foreign policy focus would be on the states that border Iraq. The main Iraqi concern would be in guarding

against meddling by one or more of these neighbors in conflicts inside Iraq.

- **Turkey** would be a concern for a post-Saddam Iraqi regime.

- Unless there is some movement on a tripartite agreement, relations between **Turkey**, Iraq, and **Syria** could become increasingly fractious because of water shortages in Syria and Iraq emanating from the Southeast Anatolian Development Project.

- Rivalry with **Iran** would be a continuing reality for Iraq. The two states are, by virtue of population and petroleum resources, the main contenders for military dominance in the Persian Gulf. Centuries-old enmity between Persian and Arab would remain, as would distrust over the status and exploitation of Iraqi Shia. The territorial and navigational issues that underlay the Iran-Iraq war would continue, as well as issues left by the war itself (unrepatriated prisoners and general rancor from eight years of combat). For the near term, Iran would be a concern to a new Iraqi regime in terms of internal meddling more than military intervention. Sunni Iraqis would be wary about Tehran's attempts to curry favor with, and perhaps dissension in, the Iraqi Shia community. Over the longer term, Iran's WMD programs would be of high concern to Baghdad, particularly if Iraq's own WMD programs were destroyed and its conventional forces weakened by combat with Coalition forces and subsequent occupation.

- A new government in Iraq would be less concerned about **Syria** than about either Turkey or Iran. The potential for interference is less, there would be continued mutual dependence on Syrian-Iraqi trade, and a collapse of the Iraqi Ba'th Party might reduce some of the Iraqi-Syrian tensions that have involved differing claims to Ba'thist orthodoxy. Both Baghdad and Damascus might be interested in developing a bilateral relationship that would help to counter a perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian alliance.

- The traditionally close ties between Iraq and **Jordan** probably would remain strong, although the makeup of a new regime in Baghdad would determine how far the relationship would develop.

- A new regime in Baghdad likely would renounce Saddam's earlier claims on **Kuwait** to garner international political and economic support over the near term. In the longer term, traditional Iraqi designs on Kuwaiti territory could resurface. Unsettled territorial issues would be a source of potential friction in the future. Iraqi complaints about the UN demarcated border—which regime

officials argue restricts Iraq's coastal access—could become an issue with a new government. Iraq has long argued that access to international waters is essential to its national security and future Iraqi regimes could seek enhanced access.

[redacted] Iraq's foreign rivalries extend beyond its immediate neighbors. Foremost among the perceived threats that will worry Iraqis is Israel. A new Iraqi regime almost certainly would stay in the Arab mainstream in voicing strong support for Palestinian statehood and criticism of Israeli actions against the Palestinians. At the same time, the Israeli destruction of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 remains a humiliating memory for most Iraqis, who have an abiding and deep distrust of Israel. [redacted]

[redacted] Expansion of relations with a variety of outside powers would be another likely theme of post-Saddam Iraqi foreign policy, partly to try to minimize the influence of any single power. This objective would become increasingly important to the extent that the United States were perceived as having gained overriding influence in a postwar Iraq. Baghdad probably would welcome enhanced political ties with Russia and the European Union—and perhaps also with Asian powers such as India and China—building on commercial relationships.

[redacted] Implications for Iraqi Security Policy

[redacted] New Iraqi leaders would understand that Iraq would have to bend to the will of the international community at least as much on military and security matters as on any other aspect of policy, given the nature of the threat Saddam's regime has posed. Nonetheless, as with aspects of broader foreign policy, there would be significant elements of continuity in Iraqi perspectives and ambitions. A combination of crushing defeat, disgust with the path on which Saddam had taken Iraq, and inspired new leadership could move Iraq in a markedly less militarist direction, somewhat like Japan after World War II. We believe it more likely, however, that any future government in Iraq would retain interest in rebuilding the Iraqi military, for several reasons:

- To counter the potential threats that Iraqis would continue to see from its neighbors, [redacted]
- To ensure internal security and provide domestic jobs.
- To restore the pride in Iraq's historical and regional importance that most Iraqis probably share; Iraqis would consider a significant military capability to be an essential component.

A security guarantee involving a long-term foreign military presence might partially assuage the first two concerns but not the third.

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

[redacted] The issue of weapons of mass destruction would not go away, even if Saddam's WMD programs were destroyed. Any successor regime probably would be cooperative on disarmament issues in the near term, however, to maintain international support.

- An immediate challenge in post-Saddam Iraq will be accounting for all of the WMD. The prospect that some material would be siphoned off by military, security, or scientific elements to be used later against Coalition interests will be of immediate concern.

- Long-term foreign monitoring and inspections likely would be necessary to ensure that Iraq's WMD infrastructure was dismantled and destroyed.

- Alternative occupations for scientists and technicians involved in WMD programs would reduce their availability for a re-established program as well as reduce their willingness to market their technical expertise or materials to others.

[redacted] Iraq's interest in WMD capabilities has been largely a result of the security environment as well as Saddam's megalomania. Unless guaranteed a security umbrella against its strategic rivals, future Iraqi leaders would likely have a continued

[redacted] Post-Saddam Political Reconstruction: A Simulation [redacted]

[redacted] a simulation in July 2002 that revolved around a post-Saddam negotiation along the lines of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan. Participants included Iraq and Middle East experts from both private and public sectors as well as Middle East experts [redacted] The participants played the role of several Iraqi actors, including Sunni officers, opposition elements, remnants of the Tikriti elite, prominent Shia figures, and Kurds. External actors included regional governments, the United Nations, the United States and several Security Council members and European countries. Principal observations from the simulation included:

- Political transformation inside Iraq would require an extremely large, long-term US military presence on the ground and willingness for the United States to go it alone.

- Limited US military involvement led to a Sunni Arab military-dominated regime working with a loose confederation of relatively autonomous groups.

- Iraqi players were preoccupied with short-term personal gains and holding onto power rather than taking a longer-term view on what might benefit Iraq as a nation. Short-term alliances can be formed, however, similar to what happened with the Kurds in 1991.

- Iraq's neighbors [redacted] were prone to take unilateral steps to ensure their interests were met.

- The UN did not readily step into line with US plans.

- International players were ready to resume business with whoever appeared to hold the power in Iraq.

- Arab League members were more comfortable with the formulas for governance proposed by the Iraqi delegations than with the democratic formula pushed by the Americans. The Arabs were concerned that an uncomfortably high bar was being set for the region.

[redacted]

interest in WMD. Baghdad might become one of the more vocal proponents of region-wide arms control. Without effective nuclear arms control, concerns about the WMD capabilities of other regional states, [redacted] probably would lead a future Iraqi regime to consider how to rebuild the country's WMD programs.

(U) Terrorism

[redacted] A new Iraqi regime would be less inclined than Saddam to support terrorism, although traditional sympathy for the Palestinians could mean continued ties to some Palestinian organizations. Sponsorship of terrorism would not be seen as fulfilling national pride or meeting regional security concerns in the same way that a strong army or WMD program might.

[redacted] The ability of al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups to maintain a presence in northern Iraq (or, more clandestinely, elsewhere) would depend largely on whether a new regime were able to exert effective security control over the entire country. In addition, rogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.

~~SECRET~~/

The National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole.

Acting Chairman	Stuart A. Cohen
Vice Chairman for Evaluation	Mark Lowenthal
Acting Director, Senior Review, Production, and Analysis	William R. Heaton

National Intelligence Officers

Africa	Robert Houdek
At-Large	Stuart A. Cohen
Conventional Military Issues	John Landry
East Asia	Arthur Brown
Economics & Global Issues	Karen Monaghan, Acting
Europe	Mark Schwendler, Acting
Latin America	Fulton T. Armstrong
Near East and South Asia	Paul R. Pillar
Russia and Eurasia	George Kolt
Science & Technology	Lawrence K. Gershwin
Strategic & Nuclear Programs	Robert D Walpole
Warning	Robert Vickers

Unclassified

~~SECRET~~/

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Information available as of January 2003 was used in the preparation of this Intelligence Community Assessment

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Assessment:

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency

The National Security Agency

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Office of Intelligence, Department of Energy

also participating:

The National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

Dissemination Control Abbreviations

All material on this page is Unclassified.

Copies of this document are available from DCI/NIC/NIO/NESA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

OVERVIEW OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON POSTWAR IRAQ

APPENDIX C: Overview of Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq

(U) In addition to the Intelligence Community Assessments (Appendices A and B), individual agencies within the Intelligence Community produced more narrowly focused assessments in 2002 and early 2003 about postwar Iraq. This section of the report briefly summarizes the assessments and briefing presentations.

Intelligence Assessments in February and March 2003

([redacted]) In February and March 2003, the CIA published two reports examining the issues of rapid military success in Iraq and the post-Saddam consequences for US military forces. The first, *Iraq: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas, Issues for US Forces Operating Behind Lead US Maneuver Elements,* assessed that "civil unrest, humanitarian burdens, and lingering military threats could pose challenges for the relatively small US military forces initially available in southern Iraq as the US main effort focuses on reaching Baghdad."[1]

([redacted]) Humanitarian problems "would be exacerbated by the extent to which a power and security vacuum develops in the south."[2] These could include "looting, banditry, and difficulties in providing food, water, medical assistance, and other services."[3] The report also pointed out "up to 4.5 million urban dwellers – about half the population of the south, probably would need food and water beginning after about one month [after US forces began operating in Iraq]" and that these and other humanitarian problems "could contribute to a severe economic breakdown in Southern Iraq."[4]

([redacted]) The CIA returned to these issues in the March 2003 report entitled, *Iraq: Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory,* that assessed that a quick collapse of Saddam's regime "might prompt Iraqis to question the need – or justification – for a US occupation." The report pointed out that rapid military victory "especially in the case of regime collapse rather than defeat" would probably leave Sunni control of major Iraqi institutions in place. Despite a shortened conflict, "humanitarian conditions in many parts of Iraq could rapidly deteriorate in a matter of days." The report assessed that "many Iraqis probably would not understand that the coalition wartime logistic pipeline requires time to reorient its mission to humanitarian aid."[5]

([redacted]) The DIA issued a lengthy report, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq,* in March 2003 that discussed how "assessing the basic attitudes of the three main ethnoreligious sectors in Iraq is fundamental to understanding the Iraqi political landscape following a successful overthrow of Saddam Husayn's regime."[6] At the beginning of the report, a separate text box noted intelligence gaps on Iraqi attitudes. It stated that while a large body of information was available about Kurdish views, little information was available for Sunnis and

---

[1] CIA: *Iraq: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas*, February 3, 2003, p. i
[2] Ibid, p. i
[3] Ibid, p. i
[4] Ibid, p. 2, 4.
[5] CIA, *Iraq: Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory*, March 10, 2003, p. 1 - 2.
[6] DIA, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq*, March 2003, pp. 1 - 2

less for the Shia, given the "climate of fear" in Iraq and the even "greater repression" under which the Shia lived.[7]

([redacted]) The report catalogued the political agendas of each of the three groups. The report suggested the Kurds would want to make "the most of their gains" since 1991.[8] The first instinct of many Shia Arabs "will be to commit acts of vengeance against hated officials, [Shia] collaborators, and symbols of the regime." [9] The report assessed that the Shia would probably be attracted to leaders who "promise to redress the imbalance of political power in their favor." The report also assessed most Sunnis would be glad to see the end of Saddam's regime, and while apprehensive about their future status, they may be receptive to democratic reforms.[10]

([redacted]) The report stated that the degree to which Islam "will become a political factor among the Shia after Saddam's demise is unclear." The report further noted that "Islam has emmerged as a more prominent factor in the lives of ordinary Iraqi Sunnis amid the hardships of the last decade . . .but the trend does not necessarily equate to openness to radical Islamic activism." The degree to which radical Islam becomes a "growing or diminishing political force in post-Saddam Iraq is not clear."[11]

([redacted]) With respect to civil war, another text box indicated: "the risk of civil strife following the demise of Saddam's regime will be high, but the possibility of full-scale civil war between major ethnoreligious sectors or other interest blocs will be much lower, although the possibility cannot be excluded." The assessment noted that geographic separation of the various groups in most of Iraq "will mitigate the prospects for civil war" although it assessed "the greatest chances for sectarian and ethnic strife" exist in cities like Baghdad or in the Kirkuk-Mosul area. [12]

([redacted]) The report noted that besides ethnoreligious groups, Iraq has "other, sometimes overlapping major interest sectors" such as externally based oppositionists and military officers, and examined them in turn. With respect to regime intelligence and security personnel, the report noted that "former security officials . . . may seek to emerge as respectable businessmen, but others may cross over into organized criminal or clandestine opposition activity."[13]

([redacted]) The CIA published an intelligence assessment on the civilian police force and judicial system and another on the senior officer corps of Iraq in March 2003. The report on the police force and judicial system, *Iraq's Civilian Police Force and Judicial System,* provided a general description of the police force and judicial system, but highlighted the lack of information held by the US with respect to officials at the local level, including their identities, loyalties, or the involvement in regime brutality of individual police officers. The scope note stated "Our understanding of Iraq's civilian police force and criminal justice system is limited by a lower

---

[7] DIA, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq*, March 2003, p. 2
[8] Ibid, p. 3
[9] Ibid, p. 3-4
[10] Ibid, p. 5
[11] Ibid, p. 3-4
[12] Ibid, p. 5
[13] Ibid, p. 3

intelligence collection priority compared to more prominent issues such as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, and leadership dynamics."[14]

([redacted]) The lengthy March 2003 CIA report on the senior military officer corps, *The Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear,* discussed the Sunni Arab dominance of the Iraqi officer corps and an extensive security oversight system that "traditionally emphasizes loyalty over competence." It assessed that these factors "limit military effectiveness and pose challenges for rebuilding the military after Saddam." The report also assessed that "reforming the officer corps and restructuring the armed forces into a force for national cohesion will be key to the stability of a post-Saddam Iraq." The report included thumbnail biographies [redacted] of [redacted] Iraqi senior officers [redacted].[15]

([redacted]) On March 18, 2003, the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) released a Special Analysis, *Iran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq,* that assessed that "Tehran seeks to influence future developments in a post-Saddam Iraq and accepts the short-term benefits of OPLAN 1003, namely, the ousting of President Saddam Hussein. However, the Iranians will not hesitate to turn against a long-term US presence [in Iraq] by encouraging surrogate elements to launch terrorist operations against US and/or coalition forces in Iraq."[16]

([redacted]) On March 1, 2003, the intelligence organization for US Central Command produced a briefing presentation entitled *Phase IV IPB.*[17] The intelligence briefing consisted of 59 slides, which provided analysis on the demographics and government bureaucracy of Iraq, the status of the infrastructure, sources of potential conflict and regional views.[18]

([redacted]) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing juxtaposed intelligence assessments with Coalition military plans. For example, a briefing slide entitled "Challenges to Rebuilding Infrastructure" noted that "coalition forces will not target civilian infrastructure such as electric power, medical, dams, roads/bridges and water control" and assessed that the Iraqi civilian and industrial sectors had suffered twelve years of neglect.[19]

([redacted]) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing included a slide explaining "What to Expect After Regime Change" in the Baghdad area which noted the following:

- Continued armed opposition to Coalition forces unlikely once Saddam flees or is captured/killed.
- Most loyal tribesman will cease fighting for the regime once the outcome becomes apparent.

---

[14] CIA, *Iraq's Civilian Police Force and Judicial System,* February 25, 2003, pp. i - ii.
[15] CIA, *Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear,* 18 March 2003, p. iii.
[16] DIA/JITF-CT, *Iran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq,* March 13, 2003. p. 1
[17] "IPB" is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as "intelligence preparation of the battlespace" in Joint Publication 1-02 "DOD Dictionary and Associated Terms."
[18] United States Central Command, *Phase IV IPB,* as of March 1, 2003.
[19] Ibid, pp. 12

- Pockets of Saddam loyalists will exist throughout the area which will provide safehaven for senior regime officials and where civil unrest is possible.
- Sunni-Shia conflict/potential breakdown of law and order. Very high potential for Sunni-Shia violence in Baghdad. Retribution against former regime officials, security forces, and/or symbols of the former regime. [20]

( ) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing assessed that Iraqi Sunnis were not a monolithic block and that elements of some Sunni tribes had been alienated and marginalized by Saddam. In discussing Iran's influence in southern Iraq, the briefing also assessed that this "threat is probably overstated" and noted that Iraqi Shia are "strongly nationalistic" and "believe in a single Iraq." [21]

( ) The Phase IV IPB noted the potential for a breakdown of law and order in each geographic region of Iraq, that there were large mixed Sunni-Shia populations in Baghdad, Ramadi, Samarra, and Baqubah, and that "widespread conflict in Baghdad could incite/provoke violence in other areas" of Iraq. [22]

( ) The summary of the *Phase IV IPB* noted that "numerous HUMINT reports from credible Iraqis and other Arab sources state that US military or civilian control of the Iraq government will not be palatable to the population" and that "military occupation will not sell…"[23] The summary also highlighted that the "requirement to create and sustain a safe, secure and stable environment to support reconstruction must be received within the Iraqi population as legitimate..."[24]

(The summary of the *Phase IV IPB* included several conclusions which outlined "dos" and "don'ts" including:
Do: [25]

- Obtain an international mandate that delivers a message of legitimacy to Iraqi population;
- Have Iraqi representation as soon as possible;
- Preserve and reform Iraq's governmental ministries;
  --Screen out Ba'ath Party leadership
- Establish internal security and safe borders and institute the rule of law;
- Rapidly engage the Iraqi military in the reconstruction effort;
- Leverage well-rooted police and judiciary systems, which could promote good governance once stripped of their Ba'athist leadership.
- Build a central representative government that empowers local ethnic, tribal and religious leaders while encouraging them to support Baghdad's authorities.
- Be extremely sensitive to Shia holy sites in Karbala and Najaf.

---

[20] Ibid, pp. 42
[21] Ibid, p. 49
[22] Ibid, p. 39
[23] Ibid, p. 53
[24] Ibid, p. 54
[25] Ibid, p. 57-58

Don't:[26]

- Accept an end state that removes Saddam and leaves other Bathists in power;
- Devolve power based exclusively on ethnicity, tribe or religion as it will undoubtedly fuel separatist movements and ethnic violence;
- Create any appearance of occupying Iraq.

Intelligence Assessments of January 2003

(▇) On January 28, 2003, the CIA disseminated a report on Iraq military reconstruction. The report, *Iraq: Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-Saddam Military,* while focused on issues such as "force structure, demobilization, force integration, and rearmament issues," discussed the "nationalist or communal sentiments" that would underlie "strongly independent" Iraqi views on these issues. According to the report, these military reconstruction issues "will pose significant challenges because of differences among the Iraqis and between the Iraqis and the United States." The report found "Iraqis are likely to resort to obstructionism, resistance, and armed opposition if they perceive Washington is attempting to keep them dependent on the West."[27]

(▇) In January 2003, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department published a short summary of a seminar attended by one of its analysts on the Iraqi Shia with a Middle East historian and a "fairly independent" Iraqi oppositionist. According to INR, the two discussed that "although the first few weeks of conflict may go well militarily, there will be many pitfalls after that – for which the United States can expect to be blamed."[28]

(▇) In January 2003, the CIA assembled a panel of non-government experts to address issues pertaining to democratization in Iraq and summarized their views in *Boosting Prospects for Iraqi Democracy.* According to the experts, prospects for "democratic stability in post-Saddam Iraq are limited for the next two years, but a US-led coalition could lay the groundwork for a consolidated democracy in five to 10 years out," and "Iraq has a skilled technical cadre, viable institutions, oil reserves, and other resources for an effective and legitimate government." The panel noted that Iraqis would accept help from the United States, United Nations, and European Union, but would view Arab, Turkish, and Iranian involvement as a threat. The experts noted that establishing internal security and safe borders would allay Iraqi fears that the country will plunge into chaos.[29]

Intelligence Assessments in December 2002

(▇ The December report, *Iraq Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability,* took the long view on Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions. The report noted that Iraq's greatest risks for sudden and violent conflict existed "where Kurd and Arab areas meet, and in southern Iraq, including Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, where long-repressed Shia citizens could lash

---

[26] Ibid, p. 59-60

[27] CIA, *Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-Saddam Military*, January 28, 2003, pp. i - ii.

[28] INR, *Iraq: Thoughts on the Shia...and Other Issues*, January 24, 2003

[29] CIA, *Boosting Prospects for Iraqi Democracy*, January 30, 2003, p. i

out against governmental, Ba'th Party, and security officials."[30] It noted that "Iraq's origins have led to a country composed of competing and often mutually antagonistic ethnic, religious, and tribal groups" and assessed that these "crosscutting ethnic and religious cleavages are likely to lead to violence as Saddam Husyan's regime begins to fall, challenging the administration of a post-Saddam Iraq."[31]

([redacted]) The report noted that "an unknown and possibly sizable portion of the population may be hostile to the United States and its allies and would resist suggestions for restructuring the government"[32] because more than 70 percent of the country had been born or reached adulthood since the first Gulf War, and had been inundated with anti-American propaganda. The report assessed that Iraq, with unemployment or underemployment reported at 50 percent, would need to create 240,000 new jobs each year for five years to accommodate the growing labor force.

([redacted] In mid-December 2002, the NIC, the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OSD-SOLIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J5/Strategy, Plans and Policy sponsored a conference and workshop on post-Saddam Iraq. The participants addressed possible security challenges, ethnic/religious violence, threats from terrorism and militant Islam, the problems of rehabilitating the Iraqi security services and accounting for and destroying WMD.[33]

([redacted]) The day-long gathering was an effort to consolidate in one place what was known, suspected and speculated about in the postwar environment in Iraq. The conference sponsors published and distributed conclusions, including the following:[34]

- "One key challenge to stability is long-term ethnic and tribal violence."
- "Terrorism and the influence of militant Islam must be prevented from coming into Iraq from across the borders."
- The United States will have to "focus immediately on security needs and will probably have to work with many of the local authorities and elements of the Iraqi regular army."
- The "use of some Iraqi personnel, authorities, bureaucracy, and military would be necessary."
- The military should be "de-Baathized, de-politicized, de-ethnicized and de-tribalized."
- "Any perception of US acquisition or control of this [oil] resource could be especially damaging."
- "It is important not to overestimate the capacity of Iraqi oil fields for the short-term ."
- "Suggestions that restoration and enhancement of the Iraqi oil industry can be self financed are optimistic at best."

---

[30] CIA, *Iraq: Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability*, December 3, 2002, p. 1
[31] Ibid, p. i
[32] Ibid, p. ii
[33] NIC: *Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam Security Environment*, December 19, 2002
[34] NIC: *Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam Security Environment*, December 19, 2002

Intelligence Assessments in November 2002

([redacted]) By the end of 2002, CIA had published additional intelligence reports on Iraq's opposition groups, nationalist forces, and demographic pressures. In mid-November, CIA also began to disseminate intelligence reports on the condition of Iraq's basic infrastructure. This effort continued into early 2003. Some of these assessments reported on contemporaneous issues, but had relevance for post-Saddam conditions in Iraq. For instance, the report on Iraq's neglected water works began: "Iraq's water and sewage infrastructures are in poor condition and vulnerable to collateral damage during wartime activities. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's water supply and sewage systems have deteriorated due to neglect, a lack of spare parts, and a shortage of trained staff. Unreliable electricity and frequent power outages further stress water treatment facilities."[35] Another intelligence assessment noted that, "Two decades of war and repression in Iraq have decimated a once relatively robust medical system."[36]

([redacted]) Likewise in November 2002, *Iraq: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change* discussed current intelligence on the prewar positioning of opposition groups inside and outside Iraq that had relevance for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The report noted that the efforts of the various Iraqi opposition groups to form alliances had "resulted in little definitive cooperation, confluence of political agendas, or lessening of longstanding competition between key leaders." The report also pointed out that Saddam's departure "would remove the one factor that has driven all past cooperation – hatred of the dictator and his regime."[37] The report discussed ways in which opposition elements could be helpful "in hashing out politically important issues" in post-Saddam Iraq but pointed out that "longstanding tensions, personal rivalries, and mutual suspicions remain close to the surface and are likely to flare as groups vie for positions of importance in key areas such as infrastructure – including oil and energy development – and politically influential subjects such as foreign and national security policy."[38] The report emphasized that "nevertheless, some opposition elements could prove to be helpful in advancing dialogue on key issues that will need to be addressed in a post-Saddam Iraq."[39]

Intelligence Assessments in October 2002

([redacted]) In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council published a 78 page NIE, entitled *Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities.* While the NIE focused on at issues related to Saddam's near-term military objectives, strategy, and capabilities against the US and Coalition forces, one section of its judgments had implications for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The NIE assessed that "Even before the end of a war, US and Coalition forces will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy – and some intelligence reporting suggests he will – advancing forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and

---

[35] CIA, *Iraq: Neglected Waterworks, Flood Warfare Raise Humanitarian Stakes*, January 2003

[36] CIA, *Iraq: Poor Medical Infrastructure Offers Post-War Opportunity for US to Improve its Image in the Region*, November, 2002

[37] CIA, *Iraq: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change*, November 18, 2002, p.i

[38] Ibid, p. i

[39] Ibid, p. i

power facilities, the contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental devastation."[40]

(▮) Another NIE produced in October 2002, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, also did not address the postwar period, but assessments concerning stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons had relevance to the postwar period.

(▮) Also in October 2002, the CIA produced three intelligence assessments and a summary of a simulation exercise on challenges for post-Saddam US policy. On October 18, 2002, the CIA disseminated, *Iraq: The Day After*. The report was intended to be "a first look at the possible broad contours of the Iraqi domestic, political, and regional scene in the immediate aftermath of a military overthrow of Saddam Husayn."[41] The report noted that there were numerous political scenarios for post-Saddam Iraq and that what scenario prevailed would "depend largely on US decisions and actions." The authors stated "we have chosen to focus on the prime concerns of the major players – both Iraqi and external – which will endure under any post-Saddam scenario." [42]

(▮) The report discussed the attitudes of Iraqi internal and external players in the context of issues that included: the ouster of Saddam by the US or a Sunni coup; score-settling and war crimes trials; not possessing a dominant role in the new political order and seeing the external opposition obtain one; maintaining the territorial unity of Iraq; the introduction of democracy; the removal of weapons of mass destruction and compliance with UN Security Council resolutions; military reorganization; and short-term economic goals and expectations. The report assessed that: the Sunnis would have the most to lose with Saddam's ouster; the Shia would celebrate Saddam's ouster as an opportunity to right what they see as a grave historical injustice; most Shia would conclude that a secular and democratic Iraq served their interests and the Kurds would seek to formalize their autonomy, freedom and relative prosperity."[43]

(▮) With respect to the role of the Ba'th Party in post-Saddam Iraq, the CIA's *Iraq: The Day After* report assessed that because "it has lost its power base and stands for little else than 'Saddamism,' we expect the Ba'th party to collapse with the regime." The report also assessed that "Despite the improbability that Ba'th ideology will persist after Saddam, much of the infrastructure of the party within civilian sectors, such as professional and civil associations, may survive to facilitate a restoration of government services." The report noted that "most Iraqis join [the Ba'th party] to get ahead" and the party "lacks ideological coherence or organizational autonomy."[44]

(▮) In *Iraq:The Day After,* the CIA discussed the various Iraqi military and security services and noted that "many troops must be quickly disarmed and demobilized to remove a potential focal point for Sunni coup plotting." The report said "certain units are so dominated by Tikriti

---

[40] NIC, *Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities*, October 2002, p i
[41] CIA: *Iraq: The Day After*, October 18, 2002, p. i, ii.
[42] Ibid, p. i
[43] Ibid, p. i, ii.
[44] Ibid, p. 1

and Duri pro-Saddam tribesman or otherwise so intimately linked to the regime that their continued existence will be incompatible with democracy," but noted that those officers who favor a professional military ethos or see themselves as guardians of Iraqi national values "may play a role in the post-Saddam military."[45]

([redacted]) The paper also noted that Shia would celebrate Saddam's ouster and "might welcome a preponderant US civilian and/or military role in post-Saddam Iraq" and that some Shia "may even call for a longer US occupation, arguing that their relative lack of experience government puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Sunnis."[46]

([redacted]) Regarding the Sunnis, the report noted that they were the "most likely targets of score-settling" and are "likely to perceive the United States as the enemy." Many Sunni "will be too stunned by their sudden loss of primacy to respond with vigor; others were Saddam's victims; and Sunnis exiled in the West have assimilated many democratic norms and will have an impact on those who remained in Iraq." It was assessed that the Kurds would be comfortable with whatever form of occupation that emerged.[47]

([redacted]) The CIA further developed its assessment of the Iraqi Ba'th Party in its October 31, 2002 assessment *The Iraqi Ba'th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam.* It assessed that the status of the Ba'th Party after Saddam "would depend on the nature of regime change" (such as natural causes, a coup) but that a US role in "removing Saddam and establishing a successor government would create a period of political dynamism...The Ba'th Party in its current form is unlikely to endure...because the Iraqi people would view retention of the Ba'th political structure as an unacceptable continuation of Saddam's legacy."[48]

([redacted]) The report emphasized that after the US removed Saddam from power, "government ministries providing critical services will need to be retained in some form after being purged of Saddam loyalists and restructured to eliminate the Ba'th party oversight mechanisms." The report continued, "Many technocrats who joined the Ba'th Party to attain their positions are probably not ardent supporters of Saddam and could probably remain . . . [after having been] investigated and vetted." The report noted, however, that the CIA did not know much about the loyalties, party affiliation, or potential criminal activities of most Iraqi military officers and government bureaucrats. The CIA acknowledged that little was known about most of these Iraqis [redacted] and that most individuals would have to be investigated and vetted before being allowed to continue in their positions.[49]

([redacted]) The CIA produced an assessment of Iran as a player in post-Saddam Iraq in the October 2002 report, *Iran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq.* This report assessed that in the period following Saddam's removal "Iran probably will seek to maximize its influence in Iraq while minimizing

[45] Ibid, p. 1
[46] Ibid, p. 2
[47] Ibid, p. i, ii.
[48] CIA, *The Iraqi Ba'th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam,* October 31, 2002, pp. i, ii.
[49] Ibid, p. 2

Washington's sway." The report noted that the shock within Iran over the successful US campaign in Afghanistan had led to an internal debate between pragmatists and ideologues within the country. The report discussed different policies Iran would take depending upon the success or difficulties faced by the US in Iraq.[50]

([redacted]) The final report of October 2002 from CIA, *Iraq Simulation Reveals Challenges for US Post Saddam Policy,* was the summary of a 3-day simulation sponsored by the CIA involving intelligence community analysts and outside experts. The simulation was premised on the scenario that a Sunni Republican Guard general would kill Saddam and his inner circle and sue for peace after US and United Kingdom forces entered southern Iraq; Kurds captured Kirkuk; [redacted]; and anti-Saddam tribes captured western Iraq. The report concluded that the simulation highlighted "the centrality of the US factor in post-Saddam Iraq and the need that the goals of the US be transparent." The report also assessed that the simulation revealed what the authors believed were the "attitudes of 'real' Iraqis," such as their support for an intact but federated Iraq, and the clout of leaders "with proven influence" on the ground in Iraq in contrast to exiled political leaders or party heads without armed followers.[51]

Intelligence Assessments in August 2002

([redacted]) In August 2002, the CIA produced three analytic products on postwar Iraq. One product examined the experience of the United States in Germany and Japan after World War II and compared this with the conditions likely to be faced by the US in Iraq. This product, *The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,* analyzed issues of importance in the post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan such as: the extent of the US international mandate and regional support; the use of local authorities and institutions; the administration of the occupation through a limited staff backed by the presence of hundreds of thousands of occupation troops; the fact that atrocities had been committed against foreign or marginalized groups and not the populations of Germany and Japan as a whole; and the unifying symbols and traditions that were present in Germany and Japan after World War II.

([redacted]) The report observed that the US began the occupations of Germany and Japan with goals for sweeping political, social, and economic change that were "rapidly rolled back" to reflect changing US policy goals due to the start of the Cold War. The report also pointed out that postwar occupation planning for Germany and Japan started in 1942, almost as soon as the United States entered the war, and that the occupations of Germany and Japan were implemented in the context of defeated populations relieved to see the end of war. The report noted that in both countries the seven-year occupation "merely laid the foundation for success" and that "solidifying political gains required generational change."[52]

([redacted]) *The Postwar Occupations* report contrasted these factors found in Germany and Japan with the existing and historical conditions in Iraq. The report noted that "the religious and cultural gap between occupying Western forces and the Iraqi population" would be wider than what was the case in Germany or even Japan. The report noted that atrocities in Iraq had been

[50] CIA, *Iran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq,* October 25, 2002, pp. 7 - 10.
[51] CIA, *Iraq Simulation Reveals Challenges for US Post-Saddam Policy*, October 10, 2002.
[52] CIA, *The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq*, August 7, 2002.

committed against the population as a whole; the existing Iraqi bureaucracy is "not inclined to respond to local and ethnic minorities' demands for greater control and inclusion;" and "the transformation of Iraq to a true democracy could require a US role lasting a generation." The paper discussed many implications for the US occupation of Iraq, among them the importance of "obtaining an international mandate and regional support" and "the ability of the occupation forces to control the security situation."[53]

([redacted]) At the request of the National Security Council, the CIA further examined issues associated with the transition to a new Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam in the August 2002 report, *Can Iraq Ever Become A Democracy?* In the report's scope note, the CIA stated that:

> "This assessment fully accepts that traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable to democracy. Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily initial and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might possess some democratic building blocks, and under what circumstances these blocks might be used to construct a democratic government in post-Saddam Iraq."[54]

([redacted]) Within the context of the scope note, the report stated that, "On the surface, Iraq currently appears to lack both the socio-economic and politico-cultural prerequisites that political scientists generally regard as necessary to nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq has several advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in post-Saddam Iraq."[55] The advantages cited by the report included the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition of political Islam, near-universal revulsion against Saddam's dictatorship, and economic resources. The report emphasized that "None of these factors should be seen as minimizing the obstacles to democratization in Iraq after Saddam."[56]

([redacted]) The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential model for democratic development in the rest of Iraq. The report noted, for example, that "Iraqi Kurdistan has become one of the more democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off–both economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history–as the rest of Iraq would likely be should Saddam be defeated."[57]

([redacted]) The report noted such "words of caution" as "we are uncertain how rapidly Iraq. . .can recover from the massive socio-economic and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially since 1991." The report assessed that without "long-term, active US/Western military, political, and economic involvement with the country" the chance of achieving even "the partial democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi Kurdistan to be poor." [58]

---

[53] In October, 2002, the DCI Red Cell, an organization devoted to alternative analysis, produced an analytic piece entitled, *"Occupied Iraq" – Thinking about Post-Saddam Governance,* The Red Cell highlighted the "vast differences in culture and contexts" between the conditions in postwar Germany and Japan and the likely conditions in post-Saddam Iraq.
[54] CIA, *Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?,* August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.
[55] Ibid, p. i
[56] Ibid, p. ii
[57] Ibid, p. i
[58] Ibid, pp. 6

(▇) The report assessed that, "In theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire economic statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and forge a more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible, however, that Saddam's rule has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set back Iraqi socio-economic development in more severe ways that will require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the dictator is gone."[59]

(▇) The third CIA intelligence assessment from August 2002 was also produced in response to tasking by the National Security Council. This report, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq,* was intended to set forth worst-case scenarios that might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope note stated that the "spirit of the paper reaches beyond what we normally would assess as plausible" and that the report was intended to "look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or together, could complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq." The negative consequences highlighted in the paper were: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States; major oil supply disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance.

(▇) The CIA's *Perfect Storm* report analyzed negative consequences before US military action, during initial US ground operations and during later phases of the US campaign and occupation. For the later phases, the report discussed scenarios, including: a Kurdish declaration of independence that provokes a military response first from ▇ and Iran; Saddam survives the US invasion and retreats with Tikriti loyalists; al Qaeda operatives take advantage of a destabilized Iraq to establish secure safe havens from which they can continue their operations; Iran works to install a regime friendly to or tolerant of Iranian policies; European confidence in US leadership plummets and NATO loses much of its effectiveness as a major security institution; Afghanistan tips into civil strife as UN and other coalition forces are unable or unwilling to replace US military resources; and Pakistan is destabilized by violent demonstrations over Islamabad's support for the US.[60]

(▇) The assessment noted that "in spite of the volatility and randomness of many of these scenarios and the ability of one event to spur unpredictable negative consequences for US interests, Washington retains the political leverage and military clout in the region to better the odds." The assessment provided a list of "near-term tactical moves" that the US could take to minimize the chances of negative consequences for US interests. These "possible options" included:[61]

- Provide "concrete diplomatic steps toward Arab-Israeli peace;"
- "Public softening of US statements on Iran and back-channel assurances to Tehran on the duration and extent of US force deployments;"
- Major political and economic aid to Turkey and financial assistance to Jordan;
- Public guarantees to counter the Iraqi missile threat to Israeli territory.

---

[59] CIA, *Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?,* August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.
[60] CIA, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq*, August 13, 2002, pp. i - ii.
[61] Ibid, pp. i - ii.

[redacted]

([redacted]) In discussing the possibility of Iraq using chemical, biological or radiological ("dirty" bomb) weapons against US troops, the paper noted that "radiological and certain biological weapons can make an area uninhabitable for years."[62]

Intelligence Assessments from Spring, 2002

([redacted]) Starting in the spring of 2002, the Intelligence Community began to produce reports premised on the possibility of a US-led effort to topple Saddam. These reports dealt directly with the conditions that might exist in Iraq following the removal of Saddam by a US-led coalition of forces. The few assessments of post-Saddam Iraq produced prior to 2002 focused on the removal of Saddam by a *coup d'etat* initiated either by the Iraqi military or oppositionists inside and outside of Iraq.

([redacted]) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing presentations in April 2002 that discussed the challenges that could arise for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV post-combat phase of the war plan for Iraq. Both briefings identified key challenges in the longer term, including:[63]

- Baath Party resurgence
- "Can a viable consensus on Post-Saddam governance be formed?"
- "Desire to minimize US force presence could be at odds with desire for dramatic transformation of the political system" . . .
- "US effort to enable key players may be resented and opposed"
- "US occupation will stir nationalist and Islamic sentiments"
- "How to purge the government of Saddamists and hard-line Ba'this without destabilizing the regime? . . .
- Will ex-regime officials seek a comeback?
  -- "launch a terror campaign or coup 6-12 months later?"
- "Will ex-regime officials become involved in organized crime?"

([redacted]) The first DIA briefing assessed that it was "too soon to know exactly what conditions will exist in Phase IV." It assessed that the Iraqi Baath Party "will attempt to return by any means necessary" that "large portions of the population will remain intimidated," and that the "Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward liberation." The briefing also assessed that "Significant force protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq."[64]

([redacted]) The second DIA briefing noted that "managing rivalries will be a major challenge to the new regime." DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will remain, but should be manageable and noted that most rivalries are intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups." It summarized its assessment of post-Saddam challenges in three areas: "Economic

---

[62] CIA, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq*, August 13, 2002, pp. i - ii. , pp. i - ii.
[63] DIA, *Knowledge of Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight* and *Looking at Post-Saddam Iraq*, April 2002.
[64] Ibid

[redacted]

reconstruction[,] Managing rising expectations and nationalist backlash[,] Rebuilding the military to assure security."[65]

([redacted]) The second briefing also outlined that potential post-war challenges that included, "preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area, managing inter-ethnic/tribal violence, gaining control of the regime's geographic power base, and accounting for WMD."[66]

[65] Ibid
[66] Ibid

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ AND REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ

EO 12958 6.2(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

ICA 2003-

DISTRIBUTION:

WH

1 - 80 WHITE HOUSE REGISTRY
INITIAL DISSEM/SPECIAL DISSEM

81 STEPHEN J. HADLEY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
WEST WING, WHITE HOUSE

82 PAUL J. JACKSON
DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL CONTINGENCY PROGRAMS
ROOM 3202, EEOB

VP

83 IRVE (LEWIS) LIBBY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM 298, EEOB

84 ERIC S. EDELMAN
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM 298, EEOB

PFIAB

85 RANDY W. DEITERING
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/PFIAB
ROOM 494, EEOB

NSC

86 ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR

ISLAMIC OUTREACH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA INITIATIVES
ROOM 351, EEOB

87 ROBERT G. JOSEPH
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR PROLIFERATION STRATEGY/ COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND HOMELAND DEFENSE
ROOM 380, EEOB

88 MATTHEW J. BRYZA
DIRECTOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 368, EEOB

89 Dr DR. MICHELE D. DUNNE
DIRECTOR FOR EGYPT AND NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

90 GARY R. EDSON
DEPUTY ASST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
WEST WING

91 RICHARD A. FALKENRATH, JR.
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR POLICY AND PLANNING /OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
ROOM 210, EEOB

92 AMB. DANIEL FRIED
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 368, EEOB

93 GEN. JOHN A. GORDON
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT/ NATIONAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR OFFICE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM
ROOM 303, EEOB

94 JEFFREY B. JONES
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR STRATREGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION IN THE OFFICE OF COMBATTING TERRORISM
ROOM 303, EEOB

95 PAUL B. KURTZ
SENIOR DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF CYBER SPACE SECURITY
ROOM 302, EEOB

96 FLYNT L. LEVERETT
DIRECTOR ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

97 AMB. JOHN F. MAISTO
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
ROOM 361, EEOB

98 HILLARY P. MANN
DIRECTOR FOR GULF AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

99 ELISABETH I. MILLARD
DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 493, EEOB

100 FRANKLIN C. MILLER
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL
ROOM 396, EEOB

101 JAMES F. MORIARTY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 493, EEOB

102 MARY K. STURTEVANT
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
ROOM 300, EEOB

GLOBAL SUPPORT/GS

103 [redacted]
ROOM 1501, OHB

HAC/DEF

104 KEVIN M. ROPER
STAFF DIRECTOR HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE/
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (HAC/D)
ROOM H148, THE CAPITOL

105 SHERRY L. YOUNG
OFFICE MANAGER, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTE ON DEFENSE
ROOM H-149, THE CAPITOL

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC)

106 CINDY PEARSON
SECURITY MANAGER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(SASC)
ROOM 228, SENATE RUSSELL OFFICE BUILDING

SAC/DEF

107 STEVEN J. CORTESE
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR FOR SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (SAC/DEC)
ROOM SRC-IIA, SENATE RUSSELL OFFICE BUILDING COURTYARD

108 CHARLES HUOY
MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (SAC/D)
ROOM 114, 114 SENATE DIRKSEN OFFICE BLDG

SSCI

109 WILLIAM D. DUHNKE
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
ROOM 110, HART SENATE OFFICE

110 JAMES (JIM) WOLFE

SECURITY DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTE ON
INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)
ROOM 211, SENATE HART OFFICE BUILDING

HPSCI

111 WILLIAM P. MCFARLAND
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, HPSCI
ROOM H-405, U.S. CAPITOL

BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL(AC)

112 AMB. DONALD A. MAHLEY
SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
ISSUES/AC
ROOM 5921, MAIN STATE

113 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CWC/BWC, ARMS CONTROL BUREAU
ROOM 5919, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR (DRL)

114 LORNE W. CRANER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
LABOR (DRL)
ROOM 7802, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS(EAP)

115 CHRISTOPHER J. LA FLEUR
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

116 MATTHEW P. DALEY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS (EAP)
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

117 JAMES A. KELLY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

118 DONALD W. KEYSER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS(EUR)

119 AMB. ANNE ELIZABETH JONES
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS/ DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
ROOM 6226, MAIN STATE

120 ROBERT A. BRADTKE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN & CANADIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6226, MAIN STATE

121 [redacted]
DIRECTOR EUR/CACEN
ROOM 4217, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS(G)

122 PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7250, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH(INR)

123 [redacted]
SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE
INR/SPM, ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

124 CHARLES (THOMAS) FINGAR
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR INR
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

125 [redacted]
INR/NEBA/AI
ROOM 4634, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

126 [redacted]
FOREIGN POLICY WESTERN REPUBLIC DIVISION INR/REA/FPW
ROOM 4758, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

127 [redacted]
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (INR/EC)
ROOM 2256, MAIN STATE

128 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR TERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND CRIME (INR/TNC)
ROOM 6510, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

129 [redacted]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC AND PROLIFERATION AFFAIRS (INR/SPA/ATD)
ROOM 6526, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

130 [redacted]
CHIEF, SOUTH ASIA DIVISION, ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OFFICE
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

131 [redacted]
INR/REA
ROOM 4843, MAIN STATE

132 [redacted]
INR/REA/RAE
ROOM 2254, MAIN STATE

133 [redacted]
INR/SPM
ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

134 [redacted]
INR/EC - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIST
ROOM 6646, MAIN STATE

135 CARL W. FORD, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

136 [redacted]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLITICAL ANALYST INR/REA
ROOM 2254, MAIN STATE

137 [redacted]
INR/SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 4634, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

138 [redacted]
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR NEAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASIA (INR/NESA)
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

139 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST INR/TNC
ROOM 6510, MAIN STATE

140 [redacted]
INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

141 CHRISTOPHER A. KOJM
DEPUTY ASSISTANT. SECRETARY(DAS) FOR INR/INTEL POLICY & COORDINATION, INR
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

142 [redacted]
INR/SPM
ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

143 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST (INR/NES-A/NAP)
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

144 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST (INR/EB)
ROOM 2258, MAIN STATE

145 [redacted]
SOUTH ASIA/INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

146 - 147 [redacted]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC AND PROLIFERATION AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

148 [redacted]
NORTH AFRICA & ARABIAN PENINSULA/INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF INTERN'L ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS(IO)

149 KIM R. HOLMES
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
ROOM 6323, MAIN STATE

150 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANARIAN OPERATIONS
ROOM 5323, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (NEA)

151 AMB. WILLIAM JOSEPH BURNS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

152 ELIZABETH L. CHENEY-PERRY
DAS/NEA
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

153 - 155 AMB. RYAN C. CROCKER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6244, MAIN STATE

156 - 158 AMB. JAMES A. LAROCCO
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

159 - 161 DAVID M. SATTERFIELD
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION(NP)

162 SUSAN F. BURK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DAS) FOR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION
ROOM 7531, MAIN STATE

163 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CHEMICAL , BIOLOGICAL, MISSLE NONPROLIFERATION
ROOM 7319, MAIN STATE

164 [redacted]
BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION/NTR
ROOM 7418, MAIN STATE

165 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROLIFERATION THREAT REDUCTION, NON-PROLIFERATION BUREAU
ROOM 3428, MAIN STATE

166 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PROLIFERATION THREAT REDUCTION, NP/PTR

ROOM 1480, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS(PM)

167 - 169 LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
ROOM 6312, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS(SA)

170 MICHELE J. SISON
PRIINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6254, MAIN STATE

171 DONALD A. CAMP
PRINCIPAL DAS FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS (SA)
ROOM 6245A, MAIN STATE

172 CHRISTINA B. ROCCA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6254, MAIN STATE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

173 RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
ROOM 7220, MAIN STATE

OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (S/CT)

174 AMB. JOSEPH COFER BLACK
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND AMBASSADOR AT-LARGE(S/CT)
ROOM 2509, MAIN STATE

OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF(S/P)

175 - 178 AMB. RICHARD N. HAASS
DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF
ROOM 7311, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY(T)

179 JOHN R. BOLTON
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 7208, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC BUSINESS & AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS(E)

180 AMB. ALAN P. LARSON
UNDERSECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7258, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS(P)

181 AMB. MARC I. GROSSMAN
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7240, MAIN STATE

182 [redacted]
EXEC. ASSISTANT TO THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7240, MAIN STATE

DCI REP - NMJIC

183 DR. JACK DYER CROUCH, II
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

ROOM 2C252,

C/O CIA DESK/NMJIC ALERT CENTER, PENTAGON

184 [redacted]

CIA REPRESENTATIVE NMJIC
ROOM 2D901, PENTAGON ATTN: CIA REP.

185 - 186 [redacted]

DCI LIAISON TO DIRECTOR NRO
C/O CIA DESK/NMJIC ALERT CENTER, PENTAGON

187 [redacted]

DCI REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD/C3I
ROOM 3C252, THE PENTAGON

DCI REP - OUSD/AT&L

188 - 197 [redacted]

CIA REP - OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/
ACQUISITION/ TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS (OUSD/AT&L)
ROOM 3C252, THE PENTAGON

OASD

198 [redacted]

DIRECTOR/STRATEGY/ FORCE AND OPERATIONS/INTL SEC POLICY
ROOM 4E880, 2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON

199 PETER C. FLORY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 4E841, THE PENTAGON

OASD - ANDREW HOEHN

200 ANDREW R. HOEHN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY
ROOM 4B724, THE PENTAGON

OASD - DR. WILLIAM LUTI

201 - 202 DR. WILLIAM J. LUTI
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEAR EAST
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OASD/ ISA
ROOM 4D765, THE PENTAGON

VIA: OASD/C3I

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

203 PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E944, PENTAGON

OSD/PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION

204 DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION/OSD/PA&E
ROOM 3E836, 1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON

OSD/USDP

205 DOUGLAS J. FEITH
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ROOM 4E808, 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON

OUSD (P) /CMD

206 KENNETH E. DEGRAFFENREID

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY SUPPORT)
ROOM 2E812, THE PENTAGON, VIA: OUSD(P)/CMD

207 [redacted]
DIRECTOR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY/INTL SECURITY POLICY
ROOM 4A873, 2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON

208 MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (SOLIC)
ROOM 2E258, THE PENTAGON, VIA: OUSD(P)/CMD

DIA

209 [redacted]
C/TRANSNATIONAL WARFARE GROUP
ROOM B7-980, DIAC

210 [redacted]
CHIEF EUROPE DIVISION DIA/RAE-2
ROOM A3-530, DIAC

211 [redacted]
DIRECTOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE - COMBATTING
TERRORISM
ROOM F3927, DIAC

212 [redacted]
DIA/DP-E
ROOM B7242, DIAC

213 [redacted]
DIA [redacted]

214 [redacted]
ACTING DP-E
ROOM B7820, 6000 BOLLING AFB, WASHINGTON DC 20430

DIA DISSEM CENTER (COLLATERAL)

215 - 394 [redacted]
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TECHNICIAN
ROOM D1405, BLDG 6000

DIA PENTAGON

395 VADM. LOWELL E. JACOBY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 3E258, THE PENTAGON

396 KENNETH L. KNIGHT
DIO FOR GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
ROOM 2D-241, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE PENTAGON

397 BRUCE D. HARDCASTLE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA (DIO/MESA)
ROOM 3E-800, THE PENTAGON

398 [redacted]
ASST. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
ROOM 3E200, PENTAGON

399 MARK W. EWING
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIA
ROOM 3E258, PENTAGON

400 [redacted]
(ACTING) DEPUTY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, MESA
ROOM 3E-200, PENTAGON

401 LONNIE D. HENLEY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
ROOM 2A540, PENTAGON

402 [redacted]
DEPUTY (DIO-EAP)

ROOM 5C447, THE PENTAGON

403 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF SUPPORT DIA/J-8/J2J
ROOM 1E935, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PENTAGON

JCS

404 GEN. PETER PACE
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E880, PENTAGON

405 VADM. JAMES W. METZGER
ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(OCJCS/ACJCS)
ROOM 2E868, PENTAGON

406 GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E872, THE PENTAGON

407 MG. GLEN D. SHAFFER
DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT CHIEF STAFF J2
ROOM 1E880, PENTAGON

408 LTG. JOHN P. ABIZAID
DIRECTOR, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (JCS)
ROOM 2D874, PENTAGON

409 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO J-2
ROOM 1E880, PENTAGON

410 LTG. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5)
ROOM 2E908, PENTAGON

411 RADM. CARLTON B. JEWETT.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS (J-5)
ROOM 2E1008, THE PENTAGON

412 [redacted]

DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF ME DIVISION J05 JCS
ROOM 2E949, PENTAGON

NIMA BETHESDA – JAMES H. CLAPPER

413 LTG. JAMES R. CLAPPER
DIRECTOR/NIMA (USAF RETIRED)
ROOM 378, NIMA BETHESDA

NIMA BETHESDA – [redacted]

414 [redacted]
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, NIMA
NIMA MAIL STOP D-134

NIMA/NP BETHESDA MD

415 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OF NIMA OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND POLICY (NIMA-NP)
MAIL STOP D-136, NIMA, BETHESDA

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

416 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE,DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE
ROOM 4A932, PENTAGON

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

417 LTG. ROBERT W. NOONAN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 1E713, PENTAGON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

418 RADM. RICHARD B. PORTERFIELD
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (N2)
ROOM 4E360, 2000 NAVY PENTAGON

U.S. MARINE CORPS

419 BG. ROBERT M. SHEA
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF COMMAND CONTROL
COMMUNICATION COMPUTER AND INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 3231, HEADQUARTERS US MARINE CORP

2 NAVY ANNEX WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

420 [redacted]
MCIA/FMT
ROOM 7, 3300 RUSSELL RD., QUANTICO, VA. 22134

DIRNSA

421 [redacted]
COORDINATOR SINIO TRAINING PROGRAMS
ROOM 2A-0506, SUITE 6426, FT. MEADE, MD.

NSA

422 JERRY L. POWERS
SIGINT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (SINIO), NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA
ROOM 2A0518, SUITE 6426

NSA - LTG MICHAEL HAYDEN

423 LTG. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

ROOM 2B8036 SUITE 6342, OPS-2B

TREASURY

424 - 425 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (NATIONAL SECURITY)
ROOM 2441, MAIN TREASURY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

426 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS
ROOM 7176, J. E. HOOVER BLDG, 10TH AND PENN. AVE., WASH., DC

427 [redacted]
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION/NS-4B
ROOM 4859, J. EDGAR HOOVER BLDG.

DOE

428 [redacted]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
ROOM GA-301, FORRESTAL BUILDING

429 [redacted]
(ACTING) DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, IN-1
ROOM GA-301, FORRESTAL BLDG.

COMMERCE

430 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE SUPPORT
ROOM 6854, HCHB, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

431 PHILIP R. AGRESS
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC

ROOM 3202, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

432 GRANT D. ALDONAS
UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION
ROOM 3850, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI)

433 [redacted]
NMIC
ROOM 7, SUITLAND, MD.

434 [redacted]
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ROOM 4A107, ONI, 4251 SUITLAND ROAD, WASHINGTON, DC 20395-5720

435 [redacted]
ONIEMIC
ROOM 2C232, PENTAGON

U.S. COAST GUARD - COGARD ICC (SUITLAND, MD)

436 [redacted]
COAST GUARD.
ROOM 3A111

DCI

437 GEORGE J. TENET
DIRECTOR, CIA
VIA EXECUTIVE REGISTRY, OHB

438 JOHN O. BRENNAN
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ROOM 7D55, OHB

446 JOHN L. HELGERSON
INSPECTOR GENERAL (DCI/OIG)
ROOM 2C30, VIA: ISC/RM 2T21, NHB

DCI/OPA

447 WILLIAM R. HARLOW
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 7C35, OHB

DDCI

448 MG. JOHN H. CAMPBELL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT
ROOM 7E36, OHB

449 JOAN A. DEMPSEY
DDCI/COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT/CMS/CM
ROOM 6G41, OHB

450 [redacted]
EX/DDCI
ROOM 7E30 VIA DAC ROOM 7312, OHB

451 JAN S. KARCZ
ADCI-AP
ROOM 2E19, OHB

452 ALVIN (BUZZY) S. KRONGARD
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE DCI
ROOM 7E12, OHB

453 JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 7D65, OHB (VIA EXECUTIVE REGISTRY)

OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS (OMA)

454 [redacted] ?

CIMS

455 CHARLES E. ALLEN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE/COLLECTIONS/CIMS
ROOM 6G33, OHB

456 [redacted]

457

458

NIC

459 STUART A. COHEN
(ACTING) CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
ROOM 7E62, OHB

460 - 509 PAUL R. PILLAR
NIO/NESA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

510 [redacted] ?
NIO/LATIN AMERICA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

511 [redacted]

DEPUTY NIO/SNP
ROOM 2E49, OHB

512 [redacted]
DNIO/SNP
ROOM 2E49, OHB

513 [redacted]
NIO/EAST ASIA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

514 [redacted]
DNIO/S&T
ROOM 2E49, VIA: DCI REGISTRY, 6E23, OHB

515 DCI/NIC/SRPAS
SRPAS FILE COPY
ROOM 2G11, OHB

516 [redacted]
SENIOR REVIEW-PRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS STAFF
ROOM 2G11, OHB

517 LAWRENCE K. GERSHWIN
NIO/S&T
2E42, OHB

518 RICHARD M. GUNTHER
NIO WARNING OFFICE
ROOM 2G11, OHB

519 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SENIOR REVIEW-PRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS STAFF(SRPAS)/NIC AND (ACTING)DIRECTOR/SRPAS
2E30, OHB

520 ROBERT G. HOUDEK
NIO/AFRICA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

521 [redacted]
NIC/SRPAS
ROOM 2G11, OHB

522 [redacted]
DNIO RUSSIA/EURASIA
2E28, OHB

523 GEORGE KOLT
NIO RUSSIA/EURASIA
ROOM 7E47, OHB

524 JOHN R. LANDRY
NIO/CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ISSUES
2E82, OHB

525 BARRY F. LOWENKRON
NIO/EUROPE
ROOM 7E62, OHB

526 MARK M. LOWENTHAL
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIC FOR EVALUATIONS
ROOM 7D66, OHB

527 MARYSUSAN N. LYNCH
DCI/NIO/ENP
ROOM 2E49, OHB

528 [redacted]
DNI/SINESA
ROOM 7E62,

OHB

529 - 531 [redacted]
NIC/PRODUCTION OFFICER VIA DDI REGISTRY
2G11, OHB

532 [redacted]
DNIO/EGI
ROOM 6E23, OHB

533 [redacted]
DEPUTY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR ECONOMIC AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS/DNIO/EGI
ROOM 6E23, OHB

534 [redacted]
DC/NIO/LATIN AMERICA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

535 [redacted]
D/NIO/CMI
2E52, OHB

536 [redacted]
D/NIO/NESA
7E62, OHB

537 [redacted]
D/NIO/CMI
ROOM 2E52, OHB

538 [redacted]
NIC CONSULTANT
7E62, OHB

539 [redacted]
ACTING NIO /EUROPE
ROOM 7E62, OHB

540 [redacted]
D/NIO/S&T
2E42, OHB

541 [redacted]
D/NIO/WARNING
2G11, OHB

542 ROBERT D. VICKERS
NIO/WARNING
2G11, OHB

543 ROBERT D. WALPOLE
NIO/SNP
ROOM 2E49, OHB

544 [redacted]
D/NIO/S&T
2E42, OHB

DDI

545	JAMI MISICK DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE (DDI) ROOM 7E30, OHB
546	[redacted]
547	DDI/OPS CENTER ~~DI/OPERATIONS CENTER~~ ROOM 7F27, OHB
548	DDI/OPS/GAP/
549	[redacted]
550	
551	
552	STEPHEN (SAMUEL) KAPLAN DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLICY SUPPORT ROOM 7G25, OHB
553 - 554	MPG PRODUCTION MANAGER DI/OPS/MPG ROOM 6H11, OHB
555	MARTIN (MARTY) C. PETERSEN CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCES ROOM 7F20, OHB

556 SCOTT D. WHITE
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 7E30, OHB

SHERMAN KENT SCHOOL-CIA UNIV.

557 DANIEL (DAN) W. WAGNER
DEAN - SHERMAN KENT SCHOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
ROOM 2300, LF-6

U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

558 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO USTR
ROOM 525, WINDER VIA:DI RBPA/USTR, DI/OPS/PSP 1H12, OHB

NESA

559 [redacted]

560 [redacted]

561 SYLVIA L. COPELAND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/NESA (ALSO ACTING D/NESA)
ROOM 6P01, NHB

562 DD/NESA/PRODUCTION FILE
NESA/PRODUCTION FILE
ROOM 6P0128, NHB

563 - 568 [redacted]

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

APLAA

576 VAUGHN F. BISHOP
DIRECTOR/APLAA
ROOM 5E88, OHB

577 DD/APLAA/RESEARCH DIRECTOR/PCS
APLAA/

RESEARCH DIRECTOR/PCS
ROOM 6C21, NHB

OREA

578 PETER A. CLEMENT
RUSSIA ISSUE MANAGER
ROOM 4E60, OHB

579 MARY F. DESJEANS
D/OREA
ROOM 4E60, OHB

580

581

582

583

OTI

584 TODD J. EGELAND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES DD/OTI
ROOM 4W03, NHB

585 DAVID F. GORDON
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES (D/OTI)
ROOM 4W03, NHB

WINPAC

586

[redacted]

587 ALAN A. FOLEY
DIRECTOR/WINPAC
ROOM 5P0102, NHB

588 ANDREW M. LIEPMAN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/WINPAC
ROOM 5P0102, NHB

589 [redacted]

CNC

590 [redacted]

CTC

591

592

593 JOHN PHILIP MUDD
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS/CTC
(CTC/OTA)
ROOM 1D4107, NHB

CIC

594 [redacted]

595 [redacted]

NIMA/PCPPZ-STOP N-29

596 [redacted]
NIMA [redacted]
ROOM 4C930, BLDG 213

597 [redacted]
NIMA [redacted]
BLDG 213

NCIX

598 [redacted]
C/NCIX/AG/CNA
ROOM 3B28, PLAZA A

599 [redacted]
(ACTING) NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE (NCIX)
ROOM 3B28, PLAZA A

DCI REP - JCS

600 [redacted]
DCI REP TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E921, THE PENTAGON

601 [redacted]
DEPUTY DCI REP TO THE JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E1017, STRATEGIC PLANS & POLICY J-5, PENTAGON

DDO

602 JAMES L. PAVITT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROOM 7E30, OHB

603

604

605

606

607

608 STEVEN R. KAPPES
ADDO
ROOM 7E30, OHB

609

610

611

612

[redacted]

IOC

613 [redacted]

IOC - [redacted]

614 [redacted]

DDS&T

615 [redacted]

616 DONALD (DON) M. KERR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR DDS&T
ROOM 6E80, VIA DDS&T REGISTRY - ROOM 6E45, OHB

617 [redacted]

NIMA LANGLEY

618 [redacted]
SIO IMAGERY
ROOM 4300, OHB

619 [redacted]

C/NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

620 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

621 [redacted]
NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

622 [redacted]
C/NPIC[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

623 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4G20, OHB

624 NIMA[redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4G00, OHB

625 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OFFICE OFCOUNTER TERRORISM/NIMA
ROOM 4G20, OHB

NIMA REGISTRY

626 [redacted]
C/NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 6N200 MAIL STOP N-82, BLDG 213

627 [redacted]
NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 4S100, BLDG 213 WNY

628 [redacted]
C/NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 3C886 MAIL STOP N-82, BLDG 213

629 [redacted]

NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 3C885, BUILDING 213

630 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
WNY N-69, WNY

631 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
ROOM 3C885, BUILDING 213

632 [redacted]
DC/NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4S1300,MAILSTOP N-68, BLDG.213

633 JOANNE O. ISHAM
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NIMA
ROOM 2N2, NIMA MAIL STOP D-100

634 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4C830, MAIL STOP N-69, BLDG 213

635 [redacted]
CHIEF, NIMA OPERATIONS CENTER, BETHESDA, MD.
ROOM 377, ERSKINE HALL

NIMA--STOP N-69

636 [redacted]
ROOM 4C830, WNY, MAILSTOP N-28

FBI/SC

637 DDS&T/FBI/[redacted]
FBI/[redacted]

ROOM 2N16, RCC-B

638 [redacted]
DS&T/FBIS/[redacted]
ROOM 1, BLDG 480

639 [redacted]
C/FBIS/[redacted]
ROOM 2N03, RCC-B

JAEIC

640 [redacted]
JAEIC/EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 102, TECH 1 BLDG

DCI REP - CENTCOM (MACDILL)

641 - 650 [redacted]
DCI REP TO CENTCOM (MACDILL)
POUCH

DCI REP - [redacted]

651

DCI REP - NORTHCOM (COLORADO SPRINGS)

652 - 671 [redacted]
DCI REP TO NORTHCOM (COLORADO SPRINGS)
ROOM 322, BLDG 1470 PETERSON AFB, COLORADO SPRINGS, CO.
80914-3030

DCI REP - PACOM (HONOLULU)

672 [redacted]
DCI REP TO PACOM(HONOLULU)
POUCH

DCI REP - SOUTHCOM (DADE)

673 [redacted]
DCI REP TO SOUTHCOM(DADE)
POUCH

DCI REP - TRANSCOM (SCOTT)

674 - 679 [redacted]
DCI REP. TRANSCOM (SCOTT)
POUCH

[redacted]

680 [redacted]
SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER (SSO/TCO/GCO/SCO/LCO)
ROOM A030, BLDG. 4505, REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898

INTERNATION POINT ISC

681 [redacted]
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM/CIO/IM&M/RG/SCD
ROOM 2E20, IP BUILDING

CIO/HQS

682 - 683 [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL
Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq
ICA 2003-

ROOM 1H15, OHB

664 ALAN C. WADE, JR.
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
ROOM 7D00, OHB

EO 12958 6.2(c)

CONFIDENTIAL
Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq
ICA

DISTRIBUTION:

WH

1 - 80 WHITE HOUSE REGISTRY
INITIAL DISSEM/SPECIAL DISSEM

81 STEPHEN J. HADLEY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
WEST WING, WHITE HOUSE

82 PAUL J. JACKSON
DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL CONTINGENCY PROGRAMS
ROOM 3202, EEOB

VP

83 IRVE (LEWIS) LIBBY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM 298, EEOB

84 ERIC S. EDELMAN
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM 298, EEOB

PFIAB

85 RANDY W. DEITERING
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/PFIAB
ROOM 494, EEOB

NSC

86 ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR

ISLAMIC OUTREACH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA INITIATIVES
ROOM 351, EEOB

87 ROBERT G. JOSEPH
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR PROLIFERATION STRATEGY/ COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND HOMELAND DEFENSE
ROOM 380, EEOB

88 MATTHEW J. BRYZA
DIRECTOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 368, EEOB

89 Dr DR. MICHELE D. DUNNE
DIRECTOR FOR EGYPT AND NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

90 GARY R. EDSON
DEPUTY ASST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
WEST WING

91 RICHARD A. FALKENRATH, JR.
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR POLICY AND PLANNING /OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
ROOM 210, EEOB

92 AMB. DANIEL FRIED
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 368, EEOB

93 GEN. JOHN A. GORDON
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT/ NATIONAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR OFFICE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM
ROOM 303, EEOB

94 JEFFREY B. JONES
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR STRATNEGIC COMMUNICATION AND

CONFIDENTIAL

Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

ICA

95 PAUL B. KURTZ
SENIOR DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF CYBER SPACE SECURITY
ROOM 302, EEOB

96 FLYNT L. LEVERETT
DIRECTOR ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

97 AMB. JOHN F. MAISTO
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
ROOM 391, EEOB

98 HILLARY P. MANN
DIRECTOR FOR GULF AFFAIRS
ROOM 351, EEOB

99 ELISABETH I. MILLARD
DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 493, EEOB

100 FRANKLIN C. MILLER
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL
ROOM 396, EEOB

101 JAMES F. MORIARTY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 493, EEOB

102 MARY K. STURTEVANT
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
ROOM 300, EEOB

GLOBAL SUPPORT/GS

103

HAC/DEF

104 KEVIN M. ROPER
STAFF DIRECTOR HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE/
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (HAC/D)
ROOM H148, THE CAPITOL

105 SHERRY L. YOUNG
OFFICE MANAGER, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTE ON DEFENSE
ROOM H-149, THE CAPITOL

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC)

106 CINDY PEARSON
SECURITY MANAGER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(SASC)
ROOM 228, SENATE RUSSELL OFFICE BUILDING

SAC/DEF

107 STEVEN J. CORTESE
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR FOR SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (SAC/DEC)
ROOM SRC-HA, SENATE RUSSELL OFFICE BUILDING COURTYARD

108 CHARLES HUOY
MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE (SAC/D)
ROOM 114, 114 SENATE DIRKSEN OFFICE BLDG

SSCI

109 WILLIAM D. DUHNKE
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
ROOM 110, HART SENATE OFFICE

110 JAMES (JIM) WOLFE

SECURITY DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)
ROOM 211, SENATE HART OFFICE BUILDING

HPSCI

111 WILLIAM P. MCFARLAND
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, HPSCI
ROOM H-405, U.S. CAPITOL

BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL(AC)

112 AMB. DONALD A. MAHLEY
SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ISSUES/AC
ROOM 5921, MAIN STATE

113 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CWC/BWC, ARMS CONTROL BUREAU
ROOM 5919, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR (DRL)

114 LORNE W. CRANER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (DRL)
ROOM 7802, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS(EAP)

115 CHRISTOPHER J. LA FLEUR
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

116 MATTHEW P. DALEY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS (EAP)
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

117 JAMES A. KELLY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

118 DONALD W. KEYSER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 6205, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS(EUR)

119 AMB. ANNE ELIZABETH JONES
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS/ DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
ROOM 6226, MAIN STATE

120 ROBERT A. BRADTKE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN & CANADIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6225, MAIN STATE

121 [redacted]
DIRECTOR EUR/CACEN
ROOM 4217, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS(G)

122 PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7250, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH(INR)

123 [redacted]
SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE
INR/SPM, ROOM 6528, MAIN STATE

124 CHARLES (THOMAS) FINGAR
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR INR
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

125 [redacted]
INR/NIESA/AI
ROOM 4634, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

126 [redacted]
FOREIGN POLICY WESTERN REPUBLIC DIVISION INR/REA/FPW
ROOM 4758, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

127 [redacted]
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (INR/EC)
ROOM 2258, MAIN STATE

128 - 129 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR TERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND CRIME (INR/TNC)
ROOM 6510, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, MAIN STATE

130 [redacted]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC AND PROLIFERATION AFFAIRS (INR/SPA/ATD)
ROOM 6528, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

131 [redacted]
CHIEF, SOUTH ASIA DIVISION, ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OFFICE
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

132 [redacted]
INR/REA
ROOM 4643, MAIN STATE

133 [redacted]
INR/REA/HAE
ROOM 2254, MAIN STATE

134 [redacted]
INR/SPM
ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

135 [redacted]
INR/EC - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIST
ROOM 6848, MAIN STATE

136 CARL W. FORD, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

137 [redacted]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLITICAL ANALYST INR/REA
ROOM 2254, MAIN STATE

138 [redacted]
INR/SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 4634, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

139 [redacted]
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR NEAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASIA (INR/NESA)
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

140 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST INR/TNC
ROOM 6510, MAIN STATE

141 [redacted]
INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

142 [redacted]
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY(DAS) FOR INR/INTEL POLICY & COORDINATION, INR
ROOM 6531, MAIN STATE

143 [redacted]
INR/SPM
ROOM 6526, MAIN STATE

144 - 147 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST (INR/RES/NAP)
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

148 [redacted]
SENIOR ANALYST (INR/EB)
ROOM 2258, MAIN STATE

149 [redacted]
SOUTH ASIA/INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

150 - 151 [redacted]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC AND PROLIFERATION AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ROOM 6528, MAIN STATE

152 [redacted]
NORTH AFRICA & ARABIAN PENINSULA/INR
ROOM 4634, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF INTERN'L ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS(IO)

153 KIM R. HOLMES
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
ROOM 6323, MAIN STATE

154 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANARIAN OPERATIONS
ROOM 5323, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (NEA)

155 AMB. WILLIAM JOSEPH BURNS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

156 ELIZABETH L. CHENEY-PERRY
DAS/NEA
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

157 - 159 AMB. RYAN C. CROCKER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6244, MAIN STATE

160 - 162 AMB. JAMES A. LAROCCO
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

163 - 165 DAVID M. SATTERFIELD
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION(NP)

166 SUSAN F. BURK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DAS) FOR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION
ROOM 7531, MAIN STATE

167 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CHEMICAL , BIOLOGICAL, MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION
ROOM 7319, MAIN STATE

168 [redacted]
BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION/NTR
ROOM 7418, MAIN STATE

169 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROLIFERATION THREAT REDUCTION, NON-PROLIFERATION BUREAU
ROOM 2428, MAIN STATE

170 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PROLIFERATION THREAT REDUCTION, NP/PTR

ROOM 1480, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS(PM)

171 LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
ROOM 6312, MAIN STATE

BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS(SA)

172 MICHELE J. SISON
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6254, MAIN STATE

173 DONALD A. CAMP
PRINCIPAL DAS FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS (SA)
ROOM 6245A, MAIN STATE

174 CHRISTINA B. ROCCA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROOM 6254, MAIN STATE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

175 RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
ROOM 7220, MAIN STATE

OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (S/CT)

176 - 178 AMB. JOSEPH COFER BLACK
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND AMBASSADOR AT-LARGE(S/CT)
ROOM 2509, MAIN STATE

OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF(S/P)

179 - 186 AMB. RICHARD N. HAASS
DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF
ROOM 7311, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY(T)

187 JOHN R. BOLTON
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 7208, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC BUSINESS & AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS(E)

188 AMB. ALAN P. LARSON
UNDERSECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND
AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7258, MAIN STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS(P)

189 AMB. MARC I. GROSSMAN
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7240, MAIN STATE

190 [redacted]
EXEC. ASSISTANT TO THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ROOM 7240, MAIN STATE

DCI REP - HMJIC

191 DR. JACK DYER CROUCH, II
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

ROOM 2C252,

C/O CIA DESK/NMJIC ALERT CENTER, PENTAGON

192 [redacted]
CIA REPRESENTATIVE NMJIC
ROOM 2D801, PENTAGON ATTN: CIA REP.

193 - 194 [redacted]
DCI LIAISON TO DIRECTOR NRO
C/O CIA DESK/NMJIC ALERT CENTER, PENTAGON

195 - 199 [redacted]
DCI REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD/C3I
ROOM 2C252, THE PENTAGON

DCI REP - OUSD/AT&L

200 - 209 [redacted]
CIA REP - OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/
ACQUISITION/ TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS (OUSD/AT&L)
ROOM 2C252, THE PENTAGON

OASD

210 [redacted]
DIRECTOR/STRATEGY/ FORCE AND OPERATIONS/INTL SEC POLICY
ROOM 4E880, 2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON

211 PETER C. FLORY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROOM 4E841, THE PENTAGON

OASD - ANDREW HOEHN

212 ANDREW R. HOEHN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY
ROOM 4B724, THE PENTAGON

OASD - DR. WILLIAM LUTI

213 - 214 DR. WILLIAM J. LUTI
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEAR EAST
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OASD/ISA
ROOM 4D765, THE PENTAGON

VIA: OASD/C3I

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

215 PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E944, PENTAGON

OSD/PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION

216 DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION/OSD/PA&E
ROOM 3E936, 1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON

OSD/USDP

217 DOUGLAS J. FEITH
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ROOM 4E808, 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON

OUSD (P) /CMD

218 KENNETH E. DEGRAFFENREID

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY SUPPORT)
ROOM 2E512, THE PENTAGON, VIA: OUSD(P)/CMD

219 [redacted]
DIRECTOR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY/INTL SECURITY POLICY
ROOM 4A573, 2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON

220 MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PDAS) OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (SOLIC)
ROOM 2E258, THE PENTAGON, VIA: OUSD(P)/CMD

DIA

221 [redacted]
C/TRANSNATIONAL WARFARE GROUP
ROOM B7-660, DIAC

222 - 226 [redacted]
CHIEF EUROPE DIVISION DIA/RAE-2
ROOM A3-620, DIAC

227 - 231 CHARLES (PAT) DUECY
DIRECTOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE - COMBATTING
TERRORISM
ROOM F3927, DIAC

232 [redacted]
OFFICE FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION SUPPORT
ROOM A 3998, BLDG 6000

233 - 247 [redacted]
DIA/DP-E
ROOM B7242, DIAC

248 - 252 [redacted]
DIA[redacted]

[redacted]

253 MARCIA L. TOEPFER
ACTING DP-E

ROOM B7820, 6000 BOLLING AFB, WASHINGTON DC 20430

DIA DISSEM CENTER (COLLATERAL)

254 - 433 [redacted]
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TECHNICIAN
ROOM D1405, BLDG 6000

DIA PENTAGON

434 VADM. LOWELL E. JACOBY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 3E258, THE PENTAGON

435 KENNETH L. KNIGHT
DIO FOR GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
ROOM 2D-241, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE PENTAGON

436 BRUCE D. HARDCASTLE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA (DIO/MESA)
ROOM 3E-200, THE PENTAGON

437 - 441 [redacted]
ASST. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
ROOM 3E200, PENTAGON

442 MARK W. EWING
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIA
ROOM 3E258, PENTAGON

443 - 457 [redacted]
(ACTING) DEPUTY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, MESA
ROOM 3E-200, PENTAGON

458 LONNIE D. HENLEY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

ROOM 2A540, PENTAGON

459 [redacted]
DEPUTY (DIO-EAP)
ROOM 5C447, THE PENTAGON

460 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF SUPPORT DIA/J-2/J2J
ROOM 1E836, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PENTAGON

JCS

461 GEN. PETER PACE
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E860, PENTAGON

462 VADM. JAMES W. METZGER
ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(OCJCS/ACJCS)
ROOM 2E868, PENTAGON

463 GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E872, THE PENTAGON

464 MG. GLEN D. SHAFFER
DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT CHIEF STAFF J2
ROOM 1E880, PENTAGON

465 LTG. JOHN P. ABIZAID
DIRECTOR, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (JCS)
ROOM 2D874, PENTAGON

466 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO J-2
ROOM 1E880, PENTAGON

467 LTG. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5)
ROOM 2E886, PENTAGON

468 RADM. CARLTON B. JEWETT

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS (J-5)
ROOM 2E1008, THE PENTAGON

469 - 471 [redacted]
DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF ME DIVISION J05 JCS
ROOM 2E949, PENTAGON

NIMA BETHESDA – JAMES H. CLAPPER

472 LTG. JAMES R. CLAPPER
DIRECTOR/NIMA (USAF RETIRED)
ROOM 378, NIMA BETHESDA

NIMA BETHESDA - [redacted]

473 [redacted]
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, NIMA
NIMA MAIL STOP D-134

NIMA/NP BETHESDA MD

474 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OF NIMA OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND POLICY (NIMA-NP)
MAIL STOP D-136, NIMA, BETHESDA

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

475 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE,DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE
ROOM 4A932, PENTAGON

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

476 LTG. ROBERT W. NOONAN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 1E713, PENTAGON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

477 RADM. RICHARD B. PORTERFIELD
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (N2)
ROOM 4E380, 2000 NAVY PENTAGON

U.S. MARINE CORPS

478 BG. ROBERT M. SHEA
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF COMMAND CONTROL
COMMUNICATION COMPUTER AND INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 3231, HEADQUARTERS US MARINE CORP

2 NAVY ANNEX WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

479 - 483 [redacted]
MCIA/PMT
ROOM 1, 3300 RUSSELL RD., QUANTICO, VA. 22134

DIRNSA

484 [redacted]
COORDINATOR SIGIO TRAINING PROGRAMS
ROOM 2A-0606, SUITE 6426, FT. MEADE, MD.

NSA

485 [redacted]
DEPUTY SIGIO [redacted]
ROOM 2A0606, FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD

486 - 510 JERRY L. POWERS

SIGINT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (SINIO), NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA
ROOM 2A0518, SUITE 6428

NSA - LTG MICHAEL HAYDEN

511 LTG. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
ROOM 2B6036 SUITE 6242, OPS-2B

TREASURY

512 - 513 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (NATIONAL SECURITY)
ROOM 2441, MAIN TREASURY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

514 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS
ROOM 7176, J. E. HOOVER BLDG, 10TH AND PENN. AVE., WASH., DC

515 [redacted]
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION/NNS-4B
ROOM 4989, J. EDGAR HOOVER BLDG.

DOE

516 [redacted]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
ROOM GA-301, FORRESTAL BUILDING

517 - 521 [redacted]
(ACTING) DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, IN-1
ROOM GA-301, FORRESTAL BLDG.

COMMERCE

522 [redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE SUPPORT
ROOM 6854, HCHB, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

523 PHILIP R. AGRESS
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC
ROOM 3202, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

524 GRANT D. ALDONAS
UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION
ROOM 3850, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI)

525 [redacted]
NMIC
ROOM ?, SUITLAND, MD.

526 - 527 [redacted]
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ROOM 4A107, ONI, 4251 SUITLAND ROAD, WASHINGTON, DC 20395-5720

528 [redacted]
ONI/NMIC
ROOM 2C232, PENTAGON

U.S. COAST GUARD - COGARD ICC (SUITLAND, MD)

529 [redacted]
COAST GUARD.
ROOM 3A111

DCI

530 GEORGE J. TENET
DIRECTOR, CIA
VIA EXECUTIVE REGISTRY, OHB

531 JOHN O. BRENNAN
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ROOM 7D55, OHB

532 HUGH MONTGOMERY
DCI/SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS
ROOM 6E22, OHB

533 JOHN H. MOSEMAN
CHIEF OF STAFF/DCI
ROOM 7D56, OHB

534 WINSTON P. WILEY
ASSOCIATE DCI FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (ADCIHS)
ROOM 7G21, OHB

DCI/DAST

535 [redacted] ?
(ACTING) C/DCI/DAST
ROOM 7F34, OHB

DCI/OCA

536 STANLEY M. MOSKOWITZ
DIRECTOR CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
ROOM 7C38, OHB

537 [redacted]
DCI/OCA
ROOM 7B00, OHB

DCI/OGC

538 JOHN A. RIZZO
SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
ROOM 7C24, OHB

DCI/OIG

539 JOHN L. HELGERSON
INSPECTOR GENERAL (DCI/OIG)
ROOM 2X30, VIA: ISC/RM 2T21, NHB

DCI/OPA

540 WILLIAM R. HARLOW
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ROOM 7C35, OHB

DDCI

541 MG. JOHN H. CAMPBELL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT
ROOM 7E35, OHB

542 JOAN A. DEMPSEY
DDCI/COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT/CMSCM
ROOM 6G41, OHB

543 [redacted]
EA/DDCI
ROOM 7E30 VIA DAC ROOM 7312, OHB

544 JAN S. KARCZ
ADCI-AP
ROOM 2E19, OHB

545 ALVIN (BUZZY) B. KRONGARD
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE DCI

ROOM 7E12, OHB

548 JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 7D55, OHB (VIA EXECUTIVE REGISTRY)

OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS (OMA)

547

CMS

548 CHARLES E. ALLEN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE/COLLECTIONS/CMS
ROOM 6G33, OHB

549

550

551

NIC

552 STUART A. COHEN
(ACTING) CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
ROOM 7E62, OHB

553 - 602 PAUL R. PILLAR

NIO/NESA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

603 [redacted]
NIO/LATIN AMERICA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

604 [redacted]
DEPUTY NIO/SNF
ROOM 2E49, OHB

605 [redacted]
DNIO/SNF
ROOM 2E49, OHB

606 [redacted]
NIO/EAST ASIA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

607 [redacted]
DNIO/ S&T
ROOM 2E49, VIA: DCI REGISTRY, 6E23, OHB

608 DCI/NIC/SRPAS
SRPAS FILE COPY
ROOM 2G11, OHB

609 [redacted]
SENIOR REVIEW-PRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS STAFF
ROOM 2G11, OHB

610 [redacted]
DEPUTY NIO/EAST ASIA
7E62, OHB

611 LAWRENCE K. GERSHWIN
NIO/S&T
2E42, OHB

612 RICHARD M. GUNTHER
NIO WARNING OFFICE
ROOM 2G11, OHB

613	[redacted] DEPUTY DIRECTOR SENIOR REVIEW-PRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS STAFF(SR/PAS)/NIC AND (ACTING)DIRECTOR/SR/PAS 2E30, OHB
614	ROBERT G. HOUDEK NIO/AFRICA - ROOM 7E62, OHB
615	[redacted] NIC/SR/PAS ROOM 2G11, OHB
616	[redacted] DNIO RUSSIA/EURASIA 2E29, OHB
617	GEORGE KOLT NIO RUSSIA/EURASIA ROOM 7E47, OHB
618	ROBERT P. (PAUL) KOZLUSKY NIO/SNP 2E49, OHB
619	JOHN R. LANDRY NIO/CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ISSUES 2E52, OHB
620 - 623	BARRY F. LOWENKRON NIO/EUROPE ROOM 7E62, OHB
624	MARK M. LOWENTHAL VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIC FOR EVALUATIONS ROOM 7D68, OHB
625	[redacted] DCI/NIO/SNP ROOM 2E49, OHB
626	[redacted] DNIO/NESA

ROOM 7E62,

OHB

627 - 629 [redacted]
NIC/PRODUCTION OFFICER VIA DDI REGISTRY
2G11, OHB

630 [redacted]
DNIO/EGI
ROOM 6E23, OHB

631 [redacted]
DEPUTY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR ECONOMIC AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS/DNIO/EGI
ROOM 6E23, OHB

632 [redacted]
DC/NIO/LATIN AMERICA
ROOM 7E62, OHB

633 [redacted]
D/NIO/EMI
2E52, OHB

634 [redacted]
D/NIO/NESA
7E62, OHB

635 [redacted]
D/NIO/EMI
ROOM 2E52, OHB

636 [redacted]
NIC CONSULTANT
7E62, OHB

637 [redacted]
ACTING NIO/EUROPE
ROOM 7E62, OHB

638 [redacted]
DNIO/S&T

2E42, OHB

639 [redacted]
DNI/WARNING
2G11, OHB

640 ROBERT D. VICKERS
NIO/WARNING
2G11, OHB

641 ROBERT D. WALPOLE
NIO/SNP
ROOM 2E49, OHB

642 [redacted]
DNI/S&T
2E42, OHB

DDI

643 JAMI MISCIK
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE (DDI)
ROOM 7E30, OHB

644 [redacted]

645 DDI/OPS CENTER
C/OPERATIONS CENTER
ROOM 7F27, OHB

646 DDI/OPS/GAP/

647 [redacted]

648 [redacted]

649 [redacted]

650 STEPHEN (SAMUEL) KAPLAN
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLICY SUPPORT
ROOM 7G25, OHB

651 - 652 MPG PRODUCTION MANAGER
DI/OPS/MPG
ROOM GH11, OHB

653 MARTIN (MARTY) C. PETERSEN
CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCES
ROOM 7F20, OHB

654 SCOTT D. WHITE
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
ROOM 7E30, OHB

SHERMAN KENT SCHOOL-CIA UNIV.

655 DANIEL (DAN) W. WAGNER
DEAN - SHERMAN KENT SCHOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
ROOM 2300, LF-5

U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

656 [redacted]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO USTR
ROOM B25, WINDER VIA:DI REP/USTR, DI/OPS/PSP 1H12, OHB

NIESA

657

658

659 SYLVIA L. COPELAND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/NESA (ALSO ACTING D/NESA)
ROOM 6P01, NHB

660 DD/NESA/PRODUCTION FILE
NESA/PRODUCTION FILE
ROOM 6F0128, NHB

661 - 666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673 [redacted]

APLAA

674 VAUGHN F. BISHOP
DIRECTOR/APLAA
ROOM 5E66, OHB

675 DD/APLAA/RESEARCH DIRECTOR/PCS
APLAA/

RESEARCH DIRECTOR/PCS
ROOM 6021, NHB

OREA

676 PETER A. CLEMENT
RUSSIA ISSUE MANAGER
ROOM 4E60, OHB

677 MARY F. DESJEANS
D/OREA
ROOM 4E60, OHB

678 [redacted]

679

680

681

[redacted]

OTI

682 TODD J. EGELAND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES DD/OTI
ROOM 4W03, NHB

683 DAVID F. GORDON
DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES (D/OTI)
ROOM 4W03, NHB

WINPAC

684 - 685 [redacted]

686 - 690

691

692

693

694

695 ALAN A. FOLEY

DIRECTOR/WINPAC
ROOM 5P0102, NHB

696

697

698

699

CNC

700

CTC

701

702

703

JOHN PHILIP MUDD
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS/CTC
(CTC/OTA)
ROOM 1D4107, NHB

CIC

704

705

NIMA/POPPZ-STOP N-29

706 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4C930, BLDG 213

707 - 711 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
BLDG 213

NCIX

712 [redacted]
C/NCIX/AG/CIA
ROOM 3S28, PLAZA A

713 [redacted]
(ACTING) NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE (NCIX)
ROOM 3S28, PLAZA A

DCI REP - JCS

714 [redacted]
DCI REP TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E921, THE PENTAGON

715 [redacted]
DEPUTY DCI REP TO THE JOINT STAFF

ROOM 2E1017, STRATEGIC PLANS & POLICY J-5, PENTAGON

DDO

716 JAMES L. PAVITT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROOM 7E30, OHB

717

718

719

720

721

722 STEVEN R. KAPPES
ADDO
ROOM 7E30, OHB

723

724

725

726

IOC

727

IOC

728

DDS&T

729

730 DONALD (DON) M. KERR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR DDS&T
ROOM 6E80, VIA DDS&T REGISTRY - ROOM 6E45, OHB

731

NIMA LANGLEY

732

SIO IMAGERY

ROOM 4G00, OHB

733 [redacted]
C/NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

734 [redacted]
NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

735 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

736 [redacted]
C/NPIC[redacted]
ROOM 5G20, OHB

737 [redacted]
NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 4G20, OHB

738 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4G00, OHB

739 [redacted]
DIRECTOR OFFICE OFCOUNTER TERRORISM/NIMA
ROOM 4G20, OHB

NIMA REGISTRY

740 [redacted]
C/NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 6N200 MAIL STOP N-22, BLDG 213

741 [redacted]
NIMA[redacted]
ROOM 4S100, BLDG 213 WNY

742 [redacted]
C/NIMA[redacted]

ROOM 3C805 MAIL STOP N-62, BLDG 213

743 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 3C525, BUILDING 213

744 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
WNY N-28, WNY

745 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
ROOM 3C805, BUILDING 213

746 [redacted]
DC/NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4S1300,MAILSTOP N-66, BLDG 213

747 JOANNE O. ISHAM
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NIMA
ROOM 2N2, NIMA MAIL STOP D-100

748 [redacted]
NIMA/[redacted]
ROOM 4C830, MAIL STOP N-28, BLDG 213

749 [redacted]
CHIEF, NIMA OPERATIONS CENTER, BETHESDA, MD.
ROOM 377, ERSKINE HALL

NIMA–STOP N-28

750 [redacted]
ROOM 4C830, WNY, MAILSTOP N-28

FBI/SSC

751 - 758 DDS&T/FBIS/[redacted]
FBIS/[redacted]
ROOM 2N18, RCC-B

759 [redacted]
DS&T/FBIS [redacted]
ROOM 1, BLDG 480

760 [redacted]
C/FBIS [redacted]
ROOM 2N03, RCC-B

JAEIC

761 [redacted]
JAEIC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 102, TECH 1 BLDG

DCI REP - CENTCOM (MACDILL) -

762 - 771 [redacted]
DCI REP TO CENTCOM (MACDILL)
POUCH

DCI REP -

772 [redacted]

DCI REP - NORTHCOM (COLORADO SPRINGS)

773 - 792 [redacted]
DCI REP TO NORTHCOM (COLORADO SPRINGS)
ROOM 322, BLDG 1470 PETERSON AFB, COLORADO SPRINGS, CO.
80914-3030

DCI REP - PACOM (HONOLULU)

793 [redacted]
DCI REP TO PACOM(HONOLULU)
POUCH

DCI REP - SOUTHCOM (DADE)

794 [redacted]
DCI REP TO SOUTHCOM(DADE)
POUCH

DCI REP - TRANSCOM (SCOTT)

795 - 796 [redacted]
DCI REP, TRANSCOM (SCOTT)
POUCH

[redacted]

797 [redacted]
SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER (SSO/TCO/GCO/BCO/LCO)
ROOM A030, BLDG. 4505, REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898

INTERNATION POINT ISC

798 - 799 [redacted]
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM/CIO/MS/IRRG/SCD
ROOM 2E30, IP BUILDING

OVERSEAS

800 - 801 [redacted]

802 - 803

804 - 805

CIO/HQS

806 - 807

808 ALAN C. WADE, JR.
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
ROOM 7D00, OHB

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, SENATOR RON WYDEN, SENATOR BAYH, AND SENATOR WHITEHOUSE

The Committee's report on the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments on post-war Iraq reveals that there was a steady flow of cautionary judgments sent to senior policy officials in the Bush Administration warning that securing the peace in Iraq would be difficult and success uncertain.

The most chilling and prescient warning from the Intelligence Community prior to the war was that the American invasion would bring about instability in Iraq that would be exploited by Iran and al-Qa'ida terrorists.

Iran's role in providing lethal assistance to insurgents has directly led to the deaths of American military personnel and Tehran continues to work behind the scenes to undermine the Baghdad government and allied reconstruction efforts.

America's prolonged presence in Iraq, the Intelligence Community correctly assessed, has allowed al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to take advantage of the security vacuum in-country and to increase their attacks against Americans with deadly results.

Prior to sending troops to Iraq, the Bush Administration promoted the terrorist nexus between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (and the attacks of 9/11) as a central part of its case to the American people that Iraq posed an imminent threat that only military action could extinguish, despite the Intelligence Community's view that Iraq and al-Qa'ida viewed each other with suspicion and were not operationally linked.

What the Administration also kept from the American people were the sobering intelligence assessments it received at the time warning that the post-war transition could allow al-Qa'ida to establish the presence in Iraq and opportunity to strike at Americans it did not have prior to the invasion.

The tragic consequences of the Administration's unwillingness to heed the pre-war judgments of the Intelligence Community are not limited to the borders of Iraq. Intelligence assessments that a U.S.-led defeat and occupation of Iraq would fuel anti-Western Islamist extremism and be used by terrorist groups as a propaganda tool to engender support and build their ranks have been proven out. So too has the following January 2003 Intelligence Community judgment:

> Al-Qa'ida – which has not given up its fight in Afghanistan – probably would try to step up its efforts to re-establish its presence there while the United States was diverted with concerns in postwar Iraq.

The wide-distribution of these pre-war Intelligence Community assessments within the White House, the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense and State (Appendix D of the report) removes any doubt that these warnings were received at the highest levels of the Administration.

The Committee is unable to answer the question as to whether the President personally was presented with the Intelligence Community's informed judgments about the factors that could prevent success from being achieved in Iraq. What can be said with greater certainty is that these pre-war cautions were marginalized if not ignored by an Administration set on going to war.

In doing so, the Bush Administration once again demonstrated its practice of cherry-picking intelligence reports and assessments that supported policy objectives and denigrating or dismissing those which did not.

This practice of misusing intelligence is not an academic matter. It is a matter of life, death, and the security of our Nation. These and other missteps of the Bush Administration have led to increased violence in Iraq, a resurgent al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, and a worsening spread of anti-American extremism around the world.

Additional Views of Senator Dianne Feinstein

I voted to support the Phase II report, "Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq" for what it contains. Unfortunately, what the report *does not* contain is even more important. I believe that the report could have, and should have, been much stronger and more direct on the quality and use of prewar intelligence.

In particular, the report should have included a conclusion that the quality of the prewar assessments was generally high and that many of the predictions made by the Intelligence Community (IC) about postwar Iraq proved to be correct. There should also have been a conclusion that although policymakers had access to these assessments – as well as additional assessments conducted during the combat phase of the war and immediate aftermath – they failed to take steps to prevent or lessen postwar challenges.

What the Report Says

The primary value that this report adds is that it releases declassified versions of the two coordinated intelligence assessments conducted before the March 19, 2003, invasion of Iraq (these Intelligence Community Assessments, or ICAs, are Appendices A and B to the Committee's report). Readers will be able to determine for themselves whether the Intelligence Community provided reasonable and accurate predictions of the postwar situation and, more importantly, warnings about the challenges that lay ahead. Coupled with the distribution lists for the ICAs, contained in Appendix D, the public will be able to understand how policymakers at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department who received the ICAs incorporated (or failed to incorporate) the intelligence into their postwar plans.

The "conclusions" presented in the report only serve to summarize the judgments made in the two ICAs. The Committee, in fact, has not done any analysis or *concluded* anything. This is in stark contrast to the July 2004 "Phase I" report and the two prior Phase II reports in which the Committee studied the facts and rendered its own judgments.

I am troubled that, even after analysis was removed from the report in an effort to forge unanimous support, a significant portion of the Committee's members did not support the final product.

Quality and Accuracy of Intelligence

In the 26 months since its February 12, 2004 decision to write this report, the Committee has reviewed scores of prewar assessments on postwar Iraq and conducted numerous interviews with intelligence officials, analysts, and customers. Separately, elements of the IC have produced hundreds, if not thousands, of reports on the security and stability of post-war Iraq. In short, the Committee has ample information available to draw upon in order to make conclusions about the quality and accuracy of the prewar assessments about postwar Iraq.

Therefore, the first conclusion I submit in these additional views has to do with the accuracy of prewar assessments and the quality of the underlying intelligence tradecraft.

Additional Conclusion 1: Quality and Accuracy of Analysis

The Intelligence Community produced and disseminated numerous assessments and predictions on the postwar environment prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, both in response to requests from across the U.S. Government and at its own initiative. These prewar assessments generally followed sound tradecraft and provided important and timely warnings about the difficulties in the postwar period of establishing a cohesive, democratic government and of avoiding significant levels of violence in Iraqi society. To a large extent, these assessments were borne out in actual postwar developments, as described by the December 2006 Iraq Study Group Report and the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate – in striking contrast to what the Committee found when comparing prewar analysis of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction with postwar findings.

I fully agreed with the Committee's first Iraq intelligence report, in which we found that the WMD intelligence was both bad and wrong. That is, it was the result of flawed intelligence analytic tradecraft (bad) and also reached the wrong conclusions – that Saddam had and was developing

WMD (wrong). It is thus important to note that the prewar assessments on postwar Iraq, which were done during the same period as the disastrous October 2002 Iraq NIE, were generally good and right.

This conclusion is shared by the "Kerr Study Group," named for its head, former Deputy CIA Director Kerr. The Group's report noted, "Intelligence produced prior to the war on a wide range of other issues [other than WMD] accurately addressed such topics .... Indeed, intelligence assessments on post-Saddam issues were particularly insightful. These and many other topics were thoroughly examined in a variety of intelligence products that have proven to be largely accurate."[1]

I would draw readers' attention to the conclusions in the Committee's report, each of which summarizes the IC's assessments on a particular topic prior to the war. Even though the assessments were not informed by intelligence collection, the IC's judgments on democracy, terrorism, domestic conflict, political Islam, Iran's views and actions (both as they pertain to Iraq and to WMD), and security have been borne out by events.

The most important judgment was exactly right – that building "an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process."

In short, the Intelligence Community presented a reasonable and compelling picture of the host of difficulties the U.S. would face after deposing Saddam Hussein. This point should not be left unstated.

Use of Intelligence

A more troubling aspect of prewar assessments on postwar Iraq was the extent to which they were ignored by policymakers. Again, this area stands in marked contrast to the prewar experience on Iraq WMD. The President, Vice President, and Cabinet leaders pored through the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and regularly used the intelligence to support public statements. In the rare occasion that Administration officials addressed the postwar environment, their statements tended to ignore or directly contradict the IC's views.

---

[1] *Studies in Intelligence,* on July 29, 2004, 48. (Richard Kerr, et al, *Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community,* July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)

Moreover, major policy decisions, including the number of troops needed after the initial combat phase and the extent of de-Baathification in the government and security forces, flatly ignored the assessments and recommendations of intelligence officials. Similarly, intelligence recommendations to actively engage Iraq's neighbors, especially Iran, in the postwar period were dismissed. These are the basis for the second conclusion I propose:

Additional Conclusion 2: Use of Intelligence

The Committee has seen no evidence that government officials and decisionmakers appropriately considered and prepared for the difficulties in the postwar environment that were predicted by the Intelligence Community. The failure to act on this intelligence is a key contributing factor to the current situation in Iraq.

In the absence of Committee discussion on this matter, I wish to associate myself with the findings of the two "internal" reviews of prewar intelligence:

First, the Kerr Study Group wrote that "Intelligence projections in this area [analysis of post-Saddam Iraq], however, although largely accurate, had little or no impact on policy deliberation."[2]

Second, the report from the DCI-directed study of lessons learned noted that "Intelligence assessments on postwar political, security, and economic issues were not effectively exploited. Analysts deferred some needed work on irregular Iraqi units and in-depth study of some postwar challenges due to lack of personnel. Assessments that indicated that the war's aftermath could be difficult or costly were largely ignored."

The DCI Lessons Learned report went on to say that "Intelligence Community assessments and recommendations on problematic postwar issues had little impact on transition planning. A variety of interagency discussions and Intelligence Community assessments during 2002-03 identified potential postwar problems in Iraq. However, these assessments

[2] *Studies in Intelligence,* on July 29, 2004, 48. (Richard Kerr, et al, *Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community,* July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)

failed to capture policymakers' attention."[3]

I am pleased that the Committee has completed this aspect of its Phase II investigation and will allow the public to reach their own informed judgments on the quality and accuracy of prewar assessments on postwar Iraq. The use of these assessments – or better put, the lack of use of them – to determine policy in the postwar period is self-evident. It is disappointing that the Committee did not address these issues in the underlying report.

[3] *The DCI's Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq*, 11 February 2005, iv.

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND JOINED BY SENATORS WARNER, HATCH, AND BURR

On July 9, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its unanimous report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, now referred to as Phase I. The Phase I report outlined the findings of the Committee's year long inquiry in extensive detail, which provided needed information to the Congress, the Administration, the Intelligence Community, and the public about how the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was flawed so deeply. The report also provided conclusions which offered insights and guidance that led the way toward needed intelligence reform. The report was a major accomplishment, coming at a time of increasingly divisive partisan rancor about the Iraq war and intelligence related to Iraq, yet it managed to draw unanimous support and provided meaningful oversight. We believe that the Committee's Phase I report was necessary, thorough and instructive for the Intelligence Community, and we believe that it was conducted in a completely bi-partisan fashion.

Unfortunately, the "Prewar Assessments About Postwar Iraq" report released today as part of "Phase II" of the Committee's investigation does not meet the standard set by the Committee's Phase I inquiry. While we are happy that the release of this report has put the Committee one step closer to finally ending Phase II and to moving on to more pressing issues of intelligence oversight, we are disappointed with the content of the report itself. The Committee staff worked diligently in an attempt to narrow the Committee's differences, and both sides made numerous accommodations and compromises in an effort to achieve an accurate and meaningful report that both sides could support. In the end, however, producing a report that could reflect all of the members' views without alienating some proved too challenging. The Phase II inquiry has become too embroiled in politics and partisanship to meet this challenge. Unfortunately, this vindicates the views of those of us who voted to conduct Phase II only as an accommodation to certain Committee members but who believed that it was a bad idea to begin with.

We firmly believe that the work of this Committee should be focused on improving our Intelligence Community and holding it accountable so that the American people receive the best protection possible from the myriad of threats we face today. We do not see how the Phase II investigation is

accomplishing these goals. Due to the partisan nature of Phase II, we believe that the Committee should quickly conclude this nearly four year investigation which has bogged us down and move on to more pressing matters of intelligence oversight. Our enemies will not wait while we take time to use subjective arguments based on cherry-picked intelligence for political gain. In the case of this report, it was near completion in November of last year when with the change in majority of the Committee placed the report on hold. The Committee then rewrote and significantly abridged the report, and now seven months later we are releasing it. There are still two remaining reports that the Committee has not acted on, and we urge the Committee to complete them or to deem them completed (particularly in regard to those matters being investigated extensively in open forum by other Senate Committees), as soon as possible so that we can return to meaningful and productive intelligence oversight.

We had many concerns about this report, some of which we were willing to set aside in the spirit of compromise. One of our concerns, for example, was that we believe this report exaggerates the significance of the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments about postwar Iraq. Because collected intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing these assessments, they were based largely on the regional and country expertise of intelligence analysts and outside experts. As a member of the Kerr study group described it, "it's speculation based on informed analysis." While the Intelligence Community's assessments on post-war Iraq likely served as useful tools for policy makers and military planners, it was only one of several useful tools available to them. Other tools included outside academics and experts, media reports, and policy makers' and military planners' own education and experience. The lack of a unique intelligence fact base behind the Intelligence Community's assessments means they were no more authoritative than the many other educated opinions that were available in the same time frame.

The chief author of the two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs), *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq* and *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq* (contained in Appendices A and B of this report), testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 2002 that when it came to predicting the development of democracy in Iraq, the lack of intelligence reporting meant that the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee "who know from first-hand experience what it takes to make our democracy work, probably have at least as much basis for

trusting your judgment on such things as those of us who are intelligence analysts have for trusting ours." We agree, and believe that this principle also extends to other disciplines relevant to post-war Iraq, such as military and economic matters.

We also believe that the structure of the report is inadequate. The report is composed of a five page introduction, followed by six pages of conclusions, with several appendices. None of the sections, not even the conclusions, offer any investigative insights. Rather, they merely restate select portions of the Intelligence Community's analysis in two of the Intelligence Community's assessments about postwar Iraq. Since the "conclusions" are immediately followed in the report by the two assessments, which were largely declassified, it is unclear what purpose the conclusions serve.

We requested that the conclusions provide some value to the reader by offering the Committee's judgments regarding whether the Intelligence Community's assessments were accurate or inaccurate. We proposed that each conclusion discuss the accuracy of the Intelligence Community's judgments and proposed the following introductory conclusion:

> **The Intelligence Community outlined a range of potential challenges an occupying force would likely face in postwar Iraq and in the region, many of which have occurred in Iraq. Some assessed challenges did not occur or occurred in ways that differed from the assessments. For some assessments, even five years into the Iraq conflict, it remains too early to determine the ultimate end result.** The Intelligence Community faced a challenging task in attempting to assess likely events in postwar Iraq, events that would depend, in part, on the events of the war itself that would be driven by the actions of the US military and 26 million Iraqis. The Intelligence Community also lacked intelligence reporting on postwar Iraq and based its analysis, therefore, on the regional and country expertise of Intelligence Community analysts and outside experts. Considering these factors, analysts performed well in outlining a range of potential postwar challenges, many of which have occurred in postwar Iraq. Some assessed challenges did not occur or occurred in ways that differed from the assessments and some challenges were not predicted. It is important to note that, although this report treats the removal of Saddam Hussein from power as the

"end" of the war, in reality, the war is not over and events in Iraq, as well as our understanding of those events, continue to evolve. It will likely be many years before we know the end result of several of these issues.

We were also concerned that the conclusions highlighted only certain issues from two ICAs, *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq* and *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq*. By selecting only those issues for the conclusions that seem to be important now, the conclusions distort the picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003, creating the impression that the issues in the conclusions were the exact issues which policymakers should have focused on in the prewar period. In reality, policymakers would have had to sift through many Intelligence Community assessments that now seem irrelevant to pick out what we now know is important. We believe Roberta Wohlstetter's account of Pearl Harbor offers insight into this analogous post-war intelligence assessing when she writes:

> "It is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings. It comes to the observer embedded in an atmosphere of 'noise,' i.e., in the company of all sorts of information that is useless and irrelevant for predicting the particular disaster." Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 387.

While we knew that finding areas of agreement on such conclusions would be difficult, we believed that the Committee had an obligation to work to find areas in which we could offer something meaningful. Although we attempted to accommodate the majority as much as possible in order to ultimately vote for this report, enough of what we communicated as our "redline" issues were not adequately addressed to the point of our being able to vote in support of the report. Two of the more significant issues are as follows:

<u>Insurgency</u>

The Committee refused to include a conclusion that said the Intelligence Community did not highlight an insurgency as a potential challenge in postwar Iraq. We believe that if the Committee intended to

select certain judgments from the two ICAs to discuss in the conclusions, it was equally important to discuss any issues that the Intelligence Community did not highlight as a potential challenge in postwar Iraq. The insurgency is one such issue. Considering that an insurgency has become a major development in post-war Iraq, it was important to note the scarcity of its appearance in pre-war assessments.

While the last line on the last page of the Intelligence assessment, *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq*, noted that "rogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces," this was not discussed in any further detail, was not highlighted in either ICA and was not included among the six pages of key judgments in the two papers. If the Intelligence Community had meant to foreshadow or point to an insurgency anywhere near the scale of what we observe today in Iraq, then not only would they have included this point as a key judgment, they would have highlighted it as the first key judgment.

Our interest in a conclusion outlining this issue was not to suggest that the Intelligence Community failed or that an insurgency was even foreseeable, rather it was to ensure that the Committee not did distort the picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003 by highlighting only those Intelligence Community assessments that have occurred in postwar Iraq.

To the extent that Intelligence Community assessments concerning post-war Iraq were accurate, they were certainly not a "crystal ball." Many of the warnings lacked detail or specificity that would have guided policymakers and military planners. For example, in terms of how Iraqis would react to a coalition invasion of Iraq, the Intelligence Community's assessments ranged from judgments stating that segments of Iraqi society (particularly the Shia) would welcome the intervention, to ambivalence, to non-violent opposition, to some level of violent opposition. Most assessments warned that a "long" or "prolonged" occupation of Iraq would have a negative effect on Iraqi attitudes toward the Coalition, but few of them defined even broadly what "long" or "prolonged" meant.

It is also important to keep in mind those Intelligence Community assessments produced before the war which did not discuss or warn. No assessments described the possibility of the use of Improvised Explosive

Devices (IEDs) against coalition troops after the war. There was also no discussion of the large number of ammunition dumps in Iraq and the monumental volume of artillery shells that they contained, and how these shells might be used as IEDs against our troops. Similarly, in the prewar assessments discussion of possible al Qa'ida attacks or sectarian tensions, there is no discussion or warning of how spectacular attacks by al Qa'ida on targets like markets or the Samara Mosque might be used to spark and fuel sectarian conflict.

Again, our interest in highlighting these issues is not to suggest that the Intelligence Community failed or that these threats were necessarily foreseeable, rather it was to ensure that the Committee did not distort the picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003.

ICA Distribution List

Our second major concern was the last minute inclusion of 81 pages of named individuals to whom the ICAs were distributed (Appendix D), a troubling departure from past Committee practice. In past reports, both Phase I and Phase II, the Committee chose wisely to leave out the names of individuals who were not department heads or cabinet level officials. Even in cases when the individual had a very public role in certain events, the Committee referred to individuals by title only. This prevented either side from engaging in the temptation to use individuals' names to score political or personal points. The inclusion of Appendix D in the Committee's report without adequate, contextual comment is misleading, because the names on such lists are typically either the principals, staff heads or security managers of a governmental office and there is no way to ensure whether the individuals named on the distribution list actually read the documents sent to their office. Most offices receive thousands of documents and the individual listed as the recipient rarely sees, reads, or even knows about a number of documents sent to them, therefore we cannot infer that because one's name appears on the distribution list that the named individual personally received and/or read the document.

More importantly, a cursory review of the 81 pages of names on these two distribution lists reveals significant errors and misleading information. For example, one intelligence official who is listed as a recipient of the two January 2003 ICAs had left that position five months before the ICA's were published, while another individual is listed as serving in the wrong office.

The document also lists as recipients security directors who are responsible for controlling and distributing these documents, not reading or assessing them. These obvious problems lead us to wonder, what else is incomplete or misleading about this list? Who else is listed that was not an actual consumer of these documents? Who else had left their jobs or gone on a temporary assignment not related to issues concerning Iraq at the time these documents were disseminated? Who was on family or medical leave at the time these documents were disseminated? With the continual coming and going of officials in government, the Intelligence Community does not constantly maintain an accurate list of 81 pages of recipient names, and for the Intelligence Community it is not the names of the individuals that is most important, rather that Intelligence Community products are sent to particular offices throughout the government where numerous individuals in those offices are assigned as action officers to read, digest and summarize them to their principals. One of the reasons we voted to strike the distribution list from the Committee's report was that no one has checked these names to make sure they are an accurate representation of who actually received and had a chance to read these two documents in January 2003. We brought this information to the attention of the Committee arguing that at least we should not release the list before we fact-checked it ourselves; to do so would be to present false and/or inaccurate information to the public and would constitute sloppy work.

We also conveyed our view to the Committee that including such a list adds no value in assessing pre-war intelligence assessments about post-war Iraq, which is supposedly the focus of this report. Unfortunately, the response we received from a number of supporters of this amendment was that Phase II is about policy makers. That simply is untrue, this report is supposed to be about "pre-war assessments about post-war Iraq," not about policy makers, and adding this list evidences a partisan motivation behind the report.

It was most unfortunate that the Majority not only rejected amendments to exclude the names of these government officials, but furthermore by party line vote also rejected mentioning that both the Senate and House Intelligence Committee's received these two reports and rejected including the names of the members of those Committees. For those who believed that this report should be about policy makers, one would think that including our names on this list would comport with such a position. Amazingly, however, in a strictly party-line vote, the Committee voted

against adding the names of our Members to the list. It is astounding to me that the Committee would vote to conceal effectively the names of the members of this Committee from an allegedly exhaustive list of the distribution of the ICAs. What possible reason could there be for concealing the names of the Members of Congress? We believe this vote is one of the most hypocritical measures we have witnessed in our time on the Committee. If the Committee is releasing a lengthy list with the perception that it is exhaustive, then our names should appear on this list too since we received these documents.

Furthermore, what purpose does the inclusion of 81 pages of names in the Committee's report serve? Is it because Scooter Libby is on page one? Or is it because Douglas Feith is on page 15? It seems clear to us that our colleagues who voted to include the distribution list want to suggest that everyone on this list read and ignored the judgments that things were going to difficult in postwar Iraq. If the Committee members believed it was so important to know whether certain policymakers read these reports and what actions they took based on them, they should have asked for interviews. We assume instead that they will make accusations that certain policymakers "ignored" these assessments without affording those individuals the opportunity to defend themselves.

Such a practice reminds us of an unclassified article titled Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community, published on July 29, 2004 by the "Kerr study group," where the group claimed that IC analysis of postwar Iraq "rested on little hard information, was informed largely by strong regional and country expertise developed over time, and yet was on the mark. Intelligence projections in this area, however, although largely accurate, had little or no impact on policy deliberations." When interviewed by Committee staff, however, the Kerr group said they had no specific knowledge of prewar policy deliberations concerning postwar Iraq. The said they came to their conclusions about the impact of intelligence assessments on policy deliberations solely by reviewing the logs of questions that the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) team sent back to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Kerr study group members stated that the lack of questions could also indicate that policy makers read and accepted its judgments without having to ask questions. The Kerr study group members also noted that the log only captures questions that the briefers thought were important or those that could not be answered on the spot by the briefer.

The Kerr study group also told Committee staff that the PDB question logs were only one channel of communication between policymakers and the IC. For example, one of the study group members told Committee staff that:

> . . . we don't know how people reacted to each of these documents. And it's important again to realize that we looked at the written, finished product, not telephone calls to CENTCOM and not [the DCI's] briefings to the President, and not somebody's briefing, what they actually said to the Secretary of Defense that day on that piece of information. Unless there was something written about it, we didn't see it.

The Kerr study group also told Committee staff that in producing this report, they did not conduct any interviews, and like the Committee's report, they did not examine any of the raw intelligence reports underlying the finished assessments.

Another report that alleged that policymakers "ignored" intelligence assessments was the February 11, 2005 report to Congress titled, *The DCI's Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq*. The authors of this report also based their judgment on the lack of feedback from policymakers on the Intelligence Community products that discussed postwar Iraq. When asked specifically what policymakers the report was referring to, one of the authors said "virtually everyone" and noted specifically that neither the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence nor the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence provided any feedback or asked any questions about these documents. Does this mean that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence "ignored" intelligence assessments that things were going to be difficult in postwar Iraq?

While we certainly dispute the authors' contention that simply because the Committee members did not formally provide questions about these documents that we "ignored" them, such an accusation makes the Committee's refusal to include our own names in the distribution list all the more ironic. This vote, more than any other vote, unfortunately confirmed nagging suspicions concerning the partisan nature of the Committee's Phase II reports which appear to be aimed at assaulting the current Administration. It is our contention that our Committee would do well to put the partisan

chapter of using intelligence oversight for politics behind us, and move forward to the pressing, and numerous, issues that are facing the Intelligence Community and our nation today. The stakes are too high to spin our wheels in political endeavors. We look forward to joining our colleagues in engaging in the serious issues facing our country today, and we trust that soon enough we can focus the full resources of this Committee back on such issues in bi-partisan fashion. The country deserves no less from us.

CHRISTOPHER "KIT" BOND
JOHN WARNER
ORRIN G. HATCH
RICHARD BURR

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND
JOINED BY
SENATORS HATCH AND BURR

While not directly related to the subject of the report released today, it is appropriate here to discuss some additional information that has come to light about an earlier prewar inquiry report by the Committee in July 2004 called "Phase I" that deals with the Iraq-Niger uranium intelligence. This section of the Committee report remains one of the most thoroughly investigated and detailed descriptions of the events and intelligence surrounding the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The Committee devoted nearly 50 pages of the report to this section alone, in order to provide all of the details of the Intelligence Community's handling of this issue – from October 2001 when the Intelligence Community produced the first intelligence report on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal to July 2003 when the CIA finally produced an assessment that said, "we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad."[1]

The vast majority of the Committee's findings were declassified and released in the July 2004 *Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.* It is important to note that while the Committee's report was over 500 pages and covered many issues, the content was reviewed by all members of the Committee in great detail and was voted out unanimously. Nonetheless, nearly three years after the report's release it is apparent that some "experts" and commentators still seem to misunderstand, or choose to ignore, the basic facts surrounding this case. Additional information that became public during the Special Prosecutor's investigation of the Valerie Wilson leak case, some of which had not been provided to the Committee during its investigation, has only reinforced the Committee's findings.

Part of the continuing public and media misunderstanding of this case stems, we believe, from a letter sent to the Committee by former Ambassador Joseph Wilson in July 2004 and subsequently released publicly,

---

[1] There are two areas of the Iraq-Niger uranium story which were not covered in the Committee's inquiry. The first area was the source of the forged Iraq-Niger uranium deal documents passed to the US government in October 2002. This issue was being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the request of then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller. The second area was the exposure of Valerie Wilson's affiliation with the CIA, which was investigated by a special prosecutor.

and from public comments and testimony from Ambassador Wilson and his wife, Valerie Wilson, asserting that the Committee's report contained errors and distortions. We take these charges seriously and believe it is important to outline information, new and old, that explains some of the key issues and supports the Committee's findings.

In July 2004, Ambassador Wilson sent a letter to the Committee in which he declared "not true" a conclusion in additional views of the Chairman and Senators Bond and Hatch that:

> **The plan to send the former ambassador to Niger was suggested by the former ambassador's wife, a CIA employee.**

In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson took issue with this conclusion although similar text was included in the body of the Committee's unanimous report. (p. 39.) Ambassador Wilson asserted that the Committee's finding appeared to be based on a quoted portion of a memo sent from his wife to her superior that says "My husband has good relations with the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity" (p. 39 of the Committee's report.) Ambassador Wilson claims in his letter that this memo shows no suggestion that he be sent on the trip and is "little more than a recitation of his contacts and bona fides." This is not true. The Committee did not release the full text of the document, thinking it was unnecessary in light of the other evidence we provided in the report, but considering the controversy surrounding this document, making the full text available now seems prudent.

~~SECRET~~

12 February 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

FROM: [Valerie Wilson]

OFFICE: DO/CP/[office 1]

SUBJECT: Iraq-related Nuclear Report Makes a Splash

REFERENCE:

The report forwarded below has prompted me to send this on to you and request your comments and opinion. Briefly, it seems that Niger has signed a contract with Iraq to sell them uranium. The IC is getting spun up about this for obvious reasons. The Embassy in Niamey has taken the position that this report can't be true – they have such cozy relations with the GON that they would know if something like this transpired.

So, where do I fit in? As you may recall [redacted] of CP/[office 2] recently [2001] approached my husband to possibly use his contacts in Niger to investigate [redacted] [a separate Niger matter]. After many fits and starts, [redacted] finally advised that the Station wished to pursue this with liaison. My husband is willing to help if it makes sense, but no problem if not. End of story.

Now, with this report, it is clear that the IC is still wondering what is going on... my husband has good relationships with both the PM and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity. To be frank with you, I was somewhat embarrassed by the Agency's sloppy work last go round and I am hesitant to suggest anything again. However, [my husband] may be in a position to assist. Therefore, request your thoughts on what, if anything to pursue here. Thank you for your time on this.

~~SECRET~~

(end memo)

The report mentioned in the opening sentence was a February 5, 2002 CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) intelligence report describing "verbatim text" of a reported Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. The report was forwarded in an e-mail from a CIA reports officer to Mrs. Wilson and a number of other recipients which said that the DO had received a number of calls from the Intelligence Community about the Iraq-Niger uranium report, citing the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and SOCOM, specifically. This likely prompted Mrs. Wilson's comment that "the IC is getting spun up about this for obvious reasons." There was no mention in either the reports officer's e-mail or in Ms. Wilson's memo (also sent via e-mail) of a request from the Vice President about this matter.

This is significant because the CIA originally told the Committee, and Ambassador and Mrs. Wilson have stated publicly, that it was a question from the Vice President that prompted CIA's Counterproliferation Division (CIA/CPD) to discuss ways to obtain additional information about the reporting. However, the Committee now knows, based on information released during the Scooter Libby trial, that the Vice President had not even asked about the Iraq-Niger uranium deal until the following day.

Evidence from the Libby trial, numbered exhibit DX66.2, includes a tasking from the Vice President to his CIA briefer which indicates that after being shown a DIA assessment about the February 5, 2002 DO report, the Vice President asked for CIA's assessment (nb: not an investigation) of the matter. The date of the briefing is noted as February 13, 2002, the day after Mrs. Wilson's memo to her superiors.

While it may be possible that the Vice President's query is what led to the ultimate decision to use Ambassador Wilson to attempt to uncover additional information about the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal, it is clear from the dates of these two documents that CIA/CPD was discussing ways to seek additional information, including the possibility of using Ambassador Wilson to look into the deal, before the Vice President asked about the reporting.

Additional information also supports the Committee's finding that Mrs. Wilson is the one who originally suggested Ambassador Wilson to look into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter. Page 39 of the Committee's Phase I report noted that a CIA/CPD reports officer told the Committee staff that Mrs. Wilson "offered up" her husband's name. In Ambassador Wilson's letter to the Committee he claims that "the reports officer has a different conclusion about Valerie's role than the one offered in the "additional views." In recent public testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Mrs. Wilson has also claimed that a memorandum from the reports officer written after he read the Committee's report "absolutely" contradicts the report, that he sought to be reinterviewed by the Committee, and that his words has been "twisted and distorted" by the Committee. None of these claims are true.

Committee staff had the opportunity to review the reports officers' "memorandum" (actually a letter addressed to Mrs. Wilson but apparently never sent) which says only that the reports officer's remarks about Ambassador Wilson's trip were "truncated" in the Committee's report. He cited two specific issues that the Committee did not include: his comments that he believed Mrs. Wilson had acted appropriately and that the reports officer "pushed for the trip" himself. The reports officer's letter does not say that the Committee twisted or distorted his words, does not contradict the Committee's finding that Mrs. Wilson is the one who suggested her husband, does not retract his comments to the Committee that she "offered up" her husband's name, and does not state that he would like to be re-interviewed by the Committee. Based on information and documents made available to the Committee, we have no reason to believe that the reports officer sought to be re-interviewed or that CIA prevented him from being re-interviewed.

The Committee interviewed nearly 300 people for the Phase I report and most interviews averaged between one to two hours. The Committee staff interviewed this reports officer for nearly an hour and a half. Obviously not all of his remarks, nor the entirety of the remarks of the other several hundred interviewees, could or needed to be included in the report. The Committee believed, as we still do, that the comment quoted in the report in response to a question about any substantive role Mrs. Wilson played in her husband's trip to Niger in 2002 accurately summarized his remarks. The reports officer's full remarks about the issue were:

> Let me speak to what I know of where she is substantively involved. She offered up his name as a possibility, because we were – we didn't have much in the way of other resources to try and get at this problem, to the best of my knowledge. And so whenever she offered up his name it seemed like a logical thing to do. I didn't make the decision to send him, but I certainly agreed with it, I recommended that he should go.

He later added:

> I'd like to state emphatically that, from what I've seen, Val Wilson has been the consummate professional through all this. From the very start, whenever she mentioned to me and some others that her husband had experience and was willing to travel but that she would have to step away from the operation because she couldn't be involved in the decisionmaking to send him, in [his] debriefing, [in] dissem[inating] the report and those kinds of things, because it could appear as a conflict of interest.

The Committee report never stated or implied that Mrs. Wilson's suggestion to her colleagues that her husband may be able to look into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter was inappropriate in any way, obviating the need to include the reports officer's comments that her role was "professional." In fact, a conclusion on page 25 of the Phase I report noted that "the Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available."

In addition, the Committee report noted that it was a CIA/CPD decision ultimately to send Ambassador Wilson to Niger. The Committee report never claimed that Mrs. Wilson made the decision to send him, only that she suggested him.

In addition to the memo and reports officer's testimony described above, the Committee considered Mrs. Wilson's testimony to the CIA Inspector General. The Inspector General testified before our Committee that Mrs. Wilson "made the suggestion" that Ambassador Wilson could look into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter. Additional information recently made

available to the Committee indicates that this information came from Mrs. Wilson's own testimony to the CIA Inspector General.

Yet, Mrs. Wilson testified before the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform on March 16, 2007 that, "I did not recommend him. I did not suggest him." Mrs. Wilson told the House Committee that a young junior officer in CIA/CPD received a phone call from someone in the Office of the Vice President asking about the alleged sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq. Mrs. Wilson testified that while she was talking to the junior officer, another officer heard this and suggested, "well, why don't we send Joe?"

This testimony was of great interest to us because during a nearly hour long interview with Mrs. Wilson in which Committee staff asked specifically what led CIA/CPD to think about sending someone to Niger and how it was that her husband's name came up, Mrs. Wilson never provided the story she provided to the House Committee. Rather, Mrs. Wilson told the Committee staff, "I honestly do not recall if I suggested it or my boss, who knew my husband and what he had done for us previously, my boss at the time being the head of the whole task force, during a brainstorming session suggested well, what about your husband, Ambassador Wilson, would he be willing to consider this." When asked specifically if she remembered whether she suggested her husband's name, she said "I honestly do not."

Mrs. Wilson told the CIA Inspector General that she suggested her husband for the trip, she told our Committee staff that she could not remember whether she did or her boss did, and told the House Committee, emphatically, that she did not suggest him.

Mrs. Wilson's role in her husband's trip was not limited merely to suggesting him. Notes from a State INR analyst, who participated in a February 19, 2002 meeting to discuss CIA/CPD's proposal to send Wilson to Niger, state that the meeting was "apparently convened by Valerie Wilson, a CIA WMD managerial type and the wife of Amb. Joe Wilson, with the idea that the agency and the larger USG could dispatch Joe to Niger." While Mrs. Wilson stayed at the meeting only long enough to introduce her husband, a CIA operations cable confirms the INR notes that she did convene the meeting. The cable, inviting Intelligence Community participants to the meeting, says that the "meeting was facilitated by [Mrs.

Wilson.]" According to her testimony before the House Committee, she did not tell the analysts who attended the meeting that she was under cover stating that she "believed they would have assumed as such." Apparently they did not "assume" she was under cover because the INR notes did not mark her name with a (C) as would be required to indicate that her association with the CIA was classified.

In addition, Mrs. Wilson drafted a cable that was sent overseas requesting concurrence with Ambassador Wilson's travel to Niger. While Ambassador Wilson suggested in his letter to the Committee and in his book that the question of him traveling to Niger was first broached during the February 19, 2002 meeting, the cable drafted by Mrs. Wilson was sent nearly a week earlier, on February 13, only one day after Mrs. Wilson's memo suggesting that her husband might be willing to look into the Niger matter. Interestingly the cable states that "both State and DOD have requested additional clarification [of the Niger-Iraq uranium report] and indeed, the Vice President's office just asked for background information ...." The cable was dated and time stamped 132142Z Feb 02, which is February 13, 2002 at 3:42 pm DC time. If the Vice President's office "just asked' it could not have been before Mrs. Wilson's e-mailed memo to her superior suggesting her husband for the Niger inquiry which was sent February 12, 2002.

Ambassador Wilson's implicit claim that the question of him traveling to Niger arose first at the February 19, 2002 meeting is also refuted by an intelligence memorandum provided to the Vice President on February 14, 2002 that stated that CIA had tasked a clandestine source with ties to the Nigerien government to seek additional information on the contract. Unless the CIA provided false information to the Vice President, CIA had already tasked Ambassador Wilson, the only source the CIA had other than the foreign liaison service, by the morning of February 14, 2002. In addition, Mrs. Wilson's own testimony to the Committee states that she went home and asked her husband if he would be consider looking into the Niger reporting. Contrary to Ambassador Wilson's allegations, the idea of sending him to Niger had been discussed in and among CIA officers for nearly a week before the February 19, 2002 meeting.

Ambassador Wilson's letter to the Committee stated that it is unfortunate that the Committee failed to include the CIA's position on this matter, citing press comments from "a senior CIA official" and "a senior

intelligence officer" who support Wilson's account that his wife did not propose him for the trip. We have been on this Committee long enough to know that leaks from CIA sources and unnamed senior officials do not represent CIA's official position and are certainly not the definitive word from the CIA. Furthermore, our Committee did seek an official response from the CIA. The response after conferring with CIA/CPD was "we do not recall specifically who surfaced [Ambassador Wilson's] name." Our Committee wisely chose to use the findings of the CIA Inspector General, our own interviews, and a thorough review of documents for our fact base to determine what CIA/CPD could not.

Ambassador Wilson's letter also took issue with the conclusion in the additional views of Chairman Roberts and Senators Hatch and Bond which said:

> **Rather than speaking publicly about his actual experiences during his inquiry of the Niger issue, the former ambassador seems to have included information he learned from press accounts and from his beliefs about how the Intelligence Community would have or should have handled the information he provided.**

The Committee report included several examples including his comments in a June 12, 2003 Washington Post story[2] by Walter Pincus which said, "among the envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because 'the dates were wrong and the names were wrong;'" his comments asserting that the Vice President had been briefed on his findings; and press stories, for which he appeared to be an anonymous source, that claimed his findings "debunked" the Niger-Iraq uranium story.

In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson took issue with this conclusion and asserted that his first "public statement" was in his *New York Times* op-ed on July 6, 2003.[3] He says that in this and his other public comments, he stated clearly that he never saw the documents, that he claimed "only that the transaction described in the documents that turned out to be forgeries could not have occurred and did not occur," and that he

---

[2] Pincus, Walter, "CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid," *The Washington Post,* June 12, 2003.
[3] Wilson, Joseph, "What I Didn't Find In Africa," *The New York Times*, July 6, 2003.

"never claimed to have 'debunked' the allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa."

Yet, Ambassador Wilson acknowledged to our Committee staff that he was the source of the June 12, 2003 *Washington Post* story in which he also claimed that the documents may have been forged and that the names and dates were wrong. In addition, a May 6, 2003 *New York Times* opinion piece by Nicolas Kristoff, in which Ambassador Wilson appears to be the source, says that the "envoy reported to the CIA and State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged."[4] Kristoff added that the "envoy's debunking of the forgery was passed around the administration." Perhaps Mr. Kristoff and Mr. Pincus misunderstood the Ambassador's comments, or perhaps Ambassador Wilson is making a distinction between speaking out under his own name and speaking out as an anonymous source to the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* with circulations of several million readers.

As for Ambassador Wilson's claim that he stated clearly in his *New York Times* op-ed that he did not have access to the actual memorandum that discussed the Niger-Iraq uranium deal, this is true, but not surprising. This admission came only *after* our Committee staff interviewed him and confronted him about the inconsistencies in his previous comments to reporters. It was during this interview with Committee staff that Ambassador Wilson asserted that he may have been confused about his own recollections after the International Atomic Energy Agency reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents on the documents were wrong. We agree that Ambassador Wilson is confused.

Ambassador Wilson's letter also comments on two reports disseminated in the Intelligence Community by then-Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick. One report was based on her own meeting with Nigerien officials and another based on a meeting between General Carlton Fulford, who was accompanied by the Ambassador, and the Nigerien president. Ambassador Wilson has claimed in his book and in numerous public appearances that these reports indicated that there was nothing to the Niger-Iraq uranium story. Mrs. Wilson also said this in her testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. This too is untrue.

---

[4] Kristoff, Nicholas, "Missing in Action: Truth," *New York Times*, May 6, 2003.

Contrary to these claims, then-Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick wrote a cable to State Department headquarters which said that the CIA report of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal "provides sufficient details to warrant another hard look at Niger's uranium sales." The cable reported that the Ambassador sought an unequivocal assurance from the Nigerien government that Niger would not sell uranium to rogue states. The cable noted that in September 2001 the Nigerien Prime Minister told embassy officials that "there were buyers like Iraq who would pay more for Niger's uranium than France," but added "of course Niger cannot sell to them." The Ambassador told the prime minister that such a sale would be wrong and disastrous for Niger's relations with the US. The cable said in a meeting on the 19th, Nigerien officials did not raise the issue or provide the requested assurances. The cable concluded by noting that despite past assurances from the Nigerien president that no uranium would be sold to rogue nations, "we should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway to supply Iraq with yellowcake from here" (p. 40). The cable said that while "it would seem politically suicidal for [the Prime Minister] to embark on a risky venture like uranium sales to Iraq" and "would seem out of character" for the Nigerien president, "we must make sure."

General Fulford did not undertake an inquiry into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter at all. He was encouraged by Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick to use a previously scheduled refueling stop to raise the general issue of ensuring the peaceful use of Niger's uranium with the Nigerien President. The embassy reported on February 24, 2002, that at a meeting the same day, the Nigerien President told the Ambassador and General Fulford that Niger's goal was to keep its uranium in safe hands. General Fulford extended an offer on behalf of the US government to work with Niger to ensure its uranium was used for peaceful purposes only and did not fall into the wrong hands. The Nigerien President told General Fulford that "Niger's uranium is secure for the moment" and asked for unspecified US help to ensure its safety.

Neither of these reports resolved the question of whether Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger and neither discounted the reporting. In fact, Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick's first cable raises, more than discounts, concern about the potential deal noting that "we should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway" and

providing the Prime Minister's comment that "buyers like Iraq" would pay more for Niger's uranium. The second cable did not address the alleged Iraq deal at all.

When Ambassador Wilson returned from Niger, the information he reported also did nothing to resolve the question of whether Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger, despite his claims to the contrary. The Committee interviewed every analyst involved in the analysis of this issue. These analysts told the Committee that the information from his report, if anything, merely reinforced their existing views, whatever those views were. The analysts consistently told Committee staff that they did not think the report outlining Ambassador Wilson's findings clarified the story or added a great deal of new information. For most analysts, the report lent more credibility, not less, to the reporter Niger-Iraq uranium deal. These analysts said that they were not surprised to read that Nigerien officials denied discussing uranium sales with Iraq because they had no expectation that they would admit to such discussions. These analysts did find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister acknowledged that an Iraqi delegation has visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales, according to the Committee's report.

In addition to these comments from analysts, a CIA memorandum released during the Scooter Libby trial supports the Committee's findings, noting that "no definitiveness could be assigned to the [Wilson] report."

The Committee stated on page 46 of our report that because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, the Vice President's CIA briefer did not brief the Vice President about the report. The CIA Inspector General confirmed this account in testimony before the Committee in which he stated:

> His [the Vice President's] briefer has told us that what was learned on this subject simply didn't rise to a level where it met the threshold that they would go back and give him an account even of what little was known. There being no news, they didn't take his time with it.

In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson cited several examples from the Committee's report which he said contradict a conclusion on the additional views that, for most intelligence analysts, his findings lent more credibility, not less, to the original Niger-Iraq uranium reporting. While nearly all of the citations in his letter are correctly noted as instances in which the CIA did not use the uranium reporting or said the reporting was not key to Iraq's nuclear ambitions, Ambassador Wilson is wrong in two respects. First, the conclusion that his findings lent more credibility to the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting was a unanimous conclusion of the entire Committee, not just in Republican additional views. Second, he is mistaken in ascribing a correlation between these instances and his own findings. In fact, none of these instances had anything to do with Ambassador Wilson's findings in Niger. The INR analysts he cited believed the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting was unlikely to be true before Ambassador Wilson went on this trip. The CIA NESA analysts were not the CIA's primary Iraq WMD analysts and knew very little about the Niger reporting at all. Their assessments did not discount the reporting, they simply did not include it. Most of the other instances Ambassador Wilson cited, including CIA testimony to Congress and the DCI's caution against the President using the information in the Cincinnati speech, were based on a misunderstanding within the CIA. This misunderstanding was explained in the Committee's unanimous conclusions.

Ambassador Wilson also neglected to mention in his letter that the Intelligence Community used or cleared the Niger-Iraq uranium intelligence *fifteen* times before the President's State of the Union address and four times *after*, saying in several papers that Iraq was "vigorously pursuing uranium from Africa." As late as March 2003, even after the IAEA found that the documents themselves were "not authentic," and while noting that the CIA had questions about some specific claims in the original intelligence reporting, the CIA still reported that, "we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program."

It was not until April 5, 2003 that the National Intelligence Council issued an Intelligence Community assessment finally saying, "we judge it highly unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in recent years."[5] It was not until June 17, 2003 that the CIA produced an

[5] Several press stories have claimed that similar language appeared in a National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessment, from the Africa National Intelligence Officer (NIO) in January 2003 prior to the State of

internal memorandum for the DCI which said, "since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad." That was June 2003, not March 2002 as Ambassador Wilson would have you believe.

We consider most aspects of the Niger-Iraq uranium matter closed – Mrs. Wilson clearly suggested her husband for the trip to Niger, neither Ambassador Wilson's report, nor the reports from Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick resolved the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting, the Vice President was never briefed on Ambassador Wilson's findings because CIA believed the findings did not clarify the issue, and the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting was cleared, by the CIA, for use in the President's State of the Union address.

One area of inquiry which now seems to be unresolved is why Mrs. Wilson provided different testimony to the CIA Inspector General, our Committee staff, and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The account of a discussion among three colleagues about a phone call from the Vice President is new to us, and apparently new to the CIA which has been unable to find the alleged participants. Still, it is a story worth exploring. For that reason, Senator Bond has written to the CIA seeking interviews with the individuals involved, including a re-interview with Mrs. Wilson. We hope that these witnesses will enable us to tie up these loose ends once and for all.

In the meantime, because so much confusion remains about these issues and because most of the Committee's conclusions in its July 2004 report, including several conclusions that may alleviate some of this confusion, were never fully declassified, we believe it is important to submit some of those conclusions for declassification now. The three conclusions, unanimously adopted by the full Committee, which explain: the lack of impact that Ambassador Wilson's findings had on Intelligence Community judgments; the fact that the CIA never informed the Vice President about Ambassador Wilson's findings; and the misunderstanding within the CIA that led the DCI to suggesting striking the Niger-Iraq uranium information from the President's Cincinnati speech, are reprinted below. We intend to

---

the Union. This is not correct. The April 2003 paper cited here is the only one prepared by the Africa NIO, according to the CIA. The only other NIC products disseminated prior to April 2003 said Iraq was "vigorously pursuing uranium from Africa."

seek declassification of the remaining Niger conclusions and the rest of the conclusions from the Committee's Phase I report separately.

Conclusion 13. The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal, but State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts believed that the report supported their assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq.

The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. Those who assessed the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was credible prior to the former ambassador's report, continued to believe it was credible. Analysts who assessed the deal was unlikely, continued to believe it was unlikely. While INR analysts believed that the report corroborated their position that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq, most analysts thought the information in the report lent more credibility to the original intelligence reports on the alleged uranium deal. In particular, analysts highlighted a meeting request by a Nigerien-Algerian businessman on behalf of an Iraqi delegation. The businessman told a former Nigerien Prime Minister that the Iraqi delegation wished to discuss "expanding commercial relations" with Niger. The former Prime Minister interpreted this request to mean that the delegation was interested in purchasing uranium. The report noted that "although the meeting took place, the [Prime Minister] let the matter drop due to the United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq." Although the report lacked important details, such as who participated in the meeting and what was actually discussed at the meeting, the report added to most Intelligence Community analysts' concerns about Iraqi interest in uranium from Niger. These analysts told Committee staff that they did not expect the former Nigerien officials to admit to entering into a uranium deal with rogue nations so they were not surprised that the report said the former Nigerien officials were unaware of any uranium contracts that had been signed with rogue nations.

After the report on the former ambassador's trip was disseminated, Intelligence Community agencies wrote intelligence products or cleared language indicating that Iraq was attempting to acquire uranium from Niger

or Africa fifteen times prior to the President's State of the Union speech and four more times following the speech.

Conclusion 14. The Central Intelligence Agency should have told the Vice President and other senior policymakers that it had sent someone to Niger to look into the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal and should have briefed the Vice President on the former ambassador's findings.

In February 2002, after the Vice President and officials in the Departments of State and Defense raised questions about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports of alleged Iraqi efforts to purchase uranium from Niger, the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) made an effort to respond by sending a former ambassador to Niger to look into the issue. The agency did not tell these senior policymakers that the former ambassador had been sent. Following the trip, the DO notified analysts within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the former ambassador's findings. Although the Vice President had asked his CIA morning briefer twice for additional information about this issue prior to the trip, and the CIA had noted in its assessment to the Vice President and others that the agency was working to clarify and corroborate information on the issue, the CIA never briefed the Vice President on the former ambassador's findings or told the Vice President that such a trip had been undertaken. Because of the level of policymaker interest in this issue, such information should have been passed along, regardless of the DI analysts' assessments of the substance or utility of the information.

Conclusion 20. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent and, at times contradictory. These inconsistencies were based in part on a misunderstanding of a CIA Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) Iraq analyst's assessment of the reporting. The CIA should have had a mechanism in place to ensure that agency assessments and information passed to policymakers were consistent.

At a video teleconference (VTC) with the British, the CIA WINPAC Iraq analyst suggested that the British not use the information on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa in their white paper because he believed there were better examples of Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its nuclear program and because the reports were unconfirmed. Following the

VTC, another analyst from the CIA's Office of Near East and South Asia (NESA) prepared consolidated agency comments on the white paper to send to the British. Based on his understanding of the WINPAC analyst's comments, the NESA analyst wrote "recommend deleting sentence on 'compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of uranium from Africa'. . . we don't view this reporting as credible." The WINPAC analyst told Committee staff, however, that these were never his comments. Documentation also shows that immediately after these comments were passed to the British, the WINPAC analyst denied saying that the Iraq-Niger reporting was not credible. The analyst said he suggested that the British not include the reporting on the Niger deal because it was unconfirmed and was not the strongest evidence of reconstitution.

The Committee believes that in attempting to summarize the WINPAC analyst's comments, the NESA analyst said the reporting was not viewed as credible, but that this was a misinterpretation of the WINPAC analyst's comments. Neither this analyst nor any other CIA Iraq analysts who had analyzed the Niger uranium reporting told Committee staff that at the time they coordinated the British white paper they viewed the reporting as not credible. In fact, each of these analysts told Committee staff that until at least March 2003 they believed that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa.

The misinterpretation of the WINPAC analyst's comments led to inconsistencies in the CIA's message to policymakers on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue throughout the fall of 2002 and into early 2003. Intelligence Community officials who were provided with information from the NESA analyst told policymakers that the reporting was not credible. For example, at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on October 2, 2002 the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence testified that "the one thing where I think [the British] stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations. We've looked at those reports and we don't think they are very credible." The NESA analyst who misinterpreted the WINPAC analyst's comments prepared the DDCI for the hearing. The CIA told the Committee that this analyst believes he was also the analyst who raised concerns about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting being used in the President's Cincinnati speech and that it was his comments that led the DCI to call the National Security Council (NSC) and suggest that the uranium reference be removed. This analyst had not performed an analysis of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting

himself and was simply passing along what he believed was his WINPAC colleague's analysis of the reporting.

Throughout this time, CIA's WINPAC analysts continued to use the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in intelligence assessments and approve the use of similar language for Administration speeches and publications. From the time the NESA analyst's comments were sent to the British until the President's State of the Union speech, the CIA and National Intelligence Council (NIC) staff had coordinated on the National Intelligence Estimate, cleared language in six policy speeches or documents for the White House and Department of State, and used language in four of CIA's own publications that all noted Iraq's attempts to acquire uranium from Africa or abroad.

The Committee believes that it was the initial misinterpretation of the WINPAC analyst's comments during coordination of the British white paper that led to mixed and inconsistent messages being passed to senior policymakers. While clearly this was an unintentional error, there should have been some mechanism in place within the CIA to ensure that different CIA analysts were not providing different assessments, to policymakers and that assessments in finished intelligence products provided a consistent message.

CHRISTOPHER "KIT" BOND
ORRIN G. HATCH
RICHARD BURR

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR CHAMBLISS JOINED BY SENATORS HATCH AND BURR

The Vice Chairman's additional views accurately describe many of my concerns with the nature and structure of this report. For these reasons, I join in his views. However, unlike the Vice Chairman, I would not have set aside some of my concerns with this report merely for the sake of compromise. When conducting an investigation, I believe the Committee has an obligation to provide meaningful conclusions after a thorough review. I do not believe this was accomplished here. In no case should this obligation be compromised merely for the sake of consensus. Regrettably, this report does not provide meaningful conclusions nor is it the fruits of a thorough review.

As the Vice Chairman articulates, this report offers no investigative insight. The "conclusions" offered are merely restatements of selected text from two Intelligence Community Assessment's (ICA), *Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq* and *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq*. Without making judgments about the accuracy or reasonableness of the ICA's, the Committee's "conclusions" are no better then a summary of the reports. Although, even a summary usually includes the main points of a document. Here, the Committee selected the points it wished to highlight, and not necessarily the main points. These reports, fully unclassified, are included in Appendices A and B of this report. Anyone reading this report may review the primary documents. It is meaningless for the Committee to selectively highlight some text from these reports since they are included in full in appendices. Like the Vice Chairman, I do not see that these "conclusions" provide any value to the reader.

As the Vice Chairman also points out, the lack of a unique intelligence fact base behind the Intelligence Community's assessments in these reports means that they were no more authoritative or insightful then many other educated opinions, including those of Members of Congress. For the Committee to review these papers and highlight only those portions of the text that reflect issues that have arisen since the start of the conflict in Iraq, is misleading. Again, I support the Vice Chairman's comments on this point.

In addition, I supported the Vice Chairman's amendment to include the members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the list of recipients of the two ICAs. I was disappointed to see my colleagues vote against such a non-partisan issue. I support fully the Vice Chairman's additional comments regarding the appropriateness and hypocrisy of this action by the Committee. Members of Congress are policymakers and are privy to the Intelligence Community's analysis when making policy decisions—such as the decision to authorize the President to use force against Iraq. If anyone is being accused of making policy decisions in a vacuum based on receiving but disregarding these two ICAs, then Congress should be held to the same standard. Effective oversight requires Congress to hold ourselves to the same standards that we demand from the Executive branch.

Aside from my concerns with this report, I believe that much of the Committee's Phase II investigation is a fruitless effort. Any investigation that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) conducts should be done with the intention of improving the Intelligence Community and enhancing our national security. This Committee did just that in July of 2004, when the Committee unanimously adopted its report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. This report led to much needed reform in the Intelligence Community and increased Congressional oversight. Regrettably, the present report neither improves our Intelligence Community nor enhances our national security.

I voted, along with the rest of the Committee, to authorize Phase II of this Committee's inquiry regarding the prewar intelligence on Iraq. My vote was based primarily on being able to vote out and approve a large portion, proving so far to be the only substantive portion, of the inquiry with the Committee's Phase I report while satisfying the further concerns of some members of this Committee. As Phase II continues, I see the Committee's resources wasted on an examination of past events meant to point fingers rather then improve our Intelligence Community.

SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS
SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH
SENATOR RICHARD BURR

COMMITTEE ACTION

Amendments to draft report, Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 5 ayes and 10 noes, the Committee rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to strike Appendix D. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller – no; Senator Feinstein – no; Senator Wyden – no; Senator Bayh – no; Senator Mikulski – no; Senator Feingold – no; Senator Nelson – no; Senator Whitehouse – no; Vice Chairman Bond – aye; Senator Warner – aye; Senator Hagel – no; Senator Chambliss – aye; Senator Hatch – aye; Senator Snowe – no; Senator Burr – aye.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to add to Appendix D a list of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members in January 2003. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller – no; Senator Feinstein – no; Senator Wyden – no; Senator Bayh – no; Senator Mikulski – no; Senator Feingold – no; Senator Nelson – no; Senator Whitehouse – no; Vice Chairman Bond – aye; Senator Warner – aye; Senator Hagel – aye; Senator Chambliss – aye; Senator Hatch – aye; Senator Snowe – aye; Senator Burr – aye.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 5 ayes and 10 noes, the Committee rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to insert a new conclusion that the Intelligence Community did not highlight an insurgency as a likely challenge for an occupying force in Iraq. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller – no; Senator Feinstein – no; Senator Wyden – no; Senator Bayh – no; Senator Mikulski – no; Senator Feingold – no; Senator Nelson – no; Senator Whitehouse – no; Vice Chairman Bond – aye; Senator Warner – aye; Senator Hagel – no; Senator Chambliss – aye; Senator Hatch – aye; Senator Snowe – no; Senator Burr – aye.

Adoption of the report on Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 10 ayes and 5 noes, the Committee agreed to adopt the report on Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller – aye; Senator Feinstein – aye; Senator Wyden – aye; Senator Bayh – aye; Senator

Mikulski – aye; Senator Feingold – aye; Senator Nelson – aye; Senator Whitehouse – aye; Vice Chairman Bond – no; Senator Warner – no; Senator Hagel – aye; Senator Chambliss – no; Senator Hatch – no; Senator Snowe – aye; Senator Burr – no.