SUBJECT: USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

SEE DISTRIBUTION
(Annex Z)

References: JSCP 02 Change 1, March 2005

1. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is attached.

2. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05 fulfills a requirement established in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 02 Change 1, Regional Tasking 9. The CDRUSNORTHCOM was directed to prepare a plan to support the employment of DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) IAW applicable DOD directives and policy.

3. The plan was coordinated with other Combatant Commands, Component and Supporting Component Commands, and Subordinate Commands during the preparation of the plan.

4. Supporting plans must be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60 days after plan approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER

MARK A. VOLCHEFF
Major General, USAF
Director, Policy and Planning
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, DSCA

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES

1. Plan Title.
   b. Short title: USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, DSCA.

2. This CONPLAN is UNCLASSIFIED to ensure ease of use by both military and interagency organizations and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of this plan, including those required to develop supporting plans. Information in USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501 may be disseminated to all interagency, National Guard Bureau, federal, tribal, state and local governments.

3. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, is authorized as required for the preparation of supporting plans and interagency coordination.

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CONPLAN 2501-05, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

PLAN SUMMARY

1. Purpose. Natural or man-made disasters can be so overwhelming that local, tribal, state and non-military federal responders cannot manage the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) will respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 02 Change 1, Regional Tasking 9, directed CDRUSNORTHCOM to prepare a functional plan (FUNCPLAN) to support the employment of DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) IAW applicable DOD Directives (DODD) and policy. However, based on Joint Staff direction, this plan’s designation has been changed to concept plan (CONPLAN) because FUNCPLAN will no longer be a plan designation type.

2. Conditions for Implementation

   a. Politico-Military Situation

      (1) USNORTHCOM was established in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM’s dual mission is to conduct Homeland Defense (HD) and DSCA operations. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USNORTHCOM fulfills its DSCA mission by responding to Requests for Federal Assistance (RFA) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Plan (NRP) and DOD policy and guidance.

      (2) The NRP is the nation’s all-hazards plan to respond to disasters, emergencies, or other events. This plan aligns with the NRP coordinating framework and applies to all forms of support that DOD could provide to civil authorities. In addition to large-scale disaster response, DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE), such as political conventions, and special events (SE) such as major sporting events.

   b. Statement. This summary provides military decision makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency. The information contained herein must be updated before use in adopting Courses of Action (COAs) in a particular situation.
Legal Considerations. The NRP provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the major pieces of legislation that govern the federal response, which includes DOD. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. DODD 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is currently in draft, but when finalized, will supersede the current DODDs describing DOD support of civil authorities. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law enforcement activities by Title 10 military personnel. Finally, while providing DSCA, DOD forces will conform to the CJCS Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and any supplemental guidance provided by USNORTHCOM.

3. Operations To Be Conducted

a. Force Requirements. USNORTHCOM force requirements to conduct DSCA operations under this plan are based upon the nature of support requested by civil authorities and approved by SecDef or the President.

(1) Based on the nature of the DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM can request the forces necessary to conduct DSCA missions via a Request for Forces (RFF) processed through the Joint Staff.

(2) Friendly forces include other Combatant Commands: USJFCOM, USPACOM, USOUTHCOM, USOCCOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM; Component and Supporting Component Commands: Army North (ARNORTH), Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH); Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH), and Fleet Forces Command (FFC); Subordinate Commands: Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK), Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR); the Military Services; the Department of Homeland Security, and supporting Defense Agencies such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

b. Deployment

(1) USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations in the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. (NOTE: Unified Command Plan 04, Change 1, will remove Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and add the Western Aleutians to USNORTHCOM’s AOR.) When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy DSCA forces from subordinate commands, or forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM via an RFF.
(2) Because of the nature of DSCA operations, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA Joint Operations Area (JOA) for the entire length of the DSCA operation.

c. Employment

(1) The USNORTHCOM Commander’s Intent is to execute a timely, safe, effective, and efficient response to approved requests for DSCA. The number one DSCA response priority is to save lives, prevent human suffering, and reduce great property damage under serious conditions.

(2) USNORTHCOM provides DSCA when directed by the President or SecDef, which is typically after local, tribal, state, and other federal resources are overwhelmed and civil authorities have requested DOD assistance. Support can be provided to prevent, protect, respond, and/or recover from a potential or actual incident. If SecDef approves the request, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for the DSCA response for those areas within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM determines the appropriate level of C2 for DOD forces based on the magnitude of the DOD response.

(3) For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who will be the senior military officer in the Joint Field Office (JFO). If designated as a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DCO can provide C2 for the entire DSCA effort so long as the response force does not exceed the DCO’s C2 capability. However, if a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO can still deploy to serve as DOD’s single point of contact in the JFO.

(4) For a medium-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can use a single-service Response Task Force (RTF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage supporting military activities. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, a JTF commander exercises OPCON/TACON over DOD forces in the JOA with the following exceptions: USTRANSCOM assets, USACE resources, National Guard forces operating in a non-federalized duty status, and in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the United States Secret Service (USSS).

(5) For a large-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can: (a) Stand up or expand an existing JTF with multiple subordinate JTFs, and/or (b) Appoint a Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), or other domain component commander(s), to provide C2 of the forces.

(6) Immediate Response Authority. Immediate Response is any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the authority of DODD 3025.dd and any supplemental guidance, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests.
of civil authorities consistent with existing law and regulations. As soon as practical, the military commander or responsible official shall make a report through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). This notification should reach the NMCC within a few hours of the decision to provide immediate response. Upon SecDef approval and CJCS EXORD execution, forces that remain at the incident will be under USNORTHCOM on site C2.

(7) Because DSCA supports civil authorities in the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, no enemy forces are expected to oppose these missions. However, like any military operation, forces performing DSCA remain vulnerable to degradation caused by man-made events or natural conditions. Consequently, anti-terrorism / force protection (AT/FP) measures are still applicable to DSCA operations.

(8) **CONPLAN Structure.** This is a five phase plan:

(a) **Phase I, Shaping.** Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, exercises, and public affairs outreach (which continues through all phases).

(b) **Phase II, Staging.** Phase II begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. The phase ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a prepare to deploy order (PTDO). Phase II success equals DCO/DCE deployment, coordination with state, local and tribal officials, and response forces positioned to facilitate quick response.

(c) **Phase III, Deployment.** Phase III begins with the initial response force deployment. However, force deployment can occur at any time, in any phase except Phase I, Shaping. Because of the nature of DSCA operations, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. Phase III success equals forces deployed with enough capability to accomplish the mission.

(d) **Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities.** Phase IV begins when DSCA response operations commence. The phase ends with civil authorities prepared to assume responsibility for operations. Success equals civil authorities ready to respond effectively to continuing requirements.

(e) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with civil authorities assuming responsibility with no degradation of operations. The phase ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success equals a complete transfer of responsibilities to civil authorities.

d. **Supporting Plans.** Commander, Army North (CDRARARNORTH), Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRAFNORTH), Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNORTH),
Commander, Joint Task Force-Alaska (CDRJTF-AK), Commander, Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (CDRJFHQ-NCR) will develop and maintain supporting plans to CONPLAN 2501.

e. **Collateral plans.** The following plans comprise the USNORTHCOM “Family of Plans” that could be implemented before, during or after USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA.

   1. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 0300 (Classified Title)
   2. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 0500, CBRNE CM (Draft)
   3. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2002-05, Homeland Defense (S)
   4. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2100, Non Combatant Evacuation Operations
   5. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2400, NCR Emergency Preparedness
   6. USNORTHCOM FUNCPLAN 2505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan (Draft)
   7. USNORTHCOM FUNCPLAN 2707, Support to Law Enforcement for Transnational Threats
   8. USNORTHCOM Combined Defense Plan, Canada-US (CANUS) (Draft) (S/RELCAN)
   9. USNORTHCOM, Canada-US, Civil Assistance Plan (draft) (U)

4. **Key Assumptions**

   a. An incident severe enough to trigger a DSCA response may occur with little to no warning.

   b. SecDef will approve civilian agency requests for DSCA, and DOD will respond IAW the NRP, and DOD policy and guidance.

   c. Appropriate elements of the National Guard will be involved in nearly all DSCA operations.

   d. Normally, except in the District of Columbia, National Guard forces deployed from the affected state, or in response to an Emergency Management Assistance Compact request, will operate under the control of State authorities.

   e. At the request of civil authorities, DOD forces may respond to the DSCA incident under Immediate Response authority. If those forces are to remain at the incident site, CDRUSNORTHCOM will request Operational Control (OPCON) of those forces.

   f. Coordination will be required with state and local officials.

   g. Under extraordinary circumstances, the President may direct DOD to lead the federal response.

5. **Operational Constraints**
a. USNORTHCOM has no legal authority to initiate DSCA operations without the approval of the President or SecDef.

b. Title 10 military personnel shall not be employed to enforce or execute civil law in violation of United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act), except as otherwise provided by law.

c. DOD forces shall not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

6. **Time To Commence Effective Operations.** All DSCA is time sensitive because speed of response saves lives. The specific circumstances of the DSCA operation drive the time it takes to deploy into the JOA and commence effective operations.

7. **Command Relationships.** See Annex J.

8. **Logistics Appraisal.** The USNORTHCOM Service Components are responsible for administrative, logistical, medical, and communication support for forces employed in DSCA operations. Component Commanders will comply with their respective Service instructions, existing plans, agreements, and legal authorities. DLA, DCMA, USTRANSCOM, and other defense agencies will continue to provide the logistics backbone in the JOA to include: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services and other combat service support to DOD forces. Efforts must be directed at leveraging the existing infrastructure, contracts, and support relationships with civilian services. See Annex D.

9. **Personnel Appraisal**

   a. The parent command or agency will retain administrative responsibility for USNORTHCOM OPCON forces.

   b. The appropriate USNORTHCOM Service or Supporting Component will assume administrative responsibility for Title 10 military personnel assigned to the USNORTHCOM subordinate units.

   c. Personnel accountability and direct management of military and DOD civilian resources (i.e., casualties, replacements, additional forces, etc.) will be the responsibility of the Service component or the parent command or Agency.

10. **Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors.** None.
CONPLAN 2501-05, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

1. General. The overall classification of this functional plan is UNCLASSIFIED.

2. Specific guidance. Classification guidance provides users with specific subjects requiring protection, specific levels of protection and establishes the period during which the protection must be continued.
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DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

References:

a. Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301-12304
   (Statutes Affecting Reserve Components)

b. Title 10, United States Code, Section 377, Reimbursement

c. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, Posse Comitatus Act

d. Title 31, United States Code, Section 1535, Economy Act

e. Title 32, United States Code, National Guard

f. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq. (Stafford Act, Disaster
   Relief and Emergency Assistance Act)


h. National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 2004

i. National Response Plan (NRP), 15 December 2004

j. National Response Plan - Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS),
   September 2005 (FOUO)


l. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY-04

m. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY-05

n. Unified Command Plan (UCP) 04, 1 March 2005 (FOUO)

o. Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Fiscal Years 2006-2011, 1 March 2004

p. CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002 (JSCP FY02), with
   change 1 (TS)

q. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement / Standing Rules for the Use
   of Force for US Forces, 13 June 2005 (S)
1. **Situation**

   a. **General**

   (1) Natural or man-made disasters can be so overwhelming that local, state, tribal and non-military federal responders cannot manage the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. DOD brings unique and specialized skills and assets that, when employed in support of (ISO) a Primary Agency, can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation until civil authorities can again effectively respond to the needs of their populace.

   (2) When approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or directed by the President, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is prepared to respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. In addition to large-scale disaster response, DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE), such as political conventions, and Special Events (SE) such as major sporting events.
USNORTHCOM was established in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM’s dual mission is to conduct Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. When directed by the President or SecDef, USNORTHCOM fulfills its DSCA mission by responding to Requests for Federal Assistance (RFA) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Plan (NRP) and DOD policy and guidance.

The NRP also uses the term DSCA to describe the support DOD provides to civil authorities. The NRP provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the major pieces of legislation that govern the federal response, which includes DOD. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. This plan covers the full spectrum of DSCA from small to large-scale operations.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 02 Change 1, Regional Tasking 9, directed CDRUSNORTHCOM to prepare a functional plan (FUNCPLAN) to support the employment of DOD forces providing DSCA IAW applicable DOD Directives (DODD) and policy. IAW recent Joint Staff direction, “FUNCPLAN” will no longer be a type of deliberate plan. Consequently, this plan is now a concept plan (CONPLAN) rather than a FUNCPLAN.

In addition to this plan, USNORTHCOM has another DSCA-related plan: CONPLAN 0500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM). CONPLAN 0500 specifically covers DSCA performed as consequence management in the aftermath of a CBRNE event.

Because DSCA supports civil authorities in the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, no enemy forces are expected to oppose these missions. However, like any military operation, forces performing DSCA remain vulnerable to degradation caused by man-made events or natural conditions. Consequently, anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) measures are still applicable to DSCA operations.

Area of Concern

Area of Responsibility (AOR). USNORTHCOM’s geographic AOR for normal operations is the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and other islands (excluding Greenland). (NOTE: Unified Command Plan 04, Change 1, will remove Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and add the Western Aleutians to USNORTHCOM’s AOR).
(2) **Area of Interest (AI).** The area of interest for USNORTHCOM is its assigned air, land, and sea areas including the United States, its territories, and possessions as defined above, and any adjacent foreign territory where a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, or event may cause an adverse impact on the United States.

(3) **Operational Area (OA).** The USNORTHCOM OA for DSCA is the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and any possession of the United States within the USNORTHCOM AOR. (NOTE: Unified Command Plan 04, Change 1, will remove Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and add the Western Aleutians to USNORTHCOM’s AOR). Areas of operation can be established within the operational area as necessary. Areas of operation should be large enough to accomplish DSCA missions and should not typically encompass the entire operational area.

(4) **Joint Operations Area (JOA).** USNORTHCOM will designate appropriate JOAs for air, land, and maritime operations within the USNORTHCOM OA for the execution of DSCA operations. Alaska and the National Capital Region are specifically designated as standing JOAs within the USNORTHCOM DSCA OA.

c. **Deterrent Options.** Not Applicable.

d. **Enemy**

(1) Enemy forces are not expected during the conduct of DSCA operations. If a situation with enemy forces should arise, it would trigger CONPLAN 2002, Homeland Defense, or other plans in the USNORTHCOM family of plans. However, anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) measures are still applicable to DSCA operations.

(2) When planning and conducting DSCA operations, commanders should consider the following AT/FP issues: (1) Terrorists organizations could conduct operations against the DSCA force, or in the DSCA operations area; (2) State and local police capabilities could be severely degraded in the area of DSCA operations, allowing a corresponding rise in criminal activity that could affect the DSCA force; and (3) environmental factors ranging from weather to contamination and disease could significantly impact the DSCA force.

(3) While every DSCA operation will encounter unique environmental factors, certain recurring operations, such as natural disaster relief, will face similar environmental conditions again and again. For example, hurricanes typically occur in the Gulf of Mexico and the mid to lower Atlantic seaboard. Earthquakes typically occur along the West Coast and in Alaska. Wildland firefighting missions tend to occur in the Western States. Commanders should consider these likely environmental conditions when they plan DSCA operations.

e. **Friendly**
(1) **Department of Defense (DOD).** When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA. When providing support under the NRP and the Stafford Act after a major disaster declaration, USNORTHCOM is the supported command within the USNORTHCOM AOR for DOD support as requested by a federal Department or Agency or a State Governor. DOD is a support agency to all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) under the NRP and a Cooperating Agency to the majority of NRP Support and Incident Annexes. DOD may also provide support when requested by a federal agency when no major disaster declaration has been issued. This type of federal to federal support is provided under the Economy Act.

(2) **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD (HD)).** The ASD (HD) provides policy oversight for DSCA.

(3) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** The CJCS communicates SecDef guidance to the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DOD Agencies. On SecDef’s behalf, the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) coordinates DOD support through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD(HD)) to the primary or coordinating agency, issues orders directing the employment of military assets, and directs the transfer of military personnel and resources to CDRUSNORTHCOM and other supporting commands.

(4) **Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM serves as a Joint Force provider for DSCA operations. CDRUSJFCOM provides military resources and forces to assist civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(5) **Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSPACOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM OA.

(6) **Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSOUTHCOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSOUTHCOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM OA.

(7) **Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM OA.

(8) **Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSTRATCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by conducting space operations, information operations and space control support during DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM OA.

(9) **Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM).** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in DSCA
operations and provides patient movement as required. As directed, CDRUSNORTHCOM deploys military resources and forces, and supports USNORTHCOM DSCA operations within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(10) Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRAFNOTHC). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, and upon receipt of TACON of forces, CDRAFNOTHC deploys military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(11) Commander, Army North (CDRAROTH). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRAROTH deploys a tailored Response Task Force or Joint Task Force, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(12) Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CFFC deploys military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(13) Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNOTHC). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, and upon receipt of TACON of forces, COMMARFORNOTHC deploys military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(14) Commander, Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (CDRFJFHQ-NCR). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRFJFHQ-NCR transitions to JTF-NCR and accepts operational and tactical control (OPCON/TACON) of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal and local authorities within the National Capital Region (NCR) JOA.

(15) Commander, Joint Task Force-Alaska (CDRJTF-AK). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRJTF-AK accepts operational control (OPCON) of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the Alaska JOA.

(16) Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (CDRJTF-CS). When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRJTF-CS deploys a tailored JTF headquarters, accepts operational control (OPCON) of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(17) Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N). Although a USNORTHCOM Staff Directorate, the SJFHQ-N is an employment option for the CDRUSNORTHCOM during DSCA operations. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM to establish a stand alone JTF, SJFHQ-N accepts operational control (OPCON) of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to

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assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, SJFHQ-N provides the core element of a newly established JTF or provides augmentation to an existing JTF.

(18) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO is DOD’s single point of contact at a Joint Field Office (JFO). The JFO is the multi-agency coordination center established in or near the incident site for coordinating incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions under the NRP. Requests for DSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated, processed, and validated through the DCO. The DCO may also be supported by an administrative and support staff element called a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). See Annex C, Appendix 25.

(19) Military Services. When directed by the President or SecDef, and through the appropriate Service component commanders, the military Services provide forces, facilities (mobilization centers ISO requests from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) and assets to CDRUSNORTHCOM as part of the DOD response to approved RFAs from civil authorities. When directed, the Services will provide installations based on Service Components nomination of appropriate installations as Base Support Installations (BSIs). BSIs provide military-to-military support to DOD assets. FEMA does not request BSIs and therefore, support provided by a BSI may not be reimbursable under the Stafford Act. Services provide unit data to CDRUSJFCOM to source DSCA response forces.

(20) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). USACE is a public engineering organization within DOD providing engineering support and services to DOD activities around the globe, as well as to the nation’s civil works, flood protection, and navigation infrastructure. USACE performs emergency support activities under separate authorities provided in Public Law 84-99, which are not under USNORTHCOM Command and Control (C2). USACE provides support as a Primary Agency and Coordinating Agency for ESF #3, and is a support agency to other ESFs as specified in the NRP annexes. When USACE conducts DSCA operations as an NRP Primary or Coordinating Agency, there is a coordination relationship with USNORTHCOM.

(21) Reserve Components (RC). The Reserve Components provide an important source of trained manpower and expertise. Reserve Components include the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNG), Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard of the United States (ANG), Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Coast Guard Reserve. They are increasingly relied upon to balance our nation’s commitments and DOD mission requirements. Units may be activated and employed for DSCA operations.

(22) Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs). Each Service selects highly qualified senior-level officers (Reserve Officers in the grades of O6/O5) to serve as EPLOs, and enlisted personnel to serve in support assignments. These personnel are administered by and report to an active duty program manager. They may be activated and employed for DSCA operations. Services ensure their EPLOs are trained, equipped
and remain current on the NRP, National Incident Management System (NIMS), DSCA procedures, and their service component’s regionally available resources. They are trained in disaster preparedness and DSCA operations. EPLOs advise civil authorities on military resources and capabilities, and facilitate coordination between civil authorities and DOD during state or federal exercises or DSCA operations. Once activated, EPLOs are OPCON to USNORTHCOM service component commands and may work at various locations based on DOD needs. Three primary locations are:

(a) **FEMA Headquarters/Regions.** EPLOs and support personnel can be assigned to FEMA Headquarters and/or FEMA Regional locations. Personnel assigned at the FEMA Region are known as Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs). When activated, they report to the FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) to advise FEMA, coordinate with the DCO, and provide situation reports (SITREPS) to their respective service components.

(b) **State locations.** At the State level, EPLOs, known as State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) and support personnel can perform duty in the Governor’s (State) Emergency Operation Center (EOC), The Adjutant General JOC’s, or obtain needed resources to conduct operations from both locations. Their function is to advise state-level civil authorities on military issues, obtain and coordinate information, proactively assess the situation from a state and State National Guard perspective and provide SITREPS to the established chain of command.

(c) **Joint Field Office (JFO) locations.** EPLOs can be activated to perform duty in the JFO as service representatives and advisors to the DCO.

(23) **National Guard Bureau (NGB).** The NGB coordinates with National Guard forces and assets through the States’ Adjutants General to conduct civil support operations to assist local, state, and tribal authorities. When appropriate, National Guard forces will be federalized into a Title 10 United States Code (USC) active duty status under the C2 of CDRUSNORTHCOM. NGB assists USNORTHCOM in synchronizing and integrating federal and non-federal military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort.

(24) **Supporting Defense Agencies.** When directed by SecDef, these agencies may provide resources and capabilities:

(a) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA provides DSCA support and technical expertise.

(b) **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** DISA ensures USNORTHCOM, supporting commands and agencies receive timely and effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other support.
(c) **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)**. DLA coordinates with USNORTHCOM, JDOMS, Service Components and NRP Primary Agencies for subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum, construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts support. DLA provides integrated material management and supply support for all DLA managed material. DLA provides property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal services.

(d) **Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)**. DCMA provides worldwide contract management services in times of peace, crisis, and war, to include administering Civilian Augmentation Program contracts. Procures contracting officers, or a buying activity may delegate to DCMA any or all contract management functions listed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42.302. DCMA responds within 48 hours to provide an initial response team to the JOA to perform contract administration services.

(e) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)**. NGA provides imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial products ISO DSCA operations for DOD, primary agencies, coordinating agencies, and supporting organizations. NGA will coordinate intermodal transportation network assessments with USTRANSCOM.

(25) **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**. The Secretary of DHS is the principal federal official (PFO) for domestic incident management. The Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary may delegate this responsibility and appoint a representative to serve as PFO on-site during a disaster, emergency, incident, or event. DHS uses the NRP and NIMS structure to coordinate the federal response. As part of DHS, FEMA plans, coordinates, and conducts the federal disaster response and recovery efforts with local, state, and tribal authorities. (See Annex V for other federal government departments and agencies).

(a) The President directed the development of the NRP to align federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-hazard approach to domestic incident management. DOD is a signatory to the NRP with 31 other federal Departments and Agencies. The SecDef retains approval authority for RFAs, and all RFAs are judged for their impact on readiness, cost, legality, lethality, risk and appropriateness.

(b) Under the NRP, the federal agency designated as a Primary Agency is the federal executive agency responsible for the ESF mission. When requested by civil authorities and approved by the SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is a support agency to all ESFs.

(c) The NRP Support Annexes identify federal Coordinating Agencies responsible for supporting DHS domestic incident management. When requested by civil authorities, DOD provides DSCA and is identified as a cooperating agency for the majority of Support Annexes.
(d) The NRP Incident Annexes identify federal Coordinating Agencies responsible for implementing the processes detailed in the incident annexes. When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is identified as a cooperating agency for the majority of Incident Annexes.

f. Assumptions

(1) An incident severe enough to trigger a DSCA response may occur with little to no warning.

(2) SecDef will approve civilian agency requests for DSCA, and DOD will respond IAW the NRP and DOD policy and guidance.

(3) Appropriate elements of the National Guard will be involved in nearly all DSCA operations.

(4) Normally, except in the District of Columbia, National Guard forces deployed from the affected state, or in response to an Emergency Management Assistance Compact request, will operate under the control of state authorities.

(5) At the request of civil authorities, DOD forces may respond to the DSCA incident under Immediate Response authority. If those forces are to remain at the incident site, CDRUSNORTHCOM will request Operational Control (OPCON) of those forces.

(6) Coordination will be required with state and local officials.

(7) Under extraordinary circumstances, the President may direct DOD to lead the federal response.

g. Legal Considerations

(1) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et seq.), authorizes the federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. This act provides authority for disaster preparedness, Presidential grants for planning, Presidential declarations of major disaster or emergency, formation of immediate support teams, reimbursement to agencies (including DOD), and major disaster assistance programs to help state and local governments mitigate the suffering and damage caused by disasters, emergencies, and other incidents.

(2) The Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) concerns federal agencies reimbursing each other for federal to federal department or agency support.

(3) The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct DOD involvement in law enforcement activities.
by Title 10 military personnel. However, exceptions exist for the involvement of Title 10 forces in law enforcement activities, including enforcing the Insurrection Act, counter-drug assistance, assistance in the case of crimes involving nuclear materials, and emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction.

(4) Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for US Forces (CJCSI 3121.01B, 13 June 2005) are always in effect during DSCA operations. U.S. forces always retain the inherent right to defend themselves. CDRUSNORTHCOM can provide mission specific guidance to the SRUF.

(5) Use of the DOD Intelligence Community (IC) Components ISO DSCA operations for analysis and production of data from airborne sensors ISO damage assessment and search and rescue operations is authorized. U.S. law and DOD policy place substantial limitations on the use of military intelligence assets for any other purpose. (See reference v).

2. Mission. When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the operational area as set forth in paragraph 1.b.(3) of this Base Plan to assist civil authorities during emergencies, natural or man-made disasters, and other approved activities.

3. Execution

a. Commander’s Intent

(1) Purpose. Execute a timely, safe, effective, and efficient response to approved requests for DSCA.

(2) Key Tasks

(a) Assist in establishing control of the situation, save lives, prevent human suffering, and reduce great property damage under serious conditions.

(b) Provide DSCA to a Primary or Coordinating Agency IAW the NRP or other authorities.

(c) Employ qualified DCOs and DCEs in a timely manner. Utilize service expertise of qualified EPLOs as advisors of their service capabilities to the DCO.

(d) Provide flexible C2 to cover a wide range of incidents.

(e) Share information and intelligence while cooperating with interagency and intergovernmental partners.

(f) Coordinate a Public Affairs message.
(g) Synchronize with local, state, and federal response efforts.

(h) Anticipate requirements to enable first responders to continue their response efforts.

(3) End State. DSCA operations conclude when DOD forces are relieved by SecDef and operational control (OPCON) of deployed assets is transferred to their respective commands.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) The NRP is the nation’s all-hazard approach to domestic incident management. Its purpose is to integrate the efforts and resources of federal agencies in support of state and local organizations. The NRP uses the term DSCA to describe DOD support during domestic emergencies and other activities. DOD support includes federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD agency and component assets.

(2) USNORTHCOM provides DSCA when directed by the President or SecDef, which is typically after local, state, tribal and other federal resources are overwhelmed and civil authorities have requested DOD assistance. Support can be provided to prevent, protect, respond, and/or recover from a potential or actual incident. If SecDef approves the request, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for the DSCA response. CDRUSNORTHCOM determines the appropriate level of C2 for DOD forces based on the magnitude of the DOD response.

(3) For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy a DCO, who will be the senior military officer in the JFO. If designated as a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DCO can provide C2 for the entire DSCA effort so long as the response force does not exceed the DCO’s C2 capability. However, if a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO can still deploy to serve as DOD’s single point of contact in the JFO.

(4) For a medium-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can use a single-service Response Task Force (RTF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage supporting military activities. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, a JTF commander exercises OPCON/TACON over DOD forces in the JOA with the following exceptions: USTRANSCOM assets, USACE resources, National Guard forces operating in a non-federalized duty status, and in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the United States Secret Service (USSS).

(5) For a large-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can:

   (a) Stand up or expand an existing JTF with multiple subordinate JTFs, and/or

   (b) Appoint a Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), or other domain component commander(s), to provide C2 of the forces.
On the opposite end of the response scale from the JTF are DSCA operations that do not require CDRUSNORTHCOM designated C2. These DSCA operations, such as military working dog teams, typically involve small-scale specialized support with organic C2, reporting to USNORTHCOM or Service Components and supported by the Service Components.

Immediate Response Authority. Any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the authority of DOD Directive 3025.dd and any supplemental guidance prescribed by the Head of a DOD Component, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with existing law and regulations. All such necessary action is referred to as “Immediate Response.” As soon as practical, the military commander or responsible official shall make a report through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

c. CONPLAN Structure. This is a five phase plan: Phase I, Shaping; Phase II, Staging; Phase III, Deployment; Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities; Phase V, Transition. Phases may overlap, or more than one phase can be underway at the same time. See Annex C, Operations, for more detailed information on the major tasks contained in each phase.
Figure 3-1

(1) Phase I, Shaping. Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, exercises, and public affairs outreach (which continues through all phases).

(2) Phase II, Staging. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. The phase ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a prepare to deploy order (PTDO). Phase II success equals DCO/DCE deployment, coordination with state and local officials, and response forces positioned to facilitate quick response.

(3) Phase III, Deployment. Phase III begins with the response force deployment. However, force deployment can occur at any time in any phase except Phase I, Shaping. Because of the nature of DSCA operations, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. Phase III success equals forces deployed with enough capability to accomplish the mission.

(4) Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. Phase IV begins when DSCA response operations commence. The phase ends with civil authorities prepared to assume
responsibility for operations. Success equals civil authorities ready to respond effectively to continuing requirements.

(5) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with civil authorities assuming responsibilities with no degradation of operations. The phase ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success equals a complete transfer of responsibilities to civil authorities.

d. **Tasks**

(1) **CDRUSJFCOM.** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM serves as a Joint Force Provider for DSCA operations. CDRUSJFCOM sources military Services resources and forces to assist civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

   (a) Be Prepared To (BPT) deploy DSCA response forces and equipment as directed by SecDef.

   (b) BPT transfer OPCON of forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM upon entrance to the designated JOA. CDRUSNORTHCOM will exercise OPCON over forces while in the designated JOA.

   (c) BPT accept return of personnel and equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM, when CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef determine that the DSCA response is complete.

   (d) BPT identify and provide any additional individual augmentation as required in coordination with (ICW) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(2) **CDRUSTRANSCOM.** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by providing deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user, air, land, and sea transportation in DSCA operations and providing medical evacuation as required.

   (a) BPT provide air, sea, or ground transportation support to deploy DSCA forces, including non-DOD assets, in response to formal requirements established IAW CJCSM 3122.02C, by the most expeditious means.

   (b) BPT provide required air, sea, and ground transportation to redeploy forces when they are released from the JOA.

   (c) BPT expeditiously deploy other DOD response assets IAW CJCSM 3122.02C as directed by SecDef.

   (d) BPT provide deployable distribution assistance (LNO / NDDOC augmentation, JTF Port Opening capability, etc.) ISO USNORTHCOM.
(e) BPT provide/coordinate patient movement by air, sea, or ground transportation resources.

(f) BPT to gain and maintain situational awareness of the status of the distribution network within the affected OA. Provide this information as an input to the USNORTHCOM Common Operating Picture (COP).

(g) BPT provide transportation support to DSCA operations as directed by the SecDef.

(3) **CDRUSPACOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, CDRUSSOCOM.** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSPACOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM and CDRUSSOCOM are supporting Combatant Commanders to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations executed in the USNORTHCOM OA. BPT attach requested forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM upon entrance to the USNORTHCOM JOA. CDRUSNORTHCOM will exercise OPCON over attached forces while in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(4) **CDRUSSTRATCOM.** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSTRATCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by conducting space operations, information operations and space control support during USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

(5) **Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRAFNORTH)**

   (a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA. Conduct planning for likely USNORTHCOM DSCA contingencies. Planning should include, but is not limited to, the following capabilities; Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS), medical, imaging, civil engineering activities, weather, and airlift capabilities.

   (b) Develop DSCA Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) ICW USNORTHCOM, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JTF-CS.

   (c) Coordinate deployment of forces and resources with USJFCOM.

   (d) Develop TPFDD requirements for both deployable and in-place personnel and/or equipment; ensure capabilities/forces are loaded into JOPES prior to issuance of an execute order (EXORD).

   (e) After receipt of an EXORD, notify USNORTHCOM and/or the JTF (if applicable) of planned deployments and prioritization of forces and resources flow via JOPES execution/issuance of appropriate orders/modifications.

   (f) As the USNORTHCOM designated theater JFACC, BPT provide theater support to the USNORTHCOM/CC, and localized support for established JTF(s)/CCs or JFLCC (to include the DCO) in conducting DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM.
JOA. BPT coordinate with JFLCC and JFMCC for DSCA support operations. DSCA operations include, but are not limited to:

1. Natural and man-made disasters including Catastrophic Incident Response (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks).

2. Defense support of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) during Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF) operations.

3. Defense support to law enforcement.


(g) Provide administrative, logistical, and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(h) BPT provide SecDef approved support to the White House Military Office, Space recovery, and NSSEs as directed by the CJCS.

(i) BPT act as Airspace Control Authority (coordinate with NORAD and the FAA), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coordinator (ISRC), establish the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), and Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) ISO DSCA operations as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for any and all task forces (to include the DCO) in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(j) BPT accept OPCON of Air Force Forces ISO DSCA operations when approved by SecDef and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(k) BPT provide an Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) representative ISO of USNORTHCOM’s Command Assessment Element (CAE) when requested to provide Air assessment inputs to CAE.

(l) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(m) BPT nominate the Commander, Response Task Force (CRTF) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval, as appropriate.

(n) Coordinate with Air Force organizations to nominate BSIs and submit them for CDRUSNORTHCOM approval.

(o) Coordinate with AF organizations (Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC)) and Major Commands (MAJCOMS) as appropriate for possible deployment of forces and resources (i.e. theater air mobility via the Director Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) thru Air Mobility Command) ISO of DSCA operations for CDRUSNORTHCOM.
(p) BPT provide recommended mission specific Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(q) BPT to account for and report on OPCON’d personnel supporting DSCA operations.

(r) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

(6) **Commander, Army North (CDRARNORTH)**

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA.

(b) BPT deploy two Task Force-level headquarters tailored to provide appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the DSCA response, to include C2 as a geographic or functional JTF when augmented by other services.

(c) BPT serve as the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) to C2 DSCA response forces.

(d) BPT deploy a CAE to provide incident awareness and early identification of potential DSCA requirements.

(e) BPT provide a Commander’s assessment identifying the likely Primary Agency requests for DSCA.

(f) BPT execute DSCA operations including, but not limited to:

   1. Supporting the response to Natural and man-made disasters including catastrophic incidents (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks).

   2. Defense support of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) during Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF) operations.

   3. Defense support to law enforcement.

   4. United Nations General Assembly support.

   5. State of the Union Address (SOTUA).


8. Defense support during domestic civil disturbances.


10. State Funerals ISO JFHQ-NCR.

(g) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA response incidents and events.

(h) Develop Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) for deployable C2 elements.

(i) Determine required training and qualifications for DCOs.

(j) BPT deploy DCO and DCE ISO DSCA operations.

(k) BPT provide a prioritization of force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

(l) BPT nominate the Commander, Response Task Force (CRTF) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.

(m) Coordinate with Army organizations to nominate BSIs and submit them for CDRUSNORTHCOM approval.

(n) Coordinate with Army organizations for possible deployment of forces and resources.

(o) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(p) Maintain a resource database for DSCA operations.

(q) Develop after-action reports on DSCA operations.

(r) Establish Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) measures as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(s) Provide recommended mission specific Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities for USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

(t) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(u) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.
(v) Provide Training Readiness Oversight for the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CST). Establish standards for readiness, training, and evaluation guidance in coordination with USNORTHCOM.

(w) Develop relationships with national-level agencies and organizations to support DSCA operations.

(x) Conduct the Defense Support of Civil Authorities Course.

(7) **Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC)**

(a) Conduct planning for likely USNORTHCOM DSCA contingencies.

(b) BPT provide Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) support to the JTF(s) and coordinate with the JFLCC conducting DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(c) BPT provide administrative, logistical, and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(d) BPT designate a RTF/JTF Commander when directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.

(e) BPT provide Space Recovery, PRESIDENTIAL and NSSE/SE support as required.

(f) BPT coordinate the joint activities of the Coast Guard and Navy ISO DSCA operations.

(g) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(h) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

(8) **Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNORTH)**

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA. Conduct planning for likely USNORTHCOM DSCA contingencies.

(b) BPT provide administrative and logistical support to deployed component forces.

(c) BPT coordinate communications support required for deployed component forces with other Marine Service authorities.

(d) BPT nominate the Commander, Response Task Force (CRTF) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.
(e) BPT coordinate with JFLCC and JFMCC for DSCA support operations.

(f) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(g) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

9) **CDRJFHQ-NCR**

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA, for operations in the JFHQ-NCR JOA. Conduct planning for likely DSCA contingencies ICW DHS, USSS, FEMA, NCR civil authorities, Service Components in the NCR, JTF-CS, and other federal agencies.

(b) BPT transition to a JTF headquarters tailored to provide the appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the DSCA response.

(c) BPT deploy a CAE to provide incident awareness and early identification of potential DSCA requirements.

(d) BPT provide a Commander’s Assessment identifying the likely Primary Agency as soon as possible after JTF-NCR personnel arrive at the incident site.

(e) BPT support the designated Primary Agency for DSCA operations including, but not limited to:

1. Natural Disasters (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, and terrorist attacks), including catastrophic incident response.

2. Defense support of law enforcement.


4. Presidential Inaugurations.

5. State of the Union Address (SOTUA).

6. State Funerals (other funeral services are not DSCA missions unless support is requested by a Primary Agency and approved and directed by the SecDef to execute as DSCA).

(f) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA operations and events in the NCR JOA.

(g) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the NCR JOA.
(h) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(i) BPT provide prioritization of force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

(j) Develop relationships with agencies and first responders in the NCR JOA to support DSCA operations.

(k) Provide recommended mission specific RUF ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(10) CDRJTF-AK

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, DSCA, for DSCA operations within the JTF-AK JOA. Conduct planning for likely Alaska contingencies.

(b) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(c) BPT arrange administrative, logistical, and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(d) BPT deploy a CAE to provide incident awareness and early identification of potential DSCA requirements.

(e) BPT provide a Commander’s assessment identifying the likely Primary Agency and expected requests for assistance as soon as possible after the incident.

(f) Plan DSCA in support of a Primary Agency. DSCA includes, but is not limited to:

1. Natural Disasters (volcanic eruptions, floods, severe weather, earthquakes and other disasters) including catastrophic incident response.

2. Defense support of the NIFC for WFF missions.

3. Defense support of law enforcement.

(g) Develop relationships with agencies and first responders to support DSCA operations.

(h) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA operations and events in the Alaska JOA.

(i) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the Alaska JOA.

(j) BPT recommend Alaska-specific FPCON and sustainment guidance.
(k) BPT provide a prioritization of force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

(l) BPT provide recommended mission specific RUF ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(11) CDRJTF-CS

(a) BPT deploy up to two joint planning augmentation cells for DSCA operations planning support.

(b) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA incidents and events that may become CBRNE CM operations requiring CONPLAN 0500 execution.

(c) BPT deploy the CAE to any potential CBRNE incident site to provide response recommendations to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(d) BPT deploy a JTF Headquarters tailored to provide the appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the DSCA operation.

(e) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(f) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(12) Secretary of the Army (SECARMY), Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), and Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF)

(a) BPT deploy service-controlled forces and equipment, as directed by SecDef, to support DSCA operations.

(b) BPT provide forces and equipment to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations.

(c) BPT deploy trained EPLOs as required ISO DSCA operations.

(d) BPT provide BSIs, based on Service Component nomination, in order to provide installation, logistics and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) support to deployed forces. Primary and alternate BSIs are designated via the EXORD.

(e) Base Support Installation (BSI) Expectations:
1. Accept LNO from designated JTF and provide LNOs to designated JTF to synchronize, and integrate final mission planning and arrival of forces.

2. Report to designated JTF when BSI is ready to begin operations.

3. In conjunction with designated JTF, conduct JRSOI for designated JTF and all in-bound DOD forces. This may involve operating multiple ground and air PODs, establishing a JRC, and providing HQ site(s) with communication support.

4. BPT receive OPCON of attached forces or TACON over military capabilities and forces made available for taskings to support JRSOI of inbound forces.

5. Exercise OPCON of attached forces or TACON over military capabilities and forces made available for taskings to support sustainment of designated JTF.

6. BPT provide installation and sustainment support (to include FOBs) as required to designated JTF units conducting response operations in the JOA.

7. Provide physical security support to the JTF while on the BSI.

8. BPT provide weapons and ammunition storage sites to JTF units.

9. BPT support decontamination of DOD personnel and equipment determined contaminated.

10. Provide redeployment supporting plan to designated JTF when requested.

11. Identify potential shortfalls to support redeployment of forces in the JOA.

12. BPT assist designated JTF with personnel and equipment processing for redeployment.

13. BPT assist designated JTF with equipment inspection requirements for redeploying units.

(f) BPT provide mobilization center(s)/staging base(s) as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef.

(g) BPT accept return of personnel and equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM, when DSCA response is complete.

(h) BPT identify and provide any additional individual augmentation as required in coordination with (ICW) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(13) Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB)
(a) Request NGB provide daily SITREPS to the USNORTHCOM JOC on non-
federalized National Guard activities in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(b) Request NGB assist USNORTHCOM and subordinate Headquarters with
integrating/synchronizing federal and non-federal military planning, response,
deployment/redeployment, and transition efforts.

(c) Request NGB coordinate, assist, and facilitate JFHQ-State(s) in
forming capabilities packages.

(d) If required for DSCA operations, request NGB coordinate, assist, and facilitate
JFHQ-State(s) in providing BSI/JRSOI to Title 10 and other federal response assets.

(e) Request NGB establish liaison with the USNORTHCOM RTF/TF/JTF to avoid on-
site duplication of missions, to ensure unity of effort, and share FPCON and a COP.

(f) Request NGB provide a National Guard (NG) Public Affairs representative for
the USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Joint Information Center.

(14) **Supporting Defense Agencies.** As directed by SecDef, provide the following
resources and/or capabilities:

(a) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** Provide DSCA support and
technical expertise to include 24 hours a day/7 days a week technical reach back
assist with federal, state and local agencies.

(b) **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** Ensure USNORTHCOM,
supporting commands and agencies receive timely and effective command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) support, and other support as
required.

(c) **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).** Coordinate with USNORTHCOM and
Service components for subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum,
construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts
support. Provide integrated material management and supply support for all DLA
managed material. Provide property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal
services.

(d) **Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).** Provide worldwide contract
management services to include administering Civilian Augmentation Program
contracts. Procure contracting officers, or a buying activity may delegate to DCMA
any or all contract management functions listed in FAR Part 42.302. Provide an
Initial Response Team (IRT) to the DSCA Area of Operations to perform contract
administration services.
(e) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Provide imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial products in support of DSCA response activities for DOD, primary/coordinating agencies, and supporting organizations.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt, and for execution upon notification.

(2) Direct liaison is authorized (DIRLAUTH) among subordinate units.

(3) Administrative, logistical, medical, and communications support for deployed forces remain a Combatant Command Service Component responsibility.

(4) All Service casualties will be reported via both the operational and Service chains of command.

(5) Service and functional components will capture costs during all phases of the operation for ultimate reimbursement from the Primary Agency.

(6) DOD members (military and civilian) may provide DSCA under “immediate response authority”. If those forces are to remain at the incident site at the request of civil authorities, CDRUSNORTHCOM will request OPCON of those forces.

(7) Any service forces responding under immediate response authority must notify the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the time they notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) IAW DepSecDef’s 25 Apr 05 guidance on, “Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities.”

(8) All DSCA will be provided on a reimbursable basis unless reimbursement is waived by the PRESIDENT or the SecDef. Immediate response should be provided to civil authorities on a cost-reimbursement basis, if possible.

(9) Installation support provided initially by MOA/MOU or under DODD 2000.18, Installation CBRNE CM response, will be completed or will be incorporated into the USNORTHCOM led response as OPCON to the established C2 organization (RTF/TF/JTF) and incorporated via the BSI and JRSOI process.

(10) All forces arriving in the USNORTHCOM JOA will be received via the JRSOI process.

(11) Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)

(a) Are there any indicators of emergencies, disasters, civil disobedience, or other events that could overwhelm local, tribal and state capabilities?

(b) Has the President issued a Disaster Declaration?
(c) Has the President invoked any extraordinary Constitutional authority?

(d) Has the Secretary of DHS declared an Incident of National Significance?

(e) Any indication of large scale industrial accidents?

(f) Have civil authorities issued warnings, evacuation notices, or notice of potential threat(s) to the population?

(g) Has a Governor requested federal assistance for which DOD may be asked to provide DSCA?

(h) Has the DOD Executive Secretary received a request for federal assistance from another federal agency?

(i) Are there gaps or inaccuracies in the media coverage of DOD response operations?

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Concept of Support. Concept of Logistics Support for DSCA operations, to include deployment, sustainment, and combat service support (CSS) efforts will be flexible and tailored to support the mission requirements. In order to meet DSCA operations requirements, minimize the logistics footprint in the JOA, and support other worldwide logistics requirements, deploying DSCA forces will leverage existing infrastructure, contracts, and support relationships with local service establishments, including the National Guard through the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO). Units will anticipate the possibility of sustained disaster relief operations for a period of up to thirty (30) days. DSCA operations expected to exceed their units’ logistics capabilities will be resupplied or rotated. Local acquisition of supplies and services is encouraged. Procure IAW the FAR. However, in a circumstance where the local infrastructure is weakened by a disaster or terrorist attack, DSCA forces shall not interfere with the ability of the affected population to receive the resources and support they require for recovery. Logistics support will be organized by phase and will be tailored and flexible in order to support mission requirements. (See Annex D)

b. Logistics. The Combatant Command Service Components are responsible for administrative, logistical, medical, and communication support for forces employed in DSCA operations. Component Commanders will comply with their respective Service instructions, existing plans, agreements, and legal authorities. DLA, DCMA, USTRANSCOM, and other government/Defense Agencies will continue to provide the logistics backbone in the JOA to include: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services and other combat service support to DOD forces. Efforts must be directed at leveraging the existing infrastructure, contracts, and support relationships with civilian services through innovative information coordination and management,
business practices, contracting, and operating procedures. A coordinated effort to match prioritization of effort and resources with each operational phase is essential to the success of providing DSCA. (See Annex D).

(1) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. Local acquisition of supplies and services is encouraged IAW the FAR. JTFs, designated C2 HQ, and USJFCOM Service Components will minimize the deployed logistics footprint through maximum use of contingency contracting. Contracts will be used, where possible, for supplies, services, engineering, construction and real estate.

(2) Civil Engineering. Depending on the nature of the event, a DSCA operation may generate a variety of engineer requirements including, but not limited to, emergency access and debris removal, emergency power, temporary roofing and housing, structural safety assessments and infrastructure rehabilitation. Under the NRP ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering, the USACE is the Primary Agency for engineer support and operates under the authority of Public Law 94-99. Other engineer requirements to support the deployed forces would most likely be provided by contractor support, by engineer forces located at or near the BSI incident site, or those deployed in support of the DSCA operation. See Appendix 6 to Annex D of this plan.

(3) Environmental Responsibilities. DOD forces employed in DSCA operations are responsible for protecting our environment. Commanders will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts on human health and the environment. The DOD goals are to initiate actions as soon as possible to curtail further environmental damage and to resolve environmental impacts. During all operations, strategies will be developed to reduce or eliminate negative impacts on the environment. DOD will be in support of a Primary Agency, and environmental responsibilities will remain with the Primary Agency. However, this does not release DOD from responsibility to plan and conduct operations in a manner responsive to environmental considerations. Timely DSCA response in crisis circumstances may make it necessary to take immediate action without preparing the normal environmental planning documents. Close coordination with local, state, and federal agencies during DSCA actions is needed to avoid negative environmental consequences. The DOD goal is compliance with all applicable laws to the maximum extent possible.

(4) Environmental Conditions and Transfer to Civil Authorities. Documenting conditions and actions as soon as possible before, during, and after operations in the JOA will facilitate resolution and closure of environmental issues. An active environmental review of DOD DSCA operations should be accomplished to identify possible environmental issues before a negative impact occurs. Close liaison/communication with the applicable DOD Regional Environmental Coordinator (REC) will also aid in ultimate resolution of environmental issues with local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Environmental impacts will be addressed as soon as possible once operations have stabilized. Emergency exemptions may be needed for disposal of contaminated and hazardous material. DOD forces should direct their
efforts to properly identify, contain, document, and transfer environmental issues to civil authorities as soon as possible.

c. **Personnel.** RTF/TF/JTF Commanders will develop and submit a Joint Manning Document (JMD) to USNORTHCOM for validation. The JMD will comply with the format and process established in CJCSI 1301-01C. CDRUSJFCOM, ICW Service Components, will source USNORTHCOM validated and SecDef approved requirements and notify the RTF/TF/JTF of individual augmentee information and arrival dates. The designated C2 HQ will be responsible for coordinating the Joint Reception Center (JRC), maintaining accountability of deployed DOD personnel, and reporting personnel information to USNORTHCOM via Joint Personnel Status (JPERSTAT) report. (See Annex E)

d. **Public Affairs.** The media will play an important role in reporting events and shaping public opinion concerning DSCA operations. Any DOD response must take into account possible media contributions and repercussions. The JFO Joint Information Center (JIC) will provide information to the media. The OASD-PA is the DOD focal point for all media inquiries concerning DOD DSCA operations. Delegation of release authority to the USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Office, and in turn to the appropriate C2 HQ, is allowed ISO this plan. (See Annex F).

e. **Medical Services.** During DSCA operations, medical and public health needs will be significant factors. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which includes DOD coordination with participating non-federal fixed hospitals and DOD provided patient evacuation, is the primary federal-level medical response element. Other DOD medical capabilities external to NDMS should be requested if it is determined necessary to augment or sustain the NDMS/local response in order to save lives and minimize human suffering. The time sensitive nature of the requirements necessitates early and rapid interagency coordination to be effective. Restrictions on the use of military medical stockpiles and on the military vaccinating civilians may need to be addressed in mission planning. (See Annex Q).

f. **Funding Requirements and Tracking.** Funding of DOD units participating in DSCA operations in support of other government agencies will be IAW law and within the established FAR, DOD Directives, policy, and guidance and the NRP. Each DOD component is responsible for capturing and reporting incremental costs to Service/Defense Agency Comptrollers. CDRUSNORTHCOM will ensure compliance by Service Components and will report to the SecDef when reimbursement is completed for all DSCA operations. Standard interagency billing procedures will be followed.

5. **Command and Control**

a. **Command.** USNORTHCOM is the DOD principal planning agent for DSCA, and will C2 any DSCA operation within the OA. At execution, USNORTHCOM will determine the appropriate C2 for the DSCA response forces OPCON to execute the mission.
(1) **Command Relationships.** CDRUSNORTHCOM will plan and execute DSCA operations within the USNORTHCOM OA. The President, SecDef and CJCS have designated CDRUSNORTHCOM as the supported Combatant Commander for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM OA. DOD DSCA response forces will always remain under C2 of military commanders and will always operate ISO civil authorities, unless otherwise directed by the President. (See Annex J)

(2) **Component Commanders/ Supporting Component Commanders**

(a) CDRAFNORTH

(b) CDRARNORTH

(c) CFFC

(d) COMMARFORNORTH

(3) **Functional Components**

(a) JFACC

(b) JFLCC

(c) JFMCC

(4) **Subordinate Commands**

(a) JFHQ-NCR

(b) JTF-AK

(c) JTF-CS

(5) **SJFHQ-N.** Although a USNORTHCOM Staff Directorate, the SJFHQ-N may be used by the CDRUSNORTHCOM as a core element for the establishment of a new JTF, augmentation to an existing subordinate command or be designated a JTF reporting directly to the CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(6) **Joint Force Headquarters – State(s) (JFHQ-State(s)).** There is a Joint Force Headquarters in each State/Territory. NG forces can operate under three distinct C2 structures:

(a) NG forces in Title 32 or State Active Duty status operate under the C2 of the Governor through the Adjutant General.
(b) NG forces may also be federalized and placed in a Title 10 status. These Title 10 forces operate under the C2 of CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(c) “Dual-Status” Option: For any response or preparatory activity, CDRUSNORTHCOM may opt for Title 32/Title 10 dual status JTF command to facilitate unity of effort. With the consent of the Governor, and at the direction of the President, a NG Officer ordered to Title 10 active duty may C2 both Title 32 and Title 10 forces. Likewise, a Title 10 Officer can be read into the NG and may C2 both Title 32 and Title 10 forces. The purpose of “Dual-Status” is to allow a “Dual-Status” Commander to provide C2 of both non-federalized and Title 10 Armed Forces. The non-federalized NG forces are performing state missions for the Governor and the Title 10 Armed Forces are performing DSCA for CDRUSNORTHCOM, each IAW appropriate federal and state laws.

(7) Command Relationships Diagram. Figure 5-1 depicts the DSCA C2 relationships. The figure depicts the day-to-day posture for planning and coordination, and is not intended to represent any particular DSCA operation. See Annex J for mission specific relationships.

![DSCA Command and Control Diagram](image)

Figure 5-1

(8) Command Post. USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (NC/JOC). The NC/JOC, USNORTHCOM’s primary incident awareness center, is located in Building 2 on Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The NC/JOC oversees current operations.

(9) Succession of Command. As specified in the UCP, if there is a vacancy in the office of the CDRUSNORTHCOM, or a temporary absence or disability, the Deputy Commander, USNORTHCOM shall act as the Combatant Commander and perform the
duties of the Combatant Commander until a successor is appointed, or the absence or disability ceases. If a Deputy Commander has not been designated, or is absent or disabled, interim command shall pass to the next senior officer present for duty and eligible to exercise command regardless of Service affiliation.

b. **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.** See Annex K.

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T. J. Keating  
Admiral, USN  
Commander

Annexes:  
A -- Task Organization  
B -- Intelligence  
C -- Operations  
D -- Logistics  
E -- Personnel  
F -- Public Affairs  
G -- Civil Affairs – Not Used  
H -- Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations – Not Used  
J -- Command Relationships  
K -- Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems  
L -- Environmental Considerations – Not Used  
M -- Geospatial Information and Services – Not Used  
N -- Space Operations – Not Used  
P -- Host-Nation Support – Not used  
Q -- Medical Services  
R -- Reports – Not Used  
S -- Special Technical Operations – Not Used  
T -- Consequence Management – Not Used  
U -- Notional CP Decision Guide – Not Used  
V -- Interagency Coordination  
W -- Contingency Contractors and Contracting – Not Used  
X -- Execution Checklist – Not Used  
Z -- Distribution
ANNEX A TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

TASK ORGANIZATION

References:


c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005

1. Task Organization Planning

a. Response forces are not dedicated to CDRUSNORTHCOM for use prior to an approved request for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). A Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) may be received from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a Primary or Coordinating Agency, or a State Governor. In anticipation of forthcoming DSCA requirements, USNORTHCOM can submit a Request for Forces (RFF). Upon Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval of either the RFA or RFF, USNORTHCOM receives OPCON of forces to conduct DSCA operations. Actual forces received depend upon:

1. Scope of mission.
2. Threat during deployment, employment, and redeployment.
3. Reaction time.
4. Geographic location, size, and nature of the situation.
5. Special requirements, e.g. equipment, training, or technical expertise.
6. Availability and readiness of forces.
7. Other worldwide commitments.

b. When CDRUSNORTHCOM is designated the supported combatant commander for DSCA operations, forces may be tasked or requested through the Joint Staff from any Service, combatant commander, or DOD agency.
2. Task Organization

a. Components

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<tr>
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<td>US Fleet Forces Command</td>
<td>CFFC</td>
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b. Subordinate Commands

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<td>Joint Task Force – Civil Support</td>
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c. Supporting Commands

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<td>US Transportation Command</td>
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TIMOTHY J. KEATING
Admiral, USN
Commander, USNORTHCOM

RICHARD J. ROWE, JR
Major General, USA
Director of Operations
APPENDIX 3, TO ANNEX A TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)
CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT BASELINE CAPABILITIES PACKAGE

References: See Base Plan.

1. General. This appendix lists force capabilities intended as a single, catastrophic incident baseline package, applicable to any catastrophic incident that may be immediately requested for response. The capabilities in this package are focused on saving lives, preventing human suffering, and mitigating great property damage. At the incident occurrence, several factors will further define the actual capabilities package requested. These include: USNORTHCOM Mission Analysis, State response capabilities, National Guard (including EMAC) response, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) response, and Federal Agency requested assistance. Several of the capabilities listed below are pre-identified as part of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), as indicated.

2. Catastrophic Incident Baseline Capabilities Package.

a. Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF). Able to Command and Control multiple maneuver units (up to 3 organizations, equivalent to Army Brigade / Air Force Wing in size), operating within a large geographical area potentially subdivided into smaller operations areas each under C2 of subordinate TF or JTF. The JTF is expected to be supported by USTRANSCOM’s USNORTHCOM Deployable Distribution Operations Center (NDDOC), a Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE), a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), a Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Center (JSRCC), augmentation from the JFCOM JFHQ Core Element (JTF-CE) and from SJFHQ-North, a Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR), and with a Defense Coordinating Officer with supporting element (DCO / E) under their Tactical control.

b. Supporting Installations. FEMA (or appropriate Federal Primary Agency) will identify to USNORTHCOM desired military installations and required capabilities to serve as either Mobilization Centers or Operational Staging Areas. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with services/agencies and designate installations to support the operation. If DOD forces are deployed, USNORTHCOM will coordinate (if feasible under the circumstances) support from Base Support Installations (BSIs) that will not interfere with recovery efforts and appropriate ports of embarkation/ debarkation with USTRANSCOM. See Annex D for more information.

c. Rotary Wing Aviation. In any large-scale DSCA response (disaster) rotary wing aviation support is a critical asset and must be employed early on.
(1) U.S. Army Aviation Brigade General Support Aviation Battalion (normally consisting of thirty five (35) rotary wing aircraft total; 32 UH-60 and 3 EH-60) with supporting Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) Company, and organic Command and Control (Headquarters and Headquarters Company). Recommended source is from an Army Armor or Mechanized Infantry Division. To provide air transport of emergency response personnel and supplies, conduct aerial damage assessment and reconnaissance, provide emergency Medical Evacuation, and to provide Command and Control aircraft.

(2) U.S. Air Force Airspace Control Center to be established by the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and to provide Airspace Control in the Disaster Relief Area. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(3) U.S. Air Force Weather Service support (METOC Team) to provide air weather service in support of the Aviation Brigade. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(4) Heavy Helicopter Company (CH-47). Recommended from U.S. Army Air Assault Division Aviation Brigade and generally consisting of 16 CH-47D aircraft. To provide air movement of emergency personnel and supplies and to augment air medical evacuation operations if required.

d. **Airfield / Fixed Wing Aircraft / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR).**

(1) Air Force Contingency Response Group (CRG) to rapidly assess and reopen airfields and to perform initial airfield / air base operations to include air traffic control.

(2) Request one (1) fixed wing search aircraft with crew, capable of conducting aerial reconnaissance (visual observation, still photography, video download) of damage in the affected area (recommend asset is a P3 aircraft or National Guard C130 Scathe View).

(3) Request U.S. Air Force, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), E-3 Sentry aircraft. To provide all weather surveillance, command, control, and communications and to gather and broad and detailed information on the affected area.

(4) Digital Topographic Support System – Deployable (DTSS-D), to provide the ability to quickly create (generate and print) map products from commercial and national imagery and to perform terrain analysis based on the attribute inspection of the available imagery. Recommended source from CCMRF designated unit.

e. **Maritime Capabilities.** (location dependent)

(1) Three Vessel Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with embarked aviation and Disaster Relief Teams (DRT). To provide the capability to launch and recover marine helicopters
and deploy landing craft as well as, providing inland and inter-coastal waterway search and rescue ops and transportation of supplies and equipment.

(2) Underwater survey capability and underwater salvage assets (situation dependent) may also be required.

f. **Engineer Capabilities.**

(1) Engineer battalion sized unit capable of:

   (a) Constructing, repairing/opening and maintaining emergency routes and/or landing strips.

   (b) Building structures and repairing or providing utilities (water, gas, sewer, heating/AC, electrical) to critical facilities in the affected area.


g. **Medical Capabilities.**

(1) Medical Brigade Headquarters (Commander and Staff) to provide Command and Control of DOD Medical Forces in the JOA / AO. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(2) Epidemiology Team to provide subject matter expertise to the TF / JTF Commander to plan and evaluate strategies to prevent illness to assist in the management of patients when disease is present. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(3) Special Medical Augmentation Response Team, Sanitation and Preventive Medicine (SMART-PM) to provide sanitation and entomological support with the capability to support mass temporary housing areas. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(4) Special Medical Augmentation Response Team, Trauma and Critical Care (SMART-TCC) to provide initial emergency medical treatment until a more robust capability is established. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(5) SMART - MC3T (Medical Command, Control, Commo and Telemedicine) to provide military coordination with civil emergency medical personnel on behalf of the TF / JTF and to provide communications and telemedicine capability. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(6) USTRANSCOM Joint Patient Movement Team (JPMT), Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Teams (AELT), and Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF), to facilitate the movement of patients via the patient movement system operated by the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) at Scott AFB, providing overall patient transportation coordination.
(7) U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) + 25, 25 bed medical capability. This package provides an initial Level III (Theater Hospital) Health Service Support (HSS) capability which can expand to an Air Force Theater Hospital if required. This capability includes a Small Portable Expeditionary Aero medical Rapid Response (SPEARR) team (Module 1), and EMEDS Module 2 providing added personnel (15) and equipment (2 463L pallets). Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(8) Two Medical Companies, with similar capabilities as Army Area Support Medical Companies (ASMC), including treatment and ambulance platoons. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

h. Public Affairs.

(1) Public Affairs detachments (2 each minimum with 8 pax each). Recommend sourcing one of the two from CCMRF designated units.

(2) Digital Imagery Distribution System Team to provide imagery collection and analysis.

(3) Combat Camera teams (2 each teams with 5 pax each) with digital and still photography capabilities.

(4) Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE) with capabilities to include a command and control element, coordinator / assessment team, product distribution and print teams, mobile radio broadcasting system, and internal communications.

i. Communications.

(1) Army Signal Battalion (HHC and 3 Companies) or Air Force Communications Squadron, to provide linked communications between the operational Command and Control element, higher headquarters, and forward units. Specific services to be provided include: UHF TACSAT, DSN/PSTN telephone, facsimile, secure and non-secure VTC (DVS), NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and JWICS support for up to 250 persons. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated units or potentially as a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) JTF Package, from FORSCOM 93rd Signal Brigade, or an ACC Theater Deployable Communications (TDC) Package.

(2) HAMMER Adaptive Communications Element (ACE), U.S. Air Force Communications Element. To provide a rapidly deployable engineers and technicians to establish secure satellite system for voice, facsimile, and limited data communications. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit, i.e., ACC.


(1) Ground Maneuver Unit (Brigade equivalent) of Army or Marine Corps ground forces for humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, medical assistance, and supply
distribution. The Ground Maneuver Unit should include the Maneuver Enhancement / Engineer capabilities, and organic Signal and Logistical support.

(2) Military Police Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. To provide Command and control of military police and security forces in the operations area. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(3) Two (2) Military Police Companies. To provide force protection and safeguard DOD assets within the AO as required. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated units.

k. Logistics. Logistics baseline capabilities are focused on the strategic level of support. Many of the other baseline capabilities (i.e, ARG, Brigade, Aviation units) come with organic support capability which can also enable immediate logistics support. Based upon on-site assessment, other specialized logistics capabilities can be requested.

   (1) DLA will be prepared to provide commodity support to FEMA as indicated in the National Response Plan.

   (2) USTRANSCOM, USNORTHCOM Deployable Distribution Operations Center (NDDOC). This capability is intended to provide supply distribution management within the area of operations. See Annex D for added information on the role of this capability.

   (3) USTRANSCOM will be prepared to provide strategic lift (air and surface) capability in support of FEMA requirements, as well as patient evacuation capability as directed by the National Response Plan.

2. Request For Forces (RFF). USNORTHCOM will request force capabilities by message to the Joint Staff. Each requested unit or capability will be assigned a unique 8 digit JOPES Force Tracking Number (FTN). Forces requested as a result of receipt of a Request For Federal Assistance (RFA) from another Federal Agency or Civil authority will have an “R” as part of their FTN.
References:  
a.  USNORTHCOM COPLAN 2002 –Annex B, 29 July 2005  (S/NF)  
b.  Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, October 2005 (draft)  
c.  Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 9 March 2000  
d.  Joint Pub 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations, 5 April 1994 (S)  
e.  DIAM 58-11 (Draft), Department of Defense HUMINT Policies and Procedures, 7 May 2002 (S)  
f.  DOD Directive 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities, 25 April 1988  
g.  DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982  
h.  Sustained Vigilance, Intelligence Support for North America’s Homeland Defense –A Strategic Direction for the NORAD-USNORTHCOM J2, January 2003  
i.  US Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) Joint Forces Component Command-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), 22 Jan 2006  
j.  See additional references in base plan  

1.  Situation  
   
a.  Characteristics of the Area.  When directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), USNORTHCOM will execute DSCA operations within the USNORTHCOM OA to respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.  In order to accomplish planning and execution of DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM will ensure that timely, relevant intelligence is provided to CDRUSNORTHCOM, COCOMS, and the Alaska region.  

b.  Enemy.  No enemy forces are expected during the conduct of DSCA operations.  However, deployed DOD forces in support of civil disaster relief efforts are potentially vulnerable to any variety of adverse affects.  The specific nature of the vulnerability will be assessed as the situation develops.  Access to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Intelligence
Directorate webpages are: NIPRNET: https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/cifc/; and SIPRNET: https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/ both will provide the most current assessment concerning impacts to deployed DOD forces. Some potential threats to the DSCA force are:

(1) Foreign intelligence services and terrorists will likely monitor how the military responds to natural disasters and emergencies in order to assess USNORTHCOM’s operational capabilities. See reference a for additional current intelligence assessments concerning the threat to U.S. Forces in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Intelligence support to force protection operations is addressed in references b and c. In general, however, the majority of operational and tactical information governing operations in support of (ISO) this plan will be derived from the cognizant local, state and federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs).

c. **Friendly.** The following national-level agencies/bureau provide intelligence support: Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospational-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Also, Subordinate, Component, and Joint Task Force Intelligence activities will provide intelligence information.

d. **Legal Considerations.** Specific legal assumptions and constraints affect intelligence support to DSCA operations. Paragraph 1g (3) and (4) of the basic plan must be addressed in parallel to this Annex in developing supporting plans or execution orders. Use of the DOD Intelligence Community (IC) Components ISO DSCA operations for analysis and production of data from airborne sensors ISO damage assessment and search and rescue operations is authorized. Use of DOD IC Components when providing Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies must comply with established policy and guidance contained in DOD Directive, Instruction, and Manual 3025.dd, DSCA (drafts).

2. **Mission:** Provide predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against and within the USNORTHCOM AOR using fused all-source intelligence to support the planning and execution of DSCA operations; respond to subordinate and component Priority Intelligence Requests; coordinate the joint intelligence activities of participating commands; coordinate requisite support from national level intelligence agencies; and, as appropriate, share intelligence information at the local, state, and federal levels.

3. **Execution:**

a. **Concept of Intelligence Operations.** NORAD-USNORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate (N-NC/J2) will provide intelligence support to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Battle Staff and JTF DSCA, if required, via the Operational Intelligence Watch (OIW), which operates a 24 hour intelligence watch at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station. The OIW will be the theater level focal point for intelligence flow and is responsible for the coordination between theater and subordinate intelligence activities required to support execution of this plan. N-NC/J2 and NC/J3 will coordinate to provide appropriate dissemination of non-foreign intelligence information in accordance with (IAW) governing legal constraints.
b. **Tasks.** N-NC/J2 ensures seamless, dynamic, and collaborative intelligence and information exchanges within the intelligence and counterintelligence/Law Enforcement communities. Key tasks include real-time and near-real-time Indications and Warnings (I&W); Fusion and Analysis; Counterintelligence; planning intelligence policy and programming requirements; and information, physical, automated data processing, and industrial security.

c. **Priority Intelligence Requirements.** PIRs are coordinated between N-NC/J2 and NC/J3 weekly and can be accessed on the N-NC Webpage at: [http://j2web.northcom.smil.mil/PIRs.pdf](http://j2web.northcom.smil.mil/PIRs.pdf).

d. **New Requirements.** Requests for specific national agency support and Intelligence requirements needed to support planning and execution should be directed to the N-NC Intelligence Policy, Plans, and Programs Division (J25X).

e. **Collection.**

(1) All collection requirements in support of this plan will be coordinated through the Collection Management Branch, Operations Division, Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). As the command’s Collection Management Authority (CMA), Collection Management Branch coordinates all collection requirements for submission to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT). As ISR resources are apportioned to the command for Joint Staff directed missions, Collection Management Branch will continue to execute CMA, however Collection Operations Management (COM) for apportioned ISR resources will be performed by the NORTHCOM Joint Component Command that is assigned the mission. COM must be closely coordinated with the NORTHCOM’s JIOC Production Manager, to ensure efficient federated product in order to properly support operations.

(2) As required, USSTRATCOM through Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance will assist USNORTHCOM to plan, integrate and employ ISR assets, including associated Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED) capabilities through the Geographic Combatant Commanders, Services, federated analytical and production centers, and mission partners. Integration and coordination of ISR activities with DOD agencies, other government agencies, allies, and friends is essential.

(3) If unable to contact the JIOC, the Operational Intelligence Watch (OIW), conduct 24/7 operations in Cheyenne Mountain and is available to accept intelligence requests/requirements. Utilization of the group e-mail addresses: cifg@cheyennemountain.af.mil (UNCLAS), nncj23oiw@cheyennemountain.af.smil.mil (SIPRNET), emocj2oiw@norad.cas.spacecom.af.mil (RELCAN), or emocj2@northcom.ic.gov (JWICS) will route the request to the appropriate OIW.
personnel. OIW STE/STU-III capable numbers are, Commercial: (719) 474-4508, or 474-4524; and DSN: 268-4508, 268-3979, or 268-4524.


g. Processing and Evaluation. All requirements ISO USNORTHCOM subordinate and component forces will be coordinated between component and subordinate J2s or JTF J2, if operational, and the N-NC/J2. See reference b. The Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-S) is requested to submit requests for information/intelligence (RFI) through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Operations Center (JOC) RFI process. The NGB JOC will validate, coordinate, and answer; however, RFIs that concern a threat to the USNORTHCOM OA should be forwarded to N-NC/J2 for resolution.

h. Analysis and Production. Data derived from law enforcement information; and all-source strategic and asymmetric capabilities is fused, analyzed, and assessed. Using various analytical techniques, the information is collated into tailored products that provide predictive and actionable threat characterization; and timely warning of threats to the USNORTHCOM AOR. The fundamental precepts to this process are; know the enemy, know ourselves (critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities), know the environment, and know what the enemy knows about us. Products are made available to customers via NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS common operation environment capabilities.

i. Dissemination and Integration. Information for support to DSCA is disseminated in the most expeditious manner available, with the priority of five networks going to that which is of primary use by the forces supporting the operation. The NORTHCOM J2 model is a federated, web-based approach with a subscription service which allows the customer to sign up for the reports key to their aspect of the operation, thereby being immediately notified via email that information has been posted. Central to dissemination is a graphic, interactive information summary, the Intelligence Common Operational Picture (ICOP). The ICOP is a venue which provides a series of layers, such as imagery, mapping data, infrastructure, and blue forces; which together constitute Intelligence Preparation of the Environment. Current crisis reporting is superimposed upon this foundation, providing pertinent information to planners and operators. This reporting is augmented by ancillary imagery, geospatial, and written products which provide amplifying information for mission accomplishment.

(1) During a DSCA event, tactical units will be required to forward status information on a 12 to 24 hour basis, depending upon the operation.

(2) The desired format is direct input into the ICOP, but contingency format is by the most expeditious route possible, such as email.

(3) To every extent possible, information is provided at the Secret Releasable to Canada level or below; this is accomplished by the “Write for Release” program.

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j. NCJ2 uses a federated approach to mission support. Tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) is done by partners within the intelligence community, with NCJ2 orchestrating the process.

(1) NCJ2 hosts video teleconferences (VTCs) and teleconferences for TPED coordination with the various partners; periodicity as required. Coordination is further supported by a federated matrix which delineates responsibilities.

(2) Domestic information is reviewed for intelligence oversight regulation adherence, and as needed, regulations are relaxed by legal counsel. A standing Proper Use Memorandums is in place for NC, and amendments are added as needed.

k. Coordinating Instructions. Intelligence Oversight restrictions on intelligence activities may exist based upon references f, g, and h, and upon DOD guidelines and rules for the Use of Force at the time of execution of this plan. Contact the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Director of Intelligence and Information Operations Systems Lawyer at Commercial (719) 554-2229 or DSN: 692-2229 or the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate at Commercial: (719)554-9193, if additional information is needed.

4. Assignment of Intelligence Tasks.

a. Orders to Subordinate and Component Commands

(1) Joint Task Force (JTF) DSCA J2

(a) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure portable voice communications.

(b) Conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(c) Identify requirements for national and theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Identify JTF intelligence shortfalls.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(2) Commander, JTF-NORTH. The JTF-NORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references
(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(3) Commander, JTF-Alaska. The JTF-Alaska/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(4) Commander, JTF-Civil Support (CS). The JTF-CS/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.
(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(5) Commander, JFHQ-National Capital Region (NCR). The JFHQ-NCR/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(6) Commander, ARNORTH. The ARNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.
(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(7) Commander, MARFORNORTH. The MARFORNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(8) Commander, Fleet Forces Command (FFC). The FFC/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

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(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(9) Commander, AFNORTH. The AFNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support N-NC/J2 in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analyst support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(10) Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Transportation

(a) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM via secure communications.

(b) Conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(c) Coordinate and consolidate reporting and production of the status of distribution networks in the affected area.

(d) Disseminate the common picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.
(e) Monitor N-NC/J2 threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

5. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Cooperating Units. Request for intelligence and information support to address DSCA related domestic disasters, emergencies, incidents or events will be made, via appropriate channels, to the following national-level agencies/bureau: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

TIMOTHY J. KEATING
Admiral, USN
Commander, USNORTHCOM

M. A. NOLL, SES-1 DAFC
Director of Intelligence
ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
OPERATIONS

References: Per Base plan

1. General.

a. Purpose. This annex provides direction for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for incidents and events described in the National Response Plan (NRP). USNORTHCOM executes DSCA missions by providing support (military forces, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and or DOD agency and component assets) when directed by the President or as approved or delegated by the Secretary of Defense.

(1) Likely DSCA missions include:

(a) Assistance provided by DOD, when requested, in response to disasters (natural and man-made, including acts of terrorism), which can also be Incidents of National Significance, and may also require support as outlined in the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the National Response Plan (NRP). 

(b) Assistance provided by DOD, when requested, to support Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated National Special Security Events (NSSE) and approved Special Events (SE) and supporting Law Enforcement in certain circumstances.

(2) General process for requesting DOD support. Federal Agencies or State Governors request DOD capabilities to support their disaster response efforts by using a formal Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) Process. Requests flow to DOD through various means, depending on the nature of the incident (whether the rules of the Stafford Act apply or not), how much time has elapsed since the incident occurred (Immediate Response, JFO established, PFO appointed, JTF deployed), and the level at which the request is generated (Incident command, State, Regional, or National).

(a) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et seq.), authorizes the federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. This act provides authority for disaster preparedness, presidential grants for planning, presidential declarations of major disaster or emergency, formation of immediate support teams, reimbursement to agencies (including DOD), and major disaster assistance programs to help state and local governments mitigate the suffering and damage caused by disasters, emergencies, and other incidents. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is normally the Primary Federal Agency for responses covered by the Stafford Act. A typical
scenario includes the requirement being identified at the event site, Incident Command Post, through situational awareness and assessment. If the local responders are capable of meeting the requirement, they do so. If not, State resources are checked. If they cannot provide the necessary capability, Disaster Field Office and or Joint Field Office (JFO), once established, is queried. The ability to fill the requirement is checked against multiple, potential sources. These include checks with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, other FEMA ESF managers, the State National Guard capabilities, other States National Guard capabilities (supporting under Emergency Management Agreement Compact / EMAC), and confirmation that contractor support is not available to meet the requirement. If there is no capability to meet the requirement, the Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) is passed to the Defense Liaison Officer / Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and his supporting staff Element (DCE). All RFA from FEMA, including Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs), should be processed through the Defense Liaison Officer / Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) tasked to support the involved FEMA Region.

1. Defense Liaison Officers (DLO) are provided to each FEMA regional office from ARNORTH. In this role, prior to being requested and designated authority as a Defense Coordinating Officer by USNORTHCOM for an incident, these personnel provide the conduit to flow information (planning efforts, regional concerns, pre-event RFA, and pre-scripted RFA / MA) into ARNORTH and USNORTHCOM. As a DLO, they review and clarify the RFA if necessary, pass an informational copy to ARNORTH, USNORTHCOM, and JDOMS. The RFA is processed through the requesting agency’s channels and into the DOD Executive Secretary. When requested and directed by USNORTHCOM to act as a DCO, this officer has the authority to determine if a RFA is appropriate for DOD to fill using the following criteria:

   i. Legality. Does DOD, active component, have authority to do this (Posse Comitatus)?

   ii. Lethality. Use of lethal force by or against DOD personnel likely or expected?

   iii. Risk. Can the request be met safely, or can concerns be mitigated by equipment or training?

   iv. Cost. Who pays, is there a fund cite provided?

   v. Appropriateness. Who normally performs and is best suited to fill the request (USACE, National Guard, USCG, contractors)? Is there a determinations and finding statement stating that providing this support is in the best interest of the government and that the requested support cannot be provided as conveniently or economically by other means (or similar wording)?
vi. Readiness. Are the force capabilities requested preparing for other deployments or significant training events (if known)?

2. If the DCO determines the request is not appropriate, the request may be rejected and sent back to the requesting agency.

3. The DCO also ensures the request is readily understandable and generally matches a DOD capability. If it is not, the DCO / E attempt to clarify and provide recommended language to the requestor.

4. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) are senior reserve officers who are the representatives of their military service to the Civil Authority, the FEMA, and to the DCO / E. EPLO have authority to self-activate and are under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the appropriate Supporting Service Command (ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH) to USNORTHCOM. EPLO assist the DCO in the assessment of the RFA. EPLO support the State Emergency Operations Centers, Regional Operations Centers, and the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) as tasked by their own service.

5. The DCO / E coordinates with the USNORTHCOM Operational Headquarters (JTF, Contingency Support Group, Response Support Group, Operational Command Post, Joint Force Commander, etc.), supporting the mission. The Operational Headquarters assesses the following:

   i. Whether additional operational or logistics support is required due to the anticipated increase in forces under their span of control. If added support capabilities, facilities, or additional staffing are required, the Operational Headquarters provides notification to USNORTHCOM and its appropriate Service Component Command (ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH).

   ii. To determine the potential of already deployed forces to meet the requirement. If so, the forces are provided a WARNORD and the assessed ability to support is reported to the DCO, the Service Component Command, and USNORTHCOM. Providing the support is not authorized until the RFA is approved by the SecDef, except to save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage under the Immediate Response allowance.

   iii. Impact on planned force flow and JRSoI.

   iv. The expected mission of the requested capability and an analysis to determine the Measures Of Performance (MOP) appropriate for the anticipated capability to enable reporting to support the Measurement Of Effectiveness (MOE) towards the desired effects.
v. Any additional considerations, or recommendations in regards to how best to support the request are provided to the DCO, the Service Component Command, and USNORTHCOM.

6. If the DCO determines that the RFA is an appropriate DOD mission, he / she provides the RFA to the NORAD USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) along with a recommendation. Additional information such as points of contact, updated assessment, and refined costing data can be provided after the RFA has gone forward.

7. In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and pass directly to the JDOMS or the DOD Executive Secretary, vice though a DLO or DCO. This may occur for initial requests in accordance with the NRP, or when a DLO / DCO is not assigned or available to the FEMA regional office, or when the request is thought to be Non-Stafford Act. These RFA are processed the same as Non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and USNORTHCOM conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to OASD(HD) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval.

(b) When a RFA is received at USNORTHCOM, a copy is immediately provided to JDOMS (and vice versa) to begin parallel coordination and planning efforts. USNORTHCOM conducts coordination with appropriate stakeholders depending on the nature of the incident and the requested support. Stakeholders may include the Supporting Service Command Headquarters (ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH), the Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), USTRANSCOM, USPACOM, the National Guard of the affected state, the National Guard Bureau, DOD Agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), subordinate units, and other Federal organizations and agencies as appropriate. This stakeholder coordination is done quickly, utilizing teleconferencing, video teleconferencing, and automated collaborative tools. Based upon the results of stakeholder coordination, USNORTHCOM provides a recommendation to JDOMS on how best to support the needs of the requestor.

(c) The recommendation goes forward through OASD (HD) to the SecDef for decision.

1. Upon SecDef approval, the Joint Staff releases an Execute Order (EXORD) to designate supported, supporting commands and to task Commands, Services, and DOD agencies to provide support.

2. USNORTHCOM provides a supporting EXORD, implementing this CONPLAN and establishing command relationships, providing task and purpose, and providing coordinating instructions to the supporting force.
(d) Non-Stafford Act requests may originate from a State Governor, Federal Agency, or other approved entity. These RFA are provided in writing to the DOD Executive Secretary. The RFA is made under the terms of The Economy Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

1. Parallel coordination occurs as described above, by USNORTHCOM and JDOMS.

2. The RFA is reviewed under the criteria of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness. Recommendations based on these criteria are consolidated and a final recommendation is provided through OASD HD to the SecDef for decision. If the RFA is determined inappropriate for DOD, the recommendation is made to the SecDef for disapproval.

3. If approved by the SecDef, an EXORD is published by the Joint Staff and USNORTHCOM as described above.

4. USNORTHCOM may direct a DCO / E to deploy in support of the requestor to assess and process subsequent RFAs.

(e) The following flow diagram, Figure C-1 outlines the RFA decision process in general.
Figure C-1, RFA Process Matrix

b. Mission. When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to assist civil authorities during emergencies, natural or man-made disasters, and other approved activities.

c. Alliance Plans. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA according to the National Response Plan (NRP), National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS), and National Incident Management System (NIMS).

d. Theater. See Base Plan for descriptions of the Area of Operations (AO).

2. Concept of Operations. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in five (5) phases: Shaping, Staging, Deployment, Support of Civil Authorities, and Transition. The Shaping phase is continuous and allows USNORTHCOM to gain situational awareness, identify capabilities, and alert DCOs of an impending event. Staging allows USNORTHCOM to respond proactively to an event by pre-positioning response forces, deploying the command assessment element (CAE), and establishing command and control or the JOA. The Deployment phase accounts for the movement of response forces, Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration.
(JRSOI), and ready to begin the conduct of mission assignments. Phase IV, DSCA, is the decisive phase. This is where DOD forces support civil authorities. The Transition phase allows response forces to hand their responsibilities back to civil authorities and concludes with redeployment. This CONPLAN includes sample effects and the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) as applicable within each phase. Throughout the operation, support is requested in accordance with DOD Instruction 3025.dd. USNORTHCOM determines the desired effects, focuses military efforts to achieve the effects, and applies criteria to measure the effectiveness of the support provided. By focusing military efforts to achieve these desired effects, military support transitions from one operational phase to the next.

a. Phase I, Shaping. Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, exercises, and public affairs outreach (which continues through all phases). When an event or specific incident is identified which is anticipated to require execution of this plan (large scale DOD support to a Federal Agency or DOD specialized support): USNORTHCOM executes Shaping actions to ensure mission success. These actions may vary according to the nature of the potential event or incident (See Appendixes for additional information on specific DSCA missions). During this phase, major actions are:

   (1) Utilization of Information Operations (IO) tools and public affairs messages supporting the themes of military readiness.

   (2) Maintain trained and ready response capabilities.

   (3) Focus intelligence integration efforts within the limits of legal authority on further defining the threat.

   (4) USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA planning for SE and NSSE.

b. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Shaping Phase (I) may include:

(Effects may be included in Commanders Situational Awareness Meetings in various formats)

   (1) Effect 1.1, Positive Media Reporting on Military and USNORTHCOM capabilities to respond to incidents and events.

      (a) MOE 1.1.1: Increase number of positive media reports on USNORTHCOM capabilities.

      (b) MOE 1.1.2: Decrease in the number of media reports requiring USNORTHCOM rebuttal and / or request for correction.

   (2) Effect 1.2, Planning and Integration

      (a) MOE 1.2.1: Increase in the number of DSCA plans that integrate USNORTHCOM and supporting commands with the Interagency community, States, and National Guard.
c. Situational awareness and preparedness are constant, ongoing actions. Plans are established, specific preparations for events and incidents are made, and focused Intelligence, Information Operations and public affairs tools are employed to shape the environment for successful support.

d. Phase II, Staging. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. This Phase includes actions taken as Immediate Response to the incident occurrence by Commanders proximate to the incident under imminently serious conditions to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage when time does not allow the requesting of approval from higher headquarters (see DOD Directive 3025 for added information). Additional instances of Immediate Response may occur throughout the execution of this plan, as circumstances warrant. DSCA operations are diverse, ranging from designated Special Events (SE), requiring little DOD support, such as providing explosive detection dog (EDD) teams to support a political or sporting event, to Catastrophic Incidents on the scale of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2005). Triggers to initiate this phase are:

   (1) Presidential disaster declaration issued IAW the Stafford Act.

   (2) FEMA and or DHS requesting DOD Crisis Response capabilities (SAR, emergency medical, reconnaissance, rotary wing assets, DCO / DCE support as examples).

   (3) Secretary of DHS declares an Incident of National Significance.

   (4) DOD Executive Secretary receives a Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) from another Federal agency.

   (5) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers receives a Mission Assignment from FEMA. (FEMA requests for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are not required to process through the DOD Executive Secretary, per the NRP and may be pre-scripted)

   (6) DOD receives a pre-scripted Mission Assignment from FEMA (see Appendix 3 to Annex A for additional information).

e. During this phase, major actions are:

   (1) Identify force capabilities for response and request increased alert. Increase Response Posture Levels (RPL) for select force capabilities as appropriate.

   (2) Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition.

   (3) Coordination with the Interagency community for a mutually supporting response.
(4) Coordinate with National Guard Bureau and State National Guard Joint Force Headquarters elements to ensure DOD unity of effort (to include employment plans for National Guard, WMD-CST).

(5) Deploy Commander’s Assessment Element (CAE) and or Commander’s Coordination Element (CCE) from USNORTHCOM (SJFHQ-North) and from JTF-CS as necessary.

(6) Publish orders.

(7) Establish Common Operating Picture (COP) with all involved commands and agencies.

(8) Deployment of Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Joint Field Office (JFO) when established or other designated location if not.

(9) Deploy Command and Control (C2) advance party element.

(10) Designation of primary and alternate military installations for use as staging bases and mobilization centers by Federal response agencies (and potentially as reception sites for international aid donations). The use of Non-DOD owned sites for use in staging or distributing supplies will be coordinated with state and local authorities.

(11) Deployment of liaison officers and self activation of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO).

(12) Repositioning of forces and supplies to avoid loss from the event, or repositioning proximate to the event to speed response. (USNORTHCOM coordinates with owning services and with the Defense Logistics Agency’s Defense Distribution Center).

(13) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers deploys appropriate regional Deployable Tactical Operating System (DTOS) Teams to provide Engineer Assessment, evaluate environmental concerns, coordinate flood control measures, provide contracting services, and provide a rapid deployable communications capability.

(14) Commanders in proximity to the event, when requested by civil authorities, provide Immediate Response to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. All Immediate Response actions must be reported as soon as possible (within hours) up the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC). USNORTHCOM requires this visibility to ensure unity of effort by DOD forces.

(15) Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) may be provided by Air Force units under Air Force Regulation 64-1, and AFI 10-802, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). Army units may provide response under Army Regulation (AR) 500-4 as assets are available. MAST operations include emergency medical evacuation and patient transport. (see also DOD Directive 4500.9)
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(16) USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM coordinate on response capabilities for: Air movements, Military Sealift Command maritime transportation and logistics assets, and for USTRANSCOM Deployed Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) support to USNORTHCOM as the NDDOC.

(17) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) locations are identified (coordinated with the National Guard as necessary) and processing instructions are provided in EXORDs / DEPORDs to alerted units.

(18) Provide a USNORTHCOM planning team to the NRP identified Federal Coordinating agency for the expected incident type (to US Department of Agriculture for Food or agriculture related event, to Department of Health and Human Services for potential disease outbreaks, to FEMA NRCC for hurricane and natural disasters, etc.)

(19) Joint Search and Rescue Cell / Center forms from Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) and U.S. Coast Guard personnel (others as required) to coordinate search and rescue operations in the affected area.

(20) Prevent detrimental acts against DOD personnel, and during NSSE and Special Events (SE) by implementing force protection and force health protection measures and security measures.

f. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Staging Phase may include.

(1) Effect 2.1, Assets staged for response.

   (a) MOE 2.1.1: Increase number of pre-positioned forces (LNO, DCO, DCE, EPLO, CAE / CCE, Planning Teams).

   (b) MOE 2.1.2: Number of alerted units achieving increase in Response Posture Levels (RPL).

   (c) MOE 2.1.3: Increase in the availability of anticipated supplies and logistics capabilities (increase level of stocks identified).

(2) Effect 2.2, Transition of local forces providing Immediate Response (cessation or incorporation into overall response) due to initial event occurrence.

   (a) MOE 2.2.1: Decrease in number of forces reporting Immediate Response actions.

   (b) MOE 2.2.2: Increase in local forces incorporated into the USNORTHCOM established C2.

g. The Staging Phase ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a prepare to deploy order (PTDO). Immediate Response, to the initial incident, is anticipated to end soon after the event occurrence. DOD elements providing support as initial immediate response will either complete the action, or will be incorporated in the USNORTHCOM led response. DSCA operations for SE and NSSE, will move to Phase V, Transition, if no incident
response is required (ergo, no incident occurs) during execution and response forces are not required to deploy.

h. Phase III, Deployment. Phase III begins with response force deployment. Triggers to initiate this phase are:

(1) USNORTHCOM designated as the Supported Combatant Commander by the Joint Staff and or SecDef by either VOCO or receipt of EXORD or PLANORD.

(2) Command Assessment Elements (CAE) / Command Coordination Element (CCE) on the site report a significant need for increased DOD support.

i. Major actions during the Deployment Phase (III) include:

(1) Employment of Command and Control (C2) elements and assignment of Operations / Joint Operations Area (JOA).

(2) Deployment of Enabling Forces to prevent the over-extension of local responder abilities.

(3) Deployment of Crisis Response Force Packages as appropriate and as approved by SecDef (or as delegated). (see Appendix 3 to Annex A)

(4) Units and individuals reporting into the JOA process through Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) facilities.

(5) Continued coordination with State Guard elements, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Interagency to ensure unity of effort.

(6) Military control and coordination of airspace in the event area in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

(7) Installation support provided initially by MOA / MOU or Immediate Response is now either complete, or incorporated into the USNORTHCOM led response via the RSOI process and forces are either OPCON or TACON to the established C2 organization (RTF / TF / JTF).

(8) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) deploys.

(9) Planned DOD Force Flow completed (exceptions requested as necessary).

j. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for Deployment may include:

(1) Effect 3.1, Increasing Build-up of force capabilities in the AO / JOA.

   (a) MOE 3.1.1: Increase in number of deployed active duty units processing through JRSOI.

   (b) MOE 3.1.2; Increased number of National Guard forces in the AO / JOA.
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(2) Effect 3.2, Build up of logistics capabilities.

(a) MOE 3.2.1: Increase in accessible gallons of potable water in impacted area.

(b) MOE 3.2.2: Increase in available rations (medical supplies, decontamination capabilities, etc. as appropriate) in the AO / JOA.

(c) MOE 3.2.2: Increase in transportation capabilities in the AO / JOA.

k. The Deployment Phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. Forces continue to flow into the JOA based on requirements to meet Federal Agency Mission Assignments, the changing operational focus (crisis response to stabilization, then to sustainment operations), and as specialized capability requirements are identified.

l. Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. Phase IV begins when DSCA response operations commence. This phase includes the rapid employment of DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. There will be considerable overlap between this phase and the previous deployment phase as units arrive in the AO / JOA and begin providing support. Triggers for this phase include:

(1) Units complete JRSOI.

(2) Receipt of additional FEMA Mission Assignment (MA) requesting DOD support.

m. Major actions during the Provide DSCA Phase (IV) include:

(1) Command and Control (C2), medical, transportation, communications, power generation, water purification, and supply units are rapidly established and become operational. Life support services (water, food, medical care, shelter) are the mission focus. Supplies are procured through normal DOD process through Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) purchase and contracting with available local vendors.

(2) Military forces provide public assurance of the national focus on response by being present in the stricken area.

(3) Military conducts coordination of airspace, establishes Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs), and manages airspace as requested and IAW regulations.

(4) Military elements conduct debris clearing operations to allow access to affected areas by ground.

(5) Joint Logistics Operations utilized when large scale humanitarian relief assistance required. A Joint Logistics Task Force may form if required.

(6) Military provides water purification, power generation, transportation, and communications support as priority missions.

(7) Medical support requirements decrease as patients move to civilian facilities (military supports patient movements).
8. Military supports environmental clean-up operations.

9. Military supports mortuary affairs operations as needed.

10. Support provided as requested by the responsible Federal agency and approved by DOD. (See Appendixes for information on specific DSCA operations)

11. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides flood control/response as authorized under Public Law 84-99 and provides support in response to approved FEMA Mission Assignments. These operations happen within USNORTHCOM’s JOA, but outside USNORTHCOM C2.

n. Measures of Effectiveness for the Provide DSCA Phase (IV) may include:

(1) Effect 4.1, Upon event occurrence, existing casualties treated and or evacuated.
   (a) MOE 4.1.1: Decrease in number of reported deaths.
   (b) MOE 4.1.2; Decrease in personnel awaiting medical treatment.
   (c) MOE 4.1.3; Decrease in personnel awaiting evacuation.

(2) Effect 4.2, At risk personnel removed from the incident area.
   (a) MOE 4.2.1: Decrease in personnel requiring evacuation from impacted areas.
   (b) MOE 4.2.2: Increase in rural impacted sectors cleared.

(3) Effect 4.3, Hazards to life or health mitigated or eliminated.
   (a) MOE 4.3.1: Increase in the number of life-threatening hazards made safe or mitigated (levee breaches, suspect explosive devices, polluted sites, damaged buildings, disease transmission sources, etc.).
   (b) MOE 4.3.2: Decrease in the number of Search and Rescue Operations performed (and or required).

(4) Effect 4.4, Life support services available.
   (a) MOE 4.4.1: Decrease in personnel without access to potable water.
   (b) MOE 4.4.2: Decrease in personnel without access to food.
   (c) MOE 4.4.3: Decrease in personnel without access to medical treatment.
   (d) MOE 4.4.4: Decrease in number of displaced persons without access to shelter (short term/long term).

(5) Effect 4.5, Vital, life sustaining services restored.
(a) MOE 4.5.1: Increase in potable water services restored.

(b) MOE 4.5.2: Increase in gas/electric power services restored.

(c) MOE 4.5.3: Increase in transportation services.

(d) MOE 4.5.4: Increase in communications services restored (i.e., mass media [TV & Radio], telephone).

(e) MOE 4.5.5: Increase in delivery services restored (mail, essential logistics, etc.).

(6) Effect 4.6, Permanent services restored (utilities, communications, transportation).

(a) MOE 4.6.1: Increase in water services restored.

(b) MOE 4.6.2: Increase in gas/electric power services restored.

(c) MOE 4.6.3: Increase in fuel services restored (gas stations open).

(d) MOE 4.6.4: Increase in transportation services (buses, train service, subways, commercial trucking).

(e) MOE 4.6.5: Increase in communications services restored (i.e., mass media [TV & Radio], telephone).

(f) MOE 4.6.6: Increase in delivery services restored (mail, essential logistics, etc.).

(7) Effect 4.7, Oil and natural gas infrastructure returned to operations.

(a) MOE 4.7.1: Increase in oil production rate.

(b) MOE 4.7.2: Increase in oil refinery rate.

(c) MOE 4.7.3: Increase in oil distribution rate.

(d) MOE 4.7.4: Increase in natural gas production rate.

(e) MOE 4.7.5: Increase in natural gas refinery rate.

(f) MOE 4.7.6: Increase in natural gas distribution rate.

(8) Effect 4.8, Waterways re-opened to commerce.

(a) MOE 4.8.1: Decrease in closed waterways.

(b) MOE 4.8.2: Decrease in closed port facilities.

(c) MOE 4.8.3: Increase in commercial activity.

(9) Effect 4.9, Transportation systems restored.
(a) MOE 4.9.1: Increase in federal and state highways re-opened to normal, pre-incident traffic flow.

(b) MOE 4.9.2: Increase in rail lines reopened.

(c) MOE 4.9.3: Increase in air passenger and cargo service.

(d) MOE 4.9.4: Increase in maritime passenger and cargo service.

o. Phase IV, Provide DSCA ends with civil authorities prepared to assume responsibility for operations. Robust distribution networks are established, and medical and essential services are operating and meeting the basic needs of the personnel in the affected area. USNORTHCOM established (event specific) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are showing consistent, positive effects.

p. Phase V, Transition, begins with civil authorities assuming responsibility with no degradation of operations. The phases, IV and V, overlap as civil authorities and infrastructure regain the ability to support. DSCA operations continue until they can be handed off to civil authorities in all areas. Triggers include:

(1) Decrease in military mission requirements.

(2) Termination of Mission Assignments.

(3) Civil Authorities begin to execute long term recovery plans.

(4) USNORTHCOM objectives and effects are achieved.

q. Major actions in the Transition Phase (V) include:

(1) Force adjustments as mission load decreases.

(2) Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC).

(3) Public safety is maintained as missions are handed over.

r. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Transition Phase may include:

(1) Effect 5.1, Perception of the national populace that the recovery effort is effective.

   (a) MOE 5.1.1: Increase in percentage of positive news releases.

   (b) MOE 5.1.2: Positive trend in third party polling results (e.g. Gallup poll).

(2) Effect 5.2, Mission closure.

   (a) MOE 5.2.1: Increased number of closure reports as units arrive at home stations.
(b) MOE 5.2.2: Decrease in ongoing Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Support Functions (ESF).

s. The phase ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. DOD forces transition to normal operations and training at their home stations.


   a. Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling

      (1) Readiness. There is no increased readiness posture associated with this CONPLAN. USNORTHCOM will publish EXORDS adjusting Force Protection levels (FPCONs), Notice to Deploy Timelines, and Response Posture Levels as the threat warrants. USNORTHCOM will recommend changes to the SecDef.
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(2) Alert. USNORTHCOM Commander’s Standing Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) set the conditions of warning likely to precede an order to implement this plan. See base plan Coordinating Instructions for standing CCIRs. See Appendixes to this Annex for situational CCIRs.

(3) Marshaling or Dispersal.

(a) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) will be established as soon as practical in the Operations Area / Joint Operations Area (JOA). All forces arriving in the JOA will be received into the area via the JRSOI process. Arriving units must provide a roster of their involved personnel, a unit description, mission statement, and a listing of their critical equipment with quantity (e.g., 5 UH-60 aircraft), and their command leadership names and method of communication (radio frequencies / cell phone numbers / email / etc.).

(b) The RTF / TF / JTF assigned responsibility for the operations area / JOA will provide arriving units with command, control, communications, and life support information (billeting, maintenance, fuel, messing, etc.).

(c) Units arriving in the operations area are required to be as self-sufficient as possible for a minimum of 3 days of operations.

(d) All units will process out of the operations area upon release by the operational commander by providing a summary of mission accomplishment, After Action Review (AAR) input for critical issues, and positive accountability of sensitive items. Units will provide a closure report to the supported operational RTF / TF / JTF (up to USNORTHCOM JOC) upon arrival at home station.

(4) OPSEC. Federal, state, and local agencies conduct emergency response operations in an unclassified forum. USNORTHCOM and subordinate commands will be active participants in the unclassified forum to ensure consistency and expeditious flow of information. In general, units may acknowledge receipt of deployment orders and commanders may confirm obvious movements, but should not disclose operational details.

b. Air Operations.

(1) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with 1st Air Force (AFNORTH) as USNORTHCOM’s designated JFACC for the 48 contiguous states, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands on pre-positioning of U.S. military aircraft to support DSCA operations. For DSCA support; active component, reserve component, and National Guard aircraft are anticipated to be required to provide reconnaissance, search and rescue, airlift, command and control, aerial refueling, etc. aircraft requirements will be written into an Air Tasking Order (ATO). To optimize air operations the overall intent is to have all participating military and other federal aircraft placed onto an Air Tasking Order (ATO).

(2) JFACC will coordinate with FAA for the movement of air traffic IAW existing FAA/DOD publications.
(3) The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) will coordinate search and rescue operations during DSCA operations.

(4) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with applicable COCOMs for assets required for the DSCA operations.

c. Air Defense Operations. Conducted by NORAD through Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) EXORD and the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense (NCR IADs) EXORD.

d. Maritime Pre-positioning Force Operations.

(1) In accordance with the established Maritime Alert Posture (MAP) Level, the U.S. Navy, Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) will place on 96 hour Prepare To Deploy status, appropriate U.S. Navy (USN) surface vessels to support DSCA operations and inform USNORTHCOM. For anticipated DSCA support following a hurricane, USN surface vessels are anticipated to be required to provide Command and Control, sea-borne rotary wing platforms and support, and potentially pier-side life support (water / power generation) and fuel operations. USN vessels may be utilized as show of force / capabilities demonstration in the shaping phase of operations as well.

(2) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with USTRANSCOM, Military Sealift Command (MSC) for the use of US Naval Ship (USNS) vessels for DSCA operations.

(3) A Maritime Component Commander will be designated when necessary to provide overall C2 of maritime forces.

e. Antisubmarine Warfare Operations. Not applicable.

f. Counterinsurgency. Not applicable.

g. Nuclear Operations. Not applicable.


i. Information Operations. The rapid production and dissemination of accurate information to the public in crisis situations is important. Such information may include messages on safety and health, locations of water and food distribution points, medical care, temporary shelters and designation of restricted areas. Communications support equipment assets of psychological operations (PSYOP) units (portable printing presses, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting stations) have great utility in response and consequence management operations. Since normal civilian facilities may be disrupted and personnel may not have the necessary individual protection equipment, capabilities normally found in PSYOP units may be employed as alternative emergency communication systems until civilian facilities can be restored. PSYOP personnel can provide commanders and civilian agencies leaders with real-time analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and feedback concerning the effectiveness of the information and support being disseminated. See Appendix 3.

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j. **Special Operations.** Not applicable.

k. **Personnel Recovery Operations.** Not applicable.

l. **Rules for the Use of Force.** Appendix 6.

m. **Reconnaissance.** Not applicable.

n. **Air Base Operability.** During response operations, USNORTHCOM anticipates the requirement to open and operate civil air ports for a limited time to allow the movement of forces and supplies into the incident area. When necessary, CDRUSNORTHCOM will task the JFACC with this mission.

o. **Combat Camera.** Appendix 9.

p. **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.** Not applicable.

q. **Escape and Evasion Operations.** Not applicable.

r. **Counterattack.** Not applicable.

s. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).** Employment of EOD units not responding as Immediate Response per DODD 3025.15, will be requested and when approved, directed by USNORTHCOM. EOD units will operate IAW their organic Standard Operating Procedures. EOD and Explosives Detection Dog (EDD) Teams are anticipated requirements for NSSE and SE support.

t. **Amphibious Operations.** Not applicable.

u. **Force Protection.** Appendix 15.

v. **Critical Infrastructure Protection.** Appendix 16.

w. **Additional Appendixes provided for specific DSCA missions.**

4. **Operational Constraints.**

a. Competing demands will exist for Low Density/High Demand units.

b. Current Intelligence (CI) oversight laws define domestic intelligence collection and fusion rules.

c. Existing statutes restrict offensive Information Operations (IO) against US citizens.
Appendixes
1 -- Nuclear Operations – Not used
2 -- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides – Not Used
3 -- Information Operations
4 -- Special Operations – Not used
5 -- Personnel Recovery Operations – Not used
6 -- Rules of the Use of Force
7 -- Reconnaissance – Not used
8 -- Air Base Operability – Not used
9 -- Combat Camera
10 -- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations – Not used
11 -- Escape and Evasion Operations – Not used
12 -- Counterattack – Not used
13 -- Explosive Ordnance Disposal – Not used
14 -- Amphibious Operations – Not used
15 -- Force Protection
16 -- Critical Infrastructure Protection
17 -- Incidents of National Significance
18 -- Postal Augmentation
19 -- Severe Weather
20 -- Wild land Fire Fighting
21 -- National Special Security Events and Special Events
22 -- Law Enforcement Support
23 -- Military Assistance During Civil Disturbances
24 -- Non-Lethal Weapons
25 -- Defense Coordinating Officer
26 -- State Funeral Support (TBP)

OFFICIAL:

RICHARD J. ROWE, JR
Major General, USA
Director of Operations
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 2501-05
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

References:


c. Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 7 April 2000


f. Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 31 May 1996

g. DODD S-3600.1, Information Operations, 9 December 1996 (S)

h. CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Operations Policy, 6 November 1998 (S)

i. CJCSI 3210.03, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy, 31 July 2002 (S)

j. CJCSI 3213.01A, Joint Operations Security, 17 December 2003

k. CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 15 June 2004

1. Situation

a. General. See base plan. USNORTHCOM will employ IO capabilities IAW US and International Laws. USNORTHCOM J39 is responsible for the planning and coordination of IO capabilities which could be used doctrinally and/or non-doctrinally in support of DSCA. IO capability refers to the use of tools normally associated with IO, several of which are multi-purpose and well suited to supporting DSCA outside of their conventional use as IO assets. Certain capabilities of IO are not expressly addressed in this appendix but could be considered following liaison with the Civil Authority.
b. **Enemy.** See base plan

c. **Friendly**

(1) USNORTHCOM IO objectives and capabilities must be integrated into overall planning. USNORTHCOM IO planners will ensure all friendly IO objectives and capabilities are identified, de-conflicted, integrated and synchronized to ensure optimal support to this plan. Forces assigned are listed in Appendix 3 to Annex A.

(a) **Augmenting Organizations.** Special Assistants to the Commander, USNORTHCOM must be included in IO planning and approval. They are:

1. **Public Affairs (PA).** PA is the coordinating element for media relations, command information, community relations and single point of contact for U.S. and foreign press. PA is the key participant in the Strategic Communications process. IO must be coordinated with USNORTHCOM PA for deconfliction, synergy and optimal messaging effect. See Annex F.

2. **Civil Affairs (CA).** TBD

3. **Judge Advocate General (JA).** Employing IO capabilities within the USNORTHCOM AOR, especially within the United States, must be properly reviewed by N-NC/JA to ensure U.S. laws, policy and regulations are followed.

4. **Interagency Coordination (IC).** Significant coordination and action to support employing IO capabilities for DSCA will be accomplished with other government agencies. IC will enable this complex and significant coordination.

5. **Political Advisor (POLAD).** Political Advisor to CDRUSNORTHCOM. If applicable, coordinates foreign offers of assistance through the Department of State to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Works with NC/J3, PA, IC and JA for foreign information sharing efforts.

(b) **Other Supported Commands, Supporting Commands, Services.** The complexities inherent in the execution of information operations require the integrated coordination of several Unified Commands, who also have supported commander responsibilities; the Services; and several Government Agencies. The Information Operations capabilities, plans, programs and activities of other Combatant Commanders’ and Agencies might have an effect on DSCA.
1. **USSTRATCOM.** Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is the supported commander for trans-regional IO to include all IO capabilities.

2. **USSOCOM.** Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) is the supporting commander for PSYOP forces and capabilities.

3. **Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC).** JIOC will provide full spectrum IO planning support to operational commanders.

4. **1st Information Operations (IO) Command.** 1st IO Command provides tailored support to Army component commands.

5. **Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM).** NAVNETWARCOM provides tailored IO support to Navy component commands.

6. **Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC).** AFIWC provides full-spectrum IO support to Air Force component commands.

7. **Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity (JCMA).** JCMA provides communication security monitoring of USJFCOM Headquarters and its Service components as required.

8. **Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC).** JWAC will normally provide support to combatant commands and the OCONUS offensive IO mission.

9. **Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS).** IOSS will provide combatant commands support in developing OPSEC programs.

10. Other combatant commands include U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Their IO capability activities will contribute to the DSCA mission and must be coordinated and synchronized to ensure unity of effort.

11. Coordination with Canada Command (CANCOM) will facilitate support with respect to requesting and movement and employment of Canadian Forces assets to support DSCA.

d. **Assumptions.** See base plan.

2. **Mission.** CDRUSNORTHCOM will optimize and execute the employment of IO capabilities in support of DSCA in the USNORTHCOM AO.

3. **Execution**
a. **Strategic Concepts.** USNORTHCOM will develop, maintain and conduct a long-term relationship with the Interagency to facilitate the planning and employment of IO or other related capabilities to address their priorities, objectives and desired effects in DSCA operations.

(1) **Strategic Objectives.** For USNORTHCOM, the following strategic objectives will define the broad spectrum of events and threats:

(a) Evaluate the use of all IO capabilities to support operations.

(b) Retain freedom of action in the Information Environment.

(c) Respond with the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.

(d) Proactively support the Primary Coordinating Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of relevant IO capabilities.

(e) Pre-deploy IO capabilities to Forward Staging Areas to expedite their use when asked.

b. **Concept of Operations.** This appendix provides for the planning and coordination of IO based on the strategic desired effects tailored to the phases of the plan and in support of operations in several distinct lines of operation as identified in the base plan. For each line of operation, USNORTHCOM and supporting military organizations will evaluate all IO capabilities to support DSCA operations. Each line of operation will be developed further for approved capabilities and their employment.

(1) **Defense Support of Civil Authorities Phases.** IO capabilities are critical given the DSCA mission areas. Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. IO will advise Civil Authorities on IO capabilities available and consider/coordinate IO capabilities which might provide support to DSCA operation. Phase II begins with identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. Due to nature of timing and placement, IO will pre-position IO capabilities, execute planning on fielding approved IO capabilities, execute immediate response approved IO capability actions or continue advising civil authorities on how IO capabilities can support DSCA. Phase III begins with the main response force deployment. IO will coordinate the deployment and execution of approved IO capabilities for DSCA. Phase IV begins when DSCA response operations commence. IO capabilities and assets are coordinated with the Civil Authorities or have been ordered by SecDef to conclude operations. IO capabilities will be executed as necessary and consider redeployment. Phase V begins with civil authorities assuming control with no degradation of operations. IO will engage in redeployment of forces back to normal operations and training.
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(2) **Disaster/Catastrophe Response.** Since disaster and catastrophe response will be almost immediate and with little or no warning or preparation time, contingency plans, interagency coordination, regularly scheduled exercises, training and education are vital to the success of DSCA operations. USNORTHCOM J39 is responsible for examining all IO capabilities with utility for DSCA and, explores ways in which to educate civil and military authorities about how IO capabilities can support DSCA, to advocate for their use and to direct their activities once deployed. As an event approaches or occurs, USNORTHCOM IO staff will advise civil authorities as to the applicability of IO capabilities for the specific DSCA operation. Once deployed, USNORTHCOM will ensure IO capability meets the needs of the civil authority. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the IO capability when released by the civil authorities.

(3) **Civil Disturbance Operations.** Since civil disturbance operations may be almost immediate and often occur with little or no warning. Contingency planning, interagency cooperation, regularly scheduled exercises, training and education are vital in understanding the causes and in planning and coordinating the appropriate response to support the Civil Authority. USNORTHCOM J39 will be responsible for examining all IO capabilities with utility for assisting the Primary Authority to manage civil disturbance and for seeking ways to educate civil and military authorities about IO capabilities, how to advocate for their employment and how control is exercised once deployed. During employment of the IO capability for DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM will ensure the capability is task-tailored to the requirement and is meeting the Primary Authority’s needs. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the capability when released by the civil authorities.

(4) **Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.** Support to law enforcement spans the spectrum from pre-planned support to immediate needs during a crisis. Under these circumstances, contingency planning, Interagency cooperation, regularly scheduled exercises, training and education are vital for success. USNORTHCOM J39 will be responsible for examining all IO capabilities with utility for support to law enforcement and seeking ways in which to educate civil and military authorities about the IO capabilities, how to advocate for their employment and how control is exercised once deployed. During employment of the IO capability for support to law enforcement, USNORTHCOM will ensure the capability is task-tailored to the requirement and is meeting the needs of the civil authorities. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the capability when released by the civil authority.

(5) **National Special Security Event (NSSE).** NSSEs are events which require significant planning and thorough execution. USNORTHCOM/J39 does have the capability to plan and coordinate IO in support of NSSEs. The execution is vested in either a JTF or provided to the JTF as a supported command. USNORTHCOM J39 will be responsible for reviewing and making recommendations as to the
applicability of IO capabilities for each NSSE and for educating the Primary Agency and assigned military authorities about IO capabilities prior to an event, how to advocate for their employment and how control is exercised once they are deployed. During the execution and or employment of IO capability for NSSEs, USNORTHCOM will ensure the capability is task-tailored to the requirement and meets the needs of the civil authority. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the capability when released by the civil authority.

(6) Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF). WFF occurs on a regular basis and USNORTHCOM supports as requested. While no IO capabilities are directly connected to WFF with exception of Combat Camera (discussed in detail in App 9 to Annex C) USNORTHCOM J39 will be responsible for examining IO capabilities which might support these events and carrying through with the appropriate process for employment.

(7) Postal Augmentation. While no IO capabilities are directly connected to Postal Augmentation, USNORTHCOM J39 will be responsible for examining IO capabilities which might support these events and carrying through with the appropriate process for employment.

c. IO Objectives

(1) Phase I

(a) Gain approval to use the IO capabilities with utility for DSCA operations.

(b) Plan and coordinate the use of the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.

1. IO capability utility for DSCA is understood by military decision makers.

2. Use of an IO capability for DSCA is approved by military decision makers.

3. IO capability is coordinated for forces, logistics and positioning.

(c) Support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of IO capabilities.

1. IO capability utility for DSCA is understood by civilian decision makers.

2. Use of an IO capability for DSCA is approved by civilian decision makers.
3. IO capability is coordinated for DSCA support requirements and positioning.

(2) Phase II

(a) Phase I activities continue and are coordinated and deconflicted. All actions mentioned for Phase I should be considered for Phase II.

(b) Respond with the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.
   
   1. IO capabilities are prepared to deploy.
   
   2. IO capability LNO is provided to civil authorities.

(c) Support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of IO capabilities.
   
   1. IO capability response is coordinated.
   
   2. IO capability response is prepared to deploy upon approval.

(3) Phase III

(a) Phase II activities continue and are coordinated and deconflicted with Phase IV activities. All actions mentioned for Phase I and II should be considered for Phase III.

(b) Respond with the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.
   
   1. IO capabilities are deployed.
   
   2. IO capabilities are responsive to USNORTHCOM C2.
   
   3. IO capabilities are executing as directed.

(c) Support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of IO capabilities.
   
   1. IO capabilities are positioned as requested.
   
   2. IO capabilities are responsive to DSCA requirements.

(4) Phase IV
(a) Support of civil authorities phase activities are executed and are coordinated and deconflicted with previous phase activities. All actions mentioned for Phase I, II and III should be considered for this phase.

(b) Respond with the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.

1. IO capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. IO capabilities are responsive to USNORTHCOM C2.

3. IO capabilities are executing as directed.

(c) Support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of IO capabilities.

1. IO capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. IO capabilities are positioned as requested.

3. IO capabilities are responsive to DSCA requirements.

(5) Phase V

(a) Phase V activities continue as required and are coordinated and deconflicted with Phase IV activities. All actions mentioned for Phase I, II, III, and IV should be considered for Phase V.

(b) Respond with the full spectrum of IO capabilities as directed.

1. IO capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. IO capabilities are redeploying as directed.

(c) Support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of IO capabilities.

1. IO capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. IO capabilities are redeployed as required.

d. Coordinating Instructions. See Tabs B, C and D to this Appendix; the tabs set forth specific coordination for general application of each IO capability.

(1) Public Affairs Coordination. Public affairs coordination will occur during all operations.
(2) **Interagency Coordination.** Interagency coordination is vital to the success of IO in support of DSCA operations. Interagency coordination will occur via the normal staff or adaptive headquarters processes.

(3) **Strategic Communications.** To be promulgated in accordance with National, Defense and USNORTHCOM guidance. All IO capabilities will be coordinated and synchronized with USNORTHCOM Strategic Communications.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** See Annexes D and E

5. **Command and Control.** See base plan, Annex A and J

   a. USNORTHCOM will plan, coordinate and monitor the execution of IO assets and capability through the USNORTHCOM Command Center.

   b. Supporting CCDR/S/As are identified in Annex A with IO capabilities. They will be tasked through USNORTHCOM/J3 authority to support USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

   c. Component Commanders will execute coordinated and synchronized IO capability activities in support of USNORTHCOM’s DSCA operations.

   d. Within USNORTHCOM, IO capability activities are directed by the NC/J3 with support from all USNORTHCOM directorates, as required in accordance with (IAW) reference e.

Tabs
A -- Military Deception – Not Used
B -- Electronic Warfare (EW)
C -- Operations Security (OPSEC)
D – Psychological Operations Support to Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE)
E – Physical Attack/Destruction – Not Used
F – Computer Network Attack – Not Used
G – Defensive Information Operations (D-IO) – Not Used
NIC WARFARE (EW)

References: See base plan and Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Operations

1. Situation
   c. Assumptions. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems will be available to ensure friendly use of the Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum and to deny use of the EM spectrum as necessary. EW systems are not limited to U.S. military assets only. EW assets from non-DOD agencies may be available for use for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. The friendly use of Electronic Attack (EA) against undesired EM sources located in the USNORTHCOM AO must be extensively coordinated.


3. Execution
   a. Concept of Operations. Employment of EW capabilities will enable select DSCA by utilizing Electronic Protection (EP) to ensure the friendly use of the EM Spectrum; utilizing EW Support (ES) to search for, intercept, identify, and localize intentional or unintentional emissions in the EM spectrum; and utilizing EA to defend the friendly use of the EM spectrum by employing the EM spectrum to degrade, neutralize or destroy undesired EM capabilities within the AO. EW capabilities will work in concert with all other IO capabilities to ensure their effectiveness.

      (1) EW actions will not be solely a DOD activity. EW actions within the AO will have to be coordinated extensively with members of the interagency (IA) community and approved by civil authorities. At a minimum USNORTHCOM must plan to coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), FCC, FBI, DOS, DOT, DHS, DOC, U.S. Customs Service and FAA authorities.

      (2) ES, EP and EA support the civil authorities’ objectives.
b. Operational Tasks

(1) Phase I

(a) Refine AO-wide Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for specific missions in a given Joint Operations Area (JOA).

(b) Coordinate EW execution with appropriate members of the interagency community for use in the AO.

(2) Phase II

(a) Continue EW tasks from the previous phases.

(b) Employ EW as requested by civil authorities to prevent degradation or impedance to the flow of information for DSCA operations.

(c) Employ EW/EP as requested by civil authorities to take pre-emptive measures to protect and defend the integrity of information, information systems and the related infrastructure.

(3) Phase III

(a) Continue EW tasks from the previous phases.

(b) EW will prevent degradation or impedance to the flow of information for DSCA operations as directed by civil authorities.

(c) EW/EP will take pre-emptive measures to protect and defend the integrity of information, information systems and the related infrastructure as directed/authorized by civil authorities.

(d) Protect by using EW, as directed/authorized by civil authorities, the C3 of civil authorities and DOD forces and operations including the leadership, information, information links/nodes and the supporting infrastructure.

(4) Phase IV

(a) Continue EW tasks from the previous phases as appropriate.

(b) Validate the EW tasks for use in transition phase in support of efforts by civil authorities.

(5) Phase V

(a) Redeploy EW capabilities as appropriate.
(b) OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

c. Specified Tasks

(1) CDR, AIR COMBAT COMMAND (ACC) will be prepared to conduct EW operations as requested by civil authorities and capabilities deemed necessary by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(2) CDR, FLEET FORCES COMMAND (CFFC) will be prepared to conduct EW operations as requested by civil authorities and capabilities deemed necessary by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(3) CDRARNORTH will be prepared to conduct EW operations as requested by civil authorities and capabilities deemed necessary by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Special Instructions (SPINS) and the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) will be developed by Commander, USNORTHCOM to deconflict EW capability actions in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(2) Use of EA and portions of ES in the AO must be coordinated with members of the IA community and approved by the appropriate civil authority for DSCA operations. USNORTHCOM/J39 is responsible for ensuring that all coordination is complete prior to execution.

(3) Coordinate with USNORTHCOM J6 to accomplish the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).

(4) USNORTHCOM J6 will develop the Joint Communication and Electronic Operating Instruction (JCEOI) for each DSCA event to support DSCA operations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration. Provide inputs to the JRFL and SPINS as required through USNORTHCOM J39.

b. Logistics. Provide logistical support for DOD and non-DOD personnel that may be required to accomplish the stated mission objectives.

5. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) Feedback. Provide any feedback inputs to USNORTHCOM J39.
(2) **After-Action Reports.** Provide inputs to USNORTHCOM J39 following each phase of the operation.

b. **Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information.** Provide any special or unusual EW-related capability C4I requirements to USNORTHCOM J39.
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

References:  


b. CJCSI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security, 17 December 2003


f. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-100

1. General. The Operations Security (OPSEC) Tab provides guidance ensuring secure and effective Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations for the USNORTHCOM AO. OPSEC will be key to the success of DSCA operations. For the purposes of CONPLAN 2501, OPSEC processes discussed within are the doctrinally accepted terms and practices. CONPLAN 2501 is based on a permissive environment and all OPSEC practices will support the operations security of USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

   a. OPSEC Scope. OPSEC, unlike traditional security programs specifically designed to protect classified information, is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information associated with sensitive operations and activities. However, OPSEC and designated classified security programs must work in conjunction with one another to ensure all aspects of operations are protected.

   b. Responsibility for OPSEC. OPSEC is a command responsibility. At each level of command, the operations officer, or his equivalent, has staff responsibility for coordinating overall OPSEC planning. Each headquarters in preparing a supporting plan will appoint an OPSEC officer to ensure OPSEC considerations are effectively carried out. Each and every individual assists in safeguarding the security of operations.

2. Situation
a. **Enemy.** See base plan and Annex B

b. **Friendly.** Our adversaries depend upon detectable activities associated with an operation as their principal source of intelligence concerning that operation. They will exploit OPSEC weaknesses and correlate information obtained from multiple sources using various collection methods. Therefore, operations must be conducted in a manner to deny our adversaries access to the essential friendly information necessary to accurately plan and execute their operations while simultaneously slowing adversary leaders’ decision cycles.

c. **Assumptions**

   (1) OPSEC will be integral to all USNORTHCOM operations in support of CONPLAN 2501. It will be used as a force multiplier within conventional and all other authorized forces.

   (2) USNORTHCOM will have an OPSEC plan and will execute it at all times. It will be a comprehensive plan that shapes and protects the planning, coordination and execution of operations at all levels.

   (3) Any DOD agency working with USNORTHCOM will have appropriate OPSEC plans and procedures in-place. Non-DOD agency OPSEC status will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and adjustments made to reflect the needs of the mission.

   (4) Adversary capability and opportunity to collect sensitive but unclassified information exists and may be enhanced by outside non-governmental organizations and other governments.

   (5) Additional assumptions include: classified information protection, procedures, and systems are working, orders (WARNORD, OPORD, PLANORD, EXORD, etc.) have not been compromised, and unclassified communication systems are subject to possible compromise.

3. **Mission.** See Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Operations

4. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operation.** Based on an analysis of the threat and friendly vulnerabilities, identify critical information, assess risk to mission success, and then implement appropriate OPSEC measures to increase mission effectiveness. OPSEC must be used at all levels of operations and during all phases of the base plan.

   b. **Employment**
(1) **Operations Security (OPSEC) Process.** OPSEC is a continual process and focuses on identifying, controlling, and protecting sensitive but unclassified information associated with any operation. OPSEC is not a security system; it is not a collection of rules or instructions. OPSEC is a function of planning. All elements responding to this plan will use the five-step OPSEC process:

(a) **Critical Information.** That information, if exploited by an adversary, would effectively guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for mission accomplishment.

(b) **Threat.** A formal assessment of the adversary’s capability and intent to exploit any critical information.

(c) **Vulnerability.** A determination of how susceptible critical information is to loss.

(d) **Risk.** A determination of how much damage loss of the critical information will create.

(e) **Countermeasures.** Anything effectively negating an adversary’s ability to exploit vulnerabilities or rendering the possession of critical information useless.

(2) **Critical Information.** In any operation, it is vital to achieve “essential secrecy” which is the condition achieved as a result of the denial of critical information. Because of requirements to share operational information across many agencies and to other governments, care must be taken to define what is critical information and to emphasize the need to protect it. This may include privileged or proprietary information USNORTHCOM may have from interagency sources such as:

(a) Missions in planning.

(b) Unit identification for possible deployment.

(c) Specifics on planning to include schedules, routes, and destinations.

(d) Current alert status and locations.

(e) Locations, itineraries and travel modes of key military and civilian leadership.

(f) Current capabilities and requirements.

(g) New systems or technology significantly impacting mission effectiveness.
(h) Single points of failure to include C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), logistics, networks and commercial infrastructure.

(i) Network logins, passwords, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.

(j) Open source indicators (financial reports, logistics requests) which when inadvertently released to adversaries could support targeting of personnel, operations or facilities.

(k) Details of military ties, agreements, or arrangements between U.S., Canada, other allies and coalition partners.

(l) Details of agreements or arrangements between USNORTHCOM and lead federal Agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies and their equivalents.

(m) Current force protection measures and shortfalls for forces assigned to USNORTHCOM.

c. Operational Tasks. The following tasks apply as appropriate to all phases of CONPLAN 2501 but are broken out by key phases:

(1) Phase I: TBD

(2) Phase II: TBD

(3) Phase III: TBD

(4) Phase IV: TBD

(5) Phase V: TBD

d. Specified Tasks. Sound OPSEC practises are a function of leadership and individual responsibility. All headquarters directorates and Component Commanders must ensure USNORTHCOM personnel are trained in OPSEC and that OPSEC awareness remains at highest possible level during all phases of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense operations.

(1) USNORTHCOM J2

(a) Develop the threat assessment

(b) Assist J3 in developing EEFI.

(c) Provide input to and review plans as necessary.

(d) Assist in developing and maintaining adversary profiles.

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(e) Support multi directorate effort to identify friendly force vulnerabilities.

(2) **USNORTHCOM J3**

(a) Provide OPSEC management, planning, and execution guidance to component and subordinate commands and staffs. Coordinate effort to identify friendly force vulnerabilities.

(b) Coordinate OPSEC concerns with appropriate DOD, State and Local governments, and other federal agencies.

(c) Disseminate enactment of OPSEC measures to all personnel, commensurate with positions and security clearances.

(d) Develop training programs to identify vulnerabilities, critical information, and heighten OPSEC awareness.

(e) Identify in writing all USNORTHCOM component OPSEC managers and coordinating agencies points of contact.

(3) **USNORTHCOM Component Commands and OPSEC Managers.** Compile a list of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and identify information critical to success of the mission using guidance established within this Tab.

e. **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) Ensure OPSEC is integrated into planning, coordination, execution, operations, exercises and training at all levels.

(2) Ensure OPSEC planning addresses C2 protection and is coordinated with operations plans.

(3) Components will coordinate specific OPSEC actions through USNORTHCOM J3, or designated representative.

(4) All personnel using radios will adhere to established military and local communications protocol.

(5) All personnel will use burn bags or shredders for disposal of all printed material, with exception of newspapers.

(6) Components will coordinate with USNORTHCOM J3 or designated representative to consolidate a comprehensive list of critical information, develop associated code words/callsigns, and disseminate to all subordinate units.
5. Administration and Logistics. Dissemination of information throughout the command demands the support of both administrative and logistics organizations. Additionally, all administrative and logistics elements will actively train its staff in OPSEC principles and maintain membership on OPSEC working groups. Administrative and logistics are particularly vulnerable to lapses in OPSEC due to the generally unclassified nature of their communications and interaction with commercial organizations. All administrative and logistics plans will be coordinated with USNORTHCOM OPSEC officer or designee.

6. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) USNORTHCOM J39 has the primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing IO strategy supporting the mission and concept of operations.

(2) See also Annex D (Logistics/ Combat Service Support) of Base Plan.

b. Feedback

(1) OPSEC Procedures. Conduct periodic reviews and evaluations of OPSEC procedures to assist in improvement of USNORTHCOM OPSEC process.

(2) OPSEC Concerns. Develop procedures to allow all personnel to raise OPSEC concerns and provide suggestions for improving the process.

(3) OPSEC Working Group. Establish OPSEC working groups consisting of representatives from all USNORTHCOM components, as well as other DOD and non-DOD agencies. The USNORTHCOM OPSEC representative will also participate in the IO Cell.

(4) OPSEC Surveys. Conduct Command and formal OPSEC surveys annually or as determined by Commander, USNORTHCOM.

(5) After-Action Reports. OPSEC managers shall provide OPSEC lessons learned, to include doctrine, organization, training material, leadership, education, strengths, vulnerabilities, and recommended corrective actions. Lessons learned should be prepared at the conclusion of each measurable phase of operations.
1. **Situation**

a. **Overview.** Refer to Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Operations (IO). Based on previous operational employment for DSCA events, PSYOP forces and capabilities can be used in a supporting role to the civil authorities. In these types of events, PSYOP forces and capabilities can assist by conducting area assessments, evacuation operations, general assistance, information dissemination, support to populace/resource control, military civic action, emergency services and support for requesting civil authorities. PSYOP forces create a small footprint while being a force multiplier to the first responders as a part of CDRUSNORTHCOM’s response in support of civil authority requirements. PSYOP capabilities and forces can support the Civil Authority in the dissemination of life-saving messages and information produced and approved by the Civil Authorities only. The use of PSYOP capabilities and forces in the support of DSCA operations will require separate POTUS/SECDEF approval. PSYOP forces and capabilities will be used to inform U.S. persons with information approved by Civil Authorities. PSYOP capabilities that could be used for DSCA operations include Commando Solo, Mobile Radio Broadcasting systems, entire family of loudspeakers, Face to Face communication, Area Assessments, Print and Media production sections. PSYOP capabilities and forces must be responsive to the varied levels of accessibility to key audiences relative to the scope and requirements in order to maximize their utility for DSCA events.

   (1) **Augmenting Organizations.** US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

   (2) **Legal Situation.** To be promulgated as necessary by USNORTHCOM JA based on the situation and scope. USNORTHCOM PSYOP capabilities and forces for DSCA will adhere to all regulations, policy and laws concerning the use of PSYOP capabilities and forces.

c. **Neutral Perspective.** Non-influence PSYOP capabilities, in a supporting role, can be used in DSCA operations to assist civil authorities by conducting area assessments, evacuation operations, general assistance, information dissemination, support to populace/resource control, military civic action, emergency services and support to the civil authorities. Non-influence PSYOP forces can create a small footprint while being a force multiplier to the first responders and USNORTHCOM.

d. **Assumptions**

   (1) USNORTHCOM will not conduct PSYOP within CONUS unless approved by SecDef or POTUS.

   (2) Civil Authorities will provide all information for PSYOP development and approve all information and messages prior to dissemination.

   (3) USNORTHCOM will identify, advise, and coordinate the use of PSYOP forces and capabilities with Civil Authorities.

   (4) Civil Authorities will be provided a PSYOP capabilities planner deployed by USSOCOM upon CDRUSNORTHCOM request in conjunction with the DCO/DCE deployment for DSCA operations.

2. **Mission.** USNORTHCOM plans, coordinates and employs PSYOP forces and capabilities to develop and disseminate critical information for DSCA operations.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operations**

      (1) **Employment.** PSYOP forces and capabilities in DSCA operations will support Civil Authorities with critical information dissemination. USNORTHCOM will plan, coordinate, and synchronize PSYOP capabilities and forces in preparation for and in support of DSCA operations. PSYOP forces and capabilities in support of DSCA will be coordinated and synchronized by phases.
to maximize effects of dissemination in designated locations within the joint operations area (JOA). During all phases of the operation the objective for PSYOP force and capability use is to disseminate critical information that supports the civil authorities and their desired end state. USNORTHCOM will establish a strategy of engagement with SecDef and USSOCOM (force provider), to address a deliberate, long-term approach for use of these forces. USNORTHCOM will also engage in educating and coordinating with Civil Authorities on the use of PSYOP capabilities for DSCA operations. Civil Authorities will be able to communicate their critical information with these capabilities in adverse conditions to the necessary populations.

(2) **Phases.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in five (5) phases: Phase I – Shaping; Phase II – Staging; Phase III – Deployment; Phase IV – Support of Civil Authorities; and, Phase V - Transition.

(3) **Themes to stress.** These themes will be approved and promulgated by the civil authority or the JTF CDR’s. PSYOP forces may suggest themes to stress to the civil authority, which have been used in similar operations, but will not create or approve themes.

(4) **Themes to avoid.** Any themes, which are not approved and promulgated by civil authorities or the JTF CDR’s, will not be used or disseminated by PSYOP capabilities or forces for DSCA operations.

(5) **PSYOP Actions**

(a) Guidance for the use of PSYOP capabilities in support of Civil Authority’s requirements.

(b) Guidance for avoiding military operations.

(6) **Operational Tasks**

(a) **Phase I:** This phase is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and situational awareness of events occurring in the area of operations. For the shaping phase, USNORTHCOM will coordinate with civil authorities on the utility of capabilities. USNORTHCOM will also coordinate within DOD on the use of these capabilities seeking approval ultimately by SecDef. Due to extreme lead time for proper deployment and execution of these capabilities, USNORTHCOM anticipates, if requested, that the full range of PSYOP capabilities and forces will be deployed to the full maximum extent possible, to support the civil authorities.

(b) **Phase II**
1. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. Due to the nature of DSCA operations and impact of PSYOP capabilities and assets (and in accordance with the base plan guidance on deployment (Phase III)), PSYOP assets might begin deploying in this phase, which will require SecDef approval. One possible deployment during this phase is the PSYOP capabilities planner provided to civil authorities and an assessment team which must assess and coordinate the operation as soon as critical information dissemination requirements are considered as a part of DSCA operations.

2. USNORTHCOM will deploy a PSYOP planner in conjunction with the deploying DCO/DCE to the Joint Field Office (JFO) to develop information dissemination requirements that are and will be needed.

3. The PSYOP Planner will coordinate with USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM to ensure that the full spectrum of PSYOP capabilities and forces will be available.

4. The USSOCOM PSYOP planner will coordinate an approval process for DSCA operations with ultimate product approval by designated Civil Authority. Civil Authority, with USNORTHCOM assistance, will coordinate product and information dissemination missions that support Civil Authority objectives.

5. USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM will monitor and assess the effectiveness of these operations.

6. USNORTHCOM through coordination with Civil Authorities and the USSOCOM PSYOP planner, will determine the triggers for requesting PSYOP capabilities and forces, and the appropriate force structure to support these requirements.

7. Success is defined as: (1) forces deployed, PSYOP liaison with the Civil Authorities is established; (2) approval process/chain is established based on civil authority’s requirements and direction; and (3) pre-approved overarching messages and products are established and approved by civil authorities.

(c) Phase III

1. USNORTHCOM J39 will coordinate with the PSYOP Planner, civil authority public information officer (PIO), JTF CDR and JTF PA to develop the approval process/chain with civil authorities for the dissemination of civilian approved information and messages.
2. The PSYOP Planner at the civil authority will coordinate with the DCO/DCE, JTF CDR, and JTF PSYOP Planner to develop the requirements for employment of PSYOP capabilities and forces for DSCA operations. Civil authority PIO and PSYOP Planner will determine the location for the PSYOP Product Development Section to ensure efficient and timely product development, approval, production and dissemination.

3. The PSYOP LNO will coordinate the receipt and logistical support of PSYOP forces and capabilities with the Civil Authority PIO, DCO/DCE, JTF CDR, JTF PSYOP Planner, and JTF PAO.

4. The PSYOP LNO will ensure that the approved approval chain and the approved themes and messages are available to the deploying PSYOP commander in the JTF AO.

5. The deploying PSYOP unit commander will coordinate with the JTF PSYOP Planner and JTF CDR to ensure that PSYOP capabilities and forces are integrated into their supporting units. The deploying PSYOP unit commander will ensure communications are established between the civil authority PSYOP LNO, commander of Product Development Section, the JTF PSYOP Planner and subordinate PSYOP Detachments commanders.

6. The deploying PSYOP unit commander will ensure that support of the supporting units is established to provide long term support to the civil authority. The deploying PSYOP commander, PSYOP LNO, JTF PSYOP Planner will ensure that themes and messages are only approved by civilian authorities. The deploying PSYOP unit commander will submit a daily SITREP, Product Dissemination Matrix and all visual copies of products to USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM J39.

(d) Phase IV: Civil Authority, USNORTHCOM, the PSYOP LNO, JTF PSYOP Planner, and PSYOP unit commanders will coordinate to conclude operations and determine the appropriate force structure to support the transfer of responsibilities to civil authorities. During this phase, USNORTHCOM objectives and effects are achieved and the civilian authorities can begin to execute long term recovery plans. Redeploy phase will begin at this time.

(e) Phase V: The PSYOP LNO (to civil authority) will provide an After Actions Report with lessons learned to the civil authority, DCO/DCE, USNORTHCOM J39, USSOCOM and the JTF PSYOP Planner within 48 hour of redeployment or end of mission. The JTF PSYOP Planner will provide an After Action Report with lessons learned to the civil authority, DCO/DCE, USNORTHCOM J39, USSOCOM and the PSYOP LNO (to civil authority) with-in 48 hour of redeployment or end of mission. The deploying
PSYOP unit commander will provide an After Actions Report with lessons learned to the civil authority, DCO/DCE, USNORTHCOM J39, USSOCOM and the JTF PSYOP Planner within 48 hour of redeployment or end of mission.

(7) Specified Tasks

(a) USNORTHCOM, TBD

(b) USSOCOM, TBD

(c) JSOC, TBD

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics

(1) See Annex D.

(2) Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) (ARSOF) unique PSYOP support requirements are arranged for through USSOCOM logistic channels. Army common supply, maintenance and facilities support is provided or arranged through standard Army logistic channels.

(3) Re-supply of PSYOP-peculiar equipment will be accomplished through US Army Special Operations Command supply channels (SOF specific re-supply).

b. Administration

(1) Requirements for special reports. During all phases of the operation, all component commands/TF’s conducting PSYOP capabilities will submit a daily Psychological Operations Report (PSYREP) through the JSOC to USNORTHCOM/J3/J5 that include copies of any approved civil authority critical information products.

5. Command and Control

a. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE) from USSOCOM for planning and execution of PSYOP capability objectives.

b. Command Relationships

(1) Commander, US Special Operations Command will designate the CAISE Commander.
(2) The CAISE is a functional component of USSOCOM.

(3) The CAISE is OPCON to USNORTHCOM, when activated.

(4) USNORTHCOM executes all PSYOP capabilities and forces through the CAISE, when activated. Additionally, under ideal circumstances PSYOP capabilities and forces would have been requested by civil authority for planning before a pending event occurs or immediately after occurrence through the proper channels to DOD. Such a proactive strategy will create awareness for susceptibilities and acceptability to critical information dissemination actions.

c. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. See Annex K
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
SEARCH AND RESCUE

References:  

- c. National Response Plan, December 1, 2004
- d. National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999, as amended
- f. through k., see enclosure 1

1. Purpose. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for a multitude of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement action, and other activities. In Disaster Response (DR) situations USNORTHCOM may be required, as directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to provide Search and Rescue (SAR) support to civil authorities.

   a. The Department of Defense (DOD) shall support civil SAR efforts on a not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles, and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements (Ref a).

   b. DOD Combatant Commanders, as appropriate, and within their capabilities and legal authority, will provide support to civil SAR operations within their respective geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Ref c). USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning and executing personnel recovery operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

   c. DOD provides SAR capabilities and assets supporting day-to-day civil SAR operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. This support is promulgated by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). Further authority is directed by the National Response Plan (NRP). These authorities are implemented through the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual) and the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual. This support is not, by definition, included in DSCA. It has separate authorities, coordination, oversight, and command structures. This support can/will be involved in the initial SAR response to a catastrophic event prior to a federal declaration.

2. Situation. See basic plan.
a. **Enemy Forces.** See basic plan and intelligence annex.

b. **Friendly Forces.** See basic plan and intelligence annex.

(1) **DOD SAR Resources and Facilities.** DOD resources and facilities include air, land, sea and command and control personnel, equipment, and facilities that may be available to provide support to civil authorities.

(a) **US Air Force (USAF).** USAF capabilities include air SAR, short and long range airlift, interception and escort of distressed aircraft, navigation and communications aids, locating landing or crash sites, aeromedical evacuation, reconnaissance, locating electromagnetic emitters, and general illumination to aid in SAR efforts. Many of these capabilities are performed by the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), a USAF auxiliary that flies the majority of US inland SAR missions. USAF resources include:

1. Civil Air Patrol (CAP) personnel, aircraft, and SAR equipment
2. Limited numbers of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
3. Limited numbers of pararescue (PJ) Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) personnel
4. Radar sites either in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or as stand-alone systems that can be utilized to locate missing aircraft.
5. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) personnel and equipment
6. Air Operations Center (AOC) Command and Control capabilities

(b) **US Navy (USN).** USN capabilities include all-weather air, surface, subsurface, sheltered or semi-sheltered water SAR, radar, extensive communications, helicopter-refueling, salvage of non-Navy shipping, and advanced emergency medical care. USN resources include:

1. Extensive numbers and types of aircraft,
2. Surface and submarine vessels,
3. Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams,
4. Diving teams,
5. Salvage forces,
6. Radar nets,
7. Sound fixing and ranging nets,
8. Worldwide communications.

(c) **US Army (USA).** USA capabilities include air and ground SAR. USA is responsible for managing the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) program (A USA and USAF program to assist in serious civilian medical emergencies by providing transportation). USA resources include:
1. Large number of helicopters
2. Light aircraft
3. Ground vehicles
4. Surface detection nets

(2) Federal Government SAR Resources

(a) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA, in addition to other resources, maintains a nationwide communications net, coordinated with international aeronautical communications services for the control, coordination, and assistance of civil and military air traffic. Primary capabilities that may be used for SAR are aircraft of various types equipped with sophisticated sensors and area navigation equipment, flight-following service for aircraft on flight plans under instrument flight rules and visual flight rules and alert RCCs when an aircraft is overdue, radar nets providing complete coverage of the continental US, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, and Puerto Rico (can provide a missing aircraft’s last known position), VHF direction-finding nets, and approximately 27 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)s for all areas where the US provides ATC services.

(b) Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC operates a High Frequency (HF) direction-finding net covering the inland US and parts of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Their Communications and Crisis Management Center is staffed 24 hours a day and has the capability to provide the locations of aircraft, ships or persons in distress. The FCC also operates field offices with personnel who can locate Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)s and Emergency Position Indicating Radiobeacon (EPIRB)s using mobile and portable Direction Finding (DF) equipment. FCC services should be used for urgent SAR only and are generally not available to the public.

(c) Department of Homeland Security – US Coast Guard (USCG). USCG capabilities include air, maritime, and land SAR, and communications. The USCG maintains a wide variety of SAR resources, primarily dedicated to maritime SAR throughout the US and its territories. USCG resources include:

1. Large number of helicopters
2. Fixed-wing aircraft
3. Cutters
4. Boats
5. Stations
6. Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER) – a computerized system for maintaining the position of participating merchant vessels worldwide) capable of being used to support civil SAR operations.
7. USCG operations are also supported by an extensive communications network of coastal radio stations, specialized landline circuits, and communications.

c. **Definitions**

(1) **Civil Search and Rescue (civil SAR).** Search operations, rescue operations, and associated civilian services provided to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress in a non-hostile environment.

(2) **Search and Rescue Coordinator.** A Federal person or agency with overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) for which the US has primary responsibility.

(3) **Search and Rescue Region (SRR).** An area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center within which SAR services are provided.

(4) **Search and Rescue Services.** The performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordination and SAR functions, including provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources including cooperating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations.

(5) **Rescue Coordination Center (RCC).** A unit, recognized by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO) or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of civil SAR services and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operations within the SRR.

(6) **Distress.** A person, craft, or vehicle threatened by grave and imminent danger that requires immediate assistance.

(7) **Rescue.** An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.

(8) **Search.** An operation normally coordinated by a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) or rescue sub-center, using available personnel and facilities to locate persons in distress.

d. **Assumptions**

(1) USNORTHCOM will comply with and support the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, National SAR Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual, National SAR Plan, Presidential Directives, and the Stafford Act while conducting civil SAR operations supporting disaster response.

(2) **Title 10 SAR forces will be OPCON (or TACON) to USNORTHCOM and its established C2 element.**

(3) Title 32 SAR forces will coordinate and liaise with the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC and AOC.
UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Non-DOD SAR forces will coordinate and liaise with the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC and AOC.

(5) USNORTHCOM DSCA SAR operations other than that specified under existing agreements will cease when directed by the President or SecDef.

(6) The designated Primary Agency will establish a SAR element under its Operation Section within its Incident Command structure.

e. Legal Considerations. See Chapter 7, Legal Aspects of the US National Search and Rescue Supplement (Ref. f).

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

(1) USNORTHCOM, when directed by the SecDef, shall plan and execute DSCA SAR operations in support of the designated Primary Agency. AFNORTH/1AF, the USNORTHCOM Air Force Component, is tasked to accomplish personnel recovery operations to include establishing a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). The JPRC will support and establish liaison with the appropriate Primary Agency command element for SAR operations. In addition, the JPRC will establish liaison with the following organizations:

(a) Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized U.S. aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental US other than Alaska.

(b) Alaska Rescue Coordination Center - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized US aeronautical SRR corresponding to Alaska;

(c) US Coast Guard (USCG) - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized US aeronautical and maritime SRRs which coincide with the ocean environments including Hawaii.

(d) DSCA specific JTF headquarters and component RCCs.

(e) Affected State Emergency Operations Centers

(f) Affected State National Guard Operations Centers

(2) USNORTHCOM will execute DSCA SAR operations in five phases.

(a) Phase I, Shaping. SecDef EXORD issued ordering CDRUSNORTHCOM to provide DOD SAR support.

1. During this phase, actions are undertaken to ensure maximum readiness for DSCA response execution.

2. CDRUSNORTHCOM prepares to execute SAR in support of civilian authorities SAR efforts.

3. USNORTHCOM conducts liaison/coordination with interagency partners involved in response operations to include Mission Assignment telephone conferences.
UNCLASSIFIED

4. USNORTHCOM directs AFNORTH/1AF JFACC to be prepared to stand up a JPRC when directed.

(b) Phase II, Staging. Phase II operations include deployment of the 5-person AFRCC element to the AFNORTH/1AF Air Operation Center (AOC) to establish a JPRC, Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO), Defense Coordinating Elements (DCE), Emergency Planning Liaison Officers (EPLO), and additional forces. The forces are optimally positioned to facilitate the DOD response.

(c) Phase III, Deployment. CDRUSNORTHCOM activates and deploys command and control (C2) construct, establishes Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), and response forces move to the Area of Operations (AO). On arrival, deployed SAR forces contact the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC for specific air tasking order information, guidance, and special instructions.

(d) Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. USNORTHCOM SAR forces conduct missions, report Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), maintain common operational picture (COP), and begin transition planning through the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC. Mission Assignments are in completion process. Phase IV ends when DOD civil SAR support is no longer required/desired by the Primary Agency. Deployed units will be released through appropriate DSCA JTF Commander and JFACC.

(e) Phase V, Transition. DOD forces redeploy incrementally to home station, operational control is transferred back to home unit, C2 stands down, situational awareness maintained, lessons learned captured, after-action reviews conducted, and expenditures reported.

b. Tasks.

(1) USNORTHCOM J1 shall:

(a) Source components for augmentees for the JPRC and Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC), as requested by AFNORTH/1AF and validated by NCJ3.

(2) USNORTHCOM J2 shall:

(a) Provide JPRC with required support during a SAR event. Submit collection requirements and requests for information (RFIs) for SAR

(b) Validate Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) requirements in support of SAR operations.

(c) Submit validated intelligence support requirements to the appropriate intelligence organizations

(d) Support SAR Intelligence requests from allied/coalition/other forces as directed by the President or SecDef.

(3) USNORTHCOM J3 shall:

(a) Establish procedures for assessment and evaluation of SAR operations and exercises.
(b) JOC – Provide additional assistance to the JPRC through the AOC as required (USNORTHCOM/J33)

(c) As PR OPR, provide staff assistance, when required, and act as a conduit to the command for the JPRC, as necessary (USNORTHCOM J35).

(d) Serve as the OPR for this document

(7) USNORTHCOM J6 shall:

(a) Coordinate directly with the JPRC Director to develop and establish and maintain connectivity to support C4 planning, coordination, and execution of SAR operations.

(b) Advise USNORTHCOM staff and JPRC, interagency, JTF, and components during CONPLAN, and contingency planning on C4 support to SAR matters.

(c) Assist operational commanders charged with SAR responsibilities with frequency management and the preparation, coordination, and submittal of satellite access requests.

(8) USNORTHCOM IC shall advise USNORTHCOM staff and coordinate interagency SAR matters

(9) USNORTHCOM SG shall provide assistance to the AFNORTH/1AF-SG and JPRC Director as directed

(10) USNORTHCOM PA shall:

(a) Provide public affairs advise regarding release of SAR information to operations and planning staffs.

(b) When required, prepare media releases regarding SAR operations.

(c) Issue post-mission press guidance to recovery forces and staffs

(11) USNORTHCOM JA shall:

(a) Provide assistance to the JPRC through the AFNORTH/1AF-SG and component RCCs regarding rules of engagement, legal status as directed by the JPRC Director

(12) AFNORTH/1AF shall:

(a) Man, train, and equip a JPRC, capable of 24/7 operations during DSCA events when augmented.

(b) Ensure JPRC operations are fully integrated with DOD and non-DOD organizations

(c) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(13) ARNORTH/JFLCC shall:

(a) Be prepared to stand up a component RCC when directed.

(b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets
(14) JTF Commanders shall:
   (a) Ensure coordination/communication between the JTF and AFNORTH/1AF AOC and JPRC
   (b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(15) JFMCC shall:
   (a) Be prepared to stand up a component RCC when directed.
   (b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(16) JFHQ-NCR, JTF-N, JTF-CS shall:
   (a) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets
   (b) Coordinate all SAR issues and operations through the AFNORTH/1AF AOC and JPRC.

(17) AFNORTH/1AF AOC/JPRC shall:
   (a) Train, equip, man and program to generate, modify, and perform SAR execution checklists.
   (b) Serve as the focal point for all USNORTHCOM SAR planning and execution activities.
   (c) Plan, develop, train and exercise C4I and standard operation procedures for SAR operations
   (d) Publish and maintain a JPRC SIPRNet and NIPRNet website to post related information.
   (e) Serve as the OPR for USNORTHCOM SAR execution checklists and supporting documents.

(18) SJFHQ-N shall facilitate coordination/communication between the JTF and JPRC.

c. General Guidance
   (1) On order, direct coordination is authorized between DOD personnel and SAR Coordinators, JTF Staff, USNORTHCOM Staff, AFNORTH/1AF AOC staff and Primary Agency Staff.

   (2) Standing rules for the use of force will be followed (Ref e).

4. Administration and Logistics
   a. Logistics. See Basic Plan.
   b. Administration. See Basic Plan.

5. Command and Control
   a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander. AFNORTH is the AFFOR, JFACC and the supported component commander for DSCA SAR. ARNORTH is the ARFOR, JFLCC and a supporting component commander. CDR Fleet Forces
Command/COMLANTFLT is the supporting naval service component commander. MARFORNORTH is a supporting service component commander.

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(f) National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, May 2000, as amended

(g) 1958 Convention on the High Seas, article 12

(h) Sections 1535 and 1536 of title 31, United States Code, “The Economy Act”

(i) Section 5121 of title 42, United States Code, “The Stafford Act”


APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

References:  a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the
Use of Force (S), 13 June 2005

b. National Guard Rules for the Use of Force

c. Additional References see base plan

1. Purpose. To provide substantive guidance on the Standing Rules for the Use of Force
(SRUF) during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations.

2. Situation

   a. **Enemy.** See base plan

   b. **Friendly.** See base plan

3. Mission. See base plan

4. General

   a. Reference a applies to Title 10 Forces performing DSCA operations.

   b. National Guard (NG) soldiers performing duty in a non-federalized duty status are
governed by their state Rules for the Use of Force.

   c. Requests for SRUF augmentation or mission specific RUF for Title 10 forces will
be staffed through the local Judge Advocate (JA) through operational channels and
forwarded to USNORTHCOM JA for submission to CDRNORTHCOM.
CDRUSNORTHCOM may forward such requests for mission specific RUF to the
CJCS for SecDef approval.

   d. Commanders may restrict SecDef approved RUF. Commanders shall notify the
SecDef, through the CJCS, as soon as practical, of restrictions (at all levels) placed on
SecDef approved RUF. In time critical situations, notify SecDef concurrently with
the CJCS. When concurrent notification is not possible, notify the CJCS as soon as
practicable after SecDef notification.
e. If the U.S. accepts foreign military support personnel, RUF should be specified and coordinated through the Department of State and Department of Justice prior to the receipt of foreign military personnel support.
APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
COMBAT CAMERA (COMCAM) OPERATIONS

References:

a. DOD Directive 5040.2, Visual Information Policy, 10 May 1999

b. DOD Directive 5040.4 Joint Combat Camera Program, 13 August 2002

c. DOD Directive 5040.5, Alteration of Official DOD Imagery, 29 August 1995

d. CJCS Instruction 3205.01A, Joint Combat Camera, 11 April 2003

e. AFI 33-117, Multimedia Management, 1 April 2004

f. OPNAV Instruction 3501.320A, Navy COMCAM ROC & POE, 3 April 1997

1. Situation

a. **Enemy.** See base plan and Annex B, Intelligence

b. **Friendly.** Sources of Combat Camera (COMCAM) documentation outside this command are provided by Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps resources.

c. **Assumptions**

   (1) **Resources Availability.** COMCAM resources residing within the homeland can be utilized for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) COMCAM operations. Request for forces messages will be used to task component COMCAM units for support.

      (a) Component COMCAM units are standing by to deploy active duty personnel upon receipt of deployment orders.

      (b) COMCAM teams deploy with enough imaging supplies to operate self-sustained for a minimum of 30 days.

      (c) COMCAM personnel are weapons qualified.

   (2) The USNORTHCOM Operations Officer (NC/J3) will delegate operational responsibility for Combat Camera to the Information Operations (IO) Officer (NC/J39).
(3) All COMCAM teams’ activities within the USNORTHCOM joint operations area (JOA) will respond to documented operational assignments initiated by USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) (NC/J3/NC/J39).

(4) A Joint Combat Camera Management Team, if required, shall assist the USNORTHCOM J39 in the tasking and direction of COMCAM video and still imagery documentation operations to meet objectives provided by USNORTHCOM, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), OSD, and the White House.

(5) All COMCAM forces in the USNORTHCOM AO or Joint Operations Area (JOA) will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM, TACON to the appropriate joint subordinate command and will be tasked to meet USNORTHCOM and subordinate COMCAM requirements. This requirement is key to maintaining USNORTHCOM and joint subordinate visibility on all DOD forces within the AO or JOA as applicable to ensure proper force management, logistics, transportation and protection.

(6) The fundamental difference between COMCAM and Visual Information (VI) lies in the level of support provided and the specialized training required to operate in austere environments. VI forces supply base level support to include still photography, limited videography, and graphic support while COMCAM provides combat trained photojournalists, videographers, and still and video editing services.

2. Mission. To ensure that visual information documentation is provided during all phases of USNORTHCOM DSCA operations. COMCAM imagery provides situational awareness information for use by military commanders, and a valuable visual record of still and video imagery used as historical evidence of military operations. COMCAM documentation of DSCA operations supports operational briefings, status reports, intelligence activities, information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and the historical record. COMCAM imagery may be used to counter disinformation programs in support of sensitive operations. Imagery will be used to evaluate concepts and the results of operations or campaigns. An expanded list of COMCAM documentation mission areas is listed in Tab A.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. During all phases of DSCA operations, the general objective of COMCAM is to document all activities of DOD forces and as requested by other government agencies. Success of COMCAM documentation is dependent on three primary factors.

(1) COMCAM must receive coordinated mission assignments via the chain of command. It is critical that COMCAM teams are included in troop movements and mission planning.
(2) Access must be given to document significant events as they occur, regardless of classification or sensitivity.

(3) Rapid transmission of COMCAM products both inside and outside the theater of operations is essential for effective support of information operations, public affairs and other mission objectives.

b. COMCAM documentation mission assignments. Assignments for Combat Camera forces can be generated at any point in the chain of command and will be coordinated via the IO chain of command. In addition to mission assignments from within the AO, assignments may be directed down the chain of command from the highest levels. Figure C-9-1 (below) shows the flow of these assignments.

Figure C-9-1: Combat Camera Documentation Mission Assignment Flow

(1) Organization. Deployed COMCAM forces will be organized into teams responsible to USNORTHCOM and JTF or other designated joint element as assigned, normally via the Information Operations directorate. The responsibilities of COMCAM documentation forces are in support of the plan. All COMCAM forces will support Joint COMCAM taskings in the JOA.

(2) Employment. COMCAM forces will be employed throughout the USNORTHCOM AO.

(3) Imagery Dissemination
(a) Key customers for COMCAM imagery are the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), JCS, USNORTHCOM, Component Commanders, JTF Commanders, on-scene commanders, and other government agencies. Imagery must be provided to these customers simultaneously and as rapidly as possible. See Figure C-11-2 below. Immediate movement of imagery to the following locations will ensure all mission requirements are met. Note: There may be special circumstances that require different paths for movement of critical imagery. In the case of special interest imagery that will be cleared for public release, Public Affairs will provide specific guidance via published Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) or in Annex F of this plan.

1. JTF or On-Scene Commander.

2. Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

3. Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon).

(b) Imagery (including captions and run sheets) will be distributed electronically (see Tab B), with the following exception, original videotapes or copies of original videotapes will be shipped as quickly as possible to the Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon), and Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

(c) When electronic dissemination is impossible or when videotapes must be moved (as above), ship COMCAM imagery (including complete captions and run sheets):

1. Via traceable means.

2. Packaged and marked per DOD and service directives. Ensure classification authority and downgrading instructions are provided.
c. Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) **USNORTHCOM COMCAM Support.** USNORTHCOM J3 is the executive agent for Combat Camera operations. Once directed, typically by JTF COMCAM coordinator/planner, Combat Camera Teams will be established and located as directed.

(2) **The Joint Combat Camera Management Team (as required) shall**

   (a) Assist the USNORTHCOM, JTF and as designated other joint elements in developing documentation requirements and implementing the use of COMCAM resources.

   (b) Coordinate logistical support requirements for the mobilization of COMCAM and their movement into the USNORTHCOM AO.

   (c) In support of mission assignments, coordinate COMCAM team logistical issues with commanders in the field.

   (d) Coordinate with component commands to ensure detailed documentation of the entire scope of operations. This includes coordinating network and telecommunications connectivity to meet the requirements for transmission of imagery as detailed in Tab B.
(e) Manage day-to-day COMCAM operations and administrative/logistical support.

(f) Ensure rapid movement of imagery to priority customers (see “3. a. (3) Imagery Dissemination”).

(g) Coordinate review of imagery for possible public release. To meet priority mission requirements, appropriate imagery must be immediately cleared for public release. Clearance for public release is normally conducted by PA Officers, and is accomplished at the lowest possible level (for most operations JTF level). Imagery designated “not cleared for public release” by clearing authorities will be properly annotated. Imagery that cannot be reviewed for public release in a timely manner (same day) must not be delayed. Such imagery will be transmitted to designated customers and annotated as “not cleared for public release”. If appropriate, such imagery can be reviewed for possible clearance at a later time.

(3) USNORTHCOM and Component Commands shall:

(a) Execute tasking procedures in support of this plan.

(b) Provide trained and equipped mobile COMCAM assets consistent with the forces they are tasked to support.

(c) Provide direction to ensure subordinate units support COMCAM mission requirements, and provide technical communications support for immediate transmission and movement of still and video imagery.

(d) Maintain movement authorization of COMCAM products, both public releasable and non-public releasable, prior to transmission to the JCCC (IAW Combat Camera Imagery Flow/Dissemination, Figure C-9-2).

(e) Ensure that COMCAM imagery, both public releasable and non-public releasable, is immediately reviewed and approved for movement clearance to the JCCC/public, as detailed in 3. b. (2) (g) above.

4. Administration and Logistics. Security classification or political sensitivity must not be used as a basis to deny operational COMCAM documentation. COMCAM teams are trained to properly label, handle and safeguard classified material. COMCAM teams are not releasing agents (see paragraph 3.c.(2)(g)).

5. Command and Control

a. Command Relationships

(1) The Joint Combat Camera Management Team and support personnel are
under operational control (OPCON) of the USNORTHCOM J39 or as delegated to JTF J39.

(2) Command and control (C2) of COMCAM forces in the JOA is depicted by the solid lines in the following diagram (Figure C-9-3: Command Relationships). Dashed lines depict COMCAM imagery product flow from COMCAM forces through the deployed Joint Combat Camera Management Team to the Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon).

(3) In certain cases, COMCAM units will be task organized to tactical level units. Tasking and requirements will continue to occur as described in this appendix and these units will accomplish this as practical with priority to tactical unit mission and operations.

![Figure C-9-3: Command Relationships](image-url)
COMCAM Customer Support Requirements

References: 
   a. AF Instruction 33-132, Armament Delivery Recording (ADR) Program, 1 December 1998
   b. SECNAV Instruction 3104.1 DOD Visual Information and Combat Camera Program 22 April 1999
   c. OPNAV Instruction 3104.1 Naval Information and Combat Camera Program (NAVIP) Policy and Responsibilities 9 February 2001
   d. OPNAV Instruction 3104.3 Naval Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures 15 April 2002
   e. OPNAV Instruction 3104.4 Naval Visual Information (VI) Imagery Management Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures 16 April 2002

1. Mission Priorities. COMCAM forces provide USNORTHCOM and subordinate commanders with trained personnel, equipment, and logistics expertise to document military operations in the AOR when this CONPLAN is executed. As the CDRUSNORTHCOM’s priorities shift and the battle rhythm changes, COMCAM forces must maintain the capability to provide responsive support for different types of missions and requirements.

2. Request Procedures. Requests for COMCAM imagery are routed to the USNORTHCOM J39, or at USNORTHCOM discretion, Joint Combat Camera Management Team, which assists in tasking for COMCAM imagery support. USAUSNORTHCOM/J39 consolidates Crisis Action Team and staff COMCAM imagery requirements and coordinates with the Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

3. Distribution Procedures. See Paragraph 3. a. (3) of Appendix 9 to Annex C, Imagery dissemination, of this plan.

4. Documentation Requirements
   a. DSCA Air Operations Documentation. The following are important subjects for documentation of air operations throughout the USNORTHCOM areas of operation.
      (1) Aircraft Operations
(a) Arrival of mission aircraft, crews, support personnel, and supporting equipment.

(b) Aircraft generation, loading/unloading and turnaround.

(c) Aircraft ramp operations, taxi in and out, take-offs, and landings.

(d) Crew briefings and mission planning.

(e) Damage to affected aircraft and airfield repair.

(f) Air-to-air photography, including allied aircraft.

(g) Service members, both on and off duty.

(h) Inter-theater delivery and offload of mission-critical cargo and military personnel supporting DSCA.

(i) Troop preparations and loading.

(j) Low-Altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) cargo delivery.

(k) Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE) operations, such as cargo handling, maintenance, and flight following.

(l) Deployed aircrew briefings, crew boarding aircraft, and in flight aerial refueling and air drop operations (aerial-qualified photographers).

(m) Aircraft battle damage and repair.

(3) **Search and Rescue (SAR)**

(a) Survivor pick-ups (aerial-qualified photographers).

(b) Helicopter and fixed wing SAR flight operations, such as generation, launch, in flight, and recovery (aerial-qualified photographers).

(c) Aircraft generation and repair.

(d) Deployed aircrew briefings, aircrews boarding aircraft, and in flight (aerial-qualified photographers).

(e) Night operations as imaging equipment permits (aerial-qualified photographers).
(f) Interviews and debriefing of key personnel after a successful SAR operation.

(5) Base Support Operations. Base support will vary due to the bed down of different units and the phase of DSCA. The most common base support functions to be documented are:

(a) Civil Engineering, including base camp construction, tents, latrines, command centers, roads, and aircraft parking areas.

(b) Messing facilities, such as civilian and troops dining and food preparation facilities. If MREs are used, photograph civilians and troops consuming them.

(c) Marshaling area activities, including arrival and breakdown of pallets, equipment, and supplies.

(d) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) handling operations and facilities, such as aircraft, ship, and ground vehicle refueling operations, fuel pits, and fuel trucks.

(e) Host nation support to DSCA efforts, including, transportation, supplies, security, or medical services.

(6) Command and Control. Document command and control actions, including planning, at all echelons of command.

(a) Arrival and stand-up of headquarters staffs, including set-up of operations centers, buildings, and plotting map boards.

(b) Arrival, set-up, and operations of communications systems, including antenna construction/erection.

(c) Interface of DOD and Inter-agency personnel in planning and mission execution.

(d) Periodic “video situation reports” where commanders describe recent operations, challenges, and lessons learned.

(e) Senior operational commander visits to deployed units.

b. Ground Operations. Key subjects for documentation of ground operations in the USNORTHCOM area of operations are:

(1) Arrival of friendly forces in the area of operations.

(2) Documentation of DSCA efforts in the joint operating area.
(3) Night operations as photo equipment permits.

(4) Arrivals of mission equipment and supporting personnel.

(5) Establishment of operations centers.

(6) Briefings, mission planning with DOD forces and inter-agency personnel in the joint operating area.

(7) Service members, both on and off duty.

(8) Night operations as photo equipment permits.

(9) After-action briefings.

c. Maritime Operations. Key subjects for documentation of maritime operations in the USNORTHCOM area of operations are:

(1) Briefings and mission planning.

(2) Employment of ship defensive weapons systems.

(3) Ship-to-ship photography, including allied ships.

(4) Night operations as photo equipment permits.

d. Disaster Assistance (DA) Operations

(1) Establishment of deployed disaster assistance facilities.

(2) Arrival of aircraft, cargo, and troops in the area of operations.

(3) Documentation of the intensity of the operation, such as actions, efforts, emotion, fatigue, and the environment affecting deployed forces and refugees.

(4) Command and control centers.

(5) Logistical support, including messing, billeting, medical, engineering, POL, transportation, security, spare parts, and field maintenance support activities.

(6) When appropriate, obtain interviews from key personnel.

e. Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE). COMCAM support of CAISE is described in Annex C, Appendix 3, Tab D of this plan. COMCAM will provide imagery support to CAISE print activities in coordination with the CAISE.
f. Mishap and Investigation Documentation. Document as directed in support of investigations and for use in “lessons learned” development.

g. Historical Records. COMCAM imagery may be used for historical purposes to provide a permanent visual record of military operations associated with this plan.

h. Combat Medical Documentation. COMCAM forces support combat medical documentation as required in Annex Q of the basic plan. This includes documentation of wounded or deceased personnel.
References: See base plan

1. LAN/WAN Connectivity Requirements (for connectivity supplied by local commands and communications units in support of COMCAM teams).

   a. **NIPRNET**

      (1) Ethernet LAN drops (RJ-45) with NIPRNET connectivity.

      (2) One to ten NIPRNET email accounts with 50 MB of mailbox storage space.

      (3) Ability to send and receive email attachments of 10 MB or less in size.

      (4) Installation’s network firewall configured to permit incoming and outgoing FTP traffic access (with RCP command support) to one IP address (Telestream ClipMail Pro server).

   b. **SIPRNET**

      (1) One Ethernet LAN drop with SIPRNET connectivity.

      (2) One shared SIPRNET email account with 100 MB of mailbox storage space.

      (3) Ability to send and receive email attachments of 10 MB or less in size.

      (4) Installation’s network firewall configured to permit incoming and outgoing FTP traffic access (with RCP command support) to one IP address (Telestream ClipMail Pro server).

2. **Equipment**

   a. Attached to NIPRNET

      (1) One Windows NT/2000 workstation with MS Office and Adobe PhotoShop. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

      (2) One Telestream ClipMail Pro server. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)
b. Attached to SIPRNET

   (1) One Windows NT/2000 workstation with MS Office and Adobe PhotoShop. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

   (2) One Telestream ClipMail Pro server. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

c. Stand Alone. M4 INMARSAT terminals for alternate communication with COMCAM field teams and movement of imagery. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

d. Direct DSN capable FAX and STU-III/STE phones.

3. Minimum Daily Data Requirements

   a. Over NIPRNET: approximately 640 MB per day.

      (1) Still Imagery (high-resolution JPEG files): 100 MB/day.

         (a) Reception of 50 MB from COMCAM teams in the field per day.

         (b) Transmission of 50 MB to NORTHCOM and the Joint Combat Camera Center (JCCC) per day.

      (2) Motion Imagery (MPEG-2 broadcast quality - 9 MBPS encoding): up to 540 MB per day.

         (a) Reception of 270 MB (approximately four minutes of video) from COMCAM teams in the field per day.

         (b) Transmission of 270 MB to NORTHCOM and JCCC per day.

   b. Over SIPRNET

      (1) Use of SIPRNET for the transmission of COMCAM imagery is dependent directly on the requirement(s) for classified COMCAM imagery or when NIPRNET connectivity or other suitable transmission methods are unavailable for the transmission of unclassified imagery. In case of the latter, the requirements are the same as for over NIPRNET.
Figure C-9-B-1. COMCAM Transmission
APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
FORCE PROTECTION

References:

a. USNORTHCOM Operations Order 05-01, Antiterrorism, 6 May 2005.

b. EXORD for Standup of USNORTHCOM CONUS AT-FP Responsibility, DTG 071710Z MAY 04.


g. CJCSI 5261.01C, “Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund,” 1 July 2003 (U).


i. USDP-SOLIC/CHAIRS Message, 071522Z SEP 01, “Force Protection Condition Implementation” (FOUO).


k. DOD Directive 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, May 91.

l. DOD 4500.54-G, "DOD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG).

1. Situation.

   a. Hazards: See Annex B.
b. Friendly. (U) DOD Elements supporting the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission address FP during all phases of the operation. FP is a command responsibility at all levels.

c. Assumptions.

(1) DOD AT/FP policies, procedures, standards, assignment of responsibilities, and TTP outlined in Refs a through l remain in effect.

d. Resource Availability. Resource constraints in both security forces and security funding may require Commanders to take stop-gap measures or accept risks. Units should use established Service/Agency resource processes, procedures and channels to obtain necessary funding.

e. Planning Factors. Designated Commanders and staff need to plan for the FP of their personnel, equipment and facilities during all phases of the DSCA operation. Additional consideration is given to the fact that DOD Elements executing DSCA will operate in an environment where DOD is not the Lead Federal Agency (LFA); and, Commanders must plan accordingly. As a minimum standard by which to judge FP capability, planners should review Refs b and c and judge their ability to implement basic physical security actions as well as those directed at each Force Protection condition (FPCON).

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM will execute a comprehensive all-hazards approach Force Protection mission that provides an appropriate level of safety and security for DOD personnel (to include the Reserve Components, DOD civilians and family members), resources, infrastructure, information, and equipment from the full spectrum of threats within the USNORTHCOM AOR in order to ensure essential operational mission accomplishment.

3. Execution. The integration of FP operations is critical to the ultimate success of the Command’s DSCA mission. FP protects installations, forces, infrastructure and information within the USNORTHCOM AOR; and, will be accomplished through the integration of law enforcement (LE), physical security, Information Operations (IO), incident management, intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), intelligence fusion, protection from WMD, and critical infrastructure protection (CIP). USNORTHCOM DSCA strategy depends upon the ability to assess potential threats and the current security posture of the USNORTHCOM AOR, to integrate the efforts of DOD Elements within the AOR executing DSCA FP operations, and, when necessary, to influence operations to deter, prevent and defeat potential threats. FP operations for USNORTHCOM are unique due to the presence of DOD assets and personnel in non-DOD controlled areas of the AOR. FP in DSCA operations is executed as a collaborative partnership to: coordinate with the necessary DOD Elements’ AT/FP programs and bridge between them to create efficiencies, enhance effectiveness and eliminate the vulnerabilities, gaps and seams in the overall security posture for the AOR; ensure interoperability and emergency preparedness between existing DOD FP jurisdictions and
local, State, Federal or Tribal organizations and communities and ensure the security of off-installation DOD assets, people, infrastructure and operations.

a. Concept of Operation. USNORTHCOM will conduct an all hazards approach to FP to gain and maintain situational awareness of the current security posture through the conduct of risk assessments and other supporting FP missions in a non-DOD-controlled environment. USNORTHCOM develops detailed FP guidance for DOD Elements in support of the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission using the AT program standards (refs a, b and c) to ensure FP mission integration.

b. Tasks. See Supporting Tabs to this Appendix.

   (1) Supporting DOD Elements.

      (a) Retain operational control (OPCON) of all assigned forces, unless otherwise directed, with inherent responsibilities of command for FP of assigned forces IAW USNORTHCOM directives.

      (b) Execute FP responsibilities for all forces assigned.

      (c) Address FP during all phases of DSCA planning and operations.

      (d) Coordinate AT/FP issues with USNORTHCOM and civilian authorities as appropriate.

c. Coordinating Instructions. All DOD Elements in support of USNORTHCOM have the following responsibilities:

   (1) It is imperative that all AT/FP matters, threat information and FPCONs, are well coordinated up and down all levels of military commands via organic command and control (C2) systems, as well as between military, civil, government, and inter-agency organizations.

   (2) DOD Elements will report cases where the implementation of specific AT/FP measures will adversely impact or significantly hamper accomplishment of their assigned duties.

   (3) Submit emergent and/or emergency requirements in support of their Combatant Command mission to the CJCS for CbT RIF consideration and to submit FP requirements.

   (4) Identify areas and assets that are vulnerable to identified threat attack means and communicate these vulnerabilities to USNORTHCOM through ATEP.

   (5) Coordinate with USNORTHCOM for FPCON changes.
(6) Coordinate mission unique requirements in plans and orders and coordinate with NC/J34 to ensure consistency of FP guidance.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics. Services and agencies retain responsibility for funding AT requirements for DOD installations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

b. Administration. None.

c. Reports.

(1) General. Provide the following to the USNORTHCOM JOC with copy to NC/J34:

(a) Change in any Alert or Security status.

(b) Current standing CCIR, PIR, EEFI and FFIR as posted in TAB 1 or situational information requirements as published.

d. Standard Reporting Criteria. DOD Elements in support of Commander, USNORTHCOM or conducting independent operations directly under USNORTHCOM control, will submit reports per Appendix 15, TAB I as directed by Commander USNORTHCOM and by this CONPLAN.

(1) Daily SITREP. See TAB I for requirements.

(2) OPREP-3/OPREP-3P. See Enclosure 1 to TAB I for requirements and format.

(3) BLUE DART Reports. See Enclosure 2 to TAB I for requirements and format.

(4) Law Enforcement Information Reporting. See Enclosure 3 to TAB I for requirements and format.

(5) Methods. Use most expeditious means. Declared FPCON is UNCLASSIFIED. Rationale for changing FPCON may be classified; use secure communications when required.

5. Command and Control.

a. Commander, USNORTHCOM exercises TACON (for FP) of all DOD Elements, whether Active Duty or Reserve Component (Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air Force Reserve and during time of
war when directed by the President, the Coast Guard Reserve) that are assigned in support of USNORTHCOM.

b. Command Relationships. Responsibility and authority for AT/FP follow command lines. The unique inter-agency environment of HLS operations may require modifications to traditional command relationships to allow proper execution of FP; inform the USNORTHCOM JOC, with copy to NC/J34, of such requirements. C2 relationships will be based on the situation and the assigned mission.

TABS:

A. Omitted
B. Antiterrorism (AT)
C. Omitted
D. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High Yield Explosive (CBRNE)
E. Omitted
F. Law Enforcement (LE)
G. Physical Security
H. Force Health Protection
I. Reports
References:  
a. USNORTHCOM Operations Order 05-01, Antiterrorism, 6 May 2005.
   b. EXORD for Standup of USNORTHCOM CONUS AT-FP Responsibility, DTG 071710Z MAY 04.
   d. DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards, 14 Jun 01.
   f. DOD Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 1 Nov 01.
   g. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, 15 Jan 00.
   h. UFC 4-010-01, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 8 Oct 03.
   i. UFC 4-010-02, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings, 8 Oct 03.

1. SITUATION.

   a. Purpose and Goal. The AT program is one of several security-related programs that fall under the overarching Combating Terrorism (CbT) and Force Protection (FP) programs. The AT program is a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparation to defend against and planning for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents. Although not elements of AT, plans for terrorism consequence management preparedness and response measures as well as plans for continuing essential military operations are important adjuncts to an effective AT program. The minimum elements of an AT program are AT risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource generation, and a program review (refs. a and c above). The
AT plan’s purpose is to safeguard personnel, property, and resources during deployed operations in support of USNORTHCOM. In meeting this goal, the deploying/deployed unit considers, at a minimum:

1. **Operations Security (OPSEC).** Is unclassified information being disclosed that could compromise the mission? Is the deploying/deployed unit continuously evaluating EEFI and countermeasures for applicability? Does the deploying/deployed unit avoid detectable actions that could be pieced together by an adversary to determine EEFI? Are secure communications devices/means being used at all times? Does the deploying/deployed unit shred/burn all unneeded documents? Is there a plan for emergency destruction of designated documents and equipment, as required? Does the deploying/deployed unit have an active OPSEC awareness plan in place? Does the deploying/deployed unit maintain continuous coordination with the PAO throughout the operation?

2. **Physical Security.** Is access to the unit/individual work and billeting areas controlled? Are other safeguards such as guards, barriers, or patrols available, if necessary? Do the local physical security measures match the threat?

3. **Personal Security.** Do the deploying/deployed unit and/or individuals vary their routines? As far as the mission permits, can individuals blend with the local environment? Do simple Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) exist? Are they widely disseminated? Incorporated into pre-deployment training? Does the deploying/deployed unit consider deploying extra personnel to enhance security? Does the deploying/deployed unit consider the assignment of bodyguards, if the situation dictates? Does the deploying/deployed unit ensure bodyguards are properly trained and vetted?

4. **Law Enforcement.** Is there liaison with local law enforcement? Are their capabilities sufficient to counter the anticipated threat? Are the locations of civilian police, military police, government agencies, and other safe locations available? Does the deploying/deployed unit maintain points of contact for law enforcement organizations in the deployment area? Is liaison established with local law enforcement, as well as Federal and State agencies, in deployment areas to: Determine capabilities? Integrate into security plan as appropriate? Develop plans to compensate for shortfalls?

5. **Combating Terrorism.** Is an updated threat briefing available? Have all personnel received the brief? Is there a plan for coping with a terrorist attack? Has it been rehearsed? Is there an alert system in the case of an anticipated attack? Is there a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) available? Is the QRF trained, rehearsed and ready? Have the appropriate security authorities been contacted to coordinate/ facilitate procedures in case of hostile action? Are the security authorities prepared to take action if a hostile incident occurs? Does the deploying/deployed unit reduce signature (concealed activities, subdued dress,
UNCLASSIFIED

indigenous vehicles, etc) where possible? Is there a means to know the whereabouts of all personnel at all times? Is the two-man rule in effect?

b. General. This plan applies to all deploying, deployed or mobilized personnel.

c. Hazards. Annex B, Intelligence. The primary hazards to deployed units are asymmetric and criminal threats.

(1) Asymmetric Threats. Asymmetric threats include terrorism, use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), information warfare (IW), interruption of critical services, and environmental sabotage.

(2) Criminal Activities include drug trafficking, murder, theft, rape, money laundering, assault, battery, domestic violence, vandalism, illegal use of firearms, and domestic terrorism.

(3) Other concerns include natural disasters, collapse of critical technical infrastructure, manmade disasters, and localized civil unrest and disturbances that threaten Government activities or critical infrastructure.


f. Assumptions.

(1) Terrorist organizations may target Government Agencies (GAs), DOD personnel, supporting personnel, their families, DOD installations’ critical assets or infrastructure within the USNORTHCOM AOR. When DOD Elements and/or personnel deploy or are mobilized within the USNORTHCOM AOR, various organizations may seek opportunities to attack and discredit the U.S. and the DOD.

(2) DOD Elements and personnel could be at risk due to collateral damage if a terrorist organization targets personnel or property in the DSCA OA.

(3) DOD Elements and personnel cannot rely solely on civilian U.S. support to provide necessary FP.

(4) Terrorist attacks typically are planned, well executed, rapidly employed, and likely violent events. Terrorist organizations usually will engage in extensive pre-attack surveillance of a potential target. When they execute the attack, terrorists will likely use hit-and-run tactics with little or no warning.

(5) Implementing security measures and training personnel will enhance the ability to disrupt terrorist surveillance/planning efforts.
(6) Individuals, groups, or countries opposed to the U.S. will use open sources to obtain intelligence about the U.S. military. These groups will also attempt to infiltrate the SIPRNet, NIPRNet, and other communications systems to disrupt or destroy information operations.

g. Intelligence. Commanders coordinate with the military and Primary Agency (PA) at the deployment/mobilized location to maintain situational awareness of current and emerging threats that may be directed against DOD personnel, facilities and assets. USNORTHCOM is also responsible to disseminate threat information to and assist commanders in maintaining situational awareness.

2. MISSION. Effective 1 October 2004, USNORTHCOM executes an AT Program to prevent and detect terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, resources, installations, and infrastructure critical to DOD mission accomplishment as well as the preparation to defend against, and planning for the response to, the consequences of terrorist incidents in order to ensure continuation of essential DOD military operations in the DSCA OA.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. USNORTHCOM will execute Tactical Control (TACON) (for Force Protection) (refs a., b. and c.). This command relationship applies to all DOD personnel to include family members, DOD contractors and the Reserve Components, assigned or non-assigned. Day to day execution of the FP mission is the responsibility of the four Service Headquarters designated points of contact (POC), the eighteen Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities Headquarters, and the six Combatant Command Headquarters located in the USNORTHCOM AOR. IAW references c, and d, of this OPORD, FP will be executed through the DOD Elements existing FP programs and current chains of command. USNORTHCOM will execute Geographic Combatant Command FP responsibilities through the five AT program elements and ten supporting tasks derived from reference a.

(1) Commander's Intent. The purpose of the USNORTHCOM AT Program is to prevent, detect, deter, defend, defeat and, if necessary, mitigate the effects of terrorist plans and operations in order to preserve the mission capability of forces operating in the DSCA OA. USNORTHCOM’s ability to assess the threat and the current security posture of the DSCA OA, to integrate USNORTHCOM efforts with those of the DOD Elements, DHS and DOS, and when required, to influence those actions to deter, prevent and defeat potential threats, are inherent in USNORTHCOM’s FP responsibilities. The FP responsibilities and AT Program are critical to USNORTHCOM’s success as a Geographic Combatant Command.

(2) End State: Effective integration of USNORTHCOM’s FP responsibilities and AT Program with those of the DOD Elements in the USNORTHCOM AOR providing a synchronized defensive strategy protecting DOD assets against
terrorist threats and ensuring DOD’s capability for sustainment of critical operations.

(3) Pre-Deployment. Ensure all personnel have completed AT training and have received current threat briefings that are deployment location-specific. Execute pre-deployment AT vulnerability assessments of installations/facilities/operational sites and movement routes to be used by in-transit forces. Review security issues with local law enforcement and government officials at the deployment location.

(4) Deployment. Implement in-transit security procedures for forces and equipment.

(5) Employment. Deployed/mobilized forces execute the AT plan. AT plans will be updated, as required, during this phase as new information becomes available regarding threats.

(6) Re-Deployment. Implement in-transit security procedures for forces and equipment.

(7) Recovery. Consolidate and disseminate AT lessons learned.

b. Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) Pre-Deployment Planning, Training and Exercises.

(a) Exercise AT plans at a minimum annually.

(b) Level I AT Training. All deploying personnel will complete Level I AT training prior to deployment. Those personnel who have undergone Level I AT training within 90 days prior to deployment are considered current.

(c) Threat Briefing. All deploying personnel will receive a threat briefing specific to the deployed location within 14 days of deployment. The threat briefing will include criminal activities as the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used in criminal attacks are similar to terrorist TTP. Commanders will brief their personnel how to protect against terrorist and criminal attacks; and, address both terrorist and criminal attacks in incident response and physical security plans. Criminal activities to consider, based upon threat, are:

   1. Robbery.

   2. Kidnapping.

4. Theft.

5. Murder.

(d) AT Plans. Deploying units will develop an AT Plan that addresses pre-through post-deployment AT measures. The plan will be reviewed and updated while deployed to reflect changes in threat levels and AT readiness. The minimum required elements of the AT plan are:

1. Address the AT program elements: risk management; planning; training and exercises; resource generation; and comprehensive program review.

2. Specific threat risk mitigation measure strategies to establish a local baseline defensive posture. The local baseline defensive posture shall facilitate systematic movement to and from elevated security postures, included the application of RAM.


4. AT Measures for Off-installation Facilities, Housing, and Activities.

5. AT Measures for HRP.

6. AT Construction and Building Considerations.

7. AT Measures for Logistics Contracting.


10. Terrorist Consequence Management Measures, including CBRNE and WMD mitigation planning.

11. FPCON Implementation Measures, including site-specific AT measures.

(e) Commanders will exercise the threat warning system (BLUE DART) prior to and during deployment to ensure all personnel are familiar with the process.

(f) Commanders will review and update AT plans prior to deployment in order to address the threat at the deployment location.

(2) In-Transit Security.
(a) Commanders will execute pre-deployment AT vulnerability assessments (VA). This includes movement routes that may be used by transiting DoD forces, ships and aircraft.

(b) Ensure Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM)/security measures are developed for each FPCON and implemented for in-transit units.

(c) Track all in-transit units as they transit through the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(d) Employ detection surveillance resources in support of in-transit units.

(e) Conduct threat assessments and VAs of routes and sites used by in-transit forces.

(f) Request AT augmentation, as required. Conduct onboard and/or advance-site support prior to and during deployment to higher-threat areas of Significant or High Threat Levels, or where a geographically specific Terrorism Warning Report is in effect. This includes ports, airfields, and inland movement routes that may be used by in-transit forces. Advance-site support affords the opportunity to communicate current local threat information to in-transit units, enabling the onboard AT team to more effectively tailor AT measures to the specific threat environment.

(g) Develop and implement an Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment for each installation and each in-transit and intra-theater unit movement.

(h) Commanders must be able to maintain continuous contact with transiting ships and aircraft. Identify shortfalls in en route communications capabilities and take steps to maintain contact with ships and aircraft, enroute, within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Inability to satisfy this requirement will be reflected in executive/operations orders and considered during mission planning and approval, but does not require submission of a waiver request to HQ USNORTHCOM.

(i) Prior to movement, commanders must conduct a terrorist threat assessment and vulnerability assessment of all locations and routes their troops will transit, including arrival sites, movement routes, planned halts, and departure sites.

(3) Deployed Forces AT Measures.

(a) Develop location-specific FPCON measures or actions for each FPCON. Appendix 5 of ref. a addresses FPCON for the USNORTHCOM AOR.
(4) **Law Enforcement Measures/Coordination.** See Tab F (Law Enforcement) to Appendix 15 (Force Protection) to Annex C.

(5) **Vulnerability Assessments.**

   (a) Threat(s). Commanders will evaluate potential threats based on: capability + intent = threat.

   (b) Pre-Deployment/Deployed Assessments. Conduct a pre-deployment assessment of the deploying element’s vulnerabilities. Conduct assessments while deployed if the threat level changes, or as the deployed element Commander directs.

   (c) Countermeasures: Deploying Commanders will employ detection surveillance resources in support of in-transit units.

   (d) Mitigation of the effects of a terrorist incident: Deploying Commanders will employ applicable active and passive measures to lessen the impact of terrorist events against DOD personnel and assets.

   (e) Individual Response to a Terrorist Incident. AT plans will address individual response to terrorist incidents.

   (f) Recovery from a terrorist incident: Deploying Commanders will design plans to recover from the effects of a terrorist incident.

(6) **Incident Response.**

   (a) Based on the threat assessment for the deployed location commanders will develop incident response plans for the following: assassination, assault, hostage barricade, hijacking, kidnapping, bombing, civil disorder, CBRNE. Integrate these plans into the AT Plan, as required.

   (b) Develop and/or verify MOAs and MOUs that address interaction with local authorities and any assistance that they are asked to provide.

(7) **High-Risk Personnel Protection.** Use the guidelines provided in Tab C, High Risk Personnel, to Appendix 5 to Annex C, USNORTHCOM OPORD 05-01 (AT).

(8) **AT Exercises.**

   (a) Enable commanders to validate existing AT plans and measures.

   (b) Commanders will, at a minimum, conduct one AT exercise annually.
(c) Commanders will exercise their AT plan while deployed.

d. Jurisdiction. Commander, USNORTHCOM has overall responsibility for FP for the USNORTHCOM AOR.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Procedural.

(a) Alert Notification Procedures.

1. Establish and rehearse procedures to notify deploying/deployed forces of changes to threat levels at the deployment location.

2. Notify the USNORTHCOM JOC, OIW and NC/J34 of any changes in the threat level immediately.

3. Coordinate with local authorities to provide deploying/deployed forces with immediate notification of potential and impending threats.

(b) Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).

1. RUF. The RUF directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM are in effect.

2. RUF Sufficiency. The deploying/deployed unit must report RUF sufficiency to HQ, USNORTHCOM within 72 hours of arrival.

(c) Legal Status of Deployed Personnel.

1. Commander, USNORTHCOM will exercise C2 through TACON (for FP) of all DOD Elements (Active Duty and Reserve Components, Title 10) that are assigned in support of USNORTHCOM.

2. Title 10, USC Status. Commander, USNORTHCOM exercises command and control of Title 10 forces when they are assigned to USNORTHCOM.

3. State Active Duty. National Guard forces in a State Active Duty status remain under the control of their respective state’s chain of command.

4. Title 32 vs. State Active Duty. The difference between Title 32 and State Active Duty forces is the funding used for their mobilization. Title 32 forces are funded by the Federal Government. State Active Duty forces are funded by their respective state government.
REMARKS:


c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.07B, 16 February 2001, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides."

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3435.01 (Draft), XX June 2004, "Standards for CBRNE Protection on Installations and Facilities."


i. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, 1 July 2002, "Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)."


k. CJCSI 3110.16, 10 November 2000, “Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for CBRNE Consequence Management Operations.”

1. USNORTHCOM Operations Order 05-01, Antiterrorism, 6 May 2005.

1. Situation.

   a. Purpose and Goal. The CBRNE program, within the comprehensive AT program, falls under the overarching Combating Terrorism and Force Protection programs (see Appendix 9 (Installation/Facility Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Preparedness) to Annex C (Operations) to USNORTHCOM OPORD 05-01, Antiterrorism). The CBRNE program is an all hazards approach focusing on contamination avoidance, protection, response, and combating WMD against terrorist incidents and criminal activities which target DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to accomplish the mission.

   The CBRNE plan’s purpose is to protect personnel, property, and resources during deployed operations in support of USNORTHCOM. In meeting this goal, the deploying/deployed unit must consider, at a minimum:

   (1) Contamination Avoidance. Has the unit developed a hazard profile based on the threat stream? Has the deploying/deployed unit completed a risk assessment covering essential facilities at risk, population at risk, and infrastructure? Has the unit prepared a hazard risk index worksheet that includes frequency of use, magnitude, warning time, severity, and special characteristics and planning considerations?

   (2) Protection. Does that unit have an SOP that addresses identified hazards, risks, and response measures? Are the personnel who can assist in key areas of response operations identified and trained? Are resources and supplies that may be required in a CBRNE event identified? How will the unit warn its personnel of an existing or impending CBRNE incident and communicate internally before, during, and after the event occurs? Is how casualties will be cared for, where, and by whom addressed in the health and medical portion of the SOP? Are special considerations, such as mass casualty decontamination, addressed for CBRNE-related terrorist events?

   (3) Response. Are the response personnel to a CBRNE event, trained and rehearsed? Do alert and notification rosters for notifying key personnel exist and
are they up-to-date? Who is responsible for ensuring accuracy and/or currency of alert rosters, SOPs, maps, etc.? Where are the warnings systems located and are they at risk of tampering? What conditions can the unit assume will exist during a CBRNE event? Who has the authority to make the decision to issue a warning? When is this decision made? Does the SOP include provisions for testing, maintaining, repairing and/or replacing warning equipment? Are procedures in place for augmenting response elements where necessary? When were these procedures last tested? Has a rapid damage assessment that focuses on lifesaving needs, imminent hazards, and critical lifelines taken place within hours after an incident?

(4) Combating WMD. Is an updated threat briefing available? Have all personnel received the brief? Is there a plan for coping with a CBRNE attack? Has it been rehearsed? Is there an alert system in the case of an anticipated attack? Is there a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for detection and decontamination available? Is the QRF trained, rehearsed and ready? Have the appropriate security authorities been contacted to coordinate/facilitate procedures in case of hostile action? Are the security authorities prepared to take action if a hostile incident occurs? Are stay-in-place or evacuation plans in-place? Is there a means to know the whereabouts of all personnel at all times? Are decontamination procedures established and rehearsed?

b. General. This plan applies to all deploying, deployed or mobilized personnel.

c. Hazards. Annex B, Intelligence. The potentially devastating effect of terrorist use of WMD mandates that organizations conduct a thorough analysis of the threat in their AOR. The primary CBRNE threat to deployed units is asymmetric.

(1) Asymmetric Threats. Asymmetric threats included improvised explosive devices, improvised chemical devices, radiological dispersal devices, biological agents and toxins, chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and environmental sabotage.

(2) Other concerns include natural disasters, naturally occurring diseases, collapse of critical technical infrastructure, manmade disasters, and localized civil unrest and disturbances that threaten Government activities or critical infrastructure.


2. Mission. USNORTHCOM executes a comprehensive CBRNE plan (within the overall AT plan) to increase the survivability of U.S. military personnel, DOD civilians, resources, infrastructure, information, and equipment during CBRNE terrorist attacks, when deployed/mobilized in support of Commander, USNORTHCOM (see Appendix 9
3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Commander's Intent.

(a) Purpose: Ensure that DOD assets deployed within the DSCA OA are capable of conducting continued operations while under the threat of or actual WMD attack. These actions will be accomplished through the use of passive defensive measures, to include vulnerability assessments, threat analysis, detection and reconnaissance, and decontamination operations. Training and medical prophylaxis will mitigate risks of unit degradation during operations.

(b) Method: Current military doctrine addresses the use of CBRNE weapons and their effects on personnel and facilities. Planning factors for battlefield use of these weapons may have direct application when planning for terrorist use of WMD. USNORTHCOM has consolidated those factors into six critical planning considerations for successful CBRNE program execution.


2. Protection: Individual and Collective

3. Decontamination: Immediate, Operational and Thorough Decontamination; Mass Casualty Decontamination

4. Medical Aspects: Treatment; Intervention/Countermeasures; and Casualty Evacuation and Handling; Surveillance

5. Consequence Management: Mitigation of Terrorist use of CBRNE

6. Other Considerations: DOD Dependents, Civilians and Contractors; Critical Infrastructure and Installations

(c) End State: DOD assets effectively integrate CBRNE responsibilities within the context of the overall AT/FP program in the USNORTHCOM AOR, provide synchronized strategies to protect against the terrorist WMD threat, and ensure DoD’s capability for mission assurance in support of all of its forgoing mission areas.

(2) CBRNE AT/FP Measures.
(a) Chemical: Terrorists may exploit a myriad of Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) and/or Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) which are available in all parts of the globe. These substances are not likely to create as many actual casualties as warfare-strength agents, but are still lethal or highly toxic. Chemical agents can be dispersed using mortars, sprayers, and improvised explosive devices. Chemicals can last from minutes to weeks at the site of release and create a larger initial hazard area than conventional explosives. Further, chemicals often create a temporary downwind vapor hazard.

(b) Biological: Biological hazards pose unique challenges because they are relatively easy to produce and difficult to detect after release. Examples of terrorist biological weapons include small amounts of anthrax or smallpox dispersed using a non-explosive point source or spray tank. The duration of agent virulence and the size of the downwind hazard area are largely dependent on environmental conditions and dissemination efficiency at the time of the attack. The potential psychological impact and relative low cost of biological hazards make them an attractive alternative to explosives. Offensive biological programs can be easily concealed, and production does not always require specialized equipment. Effective medical intervention is possible for many bacteria, but other pathogens (e.g., viruses, fungi, toxins) can be much more difficult to treat.

(c) Radiological. Low-level radiological material is available from a large number of industrial sources worldwide. Terrorists able to gain access to this material could exploit it using low-yield explosive devices. Specific examples of terrorist radiological hazards include iridium, cesium, and highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the core of a radiological dispersal device. Although rarely lethal in the near term, the deliberate dissemination of radioactive matter can cause considerable immediate psychological harm.

(d) Nuclear. Terrorists with sufficient finances will seek out those willing to sell both information and materiel regarding nuclear weapons. Besides the extremely high explosive nature of nuclear weapons, other effects include high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP/EMP) that can degrade unprotected and vulnerable military and civilian electronics.

(e) Explosive. Virtually every country, sub-national group, and terrorist organization has access to explosive devices. Traditionally, these have been the weapons of choice to terrorists because they are readily available, cheap, easy to use, and their effects are reasonably predictable. Although there is considerable psychological impact with terrorist use of an explosive devise, most actual casualties are created in the immediate area of the blast.

(3) Operational Exposure Guidance (OEG). Mission requirements and threat analysis will determine the selection of total dose exposure thresholds.
4. **Administration and Logistics.**

   a. **Protective Equipment.** Protective equipment levels will be determined based on the current threat stream and will be adjusted as the situation dictates. PPE / MOPP level determination must consider purchasing civilian masks with HEPA filters and eye protection. Decontamination support and collective shelters for quartering may provide the soldiers a feeling of safety and therefore reduce the psychological impacts of working in a contaminated area.

   b. **Storage and Transportation.** See Annex D.

5. **Command and Control.**

   a. Commander, USNORTHCOM exercises TACON (for FP) of all DOD Elements, whether Active Duty or Reserve Component (Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air Force Reserve and during time of war when directed by the President, the Coast Guard Reserve) that are assigned in support of USNORTHCOM.

   b. **Command Relationships.** Responsibility and authority for AT/FP follow command lines. The unique inter-agency environment of HLS operations may require modifications to traditional command relationships to allow proper execution of FP; inform the USNORTHCOM JOC, with copy to NC/J34, of such requirements. C2 relationships will be based on the situation and the assigned mission.
1. SITUATION. No portion of this document or any of its supporting attachments will be construed, interpreted, or employed in a manner which is contrary to, or in violation of, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)(18 USC 1385), DODD 3025.dd (DSCA), DODD 5200.27, or any other law or regulation.

a. Hazards. Categories of threats and vulnerabilities within the DSCA OA are discussed in chapter 2 of the USNORTHCOM CONOPS. Additional threat information can be found in the USNORTHCOM HLD, CS and AT/FP CONEMPs and in the USNORTHCOM AT OPORD. USNORTHCOM faces the full spectrum (Terrorism, Criminal, Natural) of potential threats in executing its command responsibilities.

1) Terrorist Threat. DOD in the DSCA OA remains a target of transnational and homegrown terrorists. As the U.S. continues the Global War on Terrorism, terrorists will continue to plan and execute activities throughout the world in opposition to U.S. national policy. It is likely that initial indicators and warnings of terrorist activity within the DSCA OA will appear as criminal activity through LE information.

2) Other Criminal Threats. DOD in the DSCA OA may be a target from a wide range of threats (e.g. terrorist sympathizers, extremists, anti-war sympathizers, cyber threats, gangs, international narcotic traffickers, etc.).

3) Natural Disasters. DOD in the DSCA OA remains vulnerable to a myriad of natural disasters, to include hurricanes, tornados, floods, and wildfires.

4) The NORTHCOM Directorate of Intelligence (NC/J2) produces and disseminates estimates of the current and projected threats within the DSCA OA. The latest threat information is posted on the USNORTHCOM Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) portal, under the N-NC/J2.
(1) Military Police (MP), Security Forces (SF), Masters at Arms and the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) in Title 10 status, operate under different rules and restrictions than do National Guard forces in SAD or Title 32 status and civilian Federal, State, and local LEAs. These Title 10 forces may not directly support civilian LEAs in law enforcement.

(2) For the conduct of Joint Task Force (JTF) DOD LE support operations in support of the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission, the JTF Provost Marshal, when designated, has primary responsibility. The proponent and central integrator for the USNORTHCOM LE Support activity (in support of USNORTHCOM’s missions, to include DSCA and FP) within the USNORTHCOM headquarters is the USNORTHCOM Chief of Security, LE Support, and Force Protection (NC/J34).

(3) DOD LE support to DSCA operations is executed by the forces described in paragraph 1.b. (1).

2. MISSION. USNORTHCOM executes the LE Support activity to include all critical tasks within the law enforcement support planning, law enforcement information and law enforcement coordination functional areas in support of the USNORTHCOM DSCA and FP missions. These DOD LE support tasks include coordinating required capabilities and standards for the employment of military police, security forces and masters at arms in support of USNORTHCOM missions; analyzing, synchronizing, integrating and disseminating law enforcement information along with recommended security measures in support of USNORTHCOM missions; and executing required coordination with DOD and non-DOD law enforcement agencies in support of USNORTHCOM missions. In addition, USNORTHCOM assists with programming resources in support of the USNORTHCOM LE Support activity.

3. EXECUTION.

   a. Commander’s Intent. The purpose of the DOD LE Support activity is to support the USNORTHCOM DSCA and FP missions. The intent of the DOD LE Support activity is to serve as the theater bridge against criminal threats aimed at DOD personnel, infrastructure, resources and information, create efficiencies, and eliminate vulnerabilities, gaps and seams in the overall security posture of DOD within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Integrating and synchronizing supporting tasks for the USNORTHCOM DOD LE support activity are essential to the successful execution of the USNORTHCOM missions. Throughout this integration effort, USNORTHCOM staff directorates will retain the DOD LE support tasks they are currently executing, and these DOD LE support tasks will be formally assigned to the appropriate staff directorates in this CONEX. This USNORTHCOM LE Support CONEX will establish clear lines of communication and responsibilities for all USNORTHCOM DOD LE support tasks as well as close cooperation between the Joint Security, LE Support and Force Protection Division, all USNORTHCOM staff
directorates and the DOD Elements within the DSCA OA. All operational information flow and communications external to USNORTHCOM will be routed through the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC). End State. The USNORTHCOM DOD LE Support activity will enhance USNORTHCOM’s synchronized defensive strategies and the Command’s overall Force Protection posture. In addition, it will ensure effective execution of USNORTHCOM’s DSCA and FP missions.

b. Concept of Operations. USNORTHCOM will execute the DOD LE Support activity as a security-related program under the over-arching umbrella of FP in support of USNORTHCOM’s DSCA and FP missions. USNORTHCOM will execute the DOD LE Support activity through assigned forces and TACON (for FP) chains of command.

(1) Day to day operational and tactical execution of DOD LE Support tasks remains the responsibility of the headquarters of the four Service designated points of contact to USNORTHCOM for FP, eighteen Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities, six Combatant Commands and four USNORTHCOM subordinate commands located in the DSCA OA. USNORTHCOM will not execute law enforcement investigative operations. Law enforcement investigations will remain solely a Service / DOD Agency responsibility.

(2) The Joint Security, LE Support, and Force Protection Division (NC/J34) is the USNORTHCOM staff proponent and central integrator for the DOD LE Support activity. As the proponent and central integrator, NC/J34 promulgates the operational guidance for the NC/J3 within which the USNORTHCOM staff and DOD Elements perform their respective DOD LE support tasks. While the USNORTHCOM staff and DOD Elements perform tasks within the three functional areas, they perform these tasks within the NC/J3’s operational guidance promulgated by the Joint Security, LE Support, and Force Protection Division (NC/J34). In addition, the USNORTHCOM staff and the DOD Elements perform all DOD LE support tasks in coordination with NC/J34. NC/J34 has the responsibility to ensure unity of effort, integration and coordination of all USNORTHCOM DOD LE support efforts.

(3) USNORTHCOM will execute the Geographic Combatant Command LE Support activity through three functional areas (law enforcement support planning, law enforcement information and law enforcement coordination) and the following six critical tasks:

(a) Law Enforcement Plans and Policy. Advise USNORTHCOM leadership on the capabilities and employment of military police, security forces and master at arms. Provide security and law enforcement input to USNORTHCOM plans, policy, and training, in support of the USNORTHCOM DSCA and FP missions. Establish and promulgate USNORTHCOM-specific requirements.
(b) High Risk Personnel Security. Promulgate requirements to set minimum standards and synchronize high risk personnel programs to ensure the protection of DOD principals from assassination, kidnapping, injury and embarrassment. Maintain situational awareness of the movement of high risk personnel within the DOD channels.

(c) Physical Security. Promulgate requirements to set minimum standards and synchronize physical security programs to ensure the protection of all DOD assets within the USNORTHCOM AOR against hostile intelligence activities, terrorist acts, criminal acts, dissidents and other disruptive influences (all hazards).

(d) Customs. Promulgate requirements to set minimum standards to eliminate illegal trafficking of controlled substances and other contraband within DOD channels in the DOD OAR.

(e) Law Enforcement Information Flow and Analysis. Ensure the Command has the capability to gather and receive law enforcement information from multiple sources and levels, both within and outside DOD channels, pertaining to criminal elements that target DOD personnel, infrastructure, information and resources. By doctrine, operational needs will drive the law enforcement information analysis. The data needed to perform this analysis will guide collection efforts. Ensure the capability exists to evaluate, analyze, and fuse relevant data on criminal activity to include trends, tactics, techniques, procedures, and emergent threats that may affect DOD personnel, resources, infrastructure, information and equipment. The intent of USNORTHCOM law enforcement information analysis is to evaluate, analyze, and fuse law enforcement reporting from all sources in order to discern trends and, when necessary, to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to deter, prevent, defeat, or mitigate threats.

(f) Non-DOD Law Enforcement Coordination. Support law enforcement operations, when directed, through operationally focused coordination between USNORTHCOM staff; non-DOD agencies at the local, State, Federal and Tribal levels; and partner nations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. The nature of this coordination will encompass the integration of military and law enforcement agency plans and operations, and will support the collaborative synchronization of USNORTHCOM support of civilian law enforcement agencies and support during civil disturbance. Coordinate DOD support to civilian authorities and provide interagency assistance to include training support to law enforcement agencies. The planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination, the coordination with LEAs (Federal, State, Tribal and Local) for law enforcement information sharing and operational support to those LEAs will all be functions of the NC/J34, with consultation from N-NC/IC.
b. Tasks.

(1) USNORTHCOM Assigned Forces:

(a) Provide military support to civilian LE operations.

(b) Provide security support for National Special Security Events (NSSE).

(c) Provide support during civil disturbances.

(d) Border Protection Augmentation (BPA).

(e) Combating Terrorism (CbT).

(f) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).

(g) Transnational Threat Operations.

(2) JTF-North:

(a) Provide support to civilian LEAs to deter and prevent transnational threats to the homeland.

(b) Provide border detection support (Aviation, FLIR, UAV, ground sensors, tunnel detection).

(c) Provide Aerial reconnaissance support (Helicopters over public lands).

(d) Provide engineer support (Fences, lights, roads).

(e) Provide transportation support.

(f) Provide intelligence support (Analysts, imagery).

(g) Provide training support (WMD, mass casualties, SRT).

(h) Provide support to civilian LEAs for counter drug and transnational threat operations.

(i) Facilitate intelligence and information sharing among Federal agencies and partner nations.
Physical Security

References: See Appendix 15 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05.


1. Situation.

a. The physical security systems installed on and around DOD installations and facilities in the DSCA OA form the physical backbone of DOD Element AT efforts. The physical security system is the first line of defense against terrorist attack. The physical security system is built on the foundation that baseline security and preparedness posture is established based on a continuous global threat to DOD resources and facilities. DOD and Service Physical Security Programs are established based on these continuing validated and postulated threats. Compliance with DOD physical security guidance only establishes the baseline program. Individual installation, site or port physical security programs must incorporate the local threat, site-specific vulnerabilities, identification and protection of critical host and tenant assets, and employment of available resources. Further, these systems must be scalable and proportional to increases in the local threat and/or the DOD Element operational capability.

2. Mission. See Base Order.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Physical security systems are designed to employ a layered “defense in depth” concept to provide graduated levels of protection from the DOD boundary to critical assets.

(2) At a minimum, and as applicable, the Physical Security Plan should adhere to DODD 5200.8-R (ref. a above), DODD 5200.8 (ref. b above), and applicable Service directives, instructions, and regulations and incorporate the following:

(a) The DOD FPCON System.
(b) Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM).

(c) Physical Security Measures for an Installation.

(d) Physical Security Measures for Facilities.

(e) Physical Security Measures for Ports.

(f) Physical Security Measures for Airfields.


(h) AT Construction Standards.

(i) AT Considerations for Deployed and In-Transit Forces.

(j) AT Considerations for Installation Infrastructure.

(3) The goal of physical security is to deploy security resources to preclude or reduce potential sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism, espionage or other criminal activity. To achieve this goal there must be the ability to detect, assess, communicate, delay and respond to an unauthorized attempt at entry. Physical security system major components include:

(a) Integrated electronic security systems.

(b) Entry and circulation controls.

(c) Barrier systems.

(d) Access delay and denial systems.

(e) Dedicated security forces.

(f) Designated immediate response forces.

(4) Physical security measures are a combination of active and passive systems, devices, and security forces used to protect an asset or facility from possible threat. These measures include, but are not limited to:

(a) Security forces and owner/user personnel.

(b) Military/police working dogs.

(c) Physical barriers, facilities hardening, and active delay or denial systems.
(d) Secure locking systems, containers, and vaults.

(e) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).

(f) Assessment or surveillance systems such as closed-circuit television or thermal imaging systems.

(g) Protective lighting.

(h) Badgeing systems, access control devices, material or asset tagging systems, and contraband detection equipment.

b. Tasks.

(1) Develop integrated physical security system, or utilize and enhance an existing system, in order to achieve the necessary levels of protection of DOD personnel and assets.

(2) Incorporate physical security systems into the AT plan and exercise same.

(3) Integrate facilities, equipment, trained personnel, and procedures into a coordinated, synchronized effort to provide maximum protection.

(4) When multiple DOD Elements are located at an installation or facility, the Service that owns the installation is responsible for ensuring that physical security is integrated into the AT plan and exercised on a regular basis.

(5) In the case of multiple DOD Elements sharing DOD-leased, -managed, or -occupied facilities the DOD Element with the largest representation is responsible for ensuring that physical security plan is integrated into the AT plan.

(6) When developing the budget for the DOD Element AT program, factor in physical security requirements.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) DOD FPCON measures, RAM, and other AT measures are implemented based on the current threat, vulnerability, critical assets and criticality assessments. Such assessments are used to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities that may be exploited by terrorists, prioritize critical resources, and support the Commander’s risk management decisions.

(2) For a physical security system to protect DOD personnel and assets, certain security functions must be performed.
(a) Threat Detection. Detection, accomplished through human, animal or electronic means, alerts security forces for possible threats and attempts at unauthorized entry at or shortly after the time of occurrence. The earlier the detection of threats and the longer the range that they are detected, the greater the opportunities are to protect DOD assets and minimize the impact of terrorist acts against DOD personnel, materiel, and facilities.

(b) Threat Assessment. The presence of a threat is usually detected as a result of an alarm. Assessment, through the use of video subsystems, patrols or fixed posts, assists in the localizing and determining the size and intention of an unauthorized intrusion or activity.

(c) Threat Response. Threat response command and control is directed through diverse and secure communications to ensure that all countermeasures contribute to preventing or containing hostile events.

(d) Threat Delay. Delay, through the use of active and passive security measures, including barriers, impedes the intruders in their efforts to reach their objective.

1. Perimeter, exterior and interior physical barriers (erected or installed) such as fences, gates, walls, windows, doors, locking systems, ceilings, and floors provides delay.

2. Delay has three purposes: facilitate definitive threat classification and assessment; facilitate response by physical security response forces; and facilitate evacuation of protected DOD assets if evacuation is the most appropriate, cost-effective remedy.

(e) Threat Response. Response to threats by designated, trained and properly equipped security forces begins immediately upon detection and is designed to:

1. Stop further intrusion by the threat at the greatest distance possible from protected assets.

2. Slow the rate of advance toward the protected asset as much as possible.

3. Facilitate the evacuation of the protected asset to safe areas.

4. Secure the protected asset and contain the threat.

5. Contain the threat, prevent additional hostile resources from arriving, and prepare to apprehend the threat and relieve the protected asset.
FORFORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

References: Appendix 15 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05.

1. Situation.

a. Hazards. See Annex B.

b. Friendly.

(1) Force Health Protection (FHP) is a command responsibility at all levels. FHP is a focus on healthcare programs that protect American’s fighting forces. FHP is a “total life-cycle” health support system supporting the concepts described in the Joint Vision through an integrated and focused approach to protect and sustain the Department of Defense’s most important resource – its Service members and their families – throughout the entire length of service commitment. FHP’s three interrelated pillars are:

(a) Promoting and sustaining a healthy and fit force.

(b) Preventing injuries and illness and protecting the force from health hazards.

(c) Sustaining world-class medical rehabilitative care for the sick and injured anywhere in the world and the infrastructure activities that underpin them.

(2) To support FHP, medical assets must be configured to support health promotion, health hazards assessments, implantation of countermeasures, and the provision of essential care of injured and ill in theater and their rapid evacuation to definitive medical care outside of the theater of operations. Medical capability must possess the kind of agility and flexibility required in the 21st century security environment. The ability to leverage innovative emerging technologies, coupled with logistical and information superiority, enhance the capability of our operational medical forces. The operational medical forces must be smaller, rapidly deployable, effective, and technologically advanced. This requires intense, concerted effort by all Services and must be implemented jointly.

c. Assumptions.
(1) DOD AT/FP policies, procedures, standards, assignment of responsibilities, and JTTP outlined in refs a through m remain in effect.

(2) Adequate resources are applied to ensure FHP efforts in support of DSCA are executable.

(3) Services maintain AT/FP and FHP responsibilities IAW current EXORDs.

d. Resource Availability. Level 1 and 2 (field) medical support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting the mission, in coordination with appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Level 3 and above will be provided by the closest military medical treatment facility or by TRICARE through coordination with TRICARE health benefits coordinators. Resource constraints in both health services and funding may require commanders to take stopgap measures or accept risks. Resources should be pursued through the unit’s Service chain of command.

e. Planning Factors. Designated commanders and staff need to plan for the FHP of their personnel, equipment and facilities during all operations both peace and war. As a minimum standard by which to judge force health protection requirements, planners should review Refs b and c and judge their ability to implement basic FHP actions as well as those directed at each force protection condition (FPCON).

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM will execute a comprehensive FHP mission that provides an appropriate level of health care for the mission at hand for DOD personnel, to include the Reserve Component, DOD civilians, resources, infrastructure, information, and equipment from the full spectrum of terrorist operations within the DSCA OA in order to ensure essential operational mission accomplishment.

3. Execution. This Tab applies to all units operating in the DSCA OA, Direct Reporting Units (DRU), and Combined/Joint Task Forces (CTF/JTF).

a. Tasks.

(1) Commanders will:

(a) Ensure all U.S. military personnel receive required immunizations and follow prescribed preventive medicine guidance and procedures.

(b) Ensure health service support is integrated into their AT plan, to include mass casualty planning, WMD identification and risk management, food and water VAs, and other appropriate preventive medicine measures.

(c) Incorporate health service support requirements into AT Program PPBE and CbT RIF funding processes IAW the procedures established in Appendix 13 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM OPORD 05-01 (Antiterrorism).
(2) USNORTHCOM Command Surgeon (SG) will:

(a) Coordinate health service support, including medical response to mass casualty situations, strategic patient movement and definitive medical treatment for any actual terrorist incident.

(b) Promulgate FHP guidance for the areas in which USNORTHCOM has FP responsibility.

(c) Provide subject matter experts to form USNORTHCOM HHQ VA teams.

(d) Publish FHP and Preventive Medicine measures information on the USNORTHCOM Surgeon’s web page [NIPRNet: https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/SG/].

(e) Distribute health-related indications and warnings IAW the procedures established in this CONPLAN.
TAB I TO APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
ANTITERRORISM REPORTING

References: See Base Plan

a. CJCSM 3150.03B, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports, 28 July 2003.

b. (FOUO) USNORTHCOM Operations Order 05-01, 6 May 2005.

1. Purpose. The reporting guidelines described herein are established to ensure timely and accurate exchanging of information relevant to the situational awareness and/or decision making process of the Combatant Commander.

2. Type. This tab outlines the types of reports used for antiterrorism and force protection reporting. Appendix 1 (Information/Intelligence Flow) to Annex C (Operations) of Reference b. provides additional detail.

a. Event-Dependent Reporting. Information required by Commander, USNORTHCOM to support situational dependent events will be submitted IAW the following requirements and procedures. Deployed or mobilized forces supporting the DSCA mission where Commander, USNORTHCOM is the supported commander are required to include FP information in the appropriate paragraph of their commands situation report. In addition, events that dictate DOD Elements raise their FPCON baseline or deviate below established baselines are reportable. Event-dependent reporting requirements are amplified below.

(1) Deployed/Mobilized Force or Supporting Commander FP paragraph of the USNORTHCOM SITREP. Deployed/mobilized forces in support of USNORTHCOM will provide a minimum of the following information:

(a) Current FPCON condition with measures from higher FPCONs.

(b) Identify vulnerabilities in priority that cannot be mitigated and requires assistance.

(c) Projected future actions.

(d) Commanders evaluation/assessment.
(2) FPCON Change Reports. FPCON change reports are required to be transmitted to the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) through the DOD Elements’ chains of command upon implementing the change. Reports should be rendered utilizing the reporting format and procedures outlined in Annex R (Reports) to Annex C of Ref. b. to the JOC and copied to the NC/J34. This includes initial voice notification and record copy (message) reports. Upon submittal and HHQ acknowledgement of these reporting actions, FPCON status change shall also be updated in JPEN and/or ASOCC (based on system availability).

b. Suspicious Activity Reporting. Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON) reports are the primary mechanism for reporting suspicious activity focused on DOD facilities or activities. TALON reports were established to provide a means to capture non-validated domestic threat information, create a standardized reporting format adaptable to analysis, and incorporate it in the DOD terrorism threat warning process as appropriate. A TALON report consists of raw information regarding suspicious incidents and must be entered into the Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). Information in TALON reports is non-validated (may or may not be related to an actual threat) and by its very nature may be fragmented and incomplete. The purpose of the TALON report is to document and immediately disseminate potential threat information to DOD personnel, facilities, and resources. TALON reports should be submitted within 24 hours of the incident. Any command that does not have access to JPEN should notify the USNORTHCOM JOC of the activity through any available line of communication.

c. Threat Warning Reporting. There are generally two sub-categories of Threat Warning Reporting: (a) Imminent and (b) Non-Imminent.

(1) Imminent Threat Warning Reporting. The BLUE DART is an AT threat-warning program designed to rapidly disseminate imminent threat information directly to affected areas and units in a simple, easy to understand format. Amplification of the BLUE DART program is in Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex C of Ref b. Refer to Enclosure 2 to TAB I to Appendix 15 to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501 for detailed Blue Dart Threat Warning Program information.

(2) Non-Imminent Threat Warning Reporting.

(a) Threat and Force Protection Information Sharing (uncategorized). All DOD Elements to include USNORTHCOM are encouraged to maintain open lines of communication to facilitate the passing and sharing of threat and FP information that are not otherwise categorized. Information includes and is not limited to: Service or command intelligence products, DHS and other federal government reports or analysis, open source intelligence, protests to DOD activities or facilities, working group products, etc. The intent is to ensure a broad range of situational awareness and collaboration.
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USNORTHCOM may disseminate this type of information via e-mail or via USNORTHCOM FP Messages.

(b) Terrorism Threat Reporting/Analysis. NC/J2 will provide Terrorist Activity, Trends, and Indicators; AOR Threat Assessments; WMD Threat Assessments; Country-specific Threat Assessments and other products based on the threat analysis process. Additional information on this subject is provided in Annex B (Intelligence) to Ref b.

d. Crisis/Incident Reporting. The primary emphasis of crisis incident reporting is focused on suspected or confirmed terrorist incidents that have affected or potentially affect the operations, facilities or personnel of the DOD Elements. Notification throughout the chain of command, to all DOD Elements and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) will be accomplished utilizing OPREP-3 Pinnacle reporting procedures and timelines.

(1) Once either a suspected incident or confirmed incident has occurred ensure the rapid notification of all personnel assigned. These actions are necessary to ensure a heightened state of alert has been obtained to prevent attacks or deter possible subsequent attacks and to facilitate the control of the attack that just occurred.

(2) Initial notification should include at a minimum the following information. However, do not delay the initial report to gain additional information.

(a) Date, Time, and Location of incident.

(b) Type of incident such as bombing, kidnapping, direct assault, chemical / biological, etc.

(c) Number of casualties (as known or estimated).

(d) Summary of current security status.


a. When Submitted. All reports should be submitted within the timeframe specified or as required IAW applicable USNORTHCOM operational directives. All report times not specified (i.e., Deployed Force SITREP) and are recurring reports are due to the USNORTHCOM JOC no later than 1800 hours (ZULU) daily.

b. How Submitted. Reports may be rendered via telephone, email, or AUTODIN/DMS. Initial reports may be rendered telephonically; however, a record copy or official report is the preferred method and is generally required for record-keeping purposes. Some operational directives (i.e., OPREP) specify document formatting and specific report submission requirements. Operational reporting
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(OPREP) procedures are derived from Ref. a. An overview of applicable procedures and general guidance is located in Enclosure 1 to Tab I to Appendix 15 to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501.

c. Submitted To. Reports to USNORTHCOM may be submitted using the contact information identified below.

(1) USNORTHCOM J3 (Joint Operations Center).
   (a) Commercial Telephone: 719-554-2361/2358.
   (b) DSN Telephone: 692-2361/2358.
   (c) Email: NIPRNet, nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil; SIPRNet,
        nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.smil.mil.
   (d) Message Address: HQ USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

(2) USNORTHCOM J34 (Force Protection/Mission Assurance Division).
   (a) Commercial Telephone: 719-554-8311/3897/8305.
   (b) DSN Telephone: 692-8311/3897/8305.
   (c) Email: NIPRNet, nc.j34.rm.omb@northcom.mil; SIPRNet,
        nc.j34.rm.omb@northcom.smil.mil.
   (d) Message Address: HQ USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO//J3/J34//

4. Special Instructions. All reports should include a point of contact and contact procedures.

Enclosures:

1. Operational Reporting (OPREP) Procedures
2. BLUE DART Threat Warning Program
3. Law Enforcement Information Reporting
OPERATIONAL REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. Purpose. The OPREP-3 reporting system is used by military units at any level of command to report significant events and incidents to the highest levels of command. OPREP-3 reports use command and control channels to immediately notify commanders of any event or incident, which may attract international, national, or significant news media interest. Reports must be timely, concise, and include sufficient information to allow action addressees to fully understand the situation and provide information to other levels as required. The report is established to provide time-sensitive information on which to base an appropriate response to any significant event or incident that has occurred or is in progress. Do not include personnel identification information such as names, social security numbers (SSN), or addresses of individuals in OPREP-3 reports (exception: see Note below). Rather provide broad categories (e.g., active duty, reserve, airman, noncommissioned officer (NCO), officer, or dependent). If a report recipient requires names or SSN, the information should be sent via secure means as an addendum separate from OPREP-3s. The unit commander’s judgment is essential to properly and accurately report events of significant interest. All units remain responsible for reporting to their respective Services via their Service’s reporting instructions. USNORTHCOM will be an additional addressee within an already established procedure. Refer to Ref. a for detailed information regarding OPREP procedures.

NOTE: Headquarters Department of the Army guidance requires that OPREP-3 reports concerning the death of a Soldier will contain name and SSN information and will be sent as unclassified For Official Use Only over SIPRNet Defense Messaging System (DMS).

2. Types of OPREP-3 Reports. OPREP-3 reports categorize events or incidents according to their nature. Flagwords associated with each category aid prompt transmission, processing, and distribution of the reports by alerting people to their importance. Reports are addressed to NMCC and/or USNORTHCOM.

   a. Reports to the NMCC. This category includes any OPREP-3 report where national-level interest has been determined. The originator sends these reports directly to the NMCC with the flagword PINNACLE. If in doubt about whether an occurrence is of national interest, the originator should send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE report. A few of the more common reports, associated flagwords, purposes, and uses are as follows:

   (1) OPREP-3 PINNACLE (OPREP-3P). This message is used to report any incident or event that could attract national-level interest, but is not specifically
covered by another type of OPREP-3 PINNACLE report. It is not restricted to reporting only operational information.

(2) OPREP-3 PINNACLE FRONT BURNER (OPREP-3PFB). Used by any unit to report pre-conflict attack, terrorist attack, harassment, or hostile act against US forces.

b. Reports to USNORTHCOM. This category includes any OPREP-3 affecting assets and/or personnel assigned to USNORTHCOM but not considered to be national level interest. These reports will also be addressed to the appropriate Service operations center. Reports having national-level interest will be transmitted to the NMCC and all combatant commands with the flagword PINNACLE inserted in the identification line. These reports, associated flagwords, and purposes are as follows:

(1) OPREP-3 (No FLAGWORD). Used by any unit to provide appropriate Services and combatant commands with immediate notification of any incident or event where national interest is not indicated or has not been determined.

(2) OPREP-3 WHITE PINNACLE (OPREP-3WP). Used by the NMCC and the combatant commanders to exercise OPREP–3 procedures and to evaluate the timeliness of the reports.

3. OPREP Submitters. The lowest level of command or the first commander having knowledge of the event or incident requiring an OPREP-3 report that has OPREP-3 transmission capability will submit the appropriate report.

4. Submission Deadlines. All OPREP-3 reports will be submitted as soon as possible after an event or incident has occurred and record copy reports will be sent at FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence (exception: see Note below). The goal is to make initial voice reports within 15 minutes of an incident, with record reports submitted within 1 hour of the incident. OPREP-3 initial reports will contain only as much of the required information as is immediately available. The initial report must not be delayed to gain additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available.

**NOTE:** NC/J3 has directed in the USNORTHCOM Operations Order 05-01 (Antiterrorism) that DOD Elements in the DCSA OA have four hours to send OPREP-3 reports for locally directed FPCON changes.

5. Submission Procedures. OPREP-3 reports will be reported by the fastest means available consistent with security constraints. Reporting methodology is an as soon as possible (ASAP) voice report by appropriate secure and/or non-secure means followed by amplifying record copy communications.
a. Voice Reports. OPREP-3 PINNACLE voice reports will be submitted directly to the NMCC using the contact information provided in this paragraph. Secure telephone will be used for all classified voice reporting and should be used for unclassified voice reporting when available. Conference calls may be used to also inform appropriate combatant commands and parent Services only if such calls will not delay the submission of the report.

(1) NMCC Contact Information. Commercial Telephone: 703-697-3840; DSN 851-3840 or 227-6340.


b. Record Copy Reports. OPREP-3 PINNACLE record copy reports will be formatted in accordance with (IAW) paragraph 6 of this enclosure and transmitted to the NMCC, USNORTHCOM J3, and appropriate Service or DOD agency operations center using the addressee information provided. The primary means for transmitting record OPREP-3 reports is Defense Messaging System (DMS), but if DMS is unavailable, any means, including e-mail, is sufficient. Record OPREP-3 reports must answer the following questions: who, what, where, when, and how. Continue reporting until these questions are answered. If there is any doubt, report it.

(1) NMCC Record Communication Addresses.

(a) DMS: JOINT STAFF J3 NMCC OPS.

(b) PLA: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//

(2) USNORTHCOM J3 Joint Operations Center (JOC) Record Communication Addresses.

(a) DMS: HQ USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

(b) NIPRNet Email: nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil.

(c) SIPRNet Email: nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

6. OPREP-3 Report Format. To ensure expeditious handling of data, all OPREP-3 reports containing operational data must be identified using US Message Text Format (USMTF) set identifiers.

a. Message Identification Line (MSGID) includes the report type (e.g., OPREP-3PFB for OPREP-3 PINANCLE FRONT BURNER), the originator, report serial number, and the month. **EXAMPLE**: MSGID/OPREP-3PFB/USS NEVERSAIL/053/FEB//
b. Reference (REF) line includes information pertaining to any previous voice and/or record reports already sent for the reportable event, i.e., type of report (telephonic (TEL) or message (MSG)), originating unit, DTG, and report serial number. **EXAMPLE**: REF/A/TEL/USS NEVERSAILS/121505Z FEB 04/053/

c. An Amplification (AMPN) line is required after each REF line to give further details or amplify the reference identified in the previous line. **EXAMPLE**: AMPN/OPREP-3PFB INITIAL VOICE REPORT/

d. FLAGWORD line includes a primary and if applicable, secondary flagword. **EXAMPLE**: FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/FRONT BURNER/

e. Time, location and report status (TIMELOC) line includes the day and time, i.e., date-time-group (DTG), the location of the event, and the report status (initial, follow-up, correction, or final). **EXAMPLE**: TIMELOC/121500Z/SAN DIEGO/INIT/

f. General Text (GENTEXT) line includes the incident identification and details describing the event or incident, i.e., who, what, where, why and how. **EXAMPLE**: GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/USS NEVERSAIL OBSERVED A LARGE MUSHROOM CLOUD AT 12/1500Z FEB 04. THE COMMANDER APPROVED THE VOICE REPORT AT 12/1504Z FEB 04. (OTHER DETAILS...)/

7. Sample Record Reports.

a. Sample OPREP-3 PINNACLE report.

CLASSIFICATION
MSGID/OPREP-3P/CTU122.1.0/001A/
REF/A/TEL/CTU122.1.0/041722ZJAN2004/
AMPN/INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO NMCC/
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/-/
TIMELOC/041715ZJAN2004/SEOUL/FOLUP/
GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/ ARMY AC APPARENTLY EXPERIENCED NAV AID TROUBLE AND HAS UNINTENTIONALLY VIOLATED NORTH KOREAN AIR SPACE AND MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO LAND AT AN UNDETERMINED NORTH KOREAN AIR BASE. PILOT REPORT AND INCIDENT DETAILS NOT YET AVAILABLE.//
RMKS/AMPLIFYING REPORT TO FOLLOW//
DECL/DERI:CTU122.1/15D/DATE:22JAN2006/

b. Sample OPREP-3 WHITE PINNACLE report.

CLASSIFICATION
EXER/WHITE PINNACLE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/JOINT STAFF NMCC-EA//
SUBJ/OPREP-3WP//
REF/A/GENADMIN/CNO N-612/120900ZOCT2004//
AMPN/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REPORT//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/WHITE PINNACLE EXERCISE COMPLETED AT 120905ZOCT2004.//

c. Sample OPREP-3 report (no flagword).

CLASSIFICATION
MSGID/OPREP-3/CTU122.1.0.3/001//
REF/A/TEL/CTU122.1.0.3/161000ZJUN2003//
AMPN/INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO USPACCOM//
TIMELOC/160910ZJUN2003/YOKOSUKA/INIT//
GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/ AIR FORCE SSGT, CMB SPT GRP, WAS DISCOVERED ATTEMPTING TO DISPOSE OF BLOODSTAINED UNIFORM. INITIAL INVESTIGATION SHOWS SUSPECT MAY HAVE KILLED FEMALE FOREIGN NATIONAL FOLLOWING ARGUMENT IN PRIVATE RESIDENCE. IDENTITY OF FOREIGN NATIONAL HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED.//
RMKS/ADDITIONAL REPORT WILL FOLLOW.//
DECL/ORIG: CTU122.1/15A/DATE: 16JUN2010//

8. Report Classification. OPREP-3 reports will be classified according to their content. The reporting unit is responsible for assigning the proper security classification to each report, including downgrading or declassification instructions, according to the guidance in DOD 5200.1R, Information Security Program. Further, when combat or combat-related operational requirements make speed of delivery paramount, military commanders may modify transmission of classified information as necessary to meet local conditions. (When so doing, they may, in a message, cite this subparagraph as the authority.) Classify all OPREP-3 reports containing:

   a. Information on a combat loss/damage or discussing combat mission results a minimum of SECRET.

   b. Information on unit names, locations, deployment dates, deployed combat assets, and mission status/impacts/results IAW the classification of an associated plan or order.

   c. Information on a unit’s total mission impairment a minimum of SECRET.

   d. Events/incidents of confirmed or suspected compromise of classified information.
9. How to Correct OPREP-3 Reports. OPREP-3 correction reports will be via follow-up reports or correction OPREP-3 reports of the same type as the original in order to add to, delete from, replace, or cancel the previously transmitted OPREP-3 message.

a. Correction Reports. The originator will submit a correction if an error is noticed after submitting a report. The corrected report includes only those sections of the report requiring correction. The corrected report will be classified according to its content. Identify a corrected report by placing "CORR" in the third field of the TIMELOC set.

b. Follow-Up Reports. If additional information becomes available, the originator will submit a follow-up report. The follow-up report includes only the sections of the report that require additional information. The codeword FOLUP will be placed in the third field of the TIMELOC set.
1. General.

a. BLUE DART is an AT threat-warning program designed to disseminate threat information directly to affected areas and units in a simple, easy to understand format. The program covers all DOD Elements TACON (for FP) to USNORTHCOM. Within USNORTHCOM, threats to the Headquarters elements, subordinate commands and forces, and allied units operating under USNORTHCOM auspices (e.g., Canadian units) are subject to BLUE DART reporting requirements. Requirements will not apply to civilian organizations or interests (e.g., commercial airlines), foreign governments, or out-of-AOR U.S. Government facilities. These organizations are subject to other reporting mechanisms. BLUE DART is a Command-wide program, and dissemination of BLUE DART warning messages will not be limited to intelligence channels. Tab B (Blue Dart Threat Warning Program) to Appendix 1 (Information/Intel Flow) to Annex C (Operations) of the USNORTHCOM OPORD 05-01 (reference b) provides detailed program information.

b. A BLUE DART originating in HQs USNORTHCOM may only be executed by the JOC at the direction of the NC/J3. DOD Elements currently using BLUE DARTs will continue doing so using their established procedures and will copy the JOC. BLUE DART is a means of disseminating a time-critical threat warning and is issued when a specific set of criteria information has been met. Criteria may be generated from a number of sources to include, intelligence activities supporting USNORTHCOM and other DoD Elements, civilian LE entities or through reporting from installation / activity levels. It must contain all of the following elements:

(1) This information must specify:

   (a) TIMING of a threat: specific near-time frame within the next 72 hours.

   (b) TARGET of a threat: i.e., exact unit, activity or location.

   (c) TYPE or means of a threat: i.e., explosives/VBIED, bombing, small arms/drive by, sniper, or biological attack.

(2) Specificity is the key principle of this program. Threat information containing the three elements above, and determined to be a valid and credible threat by the command intelligence activity, will be disseminated via a BLUE DART message.
c. BLUE DART requires two forms of notification. Immediate voice notification by telephone or radio directly to the targeted unit or installations parent organizational operations or watch center ensures threat information is passed by the fastest means possible. It also allows for authentication by the BLUE DART message recipient with the originator and provides immediate feedback from the receiving unit, thereby confirming its reception and interpretation. Record copy notification is then accomplished through OPREP-3 reporting formats utilizing appropriate message handling systems. Voice notification must be completed within fifteen minutes of BLUE DART message initiation. Record OPREP-3P message traffic from the BLUE DART originator will follow within one hour of the initial report.

2. Execution.

   a. Threat Dissemination.

      (1) Initial Warning Report. BLUE DART warnings will be passed to the threatened unit, activity or location by the most efficient means possible. Initial notification from USNORTHCOM will be passed to the identified Service, Combatant Command, Defense Agency or DOD Field Activity 24-hour/7-day a week operations center or watch and the NMCC. Non-secure communications may be used but only when secure means are unavailable or judged to be too slow. It is inherent upon all DOD Elements to establish written threat warning dissemination procedures to ensure timely introduction of a BLUE DART threat warning to command and control nets, intelligence centers, and across all echelons of the organization.

         (a) Voice Report Format. BLUE DART threat-warning reports will be passed in accordance with the provided format. Refer to Annex R (Reports) of reference b for detailed formats and procedures.

         (b) The BLUE DART message receiver will conduct a call back to the message originator/sender to authenticate the identity of the sender and verify the information.

      (2) Subsequent (Record Copy) Reports. Initial voice notification to the targeted DOD organization will be followed with FLASH precedence, OPREP-3P record message traffic. This message traffic will be submitted at a minimum to the threatened command/OPCEN, all DOD Elements and organizational Headquarters, and the NMCC. Refer to Annex R (Reports) of reference b for detailed formats and procedures.

      (3) BLUE DART Acknowledgment. All DOD Elements are required to ensure that USNORTHCOM receives acknowledgement that the threatened unit/activity/location received the threat warning. Acknowledgement report must be rendered within 30 minutes of notification to the threatened unit and will
include DTG message received by the threatened unit, who at the threatened unit/activity/location received the BLUE DART message, and method of receipt or communication (how they were notified). Method of transmission back to USNORTHCOM may be through any appropriate message handling system in OPREP-3 format.

b. Dissemination Procedures.

(1) All Services, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities are responsible for establishing local procedures to disseminate BLUE DART warnings down and across all echelons. This requires all DOD Elements to compile 24-hour contact procedures for each installation or facility supporting personnel or activities and to have checklists in place to facilitate rapid dissemination of BLUE DART messages.

(2) Notification to the NMCC.

(a) Voice Reports:

1. Primary Telephone: (DSN) 851-3840.

2. Secondary Telephone: (DSN) 227-6340; COMM (703)-697-6340.

3. DRSN: 228-2600.


(b) Record Communication Reports. Message Addresses:

1. AUTODIN: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//

2. DMS: JOINT STAFF J3 NMCC OPS.

c. Protection of Classified Information. Classified threat warning information will be protected to the maximum extent possible consistent with the need to inform threatened units within fifteen (15) minutes of receipt of the initial BLUE DART warning message. Certain sensitive sources of information, if compromised, would be irreplaceable, potentially leading to significant degradation of intelligence to the supported commander. Despite this risk of loss, nothing in this guidance overrides a unit's responsibility to report information critical to the protection and survival of U.S. and allied forces within the USNORTHCOM AOR by the most expedient means possible, though secure means are preferred. Likewise, the nature of the threat identified in a BLUE DART message may be shared with responsible local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies where DOD Elements and personnel reside in
facilities off DoD installations and rely on these agencies for increased security and response capabilities.

4. EXERCISE/WHITE PINNACLE/BLUE DART Procedures. The JOC and NC/J34 will synchronize and implement EXERCISE/WHITE PINNACLE/BLUE DART procedures, at a minimum, once a quarter to maintain program awareness and message dissemination proficiency. Exercise messages will be sent only with the approval of NC/J3, and only after appropriate staff coordination has been completed.
ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB I TO APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2501-05
LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION REPORTING

No portion of this document or any of its supporting attachments will be
construed, interpreted, or employed in a manner which is contrary to, or in
violation of, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)(18 USC 1385), DODD 3025.1
(MSCA), DODD 5200.27, or any other law or regulation.

References: See Base Order.

a. USNORTHCOM Law Enforcement Support Concept of Execution
    (CONEX) (DRAFT).

1. Situation. In order to successfully support USNORTHCOM missions, law
   enforcement (LE) information (to include suspicious activity reporting and criminal
   information) with a DOD nexus must be reported and disseminated at all levels. This
   information flow is also necessary to provide the Commander, USNORTHCOM with the
   correct analysis from which appropriate FP and risk mitigation decisions can be made.
   Without the fusion and analysis of LE information, USNORTHCOM’s ability to deter
   and prevent terrorist and/or criminal attacks will be seriously degraded

2. Mission. See Base Order.

3. Execution.

   a. Concept of Operations.

   (1) Information Categories and Reporting Thresholds. The types of LE
       information that USNORTHCOM requires from DOD & civilian law
       enforcement agencies (LEA) covers a broad spectrum of threats to DOD in the
       USNORTHCOM AOR, including: terrorists, saboteurs, sympathizers, gangs,
       organized crime, extremist groups and narco-traffickers.

   (2) LE information requirements for analysis are as follows:

       (a) Suspicious Incident/Activity Reports to include:

           1. Non-specific threats.

           2. Surveillance.
3. Elicitation to include attempts to recruit DOD insiders.


5. Repetitive Activities.


7. Other suspicious activities that could indicate a FP threat.

(b) Domestic Terrorism Activity:

1. Bomb or explosive incidents resulting in death or injury to military personnel or damage to military property.


4. Maltreatment of DOD members to include assault, abuse or exploitation.

(c) Trans-national terrorist organizations operating or planning operations in the DSCA OA.

(d) Domestic extremist activity and trans-national extremist groups that have ties within the U.S. (Includes racial supremacist groups and radical religious groups):

1. Aggravated arson.

2. Kidnapping.

3. Maltreatment of DOD members to include assault, abuse or exploitation.

(e) Anti-Government Groups:

1. Aggravated arson.

2. Kidnapping.

3. Maltreatment of DOD members to include assault, abuse or exploitation.
4. Information on threats, plans or attempts to harm or kidnap, or other information bearing on the personal security of the President of the U.S., Vice President of the U.S. or other persons under the protection of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS).

(f) Civil Disturbance Groups (Activist and Protest Groups).

(g) Domestic Gatherings with the Potential for Illegal Activities:
   1. On and off-installation riots, serious disturbances or demonstrations targeted against DOD or involving DOD personnel.

(h) Foreign Intelligence Operations within the U.S.:
   1. Requests by members of the DOD for political asylum within the DSCA OA.
   2. Violations of DOD policy pertaining to acquisition and storage of information.

(i) Organizations providing support to Domestic and Trans-national Terrorist Activity and Domestic Extremist Activity.

(j) Criminal Activity (Foreign and Domestic) with a DOD Nexus to include:
   1. Identity theft, to include creation of false identities, not for economic gain, but for possible use in gaining access to DOD locations and/or facilities or materials acquisition (acquiring explosives, dangerous chemicals or bomb making materials).
   2. Drug trafficking activities for generation of funds to support a terrorist enterprise.

(k) Indicators of acquisition of toxic industrial chemicals, biological agents or other materials that can be used in a CBRNE event.

(l) Suspected surveillance (by any means) or use of other means to acquire targeting information regarding DOD personnel, resources or facilities.

(m) Indicators of attempts to acquire explosives for illicit activities (by legal or illegal means).

(n) Indicators of activities designed to interrupt or impede port/harbor activities (shipping disruptions).
(o) Indicators of activities threatening or impeding air travel or other transportation sectors.

(p) Acquisition of supplies or materials for possible use in terrorist activities or operations (e.g. crop duster, scuba gear, radio controlled vehicles, unusual or atypical training, etc.).

(q) Theft, loss, suspected theft, unaccounted for or recovered arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) in the following quantities:

1. Any missile, rocket or mine.
2. Any machine gun or automatic fire weapon.
3. Any fragmentation or high explosive grenade.
4. Any explosives to include demolition explosives (such as detonation cord, blocks of explosives (C-4, etc).
5. Five or more semi-automatic or manually operated firearms.
6. Five or more rounds of ammunition greater than .50 caliber.
7. 5000 or more rounds of .50 caliber or smaller ammunition.

(r) Actual or attempted break-ins of arms rooms or storage areas for AA&E.

(s) Armed robbery or attempted armed robbery of AA&E.

(t) Any evidence of trafficking of AA&E, such as bartering for narcotics or any other thing of value, to include taking AA&E across international borders, regardless of the quantity of AA&E involved.

(u) Attempts to gain unauthorized access to potential terrorist targets (nuclear power plants, restricted airport, train, cruise ship/vessel, or trailer control facilities, etc.).

(v) Terrorist activities, sabotage, and incidents, initiated or sponsored by known terrorists, dissident groups or criminal elements that occur on an installation or involve military personnel or property off an installation.

(w) Any other incidents identified by the Commander, USNORTHCOM to be of immediate concern to USNORTHCOM based on the nature, gravity, potential for adverse publicity or potential consequences.
b. Tasks. The DOD Elements will use the following reporting requirements for LE reports.

(1) Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements.

(a) Suspicious incidents and suspicious activities will be reported in TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice) format directly into JPEN (Joint Protection Enterprise Network).

(b) Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). JPEN is a critical suspicious activity information sharing system and supports essential, reliable, and assured information exchange of suspicious activity reports in Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON) format, between DOD Elements, enabling decision superiority, battlespace awareness, knowledge, and information management capabilities. JPEN is for the dissemination of unvetted, unvalidated suspicious activity information from the collecting unit to other possibly threatened locations, units, activities or agencies as well as other organizations including analytical centers, such as the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). JPEN is currently operational and being fielded to all DOD installations. There is no requirement to purchase hardware or software due to the web-based architecture via the Internet. JPEN Version 2.0 is accessible via any existing NIPRNet or Internet capable computer running Internet Explorer 5.5 or higher, and is available at https://www.jpen.mil. Information on obtaining JPEN accounts and additional USNORTHCOM Command guidance for reporting suspicious activities through JPEN is posted on SIPRnet at https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j34 and on NIPRnet at https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j3/j34.

(b) The TALON report framework, established by the Joint Staff Domestic Threat Working Group and directed by the DEPSECDEF in his 2 May 2003 memorandum, directed information sharing of reports on ambiguous activity that may contain raw, non-validated information. The purpose of TALONs is to alert commanders, staff and FP personnel to anomalies, potential terrorist indicators or other FP issues. JPEN incorporates the TALON format (reports entered into JPEN will automatically be in TALON format). The seven established TALON reporting categories are:

1. Non-Specific Threats. Threats received by any means, which contain a specific time, location or area for an attack against US forces, facilities or missions. This includes, but is not limited to, any event or incident, or series of events or incidents, which in and of themselves may indicate the potential for a threat to US forces, facilities, or mission, regardless of whether the threat posed is deliberately targeted or collateral.
2. Surveillance. Any reported possible surveillance in which an attempt to record information or to use unusual means to monitor activities is observed. Such attempts may include use of cameras (either still or video), note taking, annotated maps or drawings, hand-drawn maps or diagrams, use of binoculars or other vision enhancing devices, or any reports from host nation security forces of possible surveillance of US assets.

3. Elicitation. Any attempts to obtain security-related or military-specific information by anyone who does not have the appropriate security clearance and the need-to-know. Elicitation attempts may be made by mail, fax, telephone, by computer, or in person.

4. Tests of Security. Any attempts to measure security reaction times or strengths; any attempts to test or to penetrate physical security barriers or procedures; any attempts to acquire or duplicate uniforms, badges, passes, or other security related documents.

5. Repetitive Activities. Any activities that meet one of the other TALON criteria and have occurred two or more times – the same activity by the same person and/or vehicle, within a one month period.

6. Bomb Threats. Communication by any means specifically threatening to use a bomb to attack against US forces, facilities, or missions.

7. Suspicious Activities/Incidents. This category is used only when the TALON information does not meet any of the above criteria, to report any activity/incident that represents a potential force protection threat. Examples of this include: issue resulting in the scrambling of homeland defense assets; thefts of material that could be used to manufacture false identification cards; thefts of military uniforms which may be used to gain access to a military installation, etc.

(2) Serious Incident Reporting Requirements.

(a) Serious Incident. An actual or alleged incident, accident, misconduct, act or condition (either criminal or non-criminal) that warrants timely notice to USNORTHCOM because of its nature, gravity, publicity or potential consequences. The incident should be reported regardless of the rank or position of the personnel involved. Three categories of serious incidents reported by serious incident report (SIR) are defined below. This report is forwarded through operational and LE channels. It may or may not be generated as a result of an operational report (OPREP) 3.

(b) Category 1. A serious incident that, in the opinion of the Commander, is of immediate concern to the command.
1. On- and off-post riots, serious disturbances, or demonstrations involving U.S. personnel.

2. Terrorist activities, sabotage, and incidents, initiated or sponsored by known terrorists, dissident groups, or criminal elements that occur on an installation military operating base or involve military personnel or property.

3. Bomb or explosive incidents resulting in death, injury or property damage.

4. Threats against the President, Vice President, other high government officials, or foreign dignitaries that occur on the installation or involve military personnel and threats against government weapons and ammunition.

5. Incidents involving materiel damage that seriously degrade operational readiness.

6. Death or serious injury (requiring evacuation) of DOD personnel.

(c) Category 2. A serious incident that is of concern and requires timely notice.

1. AA&E. AA&E unaccounted for, lost, stolen, or recovered as follows:

   a. Arms.

      1) Government-owned missile or rocket.
      2) Machinegun.
      3) Five or more automatic, semiautomatic, or manually operated weapons.

   b. Ammunition.

      1) .50-caliber and smaller: 5,000 rounds or more than the exception of shotgun, .38, and .22-caliber ammunition, which must exceed 20,000 rounds.

      2) Larger than .50-caliber: Five rounds or more of non-automatic weapon ammunition; 1,000 rounds or more of automatic weapon ammunition.

   c. Explosives.

      1) Five or more fragmentation or high-explosive grenades.
2) Antipersonnel or antitank mine.

3) Demolition charges, blocks of explosives, and other explosives: One hundred pounds or more net weight.

d. Break-ins of arms storage areas. Actual, or attempted, break-ins of arms rooms or of weapons or ammunition storage areas.

e. Armed robberies of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Armed robberies or attempted robberies of arms, ammunition, and explosives; evidence of terrorist involvement in thefts of these items, or any evidence of trafficking in arms, ammunition, or explosive arms, regardless of quantity involved; for example, arms bartered for narcotics, or taken across international borders.

2. Murder and Kidnapping. Incidents of murder and kidnapping that would likely arouse public interest and possibly create adverse publicity.

3. Major Fires or Natural Disasters. Major fires or natural disasters involving death, serious injury, excessive property damage, or extensive damage to unit capabilities.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Time Requirement and Means of Reporting.

(a) Time Category 1 Serious Incident. Category 1 serious incidents will be reported by telephone to the USNORTHCOM Operations Center immediately upon discovery or notification to the DOD Element Headquarters. The telephonic report will be in the format outlined in paragraph 4. It will be followed by a written report, electronic message, to the USNORTHCOM JOC within 12 hours of discovery or notification. Facsimile may be used as a supplemental transmission.

(b) Category 2 Serious Incidents. Category 2 Serious Incidents will be reported by electronic message to the USNORTHCOM JOC within 24 hours of discovery or notification to the DOD Element Headquarters. Facsimile may be used to supplement the transmission.

4. Law Enforcement Serious Incident Report. Format and instructions for preparing a serious incident report. This format is used with every method of reporting. Do not omit paragraphs or subparagraphs. If information is not known at the time of reporting, enter “unknown” where appropriate.

| 1. Category. | Indicate Category 1 or 2. |
| 2. Type of incident. | Indicate type of offense or incident, such |
as “suicide, murder, or undetermined death.” If multiple offenses are involved, list in order of the most serious first. Do not add terms such as “suspected” or “alleged” or attempt to couch the incident in favorable terms.

3. **Date and time.**

   Enter date, time group when the incident occurred, using local time. If exact time is unknown, enter “unknown” followed by a window of date, time groups in which the incident might have occurred.

4. **Location.**

   Enter specific type of structure, facility, or area and exact address or location where the incident occurred; for example, on–post, off–post, troop barracks, hospital ward, arms room, building number, open field, quarters address.

5. **Other information.**

   **Racial.** Indicate by stating “yes” or “no” whether not the incident was motivated in whole or in part by race. If racial, explain circumstances fully in paragraph 8, Remarks. If race or ethnic factors are suspected, but not confirmed, report “yes.”

6. **Personnel involved.**

   List data pertaining to subject and victim. If no identified subject and victim exist, state “none.” Do not list “U.S. Government” as victim.

   a. **Subject:**
      1. Name: (last, first, middle).
      2. **Rank or grade:** For military, enter proper abbreviation of rank; for civilian employees, enter category and grade, that is, “WG6,” “GS11,” or “GM14”; for other civilians, including family members, enter “civilian.”
      3. **Social Security Number:** Self–explanatory. For those who do not have an SSN, for example, foreign nationals, state “none.”
      4. **Race:** Use appropriate terms from AR 680–29, in other words, “white”, “black”, “American Indian,” and so forth.
      5. **Sex:** Self–explanatory.
      6. **Age:** Self–explanatory.
      7. **Position:** If military, enter duty assignment; if civilian employee, enter job title; if family member, enter relationship.
to sponsor, that is “family member–spouse.” For other civilians, enter occupation.
(g) Security clearance: Enter “Top Secret”, ”Secret,” or “Confidential,” or “none,” as appropriate.
(h) Unit and station of assignment: If military, enter the unit designation and address; if civilian employee, enter the organization name and address; if family member, enter the rank and name of followed by the home address; if other civilian, enter the home address.
(i) Duty status: If military, enter “on duty”, “leave” or “absent without leave (AWOL),” as appropriate; for civilian employees, enter “on duty”, “off duty,” as appropriate. For other civilians, to include family members, enter “NA” (not applicable). List additional subjects in consecutive paragraphs, such as, a(2), a(3), and so forth, and repeat all data elements in a(1)(a) through (i), above.

b. Victim:
(1) Name: (last, first, middle).
(a) Rank or grade.
(b) Social Security Number.
(c) Race.
(d) Sex.
(e) Age.
(f) Position.
(g) Security clearance.
(h) Unit and Station of Assignment.
(i) Duty status.
List additional victims in consecutive paragraphs, such as, b(2), b(3), and so forth and repeat all data elements in b(1)(a) through (i), above. (Note: Identifying data is needed for subjects and victims only. Other persons related to the report such as witnesses or complainants can be included in paragraph 7 with brief descriptive data, such as, “LTC Tom Smith, CDR, 1–66TH INF BN, discovered.”)

7. Summary of incident. Provide a brief, narrative summary of the incident. Tell the who, what, where, why,
and how that is basic to LE reporting. Include such information as estimated dollar loss, medical condition of victims, or disposition of offenders. Avoid jargon and trivial data that is not needed at HQDA level, such as, license numbers and colors of vehicles, or Military Police patrol designations. Do not include descriptions of subjects and victims already provided in paragraph 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Publicity.</th>
<th>Note the extent and type of news media coverage anticipated, that is, “National television coverage has occurred.” or “Local print media inquiries have been received.” This determination is best made by the Command PAO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Commander reporting.</td>
<td>Enter rank and full name of reporting Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Point of contact.</td>
<td>Enter rank, name, and defense switched network (DSN) telephone number of person to call for additional information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Downgrading instruction.</td>
<td>Provide downgrading instructions for classified report or removal date of FOUO markings, as appropriate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

References:


b. National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2 November 2005 (draft)

c. DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), 19 August 2005


1. General

a. Purpose. DOD forces must be prepared to protect three categories of critical infrastructure:

   (1) DOD critical infrastructure which is an inherent DOD responsibility.

   (2) Defense Industrial Base which is a Sector-Specific task to DOD by HSPD-7 and thus a DOD specific mission.

   (3) When requested and approved by the Sec Def, the critical infrastructure of other Federal Departments/Agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector when they can no longer protect their sectors or key resources.

2. Situation

a. Enemy. See Annex B

b. Friendly

   (1) References a and b assign Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) roles and responsibilities to Sector-Specific Federal Agencies for the various sectors of our country’s critical infrastructure. IAW reference a, the DOD role and responsibility as a Sector-Specific Federal Agency is the defense industrial base (DIB) which does not fall under DSCA.

   (2) The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) serves as the principal federal official (PFO) to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation
of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. DOD may be requested to provide DSCA by civil authorities; and, as directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), USNORTHCOM will conduct DSCA operations for the protection of critical infrastructure or key resources.

3. **Mission.** When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the DSCA OA to assist civil authorities in the protection of critical infrastructure or key resources.

4. **Execution**
   
a. **Concept of Operations.** See base plan and Annex C for Phased DSCA operations.
      
      (1) The DSCA operation may be small-scale, such as protection of a single dam or water supply that is suspected to be a target of terrorist attack, or the DSCA operation may be large-scale based upon a National threat to critical infrastructure. The DSCA operation may be short or long term based upon the threat.

      (2) Execution of DSCA operations for the protection of critical infrastructure or key resources requires close coordination with civil authorities. While close working relationships with civil authorities are necessary, Commanders at all levels must ensure DOD forces comply with the Posse Comitatus Act.

      (3) USNORTHCOM involvement in DSCA response or recovery operations to damaged or destroyed critical infrastructure will be processed as separate requests for Federal assistance from civil authorities IAW the base plan and National Response Plan (NRP) and not be considered as part of a previously approved critical infrastructure protection operation.

b. **Coordinating Instructions.** See base plan and Annex C.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** See base plan, Annex C, Annex D, Annex E, and annex F.

APPENDIX 17 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
INCIDENTS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

References:

c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005
d. DOD Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (draft)
e. DOD Instruction 3025.dd, Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (draft)
f. DOD Manual 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (draft)

1. Situation

a. General

(1) Purpose of this appendix is to provide substantive guidance pertinent to the planning for Incidents of National Significance by supporting commanders.

(2) Based on criteria established in HSPD-5 and further defined in the National Response Plan (NRP), Incidents of National Significance are those high-impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and non-governmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.

(3) The NRP bases the definition of Incidents of National Significance on situations related to the following four criteria which are set forth in HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. IAW the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the NRP, the sole responsibility for declaring an “Incident of National Significance” rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designated representative.

(a) A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(b) The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities. Examples include:

1. Major disasters or emergencies as defined under the Stafford Act; and
2. Catastrophic incidents.

(c) More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an incident. Examples include:

1. Credible threats, indications or warnings of imminent terrorist attack or acts of terrorism directed domestically against the people, property, environment, or political or legal institutions of the United States or its territories or possessions; and,
2. Threats or incidents related to high-profile, large scale events that present high-probability targets such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and other special events as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal Departments and Agencies.

(d) The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident by the President.

(4) Catastrophic incident. All catastrophic incidents are “Incidents of National Significance”; however, not all Incidents of National Significance are catastrophic. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.

b. Deterrent Options. Not Applicable

c. Enemy. See base plan

d. Friendly. See base plan

e. Assumptions. See base plan

f. Legal Considerations. See base plan

2. Mission. When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM conducts DOD responsibilities and functions contained in the NRP and NRP-CIS within the USNORTHCOM AO for Incidents of National Significance.

3. Execution
a. Commander’s Intent. Rapidly execute DOD responsibilities and functions contained in the NRP and NRP-CIS.

b. Concept of Operations. See base plan

(1) Upon implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) to the NRP, execute pre-identified DOD responsibilities and functions in the NRP-CIS.

(2) Proactive Federal Response to Catastrophic Incidents.

(a) The NRP establishes policies, procedures, and mechanisms for proactive Federal response to catastrophic incidents.

(b) Protocols for proactive Federal response are most likely to be implemented for catastrophic incidents. The NRP defines catastrophic incidents as any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass causalities, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

(c) Guiding Principles for Proactive Federal Response.

   1. The primary mission is to save lives; protect property and critical infrastructure, contain the incident, and protect the national security.

   2. Standard procedures regarding requests for Federal assistance (RFA) may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude.

   3. Pre-identified DOD and USNORTHCOM response resources will deploy and begin necessary operations as required to commence life-saving activities.

   4. Notification and full coordination with States will occur, but the coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and use of critical resources. States are urged to notify and coordinate a proactive federal response.

   5. State and local governments are encouraged to conduct collaborative planning and exercises with the DOD, USNORTHCOM, and local military installations, bases, posts, activities, and agencies as part of “steady-state” preparedness for catastrophic incidents.

(d) Implementation Mechanism for Proactive Federal Response to Catastrophic Incidents. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the authority for implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) if required.

(e) National Response Plan - Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA).
1. NRP-CIA establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.

2. The NRP-CIA is supported by a more detailed and operationally specific NRP-CIS which is published independently of the NRP base plan as a “For Official Use Only (FOUO)” document.

(f) National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS).

1. The NRP-CIS addresses resource and procedural implications of catastrophic incidents to ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of resources and assets, including special teams, equipment, and supplies that provide critical life-saving support and incident containment capabilities.

2. Procedures outlined in the NRP-CIS are based on the following:
   a. The pre-identification of DOD assets and capabilities;
   b. The strategic location of pre-identified assets for rapid deployment; and,
   c. The use of pre-scripted mission assignments for Stafford Act declarations, or individual agency authority and funding, to expedite deployment upon notification by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of a potential catastrophic incident.
   d. Agencies responsible for these assets will keep DHS appraised, through the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), of their ongoing status and location until the Joint Field Office (JFO) is established.
   e. Upon arrival at the scene, the USNORTHCOM JTF Commander will coordinate with the Unified Command, the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO), and the JFO (or its forward elements) when established.

(g) Transition. Demobilization processes, including full coordination with the JFO Coordination Group, are initiated when:

   1. The mission is completed; or,
   2. When it is determined the magnitude of the incident does not warrant continued use of the asset.

c. Coordinating Instructions. Response actions required to execute this appendix will be conducted within the context of the 5 phases of the base plan and Annex C.
4. Administration and Logistics. See base plan

5. Command and Control. See base plan
APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
POSTAL AUGMENTATION

References:

a. Section 410, et seq., of title 39, United States Code, "Postal Reorganization Act"

b. Section 1701 of title 18, United States Code, “Illegal obstruction of the passage of mail”

c. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense and the United States Postal Service, May 4, 1984 (U)


e. FORSCOM Domestic Emergency Planning System (DEPS), Volume III, "Postal Augmentation Plan, GRAPHIC HAND," October 1, 1993 (U)


g. DOD Directive 5101.11, “DOD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Service (MPS, January 31, 2005 (U)

h. Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, “Posse Comitatus Act, as revised in 2002 (U)

i. Other references per Base Plan.

1. Situation

a. Background.

(1) **General.** In the event of a postal work-stoppage and the disruption of mail service on a national, regional, or local basis, the DOD may provide DSCA in support of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to safeguard, process, and deliver mail in those areas affected.

(2) **Authority.** Strikes by Federal employees are prohibited by Title 5, Section 7311 and Title 18, Section 1918 of the U.S. Code. Title 18, Section 1701 makes it a crime to obstruct the passage of the mail. These laws are made applicable to the U.S. Postal Service by Title 39, Section 410 of the U.S. Code (Ref a.)
(3) **Postal Regions.** The United States is divided into five Postal Regions, each having a headquarters. The USPS maintains a listing of critical cities / areas which may require assistance or augmentation in the event of a major work stoppage. This list is updated eight to ten months prior to worker contract expiration.

**USPS POSTAL REGIONS**

![Postal Regions Map](image)

Figure 23 – C – 1, Five Postal Regions

b. **Friendly Forces.**

(1) **USPS.** During postal stoppages, the USPS is responsible to continue postal operations (as possible) using supervisory personnel and all other employees who report for work. This responsibility includes the technical supervision of postal operations and responsibility for the custody and security of the mail and postal facilities.

(2) **The Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA).** The MPSA is a jointly staffed headquarters located in the National Capital Region supporting the DOD for the Military Postal Service (MPS) (Ref g.). The MPSA’s mission is “to achieve
postal service excellence throughout the DOD by promoting the efficient, economical transportation of mail; by ensuring the effective operation of military post offices; and by providing sound management of the official mail program”. The MPSA is the single DOD point of contact with the USPS.

c. Assumptions.

(1) That sufficient USPS management personnel will be available in post office facilities to provide orientation, training, and supervision of military augmentation personnel.

(2) USPS vehicles and facilities will be available for use by military augmentation personnel.

(3) Military personnel will not provide street deliveries to individual homes. They will provide motorized delivery service to selected Federal and business offices, hospitals, downtown business districts, and to post office branches and stations only.

(4) The USPS retains the responsibility for security of buildings and of the mail items.

(5) Commercial delivery services (FedEx, United Parcel Service / UPS, DHL, etc.) will continue service as possible.

(6) DOD support will only be required during severe postal stoppages, not during “slow-downs” of service.

2. Mission. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, Commander USNORTHCOM executes Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the USNORTHCOM Area of Operations to assist the US Postal Service during severe postal disruptions.
3. **Execution.**

   a. **Concept of Postal Augmentation Operations.** USNORTHCOM, when designated as the supported combatant commander, executes postal augmentation operations in 5 phases.

      (1) **Phase I, Shaping.** During the shaping phase, USNORTHCOM maintains continuous situational awareness of it’s DSCA AO (see Annex C) and maintains coordination with the Interagency community. Postal stoppages may be anticipated when union disputes occur, catastrophic incidents limit or deny access to large geographic areas, or due to other regional factors. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with the MPSA when there are indications of a potential postal stoppage.

      (2) **Phase II, Staging.** This phase begins with the timely identification of an anticipated postal stoppage. During this phase, major actions include:

         (a) In coordination with the Army service component, JDOMS, and JFCOM, identify force capabilities for response and place on alert. *(NOTE: Mail delivery is a federal mission. Active, Title 10 forces are the primary force*
capability for the mission. Reserve component forces may be activated or brought onto active status if required, by Presidential authority)

(b) Coordination with the MPSA and with the Interagency community for a mutually supporting response.

c) Coordinate with the USPS to identify critical cities, augmentation priorities, and requirements.

d) Publish orders.

e) Establish Common Operating Picture (COP) with all involved commands and agencies.

f) USNORTHCOM establishes liaison with postal officials in the affected region and with the MPSA.

g) Designation of military installations for use as staging bases.

h) Employment of Command and Control (C2) elements and assignment of Operations / Joint Operations Area (JOA).

i) Service components alert required active and reserve component (if required) forces. Installation Commanders in the affected area may provide support as planned and directed by applicable service component regulations and directives. This response must also be reported through appropriate chain of command channels with information required to reach the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and USNORTHCOM within hours of support being provided.

(j) City Task Force Commanders are designated and prepare units for employment (TF-San Diego, for example).

(k) Defense Coordinating Officer (s) deploy as directed by USNORTHCOM to affected Postal Region Headquarters. (NOTE: The USPS has restricted initial liaison to the regional level and above. Liaison to city postal services require additional, specific USPS approval).

(l) Forces are postured to respond to any potential Civil Disturbance operation outside of postal augmentation (Response Posture Levels reduced).

(3) The Staging Phase (II) ends when DOD response forces are in receipt of Prepare to Deploy Orders (PTDO) (Immediate Response does not apply to postal augmentation mission).

(4) Phase III, Deployment. This Phase begins with the main response force deployment. Forces may deploy throughout the mission execution as required to
meet the changing needs and or as the stoppage expands. During this phase, major actions include:

(a) City Task Force commanders are designated and deploy. (Transfer OPCON to USNORTHCOM upon arrival in the designated Joint Operations Area / JOA, or if resident in the area, are OPCON upon receipt of order)

(b) USNORTHCOM TF/ RTF / or JTF deploy depending on the scale of the operation and assume OPCON of installation forces already executing the mission.

(c) Military forces complete deployments, and are received, staged, and are integrated into the postal outlets.

(5) The Deployment Phase (III) ends when initial response forces are ready to conduct Postal Augmentation operations in the JOA.

(6) Phase IV, Provide Postal Augmentation (DSCA) begins when Postal Augmentation operations commence. This phase contains actions from the Operational phase of the former Graphic Hand plan. This phase continues while the support is needed, however, requirements will be continuously reviewed with the intent to limit the duration of DOD support. Major actions may include;

(a) City Task Forces (TF-Chicago for example) operational and providing mail service in the affected region(s) OPCON to USNORTHCOM. (USPS retains all responsibility for custody and technical supervision of U.S. mail).

(b) Designated Base Support Installations provide logistics support for common items and life support with services providing service specific support requirements.

(c) Police escort will be requested from local law enforcement in support of postal augmentation operations if necessary. Postal augmentation forces will not attempt to enforce the law beyond the protection against loss of life or the safeguarding of DOD owned Federal property.

(d) Military personnel will;

1. Prepare mail for sorting and sort mail.

2. Transport mail between postal facilities (including airports and railroads).

3. Accept mail from customers and issue mail to customers (supervised by USPS personnel) via call windows.

4. Place mail in lock boxes and move sacked mail.
5. Provide motorized mail delivery to select business and or government offices (NOTE: Military personnel will not provide home delivery service).

6. Collect mail from arterial boxes and chutes in major office buildings (as designated by USPS).

7. Maintain postal vehicles utilized during augmentation operations.

(7) Phase IV, Provide Postal Augmentation (DSCA) ends as the affected major cities resume normal postal operations.

(8) Phase V, Transition occurs incrementally as city and regional postal employees resume work. Military augmentation forces re-deploy to home station and return to organic Command and control. The Transition phase ends when all DOD support has transitioned and has reported closure at home station to the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center.

b. Tasks.

(1) USJFCOM.

(a) Identify postal augmentation forces available for response upon the request of USNORTHCOM.

(b) BPT deploy response forces and equipment as approved by SECDEF, and transfer OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM when the forces and equipment enter the area of operations.

(c) BPT accept return of DOD personnel and equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM, when CDRUSNORTHCOM or SECDEF determine that the DSCA response is complete.

(d) BPT provide additional support to CDRUSNORTHCOM, as directed by SECDEF, when required for DSCA response.

(2) Supporting Services. (Army, Navy, and Air Force)

(a) Require CONUS bases and installations to incorporate postal augmentation operations in their local emergency response plans.

(b) BPT Provide CONUS bases and installations as Base support Installations, staging areas and mobilization sites to support postal augmentation operations.

(c) Secretary of the Army, provide a general officer or equivalent DOD civilian employee to serve as the Executive Director of the Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) as is the current policy.
(3) Army Supporting Service Component Command (FORSCOM until ARNORTH achieves FOC).

(a) BPT provide C2 for postal augmentation operations at the Response Task Force / Task Force / Joint Task Force level as directed by USNORTHCOM.

(b) Recommend and provide Base Support Installations (BSI) proximate to the affected area.

(c) Conduct planning for likely USNORTHCOM DSCA contingencies in CONUS including postal augmentation.

(d) On order, deploy Defense Coordinating Officer with Defense Coordinating Element (DCO / DCE) as a Liaison element to affected US Postal Region Headquarters, upon indications of postal stoppage.

(e) Perform other tasks as assigned in the base plan.

(4) Commands, Agencies, and Activities perform tasks as outlined in the Base Plan.

c. Limitations.

(1) Active Duty forces are prevented from performing law enforcement tasks by the Posse Comitatus Act (Ref h.)

(2) DOD performs DSCA (Defense Support of Civil Authorities) operations as approved by the Secretary of Defense (or as delegated).

(3) The Immediate Response allowance for commanders to support civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage does not apply to postal augmentation operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The USPS has limited liaisons to the Regional Postal Headquarters and above.

(2) All Title 10 postal augmentation forces will be OPCON (or TACON) to USNORTHCOM and its established C2 element.

(3) Units providing postal augmentation will process into the operations area through the RSOI process established by the operational commander.

(4) Support period. The duration of support is not expected to exceed 30 days. Requirements will be continuously reviewed with the intent to discontinue military support as quickly as is feasible. Planning and coordination may begin immediately. This plan is executed upon order of USNORTHCOM.
(5) Force Capabilities to support Postal Augmentation plans must be requested by GENADMIN message to CDRUSNORTHCOM stating the capability required, dates required, and impact if not provided.

(6) RTF / TF / JTF manning requirements must be identified in Joint Manning Document (JMD) format and Individual Augmentees must be requested to CDRUSNORTHCOM for validation per CJCS Instruction 1301-01C.

(7) Rules for the use of force are as per CJCS Message providing guidance on the rules for use of force by QRF/ RRF units. National guard personnel (title 32) will follow RUF established and approved by their states.

(8) Force protection (FP).

(a) Military departments ensure deploying forces are aware of FP conditions in the USNORTHCOM DSCA AO. Supporting military departments will ensure forces complete service-required pre-deployment training, including terrorist awareness training. FP measures for contractors involved in the operation will be consistent with governing contracts. All deployed personnel will comply with applicable FPCON measures.

(b) Force health protection. Commanders are responsible for ensuring pre-deployment health threat briefings are conducted. Health screenings are conducted by parent service IAW service instructions and or regulations on DOD personnel to ensure they are physically and mentally prepared to execute the mission. Immunization records will be screened and shots provided to protect against diseases in the deployment area.

(9) Funding. USNORTHCOM will not provide any funding. The incremental costs related to DOD resources provided to the USPS under the provisions of this plan will be provided on a reimbursable basis. The DOD Components will forward requests for reimbursement to their supporting service comptrollers with copies to USNORTHCOM J8; USNORTHCOM Program and Resources Directorate 250 Vandenberg Street, Suite 1031, Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3812. Unclassified e-mail is Northcom.j8@northcom.mil; classified e-mail is Northcom.j8@northcom.smil.mil.

(10) Public affairs posture will be set by the DOD Public Affairs. USNORTHCOM PA will provide additional instruction upon plan execution.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Supply.
(1) Forces will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible.

(2) Postal Service resources will be used first to support Postal Service requirements.

(3) Designated Base Support Installations (BSI) will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Re-supply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

b. Storage and Transportation.

(1) USPS will provide secure storage for mail items, equipment, and vehicles.

(2) USPS vehicles and equipment will be utilized to the maximum extent possible in direct support of USPS operations.

(3) The use of JOPES is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD LOI, enclosure F of JOPES Vol III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup “gccs.northcom.jopes.operations” on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gccs.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(4) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(5) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

c. Reports.

(1) Supporting Commanders (RTF / TF / JTF / City TF Cdr’s) will ensure that daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) are provided to the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to USNORTHCOM by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to:
UNCLASSIFIED

Nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: USNORTHCOM JOC Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) will be reported telephonically; DSN 692-2361, Comm (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (unclass)/692-2368 (classified).

(2) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted NLT 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

(3) Communications status reporting. Commanders will report communications status IAW NORAD/USNORTHCOM J6 TCCC reporting requirements (message DTG 06106Z Mar 03) to the NORAD / USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address; Northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil. Commanders will include the communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

(4) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in OPTASKCOP message DTG 272330Z Jan 03. USNORTHCOM COP classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-2363, Comm (719) 554-2363.

5. Command and Control

a. Command.

(1) The USPS is the supported Federal Agency.

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander.

(3) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are supporting combatant commanders.

(4) DOD Service Components and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations to USNORTHCOM.

(5) CDRARNORTH (CDRFORSCOM until ARNORTH achieves Full Operational Capability / FOC) is the supported operational commander.

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4).

(1) Minimum C4 capabilities will include the following: Connectivity to the DISN that supports NIPRNET and SIPRNET access, Defense Collaborative Tool
Suite (DCTS), Dynamic Synchronization Event Log (DSEL) and chat capability for SIPRNET and NIPRNET, and both secure and unsecure voice capability.

(2) USNORTHCOM C4 directives can be accessed via the secret nc communications portal at: [Https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/communications/2002_annex_k/](https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/communications/2002_annex_k/)

(3) Notify the USNORTHCOM TCCC of any critical C4 shortfalls.

(4) Send any SATCOM requirements to USNORTHCOM J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM, DSN 692-7771, Comm (719) 554-7771 Classified e-mail address is Nc.satcom.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

(5) Advise NORAD / USNORTHCOM, Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) North, of all frequency management issues/support needed. Email SIPRNET to; Nc.j636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, or NIPRNET to; nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil. Submit all frequency requirements in SPXXI to job account JFMO North. All units will submit SOI/CEOI in JACS format to JFMO North. Identify nets to be included into the JRFL. Report unresolved interference to JFMO North.

(6) Commercial voice. Ensure that deploying units are equipped with the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS) cards and associated PIN.

Tabs

A – Force Package Options For Postal Augmentation
1. Postal work stoppages are anticipated to occur at either the regional or major city level. The following Force Package Options may be employed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, with SecDef approval (see Appendix 3, Annex A for additional Force Package Options):

   a. All major DOD bases and installations (major, as defined by the Base Realignment and Closure commission) should be prepared to provide a basic Force Package Option of 100 soldiers (company) with company grade leadership.

   b. 06 Level City Task Force Commanders will be identified upon receipt of an alert or warning order. USNORTHCOM will provide alert to the supporting services and to ARNORTH when a severe postal stoppage is anticipated. Ideally, City Task Force Commanders and supporting forces will come from bases and installations (Army, Air Force, or Navy) proximate to the effected major city.

   c. If required, a regional Response Task Force or Joint Task Force will be organized. ARNORTH is tasked to provide up to 2 regional response task force C2 elements in support of USNORTHCOM.

   d. Supporting Services will identify available reserve component forces for activation to support during severe postal stoppages. Service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) will self activate as necessary and support the DCO, and any activated State Emergency Operations Centers.

   e. Base Support Installations will be identified as close to the effected city and or cities as possible during the Staging Phase.

   f. A Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) with supporting staff (DCE) will be deployed to the effected postal region headquarters during the Staging Phase.

   g. National Guard forces are expected to be Federalized, under Title 10 status, if required for postal augmentation.
References:  
b. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 2004  
d. Joint Staff Severe Weather EXORD 192300ZAUG2005  
e. See additional references per the base plan  

1. Situation  

a. Purpose. This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations for severe weather.  

b. Background. Each year portions of the USNORTHCOM AO are devastated by the effects of severe weather such as, thunderstorms, tornadoes, flash floods, riverine (inland) floods, coastal floods, extra-tropical/ tropical cyclones (hurricanes/typhoons), tsunamis, winter storms, excessive cold, fog, excessive heat, dust storms, wind storms, or fire weather storms. The effects of these severe weather events can destroy lives, property and critically impact infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DOD) possesses unique assets and capabilities that may be used to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).  

c. Interagency Plans. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and DOD policy and guidance.  


e. Standing Joint Operations Areas (JOAs). JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the National Capital Region with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).
2. **Mission.** See Base Plan.

3. **Execution.** The three primary objectives of DSCA operations for severe weather are: Minimize casualties in the effected area, Restore vital infrastructure, and Maintain the public confidence in the US Government and the DOD.

   a. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations for severe weather in five (5) phases: Shaping, Staging, Deployment, Support of Civil authorities, and Transition.

   (1) **Phase I, Shaping.** The Shaping Phase is continuous. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and maintaining situational awareness (SA) of events occurring in the AO.

      (a) USNORTHCOM’s severe weather Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) serve as triggers to initiate follow-on phases of this plan. These CCIRs keep the CDRUSNORTHCOM informed on the potential for, and current status of, DSCA operations for severe weather.

         1. Are there any potential weather systems (CAT 3 or greater Hurricanes) forming that may impact the United States?

         2. Has the President declared an Emergency or Major Disaster?

         3. Has the Secretary of DHS declared an Incident of National Significance?

         4. Are there indications of a predicted or imminent emergency, disaster, or incident that has the potential to overwhelm civil authorities and impact DOD?

         5. Are there any impending threats to the Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure to include communications and communications nodes?

         6. Are there any impending threats to transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air, Maritime) due to severe weather?

         7. Have civil authorities issued guidance/warning to public?

         8. Has a Governor requested Federal assistance?

         9. Has a Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) been submitted?

         10. Is there any negative reporting in media of the government response or actions?
(b) Situational awareness is provided to the CDRUSNORTHCOM by the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC), USNORTHCOM Liaison Officers (LNOs) to other agencies and situation reports (SITREPs) provided by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) teams and JTF Commander (when deployed).

(c) Responsibilities of the DCO as outlined in DOD Manual 3025.dd (DRAFT) are:

1. Validate requests from the FCO.

2. Establish the Defense Coordination Element (DCE).

3. Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

4. Provide a liaison officer, as required, to each activated ESF.

5. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for defense support.

6. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

7. Work with the FCO and SCO to integrate the taskings of National Guard on State Active Duty (SAD) with active units to maximize responses while avoiding duplication of effort.

8. Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.

9. Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

10. Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each tasking is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

(d) Regionally aligned DCO/DCE teams are an integral part of the USNORTHCOM DSCA operations for severe weather. They ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the DSCA operations by maintaining SA through developing and refining the following tasks:

1. Coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for Regional Plans.
2. Coordinate with activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in the Joint Field Office (JFO).

3. Coordinate with Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for the non-Federalized National Guard (NG) capabilities and on-going response activities in the JOA.


5. Conduct an assessment of DOD Installations within the region for use as a Base Support Installation (BSI).

6. Become familiar with the DOD Installation’s immediate response plans and the MOAs /MOUs between the installation and the local communities within the region.

7. Review the local Disaster Response Plans for major population centers within the region.

8. Reviews Disaster Response Plans for Critical National Assets within the region.

9. Coordinate the training and integration for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) assigned to each state and region into the DSCA operations for severe weather.
(e) When an anticipated DSCA operation for severe weather is identified, Phase I, Shaping situational awareness continues as a means to plan, prepare for, and identify other potential or follow-on incidents, but execution moves into Phase II, Staging for the anticipated DSCA operation for severe weather.

(2) Phase II, Staging. This phase begins with the timely identification of an anticipated severe weather incident or when directed by SecDef. DSCA response operations to severe weather incidents range from minimal support requirements (DCO / DCE only) to catastrophic incident response on the scale of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2005).

(a) During Phase II, Staging, key actions are:

1. Deployment of Command Assessment Element (CAE) to the event and or incident site.

2. Deployment of a DCO to FEMA Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) or JFO when established.
3. Designation of military installations for use as BSIs for Title 10 Forces and mobilization centers by FEMA.

4. Deployment of LNOs, EPLOs, and JRMPOs.

5. Employment of C2 elements and assignment of JOA.

6. Deployment of Crisis Response Force Package Options (FPO), as appropriate, and as approved by SecDef (See Appendix 3 to Annex A, Force Package Options).

7. Repositioning of forces and supplies to avoid loss from the incident, or repositioning proximate to the incident site to speed response operations. (USNORTHCOM coordinates with owning services and with the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Defense Distribution Center)

8. Alert Stabilization and Recovery / Reconstitution Force Package Option forces for deployment (request via Request For Forces (RFF) to Joint Director for Military Support (JDOMS) for SecDef approval).

9. Continued coordination with NG the Interagency, and State, local and Tribal governments to ensure unity of effort. Provide a USNORTHCOM planning team to FEMA, who is designated as the Coordinating Agency in the National Response Plan (NRP) for response and recovery.

10. Commanders in proximity to the event provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. All immediate response actions must be reported as soon as possible (within hours) through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and concurrently to USNORTHCOM JOC.

11. Installation Commanders may provide support for severe weather events as planned and directed by DOD Instruction 2000.18, Installation CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) response. This DOD Instruction requires Installations to identify emergency response personnel and assets that can provide support to the local community during emergency circumstances. This response will be reported through the appropriate chain of command to the NMCC and concurrently to USNORTHCOM JOC within hours of the support being provided.

12. Installation Commanders may provide response per MOA and/or MOU with local first responders and civil authorities (search and rescue, fire fighting, ground ambulances, rotary wing medical evacuation, building damage assessment, emergency power generation, all-terrain vehicles, water purification, and emergency communications for example). These responses must be reported through the appropriate chain of
command to the NMCC and concurrently to USNORTHCOM JOC to ensure unity of DOD effort.

13. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) may be provided by Air Force units under Air Force Regulation 64-1, and AFI 10-802, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). Army units may provide response under Army Regulation (AR) 500-4 as assets are available. MAST operations include emergency medical evacuation and patient transport.

14. USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM coordinate on response capabilities for; Air Movements, Military Sealift Command maritime transportation and logistics assets, and for USTRANSCOM Deployed Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) support to USNORTHCOM as the NDDOC.

15. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) locations are established (supporting forces deployed to the AO or JOA (if established)) and processing instructions are provided in EXORDs / DEPORDs to deploying units.

16. An damage assessment plan is developed and resources are requested to be placed on increased alert or given an event occurrence as an execute trigger. (e.g. 12 hours after hurricane land-fall)

17. Conduct response planning (Search and Rescue etc.) and war-gaming.

18. Identify additional force capabilities for response and place on alert.

19. Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition if required or conduct coordination to obtain.

20. Conduct coordination with the Interagency and State, local and Tribal governments for a mutually supporting response.

(b) Phase II, Staging, ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a Prepare To Deploy Order (PTDO) and when Immediate Response actions for the initial severe weather event completed or incorporated into USNORTHCOM response.

(3) Phase III, Deployment. The deployment phase begins with the movement of main response force into the JOA. Advon teams, DCOs/DCEs, Command Assessment Elements, or enabling forces are not considered Phase III forces as their movements may occur in Phase II of the operation. Near simultaneous force movements of “first responder type” forces or initial response forces (i.e.,
Medical, fire, law enforcement, rescue, etc.) and follow-on or sustainment type forces will occur during this phase.

(a) Phase III, Deployment, key actions include:

1. Command and Control (C2), medical, transportation, communications, power generation, water purification, and supply units are rapidly established and operational. Life support services (water, food, medical care, shelter) are the mission focus. Supplies are procured using established DOD process through the DLA purchasing and contracting with available local vendors.

2. Military forces provide public assurance of the national focus on response by being present in the stricken area.

3. Units and individuals reporting to the JOA process through JRSOI facilities.

4. Units responding under local command authority are incorporated into the USNORTHCOM C2 structure for the DSCA operation via the JRSOI process.

(b) Phase III, Deployment ends when initial response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. It is envisioned that a robust distribution network would be in place, and with medical and essential services operating and meeting the basic needs of the personnel in the affected area.

(4) Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. Phase IV begins as DSCA response operations commence in the JOA.

(a) Key actions include:

1. Providing DSCA as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef to execute Mission Assignments (MA).

2. Arranging for the procurement (through DLA and Defense Fuels) and distribution of supplies (rations, water, canvas, tents, cots, sandbags, bulk fuel, etc.) if requested by MA.

3. DSCA operations may include SAR, emergency medical, patient transport, life support functions, supply distribution, recovery support operations, use of DOD facilities, mortuary affairs, utilities restoration, infrastructure repair, debris removal, environmental, and debris clean-up.

(b) Phase IV ends with civil authorities prepared to assume responsibility for operations. Military units providing life support services on a routine basis as
civil authority capabilities increase and USNORTHCOM established Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) showing consistent, positive effects. See Annex C

(5) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with civil authorities assuming control with no degradation of operations. The phases overlap as civil authorities and infrastructure regain the capacity to support the populace. Military operations continue until they are handed off to civil authorities in all areas.

(a) Phase V, Transition key actions include

1. Force adjustments are initiated as the mission load decreases.

2. USNORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON of forces as they depart the AO.

3. Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM.

4. Public safety is maintained as missions are handed over to civil authorities.

(b) Phase V, Transition ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. This phase is executed incrementally as mission execution transitions from the DOD to civil authorities. Military forces are no longer required for DSCA operations and the ESFs are transitioning to normal operations.

e. **Tasks.** Per Base Plan and Annex C, specific tasking will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for severe weather.

f. **Coordinating Instructions.** See base plan and Annex C

   (1) The annual Hurricane Season is from 1 June to 31 November.

   (2) Support period is not to exceed 20 days without review.

   (3) DSCA operations for severe weather are provided on a reimbursable basis IAW applicable laws and regulations for the type of incident.

   (4) Service ADCON will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

g. **Force Protection (FP).** See base plan and Annex C, Appendix 15. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for severe weather.
(1) Unit commanders are responsible for FP and will not conduct DSCA operations without proper equipment and training.

(2) All deploying unit ground commanders will ensure that at least one (1)/Level II qualified anti-terrorism (AT) Officer/NCO deploys with the deploying element.

(3) All deploying personnel must be level I trained and certified. The unit Commander and AT Officer/NCO are responsible for ensuring all deploying personnel are level I trained and certified.

(4) Supporting commands and/or services ensure all forces deploying receive a threat briefing for the deployment area. Supporting commands and/or services will ensure forces complete service component required pre-deployment training certified by a Level II AT Officer/NCO, to include anti-terrorism awareness training IAW their parent service. Mission Commanders will ensure deployed forces receive an appropriate level of terrorist awareness training upon arrival and, as required, throughout the length of deployment. Ensure force protection measures include provisions for contractors that are involved in the operation.

(5) Consider deploying the AT Officer/NCO early in the deployment flow to execute AT/FP tasks that are requisite to the deployment, e.g., site survey or assessment and coordination of security requirements with the Primary Agency.

(6) Ensure the AT Officer/NCO is trained to employ methods to reduce risk or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. The AT Officer/NCO must also be familiar with pre-deployment AT training requirements. Assignment as the AT Officer/NCO may be a collateral or additional duty for the individual appointed. The AT Officer/NCO duties include but are not limited to:

(7) Use UFC 4-010-10 DOD minimum anti-terrorism standoff distances for buildings, dated 31 July 2002, temporary structures, to determine if facilities either currently occupied or under consideration for occupancy by DOD personnel can adequately protect occupants against terrorist attack.

(8) AT/FP guidance must appear in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, and execute orders.

(9) All personnel must be proficient in individual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) defense survival skills as prescribed by service directives. Unit commanders will determine if personnel will deploy with their appropriate CBRNE protective equipment (MOPP gear), based upon the current threat situation.

h. Public Affairs (PA). See base plan and Annex F. PA guidance is active when conducted in coordination with (ICW) FEMA. Personnel involved in DSCA operations may actively engage the media to explain their role; however any
comments regarding a specific disaster situation will be referred to Joint Information Center (JIC). DSCA operations PA guidance will be issued by USNORTHCOM PA.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D

a. Administration

(1) Mission execution notification process is as follows:

(a) Upon receipt of an RFA or MA from civil authorities, USNORTHCOM will confirm JDOMS has received a copy. If the request is for a DCO/DCE or an installation to be used as a staging area AND the CJCS Severe Weather EXORD of 19 Aug 2005 is still in effect, then USNORTHCOM has the authority to execute the mission after concurrence from the installation-owning service. Upon service concurrence or DCO notification, USNORTHCOM must submit a GENADMIN message to CJCS, followed by an email, and a follow-on phone call. Unclassified DDO emails are: j-3ddos@js.pentagon.mil and j-3addos@js.pentagon.mil. Classified DDO emails are: j-3ddo’s@js.pentagon.smil.mil and j-3addo’s@js.pentagon.smil.mil. DDO phone number: 703-695-0100, DSN: 225-0100. Include JDOMS in the email of the GENADMIN message.

(b) GENADMIN message will include:

1. Type of support requested (example: DCO, DCE, or installation).

2. Number, by type, of DOD assets to be provided or installation requirements needed.

3. Duration of support.

4. Confirmation of concurrence from Military Department(s).

5. Deployment location, by type, if applicable.

(2) Reports

(a) Supporting Commanders (RTF / JTF / TF Cdr’s) will ensure that daily SITREPs are provided to the USNORTHCOM JOC upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to USNORTHCOM JOC by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: Net.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: USNORTHCOM JOC Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM CCIR will be reported telephonically; DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (UNCLASSIFIED)/692-2368 (CLASSIFIED).
(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted Not Later Than (NLT) 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

(c) Communications status reporting. Commanders will report communications status IAW NORAD/USNORTHCOM J6 TCCC reporting requirements (message DTG 06106Z Mar 03) to the NORAD / USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address; Northcom.tcce@northcom.smil.mil. Commanders will include the communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

(d) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in OPTASKCOP message DTG 272330Z Jan 03. USNORTHCOM COP classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(3) Funding

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) Pre-disaster declaration support. The Economy Act is the funding authority for DOD support to another Federal department or agency in planning and preparing to conduct DSCA operations in advance of a Presidential Declaration of Emergency or Disaster. For all SecDef approved pre-incident DSCA rendered to another Federal department or agency under terms of the Economy Act, units will capture and report all costs to their Military Department comptroller and will record man-hours per grade per person expended in executing the DSCA operation, including pay and allowances (P&A).

(c) Post-disaster declaration DSCA operations are reimbursable IAW the Stafford Act. The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to. Units will capture and report incremental costs. If SecDef approves an RFA, it will be executed under a fund cite provided by the agency requesting DOD support.

(d) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to.
(e) Provide Primary Agency invoices from each DOD Service or Agency for goods and services using a Standard Form 1080.

(f) Reimbursable rates will be published for each Fiscal Year and provided by the J8 for the current year.

(g) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.

(h) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC’s commercial phone number, the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(i) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all SecDef approved RFAs or MAs with the fund cite. Backup documentation will identify the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the RFA or MA.

(j) USNORTHCOM N-NC J8 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J86, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

(k) Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080 invoices to USNORTHCOM J8.

b. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) Forces will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible for 3 days of operations. Military forces should carry (as possible) additional rations, medical items, and water to allow emergency assistance when circumstances warrant.

(b) When designated, BSIs will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Re-supply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for relief items, FEMA approved equipment, trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.

(3) Transportation
(a) The use of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI), enclosure F of JOPES Vol III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup “gccs.northcom.jopes.operations” on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gccs.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS)

(a) Medical Treatment. Level 1 and 2 (field) medical support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting DSCA operations, ICW appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and Primary Agency. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of DOD Forces, with the DCO, to a military treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, VA, or civilian hospital.

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JRMPO) will provide JRMPO support to the DCO as part of the DCE to include coordinating requests for DOD HSS resources ISO of the Primary Agency. JRMPO assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, state, and Health and Human Services/ESF8 elements will provide SA and information updates through the DCO / DCE designated C2 structure to USNORTHCOM in general and specifically to the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.
5. **Command and Control**

   a. **Command Relationships**

      (1) FEMA is the Federal Coordinating Agency (FCA).

      (2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander.

      (3) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

      (4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

      (5) Upon completion of support mission, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the JOA. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   b. **Signal**

      (1) Send SATCOM requirements to USNORTHCOM J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

      (2) As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Nc.j636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil.

      (3) Common Operational Picture (COP). Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

      (4) Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. Secure VTCs are used, on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as needed basis. The NC/JOC Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by USNORTHCOM Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719) 554-9990.
(5) Collaborative tool sets. USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail address Nc.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address is Nc.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

(6) USNORTHCOM portal information. The address for the classified USNORTHCOM portal is Https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.
APPENDIX 20 TO ANNEX C, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
WILDLAND FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS

References:

a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo, 25 Mar 03
b. Army Wildland Fire Policy Memorandum, 04 Sep 02
c. MOU between DOD, USDA and DOI, 25 Apr 75, and MOU between DOA/ and the Boise Interagency Fire Center, 8 Aug 90
d. Air Force Instruction 11-2C-130, Vol 3 Chapter 26, 01 Apr 00
e. National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) 2005 Fire Season Outlook, 26 Jan 05
f. NIFC Military Use Handbook, May 02
g. Air Force Instruction 31-101, 1 Mar 03
j. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 04 (U)

1. Situation.

a. This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM Guidance for the conduct of support for Wildland Firefighting.

b. Background. DOD historically responds to requests to provide emergency assistance to federal agencies for forest or grassland fires that are beyond the capabilities of available local, state, and federal resources. This support comes in the form of personnel, equipment, supplies, and fire protection services. The hazards and priorities that trigger a request include:

(1) The potential to destroy or harm human life.
(2) Potential to destroy communities, community infrastructure, historically significant cultural resources, commercial businesses, principal residences and/or outbuildings.

(3) The potential to adversely impact cultural and natural resource

c. Interagency Partners.

(1) The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), a component of the US Department of Agriculture, US Forest Service (USDA/FS), is located in Boise, Idaho. NIFC is designated in the National Response Plan (NRP) as the Primary Agency for coordinating Federal resources for Wildland Firefighting (WFF) operations in the Continental United States (CONUS). The NRP designates USDA/FS as the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4, Firefighting. The Department of Commerce, DOD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are supporting agencies for ESF #4.

(2) The National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) is located within NIFC and functions as the operations center for WFF operations. In situations where WFF requirements exceed the capabilities of local and State resources, the affected local agency may request support from NIFC through the respective Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) (See Figure 20 - C - 1). When WFF requirements exceed available GACC provided Federal assistance, NIFC will task NICC to request assistance from DOD.

(3) The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (DOI/BLM), is the NRP designated Primary Agency for coordinating federal resources for WFF operations in Alaska.

d. WFF Area of Operations (AO). The USNORTHCOM AO for conducting WFF DSCA missions (in support of NIFC) includes the CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. NIFC divides this AO into 10 geographic areas as the following figure indicates;
e. Immediate Response. DODD 3025.dd outlines Immediate Response Authority. In response to requests for assistance, commanders are authorized to provide support to civil authorities for WFF in the immediate vicinity of their respective installations to: save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage, under imminently serious conditions. Unit commanders performing Immediate Response will inform proper authorities, to include USNORTHCOM JOC and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) as outlined in paragraph 5.j.(1) of this appendix.

f. WFF Planning considerations include:

(1) The annual fire season is expected to occur from 1 May to 31 Oct.

(2) NIFC will provide most of the logistics for forces conducting WFF operations in accordance with reference k.

(3) The National Guard within the affected state is not normally federalized for WFF ground crew duty.
(4) Eight (8) Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft, associated support personnel, and equipment are available for employment for the entire season.

(5) USDA/FS (DOI/BLM for operations in the Alaska) will perform airspace management functions.

(6) NIFC Preparedness Levels range from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest.

(a) Preparedness Level I: No large fire activity nationally. Most Geographic Areas have low to moderate fire danger. (Little or no commitment of National Resources)

(b) Preparedness Level II: One Geographic Area experiencing high fire danger. Numerous Class A, B, and C fires are occurring and a potential exists for escapes to larger (project) fires. Minimal mobilization of resources from other Geographic Areas is occurring. The potential exists for mobilizing additional resources from other Geographic Areas.

(c) Preparedness Level III: Two or more Geographic Areas are experiencing incidents requiring a major commitment of National Resources. High number of fires becoming Class D and larger, Additional resources are being ordered and mobilized, Type I teams are committed in two or more areas, or 300 crews are committed nationally.

(d) Preparedness Level IV: Two or more Geographic Areas experiencing incidents requiring Type I teams. Competition exists for resources between Geographic Areas. 450 crews or nine Type I teams committed nationally.

(e) Preparedness Level V: Several Geographic Areas are experiencing major incidents which have the potential to exhaust all Agency Fire Resources. 625 crews committed nationally.

2. **Mission.** When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Wildland Firefighting operations within the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in support of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC).

3. **Execution.**

   a. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts WFF operations in support of NIFC in five phases.

      (1) Phase I. Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. The Shaping Phase sets the conditions for the successful execution of the DOD response for wildland fire fighting. USNORTHCOM will maintain situational
awareness through interagency coordination and monitoring the current wildland fire situation. During this phase training for MAFFS crews is conducted and coordination for installations to be used as mobilization bases or MAFFS operating bases is made. Coordination is conducted with NIFC for the pre-positioning of MAFFS assets and slurry/flame retardant. The Army Service Component will identify potential military fire fighting battalion (MFB) level units for possible employment. On or about 1 May of each year, JDOMS will issue a WFF EXORD. This EXORD will specify SECDEF approved assets for WFF. CDRUSNORTHCOM will have authority to deploy and redeploy these assets based on NIFC requests. The following Wildland Fire Fighting situational CCIRs keep the CDRUSNORTHCOM informed on the potential for WFF missions:

(a) WFF CCIR 1. Have large wildland fires been reported in the DCSA OA?

(b) Has NIFC increased its preparedness level to Level III or higher?

(c) Has the President declared a national emergency as a result of wildland fires?

(d) Are there impending threats to the Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure to include communications and communications nodes as a result of wildland fires?

(e) Are there impending threats to transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air) as a result of wildland fires?

(f) Has NIFC submitted a request for DOD assistance for wildland fire fighting?

(2) Phase II. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential Wildland Firefighting mission, or when directed by SecDef. Actions during this phase include, but are not limited to: pre-positioning of MAFFS assets, identification of a JFACC for control of air operations, deployment of a DCO/DCE when requested by NIFC, designation of DOD installations for use as mobilization or MAFFS operating bases, identifying, training and equipping military firefighting battalions (MFB) (Note: MFB training requires 7 days). During the Staging Phase, coordination with NIFC continues.

(3) Phase III. Phase III begins with the main response force deployment. During this phase, command and control assets and response forces deploy to the effected areas and prepare to conduct WFF operations. USNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces as they arrive in the affected area. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) are established and Liaison officers are employed. The following chart outlines the Force Packages that may be requested by NIFC in support of WFF
(4) Phase IV. Phase IV begins when WFF response operations commence in support of NIFC. Supporting units (MAFFS or Ground Unit) report status to USNORTHCOM and maintain a common operational picture of current and future operations. Report the status of missions, personnel and equipment status and costs associated with operations. Begin transition planning.

(5) Phase V. Transition begins as fires are contained and military support can be pulled off the fire line. Transition will be conducted incrementally as NIFC can assume operational control for any continued wildland fire fighting operations. Units are redeployed back to home stations and parent organization assumes OPCON as soon as units depart the AO. Situational awareness and a common operational picture are maintained throughout the transition phase. All units capture lessons learned and submit cost expenditures for reimbursement.

c. Tasks. Per Base Plan and Annex C. Specific tasking will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD upon CONPLAN execution.

d. Coordinating Instructions. Per Base Plan and Annex C.
(1) The Fire Season is from 1 May to 31 Oct annually.

(2) When military fire crews are requested, NIFC personnel will travel to the unit's installation to conduct WFF training and issue Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (See Figure 20 – C – 2). NIFC will provide advisors to each military fire fighting crew. All units will be properly trained and equipped prior to WFF operations.

(3) Unit commanders will not conduct WFF duties without proper training, equipment, certification, and supervision from NIFC, unless responding to Wildland fires on installations or operating under immediate response authority.

(4) Support for WFF operations is executed on a reimbursable basis under the authorities and procedures of reference h.

(5) Service ADCON will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

e. Force Protection (FP). (In addition to Base Plan and Annex C)

(1) Each MAFFS Air Expeditionary Squadron Commander (AES/CC) is responsible for force protection of C-130 MAFFS units, aircraft, personnel, and equipment. Refer to AFI 31-101, Aircraft Personnel and Security, for specific guidance. The USDA/FS has traditionally provided aircraft security at MAFFS operating bases, consisting of a combination of security fencing, ramp lighting, controlled entry points, and armed security guards, both on call and on scene. Each aircraft commander, and ultimately the AES/CC, is responsible for ensuring all aircraft, personnel, and equipment are adequately protected against the local threat.

(2) The AES/CC should elevate concerns up the chain of command if problems cannot be resolved at the local level.

f. Public Affairs. (In addition to Base Plan and Annex C)

(1) The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD PA) policy guidance requires pursuing a proactive, vigorous public information program. USNORTHCOM PA, C-130 Airlift Wings and/or the MFB may provide Public Affairs support to WFF as requested. Any deployed PA officers will primarily serve as subject matter experts regarding military operations in a WFF situation.

(2) When a DCO deploys to NIFC, a PA officer may be alerted and on-standby to deploy to support the DCO and the NIFC PA office.
UNCLASSIFIED

(3) When MAFFS aircraft deploy to a forward operating location, the respective unit may deploy and provide PA support.

(4) When an EXORD is issued for ground battalion type unit deployment, an RFF for PA support may be issued. If the battalion is split and assigned to multiple fires within a complex, the DCO/Joint Force Commander will determine the appropriate PA support as needed.

(5) NIFC Public Affairs POC is (208) 387-5437.

4. **Admin and Logistics.** (In addition to Base Plan and Annex C)


   b. NIFC Incident Command staff will provide a variety of materiel and life support requirements for WFF operations once forces arrive at an incident site or mobilization center. In compliance with mission analysis and coordination with the primary agency, forces will deploy with organic equipment required to accomplish the mission. Units are responsible for self sustainment to and from the incident site.

   c. **WFF boots.** The military boot, combat full leather upper with speed lace, is the USDA/FS approved boot for WFF operations. These boots are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This particular combat boot can be seen at the following web site: http://ct.dscp.dla.mil/ascot. Boots are funded by NIFC for each deploying MFB, to include shipping and transportation costs. Parent service components are responsible to ensure that boots are ordered and received by designated units and to coordinate NIFC reimbursement via approved fund cite. Units requisitioning this combat boot should use appropriate Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) and the processes outlined by their respective service and/or organization. Due to the urgency usually associated with the delivery of these combat boots, the highest allowable Priority Designator should be used in record position 60-61 and a required delivery date of "777" in record position 62-64, when submitting the requisition(s). The fund code used on the requisition should be the same fund code used by the retail supply activity that is requisitioning the combat boot (NIFC will provide a fund cite or fund authorization for reimbursement). Units should not requisition boots until they have been provided the NIFC fund cite or fund authorization. Immediately, upon preparation or submission of boot requisitions, the service component will contact the DLA Liaison Officer at N-NC/J4, DSN 692-8318 or COMM (719) 554-8318. 24/7 contact numbers are (719) 488-2604 and the DLA customer support center at (877) 352-2255. In the case when a MFB is mobilized, receives boots, but doesn't deploy, every effort will be made to recover/repackage the boots and return them to the source of supply.
d. Health Service Support (HSS). Level 1 and 2 (field) medical support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting WFF operations, in coordination with appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and NIFC. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of forces, with NIFC and the DCO, to a military treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, the Veterans Administration (VA), or civilian hospital.

e. Funding. USNORTHCOM will not provide funding for WFF missions. All support to NIFC is performed under the Economy Act and subject to reimbursement pursuant to references h, n, and o. Upon USNORTHCOM tasking, services and or agencies will estimate costs of requested support and send to NIFC for approval with information copy to N-NC/J83. NIFC contact information is: NIFC, ATTN: Financial Manager, 3833 S. Development Ave, Boise ID, 83705-5354. Fax is: (208) 387-5398. N-NC/J83 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J86, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite B016, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334. NIFC Financial Manager will prepare a USDA Form, AD-672, Reimbursement or Advance of funds agreement, for service or agency signature. Upon signature by both parties, NIFC will establish an obligation in the USDA/FS accounting system. The signed USDA Form AD-672 shall provide reimbursable budget authority for supporting units. Pursuant to Tab k of ref p, Military Personnel Costs will be reimbursed at the current FY rates specific to each service. (see 6 HTTP://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2006/2005_k.pdf). Civilian personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current rates specified by the office of personnel management (see http://www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/) and accelerated by the current FY fringe benefit rate specific to each service pursuant to Tab d of ref p (see http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2006/2006_d.pdf). Services and agencies will price all other goods and services provided to NIFC based on actual costs incurred or on service or agency-accepted cost factors for estimating and billing. Use guidance in addendums 1 and 2, as well as chapters 1 and 3, of references n and o to ensure all costs are captured and services and agencies shall bill NIFC using Standard Form (SF) 1080 (see para 10(e) above for address). Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080 invoices to N-NC/J83 (see para 10(e) above for address).

5. Command and Signal.

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for WFF operations within the CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. JDOMS will normally release the WFF EXORD on or about 1 May of each year specifying SecDef approval for:

(1) Deployment of a DCO for WFF

(2) Deployment of MAFFS equipped C-130s and associated support personnel and equipment
(3) Use of MAFFS operating bases listed in the current MAFFS OPLAN

(4) Use of NWCG certified volunteer civilian fire fighters. When NIFC requests any of these assets, CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy them without a JDOMS EXORD MOD. CDRUSNORTHCOM will notify SecDef, through CJCS, of deployment, redeployment, and/or movement of any WFF assets prior to execution. This notification is done by the NC JOC as follows: NC/JOC Director will notify the NMCC via the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) with a GENADMIN message, followed by an email, and a follow-on phone call. DDO emails are: UnclassifiedJ-3DDO'S@js.pentagon.mil and J3ADDO'S@js.pentagon.mil; Classified J-3DDO'S@js.pentagon.smil.mil and J-3ADDO'S@js.pentagon.smil.mil. Phone number (703) 695-0100. Include JDMS in the email of the GENADMIN message: Unclassified email jdoms@js.pentagon.mil and Classified email jdoms@js.pentagon.smil.mil. GENADMIN Message will include:

(a) Type of support requested by NIFC (example: MAFFS, DCO, etc.)
(b) Number, by Type, of assets to be provided
(c) Duration of support
(d) Deployment location, by type, if applicable
(e) Procedures for confirmation of reimbursement

b. C-130 aircraft, personnel, and equipment. IAW the C2 construct for C-130 forces, USNORTHCOM will receive TACON of C-130 forces while USTRANSCOM / AMC / AFRC / ANG retain OPCON. CDRUSNORTHCOM will transfer TACON to the JFACC or the Joint Task Force commander as appropriate.

c. Send SATCOM requirements to N-NC/J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

d. As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil, unclassified Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil.

e. Components will report communications status IAW N-NC/J6 message DTG 061806z MAR 03 (TCCC reporting requirements, found at https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j6/j63/j633, reference documents) to the NORAD / USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address
Components will include communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

f. Common Operational Picture (COP). Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

g. Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. Secure VTCs are used, on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as needed basis. The NC/JOC Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by NC Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719) 554-9990.

h. Collaborative tool sets. USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail address Nc.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address is Nc.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

i. USNORTHCOM portal information. The address for the classified USNORTHCOM portal is Https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.

j. Reporting.

   (1) DCO/JFACC/JFLCC/JTF CDR will submit a SITREP to CDRUSNORTHCOM by 0300z daily. Email reports to the NC/JOC Aerospace Watch Officer at: nc.joc.aerospace.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-1659, COMM (719) 554-1659.

   (2) Upon stand-up of C2 elements, contact N-NC/J1 for personnel reporting formats. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted NLT 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

k. After Action Reports (AAR): USNORTHCOM components (DCO/JFACC/JFLCC/JTF CDR (When designated by CDRUSNORTHCOM)) submit AAR comments to USNORTHCOM J33 (NC/J33) NLT 30 days after the end of the fire season (when DOD support is provided). Use item, discussion, and recommendation format for both sustain and improve comments.

l. NC JOC POCs are the Operations Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, and the Aerospace Watch Officer, DSN 692-1659, COMM (719) 554-1659.

m. NIFC POC may be reached at, (208) 387-5661.
n.  NGB POC may be reached at, DSN 327-3515.

Tabs
A – Force Package Options For Wild Land Fire Fighting
1. Force Packages to support Wild Land Firefighting may include:
   a. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE).
   b. Use of installations as mobilization centers or MAFFS operating bases.
   c. Transportation support.
   d. Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft, support personnel and equipment.
   e. Military ground fire fighting crews (normally Battalion sized element plus command and control (C2)).
   f. Rotary wing aviation support to include MEDEVAC / Casualty Evacuation.
   g. Limited logistical and medical support.
   h. Engineering support.
   i. Airspace management.
   j. National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG) certified volunteer civilian fire fighters.
   k. Imagery products and reconnaissance.
APPENDIX 21 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

References:


e. Posse Comitatus Act, 18USC1385.


g. MOA Between DOD and Treasury Department, 27 Jun 1968

h. USNORTHCOM 251530Z May 04, Public Affairs Guidance, Military Support to National Special Security Events (NSSE)

i. See base plan for additional references

1. General. This appendix addresses the DSCA operations planning and execution for National Special Security Events (NSSE) and Special Events (SE). The Secretary of Homeland Security (SecHLS) designates NSSE and assigns SE Homeland Security (SEHS) Levels I-V for other events. Commander United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) will be designated the supported combatant commander for all NSSEs and some of the SEs in the USNORTHCOM AO to provide command and control (C2) of Department of Defense (DOD) forces approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). DOD and USNORTHCOM involvement in an SE depends on whether the Primary Agency/Agencies requests a capability from the DOD.

a. National Special Security Events (NSSE). NSSEs are events of national significance that require greater federal visibility. Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD-62) formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies
in the development of security plans for NSSEs. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-7 established the new process for designating events of national and
international significance as NSSEs. NSSEs receive greater federal planning and
protection than other special events. The process begins with a request for NSSE
designation, usually by the Governor of the State where the event will be held, to the
SecHLS. The NSSE working group (WG) evaluates the request using such factors as
anticipated attendance by dignitaries, size of the event, significance of the event, a
questionnaire, and conducts a site survey. The SecHLS, in consultation with the
Attorney General (AG), and based on the recommendation of the NSSE WG,
designates events as NSSEs. For NSSEs, DHS/United States Secret Service (USSS)
has primary responsibility for security design, planning, and implementation; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has primary responsibility for law enforcement,
intelligence, hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and criminal investigation; and
DHS/EPR/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary
responsibility for emergency response and recovery planning and coordination.
These agencies work together using the principles of Unified Command with a pre-
designated Principal Federal Official (PFO) facilitating interagency (IA) incident
management coordination during NSSE planning and execution. To thoroughly plan
for a NSSE, the Primary Agency/Agencies would establish a number of Law
Enforcement and Public Safety Subcommittees with representation from all the IA
organizations involved, including DOD, accreditation, air space security, civil
disturbance, consequence management, crisis management, critical systems
protection, dignitary protection, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/hazardous
materials (HAZMAT), fire/life safety/contingency plan, IA communications,
intelligence/counter terrorism, legal, logistics, public affairs (PA), training,
transportation, tactical/counter surveillance, venue security, and water and food
safety. Some of the titles may change, but these are representative subcommittees.
The Primary Agency/Agencies submit a request for Federal assistance (RFA) to the
OSD Executive Secretary for DOD support. The request is staffed by the Joint
Director of Military Support (JDOMS) and is approved by the SecDef. Once
approved, the JDOMS issues an Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM to
accept forces operational or tactical control (OPCON/TACON), provide C2 of
approved forces, and provide DSCA for the event. A list of NSSEs is provided at Tab
1.

b. Special Events (SE). The SecDHS releases the annual prioritized list of SEs
which is the result of a coordinated IA effort to develop and implement an all-
inclusive, comprehensive methodology to identify, categorize, and coordinate federal
support for SEs below the NSSE threshold occurring across the country. Events that
make the list are based upon potential threat, vulnerability, and consequence that do
not rise to the level of NSSEs, but are nevertheless significant and merit varying
degrees of federal support. Similar to NSSEs, the Primary Agency/Agencies for the
event submit a RFA to the OSD Executive Secretary for DOD support. The request is
staffed by the JDOMS and is approved by the SecDef. Once approved, the JDOMS
issues an EXORD to USNORTHCOM to accept forces OPCON/TACON, provide C2
of approved forces, and provide DSCA for the event. The events are categorized into four SEHS levels:

1. **SEHS-I.** An event of large magnitude and significant national and/or international importance requiring significant federal support and situational awareness (SA). SecDHS will appoint a Federal Coordinator and direct the development of an Integrated Federal Support Plan for these events. Examples of a SEHS-I event are the Superbowl and the United Nations General Assembly.

2. **SEHS-II.** An event of medium magnitude and average national and/or international importance requiring federal support and SA. SecDHS will appoint a Federal Coordinator and direct the development of an Integrated Federal Support Plan for these events. An example of a SEHS-II event is the International Monetary Fund/World Bank Meetings.

3. **SEHS-III.** An event of low magnitude and low national and/or international importance requiring limited federal support and SA. Monitoring and Federal Coordination for support are accomplished thorough the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the Special Events Working Group (SEWG). The NFL Pro Bowl and NBA All Star Game are two examples of a SEHS-III event.

4. **SEHS-IV.** An event that requires federal awareness but does not warrant direct federal support or involvement. The HSOC and the DHS Integration Staff (I-STAFF) will maintain SA of these events. The Golden Globe Awards, Grammy Awards, and the Academy Awards are all examples of SEHS-IV events.

2. **Mission.** When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands for designated NSSEs and SEs by providing unity of DOD effort and command and control of DOD Forces.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Commander’s Intent.** Provide C2 and unity of effort to contribute to a safe and secure environment for the event.

   b. **Method**

      (1) Provide unity of DOD effort.

      (2) Conduct proactive planning, coordination, and collaboration.

      (3) Provide scalable C2 to handle additional missions.

      (4) Effectively use exercises and rehearsals.
(5) Maximize situational awareness, accurate reporting, and timely intelligence dissemination.

(6) Provide assistance to lessen and mitigate the effects in the event of consequence management activities.

c. **End State.** Quality, pre-event, planning and coordination that results in timely and synchronized support and ensures a safe event, with public confidence in DOD/USNORTHCOM maintained throughout the operation.

d. **Supported Primary Agencies.** USNORTHCOM conducts SecDef approved DSCA operations for NSSEs and SEs. Primary Agencies may include, but are not limited to the USSS, FBI, FEMA, Department of State (DOS), United States Capitol Police (USCP), and United States Park Police (USPP).

e. **Area of Operations (AO).** See Base Plan.

f. **Standing Joint Operations Areas (JOA).** JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the District of Columbia with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) which covers a multi-jurisdictional area that encompasses two states, six counties, four cities, and the District of Columbia.

g. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in five (5) phases: Shaping, Staging, Deployment, Support of Civil Authorities, and Transition.

(1) **Phase I, Shaping.** The Shaping Phase is continuous and inherent to daily USNORTHCOM operations. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and situational awareness of upcoming events occurring in the AO. NSSE and SEs are pre-identified and pre-designated events that allow for advanced preparation and planning. Phase I, Shaping continues as a means to plan, prepare for and identify other events, but execution moves to Phase II, Staging. Major actions include:

(a) Specific plans for recurring and predicted NSSE / SE are completed during the Shaping phase to facilitate successful execution.

(b) Trained and ready response capabilities are developed and maintained.

(c) Utilization of Information Operations (IO) tools and public affairs messages supporting the themes of military readiness.

(d) Coordinate with National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Joint Force Headquarters-State(s) (JFHQ-State(s)) to ensure DOD unity of effort.
(e) Coordination with the Inter-agency and inter-governmental community for a mutually supporting response.

(f) Commanders may elect to support recurring NSSEs and SE as Innovative Readiness Training as described in DOD Directive 1100.20. To avoid duplication and to ensure unity of effort, planned support should be coordinated with USNORTHCOM and identified in the planning process in either the Shaping or the Staging Phases. Innovative Readiness Training is not a DSCA mission, but its execution may have an impact. Units executing Innovative Readiness Training, as support to a DSCA incident and or NSSE event, remain under their organic C2. Innovative Readiness Training is not authorized for disaster response operations.

(g) Commanders may provide support to NSSE/SE operations in the form of Public Affairs (PA)/Civil Military Affairs under DOD Directive 5410.18. To avoid duplication and to ensure unity of effort, planned support should be coordinated with USNORTHCOM and identified in the planning process. Civil Military Affairs support is not authorized for disaster response operations.

(h) USNORTHCOM identifies representatives to participate on USSS planning subcommittees.

(2) **Phase II, Staging.** This phase begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. NSSE and SE have known event start dates, allowing for significant Staging activities. These activities include detailed preparations to support the event as well as preparing response to an Incident, act of terrorism or otherwise, during the event. The following are the major actions during this phase:

(a) Focus intelligence integration efforts within the limits of legal authority on identifying any threat to the event.

(b) Identify force capabilities for response and place on alert/increased Response Posture Level.

(c) Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition.

(d) Publish orders.

(e) Establish Common Operating Picture (COP) with all involved commands and agencies.

(f) Coordinate with the U.S. Coast Guard for unity of effort in support of (ISO) the operation.
(g) Deploy LNO and DCO / DCE

(h) Identify mobilization sites and staging areas.

(i) Identify VIP transportation support requirements and jump to locations.

3) Phase III, Deploy. Phase III begins with the main supporting force deployment. Deployment of force capabilities for NSSE / SE DSCA operations may occur in 2 parts. Requested supporting force capabilities are deployed as approved for the event. Response force capabilities are placed on heightened alert status for potential response and deploy only if needed as a second force deployment. Deployment, ends when all required supporting forces have deployed to the AO / JOA. Deployment phase major actions are:

(a) Employment of C2 element and SecDef approved supporting forces at the event site.

(b) Planned DOD Force Flow completed. (Exceptions requested as necessary).

4) Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. Phase IV begins with the employment of force capabilities supporting the event. The phase ends with civil authorities prepared to assume normal operations. Major actions during Phase IV include:

(a) The employment of appropriate C2 element and consequence management forces as approved by SecDef.

(b) Title 10 Forces provide DSCA as requested by civil authorities and approved by SecDef.

(c) DSCA operations during NSSE / SE may include but are not limited to EOD, EDD, communications support, rotary wing assets, security forces, and transportation assets.

(d) Response forces remain on heightened alert status for the duration of the event as necessary.

5) Phase V, Transition to Civil Authority. Phase V begins at the planned conclusion of the event or, if DSCA response operations were required, as the incident is stabilized and civil authorities assuming control with no degradation of operations.

h. Coordinating Instructions. See base plan and Annex C. Specific coordinating instructions for the NSSE or SE will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD.

(1) Unit commanders are responsible for FP and will not conduct DSCA operations without proper equipment and training.

(2) All deploying unit ground commanders will ensure that at least one (1)/Level II qualified anti-terrorism (AT) Officer/NCO deploys with the deploying element.

(3) All deploying personnel must be Level I AT trained and certified. The Unit Commander and AT Officer/NCO are responsible for ensuring all deploying personnel are level I trained and certified.

(4) Supporting Commands and/or services ensure all forces deploying receive a threat briefing for the deployment area. Supporting Commands and/or services will ensure forces complete service component required pre-deployment training certified by a Level II AT Officer/NCO, to include anti-terrorism awareness training IAW their parent service. Mission Commanders will ensure deployed forces receive an appropriate level of terrorist awareness training upon arrival and, as required, throughout the length of deployment. Ensure FP measures include provisions for contractors that are involved in the operation.

(5) Consider deploying the AT Officer/NCO early in the deployment flow to execute AT/FP tasks that are requisite to the deployment, e.g., site survey or assessment and coordination of security requirements with the Primary Agency.

(6) Ensure the AT Officer/NCO is trained to employ methods to reduce risk or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. The AT Officer/NCO must also be familiar with pre-deployment AT training requirements. Assignment as the AT Officer/NCO may be a collateral or additional duty for the individual appointed. The AT Officer/NCO duties include but are not limited to use UFC 4-010-10 DOD minimum anti-terrorism standoff distances for buildings, dated 31 July 2002, temporary structures, to determine if facilities either currently occupied or under consideration for occupancy by DOD personnel can adequately protect occupants against terrorist attack.

(7) AT/FP guidance must appear in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, and execute orders.

(8) All personnel must be proficient in individual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) defense survival skills as prescribed by service directives. Unit commanders will determine if personnel will deploy with their appropriate CBRNE protective equipment (MOPP gear), based upon the current threat situation.
4. Administration and Logistics. See base plan, Annex C, Annex D, and Annex E. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for each event.

a. Administration

(1) DSCA operations will be IAW the USNORTHCOM EXORD.

(2) Reports

(a) Supporting Commanders (Joint Task Force Commander or Joint Mission Commander) will ensure that daily situation reports (SITREPs) are provided to the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to USNORTHCOM by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: Nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: USNORTHCOM JOC Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) will be reported telephonically; DSN 692-2361, Comm (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (unclass)/692-2368 (classified).

(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted NLT 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.
(c) **Communications status reporting.** Commanders will report communications status IAW NORAD/USNORTHCOM J6 TCCC reporting requirements (message Date Time Group (DTG) 06106Z Mar 03) to the USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address; Northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil. Commanders will include the communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

(d) **Common Operational Picture (COP).** Reporting instructions are identified in OPTASKCOP message DTG 272330Z Jan 03. USNORTHCOM COP classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(e) **After Action Reports (AAR).** Provide After Action Reports (AAR) IAW CDRUSNORTHCOM direction for DSCA operations.

(3) **Funding**

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) DSCA to another federal department or agency is provided under the Economy Act. For DSCA operations under terms of the Economy Act, units will capture and report all costs to their Military Department comptroller.

(c) The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operations procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to IAW appropriate funding guidance. Units will capture and report incremental costs IAW appropriate funding guidance.

(d) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operations procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to IAW the Economy Act.

(e) Pursuant to published DOD reimbursable rates, military personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current fiscal year rates specific to each service. FY05 rates may be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2005/2005_k.pdf. Civilian personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current rates specified by the office of personnel management (see http://www.opm.gov/oca/05tables/) and accelerated by the current FY DOD fringe benefit rate specific to each service pursuant to Tab d of ref p (see http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2005/2005_d.pdf).
(f) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.

(g) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC's commercial phone number, the disaster relief incident name, the incident number, the incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(h) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all requests for Federal assistance. Backup documentation will identify the disaster relief incident name, the incident number, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the mission order.

(i) USNORTHCOM J8 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J8, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

b. Logistics. See Annex D

(1) Supply

(a) Forces will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible for 3 days of DSCA operations. Military forces should carry (as possible) additional rations, water, and medical to allow emergency assistance when circumstances warrant.

(b) Designated BSI will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Re-supply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for FEMA approved equipment, trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.

(3) Transportation

(a) The use of JOPES is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD LOI, enclosure F of JOPES Vol III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup “gces.northcom.jopes.operations” on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gces.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-
UNCLASSIFIED

working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS). See Annex Q

(a) Medical Treatment. Level 1 and 2 (field) medical support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies ICW appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level).

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JRMPO) may provide JRMPO support. JRMPO assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, State, and Health and Human Services; and provide situation awareness and information updates through the established C2 structure to USNORTHCOM and the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.

5. Command and Control. See base plan

a. Command Relationships. See Annex J

(1) Several agencies can be the Primary Agency for NSSEs and SEs (e.g., U.S. Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, USPP, and USCP, NASA, U.S. Olympic Committee)

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander for DSCA operations within its designated DSCA AO.

(3) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.
(4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

(5) Upon completion of DSCA operations, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the affected area. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. Signal. See Annex K

(1) Send SATCOM requirements to USNORTHCOM J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil.

(2) As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Nc.j636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil.

(3) Common Operational Picture (COP). Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(4) Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. Secure VTCs are used, on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as needed basis. The USNORTHCOM JOC Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by USNORTHCOM Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719) 554-9990.

(5) Collaborative tool sets. USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail address Nc.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address is Nc.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

(6) USNORTHCOM portal information. The address for the classified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.
LIST OF NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

References:  
  a. See Additional References base plan  
  b. See Annex C  
  c. See Appendix 21 to Annex C

1. **Purpose.** To identify events which have been designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE).

2. **General**
   
   a. **1999**
      
      (1) 50th Anniversary of NATO Conference
      
      (2) World Trade Organization Conference (WTOC)
      
      (3) President’s 1999 State of the Union Address to Congress
      
      (4) Pope John Paul II Visit to St Louis MO
   
   b. **2000**
      
      (1) 55th United Nations General Assembly
      
      (2) Democratic National Convention, 14-17 Aug 05, Los Angles CA
      
      (3) Republican National Convention, 31 Jul – 3 Aug 05, Philadelphia PA
      
      (4) OpSail 2000
      
      (5) President’s 2000 State of the Union Address to Congress
   
   c. **2001**
      
      (1) 2001 Presidential Inaugural, 20 Jan 01, Wash DC
      
      (2) 56th United Nations General Assembly Opening Session
d. 2002
   (1) Super Bowl XXXVI
   (2) 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics
   (3) President’s 2002 State of the Union Address to Congress

e. 2004
   (1) President’s 2004 State of the Union Address to Congress
   (2) Operation Serenade, Former President Reagan State Funeral
   (3) G-8 Economic Summit, Sea Island GA
   (4) Democratic National Convention, Boston MA
   (5) Republican National Convention, New York City NY

g. 2005
   (1) 2005 Presidential Inaugural
   (2) President’s 2005 State of the Union Address to Congress
APPENDIX 22 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

References:

a. 10 United States Code 372, 382, 2576, 2667

b. 18 United States Code 831

c. 18 United States Code, Section 1385, Posse Comitatus Act

d. 31 United States Code, Section 1535, Economy Act

e. National Response Plan, 15 December 2005

f. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) 13 June 2005 (S)

g. DOD Directive 3025.dd (draft), Defense Support of Civil Authorities

h. DOD Directive 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities

i. DOD Instruction 3025.dd (draft), Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities

j. DOD Manual 3025.dd (draft), Defense Support of Civil Authorities

k. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, DOD Intelligence Components that affect United States Persons

1. **Situation**

a. State, local, tribal, private-sector, and specific Federal authorities have primary responsibility for public safety and security, and typically are the first line of response and support. Local jurisdictions have primary authority and responsibility for law enforcement activities. As local incidents or events escalate, additional resources will first be obtained through the activation of mutual aid agreements with neighboring localities and/or State authorities. In the context of State’s resources, the National Guard (NG), while serving under state control for state purposes, is not considered to be part of the Department of Defense (DOD) and executes missions under the
b. It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the maximum extent practicable. The implementation of DOD policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, and the requirements of applicable law.

c. It is the intent of this appendix to provide an overview of defense support of law enforcement as it cannot cover all potential requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) that relate to civilian law enforcement. Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies covers a broad spectrum of potential activities from very small support activities such as training civilian law enforcement, loaning a piece of equipment, or an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or dog team to large-scale incidents or events such as a riot. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) addresses civil disturbance operations as part of public safety. This appendix will not address civil disturbance operations. See Appendix 23, Civil Disturbance Operations to Annex C, Operations.

d. State level emergency response operations for natural disasters have evolved concerning the use of the NG in a law enforcement role from state to state. Governor's use of their powers has set a precedence for the future. Governor's may, by use of their state powers and via a state to state memorandum of agreement, authorize the NG of one state to perform law enforcement and security duties within the another state.

e. In accordance with (IAW) reference g above, DSCA does not apply to the following programs that are related to support to law enforcement agencies:

(1) Sensitive support provided IAW DOD Directive (DODD) S-5210.36.

(2) Inspector General of the DOD, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, or the military criminal investigative organizations when they are conducting joint investigations with civilian law enforcement agencies of matters within their respective jurisdictions, using their own forces and equipment.

(3) The non-Federalized National Guard and their activities under the C2 of the Governor.

(4) Counter-drug operations.

(5) Defense Intelligence Components providing intelligence support IAW Executive Orders (EO) 12333 and 13356, the DODD on Intelligence activities (DODD 5240.1) and DODD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD
Intelligence Components that Affect United States Person (DODD 5240.1-R). Defense Intelligence Components are defined in DOD Directive 5240.1

f. **Enemy Forces.** See base plan

g. **Friendly Forces.** See base plan

h. **Assumptions**

1. DOD law enforcement and security missions/tasks will be in support of a Primary Agency under the NRP or a designated agency for other approved law enforcement activities.

2. The Posse Comitatus Act will not be modified.

3. DOD policy and guidance will not change after the formal release of references g, i, and j.

4. Civilian law enforcement agencies will continue to request training support for law enforcement activities, loan/lease of DOD equipment, support for National Special Security Events (NSSEs), and other law enforcement activities.

2. **Mission.** See base plan

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operations**

        1. Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies in response to a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, incident, or event will be processed IAW reference i above and executed at the direction of the President or approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) IAW the base plan.

        2. Release of information to the public concerning law enforcement operations is the primary responsibility of the civilian agency that is performing the law enforcement function. When defense support is provided under reference j above, assistance provided and information released by DOD PAO agencies to the public shall be approved by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or the Directors of the Defense Agencies and such assistance may be conditioned upon control by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies before information is released to the public.

        3. **Use of Information Collected During DSCA Operations.** Military Departments and Defense Agencies are encouraged to provide to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the
normal course of DSCA operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials.

(4) USNORTHCOM will initiate coordination for defense support with the designated law enforcement agency upon SecDef approval of a RFA.

(5) **Training Civilian Law Enforcement.** Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials. Such assistance may include training in the operations and maintenance of equipment made available under the military equipment loan/lease program. This does not permit large scale or elaborate training, and does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise approved and authorized.

b. **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) Coordination regarding legality of support will be staffed through the chain of command and USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) to the SecDef.

(2) The SecDef is the approval authority for all RFAs made by law enforcement agencies. This includes:

   a) Requests for potentially lethal support (i.e., lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, a military member or DOD employee).

   b) Loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.

   c) Lethal support includes: loans of arms; combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft, or ammunition.

   d) All requests for support under 10 USC 382 and 18 USC 831; all support to counterterrorism operations; and all support to law enforcement when there is a potential for confrontation between law enforcement and specifically identified civilian individuals or groups.

(3) **Immediate response authority.** When requested, local military commanders and DOD officials may provide defense support to civil law enforcement agencies under this authority consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC, Section 1385) and IAW the guidance provided in the base plan.

(4) **Restrictions on direct assistance to civilian law enforcement.** Except as otherwise provided, the prohibition on the use of military personnel “as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws” prohibits the following forms of direct assistance:
(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(5) The SecDef is the approval authority for all assistance with the potential for confrontation between DOD personnel and civilian individuals or groups.

(6) If a DOD Component has a question on the appropriateness or legality of providing requested support, such request shall be forwarded through the military chain of command to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)).

4. **Administration and Logistics.** See base plan

5. **Command and Control.** See base plan
APPENDIX 23 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS (CD Opns)

TO BE PUBLISHED
APPENDIX 24 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (NLW)

References:

a. USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment, 9 July 2004 (FOUO)


c. FORSCOM Pamphlet 380-1, “Quick Reaction Force/Ready Reaction Force Pamphlet” May 2003 (U)

d. FM 3-19.15, “Civil Disturbance Operations” (U)

e. Air Land Sea Application, “Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons”, January 2003 (U)

f. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons JCIDS Analysis Functional Area Analysis, August 2004 (FOUO)

g. CJCS Washington DC Message O 072310Z AUG 03, “Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) for Quick Response Force and Rapid Response Force (QRF/RRF) Ground Security Operations” (S)

h. CJCSTI 3110.07B, “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides”, 16 February 2001 (S)

i. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) Information Packet, “Non-Lethal Capability Set (NLCS)”, March 2004 (FOUO)

1. Situation

   a. General. When directed to perform a DSCA mission, forces under the operational control (OPCON) of CDRUSNORTHCOM must be prepared to perform a wide range of tasks in response to requests for assistance from a Primary Agency. These tasks can range from providing humanitarian assistance to suppression of insurrection or civil disorder. It is the policy of CDRUSNORTHCOM that these forces are equipped with an equally wide range of both lethal and non-lethal response options. As stated in reference (a), in executing its DSCA mission, “consideration will be given to the use of non-lethal means in order to minimize civilian casualties,
permanent injury to personnel and undesired damage to property and the environment.” Within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the avoidance of civilian casualties is imperative, particularly in a densely populated area. When deciding on response options requiring the application of force, subordinate commanders may choose a variety of non-lethal and lethal capabilities within the force continuum to facilitate tailoring the employment of the most suitable force package. Non-lethal technologies hold great promise for restoring order while avoiding fatalities among the civilian population. Non-lethal technologies with potential application to DSCA missions fall into three main areas:

1. **Counter personnel.** Technology, used to temporarily incapacitate individuals or groups; deny entry into a particular area, clear facilities, structures and areas; and protect our own forces and facilities.

2. **Counter material.** Technology, to deny an area, buildings, facilities and structures to vehicles; disable, neutralize vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment; and protect our own forces and facilities.

3. **Counter capability.** Technology to disable or neutralize facilities and systems; and deny the use of weapons of mass destruction.

b. **Non-lethal Weapons Definition.** As defined by reference (b), Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) are weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are designed to have relatively reversible effects on personnel or material.

c. **Enemy.** See Annex B.

d. **Friendly.**

1. **QRF/RRF.** When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM employs designated Company-sized Quick Reaction Forces and Battalion minus-sized Rapid Reaction Forces (QRFs / RRFs) to designated location(s) within USNORTHCOM’s DSCA Operational Area (OA) in support of DSCA missions. These forces are designed to provide responsive, mission-tailored, lightly armed ground units that can deploy on short notice, with minimal lift assets, and capable of providing immediate or emergency response for DSCA missions consistent with the law and DOD policy. QRF/RRF units OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM will be equipped with Service-approved, unit-issued non-lethal weapons/capabilities. This includes the Initial Response Company (IRC), which, pending execution of the JFHQ-NCR Standing EXORD, will most likely be
employed in a rapid-response scenario and TACON or OPCON to the CDR JFHQ-NCR.

Reference (c) delineates Army QRF/RRF missions, CONOPS, alert levels, equipment required, training scenarios, tasks, conditions, and standards. Primary tasks applicable to DSCA for QRFs/RRFs include:

- Providing Defense/Security of critical infrastructure
- Supporting quarantine operations
- Assisting evacuation operations
- Conducting civil disturbance control operations
- Establishing checkpoints and/or roadblocks
- Securing a facility
- Conducting perimeter security

Reference (d) addresses domestic unrest and the Army’s role in providing assistance to civil authorities requesting it for civil disturbance operations. It also provides the commander and his staff guidance for preparing and planning for such operations.

It can be anticipated that the QRF/RRF’s role in providing DSCA support could be a follow-on to their initial employment in a Homeland Defense mission.

(2) USNORTHCOM Component Commanders / Supporting Component Commanders

(a) CDRAFNORTH
(b) CDRARNORTH
(c) COMMARFORNORTH
(d) CFFC

(3) Subordinate Commands

(a) JFHQ-NCR
(b) JTF-Alaska
(c) JTF-CS

e. Assumptions

(1) The use of NLWs is consistent with the RUF. Mission Specific RUF may be requested as needed.

(2) Units assigned to support USNORTHCOM DSCA operations will be trained and equipped in the use of Service-approved non-lethal weapons contained in non-lethal capabilities sets (NLCS) described in Tab A.
f. **Resource Availability.** Availability of non-lethal weapons varies among Services and individual units. The general guidance contained in this CONPLAN for employment of NLW by forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM assumes those forces as a minimum, will be equipped with those capabilities contained in Tab A to this Appendix.

g. **Planning Factors.** Non-lethal weapons should be considered complementary to lethal weapons and their contemplated use by forces COCOM to USNORTHCOM should in no way be considered the preferred force application option when the situation dictates use of lethal force. Non-lethal weapons can offer obvious alternatives to lethal force for the full range of DSCA operations. Concepts for employment of NLWs for these types of scenarios are well documented in publications such as references (d) and (e). Accordingly, non-lethal capabilities should be an integral part of planning for DSCA operations in order to offer Commanders a wider range of force options. General planning considerations when writing a Request for Forces (RFF) should indicate special equipment required by deploying personnel to include non-lethal weapons. Execution Orders (EXORDS) should specify non-lethal equipment requirements since deployment of this equipment will have an obvious impact on load planning. Table C-24-1 contains the CDRUSNORTHCOM approved DSCA non-lethal required capabilities. It is recognized that NLW technology currently does not exist, nor will it exist in the near future, to meet all of these requirements particularly in the sea and air domains for denying an area to a large vessel or an aircraft using non-lethal means. They are provided to assist planners in addressing long-term investments that will provide JTF commanders with additional alternatives to lethal force application when the mission and RUF dictates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table C-24-1 USNORTHCOM NLW DSCA Required Capabilities</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domains</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Mission.** Refer to the Base Plan.
3. **Execution.** Initial military response to a terrorist attack, major disaster or other national emergency may be in the form of National Guard (NG) organizations in a State Active Duty or Title 32 status. Likewise, for incidents within the maritime domain, a Coast Guard vessel will likely be the first on the scene. When performing these missions, the Coast Guard in a Title 14 status (law-enforcement role) is equipped to employ non-lethal capabilities, and the NG in its law-enforcement support role may or may not be equipped, but certainly able to employ non-lethal capabilities. Policy, RUF and other legal considerations for employment of non-lethal weapons/capabilities by these non-Title 10 forces when employed in their law-enforcement roles, can differ considerably from those of their Title 10 counterparts. Moreover, these factors can vary from state to state, and even from locality to locality. Accordingly, no effort is made in this CONPLAN to address specific non-lethal capabilities for these non-Title 10 forces not under OPCON of CDRUSNORTHCOM. Only when tasking is received from POTUS or SecDef, will CDRUSNORTHCOM assume subsequent responsibility for DSCA support to a Primary Agency and OPCON of assigned forces. Whether DSCA forces employed by USNORTHCOM are via Quick Reaction Forces/ Rapid Reaction Forces (QRFs/RRFs), Request for Forces (RFF) process through the Joint Staff via JFCOM and Supporting Commands, standing JFHQs/JTFs, or “federalized” NG units, they should be prepared to respond to requests for DSCA support within USNORTHCOM’s DSCA OA using the full range of force application options including non-lethal capabilities. However, it should be clear that the possession of non-lethal weapons in no way indicates abandoning the option to employ lethal force when the situation dictates or limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available to take all appropriate action in self-defense. Non-lethal weapons/capabilities allow the commander the flexibility to increase or decrease the amount of force applied to achieve the commander’s desired effect.

a. **Concept of Operations.** Forces OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM should be equipped and trained in the use of Service-approved Non-Lethal Capability Sets (NLCS) described in Tab A. These sets are comprised of a prepackaged mix of counter personnel, counter material, personal protection and support equipment intended to provide commanders in the field the option of applying non-lethal force to achieve the desired effect. Specific composition of NLCS varies among the Services based on Service-unique requirements (e.g., USN/USCG entanglement systems designed to foul boat propellers would have no utility for land operations while USA/USMC arresting barriers designed to stop wheeled vehicles would have no maritime utility). However, there is sufficient commonality in the non-lethal capabilities (i.e., counter personnel, counter material) provided by these sets to support a standardized concept for their employment by those forces conducting DSCA missions. While it is recognized that emerging non-lethal technologies (i.e., directed energy, pulsed energy, etc.) exist that offer a wider range of capabilities than those contained in existing Non-Lethal Capabilities Sets, this CONPLAN will defer addressing application of those technologies pending resolution of policy, legal and human effects issues associated with their use for DSCA applications.
(1) **NLW Implications for DSCA Phases I-V.** Table C-28-2 provides general guidance regarding the NLCS implications for each of the five DSCA Phases described in Annex C.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>NLW Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| I - Shaping         | 1. Units employ NLCS training equipment to develop proficiency.  
|                     | 2. NLWs incorporated into DSCA exercises.  
|                     | 3. NLCS are palletized and available for immediate deployment should situation dictate immediate Phase III response.  
|                     | 4. Equipment Load Plans include NLCS.                                                                                                                                               |
| II – Staging        | 1. Time permitting, NLCS are tailored to address anticipated DSCA requirement that triggered Phase II declaration.  
|                     | 2. Units are briefed on specific RUF for employing NLWs.  
|                     | 3. NLCS pallets are positioned for loading.                                                                                                                                 |
| III - Deployment    | 1. NLCS accompany deploying units into JOA.  
|                     | 2. NLWs issued as appropriate.  
|                     | 3. Review RUF and mission-specific situations dictating the potential use of NLWs.                                                                                                                                                  |
| IV – DSCA           | 1. USNORTHCOM forces employ NLWs where appropriate in support of Primary Agency.                                                                                                                                                   |
| V - Transition to Civil Authorities | 1. NLCS return to base with units.  
|                     | 2. NLCS inventoried, reconstituted and prepared for redeployment.  
|                     | 3. Develop lessons learned and incorporate into TTPs where appropriate.                                                                                                         |
b. **Tasks**

(1) **USNORTHCOM**

(a) Ensure policy for employment of non-lethal capabilities is contained in DSCA EXORDS.

(b) Identify the NL assets that contribute to mission accomplishment.

(c) Ensure NL capabilities are incorporated into USNORTHCOM Civil Support /DSCA exercises.

(d) Develop/refine NL requirements for DSCA applications and provide guidance for supporting DOD elements.

(2) **USNORTHCOM Supporting Component Commanders**

(a) **Commander, Army North (CDRARNORTH)**

1. Ensure units employed in providing DSCA support to USNORTHCOM are equipped and trained in the use of non-lethal capability sets.

2. Participate in USNORTHCOM activities directed toward identification of land NLW requirements.

3. Develop TTPs for land use of NLWs for DSCA.

4. Incorporate NLCS into QRF Load Plans.

(b) **Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC)**

1. Ensure naval units employed in providing support to USNORTHCOM are equipped and trained in the use of NL capabilities for maritime DSCA applications.

2. Participate in USNORTHCOM activities directed toward identification of maritime NLW requirements.

3. Develop TTPs for maritime use of NLWs in support of DSCA.
(c) Commander, Air Force North (CDRAFNORTH)

1. Ensure units employed in providing support to USNORTHCOM are equipped and trained in the use of non-lethal capability sets.

2. Develop TTPs for use of NLWs in support of DSCA.

(d) Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNORTH)

1. (U) Ensure units employed in providing support to USNORTHCOM are equipped and trained in the use of non-lethal capability sets.

2. (U) Develop TTPs for use of NLWs in support of DSCA.

(3) Tasks to Supporting Combatant Commands

(a) USTRANSCOM

1. Provide support for transportation of DSCA forces and accompanying NLCS pallets to and from the Port of Debarkation (POD).

(b) USJFCOM

1. Provide CONUS-based forces that are trained in the joint use of non-lethal capabilities that support DSCA missions.

(4) Tasks to Supporting Services

(a) Services will ensure USNORTHCOM Supporting Component Commander’s NLW requirements are included in their POM.

c. Coordinating Instructions. All DOD elements in support of USNORTHCOM have the following responsibilities:

(1) Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). General Guidance on RUF is contained in Appendix 6 to this Annex. Specific guidance on RUF for QRF/RRF is contained in references (c and g). Policy regarding use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) is contained in reference (h).

(2) Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

(3) Interagency Coordination. Refer to Annex V.

4. Administration and Logistics
a. **Logistics.** Refer to Annex D.

b. **Administration.** Refer to Annex D.

c. **Reports.** Refer to Annex C and appendixes.

5. **Command and Control**

   a. **Command Relationships.** USNORTHCOM is the supported combatant command. CDRUSJFCOM and CDR USTRANSCOM are the supporting combatant commands.

   b. **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.** Refer to Annex K.

Tab

A -- (U) Non-lethalCapabilities Sets
Non-Lethal Capabilities Sets (NLCS) are versatile packages of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) items consisting of non-lethal force protection equipment, training devices, support equipment and weapons. Reference (i) provides detailed descriptions of individual items contained in these sets. The weapons and munitions in the currently-fielded NLCS have effective ranges of 10-100 meters and each set contains Service-unique equipment based on that Service’s requirements. Each Service has different quantities for the equipment and munitions in their NLCS that are based on unit organizational structures (i.e., battalion, company, platoon, security team). Packed in Quad Con containers for easy storage and handling, the NLCS can be rapidly deployed by military transport or commercial carrier. The US Army sets are designed to equip company-sized units, and US Marine sets are designed to equip one of their battalion-sized units. Air Force sets are designed for a 13-person squad.

Exhibit
1 -- Non-Lethal Capability Set Descriptions by Service
EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 24 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
NON-LETHAL CAPABILITIES SETS DESCRIPTIONS BY SERVICE

USMC Non-Lethal Capabilities Sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ballistic USMC Riot Face Shield (S/R)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ballistic Riot Body Shield Paulson</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ballistic Riot Shin Guards</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC23”/36” Riot Baton (Expandable) (w/holster)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Megaphone</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Disposable Handcuffs</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Disposable Handcuff Training Device</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-4 Pouch OD</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-4 Individual Live (OC) Dispenser (Pepper Spray)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-9 Squad (OC) Dispenser (Pepper Spray)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-9 Pouch OD</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Live (OC) (Horizontal) (Pepper Spray)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Sling</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Hardware Kit</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Refill Unit (OC) Live (Pepper Spray)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-4 Inert Individual Training (OC) Dispenser</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-9 Inert Squad Training (OC) Dispenser</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Inert Training (OC) (Horizontal) (w/Dye)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Refill Unit (OC) Inert Training (w/Dye)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Training Suit w/Accessories (F.I.S.T.)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Training Strike Bag</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caltrop</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stinger Road Spike Kit (15.5’)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Intensity Light (Xenonics)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Surefire 6P Holster</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6V Lithium Individual High Intensity Flashlight</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surefire 6P (P-60) Bulbs</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3V Lithium Batteries</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Buttstock Cuff</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Utility (25 Round) Pouch</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM Carrying Pouch</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>QUANTITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversionary/Stingball Grenade Pouch</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorer’s Kit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB-WT White Training Baton-24”</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate Straight Training Baton-24” Blue Padded</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Shield Storage System</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lethal Grenade Launching Cup Carrying Bag</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USA Non-Lethal Capabilities Set (Platoon Size)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Ballistic Riot Face Shield</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Riot Face Shield</td>
<td>1 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ballistic riot Body Shield</td>
<td>1 per SL. TL &amp; shield bearer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ballistic Riot Body Shield Hardware</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Riot Body Shield</td>
<td>1 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Riot Shin Guards</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Riot Shin Guards (Medium)</td>
<td>1 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Riot Shin Guards (Large)</td>
<td>1 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint, Strap Cinch</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint, Full Body</td>
<td>3 Per Set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint, Disposable, Tri-Fold</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable Riot Baton</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying case for Expandable Riot Baton</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Bull Horn</td>
<td>1 Per Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Mounted Bullhorn</td>
<td>1 Per Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Intensity Light</td>
<td>1 Per Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Voice Amplification System</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual High Intensity Light With Carrying Case</td>
<td>1 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Pouches</td>
<td>1 Per PL/PSG/SL/TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm carrying Pouch</td>
<td>2 Per Grenadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-gauge Utility pouch (25 rounds)</td>
<td>1 Per 12-guage shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-gauge Butt-cuff Carrier (6 rounds)</td>
<td>1 Per 12-guage shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying case for M39</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QuadCon containers</td>
<td>1 Per Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1006, 40mm, Cartridge, Non-Lethal</td>
<td>6 Per Grenadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1029, 40mm Non-Lethal Crowd Dispersal Grenade</td>
<td>6 Per Grenadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1012, Cartridge, 12 gauge Shotgun: Non-Lethal Point Control</td>
<td>10 Per 12-guage shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1013, Cartridge, 12 gauge Shotgun: Non-Lethal Crowd Dispersal</td>
<td>10 Per 12-guage shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L96, Grenade, Discharger: 66mm Anti-Riot Irritant, CS</td>
<td>4 Per HMMWV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Material</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5, Munition, Modular Crowd Control</td>
<td>4 Per Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M39, Individual Riot Control Agent Dispenser (IRCAD)</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Material</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALTROPS Set (250 per Set)</td>
<td>1 Per Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Vehicle Arresting Barrier</td>
<td>1 Per Every 12 PNLCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Baton Training Suit</td>
<td>1 Set Per PLT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Strike Pad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L97, Grenade, Discharger: 66mm Anti-Riot Practice</td>
<td>4 Per HMMWV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M40, Individual Riot Control Agent Dispenser (IRCAD Training)</td>
<td>1 Per Every 2 Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-gauge Dummy Round</td>
<td>5 Per 12-Guage Shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposed Items – Not Yet Available</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancement &amp; Other Devices</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Laser White Light Pointer (ILWLP) – Aiming Device</td>
<td>1 Per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-gauge Non-Lethal Enhanced Round</td>
<td>10 Per 12-Guage Shotgunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK19 Short Range Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M99, Grenade, Launcher: 66mm Non-Lethal, Blunt Trauma</td>
<td>4 Per HMMWV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M98, Grenade, Launcher: 66mm Non-Lethal Distraction</td>
<td>4 Per HMMWV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M84, Grenade, Stun/Diversionary Flash-Bang Hand Thrown</td>
<td>1 Per PL/PSG/SL/TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of Electric Stun Devices (FESD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of Electric Stun Devices (FESD) Accessories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Material</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device (VLAD)</td>
<td>1 Per Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility Denial System (Man Portable)</td>
<td>1 Per PLT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility Denial System (Vehicle Mounted)</td>
<td>1 Per Every 12 PNLCS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USAF Non-Lethal Capabilities Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Strike Bag</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Baton Training Suit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inert Individual (OC) Training Dispenser</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Sized Riot Control Dispenser (Chemical)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Control Dispenser (OC) Agent Quarts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/Ballistic Face Shields</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/Ballistic Full Length Riot Shield</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/Ballistic Shin guards</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36&quot; Riot Baton w/Holster</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portable Megaphone</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackhawk Omega Tact-Chem Vest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Gloves (Hatch Gauntlets)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Cups</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable Forearm/Ankle Cuffs (FLEX)</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual MK4 (OC) Dispenser with Carrier</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Utility Pouch</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Butt Stock Cuff</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM Carrying Pouch</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Taser M26</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Cartridges Box or 28 (21ft)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ballistic Nylon Thigh Holster (Right side)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ballistic Nylon Thigh Holster (Left side)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taser Nimh Battery Charger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taser 8 pack Nimh Batteries w/ magazine</td>
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<td>Garrett Shipping Container</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ammunition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Shotgun (Area CDC/Rubber Pellet)</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Gauge Shotgun (Point/Fin Stabilized)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stun Hand (Sting Ball) Grenade</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stun Hand Grenade/Flash-Bang Device M84</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>40MM (Point) Sponge Round M1006</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>40MM (Area) Crowd Dispersal Cartridge M1029</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
APPENDIX 25 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
DEFENSE COORDINATING OFFICER (DCO)

References:

a. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq. (Stafford Act, Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act)


c. DOD Instruction 3025.dd, Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (draft)

d. DOD Manual 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) (draft)

e. Additional references in base plan

1. Situation

   a. Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) are activated for each Presidentially declared disaster requiring defense support. Activation occurs in response to a request from Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DCOs are pre-designated for each State, Territory, or US possession. The authority of each DCO is defined in documentation issued or authorized by CDRUSNORTHCOM and is limited either to the requirements of a specified inter-agency planning process or to a specified geographical area or type of emergency. DCOs are usually activated for a Presidential-declared major disaster in anticipation of requests for Department of Defense (DOD) assistance. Once a request from DHS or a designated Primary or Coordinating Agency, specified in the National Response Plan (NRP), is received and approved by the SecDef, a DCO will be deployed to support a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or other element to assist in coordinating DOD assistance. Without a Presidential-declared major disaster and the approval of the SecDef, the DCO lacks authority to coordinate or commit defense assets. A DCO will not be activated before a disaster or emergency declaration without prior coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD(HD)) and the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS).

   b. Pre-disaster Activation. A DCO may be appointed prior to a disaster or emergency declaration if there is a reasonable expectation that future events may require defense support and CDRUSNORTHCOM receives approval. Such activations are related to incidents that are somewhat predictable in intensity and location such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.
c. When appointed, the DCO serves as DOD’s single point of contact at the Joint Field Office (JFO). The DCO is a military or DOD civilian official designated to coordinate Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with (IAW) references above. Under the Stafford Act, any support provided prior to a disaster declaration can only be provided for a 10-day period. With few exceptions, requests for DSCA originating at the JFO will be coordinated with and processed through the DCO.

d. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison officers in order to facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).

e. Enemy. See base plan

f. Friendly. See base plan

g. Assumptions. See base plan

2. Mission. When activated by the SecDef and under the direction of CDRUSNORTHCOM, DCOs are DOD’s single POC within the JFO for receiving, validating, and forwarding Requests for Federal Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Assignments (MAs) for DSCA.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operation

   (1) Initial Actions. Upon activation, the DCO and DCE should normally collocate with the FCO in the JFO. Depending on the specific nature of the incident, a DCO may initially work from one location while his staff operates nearer the disaster location. As soon as possible, the DCO should collocate with the FCO and place the DCE with the JFO. Split operations may be the result of State decision-makers operating initially from several sites.

   (2) Assessment. The FCO conducts an initial damage assessment within the first 6 hours following a disaster or emergency. The DCO, if available, participates in this assessment. The initial assessment is used to determine the potential for defense support. This is not a unilateral DOD assessment. The DCO continues to identify potential DOD support tasks from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assessment.

   (3) DCO Tasks

      (a) Validate requests from the FCO.
(b) Establish the DCE.

(c) Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

(d) Provide a liaison officer, as required, to each activated ESF.

(e) Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support providers.

(f) Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

(g) Coordinate with the FCO and State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to integrate the missions of the National Guard performing duty in a non-federalized duty status with active units to maximize DSCA operations while avoiding duplication of effort.

(h) Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.

(i) Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

(j) Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each task is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Pre-designated DCOs and personnel identified to be part of the DCE are required to be trained prior to employment. Training consists of, but is not limited to:

(a) National Response Plan (NRP).

(b) National Incident Management System (NIMS).

(c) National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) (FOUO).

(d) USNORTHCOM DSCA Training Course to include USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Civil Support Concept of Employment (CONEMP).

(e) DOD policies and guidance contained in DOD Directive, Instruction, and Manual 3025.dd series (draft).
(f) Procedures pertaining to DOD contained in the Stafford Act.

(g) Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), Joint Field Office (JFO) Activation and Operations (FOUO).

(2) Relationship with the FCO. The DCO is the DOD on-scene representative for coordinating DSCA requirements with the FCO or his/her designated representative. The DCO is the primary DOD interface in support of the State and Federal disaster response effort at the JFO. As such, the DCO participates in the incident action planning process, a formal action planning cycle that serves to coordinate short and long-term activities.

4. Administration and Logistics. See base plan

5. Command and Control. See base plan and Annex J
   a. Command Relationships
      (1) When activated, normally the DCO is OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM.
      
      (2) When activated for complex disasters, the DCO may be OPCON to the JTF or Subordinate Commander as decided upon by CDRUSNORTHCOM. The DCO will operate where he can best facilitate the unity of effort between the JFO and Title 10 Forces.
      
      (3) Many factors influence decisions about what may determine the appropriate command structure and arrangements, but typically decisions are made based upon the type of incident or event, the magnitude and severity of the incident, scope of DOD assistance, complexity of the support, specialized capabilities of forces, and even political or public perception influence. Plans for some DSCA incidents such as CBRNE, Radiological emergencies, established JTF’s, and WFF have pre-determined C2 procedures and DCO relationships.
      
      (4) Relationship to JTF Commander. The relationship is determined by CDRUSNORTHCOM based upon factors such as seniority, type of deployed force, duration of the response effort, and the JTF mission.

   b. Signal. See base plan
APPENDIX 26 to ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
SAFETY

References:

a. DOD Instruction 6055.1, "DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SCH) Program", 19 August 1998
b. DOD Instruction 6055.7, "Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping", 3 October 2000

1. General.

a. Purpose. This appendix provides directions to help reduce potential injuries, losses in combat power and damage to government and/or private property as a result of mishaps during DSCA operations.

b. Concept of Operations. US NORTHCOM will conduct DSCA operations in a manner that does not expose DOD personnel or assets or the general public to unacceptable levels of risk. Commanders at all levels will take a personal interest in the safe conduct of all assigned missions. Effective risk management and disciplined adherence to established standards are essential to success.


a. Risk Management. Commanders will conduct or direct the completion of mission specific risk assessments during the Pre-Deployment Phase and will update them as the mission progresses. All leaders will ensure that risk decisions are made at appropriate levels. The Task Force Commander is the approving authority for all operations deemed to carry an extremely high risk, after controls are in place. Units will develop and implement controls to retain risks at an acceptable level.

b. Safety Staffing. Units will deploy with their assigned safety professionals and collateral duty safety officers and NCOs. Liaison officers from each participating
service will provide the task force safety manager with a safety point of contact or contacts for their significant elements supporting the operation.

c. **Accident Reporting.** All units will report mishaps to their respective services in accordance with existing policies and regulations. Additionally, they will report all Class A through C accidents on unit SIGACTs reports and provide courtesy copies of the accident reports to the task force safety manager.

d. **Accident Investigation.** All accidents will be investigated for possible causes and lessons learned that could be used to prevent accidents of a similar nature. The depth of the investigation depends upon the classification of the accident. Accident investigations will be conducted and boards established in accordance with established regulations and policies.

e. **Standards and Discipline.** Adherence to established standards must not be suspended during DSCA operations. Failure to follow regulations, policies and procedures frequently results in tragic loss. All leaders are responsible for enforcing standards and discipline.
SUBJECT: HURRICANE DISASTER RELIEF RISK ASSESSMENT

1. THIS FRAGO PROVIDES MAJOR CONCERNS FOR MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL LOSSES OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH JTF PERSONNEL AND OPERATIONS.

1.A. RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY. IN GENERAL, THE RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY IS THE COMMANDER WHO HAS THE ASSETS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO MITIGATE THE RISK TO AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL BASED UPON MISSION REQUIREMENTS. RISKS DETERMINED TO BE "EXTREMELY HIGH RISKS WILL ONLY BE APPROVED BY THE JTF COMMANDER AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE RISKS VERSUS BENEFITS.

2.A. MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN/ AVIATION OPERATIONS, VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS, WEAPONS HANDLING, DROWNING HAZARDS, HEAT INJURIES, ELECTRICAL MISHAPS, FIRE HAZARDS, EQUIPMENT SAFETY, HURRICANE DEBRIS, LIGHTNING STRIKES, SANITATION AND HYGIENE, BIVOUAC SAFETY, CHEMICALS AND FUELS EXPOSURE

2.B. SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN RISKS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND CONTROLS.

3.A. AVIATION OPERATIONS
POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; THE POTENTIAL FOR A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT, IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, LOSS OF HUMAN AND MATERIEL RESOURCES, POTENTIAL INJURIES TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

3.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; HEAVILY SATURATED AIRSPACE, MIXED OPERATIONS OF MULTI BRANCH AIRCRAFT, HAZARDS TO FLIGHT (WIRES, ANTENNAS, ETC.), OVERWATER OPERATIONS, INADEQUATE CREW ENDURANCE, OPERATIONS INTO/OUT OF UNSERVEYED LZS/PZS, UNRULY/ANXIOUS CROWDS, COASTAL/SUMMER WEATHER FACTORS, POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF FUEL SOURCES, INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, UNIT/TASK ORGANIZATION CHANGES, HIGH OPTEMPO DUE TO ACTUAL/PERCEIVED URGENCY OF SITUATION.
3.C. CONTROLS THAT MAY MITIGATE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; ESTABLISH A FLIGHT COORDINATION CENTER AND DESIGNATE TRAFFIC DECONFLICTING ROUTES, CONDUCT CONCISE AND DETAILED MISSION BRIEFINGS, APPLY PROPER RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND ENSURE APPROVAL AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL, MAINTAIN POSITIVE FLIGHT FOLLOWING FOR EACH AIRCRAFT, USE THE CRAWL-WALK-RUN APPROACH FOR EACH TASK AND MISSION, ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A HAZARDS TO FLIGHT REPORTING SYSTEM, DESIGNATE PZS AND LZS AND RECORD INFORMATION ON EACH ONE (HAZARDS, LANDING AND TAKEOFF AXIS, ETC), DEVELOP AND FOLLOW A CREW ENDURANCE PROGRAM TAILORED TO THE MISSION, ENSURE PROPER ALSE IN ON BOARD TO INCLUDE WATER SURVIVAL GEAR, LIMIT NIGHT FLIGHT OPERATIONS TO EMERGENCY ONLY, DEVELOP INADVERTENT INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL RECOVERY PROCEDURES, ENSURE POL PERSONNEL FOLLOW ESTABLISHED FUEL TESTING AND AIRCRAFT REFUELING PROCEDURES

4. VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS

4.A. POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS INCLUDE; VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, ROLLOVERS/COLLISIONS/PERSONNEL, LOADING AND UNLOADING (FORKLIFTS), POL SPILLS, BACK STRAINS AND MUSCLE STRAINS, EMERGENCY REPAIR OPERATIONS, SNIPERS, VEHICLE / PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENTS

4.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH CONVOY OPERATIONS INCLUDE; HASTE, FATIGUE, LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH ROADWAYS, NOT USING PPE, OVER ESTIMATING CAPABILITIES, WEATHER, ROAD CONDITIONS/TRAFFIC/SIGNAGE

4.C. CONTROLS. PROPERLY TRAINED AND LICENSED DRIVERS, SPEED LIMIT CONTROL, MANDATORY ASSISTANT DRIVER, COORDINATE WITH STATE PATROL, LOAD PLANS, SAFETY BRIEFINGS, GROUND GUIDES, SPILL KITS, IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION TO COC, TRAINING AND PROPER LIFTING TECHNIQUES, EMERGENCY SIGNALING SYSTEMS, BLOCKING VEHICLE, FULL COMBAT GEAR AND KEVLAR (IN HIGH RISK AREAS), MAINTAIN TROOP INTEGRITY DURING MOVEMENT

5. WEAPONS HANDLING

5.A. POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS HANDLING INCLUDE; NEGLIGENT DISCHARGES, LACK OF MUZZLE AWARENESS, INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, INEFFECTIVE SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENCE, INATTENTIVENESS, INDISCIPLINE
5.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; OPERATIONAL PACE, FREQUENT CHANGES IN WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS / OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, COMPLACENCY, INCREASED ACCESS TO WEAPONS & MUNITIONS, NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS, CONFLICTING PROCEDURES IN SOLDIERS MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, TMS & FMS

5.C. CONTROLS; TRAIN TO ARMY STANDARDS FOR CLEARING WEAPONS, LEADER ENGAGEMENT & ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROLS, PRE-DEPLOYMENT REVIEW OF WEAPONS HANDLING & PROCEDURES, ESTABLISH & DISSEMINATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT & WEAPONS STATUS LEVELS FOR MISSION PROFILES & TROOP LOCATIONS, TRAIN & CERTIFY AMMUNITION HANDLERS & SUPERVISORS, INSTALL CLEARING BARRELS WITH INSTRUCTIONS, THOROUGH REDEPLOYMENT SHIPMENT CHECKS, CONDUCT APPROPRIATE WEAPONS TRAINING

6. FIRE HAZARDS

6.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; RUPTURED GAS LINES, STRUCTURE FIRES, VEHICLE FIRES, CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING, EXPLOSIONS.

6.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; GAS LINES NOT VISIBLE, UTILITY COMPANIES OVERWHELMED, ARSON, USE OF FIELD EXPEDIENT LIGHT AND HEAT SOURCES

6.C. CONTROLS; USE ONLY BATTERY POWERED FLASHLIGHTS OR AVAILABLE GENERATOR POWERED LIGHTS, SIGNAGE OF AREAS NOT CONSIDERED SAFE, TRAINING FROM UTILITY COMPANIES, LET SEARCH AND RESCUE DO THEIR JOB, ASSUME ALL RUPTURED GAS LINES ARE LETHAL, USE PROPER FIRE SUPPRESSION, STAY OUT FLOODED STRUCTURES.

7. DROWNING HAZARDS

7.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; LEVEES NOT STABILIZED, SINK HOLES IN ROADS, WATER DEEPER THAN APPEARS, WATER MAY HAVE AN UNDERTOW, DOWNED POWER LINES IN WATER, FALLING FROM CRAFT, INJURY FROM BOAT PROPELLERS, BOAT SINKING.

7.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; WATER IS WEAKENING INFRASTRUCTURES, DEPTH OF WATER NOT CLEAR, HIDDEN HAZARDS NOT CLEARED, UNFAMILIARITY WITH AREA, UNFAMILIARITY WITH BOAT OPERATION, PROXIMITY TO MOVING BOATS BY PERSONNEL

7.C. CONTROLS; SOLDIERS USE FLOTATION DEVICES IN VEHICLES/WATER CRAFT AND WORKING NEAR WATER, IDENTIFY WEAK AND NON-SWIMMERS / DROWN PROOFING, BUDDY SYSTEM, TRAIN IN RESCUE TECHNIQUES, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TO ENSURE ALL SOLDIERS ARE
8. HEAT INJURIES
8.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; POTENTIAL HIGH HEAT INDEX, PHYSICAL EXERTION, REPEAT EXPOSURE/POOR RECOVERY, REDUCED WATER SUPPLY, SUN EXPOSURE

8.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; FATIGUE: ACUTE AND CHRONIC, PREVIOUS HEAT INJURIES, PHYSICAL CONDITIONING, POOR LIVING CONDITIONS,

8.C. CONTROLS; INCREASED SUPERVISION, WATER STATIONS, TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR MOST DISTANT EVACUATION CAMPS, HYDRATION ALL THE TIME, SUPPLEMENT TO MAINTAIN ELECTROLYTE BALANCE, ID, MONITOR& ASSIST HIGH RISK PERSONNEL, USE BUDDY SYSTEM, USE SUNSCREEN, WEAR APPROPRIATE CLOTHING, INCREASE TRAVEL TIME-LINE, SHADE SOLDIERS WHEN POSSIBLE, IF ONE TO TWO INDIVIDUALS SUFFER HEAT INJURY, STOP AND REASSESS, COOLING TENTS

9. ELECTRICAL MISHAPS
9.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; DOWNED POWER LINES DURING HURRICANE AND FUTURE STORMS, TENTS ERECTED UNDER POWER LINES; SAGGING OF LINES OVER EXISTING TENTS, OVERLOADING OF ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS IN THE LIVING AREAS WHICH POTENTIALLY COULD CAUSE A FIRE, POOR WIRING

9.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; LIMITED OPEN SPACE WITH NO POWER LINES, LACK OF AWARENESS, EVERYONE WILL WANT SOME CREATURE COMFORT, POOR CONTRACTORS/HASTE

9.C. CONTROLS; ASSUME THAT ALL DOWNED LINES ARE LETHAL, AVOID ERECTION OF TENTS OR OTHER STRUCTURES UNDER POWER LINES, DO NOT OVERLOAD CIRCUITS...STAY WITHIN AMP LIMITS, USE UL APPROVED APPLIANCES ONLY, AVOID CONTACT WITH WATER NEAR DOWNED POWER LINES, MAKE SURE ELECTRICITY IS OFF IN UNSTABLE BUILDINGS, ENSURE PROPER GROUNDING, TRAINING FROM TRAINED POWER CO PERSONNEL, CONDUCT DAILY INSPECTION OF LIVING QUARTERS.

10. EQUIPMENT SAFETY

10.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; CHAINSAW KICKBACKS, IMPROPER USE OF EQUIPMENT LEADING TO INJURY OR DEATH, LOSS OF HEARING/EYE INJURIES, FIRE FROM IMPROPER FUEL.
10.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; HASTE, LACK OF FAMILIARITY, NOT USING PPE, OVERESTIMATING ABILITIES

10.C. CONTROLS; INSPECT FOR SERVICEABLE CONDITION AND WEAR PPE. TRAINING ON USE OF EQUIPMENT, REALISTIC TIMELINES FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, PROPER FUEL AND FUEL CONTAINERS, PROPER EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, USE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT

11. HURRICANE DEBRIS

11.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; PUNCTURE WOUNDS, CUTS, TETANUS, BUILDINGS COLLAPSING ENTRAPPING SOLDIERS, MOLD – HEALTH REACTIONS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, EVERYWHERE THERE IS DEBRIS OF ALL TYPES OF SUBSTANCES, CONTAMINATION

11.B. CONTROLS; USE FLASHLIGHTS, WEAR PPE, BUDDY SYSTEM IN CASE A SOLDIER BECOMES TRAPPED, MONITOR FOR MOLD AND TREAT PERSONNEL APPROPRIATELY, PRACTICE GOOD HYGIENE, FIRST AID TRAINING, ENSURE SOLDIERS’ IMMUNIZATIONS ARE CURRENT

12. LIGHTNING STRIKE
12.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; HIGH CHANCE OF THUNDERSTORMS, LOCATION OF SOLDIERS, TREES, STRUCTURES, AQUATIC AREAS, INADEQUATE WARNING, FAILURE TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS / SUPERVISION, STRUCTURAL FIRES
12.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; DISPERSION OF SOLDIERS, SEPARATION OF SOLDIERS FROM LEADERS, LACK OF TRAINING / EXPERIENCE, CIVILIAN GROUNDING NOT AVAILABLE, INADEQUATE FIREFIGHTING AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
12.C. CONTROLS; INCREASED SUPERVISION, USE BUDDY SYSTEM, USE OF PORTABLE LIGHTNING DETECTORS, STAY OR GO INDOORS IF POSSIBLE, IF OUTDOORS, AVOID HIGHEST OBJECT OR HIGH GROUND, STAY IN VEHICLE IF TRAVELING, DISCONTINUE USE OF CELL PHONES, GET OUT OF THE WATER, DON’T USE METAL OBJECTS IF OUTDOORS, STAY CLEAR OF ALL WIRES, ANTENNAS OR OBJECTS CONNECTED TO WIRES, ENSURE THAT GENERATORS AND FUELING EQUIPMENT ARE PROPERLY GROUNDED, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, CPR/FIRST AID TRAINING, MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIGHER

13. BIVOUAC SAFETY
13.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; TENT FIRES, ELECTRIC SHOCK / ELECTROCUTION, TRIP HAZARDS, PUNCTURE HAZARDS
13.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; MISUSE OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, OVERLOADING CIRCUITS, HASTY CONSTRUCTION / SETUP, INATTENTION

C-26-A-5
UNCLASSIFIED
TO HIGH POWER LINES, LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, ELECTRICITY AND STANDING WATER.
13.C. CONTROLS; PROHIBIT COOKING IN TENTS NOT DESIGNATED AND CONFIGURED FOR COOKING, ENFORCE SAFE LIMITS ON POWER CIRCUIT USE, AVOID SETTING UP AROUND HIGH POWER LINES, INITIATE SITE SURVEY / DIG PERMIT PROCESS, AVOID OUTDOOR USE OF INDOOR POWER CORDS, AVOID USE OF OR PROTECT TEMPORARY ELECTRICAL LINES IN HIGH TRAFFIC AREAS, ENFORCE NO SMOKING POLICY IN OR NEXT TO TENTS – PROVIDE BUT CANS, CLEAR AREA AROUND TENTS OF FLAMMABLE & COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL, CAP TENT PEGS TO AVOID PUNCTURE, ENFORCE HOUSE KEEPING

14. CHEMICALS AND FUELS EXPOSURE
14.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; BURNS TO SKIN, MUSCLES, EYES, RESPIRATORY SYSTEM, SKIN RASHES, DIZZINESS, NAUSEA, EXCITABILITY, WEAKNESS/FATIGUE, STRUCTURE FIRES, VEHICLE FIRES, EXPLOSIONS

14.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; DESTROYED STORAGE AREAS AND FACILITIES, AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, FUEL SPILLS FROM STORAGE TANKS ARE LIKELY

14.C. CONTROLS; USE ONLY BATTERY POWERED FLASHLIGHTS OR AVAILABLE GENERATOR POWERED LIGHTS, SIGNAGE OF AREAS NOT CONSIDERED SAFE, TRAINING FROM HAZMAT TEAMS, LET SEARCH AND RESCUE DO THEIR JOB, USE PROPER FIRE SUPPRESSION, IF WATER IS SUSPECTED OF BEING CONTAMINATED WITH HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS USE PROTECTIVE OUTER CLOTHING, GOGGLES, GLOVES AND BOOTS TO AVOID CONTACT WITH WATER., STAY OUT FLOODED STRUCTURES
ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
LOGISTICS

References:  a. Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301-12304

    b. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq. Stafford Act

    c. PDD-39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism, 21 June 1995 (S)


    f. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2002, Homeland Defense, 29 July 2005

    g. CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority, 15 April 2005

    h. Joint Pub 4.01, Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

    i. Additional references see base plan

1. Situation

   a. Enemy  See base plan

   b. Friendly  See base plan

   (1) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides deployment and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in civil support operations and provides aero-medical evacuation and tanker support as required. Additionally, USTRANSCOM has been designated DOD’s Distribution Process Owner (DPO), charged to integrate strategic and theater (JOA) distribution. When requested by a federal agency and approved by SecDef, USTRANSCOM may provide transportation support to non-DOD organizations, such as movement of critical capabilities or commodities, or evacuation of personnel.

   (2) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistics support for the missions of the military departments and the Unified Combatant Commands engaged in
civil support operations. It also provides logistics support to other DOD Components and certain federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and others as authorized. Through DLA’s defense reutilization and marketing services, DLA provides worldwide reuse, recycling, and disposal solutions, to include hazardous material disposal.

(3) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provides contract administrative service support and assists USNORTHCOM in developing contingency contracting packages as required.

c. Assumptions. See base plan

(1) Military forces will provide emergency logistics and engineering support to other Federal, State, and local agencies.

(2) DOD forces will be prepared to deploy for thirty (30) days in support of (ISO) DSCA operations unless otherwise directed by OPORD.

d. Resource Availability

(1) Employed forces will depart home station with requisite number days of supplies predicated on anticipated mission requirements and availability of commercial resources.

(2) There will be limited strategic airlift to support continued operations.

e. Planning Factors

(1) Supply levels of consumption for DOD forces will be based on service approved planning factors.

(2) Logistics planning will anticipate the possibility of sustained disaster relief operations for a period of up to thirty (30) days.

(3) Planning factors for support must consider available commercial resources as well as DOD sources.

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM provides logistics support to DOD forces deploying in support of civil authorities.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Logistics Support. Logistics support is the responsibility of the force provider, IAW governing service policies and directives. Requirements for each operational phase, and specific responsibilities are outlined below.
b. Logistics and Engineering Support by Phase

(1) **Phase I, Shaping.** The priority of logistics efforts will focus on maintaining continuous situational awareness, participating in planning efforts and exercises, and coordinating with appropriate interagency and defense agency staffs to maximize the ability of DOD to rapidly provide DSCA when needed.

(2) **Phase II, Staging.** Logistics focus during this phase is on identifying potential logistics missions, as well as appropriate logistics infrastructure for potential deploying forces.

(3) **Phase III, Deployment.** This phase begins when response forces begin moving, and logistics support forces deploy into the DSCA JOA. Logistics supporting preparations for execution of DSCA operations will also occur during this phase.

(4) **Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities.** Commands, defense agencies and forces provide required logistics and engineering support to civil authorities. Forces deployed receive sustainment support during this phase, as well.

(5) **Phase V, Transition.** Civilian authorities assume control of logistics operations and DOD support concludes. Deployed forces redeploy to home station and reconstitute.

c. Tasks

(1) **NORAD-USNORTHCOM Directorate of Logistics and Engineering (N-NC/J4)**

   (a) Provide the overall concepts, policies, and guidance for logistics and engineering support of DSCA forces supporting the DSCA operation.

   (b) Maintain situational awareness of the logistics support for deployed forces via the JTF or DCO.

   (c) Monitor the logistics and engineering capability of tasked units and deploying forces to support each phase of DSCA operations.

   (d) Determine the need for and deploy the USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) to synchronize movement of assets into and out of the JOA.

   (e) In consonance with USTRANSCOM J3, determine the need for and location(s) of JTF Port Opening capability.

(2) **USNORTHCOM Subordinate / Supporting Commands**
(a) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs for reimbursement purposes.

(b) Coordinate BSI support requirements with designated installations.

(3) Services

(a) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs for reimbursement purposes.

(b) Provide supportability assessment of BSI nominations and provide BSI support as directed.

(c) Provide reception and staging support as required for all DOD forces at designated BSIs.

(4) Commander, USTRANSCOM.

(a) Provide ground, sealift, and airlift support assets to transport DOD and other agency personnel, teams, and equipment as directed by SecDef.

(b) When requested by CDRUSNORTHCOM, provide augmentation to the NDDOC and establish JTF Port Opening capability.

(c) Gain and maintain situational awareness of the transportation infrastructure throughout operations, and provide a common operating picture of the status of the infrastructure to USNORTHCOM, supporting commands, services, and agencies.

(d) Provide lift for non-DOD entities, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Mission Assignments, as directed by SecDef.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics

(1) Supply and Distribution. The support concept is built around forces deploying with a mission tailored initial level of supply.

(a) Distribution and Allocation. Services provide for supply support of their respective forces unless a BSI is designated and assumes responsibility.

(b) Level of Supply. Logistics planning will anticipate the possibility of sustained disaster relief operations for a period of up to thirty (30) days.
(c) **Salvage.** Civil authorities will retain responsibility to plan and execute salvage operations in the affected area. DOD will only provide support as requested by the Coordinating Agency and approved by the SecDef or the President.

(d) **Captured Enemy Materiel.** Not applicable.

(e) **Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services.** Acquisition procedures will be in accordance with (IAW) established Federal and DOD regulations through the supporting BSI.

(f) **Petroleum, Oils, and Lubrication (POL).** If designated, the supporting BSI will be responsible for POL support for deploying forces. Otherwise, services retain responsibility for POL support to deployed DSCA forces.

(g) **Inter-Service Logistic Support.** Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA) will remain in effect.

(h) **Mortuary Affairs.** Service members that die while OPCON to USNORTHCOM will normally be handled in accordance with Service and subordinate command procedures. In general, civilian medical examiners or coroners will maintain jurisdiction over both military and civilian fatalities. In certain circumstances, such as a mass fatality involving predominately military personnel, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) may request and receive jurisdiction. If granted, the AFME will coordinate and determine final disposition of remains. Additionally, military mortuary affairs units can be deployed in order to search, recover, transport, and temporarily store remains in the event of a mass fatality incident.

(2) **Maintenance and Modification.** Services will be responsible to perform maintenance, equipment evacuation, and modification per Service and component procedures and doctrine.

(3) **Medical Services.** See Annex Q

(4) **Mobility and Transportation**

(a) **General**

1. Supporting and subordinate commands will use the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES) for the movement of all forces.

2. Force deployment will be time-phased to meet operational mission requirements per validated priorities in JOPES. CDRUSNORTHCOM, as the supported Combatant Commander, will validate movement
requirements via time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) and Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).

3. CDRUSTRANSCOM will provide required lift IAW CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority.

(b) **Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis**

1. In conjunction with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), and if feasible, deployed Joint Task Force (JTF) and USTRANSCOM, USNORTHCOM will determine movement priority and designate Ports of Embarkation (POE)/Ports of Debarkation (POD).

2. Seaport and aerial port terminals will be assessed with regard to throughput capabilities.

(c) **Intra-Theater Lift.** When damage to commercial airfields prevents commercial aircraft from flying into the JOA and roadways are impassable, USTRANSCOM, in coordination with (ICW) USNORTHCOM, may be requested to provide intra-theater lift to move forces and sustainment resources into the JOA by setting up channel/shuttle service, IAW JTTP 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics.

(5) **Civil Engineering Support Plan.** See Appendix 6, Annex D.

(6) **Sustainability Assessment.** USNORTHCOM will develop a sustainability assessment to ensure DOD’s ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the affected area for the duration of the operation. Logistic momentum must be maintained to ensure that resources arrive where and when they are needed. In addition, waste of supplies and services must be minimized to prevent a shortage, which may jeopardize continued operations.

b. **Administration.** Reporting requirements will be tailored to the situation and will vary depending on both the nature and scope of the DOD response.

5. **Command and Control.** See base plan and Annex J

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Commander, USNORTHCOM
Appendixes:
1 -- Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply – Not Used
2 -- Joint Substance, Food Service Support & Water Management – Not Used
3 -- Mortuary Affairs – Not Used
4 -- Sustainability Analysis – Not Used
5 -- Mobility and Transportation – Not Used
6 -- Engineering Support Plan
7 -- Non-nuclear Ammunition – Not Used
8 -- Logistics Automation – Not Used

OFFICIAL

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Rear Admiral, SC, USN
Director, J4
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
ENGINEERING SUPPORT PLAN

References:

a. Joint Publication 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, 5 July 2000

b. Joint Publication 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, 27 September 2001

c. See basic plan and Annex D.

1. General

a. Purpose, Scope, and Limitations. To provide guidance for Department of Defense (DOD) engineering support for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations in the USNORTHCOM Joint Operational Area (JOA). The primary focus of the DOD engineering effort is to sustain and assist DOD forces employed, force bed-down work, emergency stabilization/repair of damaged critical infrastructure, opening lines of communication (roads/debris clearing) and rendering assistance to the designated Base Support Installations (BSIs). In general DOD Engineer forces will be called upon when local, state, tribal, federal and contract resources are fully engaged, exhausted, or timely action is necessary to save lives and prevent further human suffering and loss of property.

b. Engineering Intelligence. See Annex B

c. Concept of Civil Engineer Support. DOD Engineer forces may be tasked with short notice to assist civil authorities as a result of a natural or manmade disaster. DOD Engineer forces may be engaged in DSCA operations directly by the local commander under immediate response authority or indirectly in support of a Primary Agency through the National Response Plan (NRP).

(1) Maximum consideration will be given to the use of locally available contract services, facilities, and support structures, followed by tribal, state, and federal resources before DOD engineers are engaged. The federal response will be conducted by a Primary Agency. The NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS) will be used.

(2) A total force perspective for achieving engineering objectives is necessary. Engineer support may be garnered from local, state and federal resources via a multitude of avenues or agreements. Non-Federalized National Guard (NG)
engineer forces may be actively conducting similar operations within the JOA along with Title 10 Active Duty engineer forces.

(3) The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) acting under its civil role and authority will be the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3, Public Works of the NRP. It is when these resources are fully engaged and unable to accept additional tasks that DOD engineer resources may be required to assist or when a unique DOD engineer capability is needed. Due to time and lift limitations, engineer forces, equipment and supplies will generally be tasked from the nearest available and capable engineer unit.

d. Definitions. See Glossary

e. Construction Policy. New construction effort to support DSCA operations in accordance with (IAW) this plan is not envisioned. Expedient construction should be considered. Expedient construction includes several types of rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, inflatable buildings, clamshell structures, etc. These construction techniques can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk and offer deployed forces another source of required temporary facilities. Temporary facilities may be required or requested in certain cases during the initial phase of operations or in support of (ISO) the Primary Agency.

f. Planning Considerations

(1) Operations. On-going military operations and Homeland Defense (HLD) requirements have priority over DSCA operations unless otherwise directed.

(2) Scope. The DSCA mission will likely be the result of a major or catastrophic incident. The large possibility of locations, varying types of incident, and near limitless scope of requirements hinders the identification of specific capabilities and any resulting shortfalls.

(3) Duration. The duration and scope of DOD involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event, and the requirements for DOD DSCA operations. For planning purposes, operations will conclude within 30 days of initiation.

(4) Deployable assets. Consider use of DOD military services’ deployable assets as contained in JP 3-34. Deployable assets for force bed down are primarily in the Army Force Provider, Navy Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFC), and Air Force Harvest Base Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) equipment sets.

(5) Class IV. Where supplies are limited or significant competing demand is anticipated, it is crucial that engineers estimate their requirements and initiate requests prior to or during DSCA operations.
(6) **Facilities.** Facility requirements will first be met through existing local facilities, preferably government owned, organic portable or relocatable substitute facilities, or field construction.

(7) DOD Engineers should utilize DOD Engineer and construction agencies such as USACE, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) for technical and specialized engineer support.

(8) **Real Property.** DOD forces will rely on DOD facilities for real estate needs to the maximum extent possible. Short-term leasing may be a necessary option depending on location and duration. No occupation of private land or facilities is authorized without specific legal authority. Real Property support may be obtained from the General Services Agency (GSA), USACE, NAVFAC, or other government agencies.

(9) **Financial Planning.** See paragraph 4f base plan

g. **General Priority of Engineer Actions.** Engineer units will be requested to provide support to other federal agencies in accordance with the NRP through the executing JTF. Based on the type of mission, the tasks may differ, but the general priority is as follows:

(1) Force bed-down with Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) considerations.

(2) Emergency stabilization and repair of damaged critical infrastructure. Repairs/work-arounds to other critical public utilities, services, and facilities that will help restore the ability of the local authority to manage its own recovery efforts.

(3) Emergency clearing of debris from streets, roads, bridges, airfields, ports, and waterways.

(4) Immediate humanitarian needs of the dislocated populace, such as the construction of temporary shelters and support facilities.

(5) Demolition of damaged structures and facilities.

h. **Contractors.** Contracts will be the primary methodology used to accomplish engineer/construction requirements in civil emergencies. Ample contractor support in heavy equipment and materials should be available in the JOA. DOD Engineer capabilities coupled with the commercial sector/contract capabilities provide virtually unlimited engineering depth and breadth. Coordination with the USACE and other
potential construction contracting agencies at local, state and federal levels should be conducted to ensure efficient resource utilization and economies of scale when possible.

i. Allied and Coalition Forces. The availability and possible use of allied and coalition civil engineering forces should not be considered during mission planning. However, these forces may be made available to support operations, particularly if a DSCA event occurs in close proximity to adjacent country boundaries.

j. Construction Standards. When construction is authorized, all local, state and federal codes and standards should be adhered to. Use of service construction standards, planning factors, development priorities, and cost estimates is encouraged. Reference a. provides construction standards, and reference b. provides guidance for bed-down of DOD forces.

2. Responsibilities for Civil Engineering Support Planning

a. Primary Responsibility. USNORTHCOM retains primary responsibility for the civil engineering support concept and analysis, and military engineer resource allocation within the USNORTHCOM JOA.

b. Supporting Responsibility. Engineer forces provided by supporting commands will follow all engineering and environmental policy, directives and planning guidance provided by USNORTHCOM, the established JTF, and the Primary Agency being supported in the DSCA operation.

3. Command Relationships. The operational command and control (C2) structure is described in the Annex J. In most cases engineer forces will work through a JTF (to the J-3, J-4, or to a staff engineer) command structure. As noted above, the local commander may direct his/her engineer units under immediate response authority and will maintain C2 authority over the engineer forces. Each DSCA operation will be unique and may require adjustments to the C2 structure of engineer forces. Further elaboration of C2 will be provided in the DSCA EXORD prior to and during the execution.

4. Time-Phased Requirements. DOD engineer forces will be deployed via the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to provide the appropriate level of support. Engineer requirements will be sourced based on the force availability, geographic location and anticipated size, scope, area and duration of the DSCA operation.

5. Summary of Critical Factors Affecting Civil Engineering Support Planning. DSCA operations conducted in the USNORTHCOM JOA are affected by numerous local, state and federal laws and regulations. Most of the laws, regulations, etc are those that civil engineers deal with on a daily bases. In most instances the request for Federal assistance (RFA) will be submitted through the DCO from the Primary Agency and will be funded via the Primary Agency. See Annex E. The proper flow and authorization of the Mission Assignments (MA) must be accomplished. This will avoid difficult issues such as
environmental impacts, funding sources, scope and authorities of work, etc. Close coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), and the USNORTHCOM staff will help ensure many issues are avoided or quickly overcome.
ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
PERSONNEL

References:  


c. AR 608-4/OPNAVINST 3460.7A/AFI 125-13/MCO 58 5800.6A, Control and Registration of War Trophies and War Trophy Firearms, 27 August 1975

d. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001


f. DA Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions (FMPEC), 1 March 1984

g. DOD 1348.33-M, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, 12 September 1996

h. DOD Directive 1404.10, Emergency Essential (E-E) DOD Citizen Civilian Employees, 10 April 1992

i. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures, 1 January 2004


k. JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 18 November 1998

l. Title 10, Armed Forces, United States Code

m. DODD 1352.1, Management and Mobilization of Regular and Reserve Retired Military Members, 16 July 2005

n. DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Ready Reserves, 19 January 1996
o. DODD 1235.9, Management of the Standby Reserve, 10 February 1998

p. DODD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, 23 Sept 2004

q. DODD 1235.11, Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), 6 May 1996

r. DODD 1235.13, Management of Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING), 16 July 2005

s. JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, 19 March 2003

t. AR 140-1, Mission, Organization, and Training, 12 January 2004

u. AR 135-200, Active Duty for Missions, Projects, and Training for Reserve Component Soldiers, 30 June 1999

v. AR 600-8-101, Personnel Processing (In-, Out-, Soldier Readiness, Mobilization, and Deployment Processing), 18 July 2003

w. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

x. AFI 10-402, USAF Mobilization Planning, 1 January 1997

y. AFI 36-2629, Individual Mobilization Augmentee Management, 10 December 2001

z. AFMAN 36-8001, Reserve Personnel Participation and Training Procedures, 22 January 2004


1. General

a. Purpose. This concept of personnel support establishes the administrative and personnel responsibilities, policies and planning guidance necessary to support the basic order.

b. Concept of Personnel Support. The concept of Personnel Service Support (PSS) is that all US service members and DOD civilians directed under this plan will receive PSS commensurate with the level of support available at home station in accordance with (IAW) Service specific policies and regulations. The objective of PSS is to maintain the designated units at authorized strength, ready in all respects to carry out the concept of operations. The Component/Joint Task Force (JTF) Personnel Officers will report (specific skills) to USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) J1, by the most expeditious means, when the strength of any force is forecast to reach, or actually reaches, a point where the capability to accomplish an assigned Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) operation is jeopardized.

c. Planning Factors

(1) Manning & Augmentation. Manning and augmentation of individual units is a Service responsibility. Augmentation to any potential JTF Headquarters will be in accordance with (IAW) current policies and will follow current procedures outlined in CJCSI 1301.01C and JP 1-0.

(2) Replacement and Rotation Requirements. Replacement and rotation operations are the responsibility of the affected Service. Planning factors for computing personnel attrition will be developed per existing Service procedures. Component Personnel Officers will coordinate replacement and rotation through USNORTHCOM J1. In addition, the Component J1 representative will record TEMPO days, as required, IAW the National Defense Authorization Act FY-01 and Service instructions.

(3) Reserve Forces. See paragraph 2.b (20) of this plan.

(4) Joint Reception Center (JRC). Under current operations, Components/JTFs are responsible for reception, accountability, processing and training of military,
DOD civilian and contractor employees, and individual augmentees. If the scope of operations changes to necessitate a JRC, JP 1-0 specifies establishment and additional guidance concerning the concept, function, responsibilities and mission of the JRC.

(5) Equip, Train, Prepare. Prior to deployment, the Component/JTF employing military and/or civilian personnel will ensure the member is equipped, trained and prepared to deploy.

2. Personnel Policies and Procedures

a. General Guidance. Individual Service military and civilian personnel policies and procedures will apply unless otherwise directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. Specific Guidance

(1) Reporting Requirements

(a) Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT). When directed, Component Personnel Officers will submit JPERSTAT to USNORTHCOM JOC J1 per CJCSM 3150.13. Reports are due by 1900Z with a cut off as of 1700Z. USNORTHCOM JOC J1 will compile the report by 2100Z and forward to Joint Staff J-1/PRD each day.

(b) Accountability. Due to the sensitivity of a large DOD personnel presence concentrated within CONUS and the danger of contamination/infection at deployment sites, the Component/JTF must maintain accountability for all assigned/attached/OPCON Title 10 Armed Forces and DOD civilian and contractor personnel. To document any potential or actual exposure to a hazard, a comprehensive list of all personnel must be maintained for historical accounting in the event long-term medical consequences result from exposure to such a hazard.

(c) Performance Evaluations. Officer, enlisted and civilian evaluation reports will be IAW applicable Service directives.

(2) Replacement Policies. Requests for replacement of Service personnel will be submitted per existing Service directives and procedures.

(3) Replacement Personnel. Replacement personnel will be provided by the Component through parent Service channels.

(4) Personnel Service Support Center. Component/JTF Commanders will establish personnel service support centers, as required, to effectively account for and in/out-process of forces. Component/JTF Personnel Officers are responsible
for establishing a JRC as required. The parent Service will account for TAD/TDY/TCS personnel.

(5) Rotation Policies. Rotation policy will be established by USNORTHCOM or JCS. Unless otherwise directed, 30 day rotations will be assumed for DSCA operations.

(6) Critical Skills/Specialists/Key Positions. The Services are responsible for ensuring the selective assignment of specialists under conditions of mobilization. Upon execution of this plan, Component/JTF Commanders will ensure the proper assignment and utilization of personnel (e.g., linguists, chaplains, intelligence analysts, civil affairs, psychological operations teams). Civilian employees with critical skills and occupying key positions must continue to perform those functions during a crisis or national emergency.

(7) Military Law, Discipline, and Order

(a) JP 0-2 outlines the policies and responsibilities for establishment of Joint military police and disciplinary measures necessary to support major military operations.

(b) USNORTHCOM J1 will act through Component Commanders, where practical, to coordinate discipline of assigned forces. Each Component Commander will ensure that uniform procedures are developed for police functions within his command in order to carry out the specific responsibilities.

(8) Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting will be IAW applicable Service directives and will be reported via JPERSTAT when applicable. Parallel reporting is anticipated.

(9) Decorations and Awards.

(a) Only those personnel assigned to or attached to a joint staff or a joint activity, as defined by DOD 1348.33-M are eligible for joint awards (Defense decorations and unit awards). Personnel officially assigned in a temporary additional duty/temporary duty joint capacity are also eligible for joint awards. Personnel who are assigned to units that are attached to a joint activity (as a unit) are not eligible for joint awards.

(b) The Components/JTF will execute all joint awards via existing directives and policies.

(10) Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay. Depending on the nature of the operation, JP 1-0, Appendix J will apply for military members.
(11) **Family Separation Allowance (FSA)**. Members may be eligible for FSA per DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 7A, Chapter 27.

(12) **Travel Procedures**. Travel procedures will be IAW Joint Federal Travel Regulation Volume 1 (military members) and Volume 2 (DOD Civilian Personnel).

(13) **Medical**. See Annex Q.

(14) **Spot and Field Promotions**. Will adhere to procedures outlined in Joint Pub 1-0 and IAW service requirements.

(15) **Special Leave Accrual**. Accrual will be IAW applicable Service directives. Normally, only leave of an emergency nature should be granted. Commanders can allow leave to those in a "use or lose" status, if possible. If not possible, applicable Service directives apply to lost leave recoupment. Requests for exception should be forwarded through command channels. The Component/JTF will establish policy on passes.

(16) **Combat Zone Benefits**. For the purpose of tax exclusion, combat zones must be designated by the Executive Order of the President.

(17) **TAD/TDY/TCS Pay**. The Component Commander is responsible for determining the appropriate type of temporary duty status of military and civilian personnel assigned/OPCON/TACON. Insofar as possible, a consistent policy that ensures equitable treatment of personnel deployed in a joint environment will be executed. The JTF commander must establish set rules for status of personnel, regardless of Service, at the operating location. Questions regarding this policy will be forwarded to the USNORTHCOM J1 for resolution.

(18) **Uniform Policy**. The host Commander will determine the appropriate duty uniform for military and civilian members. If BDUs are essential for DSCA operations, a civilian employee’s parent Service organization is responsible for issuance or authorization to purchase.

(19) **Civilian Personnel**

(a) **DOD Civilian Work Force**. Employees of the DOD civilian work force will be considered as an available resource when creating and sustaining personnel requirements for deployment. While deployed, civilian employees will be under the direct command and control (C2) of the on-site supervisory chain, which will provide normal supervisory functions such as assignment of work, establishment of work schedules, performance evaluation and initiating and effecting disciplinary actions. The Component/JTF deploying the civilian employee will retain administrative responsibility for all personnel management responsibilities, including time and attendance reporting.
(b) **Earning limitations.** Biweekly Earning Limitation, Annual Limitation on Premium Pay for Emergency Work, and Annual Aggregate Limitation will be executed IAW 5 USC 5546.

(20) **Use of Reserve Forces**

(a) The use of Reserve Forces or Reserve Component augmentees will be per prescribed Public Law and Service directives, per references a through gg. All requests for Reserve Forces that fall outside the purview of the JTF Commander or a Service component’s authority will be coordinated through USNORTHCOM J1 Joint Reserve Integration Division or the USNORTHCOM JOC J1. Final decisions on the use of Reserve Forces will be made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD(HD)) and the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) and approved by the SecDef. Reserve force volunteers are addressed in DODM 3025.dd (draft).

(b) **Assigned Reserve Forces Without Mobilization Authority.** On any level of emergency, Reserve Component volunteers will often respond to Service requirements for additional personnel. Temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) are normally available for periods of between 31 days (minimum) and 179 days (maximum). Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) tours of between 139 days and 179 days are also normally available. Members of the reserve components will be ordered to active duty IAW established Service procedures.

(c) **Retired Reserve.** Members of the Retired Reserve and other members of the reserve components may be ordered to active duty with or without a declaration of war or national emergency.

(d) **Partial Mobilization.** In time of national emergency, declared by the President or otherwise authorized by law, the Secretaries of the military departments (or their designees) may order to active duty units and members of the Ready Reserve. Up to one million reservists may be mobilized for a period of up to 24 months.

3. **Finance and Disbursing**

   a. All SecDef approved DSCA operations are reimbursable unless reimbursement is waived by the SecDef or the President. IAW the provisions set forth in DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume, 12, Chapter 23, directed contingency operations must be accomplished within the Command’s or the DOD Component’s available funding. A contingency operations cost report will be completed and forwarded through Service channels as indicated in Appendix 1 to the DOD FMR Volume 12, Chapter 23. DOD costs incurred in support of (ISO) a
Primary Agency will be captured separately from cost incurred to support DOD efforts. The Primary Agency will issue a control number with all mission assignments. The Primary Agency control number must be used to qualify for possible reimbursement.

b. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate response. These instances will be handled IAW DOD Directive, Instruction, and Manual 3025.dd, DSCA (draft).

c. USNORTHCOM will issue more specific financial management guidance with execution of DSCA operations.

4. **Legal**. See Appendix 4

5. **Military Postal Services**. See Appendix 5

6. **Chaplain Activities**. See Appendix 6

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Appendixes
1 -- Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons - Not Used
2 -- Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel - Not Used
3 -- Finance and Disbursing - Not Used
4 -- Legal
5 -- Military Post Offices
6 -- Chaplain Activities

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

LEGAL ISSUES

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a. DODD 3025.dd (draft), Defense Support of Civil Authorities, TBP

b. DODI 3025.dd (draft), Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, TBP

c. DODM 3025.dd (draft), Defense Support of Civil Authorities, TBP

d. AR 27-20 Claims, 1 June 2003

e. DA Pam 27-162, Claims Procedures, 8 August 2003

f. JAGINST 5890.1, Administrative Processing and Consideration of Claims on Behalf of and Against the United States, 17 January 1991

g. Manual for the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) 2004

h. AFI 51-502, Personnel and Government Recovery Claims, 1 March 1997

i. DODD 5515.8, Single-Service Assignment of Responsibility for Processing Claims, 1 November 2002

j. AR 27-3, The Army Legal Assistance Program, 21 February 1996

k. CNLSCI 5800.1E CH-1, Naval Legal Service Command Manual, 19 February 2002 with Change 1, 4 April 2003;

l. JAGI 5801.2, Navy-Marine Corps Legal Assistance Program, 11 April 1997

m. AFI 51-504, Legal Assistance, Noatary and Preventive Law Programs, 27 October 2003

n. DODD 5510.3, Authority to Convene General Courts-Martial, 30 June 1980

o. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001
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p. AR 27-1, Judge Advocate Legal Services, 30 September 1996

q. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 16 November 2005

r. JAGI 5810.2A, Military Justice Regulations, 17 September 1993

s. AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, 26 November 2003

t. AFI 51-202, Nonjudicial Punishment, 7 November 2003


v. DOD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), 25 March 1996

w. DODD 1005.13, Gifts and Decorations from Foreign Governments, 19 February 2002

x. DODD 7250.13, Official Representation Funds (ORFs), 12 January 2005

y. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force (S), 13 June 2005

z. DODD 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 9 July 1996

aa. DODD 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Weapons by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 1 November 2001

bb. 10 USC 331-378

c. 18 USC 1385


ee. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)

ff. Chemical Weapons Convention, 13 January 1993

gg. EO 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1975

E-4-2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

hh. CJCSI 3110.07B, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides (S), 25 February 2005

ii. EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981

jj. DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities, 25 April 1988

kk. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982

II. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and organizations not Affiliated with the DOD, 7 January 1980

1. **Mission.** USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) Office and subordinate/Joint Task Force (JTF) component JAs will provide the fullest possible range of legal services to units and personnel in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) as far forward as circumstances permit. Specifically, JA will:

   a. Provide legal advice to the Commander and staff.

   b. Serve as the single point of contact for all legal issues.

   c. Monitor all legal activities within the JOA.

2. **Specific Legal Issues**

   a. **Claims.** Commanders will ensure that all claims are promptly reported and thoroughly investigated in accordance with (IAW) applicable law and policy. Normally, the Base Support Installation (BSI) will receive all claims against DOD components and process or forward such claims IAW Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the respective component.

   b. **Legal Assistance.** Service component commanders will arrange legal assistance for personnel assigned or attached to their respective forces.

   c. **Military Justice.** Service component commanders will administer military justice within Service component channels IAW Service directives.

   d. Reporting violations of the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and non-compliance with SRUF.

      (1) **Acts of violence.** Service component personnel will immediately report all acts of violence, to include homicides, assaults, rapes, robberies, abductions, and instances of mayhem or mass disorder, to their commander. Commanders will
Conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether violations were committed by or against service component personnel.

(b) Cooperate with appropriate civil authorities should their personnel be involved.

(c) Immediately report suspected violations by or against service component personnel IAW OPREP-3 procedures.

(d) When service component personnel are involved as either victims or perpetrators, or when directed by USNORTHCOM, conduct a complete investigation, and preserve all evidence of the suspected violation. A decision not to investigate or to discontinue an investigation will be made only after coordination with the Component SJA.

(e) Provide copies of all OPREPs, initial reports, and reports of investigation to the Component SJA and the USNORTHCOM JA.

(f) Take appropriate corrective and/or disciplinary action.

e. Legal Review of Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF). All requests for SRUF augmentation or mission-specific RUF will be coordinated with the supporting JA and through operational channels and forwarded through the USNORTHCOM JA and J3 to CDRUSNORTHCOM who may forward such requests through CJCS for approval by Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

f. Arming Policy. CDRUSNORTHCOM delegates to the JTF Commander the authority to authorize Title 10 personnel to carry firearms for self defense in non-CBRNE situations. This authority will not be further delegated to subordinate commanders. CDRUSNORTHCOM retains the authority to establish arming levels for Title 10 forces in the DSCA JOA. In Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) situations, SecDef, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General, must approve the arming of Title 10 forces.

g. Component and supporting commanders’ and staff responsibilities. Subordinate component commanders will:

(1) Ensure all plans, orders, policies, and procedures comply with applicable law and policy, including the SRUF and arming policy.
(2) Immediately report legal issues of joint origin or that affects the external relations of Component and Joint Commands to USNORTHCOM JA.

(3) Provide a weekly status of general legal operations to CDRUSNORTHCOM, ATTN: SJA. This report will include, at a minimum, the following information:

(a) Domestic law. Incidents affecting local civil authorities, suspected violations of the RUF and incident involving US Forces and civil authorities or US Citizens.

(b) Military Justice. Incidents that may result in disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), any final disposition of such actions, and notice of any Service personnel in pretrial confinement. Immediately report all serious incidents.

(c) Claims. Any incidents that may give rise to claims for or against the US government.

h. Acquisitions during Military Operations

(1) Goods and services to satisfy US-specific requirements will be obtained IAW applicable US laws, directives, and regulations. Component and Joint Commanders do not have the authority to waive any of the statutory or regulatory requirements contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

(2) Only contracting officers may enter into and sign contracts on behalf of the US Government. Only those persons who possess valid contracting warrants may act as contracting officers and then only to the extent authorized. Only those persons who have been appointed as ordering officers by competent authority may make obligations pursuant to contracts.

(3) Avoid unauthorized commitments. Although an unauthorized commitment is not binding on the US Government, in appropriate cases it may be ratified by an authorized person IAW the FAR. Unauthorized commitments are the responsibility of the person who made the commitment. In appropriate cases, such persons also may be subject to disciplinary action.

i. Intelligence oversight. Ensure intelligence oversight authorities and restrictions in references ii through ll are followed when intelligence information, personnel, or equipment are involved in DSCA operations.

j. Information Management/Sharing. Ensure references ii through ll are followed when information other than intelligence is collected, analyzed, produced or disseminated during DSCA operations.
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k. **International Assistance.** If the U.S. accepts foreign military aid, JA will review the foreign nation ROE/RUF and arming policies for compliance with U.S. policies prior to the commencement of foreign operations. This review will be conducted in coordination with (ICW) the Department of State (DOS). Legal issues such as Status of Forces, individual liability, claims, information sharing, and use of material and equipment should be addressed in writing prior to deployment and coordinated with the DOS.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
MILITARY POST OFFICES

References:  

a.  DOD 4525.6-M, DOD Postal Manual, 15 August 2002

b.  DODD 5101.11, DOD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Service, 31 January 2005

c.  DODI 4525.8, DOD Official Mail Management, 26 December 2001

d.  DOD 4525.8-M, DOD Official Mail Manual, 26 December 2001

e.  AR 600-8-3, Unit Postal Operations, 28 December 1989

1. General Guidance

a.  Purpose.  To establish policy and provide guidance for the planning and execution of postal operations support.

b.  Concept of Postal Operations.  Postal requirements will be based on the minimum support necessary to provide personal and official mail services to all units and personnel.  Each Service is responsible for providing or arranging for postal support for its own forces.

c.  Assumptions.  Postal support will be required as long as forces are deployed in the area.

   (1) United States Postal Service (USPS) will continue to distribute to local Post Offices.

   (2) There are no initial restrictions on inbound mail.  As the operation matures and the number of forces committed grows, restrictions may be applied.

d.  Planning Factors.  Not applicable.

e.  Responsibilities

   (1) Military Postal Service Agency will provide technical guidance.

   (2) USNORTHCOM will provide overall guidance to supporting commanders.
(3) USNORTHCOM will task a component to be in general and direct support for postal operations.

(4) Each Component/Joint Task Force (JTF), in accordance with (IAW) Service instructions, will develop and implement procedures to screen, identify, and handle suspected contaminated mail.

(5) Each Component/JTF IAW Service instructions, will develop and publish emergency actions procedures in the event a package is suspected of being contaminated.

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

References:

a. See references a through x of base plan

b. Title 10, United States Code: (Army) Subtitle B, Part I, Chapter 307, Section 3073 and Subtitle B, Part II, Chapter 343, Section 3547; (Navy and Marine Corps) Subtitle C, Part II, Chapter 549, Section 6031; (Air Force) Subtitle D, Part II, Chapter 843, Section 8547

c. DODD 1300.17, 3 February 1988, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services, with Change 1, 17 October 1988

d. DODD 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments, 11 June 2004

e. DODD 5100.73, Major DOD HQ Activities, 13 May 1999

f. CJCSM 3122.03A, 30 November 2005, JOPES, Volume II, Planning Guidance for Appendix 6 to Annex E, Chaplain Activities

g. Joint Pub 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, 2 June 2004


i. Army Regulation 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, 25 March 2004


l. Air Force Instruction 52-101, Planning and Organizing, 16 April 2004

m. OPNAVINST 1730.1D, Religious Ministries in the Navy, 6 May 2003

n. NWP 1-05, Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy, August 2003

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p. MCWP 6-12, Religious Ministry Support in the USMC, 12 December 2001

q. MCWP 6-12A, The RMT Handbook, 16 May 2003

r. MCWP 6-12B, Religious Lay Leaders Handbook, 28 February 2000

s. MCWP 6-12C, Commanders Handbook for Religious Ministry Support, 2 February 2004

t. USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Section 9.6, Chaplain Activities, March 2005

u. USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment (CS CONEMP), Annex M and Appendix M-2, 13 May 2005 (revised draft)

v. Office of Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Memorandum to Commander USNORTHCOM, Emergency Family Assistance Centers (EFAC), 17 August 2005

1. Situation

a. Purpose. This appendix is the USNORTHCOM Religious Support Plan (RSP) for chaplain activities for planning and execution of CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). This appendix applies to all DOD forces and installations COCOM, OPCON or TACON to USNORTHCOM for DSCA operations.

b. Assumptions

   (1) Joint area religious support (RS) as defined in the USNORTHCOM CS CONEMP will be employed when necessary.

   (2) Policy and doctrine in place or given by the Command Chaplain will provide guidance for chaplain activities in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

   (3) The number of Religious Support Teams (RSTs) may be limited due to competing operational commitments. Service Component augmentation or mobilization may be required.

   (4) The National Guard (NG) RSTs under supervision of their Commanders, the Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) Command Chaplain and ICW National Guard Bureau (NGB) Office of the Chaplain (NGB-OC) will normally be the first military chaplains on the scene during a catastrophic incident.
c. **Enemy.** See base plan

d. **Limitations**

(1) Communication between organizations may be limited due to non-compatible systems and equipment.

(2) Other operations will affect the availability of support with regard to personnel, equipment, and supplies.

2. **Mission.** The USNORTHCOM Chaplain Directorate (NC/HC) provides for the free exercise of religion, imparts ethical guidance, advises the commander and staff on religious issues affecting DSCA operations, and provides spiritual care in support of (ISO) assigned personnel and their families.

3. **Execution.** USNORTHCOM/HC directs and sustains overarching organization of Chaplain and Chaplain enlisted personnel for DSCA. DSCA operations include directed military activities.

a. **Concept of Operations**

(1) Considerations common to all phases.

   (a) RSTs will provide religious support to authorized DOD personnel during all phases of DSCA operations. USNORTHCOM Service Components and Joint Task Force(s) (JTFs) provide religious support to service personnel through assigned RSTs.

   (b) Service Components will identify, mobilize and/or deploy religious support personnel who meet deployment standards. Deployment taskings are processed through service component Crisis Action Centers (CACs) and Joint Operational Centers (JOCs).

   (c) **Support Planning**

      1. **Religious Support to Military Forces.** General planning considerations for ministry to military forces include but are not limited to the following:

         a. Duration of deployment.

         b. Theater of operation.

         c. Culture/Religion.

         d. Logistic Support.
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e. Command and control.

f. Mission and objectives.

g. RST ministry/responsibilities.

h. Religious Accommodation.

i. Grade distribution.

j. Chaplain faith and denominational balance.

k. Coordination between USNORTHCOM, Service Component, NG, US Coast Guard (USCG), civilian chaplains and clergy.

2. Medical Services. Identify coordination and planning requirements for chaplain activities ISO Annex Q.

3. Mortuary Affairs. DOD Mortuary Affairs personnel may be tasked to assist other government agencies. During such operations, military chaplains are present to provide pastoral care to DOD personnel. In addition, military chaplains may assist in mitigating stress as part of a multidisciplinary stress management process (CISM or equivalent). Chaplains may render honors with respect to the remains of deceased military individuals under the guidance provided by the Command Chaplain.

4. Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC). The Command Chaplain will provide direction for the EFAC implementation IAW the EFAC CONOPS (TAB C). Chaplain support will be provided to the EFAC as required.

(d) Employment common to all phases

1. NC/HC provides guidance to subordinate joint force RSTs and coordinates with NG and USCG RSTs.

2. Chaplains in supervisory positions will coordinate with appropriate staff agencies in order to ensure that subordinate chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel receive appropriate support, professional guidance, and performance evaluations.

3. RST deployments are coordinated through JTF Command Chaplains to USNORTHCOM/HC. JTF Command Chaplains determine Manning requirements within their JOA beyond the RSTs assigned to the units
under their JTF. This may include low density RSTs for Roman Catholic or other low density faith groups for area coverage. Units in the JOA will be provided joint area religious support as necessary.

4. RSTs at the JTF level and below will normally consist of a chaplain and an enlisted support staff from the same service component. RSTs function IAW reference and appropriate service publications.

5. Chaplain Assistants are classified as combatants and therefore are authorized to carry and use weapons IAW RUF.

(2) Phase I (Shaping). RSTs provide religious support (RS) to authorized DOD personnel and their families, plan for operations and secure deployment liturgical supplies. JTF Chaplains coordinate with USNORTHCOM/HC and subordinate chaplains to insure smooth transition to DSCA. RSTs gain awareness of the presence of NGOs in the JOA and prepares to conduct liaison with NGOs as directed. When JTFs deploy Command Assessment Elements (CAE) to the disaster area, an RST may accompany them to assess the situation, the religious support needs of the effected population and report regularly to USNORTHCOM/HC.

(3) Phase II (Staging). RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel and conduct mission analysis. Before and after onward movement, RSTs contact supervisory chaplains to coordinate religious support. RSTs anticipate religious support needs.

(4) Phase III (Deployment). RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel, coordinate religious support with supervisory chaplains, and provide joint area religious support when directed. RSTs maintain situational awareness of stress levels of assigned DOD personnel, first responders and affected civilians, take actions to provide care and mitigate stress for DOD personnel, and provide situational awareness reports to the commander. When directed, RSTs conduct liaison and coordinate activities with National Guard RSTs and NGOs in the JOA.

(5) Phase IV (Support of Civil Authorities). RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel and focus on mitigating the impact of traumatic events. RSTs advise the command on indicators documenting civilian community capabilities to resume normal functioning without military support. RSTs coordinate activities with the National Guard, USCG and NGOs.

(6) Phase V (Transition). RSTs conduct redeployment religious support to assigned personnel and their families, focusing on reunion and reintegration issues with families.

b. Tasks

E-6-5

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(1) **USNORTHCOM Chaplain**

(a) Advises CDRUSNORTHCOM on issues pertaining to the free exercise of religion and the impact of religion on military operations.

(b) Develops, revises and coordinates the Chaplain Activities, Appendix 6, to Annex E, to CONPLAN 2501-05.

(c) Directs religious support activities to include unit and area religious support in the NORTHCOM AOR.

(d) Identifies Unit Type Code (UTC)/Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) requirements to meet mission objectives, and coordinates with JTF Command Chaplains, Service Components, and the Joint Staff (JS) Chaplain.

(e) Clarifies RST staff coordination channels and delineate how different components interface to ensure appropriate religious support. See USNORTHCOM CONOPS, CS CONEMP and Battle Staff Standing Operating Procedure (BSOP) for further guidance.

(f) Establishes reporting formats, frequency and suspense dates.

(g) Coordinates methodology of communication among RSTs.

(h) Establishes Chaplain policy and procedures for donated goods received from faith groups, charities, or individuals in conjunction with legal counsel, command policy, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direction. Donations for the military personnel of the units will be distributed to the unit by the RST. The RST will direct individuals, groups, or organizations wishing to make donations for civilian relief to donate to NGO, PVO, FBO, etc.

(2) **Commanders, Service Component Commands**

(a) Through deliberate and crisis action planning, identify UTC/TPFDD requirements supporting USNORTHCOM.

(b) Coordinate UTC/TPFDD requirements with service component crisis action team planning and response groups, JTF and USNORTHCOM Chaplain.

(c) Insure that authorized RST positions are filled in order to provide religious support to service personnel.

(d) Plan for reconstitution of forces following cessation of operations.
(3) **Other supporting commands’ staff chaplains.** Supporting commands’ staff chaplains include but are not limited to Active and Reserve Service Components, Air and Army NG, and the Coast Guard. USNORTHCOM/HC coordinates OPLAN guidance and execution with all appropriate departments and commands for deployment and sustainment of forces.

(4) **Joint Task Force (JTF) Chaplains**

   (a) Advise the USNORTHCOM Chaplain on distinctive component organizational and operational procedures and policies.

   (b) Advise the USNORTHCOM Chaplain on “Free Exercise” issues and religious support in Joint Operation Area (JOA).

   (c) Advise the USNORTHCOM Chaplain ICW Information Operations (IO), Intelligence (Intel), Civil Affairs (CA), Legal, and Public Affairs (PA) on the religious implications of operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

   (d) Certify appropriate levels of training for RSTs, based upon Service Component and JFCOM requirements for RST deployment.

   (e) Provide information on projected area support responsibilities.

(5) The JTF Command chaplain will have a NGB-OC liaison (LNO) to facilitate coordination between the JTF Command Chaplain, NGB-OC, and NG RSTs in the AO. The JTF chaplain will use the NGB LNO to maintain situational awareness of ongoing operations and religious support requirements.

(6) **Chaplain Service Personnel**

   (a) Provide direct and indirect religious support for joint component military personnel, families, and authorized civilian DOD personnel.

   (b) Acquire training for DSCA to include Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and Management (CISD/CISM), Post-Traumatic Stress, and Applied Suicide Intervention Skill Training (ASIST). Additional training should include Mass Casualty (MASCAL).

   (c) RSTs will cooperate with federal agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), private volunteer and faith-based groups. RSTs will not normally engage in direct civil support but may do so when directed or requested IAW JP 3-26 and ICW the senior supervisory RST for the JOA.

   (d) Personnel will meet service component standards for worldwide deployment, including receipt of appropriate immunizations.
c. **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) Commanders will coordinate religious support for their personnel IAW JP 1-05 and JP 3-26. The primary role of the RST is to provide religious support to authorized DOD personnel and their families.

(2) RSTs will follow command direction, joint doctrine, chaplain policy and legal counsel when providing religious support during DSCA operations.

4. **Administration and Logistics**

   a. Chaplain logistics, resupply, and material management are a service component responsibility.

   b. Service components will provide religious supplies and materials to support rapid deployment and subsequent sustainment until routine resupply can be accomplished.

   c. Supplies are ordinarily provided via unit supply channels – using the supplies provided by the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA).

   d. Personnel. Reserve component/NG augmentation is essential to mission accomplishment. Augmentation procedures should be refined for expedient activation of Reserve/NG components. RSTs will follow appropriate mobilization procedures.

   e. Ground transportation is the responsibility of deploying units. Deploying units will provide dedicated ground transportation assets to the RSTs for their exclusive use.

   f. RSTs will deploy with adequate communications and computer resources provided by the JTF or Service Component.

   g. RSTs will deploy with 30 days of religious supplies and with all authorized equipment unless otherwise ordered by their commanders.

5. **Chaplain Communication**

   a. DSCA operations for RSTs generally require non-secure communications. Coordinate security requirements for communication with appropriate authorities.

   b. Routine communication between USNORTHCOM/HC, Service Component Chaplains, Sub-unified Command Chaplains, NGB-OC, and JTF Command Chaplains will be by telephone when possible. Alternate means of communications are e-mail and FAX message.
c. Official annexes, tabs, orders, SITREPS and requests will be transmitted via authorized means of communication.

d. Service component, Sub-unified Command and JTF chaplains will coordinate communications internal to their commands.

e. Reports

   (1) JTF Command Chaplain will submit reports to the JTF Commander and to USNORTHCOM/HC as required in the USNORTHCOM BSOP.

   (2) RSTs will prepare after action reports for submission to the JTF Command Chaplain and Service Component supervisors not later than (NLT) thirty days after completion of deployments.

Tabs
A -- Inter-Service chaplain Support – Not Used
B -- Host-Nation Religious Support – Not Used
C -- Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) Concept of Operations
References:

a. DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005

b. USNORTHCOM Strategic Action Plan, 16 December 2003

c. USNORTHCOM FY05 JMETL, ST 4.2; 8.4.5; 8.5; and 9.5

d. Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to NORAD-USNORTHCOM Commander, 17 August 2005

e. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC) After Action Report, March 2003

f. DODD 1342.17, Family Policy and 1342.22, Family Centers

g. DODI 1300.18, “Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies and Procedures,” December 18, 2000

1. Situation

a. Purpose. This tab is the USNORTHCOM Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

b. Conditions for Implementation. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for situational awareness or in direct support of DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM will implement the EFAC CONOPS to assess the need for support to DOD personnel and their families and/or local, state and federal Family Assistance Centers (FACs) with a focus on DOD populations.

(1) A Command Assessment Element (CAE) may be deployed at the direction of the CRDUSNORTHCOM for situational awareness.

(2) USNORTHCOM will facilitate a graduated response to validated requests for EFAC support consistent with the Commander’s intent.
(3) EFAC manning will be sourced from the Services at large to augment Service specific FACs and/or support local, tribal, state and federal FACs. Under catastrophic conditions, a fully staffed EFAC may be sourced as a stand-alone capability to support DOD personnel and their families and to lessen the burden on local, state and tribal agencies.

c. Scope. This plan applies to any natural or manmade disaster requiring an EFAC response within the DSCA OA.

d. Assumptions

(1) Natural and manmade disasters are capable of overwhelming local, tribal, state, federal and DOD installation resources, including Service specific reach-back capabilities.

(2) DOD personnel and their families could be involved in a catastrophic event in significant numbers and represent a burden to civil authorities.

(3) EFAC staff requirements will be based upon the essential capabilities needed to accomplish mission objectives.

(4) EFAC manning is multidisciplinary and includes, but is not limited to, personnel from family support, public affairs, force protection, mental health, chaplains, casualty assistance, mortuary affairs, communications, and judge advocates.

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM will implement the EFAC CONOPS during DSCA operations to provide planning assistance and/or support the needs of DOD personnel and their families when a catastrophic event overwhelms available resources.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Commander’s Intent. If an overwhelming catastrophic event occurs impacting local, tribal, state and federal resources, USNORTHCOM will facilitate deployment of a tiered complement of EFAC capabilities or a stand-alone EFAC to mitigate the effects of the incident and initiate a return to normalcy.

(2) Employment. Operational control (OPCON) of EFAC staff members may be delegated to the on-scene Installation Commander or the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander or retained by the CDRUSNORTHCOM, who will coordinate efforts with other agencies as appropriate.

(3) Deployment. EFAC capabilities may be deployed as elements, modules, cells or as a full complement of required services. An EFAC capability will be
deployed when the Commander deems it necessary to provide DSCA to local, state or federal agencies, or to combine Service resources and/or when the incident impacts multiple Services.

(a) Religious Support Assessment Element (RSAE). The RSAE consists of one to four USNORTHCOM personnel to assess EFAC requirements, provide situational awareness to the Commander and advisory assistance to local, tribal, state, or federal agencies.

(b) EFAC Advance Coordinating Element (ACE). An ACE is a multi-disciplined, rapid response capability deployed forward to provide command and control (C-2) for EFAC operations. An ACE will consist of a cadre numbering five to fifteen personnel.

(c) EFAC Module. A module is a specialized skill set identified within an EFAC, such as communications, chaplains, mental health counselors, security forces, etc., which can be deployed to supplement an existing FAC.

(d) EFAC Cell. An EFAC Cell may be deployed to serve DOD personnel and their families as part of a local, state, or federal FAC. The EFAC Cell will provide a scaled range of EFAC services for military families contingent upon the needs of the effected DOD population. Services may include grief counseling, legal assistance, mortuary and casualty assistance, briefings on recovery ops, etc.

(e) Stand-Alone EFAC. A stand-alone EFAC consists of a full complement of services such as counseling, data collection, legal assistance, communications, public affairs, interagency support, and fatality management, including DNA collection and casualty assistance. A complete EFAC organization will consist of command, support and action centers. The minimum recommended grade for the EFAC Director is Colonel/CAPTAIN (O-6) and may require higher grades depending on the scale of the incident.
(f) CONOPs (figure 1).

(g) Resourcing. EFACs can require extensive resources and must be sourced under careful guidelines.

1. Requests for Assistance (RFAs) from local, state or federal FACs will be submitted through a Primary Agency IAW the National Response Plan (NRP). RFAs will then be validated according to DOD procedures.

2. On behalf of effected DOD personnel and their families, requests for EFAC capabilities will be coordinated through the Installation Commander to the appropriate Service, or JTF Commander or USNORTHCOM as events dictate. The Services will forward requests to USNORTHCOM which in turn will process a Request for Forces (RFF) through the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as
appropriate. The Services will then provide augmentation to resource the EFAC as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

4. Selected Tasks. Ensure 24/7 immediate and sustained crisis intervention by providing a central point of contact for sustained support and services to grieving DOD family members in the midst of DSCA operations and/or planning assistance for civil authorities as requested.

   a. CAE will provide an assessment to CDRUSNORTHCOM and the JTF Commander of situational needs and coordinate initial support to civil authorities.

   b. Provide psychological, spiritual and survivor benefit counseling to stabilize family distress, grief and shock.

   c. Establish a data collection center including a center.

   d. Arrange child-care services for families seeking EFAC services.

   e. Monitor the status of DSCA operations and update families on unfolding events through daily briefings.

   f. Schedule site visits, if appropriate, when conditions are safe.

   g. Facilitate reunification between families and victim’s remains.

   h. Honor fatalities by coordinating a memorial service(s) for families.

   i. Facilitate contact with families to foster assist their return to a functional lifestyle.

   j. Perform additional tasks as required including planning assistance to local, state and federal agencies if requested and feasible.

   k. A full complement of tactics, techniques and procedures will provide further guidance.
ANNEX F TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

b. National Response Plan (NRP), 15 December 2004
c. National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 2004

1. Situation
   a. General. This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for military
      Public Affairs (PA) actions for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). (See
      Annex C for operational details)
   b. Enemy. See base plan
   c. Friendly. See base plan

   (1) The DOD PA posture for DSCA is active when done in coordination with
       (ICW) the Primary Agency. Units supporting DSCA operations may discuss their
       specific mission assignments following receipt of deployment orders. Units
       should refrain from discussing the overall operation and refer queries to the
       Primary Agency or Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as appropriate.
       USNORTHCOM will issue PA guidance.

   (2) Prior to the issuance of USNORTHCOM guidance, questions regarding
       DSCA will be referred to the NORAD/USNORTHCOM (N/NC) PA or the Office
       of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD)/PA.

d. Assumptions. See base plan

   (1) DOD will be in support of (ISO) a Primary Agency during DSCA operations.
       The Primary Agency will be responsible for leading public communications and
       must be prepared to direct operations in multiple Joint Areas of Operation.

   (2) The incident may be designated an “Incident of National Significance” and if
       so, the National Response Plan (NRP) and Emergency Support Function (ESF) 15
       will be activated placing DHS in charge of all public communication. SJFHQ-N
       will provide PA when directed by N/NC PA.
(3) A Federal Interagency Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established in the vicinity of the incident. DOD will provide representatives to that JIC.

(4) Combat Camera resources (as deployed by N-NC/J-39, see Appendix 9 to Annex C) will be available to document the DOD response (i.e., arrival of first troops, employment of DOD, significant operations, etc.) and provide a product in a timely manner to PA for review and release to the media.

2. Mission. PA personnel provide a free-flow of information to the public while at the same time protecting the inadvertent release of classified information.

3. Execution

   a. Concept of Operations

      (1) A Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will deploy with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for major events or those that are expected to have significant public interest. Normally, the PAO will come from the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). When the DCE does not have an assigned PA and ARNORTH PA cannot support, N-NC/PA may ask SJFHQ-N to deploy a PAO.

      (2) When deemed appropriate by the senior Public Affairs (PA) official with OPCON of all DOD PA personnel, additional PAOs will be deployed from the component command providing primary support to the event to staff the JIC. The Primary Agency may submit an Action Request Form (ARF) to request DOD PA support in the JIC.

      (3) Units deploying for DSCA operations will deploy with PA personnel as part of their overhead staff. Deploying PA personnel will maintain regular contact with the DCO’s PAO.

      (4) If the scope of a disaster, emergency, incident, or event requires the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), the JTF PAO and N/NC PA will require augmentation. The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) will deploy personnel, as required, to augment both staffs. Additional PA resources will be provided by the services as tasked by USJFCOM.

   b. Tasks

      (1) Release Authority. Release authority will be delegated to the lowest level possible consistent with published PA guidance.

      (2) Reporting Requirements. Copies of all releases and a summary of media engagements will be provided to USNORTHCOM on a daily basis. The JTF (if established) will provide daily situation reports (SITREPS) to N/NC PA by 1500 Mountain Standard Time (MST) each day. SITREPS will include a summary of
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PA actions completed and planned for the next 24 hours, summary of PA personnel deployed, actions of subordinate Task Forces, and any messages or talking points. The JTF should also provide clippings of articles published in the preceding 24 hours. If possible, provide transcripts or summaries of broadcast media reports. NIPR E-mail will be the preferred method of communication.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Coordination of release of information. Coordination of information will occur via the National Interagency Communications Conference Line (NICCL) conference call and/or through the established JIC. N/NC PA will host a daily telephone conference call with services, supporting commands, deployed PA elements, OCJCS/PA and OASD/PA. USNORTHCOM will issue PA guidance.

(2) Information Operations (IO) Coordination. Coordination between IO and PA will only be conducted at the USNORTHCOM level. IO will provide combat camera resources to the event and PA (at the lowest level consistent with PA guidance) provide review and release of those materials where warranted.

(3) Force Protection. See Appendix 15 to Annex C

(4) Security Review. Although “information sharing” is key, PAOs must exercise “security at the source,” Operations Security (OPSEC) will be considered throughout all phases of the operation. USNORTHCOM PA will conduct security policy review when necessary.

(5) Community Relations. Community relations activities will be conducted ICW local, state and federal agencies involved in the operation.

(6) Internal Information. As news releases and statements are issued to the media, they should also be disseminated to the internal audience. An intranet website or portal should be established, if possible, with a news and information page for the event.

(7) Audiovisual and Visual Information. The PAO is encouraged to use organic assets to document the exercise. Combat Camera assets should be considered and requested if necessary. Significant imagery should be forwarded to the Joint Combat Camera Center (JCCC) and USNORTHCOM PA. Imagery will be annotated as “cleared for public release” or “requires review.” Still and video imagery produced in support of this operation must be forwarded to the DOD JCCC at the earliest opportunity and by the quickest available means to support OASD/PA and Joint Staff imagery requirements. Questions regarding imagery transmission should be addressed to the JCCC at COMM 703-695-7118, DSN 225-7118, or by e-mail at jccc@hq.afis.osd.mil or jccc@osd.smil.mil.

d. Media Ground Rules
(1) Normally, no special arrangements (messing, billeting, medical, transportation, communications, etc.), will be made available through government facilities or at government expense to support the media. However, if media are embedded with DOD forces, they may be afforded the same support provided to DOD forces. If required, media will be credentialed by the JIC. Except on federal military installations or within National Defense Areas, DOD has no jurisdiction over where the media may go or what they may do. The JIC should establish a media center for the media to gather, file reports, and obtain information including regular media briefings. If the JIC does not establish a media center, DOD may establish one.

(2) Media will be granted maximum access to view and photograph response actions. Unless special arrangements are made to sanitize the area, the media will not be allowed access to areas where classified information or operations are apparent.

4. Administration and Logistics, Equipment

   a. Be prepared to (BPT) be self-sufficient. That is, deploy with appropriate portable computer equipment, cell phones, satellite phones, and digital photographic equipment (if available). Internet access should be available in all commercial billeting (hotels) and through the JIC.

   b. BPT obtain a commercial rental vehicle.

5. Command and Control. See base plan

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ANNEX J TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

References:  

b. National Response Plan (NRP), 15 December 2004

c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005

1. General

a. Operational Area(s)

(1) The USNORTHCOM operational area for DSCA is the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and any possession of the United States within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) USNORTHCOM will designate appropriate Joint Operational Area(s) (JOAs) for air, land, and maritime operations within the USNORTHCOM OA for the execution of DSCA operations.

(3) Alaska is designated as a standing Joint Operations Area (JOA) within the USNORTHCOM DSCA OA.

(4) National Capital Region (NCR) is designated as a standing JOA within the USNORTHCOM DSCA OA.

b. Scope

(1) Annex J establishes the relationships between the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), regional and functional Combatant Commanders, and Service Component Commanders for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. This includes the relationships between CDRUSNORTHCOM and the following:

(a) Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(b) Other Combatant Commanders.
(c) Joint Staff (JS).

(d) USNORTHCOM Component Commands.

(e) Supporting Commands and Services.

(f) Federal Departments and Agencies.

(g) Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

(h) Department of Justice (DOJ).

(i) Department of Energy (DOE).

(j) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

(k) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

(l) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

(2) The command relationships established in this annex apply to all DOD personnel deployed to a DSCA operation as defined in CONPLAN 2501-05, DSCA.

(3) CDRUSNORTHCOM conducts DSCA, when directed by the SecDef, in the USNORTHCOM OA to assist civil authorities in responding to disasters, either natural or man-made, emergencies, incidents, national special security events, or other special events covered in the NRP. See base plan for OA description.

(4) Response forces are not dedicated to CDRUSNORTHCOM for use prior to a request for Federal assistance (RFA). In the event of a SecDef approved RFA, forces will be provided to CDRUSNORTHCOM at the direction of the SecDef via Commander, Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).

2. Mission. See base Plan

3. Execution

   a. Service and Functional Components

      (1) CJCS will recommend, and the SecDef will designate supporting Combatant Commanders, Services, and DOD agencies to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations. They will provide designated specialized functional support to USNORTHCOM for DSCA operations.
(2) Each of the Services has responsibility for equipping, administering, and supporting forces assigned and allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM except as otherwise directed by the SecDef. Service component commanders communicate directly with their Service Chief on Service related matters. The operating details of service logistic support systems will be retained and exercised by the Service Commander per departmental instructions. Service Commanders will report operational limiting factors (LIMFACTS) per their daily commander’s situation report (SITREP).

b. Other Subordinate Commands

(1) At the direction of the SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will assume Operational Control (OPCON) of provided forces and provide DSCA in response to RFAs. USNORTHCOM DSCA operations will be commensurate with the magnitude of the situation and will be focused to meet response requirements beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities.

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM reports through the CJCS (via the National Military Command Center (NMCC)) to the SecDef.

(3) CDRUSNORTHCOM orders will delineate the transfer of forces and the requirements associated with the delegation of command authorities.

(4) CDRUSNORTHCOM will use a flexible approach to provide DSCA to a Primary or Coordinating Agency. Designated commanders will report directly to CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM will exercise OPCON of DOD response forces and transfer OPCON/TACON to the appropriate subordinate headquarters for Command and Control (C2) during mission execution. CDRUSNORTHCOM will determine the appropriate C2 and DCO relationship for the deployed forces at execution and will generally employ the following C2 constructs for DOD forces (but is not limited to these C2 constructs).

(5) Figures J-1, J-2 and J-3 illustrate the fundamental ways that USNORTHCOM forces interact with other agencies and functions. For clarity, the figures do not depict every possible relationship that USNORTHCOM can have with every potential DSCA partner. Consequently, not all departments or agencies are listed, nor are all potential connecting lines shown. A coordinating or C2 relationship can exist without explicit illustration in this Annex.
(a) **Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).** The DCO is a military or DOD civilian official designated to coordinate DSCA. A DCO can be employed for a small scale DOD response, and can be employed as the Joint Force Commander (JFC). When directed, and upon activation, the designated DCO will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM. The force will most likely consist of a DCO, a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE), and/or Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMPS). The DCO coordinates DOD DSCA operations with the Primary Agency and other Federal and State Agencies. Based on the size and complexity of the DSCA operation, USNORTHCOM will be prepared to provide additional augmentation to the DCO through the Request for Forces (RFF) process. CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy elements of SJFHQ-N or a JTF-CS Joint Planning Augmentation cell to augment the DCE.
(b) Joint Task Force (JTF). Implemented for disasters broader in scope and devastation requiring provisions of basic needs (food, shelter, water, medical support and electric power) or when operations require significant C2 capabilities because of complexity of the support, specialized capabilities of forces, and even political or public perception impact. The JTF response normally requires establishment of an augmented Service specific TF or a JTF HQ. CDRUSNORTHCOM will establish a JTF, as the DOD response to a single event that escalates and force size warrants increased assets for C2 capabilities. The JTF will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM. All SecDef approved DOD forces executing a DSCA operation will be OPCON/TACON to the JTF to include the DCO when directed by USNORTHCOM. If required by the magnitude and complexity of the situation, CDRUSNORTHCOM initial response choice may be a JTF C2 response. Plans for some DSCA incidents such as CBRNE CM, radiological emergencies, Wildfires and the National Contingency Plan have predetermined C2 procedures. Based on the complexity of the event, CDRUSNORTHCOM can utilize the SJFHQ-N as a JTF or as a core to any JTF C2 structure. Further, in appropriate circumstances, a Title 32 / Title 10 dual status JTF commander may be designated to facilitate unity of effort in
appropriate circumstances. The JTF Commander or his designated representative (to include the DCO) may be the Senior Federal Official (SFO) representing DOD’s interests within the JFO Coordination Group.

**USNORTHCOM Functional Component Command**

![Diagram of USNORTHCOM Functional Component Command]

(c) **Functional Component Commands.** Functional Component Commands may be implemented for a DSCA operation that requires greater USNORTHCOM control and significant C2 capabilities and/or the incident covers a large area or multiple areas, are also great in magnitude, scope and devastation. A functional component response normally will be executed by the Functional Component Commanders (e.g. JFLCC, JFACC, or JFMCC). The component command will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM. Designated DOD forces supporting Primary Agencies, in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Plan (NRP), will be OPCON/TACON to the appropriate USNORTHCOM component command. DCOs will have a C2 relationship (OPCON, TACON, or SUPPORTING) to the Functional Component Headquarters. CDRUSNORTHCOM may direct the SJFHQ-N staff to augment the Component Commander’s staff to provide functional expertise from other service components.
c. **Augmentation Forces.** Appropriate augmentation forces will be determined through crisis action planning or upon request of the designated DCO/ITF/JFLCC Commander. USNORTHCOM will request augmentation forces through the RFF process.

4. **Support and Coordination Relationships**

a. **Supporting Military Forces.** When directed by SecDef, the following U.S. Commands provide support to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Additional requirements will be identified during execution planning.

   1. **Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).** When directed by SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM directs deployment of forces in support of (ISO) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   2. **Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM).** When directed by SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides strategic movement by air, sea, and land of forces ISO CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   3. **Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM).** When directed by SecDef, CDRUSPACOM deploys mission essential military resources and forces ISO CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   4. **Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSOUTHCOM).** When directed by SecDef, CDRUSOUTHCOM deploys mission essential military resources and forces ISO of CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   5. **Commander, Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).** See base plan.

   6. **Military Services.** When approved by SecDef, the military Services provide forces, facilities, and assets to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. **Coordinating Authorities.** Requirements will be identified during execution planning.

c. **Department of Defense (DOD) Supporting Agencies.** See base plan


   2. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).


d. Non-DOD Supporting Organizations. The JFC/JTF Commander/Functional Component Commander will forward requests for non-DOD support to CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM will request support as required through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/NMCC.

(1) Department of Energy (DOE).


(3) Department of Justice (DOJ) - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

(4) Department of Transportation (DOT).

(5) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

e. Coordination with the non-Federalized National Guard (NG). National Guard forces operating in a non-Federalized status operate under state control when performing civil support operations. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as needed. NGB is the channel of communication between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard of the states.

f. Planning Relationships. USPACOM, USJFCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USOUTHCOM, USSTRATCOM exchange and coordinate necessary information directly with USNORTHCOM and supporting commands during planning and deployment phases.

5. Command and Control. See base plan

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Appendixes

1 -- Command Relationships Diagram – Not Used
ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS (C4)

References:


c. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001
d. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, 9 October 1996
e. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October 1998
g. Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems to Support Joint Operations, 4 January 2002
h. CJCSI 3110.10A, Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 98, 1 April 1999
i. CJCSI 6510.01C, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 1 May 2001
j. CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Networking (JDN) Operations, 1 October 2000
k. CJCSM 6510-01, Defense-in-Depth, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND), 15 March 2002
l. Additional references, see base plan
1. **General.** Purpose: Per the references, this annex provides United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and subordinate forces requisite guidance and coordinating instructions for installing, operating, and maintaining (IOM) command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems in support of (ISO) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. These actions include, but are not limited to, C4 of multiple Joint Task Forces (JTF) operating in the same or separate Joint Operations Area (JOA).

2. **Situation.** Department of Defense (DOD) resources used during DSCA operations must be capable of communicating directly through their chain of command with USNORTHCOM, Coordinating Agencies, civil authorities, and other supporting forces.

   a. **Enemy.** Natural or human-caused disasters can be so overwhelming that local, state and Federal responders need DOD assistance to manage the situation. When approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), USNORTHCOM is prepared to respond quickly and effectively to requests for Federal assistance (RFAs) to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The potential exists for large scale disruptions of commercial power grids, communications infrastructure, and regional saturation of available resources. These outages or disruptions may be caused by physical destruction or malicious actions in or near the incident area. They may also be due to system saturation, congestions, dead spots, blockage zones, or interference.

   b. **Friendly.** See Annex A and V. Support is anticipated from the following commands or agencies within and beyond the DOD.

      (1) **Coordinating Federal Departments and Agencies.** See base plan

      (2) **Coordinating and supporting DOD organizations, commands and agencies***

      (3) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** Approves requirements for and identifies sources of tactical and gateway communications-electronics assets requested by USNORTHCOM.

      (4) **Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD).** Provides commercial and tactical communications assets and personnel, as required.

      (5) **Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).** Provides satellite communications support, as required. As the DOD Executive Agent for computer network operations (CNO), provides support to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

      (6) **Supporting Combatant Commands/Military Services.** When directed by the SecDef, provide commercial and tactical communications assets and personnel as required.
(7) The National Communications System (NCS). The NCS office is the Point of Contact (POC) for coordinating and integrating civilian agency and military C4 systems. In addition, during emergency situations, the NCS stands up the National Coordinating Center (NCC) for telecommunications. The NCC consists of NCS personnel and representatives from all domestic commercial telecommunications carriers. If a natural disaster, terrorist incident, or accident involving hazardous materials occurs, the NCC will have the most current status of the commercial telecommunications infrastructure and capabilities in the incident area. The NCC is a particularly valuable source of information for pre-deployment planning after an incident happens and can be contacted at (703) 607-4950, DSN 327-4950, unclassified e-mail ncs@ncs.gov.

(8) Defense Information System Agency (DISA)

(a) Provides access to appropriate communications facilities to terminate circuitry within the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(b) Provides use of existing DISA assets to meet validated operational requirements within the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(c) Provides primary and alternate routing of circuitry supporting all command and control (C2) elements ISO USNORTHCOM within the JOA.

(d) Provides DISA liaison personnel to USNORTHCOM and selected USNORTHCOM forces as required and mutually coordinated.

(e) Provides provisioning and restoral coordination for commercial communications service.

(f) Provides procedures for the use of alternate entry stations and facilities on short notice to restore connectivity in the event of failures of primary stations or facilities.

(9) National Security Agency (NSA)

(a) Provides COMSEC Materials System (CMS) support as required.

(b) Provides cryptographic support as required.

(10) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). USCG operating under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for homeland security maritime C4 operations.

e. Assumptions
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(1) Sufficient funds will be available for extending communications services as required.

(2) Sufficient assets will be available to support the highest priority end-to-end satellite communications (SATCOM) requirements.

(3) Required communications facilities and circuits will be approved.

(4) Inter-theater transportation support for deploying highest priority communications resources will be available.

(5) Commercial bandwidth within and outside an incident area will be in high demand and will be available to support DOD forces conducting operations.

(6) Depending on the size and scope of the incident, a large percentage of the JOA infrastructure could be destroyed or degraded, to include commercial power systems and grids. Robust and reliable tactical communications architecture may be required due to disruptions in the communications infrastructure.

(7) The Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) will impose network controls in an incident area.

(8) Depending on the scenario, National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) may be invoked for the JOA. CDRUSNORTHCOM and Service Component Commanders will operate from their permanent land based locations.

3. **Mission.** On order, assigned forces will be prepared to provide requisite support and coordination for the C4 employment of subordinate, adjacent, and deployed forces in response to a request for DOD assistance in the USNORTHCOM AO.

   a. **Execution.** In order to ensure that C4 architecture is sufficiently resilient, the following guiding principles apply:

   (1) Data within the DOD enterprise network must be protected in accordance with (IAW) its classification and mission criticality. See Appendix 1.

   (2) Mission critical and mission support networks must be protected against unauthorized access and denial of service attacks to the maximum extent possible.

   (3) DOD systems and networks must have the ability to react to a catastrophic event, and restore critical capabilities to support essential operations.

      (a) Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) remains under COCOM/OPCON of CDRUSSTRATCOM as a supporting command and is the DOD primary operations center to monitor and respond to attacks and intrusions targeted against the Global Information Grid (GIG).
(b) Links to coalition elements must be secured by U.S.-based COMSEC. Appropriate guidelines are contained in Annex K, Appendix 7.

(4) USNORTHCOM Theater NetOps Control Center (TNCC) will serve as the POC for control of all circuits, either directly or through an established component or JTF Joint C4 Coordination Center (JCCC).

(5) Existing military communications systems commercial communications infrastructure will be used to the maximum extent possible for communicating with DOD, federal, state and local elements.

   (a) Subordinate communications plans and annexes will delineate deployed communications connectivity to include but not limited to, connections into the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) network and DISN Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) sites. Supporting plans will include Super High Frequency (SHF) satellite network (both Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) and commercial), Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Nets (prioritized), voice, message and data networks. Components will also address frequency management requirements/allotments, and provide comprehensive circuit installation and restoration priority lists.

   (b) USNORTHCOM subordinates and components will establish C4 nodal services, as directed in this annex, using subordinate or component sourced assets, CJCS controlled communications equipment, and leased commercial services to augment and extend the existing DII.

   (c) Commercial satellite systems provide significant bandwidth capacity and will be integrated into the JOA architecture to meet large-capacity requirements and to provide routing diversity. Planned satellite connectivity is detailed in Appendix 2 to this annex and is controlled by the USNORTHCOM TNCC. Commercial satellite systems will be configured to maximize their contribution to the joint network, and to enable critical support to dedicated missions, where required. USNORTHCOM J6 will be the validation authority for all use of commercial leased services.

   (d) Supporting Combatant Commands, components, subordinate commands, and adjacent units will provide the resources to interface into and extend the network to develop a robust and reliable intra-JOA communications network.

   (e) Subordinates and Components will take necessary action to establish a registration number in the Satellite Data Base (SDB) corresponding to all satellite access requirements needed to support this plan. Requirements outlined in Appendix 2 have been validated by NCJ6. Additional requirements must be approved and validated by NCJ6 prior to inclusion in the SDB.
(6) The Joint Frequency Management Office North (JFMO NORTH) will support USNORTHCOM and assigned units to coordinate approval for use of required military radio frequencies and those required for interoperability with civil authorities. JFMO NORTH is the primary DOD POC for frequency management for USNORTHCOM for DSCA operations. Correspondence regarding frequency management will info copy USNORTHCOM/JFMO NORTH, nc.jfmonorth.omb@northcom.smil.mil, and/or nc.jfmonorth.omb@northcom.mil.

(a) Use of call signs and frequencies will be IAW Service approved documents, interoperability agreements, service coordinated messages, and the Joint Communications-Electronics Operations Instructions (JCEOI).

(b) The JCEOI/CEOI provides the Combatant Commander as well as the service components and major subordinate units with specific instructions for the operation of C-E equipment, systems and facilities. Development of the JCEOI to support this plan will be accomplished using the Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) at the component level. Components will also have their layer of CEOI available in JACS or Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System (RBECS) format for distribution to their subordinate commands.

(c) Subordinates and Components are responsible for establishing standards and procedures for planning, generating, disseminating, operating, and managing communications networks supported by JACS.

(d) USNORTHCOM will develop, maintain, and provide the components with the joint layer for the JCEOI. This layer provides the central core of the JCEOI containing only joint circuits (CFC, CJTF and Air Coordination), common suffix and expander list, and those organizations that would require communications over joint circuits. The component master net list layers and requirements will be prepared by each respective Component and then JFMO NORTH will consolidate and generate the final JCEOI for dissemination, as needed.

(e) Subordinates and Components will electronically transfer their headquarters and subordinate CEOI information to the USNORTHCOM Joint Frequency Management Office for consolidation and deconfliction.

(f) Semiannually, all Subordinates and Component commands will review their OPLAN JCEOI database and submit updates to their master net lists.

(g) Subordinates and Components will ensure JACS computers, software, and properly trained personnel are deployed early to FORWARD headquarters locations.
(h) Air Combat Command (ACC) and Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) will extract the appropriate call sign, call words, and frequency data to build their Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Operational Tasking (OPTASK) communications.

(7) SJFHQ-North, subordinate commands, and/or component headquarters will deploy within the JOA as required. Initial communications for all headquarters, including connectivity to the NCA and to component headquarters, will be provided by in-place DII assets, Joint Communications Support Center (JCSC), Joint Staff Controlled communications assets, and leased commercial resources.

(8) Communications plans will include communications support to enable coordination between all assigned and supporting forces. Communications links established for liaison with non-DOD, Interagency, state, tribal, or local elements should use in-place U.S. networks or U.S. theater communications systems, as appropriate. Where U.S. military communications equipment is required, connectivity should be planned with U.S. equipment and operators at both ends. Component supporting plans should address specific communications requirements with outside agencies such as first responders.

(9) Joint communications methods and procedures will be employed unless otherwise directed. In those cases where individual service doctrine is in conflict, joint procedures will apply.

c. Operational Concept

(1) CDR USNORTHCOM, Interagency partners, and subordinate elements will deploy ISO DSCA operations. The objective is to integrate Joint and Interagency forces C2 in response to SecDef approved DSCA operations.

(2) **Network Connectivity Requirements.** Support for the baseline C4 systems and other essential communication capabilities require planning for connectivity to DISN services. Connectivity to the DISN allows information flow between DOD organizations/agencies, interagency organizations, and other supported or supporting entities; providing secure and non-secure voice, secure and non-secure data, e-mail, file transfer, and Video Teleconference (VTC) services.

(3) Essential communications with the interagency organizations will continue to evolve as requirements are defined and as the situation dictates. The designated C2 HQ will ensure coordination with interagency participants for implementation of critical links ISO communications and information flow.

c. Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) **USNORTHCOM Staff Directorates and Operational Planning/Coordination Cells.** Identify functional C4 information systems requirements to the
USNORTHCOM J6. USNORTHCOM J3 will validate all requirements and
determine their respective priorities.

(2) **USNORTHCOM / J6**

(a) Develop and manage integration of the C4 plan ISO DSCA operations.

(b) Oversee and monitor all communications networks ISO USNORTHCOM. Set policies and provide guidance to ensure communications equipment interoperability, compatibility and integration between USNORTHCOM Service Components and other supporting commands and agencies. Coordinate with USSTRATCOM, USJFCOM, the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office, and the Joint Staff J6 for communications support.

(c) Establish, operate, and maintain a TNCC to oversee and monitor component and JTF JCCCs IAW CJCSM 6231.07A.

(d) Exercise overall responsibility for spectrum management for Joint Operations with support from JFMO NORTH.

(e) Coordinate with controlling authorities for use of joint keying materials.

(f) Release Intent to Use and COMSEC Call Out message to all Services, Service Components and potential units.

(g) Coordinate, request, and validate the interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial and fixed communications systems.

(h) Develop, promulgate, and update a JCEOI to direct call signs, frequencies, and operating procedures.

(i) Identify, review, validate and prioritize SATCOM requirements.

(j) Develop and validate C4 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) issues within the JOA.

(k) Identify, validate, and prioritize STEP/Teleport support.

(l) Coordinate with USJFCOM for communications support to USNORTHCOM units using JFCOM resources.

(m) Approve the implementation of National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) to provide access to the commercial telecommunications infrastructure in or adjacent to the JOA.
(3) **USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office**

(a) Provide a liaison to the USNORTHCOM TNCC, JTF JCCC(s) and USNORTHCOM Current Operations Group (COG).

(b) Provide coordination to establish DISN connectivity.

(c) Coordinate NSEP procedures to expedite circuit requirements.

(d) Assist the USNORTHCOM Operational Planning Group (OPG) and Joint Planning Group (JPG) in identifying the designated communications capabilities during Course of Action (COA) development.

(e) Coordinate commercial communications systems provisioning and restoral.

(4) **Supporting Commands**

(a) **Commander, US Army Forces North (CDRARNORTH)**

1. Be prepared to (BPT) provide communications personnel and equipment support.

2. When designated, nominate and provide a JTF/J6.

3. Identify to USNORTHCOM/J6 any C4 requirements, to include Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) or SATCOM access support. Include and C4 CIP locations within the JOA that should be assessed for additional support or protection.

4. Plan communications interoperability procedures for operations with other USNORTHCOM Service Components and civil agencies.

5. Provide communications support packages for JTF HQs, as required.

6. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDRARNORTH and its’ subordinates.

7. Submit Communications SPOT (COMSPOT) and Communications Status (COMSTAT) reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

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8. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc_opg.c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

(b) Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Commander, Air Combat Command; Commander, Air Force Space Command

1. Provide, install, operate, and maintain (PIOM) all requisite communications equipment and systems applications necessary to support activities in the JOA and IAW Appendix 2 and Appendix 7.

2. BPT deploy an Initial Response Force (IRF) to take immediate emergency actions and provide initial C4 at the accident/incident location.

3. BPT recall and deploy the Response Task Force (RTF) to provide area C4 for deployed units.

4. Support the Joint Staff’s Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team, as required.

5. Identify to USNORTHCOM/J6 any C4 requirements, to include JCSE or SATCOM access support. Include any C4I CIP locations within the JOA that should be assessed for additional support or protection.

6. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CFFC; COMACC; and CDRAFSPC and their respective subordinates.

7. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

8. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc_opg.c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

(c) Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N)

1. BPT deploy the USNORTHCOM Commander’s Coordination Element (DDE)/Situational Awareness Team (NSAT) with organic C4 assets, as required.
2. BPT establish C4 nodes to support the IRF, RTF or JTF as required.

3. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDR JTF-CS and its’ subordinates.

4. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

5. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc_opg_c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

6. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(d) Joint Task Force (JTF) – Civil Support (CS)

1. BPT establish C4 nodes to support the IRF and RTF as required.

2. Identify to USNORTHCOM/J6 any communications equipment and personnel shortfalls.

3. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDR JTF-CS and its’ subordinates.

4. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

5. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the
USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc.opg.c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

6. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(e) Joint Task Force (JTF) – Alaska

1. BPT coordinate and integrate IRF and RTF C4 systems and requirements to support the CJTF.

2. Identify to USNORTHCOM/J6 any communications equipment and personnel shortfalls.

3. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDR JTF-Alaska and its’ subordinates.

4. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

5. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc.opg.c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

6. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(f) Joint Task Force (JTF) – National Capital Region (NCR)

1. BPT establish C4 nodes to support the IRF and RTF as required.

2. Identify to USNORTHCOM/J6 any communications equipment and personnel shortfalls.
3. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDR JTF-CS and its’ subordinates.

4. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).

5. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc_opg_c4i.omb@northcom.smil.mil. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

6. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(g) Commander, Joint Communications Support Element (CDRJCSE)

1. Upon CJCS approval, provide communications planning teams, expertise, personnel and equipment, as available. Advise USNORTHCOM/J6 of any limitations or equipment shortfalls.

2. Plan, coordinate, and execute frequency management operations and coordination for joint operations through the JFMO NORTH.

3. Provide a frequency manager and basic frequency management training for the JTF Joint Spectrum Management Element (JTF-JSME), as required.

4. On order, establish and maintain a JCCC. The JCCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for CDR JCSE and its’ subordinates.

5. Submit COMSPOT and COMSTAT reports IAW USNORTHCOM TNCC reporting procedures, as required. These procedures can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal (https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/J6/J63/J633).
6. When the JCCC is activated, publish a daily Communications Tasking Order (CTO) for dissemination to subordinate communications units. Send an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6 and the USNORTHCOM Operation Planning Group (OPG), e-mail nc.opg.c4i.omb@northcom.mil. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

7. Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 representative in the OPG. The USNORTHCOM/J6 OPG representative will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

d. Special Measures

(1) Commanders at any level of command have the authority to impose MINIMIZE within their command or JOA. USNORTHCOM/J6 will coordinate MINIMIZE imposition in the case of multiple JTFs operating in the same JOA.

(2) USNORTHCOM Component and subordinate commands may be tasked to provide, install, operate and maintain C4 assets and personnel, to include regional or local Systems Control Centers (SYSCONs), to meet potential future operational requirements.

(3) Intertheater COMSEC Package (ICP) materials will be used to secure joint and other specific circuits. USNORTHCOM will issue Combatant Command level COMSEC Call Out messages providing additional specific guidance as needed in coordination with (ICW) supported and supporting Combatant Commanders.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Requests for deployed routing indicators (RI), plain language addressees (PLA), or Defense Messaging System (DMS) support will be forwarded via chain of command, to USNORTHCOM/J6 IAW appropriate service directives.

(2) USNORTHCOM COMSEC Management Office is the single DOD POC for COMSEC management in USNORTHCOM.

(3) Information Assurance and Information Systems Security for a specific contingency management operation will be addressed by USNORTHCOM/J6 or the JTF Information Manager (IM), in the appropriate Execution Order (EXORD), Deployment Order (DEPORD), and/or Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO).
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D

a. Logistics

(1) USNORTHCOM components and agencies will fund their costs incurred as a result of this operation to include all pre-deployment costs and ongoing costs of transportation support to and from the USNORTHCOM JOA. Component commands will track costs and report costs to their component comptrollers.

(2) Maintenance and logistic support of communications resources tasked to support joint requirements will be the responsibility of supporting services except in those cases where other arrangements have been made through prior coordination.

b. Administrative


(2) Reporting requirements will be as directed by the USNORTHCOM EXORD, DEPORD, or applicable directives.

(3) Joint and commercial based circuit activations, outages and terminations will be reported via a COMSTAT report to USNORTHCOM TNCC daily. A COMSPOT will be submitted to report major communications outages longer than one hour. Both reports will be submitted to USNORTHCOM/J6 TNCC and the format can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal site.

(4) Document all communications after action items and Lessons Learned for inclusion into USNORTHCOM After Action Reports (AAR) and Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS).

(5) All cryptographic insecurities will be reported immediately IAW Service regulations. As a minimum, all incidents involving ICP key will include: Joint COMSEC Management Office, MacDill AFB, FL and USNORTHCOM/J6 TNCC as information addressees.

(6) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) incidents will be reported IAW Appendix 6 Tab A. Include USNORTHCOM TNCC on all messages.
5. Command and Control. USNORTHCOM exercises operational and supervisory control over all communications personnel and assets organic, assigned, attached, or ISO USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM Network Operations (NETOPS) will direct, via the TNCC, the activation, restoration, and deactivation of all C4 systems, links, and circuits.

TIMOTHY J. KEATING
Admiral, USN
Commander

Appendixes
1 -- Information Assurance
   Tab A -- Information Security
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OFFICIAL

NANCY L. BROWN
Rear Admiral, USN
Director, J6
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
INFORMATION ASSURANCE

References:


b. DOD Directive O-8530.2, Support to CND, 9 March 2001

c. DOD Directive 8500.01, Information Assurance, 2 October 2002

d. DOD Instruction 8500.02, Information Assurance Implementation, 6 February 2003

e. DOD Directive O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense, 8 January 2001

f. DOD Instruction O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense, 9 March 2001


i. NSTISSI No. 4013, National Training Standard for System Administrators in Information Systems Security (INFOSEC), August 1997

j. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy, 6 November 1998 (S)

k. CJCSI 6510.01C, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 1 May 2001

l. CJCSM 6510.01, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 25 March 2003
1. Situation

a. General. Advanced information systems technology today represents the cutting edge in many of our weapons, sensors, and command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems. This advanced technology is also a threat to military systems due to the availability of inexpensive attack alternatives to our adversaries. All systems connecting to, or utilizing Department of Defense (DOD) communications pathways are to be secured as to minimum DOD standards.

b. Enemy. There is no known enemy identified in the concept of this plan. If there were to be a network attack, another plan would be executed.

c. Friendly. All organizations are involved in protecting communications networks. USSTRATCOM via Joint Task Force-Global Net Ops (JTF-GNO) is responsible for processing and disseminating Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs) / IA Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVBs) which include implementing instructions.

2. Mission. Protect information by ensuring systems availability, integrity and confidentiality and promptly detecting, reporting, responding and recovering from incidents.

3. Execution. USNORTHCOM shall incorporate both technical and non-technical means to employ multiple protections within information systems and their supporting networks to establish and maintain a strong information assurance posture.

a. Concept of Operations. The USNORTHCOM Computer Network Defense (CND) strategy employs people, technology and operations to provide a defense-in-depth of DOD networks. CND activities are organized around four fundamental principles: deterrence, assurance, defense, and stabilization.

b. Tasks. All USNORTHCOM functional components and assigned forces will develop and implement a CND program. USNORTHCOM subordinate elements and staff must accomplish the tasks listed below.
UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Ensure all computer networks are reinforced with access control and strong identification and authentication measures within the system or network management components.

(2) Enforce the need-to-know principle for access to computer networks and specific types of information (e.g., intelligence, proprietary).

(3) Ensure network enclaves are protected by intrusion detection systems and firewalls.

(4) Ensure all networks are protected by DOD licensed anti-virus software.

(5) Ensure that classified or sensitive information transmitted between networks over a non-secure medium is encrypted or travels through an approved, protected distribution system.

(6) Provide for an IA monitoring and analysis capability that includes review of audit, firewall and intrusion detection logs.

(7) Ensure that Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) are developed and tested for all mission critical and support systems.

(8) Ensure electronic transaction data integrity and authentication are enhanced using appropriate combinations of digital signature, keyed hash and encryption mechanisms, whenever possible.

(9) Ensure systems are accredited, deployed and implemented as outlined in the accreditation package approved by the Designated Approving Authority (DAA).

(10) Ensure all personnel who use, operate, administer, or maintain DOD computers and computer networks receive CND and IA awareness training. Ensure all system administrators are certified in accordance with DOD skill qualifications and training level requirements.

(11) Ensure all systems comply with DOD, USNORTHCOM, and service COMSEC instructions and regulations.

c. Coordinating Instructions. IAW local unit COMSEC Custodian.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Units tasked to provide base or facility COMSEC service will respond to requests from operational elements for COMSEC keying material required to support operations.

b. Acquire security related COTS products (anti-virus software, enterprise security management software, etc. required to protect USNORTHCOM information systems,
including those used to protect “sensitive” information. Cryptographic systems will be acquired through the National Security Agency (NSA).

c. Operational Units will identify their COMSEC requirements early to the "base or facility COMSEC service" to ensure the COMSEC material is on hand.

5. Command and Control. Report all possible compromises of COMSEC keys to the unit COMSEC Custodian.

Tabs
A -- Information Security (INFOSEC)
B -- Theater COMSEC Management
INFORMATION SECURITY

References:

a. DOD Directive C-5200.5, Communications Security (COMSEC), 21 April 1990 (C)

b. DOD Directive 4640.6, Communication Security Telephone Monitoring & Receiving, 26 June 1981

c. DOD Directive 8500.01, Information Assurance, 24 October 2002

d. DOD Instruction 8500.02, Information Assurance Implementation, 6 February 2003

e. DOD Directive 8570.1, Information Assurance Training, Certification and Workforce Management, 7 Jul 2004

f. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy, 6 November 1998 (S)

g. CJCSI 6510.01C, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 1 May 2001

h. CJCSM 6510.01, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 25 March 2003

i. DOD 8510-1 M, DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), 31 July 2000


k. NAG 16, Field Generation & Over-the-Air Distribution of COMSEC Key in Support of Tactical Operations and Exercises, January 1999

l. NTISSD 600, Communication Security Monitoring, 10 April 1990 (FOUO)
1. **Purpose.** While there are many causes of computer network vulnerabilities, a number of them can be mitigated with appropriate planning and proper procedures. This tab establishes USNORTHCOM’s information security procedures to ensure the defense of Department of Defense (DOD) information and information systems that Combatant Commanders (CC)/Services/Agencies rely on to conduct operations. It includes processes and procedures necessary to achieve a secure information environment in which unauthorized elements are denied access. It includes the responsibilities, concepts and procedures of Information Security (INFOSEC), including Communications Security (COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC) requirements.

2. **General.** INFOSEC is critical to the successful execution of DSCA military operations.

   a. The provisions of this tab apply to all who use DOD computers and computer networks in the performance of their duties.

   b. The objective of this tab is to provide for transmission security, cryptographic security, and the physical security necessary to support INFOSEC and ultimately Computer Network Defense (CND).

   c. **Training**

      (1) The Designated Approving Authority (DAA), Information Assurance Manager (IAM), Information Assurance Officer (IAO), System Administrators, Information Assurance Professionals, Joint Task Force Command and Control (JTF-C2) Protect Officer and all others who are assigned Automated Information system (AIS) and computer network security responsibilities must be properly trained in security principles and techniques per DODD 8570.1 to ensure the AIS and computer network security program are properly administered.

      (2) Personnel having access to USNORTHCOM computer networks shall be familiar with the USNORTHCOM Information Assurance Awareness Program (https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j6/J63/j632/iaap/default.htm).

   d. **Certification & Accreditation**

      (1) Per CJCSM 6510.01, information and processes must be protected to ensure an appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability and to ensure that NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations are not disrupted and NORAD-USNORTHCOM missions are accomplished.

      (2) All information systems to include stand-alone personal computers, connected systems, and networks must be accredited IAW the DITSCAP manual.

      (3) The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Information Assurance Branch is available to assist in identifying the appropriate security requirements, design to meet those requirements, and then monitoring the accredited system for changes or reaccreditation as necessary.
3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of COMSEC Support.** Standard COMSEC procedures and requirements for USNORTHCOM are detailed in Tab B of this Appendix.

   b. **Concept of COMPUSEC.** Fundamental COMPUSEC safeguards shall be enforced to limit access to authorized persons, assure data integrity and provide for continuity of operations.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures.

5. **Physical Security.** Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures commensurate to high classification of information processed.
1. Purpose. This appendix establishes the information security (INFOSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) procedures needed to attain a secure communications-electronics (C-E) environment in which hostile elements are denied interception, intrusion, imitative deception, extraction, and analysis of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). This is accomplished through the conscious and thorough application of established INFOSEC/COMSEC directives and procedures. All additional procedures will be cleared through the USNORTHCOM/J6 COMSEC representative prior to implementation.

2. General. The provisions of this Tab apply to all who use secure Department of Defense (DOD) computers networks and communications equipment in the performance of their duties. The objective of this Tab is to provide for COMSEC procedures necessary for the protection of the Global Information Grid (GIG) and ultimately execution of the Computer Network Defense (CND) mission.

3. Execution

   a. Concept of COMSEC Support Operations. The COMSEC objective is to achieve maximum protection against hostile interception and analysis of communications by:

      (1) Systems shall always be accredited for the classification level of the information you are sharing. During civil support operations the use of higher classification systems to transmit unclassified data results in information flow hindrances to other civil support agencies that lack ready access to higher classification systems.

      (2) Complying with established red and black installation standards as they relate to the use of electronic processors of classified information.
(3) Separation of classified processors from unclassified processors to minimize acoustical and electromagnetic coupling that could result in inadvertent transmission of classified information beyond established physical control zones.

(4) Bulk encrypting transmission paths and thus reducing vulnerability to interception.

(5) Establishing procedures to reduce electro-magnetic emissions; e.g., reduce transmitter power, use directional antennas, and eliminate unnecessary transmissions.

(6) Practice and training in sound electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) procedures.

(7) COMSEC Key Materials (KEYMAT) will be provided via normal distribution methods, in accordance with prescribed service directives. USNORTHCOM COMSEC office will function as a coordinating agency for KEYMAT requests in support of NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations. The primary mission is to ensure effective distribution of KEYMAT supporting NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations.

(8) USNORTHCOM J6 provides overall policy guidance.

b. Tasks

(1) Commanders will ensure that appropriate joint, Service component, and unit-unique cryptographic codes and authenticators are issued from unit accounts to support operations.

(2) Responsible personnel will continuously account for and provide physical security of all classified communications equipment, materials, and Service/national directives.

(3) Responsible personnel will maintain continuous accountability of all COMSEC material according to prescribed service directives.

(4) Commanders ensure custodians are trained on the Electronic Keying Materials System (EKMS) as this will be the primary means for distributing keying materials in the AO.

(5) Personnel will use only approved storage facilities for COMSEC material.

(6) Personnel will destroy all COMSEC materials according to prescribed Service procedures.

(7) Commanders will ensure that all unit personnel are briefed on the following:
(a) Proper COMSEC procedures.

(b) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(c) Proper use of applicable call signs, cryptographic codes, and authentication systems.

(d) Techniques and countermeasures to use when confronted with communications deception and jamming.

(8) The Joint COMSEC Management Office Inter-theater COMSEC Package (ICP) will be used to support joint secure communications connectivity and interoperability. USNORTHCOM AOR-specific COMSEC will be distributed in-theater from the USNORTHCOM COMSEC office to the units/activities, when directed. Appropriate COMSEC short titles to be used in these operations will be determined and distributed.

(9) Component headquarters will ensure that units requisition listed materials, based on required connectivity, from Service crypto logic depots in advance of deployment. Deploying units will take all assigned/on-hand joint, Service, and unit-unique material. The basic deployment load for ICP material is current one (1) month plus three (3) reserve editions/months. The basic deployment load of non-ICP material is current one (1) month plus three (3) reserve editions/months. Reserve editions will be returned to stock/depot if not used or implemented by the controlling authority. Refer problems encountered in obtaining keying material for joint requirements to USNORTHCOM/J6 for resolution.

(10) To order required cryptographic material, one-time holders of ICP material will submit requests, through Service channels, to the Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO) ICP manager, with an information copy to USNORTHCOM/J6.

(11) Discoverers will report COMSEC incidents (cryptographic losses/violations, physical/personnel insecurities, etc.), to include those concerning ICP material, by immediate message, to (ACTION) USNORTHCOM //TCCC/TCMO// and the controlling authority of the key mat involved (for ICP material: JCMO MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL/) with info copies to Service chain of command authorities and Service crypto logic agencies, as appropriate, for evaluation and resolution. Reports should be identified as INITIAL, AMPLIFYING, INTERIM, or FINAL. Message(s) subject will be: COMSEC Incident. (See NSTISSI 4003 or applicable service regulation for additional instructions.)

(12) USNORTHCOM will make the decision for emergency supercession of keying material controlled by USNORTHCOM.
c. **Training.** All organizations are required to have trained COMSEC personnel IAW written policy and procedures. Formal cryptographic access, if appropriate, will be given to users based upon national or Service regulations.

d. **Coordinating Instructions**

   (1) Commanders of all organizations holding COMSEC material will maintain current detailed physical security, emergency destruction, evacuation, and disaster plans. Note: Emergency destruction and evacuation plans may not be required for units located in CONUS. Reference applicable service regulations for determination.

   (2) Guards for vehicles, ships or aircraft containing cryptographic equipment do not require clearance or formal cryptographic access. Equipment operators who do not have access to keying material do not require formal cryptographic access but must be responsible and trustworthy US military personnel or US government employees.

   (3) Holders of COMSEC material will follow service directives to maintain continuous accountability.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** Units are required to administer their COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

   a. **Cryptographic Security.** Only those codes, ciphers, or authentication systems provided by approved production agencies will be used for USNORTHCOM operations. It is a user responsibility to deploy with adequate quantities of required COMSEC items to enable secure communications.

   b. **Physical Security.** Units are required to administer their COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

      (1) Operators must have a clearance at least as high as the level of traffic being passed. Formal cryptographic access will be given to those individuals, as appropriate, based upon national/Service regulations or instructions.

      (2) Personnel assigned to guard vehicles, ships, or aircraft which contain cryptographic equipment do not require clearance or formal cryptographic access. Personnel assigned to operate equipment and who do not have access to keying material do not require formal cryptographic access, but must be responsible and trustworthy U.S. military personnel or U.S. government employees.

      (3) COMSEC equipment may be used in the immediate presence of non-U.S. personnel. Non-U.S. personnel should not be allowed to examine keying
material, support documents, or the equipment interior. Non-U.S. personnel will not be used as couriers for keying material.

(4) Over-the-Air Transmission/Over-the-Air Re-keying will be in emergency situations only and every precaution must be taken to eliminate the chances of proliferation of keying materials.

5. Command and Control

a. Positive Actions

(1) When using non-secured telephone or radio communications:

   (a) Maintain strict communications discipline.

   (b) Restrict number and length of telephone call/radio transmissions.

   (c) Maximize use of approved operations codes and authentication systems. Called station makes the initial challenge when authentication is mandatory.

   (d) Using available auto manual systems, encode or encrypt all sensitive or classified information for transmission.

   (e) Review cryptographic operating instructions of auto manual cipher systems.

   (f) Advise personnel of open circuit or uncradled phones to prevent acoustical coupling of background conversations over non-secure paths.

(2) When using secured communications links:

   (a) Used to pass EEFIs and sensitive or classified information.

   (b) Used to pass actual or suspected COMSEC violations.

   (c) Provide the required physical and personnel security for cryptographic equipment and materials.

(3) Transmission of the following information will be encoded or encrypted:

   (a) Reveals tactical training or the readiness or efficiency of units.

   (b) Contains information regarding identity, location, movement, or changes in strength of units.

   (c) Reveals changes in unit organization or mission.
(d) Reveals the introduction of new equipment which changes capabilities.

(e) Discloses shortages or deficiencies which impair the efficiency or readiness of a unit.

(f) Reveals actions which indicate operational intent or activity.

(g) Reveals the classification of a classified operation, program, or project.

b. **Prohibited Actions**

   (1) Do not discuss classified information or EEFI over non-secured communications means or attempt to "talk around the subject."

   (2) Do not use "homemade" call signs, code, cipher, or authentication systems or make modifications to approved cryptographic systems.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER PLANNING

References:

a. JCS Pub 6-01.1, Tactical Command and Control and Communications System Standards, Vol I, October 1991 (C)

b. CJCSM 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems, March 1999

c. JCS Pub 3-56, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations, 3 May 1995 (C)

d. CJCSI 6110.01A, CJCS-Controlled Communications Assets, 1 July 2002

e. JANAP 128J, Automatic Digital Network Operating Procedures, July 1993

f. ACP 121, Communications Instructions General, April 1983

g. ACP 126, Communications Instructions Teletypewriter Procedures, May 1989

h. DOI-102, DSSCS Operating Instructions, Routing Indicators, 1 May 2003 (S)

i. DOI-103, DSSCS Operating Instructions, System/Data Procedures, Dec 1999 (C)

j. ACP 117, Allied Communication Routing Indicator Book, Canada-U.S., April 1991

k. ACP 100, U.S. Call Sign and Address Group System Instructions and Assignments, March 1984 (C)

l. CJCSI 6511.01, Information Security Guidelines for the Deployment of Deployable Switched Systems, 1 Feb 2001

1. Purpose. Identifies the communications systems that are required to support USNORTHCOM assigned forces and supporting commands, and assigns specific responsibilities to provide, install, operate, and maintain (PIOM) these systems.
2. **Execution.** Upon execution of this plan, communications links will be established from the USNORTHCOM COG to the designated Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), Defense Coordinating Elements (DCEs), deployed JTF HQs, designated Base Support Installations (BSIs) and to other Federal and State agencies as required.

   a. **DCO/DCE, QRF/RRFs communications.** In addition to equipment required to support internal C4 requirements, owning unit will ensure they deploy with the standard C4 capabilities outlined in Tabs J and K of this Appendix.

   b. **Alternate Communications.** At the direction of USNORTHCOM, communications will be established using NSEP/TSP to procure existing commercial telecommunications services, tactical and theater fixed base communications, as well as any BSI assets. Should BSI assets fail, implement normal systems restoration plans. If systems are still inoperable, Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) action plans will be initiated to restore communications. If DISN restoration actions are not effective, then available tactical communications systems may be tasked to provide critical BSI communications. See Tabs E, F, and G of this Appendix.

   c. **Circuit Allocation.** USNORTHCOM and Service owned communications equipment associated with circuits listed in the MECL will be employed in accordance with this plan. The designated JTF/J6 will exercise technical control of the tactical communications systems in the JOA as determined by the MECL. Additional circuits necessary to support DP03 Contingency Operations may necessitate preemption of lower priority circuits and deployment of additional tactical communications equipment to the JOA. (See Tab H of this Appendix).

3. **Tasks and Responsibilities.** See Annex K

4. **System Description.** A tiered network architecture will be used to describe the level of the telecommunications infrastructure or boundary.

   a. Tier 0 nodes are managed by DISA or DIA and include fixed DII nodes as well as DISA Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) sites used to provide connectivity to DISN services.

   b. Tier 1 nodes are managed by USNORTHCOM. The principal agent for management of Tier 1 nodes and services supporting USNORTHCOM force deployments is the Theater NETOPS Control Center (TNCC) located at Peterson AFB, CO. Tier 1 nodes include all JTF, JCSE, TCCE-CA, and Service component nodes that directly interface with Tier 0 nodes or tie to a different Service component. The rule of thumb for Tier 1 (joint) is that anything that leaves the AOR or crosses Service or Agency boundaries is joint.

   c. Tier 2 nodes are managed by Service components or agencies. Tier 2 nodes include Service Component or agency nodes that are connected to Tier 1 nodes.
d. Tier 3 nodes are managed by Service components or agencies. Tier 3 nodes include Service Component or agency nodes that connect to Tier 2 nodes, typically resulting in an enclave with no other route out.

e. The network architecture will be supported by either ATM or Promina transport technology. Transmission links above 8.192 Mbps will normally use ATM switches tied into the DISN ATM (DATMS) network. Transmission links 8.192 Mbps and below supporting Tier 1 and 2 networks will be Promina based. An architecture based upon the existing CONUS infrastructure, extended by JCSC or JCSE, the JTFs, and select component established nodes will provide the required connectivity to all components and supporting agencies.

5. Planning Considerations. Specific guidance for planning and implementation of Promina network transmission resource controllers, voice, data, and message switch networks and terrestrial transmission systems are provided below and in Appendix 2 Tab H. Guidance for satellite planning is contained in Appendix 3.

a. Promina Network. The joint (Tier 1) transport network or backbone will be supported using the Promina transmission resource controller. The Promina provides a single, smart resource controller to efficiently interface, multiplex, route and altroute DISN services to other nodes via whatever transmission means is available (TRI-TAC and/or COTS systems). It provides for the seamless extension of existing CONUS DII strategic infrastructure. The Promina will be used as the primary nodal interface at each of the CONUS DII strategic nodes, JTFs, JCSE nodes, and at component Tier 1 and below nodes. Together these nodes will constitute the USNORTHCOM Promina network in an assigned domain between 120-129. These ten Promina domains have been assigned by DISA to USNORTHCOM for contingencies.

(1) Domain and Node Numbering. The USNORTHCOM deployed DISN domain, Domain 120, will be used by all Promina nodes within the deployment AOR. This includes the SJFHQ-North, JFHQ-NCR, JTF-CS, JTF-NORTH, JTF-AK, and Service component nodes. The Domain 120 nodes will be numbered from 1 to 250 as assigned in Tab A of this appendix. Node number changes and assignments will be controlled by USNORTHCOM/J6 TNCC and will be maintained as part of the NORTHCOM Communications Portal. Subordinate elements should provide the detailed engineering and configuration details of the communications node equipment in their respective Annex Ks. Even the card and port assignments must be well documented to enable timely circuit activations.

(2) Call Origination/Answer Standard. The call origination and answer parameter allows you to specify whether a port interface or circuit can originate and answer calls, only answer calls, or only originate calls. This allows processors to share loading so that no one node is performing all the call processing functions. The following call origination and answer standards will be
used within the USNORTHCOM network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>DISA</th>
<th>NORTHCOM</th>
<th>JTF</th>
<th>MARNORTH</th>
<th>NORTHAF</th>
<th>ARNORTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARNORTH</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNORTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table K-2-1. USNORTHCOM Call Origination/Answer Standard

(3) **Card Standards.** Specific Promina circuit cards will be used in order to maintain a common baseline or standard carding of Tier 0 and Tier 1 Promina nodes. The table below provides a listing of the Promina standard cards and the typical circuit or interface supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Card Type</th>
<th>Circuit Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Voice Analog</td>
<td>Voice Orderwire (primary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QASD with RS-232 Rear Interface Card</td>
<td>TADIL/Link 11 &amp; 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC with DSX Rear Interface Card</td>
<td>DSN CAS and ISDN Voice (and commercial telephone T1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSD2B with RS-530 Rear</td>
<td>SIPRNET/NIPRNET/JWICS/DRSN/DVSG/Predator UAV Video at rates 9.6 Kbps &lt; 8.192 Mbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD with RS-530 Rear</td>
<td>SIPRNET/NIPRNET/JWICS/DVSG/DRSN (at rates 1.2 Kbps &lt; 1.344 Mbps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD with CDP Rear Interface Card</td>
<td>TRI-TAC DTGs at rates 1.2 Kbps &lt; 1.344 Mbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Switch Module (PX3 with LWX) (for ISDN and LAN/WAN)</td>
<td>NIPRNET (secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Switch Module</td>
<td>ISDN Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Voice Secure (PVS) Card</td>
<td>Voice Compression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QBRI Card</td>
<td>ISDN BRI interface</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table K-2-2. USNORTHCOM Call Standards
(4) **Network and Node Management.** The PanaVue network management system will be used to manage the deployed AOR Promina network or domain. The HP Open View Network Node Manager application will be used to provide nodal management. The PanaVue platform uses industry standard SNMP based tools for managing a network. The DISA RNOSC will manage the DISN Tier 0 nodes. The TNCC or JCCC will manage the Tier 1 nodes. The RNOSC, TNCC, SJFHQ-North, and Service component headquarters may be expected to have a PanaVue network management system capability. There will be no more than eight PanaVue managers in a deployed domain. Nodes with PanaVue will perform a SNMP management function and will receive (as directed) Promina node (SNMP agent) information. The PanaVue will be installed on a Sun Ultra workstation running at a minimum the web server with P-800 Series Manager and HP Open View. The TNCC will determine which PanaVue network managers are authorized to monitor and configure which traps a Promina node (agent) sends. In addition, the TNCC will assign Tier 1 PanaVue managers an IP address and determine the community string or workgroup assigned to one or more manager. In order to protect nodes, the TNCC PanaVue manager will use read-only privileges. Service Component headquarters will be responsible for assigning IP addresses to subordinate Tier 2 Promina nodes.

(5) **Network Timing.** Stratum 1 clock references disciplined by GPS receivers will be required at all Tier 1 nodes. Therefore, the primary Tier 1 joint network and systems will be Stratum 1 equivalent. Any systems without a stratum 1 reference will derive timing from another Stratum 1 node within the network.

(6) **Promina Node Programming.** The Promina node programming will be IAW USNORTHCOM/J6 Rules of Engagement, DISANORTH and JITC standards and procedures. Careful attention will be made to properly configure the Promina in order to minimize differences between strategic and tactical (Tier 0 and Tier 1 and below) networks.

b. **Voice Networks.** The backbone of the USNORTHCOM deployed voice network will consist of deployed RED Switches, Commercial Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) switches; e.g., REDCOM IGX, and TTC-56 Single Shelter Switches. Gateway links shall be established between US controlled switches and designated coalition switches. Refinement of the routing scheme will be coordinated with the TNCC and accomplished as equipment becomes available until the entire network is complete. Joint Tier 1 voice network diagrams are contained in Tab A to this appendix. Changes to the network will be coordinated with the TNCC, and subscribers will be notified of numbering scheme changes. Circuit status reporting to the TNCC will be IAW the USNORTHCOM JCESI.

(1) **Routing.** The Joint tactical switched network will be a mixture of commercial PABXs and flood search routed network employing Circuit Switch Routing – Task Execution Plan (CSR-TEP) software. The flood search switches employing this software are now referred to as Common Baseline Circuit Switches (CBCS).
The joint tactical flood search network will have gateway access into the Defense Switched Network (DSN), deployed commercial PABXs, and designated coalition switched network. All CBCS switches will route to these gateways using the Assign Gateway Classmark (AGC). Component networks will include some deterministic switches such as the SB-3865, Line Terminating Units (LTU) and Small Extension Nodes (SEN). Routing to these switches will also use AGC if the distant end has a different NNXX than the parent switch. All Zone Restriction, Gateway and Deterministic routing screens within the Tier 1 network will be reported to, logged and managed at the TNCC.

(2) Trunk Group Cluster List. The present Tactical/DSN network in the AOR may conflict with the Tactical Network Analysis and Planning System (TNAPS) Trunk Group Cluster (TGC) automatic assignments.

(3) Trunk Group Signaling for Interswitch Trunks. The first digital channel of each digital TGC and each hybrid TGC will be used for signaling.

(4) System Activation. Activation of switches, switchboards, and trunks will be coordinated with the TNCC so the appropriate switch program changes and user-dialing instructions can be promulgated. TNCC will coordinate with DISA to ensure that the NROs are initiated. Once the NRO is complete the TNCC will ensure that a copy is sent to the component.

(5) Reserved Subscriber Numbers. The individual subscriber number 0 is reserved for operator intercept at all locations, and 100 is reserved for information. Subscriber number 866 will be reserved for switch maintenance.

(6) Tactical Numbering Plan. The tactical numbering plan will be IAW CJCSM 6231.02 CH 3. The network will use the 3-digit switch/4-digit extension (3/4) numbering plan. The Global Block Numbering Plan will be used.

(7) Restoration of Service. Service failures will be restored to theater subscribers by priority as reflected on the critical circuits list and as determined by the TNCC. Each voice switch will implement a restoration plan by applying the Essential User Bypass (EUB) for deterministic routing switches or the Assigned Bypass and Duplication (ABD) and Assign Bypass Reception (ABR) for flood search routing switches.

(8) Red Switch Network. A Red switch network is interwoven in the tactical and DSN network. The Red switch network consists of Red ISTs, long locals and on site Deployment Red Switches (DRSs). Red Voice calls to/from DSVTs utilize area codes as follows: Incoming Red calls will use area code 615 and outgoing calls area code is 812. Note: DSVT Red Voice subscribers CANNOT call VoIP Red phones. Red IST's can be (U) interconnected between TRI-TAC / MSE switches and DRSN switches via a T1 LTU with appropriate classmarks. All Red Voice service requirements must be validated by the TNCC and approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Request for DRSN service will be submitted IAW CJCSI 6215.01B message format.

9. Protective Distribution Service and zone restriction tables. All Joint switches will configure for PDS=N. Under no condition will this feature be modified. All switches will implement zone restriction for area code 812 in tables 1-6. All switches configured for PDS=Y will implement Zone Restriction for area code 812 in all Zone Restriction tables. Calls initiated from switches configured for PDS=Y are NOT PERMITTED to connect with area code 812.

10. Affiliation. Users off of the CBCS switch supporting joint HQs will have their phones affiliated by the supporting communications unit. Components may choose to have their users affiliate their own instruments.

11. Timing. All CBCS switches should be run in the MASTER TIMING mode even if collocated with another timing source such as an IDNX with a GBS standard. All switches without a timing standard will run in the SLAVE mode off the closest timing source.

12. Telephone Book Maintenance. Hard copy telephone books will not be published. Each subordinate and component will maintain electronic phone books on their web servers. The URL for component phone books will be provided to the TNCC for inclusion on the TNCC web page. The TNCC will archive all component phone directories on a monthly basis.

13. Defense Switched Network Service

(a) Defense Switched Network (DSN) service will be provided to essential elements of commands, and will be accessible through “common-user” DSN trunks tied to the deployed (tactical) voice network. DISA will reprogram the DSN switching network to ensure area codes are properly routed. All DSN user problems (i.e., misdirected calls, DSN recorded messages) will be reported to the TNCC. Tactical subscribers will be required to dial the appropriate area code to complete a DSN call.

(b) The 615 area code will be entered as the home area code into the software database for each EAC switch such as AN/TTC-39, TTC-56 and AN/TTC-42 circuit switch located in the USNORTHCOM deployed AOR. This will eliminate the requirement for users to dial ten or eleven digits for calls within the area code. These additional area codes have been reserved by DISA for USNORTHCOM contingency use: 616, 617, 618.

(c) The 615 area code will be entered as the home area code into the software database for each REDCOM IGX commercial switch located in the AOR.
(d) JFLCC Echelon Below Corp (EBC) switch operating in PDS=Y environment ISO V Corp will enter 616 as their the home area code.

(e) Other area codes (617 and 618) may be used in the network; however assignment will be made by the TNCC in coordination with DISA.

(f) Precedence for the majority of DSN customers will be routine. Precedence for tactical users will be governed and assigned in accordance with USNORTHCOM JCESI and CJCSI 6215.01 regulations. No Flash or Flash Override precedence will be programmed without COMUSNORTHCOM validation and approval. All components will monitor precedence abuse and report it to the TNCC. Should there be any precedence abuse, trunks will be class-marked to restrict the highest precedence they will pass. Subsequent abuse may result in zone and area code restrictions being applied to the appropriate switch, area code, or subscriber.

(g) DSN and commercial access will be limited IAW CJCSM 6231.02.

(14) **Switch Reporting**

(a) All Tier 1 tactical switches will monitor their R1, R2, R3 and R5 in 12-hour increments, consolidate and forward to the TNCC on a weekly basis.

(b) All REDCOM IGX commercial switches will monitor their switch call attempted, completion and routing performance reports in 12-hour increments, consolidate and forward to the TNCC on a weekly basis.

c. **Data Networks.** Joint data networks in the deployed USNORTHCOM AO include NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS. NIPRNET and SIPRNET are Internet Protocol (IP) data networks. JWICS is an SCI ATM system with an IP data, grey voice, and video component.

(1) **Data Network Guidance**

(a) All data requirements of joint headquarters, components, and supporting agencies will be satisfied by joint IP data networks.

(b) NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS connections will be available from in-theater locations via fixed station DII (includes STEP/Teleports) nodes.

(c) Components and agencies are responsible for interfacing their data networks with the joint IP data networks and to each other as required.

(d) No joint satellite or terrestrial bandwidth will be allocated for component and/or agency unique IP data network requirements.
(e) Component and agency data networks will not duplicate the joint data networks.

(f) Only the TNCC can exempt data systems from using the joint IP data networks.

(2) **Configuration Management.** The TNCC controls configuration of Tier 1 routers. To facilitate configuration management, all first-level passwords for Tier 1 routers will be established by the TNCC. Enable passwords will be developed by the responsible O&M activity and will be provided to the TNCC via secure means. Passwords will not be changed without TNCC approval. The TNCC will direct password changes based on current network security guidelines. The TNCC retains the authority to direct configuration changes to any router which extends the joint data network. Any extension of NIPRNET or SIPRNET into the deployed USNORTHCOM AOR (e.g., Trojan Spirit) is considered a joint resource and will be connected with appropriate IP networks under TNCC control. Configuration changes will be directed through a Tactical TSR (TTSR) issued by the TNCC.

(3) **Routing Standards**

(a) **Exterior Gateway Routing.** Border Gateway Protocol, version 4, (BGP4) will be used as the standard for connecting IP router autonomous systems. The use of any other exterior routing protocol requires TNCC approval.

(b) **Interior Gateway Routing Protocol.** Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP) will be used for routing within an autonomous system. The use of any other interior routing protocol requires TNCC approval.

(c) **Router Configuration.** All routers connected to the joint IP data networks must meet the configuration standards established in the USNORTHCOM C4 ROE. Routers will not contain static routes without TNCC authorization.

(4) **IP Addressing.** IP addressing will be in accordance with the CJCSM 6231.07B. USNORTHCOM/J6 will assign contingency IP network addresses and autonomous system numbers (ASNs) as required. The USNORTHCOM/J6 has been assigned from DISA five SIPRNET and five NIPRNET ASNs for contingencies; sixty-four SIPRNET and sixty-four NIPRNET Class-C address ranges have also been assigned by DISA to USNORTHCOM for contingency use.

(5) **Electronic Mail.** The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) will be the standard network electronic mail protocol. Components and agencies using NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS will provide SMTP gateway service and Domain Name Server (DNS) service for each network.
UNCLASSIFIED

(6) **Network Connection Process.** Network connections will be established in accordance with the NIPRNET Connection Approval Process (CAP) and the SIPRNET connection process. These processes are identified in DOD Instruction 5200.40.

(7) **Network Management.** Network management is accomplished through employment of the Joint Network Management System (JNMS). To enable network status monitoring through JNMS, all Tier 1 routers will be Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) compliant. The TNCC will direct the use of a common community string to allow data gathering and network device polling. JNMS suites fielded at each JTF JCCC are the only authorized SNMP polling sites. Until JNMS suites have been fielded to the deployed elements, Joint DII Control Systems (JDIICS) and other HP OpenView systems are directly interoperable with those JNMS suites already fielded. Component-unique network management tools used to manage Tier 2 and below network devices can be used but will not conduct SNMP polling of network devices without TNCC approval.

(8) **Information Assurance.** All organizations are involved in protecting communications networks. All systems connecting to, or utilizing Department of Defense (DOD) communications pathways are to be secured as to minimum DOD standards.

(a) **Directives.** USSTRATCOM via Joint Task Force-Global Net Ops (JTF-GNO) is responsible for processing and disseminating Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs)/IA Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVBs) which include implementing instructions.

(b) **Guidance.** The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Information Assurance Branch is available to assist in identifying the appropriate security requirements, design to meet those requirements, and then monitoring the accredited system for changes or reaccredidation as necessary.

d. **Messaging Network**

(1) **Purpose.** To establish procedures for preparation, transmission, and distribution of record message traffic in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(2) **General**

(a) Record message traffic will be via DMS.

(b) **Fortezza distribution.** Services are responsible for forterza distribution in theater.
(c) Cross-Service DMS support. Cross-Service agreements will be made at the discretion of local commanders based on recommendations from supporting communications staff.

(d) Routing indicators (RIs) will be constructed and promulgated IAW CJCSM 6231.03, CJCSM 6231.07 and Tabs A, B, and C of this Appendix. Effective dates will be published by separate correspondence on plan implementation.

(e) Message precedence is determined by the speed of service required to deliver the information to the user. The criteria for use of a particular precedence are provided in ACP 121 and will be used to select a precedence for a message.

(f) The speed-of-service objectives for message switch networks are established in ACP 121, U.S. Supplement 1. These objectives apply to the total elapsed handling time, from time of file at the point of origin, to the time available at the addressee's communications center. In-station handling times at each switch directly affect speed of service.

(g) The message network will operate as an integrated R/Y, U.S. tactical network, serving both GENSER and DSSCS communities. To achieve this capability, individual switches shall operate as R/Y, R-only, or Y-only switches, if certified by DIA, JITC, and the USNORTHCOM theater Automatic Message Processing System Security Officer (AMPSSO) to do so.

(h) The network will be activated and deactivated IAW CJCSM 6231.03 and CJCSM 6231.07.

(3) General Service Routing Indicator. The procedures for general service (GENSER) routing indicator (RI) allocation and assignment to USNORTHCOM service components are described below.

(a) Non-Automatic Relay Center (NARC) Assignment. The theater network AMPSSO will assign four-letter NARC RIs to each message switch as required by CJCSM 6231.07.

(b) RI and Plain Language Address (PLA) Assignment. Each component will issue and maintain individual seven-letter RIs (derived from assigned NARCs) and PLAs IAW CJCSM 6231.07. Each message switch AMPSSO will provide the seven-letter RIs for all connected subscribers. Each Service component will ensure each PLA and RI is appropriately published in ACP-117 (Sections I and IV) for tactical and worldwide promulgation. In addition, each component is responsible for dissemination of all PLAs and RIs to subordinate units/activities.
(4) Message Switch Network Management

(a) The TNCC will centrally manage, direct, and control all message switches under the guidance of the NCJ6. The TNCC will monitor network performance and will direct and approve network changes/additions as required, including circuit activations, DISA controlled CARPS and other actions initiated or controlled by outside agencies that affect the intra-theater networks. The network will be managed IAW CJCSM 6231.03 and CJCSM 6231.07. The procedures described herein for message switches will also apply to "stand-alone" terminals directly connected to ASCs.

(b) Routine changes to the automatic message switch data bases will be made by a Communications Service Order (CSO) change order from the TNCC to the appropriate AMPSSO and component SYSCON. For clarity, TNCC personnel will also coordinate these change orders telephonically with the appropriate component AMPSSOs.

(c) Responsibilities

1. USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO. The Theater Message Switch Network will be managed by the USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO. Management responsibilities and guidelines for the network manager/AMPSSO are provided in CJCSM 6231. Specific functions include, but are not limited to:

   a. Assigning "R" and "Y" NARC RIs to all message switches in the theater.

   b. Assigning, in coordination with the Theater Special Security Officer (SSO), all DSSCS RIs (NARC plus derivative) in the theater.

   c. Approving the activation, deactivation, and modification of all AUTODIN circuits between DCS ASCs and message switches in the theater.

   d. Approving the activation, deactivation, and modification of all inter switch trunks between message switches in the theater.

   e. Approving the activation/deactivation of all message switches and DSSCS terminals in the theater.

   f. Ensuring that message switch databases are properly certified and maintained.

   g. Issuing database change orders.

   h. Approving all CARP actions.
i. Specifying reports and submission frequency.

j. Controlling and promulgating AN/TYC-39 message switches passwords, unless the AMPSSO delegates that authority to the component, or switch AMPSSO.

2. Message Switch-AMPSSO. Each message switch within the network shall have an AMPSSO. Each switch AMPSSO will be guided by CJCSM 6231.03 and CJCSM 6231.07, and 5.c(5)(c)1. above. Specific functions to be performed include, but are not limited to:

a. Ensuring that GENSER and DSSCS NARC and RI assignments are executed.

b. Requesting, in coordination with the appropriate SSO, PLAs and RIs (NARC plus derivative) for DSSCS terminals to be connected to the switch.

c. Requesting and supervising the activation, deactivation, and modification of all AUTODIN circuits between ASCs and the message switch.

d. Requesting, and supervising the activation, deactivation, and modification of all inter-switch trunks between adjacent message switches.

e. Requesting and supervising the activation and deactivation of the message switch, as well as the activation and deactivation of all DSSCS terminals connected to the message switch.

f. Ensuring the message switch data base is properly maintained and secured.

g. Executing data base change orders issued by the Theater AMPSSO.

h. Requesting, in coordination with the SSO, CARP actions involving DSSCS traffic.

i. Certifying to the USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO that the switch database is correct whenever a new database is loaded or undergoes significant modifications affecting DSSCS traffic.

j. Ensuring that the Network Control Routing Report (NCRR A) function is enabled when the switch is initially activated, and that it remains enabled during the entire operational period. Switch
supervisors are not authorized to disable network reporting without both switch and USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO approval.

k. Ensuring that the switch, if operationally capable of processing DSSCS traffic, is certified by the appropriate SSO as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

3. Component Communications Control Centers. Each component with responsibility for record communications network management will:

   a. Provide the USNORTHCOM TNCC with a point of contact name and telephone number for their network manager/AMPSSO.

   b. Provide message switch reports to the USNORTHCOM TNCC during the course of the operation as required and scheduled by the USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO.

(d) Message Switch Activation Procedures

1. Upon arrival at the deployment site, switch personnel will establish tactical circuit connectivity and will verify AUTODIN access circuitry to the AUTODIN patch and test facility. However, activation of these circuits will be controlled through the TNCC in coordination with DISA. Prior to activation as an R/Y message switch, the AN/TYC-39 must be established inside a SCIF that has been certified to the CFC SSO as meeting the SCIF requirements outlined in DIAM 50-3. The message switch will not be activated for R/Y traffic until this certification is complete.

2. During message switch activation, the network control function, NARC, will be enabled and remain enabled for the duration of the operation. All data bases must have been previously certified by the switch AMPSSO and SCIF requirements (for R/Y switches) must have been met.

3. The Inter-Theater COMSEC Package (ICP) Pair-Wise Unique COMSEC concept will be used when the AN/TYC-39s are activated. When a message switch is activated, systems checks will be performed to ensure circuits are operational. All message switches will rekey their COMSEC devices IAW CFC COMSEC call out message (TBP).

4. Designated COMSEC Net Control Station (CNCS) will perform master switch functions as detailed in the AN/TYC-39 COMSEC call out message (TBP).

5. All activations, deactivations, circuit data rate changes, etc., will be coordinated with the DCS AUTODIN controller prior to implementation.

(e) Contingency Alternate Routing Program (CARP)
1. The USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO will manage/approve all tactical switch CARP actions within the theater and coordinate with the Defense Information Systems Agency AUTODIN Control.

2. Service components will submit all requests for CARP actions to the USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO.

3. CARP requests must identify the source RI, destination RI, categories of traffic, the Language Media Format of the messages to be CARP'd, and how long the CARP needs to remain in effect (from/to dates and times [ZULU]).

4. The USNORTHCOM TNCC-AMPSSO will review and validate all CARP requests. CARP orders will be issued by USNORTHCOM TNCC and/or the DISA Liaison Element, as appropriate.

(5) **Addressee Indicator Groups (AIG)**

(a) An AIG is a form of address designation, for electrically transmitted messages, representing a predetermined list of specific and frequently used combinations of action and/or information addressees represented by a number.

(b) The appropriate AIG may be used by the message drafter in lieu of listing each addressee individually. Additional addressees, for a specific message, may be included by showing them specifically in the address element on the message form under ACTION or INFO, as appropriate, in addition to the AIG. Addressees contained in the AIG may be omitted from a specific message by using an XMT followed by the action and information addressees whom are to be exempted from receiving a particular message.

(c) AIGs for use by coalition forces will be requested from USNORTHCOM/J6. The staff section requiring the service of an AIG will promulgate AIGs for coalition forces. Components will obtain required AIGs through service channels.

(d) AIG management is the responsibility of the AIG originator.

e. **Terrestrial Transmission Systems.** The following information and guidance for the activation, operation, and configuration of the terrestrial transmission systems applies to all forces and subordinate elements operating or subscribing to the intra-theater communications systems or networks.

(1) **Joint Radio Net Operations.** Joint command and control radio nets will be used to support combat operations, and all radio net operation will be IAW applicable ACPs and JANAPs. Net Control Stations will maintain positive
control over the network's operation. Only authorized and assigned frequencies will be used. The USNORTHCOM JCEOI provides information on the use of joint radio nets. The JCEOI will be supplemented as necessary by separate correspondence.

(2) Terrestrial Multi-channel Communications. Terrestrial transmission systems provide significant increases in bandwidth availability and ease the burden on scarce satellite resources. Planned terrestrial multi-channel connectivity between joint Tier 0 and Tier 1 nodes is shown at Tab E of this Appendix. These systems provide robust and redundant paths for the intra AOR network. As equipment becomes available, the terrestrial multi-channel network will continue to expand.

(a) Components and supporting agencies will use terrestrial transmission media to the maximum extent possible. Every effort will be made to transition fixed nodes (e.g., air bases, port and logistics facilities) from satellite transmission systems to terrestrial systems at the earliest opportunity. Priority for use of available satellite space segment will be given to mobile forces.

(b) Transmission systems will be shared whenever possible to provide an alternate routing capability for restoral of high priority circuits.

(c) To ensure system and circuit interoperability, component units providing support to agencies external to their command will ensure changes in transmission media are coordinated with the agency concerned prior to implementing the change.

Tabs
A -- Topology
B -- Collaboration Tools
C -- Interagency Communications
D -- Network Operations
E -- Recovery and Reconstitution
F -- Deployable Communications Guidance
G – Mission Essential Circuit List
H – USNORTHCOM / J6 Theater C4I Coordination Center Network Communications Reporting
I – Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Rapid Reaction force (RRF) Communications Guidance
J -- DCO/DCE Communications Guidance
K – Common Operating Picture
TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

TOPOLOGY

1. Purpose. The purpose of this tab is to identify representative transport topologies supporting CONPLAN 2501-05 Contingency Operations.

2. General. There are a number of systems used in USNORTHCOM and the components. Each of the systems is unique in its mission. The layout of each of these systems is identified in the exhibits.

   a. Subordinate elements should document the next level of engineering and configuration detail for each of these exhibits to ensure timely activation of circuits.

   b. Subordinate element Annex Ks should include these exhibits in relation to the mission.

Exhibits
   1 -- Topology
   2 -- DSN
   3 -- DRSN
   4 -- SIPRNET
   5 -- NIPRNET
   6 -- CENTRIX/RELCAN
   7 -- JWICS
EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

STEP / Teleport Sites:
- Roberts (C, KU, X Band)
- Detrick (X Band)
- Belvoir (X Band)
- Bragg (X Band)
- Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
- Melville (X Band)
- MacDill (X Band)

Camp Roberts, California
DISA Teleport with IP Modems

USNORTHCOM
MCCC

DISN
Promina Domain 1

ARNOIRTH
OCP #2

USNORTHCOM
Contingency Promina Domains = 120 => 129
FOUO
STEP / Teleport Sites:
1. Roberts (C, KU, X Band)
2. Detrick (X Band)
3. Belvoir (X Band)
4. Bragg (X Band)
5. Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
6. Meade (X Band)
7. MacDill (X Band)

K-2-A-3-1
UNCLASSIFIED
EXHIBIT 4 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2501-05
SIPRNET

STEP / Teleport Sites:
- Camp Roberts, California (C, X Band)
- Detrick (X Band)
- Belvoir (X Band)
- Bragg (X Band)
- Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
- Maldives (X Band)
- MacDill (X Band)

---

USNORTHCOM
MCC

Ft. Sam Houston
ARNORTH
Garrison

Ft. Monroe
JTF-CS
Garrison

JISCC/ISISCS xN
SJFHQ-N JEMPRS
JTF-CS TACPAC x2

TF Troops xN
TF Medical xN
TF Logistics xN

---

CONPLAN 2501-05
SIPRNET
ASN 3614

STEP / Teleport Sites:
- Camp Roberts, California (C, KU, X Band)
- Detrick (X Band)
- Belvoir (X Band)
- Bragg (X Band)
- Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
- Maldives (X Band)
- MacDill (X Band)

---

USNORTHCOM
Contingency
ASNs = 27053-27057
IPs = 199.32.60.0
→ 199.32.123.255
FOUO
EXHIBIT 6 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2501-05
CENTRIX/RELCAN

STEP / Teleport Sites:
/ Roberts (C, KU, X Band)
/ Detrick (X Band)
/ Belvoir (X Band)
/ Bragg (X Band)
/ Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
/ MacDill (X Band)

SIPRNET
ASN 3614

USNORTHCOM MCCC

CNTRIXS / RELCAN

KIV-7
CISCO IP Router

KIV-7
CISCO IP Router

KIV-7
CENTRIXS / RELCAN LAN

CENTRIXS / RELCAN

SJFHQ-N

CNTRIXS / RELCAN

ARNORTH OCP #1

ARNORTH Garrison

ARNOARH OCP #2

FT. MONROE JTF-CS Garrison

FT. SAM HOUSTON ARNORTH Garrison

NORAD-USNORTHCOM HQs
EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05

JWICS

STEP / Teleport Sites:
- Roberts (C, KU, X Band)
- Detrick (X Band)
- Belvoir (X Band)
- Bragg (X Band)
- Northwest (C, KU, X Band)
- Meade (X Band)
- MacDill (X Band)

DIA JWICS

ASN 1

USNORTHCOM

MCCC

DIAC

Ft. Sam Houston

ARNORTH Garrison

NORAD-USNORTHCOM

HQ

ARNORTH OCP #1

ARNORTH OCP #2

JTF-CS

FOUO
References: USNORTHCOM Information Management Plan, 30 December 2003

1. **Purpose.** This tab provides an overview of the CONOPS for collaborative tools and outlines key features of them.

2. **Communications Tools.** The importance of time and the criticality of information requirements are what drive the development and use of communication tools. The capability of each tool is flexible and can be applied to a variety of purposes and processes. People drive processes and the communication tools provide support for those processes. Figure C.2.K.1 illustrates possible information requirement scenarios and the potential tools that can be used. The tools are not limited to the diagram. Information and documents pertaining to the communication tools listed below are located on the USNORTHCOM Communications portal Quick Launch bar located at:

NIPRnet: https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/communications/
SIPRnet: https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/communications/

Table K-2-B-1. Collaborative Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements Categories</th>
<th>Examples of Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Decisions</td>
<td>DRSN, IRC, Web Chat, VOIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Crisis Alarms</td>
<td>COP, AME, Phone, PA System,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Real Time or Time Sensitive</td>
<td>Arc View GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Quick Dissemination to All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness and Planning</td>
<td>VTC, DCTS, Net Meeting,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Groups and teams</td>
<td>DSEL, Portal, RFII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Real Time</td>
<td>VTC, DCTS, Net meeting,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Collection &amp;</td>
<td>DSEL, Email, Portal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>Public Folders,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-One to One or Many</td>
<td>Shared Drives,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Not Urgent</td>
<td>AMHIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Folders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Document Storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED
INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

1. **Purpose.** Coordinate methods of communications to be used between USNORTHCOM and other Federal Agencies supporting the USNORTHCOM missions.

2. **General.** Because there are numerous communications systems within the government and civilian sectors and not all of them are compatible, efforts need to be made by each unit with the agencies they communicate with. The following guidance will apply to all local, state, and federal agencies supporting the USNORTHCOM mission.

   a. All unclassified information will be posted on the unclassified NIPRNET portal so as to allow maximum information sharing among all participants. Access to the USNORTHCOM collaborative tools (DSEL, DCTS, mIRC and RFI tool) will be available for all participants through the portal. Accounts for the collaborative tools will be administered by USNORTHCOM J6.

   b. An unclassified, static version of the COP will be posted on the portal in conjunction with a readily available GCCS based, dynamic COP feed distributed via C2PC.

   c. All unclassified message traffic will be posted on the NIPRNET portal.

   d. VTCs will be held at an unclassified level as much as possible in order to invoke maximum participation.
TAB D TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
NETWORK OPERATIONS (NETOPS)

References:


b. Unified Command Plan 2002, with Changes 1 and 2, 10 January 2003

c. Terms of Reference for the Implementation of UCP 02 Change 2 Revision 1, 10 December 2003

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, May 1996

e. CJCSI 3110.01A, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 12 September 2003

f. CJCSI 6510.01C, Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 1 May 2001

g. CJCSM 3150.07A, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), 1 October 1998

h. CJCSM 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), Version 4.0, 1 October 1999

i. CJCSM 6231.01A, Manual for Employing Joint Communications Systems: Joint Tactical Systems Management, 23 May 1997

j. CJCSM 6231.07, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications: Joint Network Management and Control, 1 August 2001

k. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 February 1995

l. DODD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense (CND), 8 January 2001

m. DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense (CND), 9 March 2001

n. DOD Directive 8100.1, Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy, 19 September 2002
1. **Purpose.** NetOps is the operational construct that the Commander, NORAD-USNORTHCOM will use to enable a full spectrum of assured, interoperable, Net-Centric capabilities to direct, prioritize and respond to mission requirements. NetOps will provide the commander NORAD/NORTHCOM Situational Awareness (SA) of all Area of Responsibility (AOR) theater GIG assets and command and control (C2) of those required for mission accomplishment.

2. **General.** USNORTHCOM NetOps will employ the following methods to achieve these goals:

   a. Establish NetOps Joint Mission Essential Tasks List (JMETL). Define, develop and deploy functions and capabilities through the integration of NetOps JMETL ~ Enterprise Service Management / Network Management (ESM/NM), Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND) and Content Staging/Information Dissemination Management (CS/IDM). Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of NetOps (ESM/NM, IA/CND and CS/IDM) by enhancing understanding of the effects each has on one another and managing them holistically.

   b. Establish shared situational awareness. Define, develop and deploy a user definable, automated, near real-time situational awareness capability that supports all DOD domains and NetOps decision makers. This includes developing a collaborative decision making process, the standard reporting TTP, criteria, thresholds and information required to integrate, correlate and analyze the GIG.

   c. Establish an operational construct. Define an operational construct that establishes the authorities and responsibilities for centralized control and decentralized execution of NetOps throughout the Combatant Commands, Services and Agencies (CC/S/A). Develop well-defined collaborative TTP that establishes an operational understanding between warfighting, intelligence and business domains. This collaborative process of
operating the TIG will enable Net-centric Operations and Warfare by DOD and NORAD-USNORTHCOM. Key to the successful operation and security of the TIG are the collaborative tactics, techniques and procedures that will enable centralized control and decentralized execution of NetOps.
1. **Purpose.** Provide CONPLAN instruction to USNORTHCOM, its subordinate commands, and the Service Components

2. **General**

   a. There are two primary emergency capabilities employed by USNORTHCOM, its subordinate commands, and the Service components. These are Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS); these two programs are discussed herein.

   b. Each USNORTHCOM subordinate command and Service component is responsible for establishing its own policy for management of GETS and WPS.

   c. The Military Affiliated Radio System (MARS) is addressed below.

3. **Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).**

   a. GETS provides National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users with a dependable and flexible switched voice and voice-band data communications service for use during periods of emergency or crisis. GETS uses existing features and services of the public switched network (PSN) with selected NS/EP augmentations and enhancements. The GETS architecture allows the service to evolve and capitalize on the changing and improving technological capabilities in the PSN, thus remaining responsive to NS/EP users.

   b. GETS is an emergency telecommunications service to be used only when a user is unable to complete emergency calls through normal or alternative telecommunications means. It is to be used on a call-by-call basis for voice calls and/or low rate data communications calls; it is not intended for extended use on a modem line or for high volume/high speed data communications calls. GETS can not be used to dial a toll-free destination number, but each toll-free phone number translates to a regular 10-digit North American Numbering Plan (NANP) telephone number. Emergency planners are encouraged to provide both the toll-free number and its translation number in all emergency planning documents.
c. GETS is available nationwide and from overseas locations through the GETS universal access number, 1-710-NCS-GETS (627-4387). The GETS long distance carriers, AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, provide this service using priority features and services of the PSN. They provide personal identification number (PIN) access authorization for GETS access control, priority treatment and enhanced routing of calls, and other features within their networks in conjunction with any government-acquired enhancements to the PSN.

d. GETS can be accessed from a telephone service connected directly to a local phone service provider end office, cellular service, personal communications service (PCS), or from telephones connected to the PSN through a private branch exchange (PBX) or central office exchange (Centrex). In addition to these normal PSN access methods, Federal Telecommunications System (FTS), Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), and Defense Information System Network (DISN) provide alternatives for access to GETS for government GETS users.

e. POC and User Organization Responsibilities.

(1) Responsibility for GETS policy and procedure administration resides with personnel within each of the subordinate commands and Service components. These policies and procedures are generally incorporated into the operational or contingency telecommunications plans of the user organization. Each organization is responsible for designating a POC and alternate. A POC’s responsibilities include identifying GETS users, requesting GETS cards for each user, reviewing GETS Usage Reports (Call Detail Records), and identifying future GETS requirements. Additionally, the POCs are required to validate the accuracy of their GETS card holdings on an annual basis and provide updated information on a regular basis.

(2) Access to the PSN and to the local telephone company end office is the responsibility of the GETS user organization and must be addressed for each location where GETS users are expected to perform NS/EP functions. Where applicable, it may be necessary to modify PBX and Centrex service to recognize the GETS NANP Code (710) and the long distance providers’ carrier access codes (CAC).

(3) The policies and procedures developed by the user organizations should cover all aspects of using GETS, including:

   (a) GETS card management/administration.
   
   (b) Training/Exercises.
   
   (c) Usage reports and billing
   
   (d) Fraud and abuse
(4) Each user organization is responsible for determining the number of GETS cards required for individual users, contingencies, and future growth. There are no specific limits on the number of GETS cards an organization can or should request. However, each GETS user must have a bona fide NS/EP mission as described above. In determining the requirements, identify those individuals who must be able to maintain communications in order to implement emergency contingency plans and disseminate critical information.

(5) GETS cards must be protected to prevent unauthorized access to GETS and fraudulent use of the service. Each organization should develop policies and implement procedures to ensure GETS cards are provided adequate protection.

(6) The GETS POC is responsible for submitting a completed GETS/WPS (Wireless Priority Service) request form for each user to the OMNCS (See "Requesting GETS" below). In addition, user organizations may request active GETS cards to be retained as "stockpile." Stockpiling ensures the user organization has an active GETS card supply available for emergency use, but requires careful control and handling. Each user organization may request no more than 10% of their total GETS cards as stockpile. In an emergency, the cards may be distributed by express mail, telephone, e-mail, or fax. When issuing a stockpile card to an individual, it is necessary to inform the OMNCS, preferably by submitting an on-line GETS/WPS User Request, including only the first eight digits of the stockpile PIN used as indicated on the GETS card. In the case of a short-term GETS card assignment, it is necessary to cancel the card after the need has passed. If necessary, it is possible to request replacement stockpile cards.


a. WPS allows authorized National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) personnel to gain access to the next available wireless radio channel on their cell phone to initiate calls during an emergency when channels may be congested. Note that at this time WPS provides priority access to the originating cell tower only. Later, WPS will provide priority access through the remaining segments of the cellular system to the destination.

b. When congestion is experienced on a WPS-enabled phone, dial *272 + the destination number. This will invoke the WPS feature and signal the network that the call being placed is a priority call. Use the GETS card by dialing *272 710-NCS-GETS for even greater priority to a destination number. GETS provides priority service over the landline segments of your cellular call. GETS and WPS work together to greatly enhance the chances of completing an NS/EP call. T-Mobile is the current service provider offering WPS, but AT&T Wireless, Cingular, and Nextel will be offering WPS soon.

c. GETS/WPS CONTACT INFORMATION
5. **Military Affiliated Radio System (MARS).**

a. MARS is a Department of Defense sponsored program, established as a separately managed and operated program by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The program consists of licensed amateur radio operators who are interested in military communications on a local, national, and international basis as an adjunct to normal communications. There are various types of networks and each accomplishes a specific goal. For example, administrative networks take care of the day-to-day management of the program; traffic networks exist solely to pass third-party traffic; and of course, emergency networks provide for communications needs during periods of emergency. There are also technical nets and training nets. MARS nets operate in different modes.

b. USNORTHCOM subordinate commands and Service components will develop plans to use MARS as appropriate in a contingency.

c. The MARS program is designed to support:

   (1) **The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS).** JDOMS is the DSCA Action Agent. JDOMS recommends the deployment and employment of Military Service, Defense Agency, and DOD Field Activity resources and transmits appropriate orders directing such deployment and employment in DOD responses to natural and man-made disasters.

   (2) **National Communications System (NCS).** This NCS "SHARES" program provides a single, intergovernmental emergency message handling system by bringing together existing HF radio resources of Federal and federally affiliated organizations when normal communications are destroyed or unavailable for the transmission of national security and emergency preparedness information.

   (3) **National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).** NDMS is a federally coordinated system that augments the Nation's emergency medical response
capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to establish a single integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in dealing with the medical and health effects of major peacetime disasters.

d. MARS Frequencies include:

- **Phone patch frequencies**
  - 13927 KHz  Primary Call
  - 14390.5 KHz  Secondary Call
  - 7633.5 KHz  Call (night)
  - 4557 KHz  Call (night)

- **Regional net frequencies**
  - Region 1: 3315, 4595, 7324
  - Region 2: 3299, 4577, 7317
  - Region 3: 3308, 4517, 7305
  - Region 4: 3370, 4842, 7302
  - Region 5: 3292, 4450, 7329
  - Region 6: 3296, 4575, 7457
1. **Purpose.** Provide guidance for deployable communications packages to support USNORTHCOM missions.

2. **General**

   a. Deploying units that have been chopped to USNORTHCOM and all USNORTHCOM components will follow this guidance in order to ensure communications between them and USNORTHCOM. This is general guidance and packages should be tailored to meet minimum communications requirements for the unit. Packages can be mixed to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for the deployment.

   b. The chart below gives general guidance to what constitutes a light, medium, or heavy deployment. Use it as a guide to determine what communications packages should accompany the unit during the deployment. Time can also be a factor in determining the communications packages. For example, if the deployment is within a short period of time (less than 24 hours) then packages may change based upon availability of equipment and personnel. In any case, appropriate communications packages should be deployed as soon as possible to support the deployed unit.
Table K-2-F-1. Deployable Communications Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT SIZE/FORCE PACKAGE</th>
<th>SMALL</th>
<th>MEDIUM</th>
<th>LARGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Personnel deploying</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated Communication Technician</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment lift requirements</td>
<td>Hand Carry</td>
<td>C-130 lift</td>
<td>Self mobile or C130 lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Voice (STU/STE or secure cell phone)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Secure Voice (cell phone and land line)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Data connectivity (SIPRNET with access to NC collaborative tool suite)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure connectivity (NIPRNET with access to NC collaborative tool suite)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure VTC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure VTC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRSN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWICS (with video capability)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMR</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure High Freq Radio</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS (NC COP access)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF SATCOM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Phone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Fax</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure Fax</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TAB G TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
MISSION ESSENTIAL CIRCUIT LIST (MECL)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this tab is to identify the MECL in support of CONPLAN 2501-05 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Contingency Operations.

2. General. The following voice and data circuits are identified as mission essential in support of Contingency Operations (circuits are listed by priority; highest priority in each category listed first):

   a. Voice

      (1) DRSN: Any switch to military Point of Presence (POP).

      (2) DSN: Any switch to military POP.

      (3) Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN): Any switch to civilian POP.

      (4) Satellite phone: Iridium, Globalstar and INMARSAT are acceptable; others may be used after coordination and testing with USNORTHCOM.

      (5) UHF TACSAT - USNORTHCOM Nets.

   b. Data

      (1) NIPRNET - Unclassified E-Mail.

      (2) SIPRNET – Classified E-Mail, GCCS, JDISS, GSORTS, JOPES, etc.

      (3) AUTODIN/DMS.

      (4) UHF TACSAT - USNORTHCOM Nets.

      (5) Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)

3. Group One - Mission Critical. The loss of this equipment would cause an immediate stoppage of critical mission support:

   a. Any military or civilian wideband (SHF, GBS, commercial) satellite system or transponder that provides intra-theater communications connectivity or alternative DISN entry.
b. Any UHF satellite system or transponder that provides intra-theater communications connectivity.

c. The loss of any military or civilian Dial Central Office (DCO) or equivalent at the deployed location or relay point.

d. The loss of connectivity between GCCS nodes.

e. The loss of a military or civilian NIPRNET or SIPRNET server or router at the deployed location or relay point.

4. **Group Two - Mission Essential.** The loss of this equipment would reduce operational capability:

   a. Automatic telephone switches, which provide additional secure and non-secure telephone connectivity.

   b. Automatic message switches, which provide record communications connectivity.

   c. Technical control type systems, which provide line conditioning, patching, monitoring, and testing for voice and teletype or data circuits.

5. **Promina Switch Installation and Circuit Priorities.** A Promina node will enter the network only after proper node number assignment and other connectivity information (cut sheets) is obtained from the TCCC or USNORTHCOM/J6. Nodes first entering the network will use the “force path” or “require path” feature to statically route circuits. This option specifies that a specific trunk will be used to route a circuit. The circuit will be blocked if the trunk is not activated or sufficient bandwidth available. The call / preempt priority option determines what circuit is allocated bandwidth or reconnected in assigned priority order of importance. The option for call priority and preempt priority allows for 0 (lowest) to 15 (highest). The call priority determines if a circuit can be preempted when there is insufficient bandwidth on a trunk (or in a network) to handle the call. The preempt priority is used in cases where no trunk or network bandwidth is available and the preempt value assigned is higher than the call priority. Circuits having a call priority value lower than the preempt priority are preempted until enough bandwidth becomes available. The following call and preempt priorities will be used unless otherwise directed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circuit Call/Preemption</th>
<th>Circuit Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/15</td>
<td>Orderwire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/14</td>
<td>Emergency Use</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/13</td>
<td>TADIL / Link 11, 16, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>DSN (First Parallel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>DSN (ISDN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>DVSG VTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11</td>
<td>SIPRNET (First Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11</td>
<td>AUTODIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>NIPRNET (First Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>JWICS (First Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>DRSN / PDAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>DSN (Second Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>SIPRNET (Second Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>NIPRNET (Second Parallel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>JWICS (Second Parallel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>AAFES / other Logistics</td>
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<td>1/1</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<td>TBD/TBD</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1. **Purpose.** Provide an overview of the TNCC mission, structure and functions; and information on TNCC reporting relationships and requirements.

2. **TNCC Mission.** TNCC provides 24/7 Situational Awareness (SA), coordination, defense and oversight of NORAD/USNORTHCOM (NORAD-USNORTHCOM) C4 resources. The TNCC monitors status of C4 troubleshooting, networks, bandwidth, SATCOM apportionment, spectrum management, and Information Assurance (IA) activities within the command.

3. **Operations.**

   a. **Normal Operations.** During non-crisis and non-exercise periods the TNCC conducts normal operations. The roles and functions of each position are as follows:

   (1) **Systems and Network Management (S&NM) Watch.** The S&NM role includes monitoring the many different transmission systems that carry voice, data, and video throughout the theater. S&NM functions include the following:

      a. Maintain SA on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TIG resources.
      
      b. React to unscheduled outages.
      
      c. Coordinate scheduled outages.
      
      d. Report health and status of NORAD-USNORTHCOM TIG resources.
      
      e. Recognize TIG deterioration and coordinate maintenance and repair measures.
      
      
      g. Coordinates with Air Force Space Network Operations and Security Center (AFSPC NOSC) and Defense Information Systems Agency Global Network Operations and Security Center (DISA GNOSC) at daily meeting.

   (2) **Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND) Watch.** The IA/CND Watch mission includes the following functions:
(a) Assess impact of C4 issues and the events affecting the NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations.

(b) Recognize IA threats and coordinate CND measures.

(c) Provide C4 SA required to operations, planning, and support groups.

(d) Serves as J6 liaison within the Joint Operations Center (JOC).

(e) Monitor Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) conferences.

(f) Represent NORAD-USNORTHCOM in Computer Network Event Conference (CNEC) and Computer Network Assessment Conferences (CNAC).

(g) Complete all appropriate checklists when a IA/CND event occurs.

(h) Perform S&NM tasks as needed.

(3) Defense Messaging Service (DMS). The TNCC will provide 24 hour DMS support:

(a) The DMS Center supports the NORAD-USNORTHCOM command in accordance with the NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J6 Information Management Plan (IMPLAN), Annex U, Tab G, Appendix 3.

(b) The email address for each network is:

1. SIPRNET: dms.center@dms.northcom.smil.mil.

2. NIPRNET: dms.center@dms.northcom.mil.

3. NEN: dms.center@norad.cas.spacecom.af.mil.

(4) Noncommissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) of the Watch. The NCOIC monitors all aspects of the TNCC operations and provides guidance to the S&NM, IA/CND, and DMS personnel to ensure that the TNCC is successful in its mission. The NCOIC will also complete the following:

1. Assure quality products from the crew.

2. Attend key meetings such as the CSAM, and OPS/INTEL meeting.

3. Prepare and present TNCC daily briefing.
4. Brief J6 Director and staff who call in for SA updates.

b. Adaptive Operations (Crisis Ops). During a crisis or exercise the NORAD-USNORTHCOM HQ transitions to an adaptive “egg” structure. When this occurs the TNCC will adapt its operations to support the 24/7 operations of the Current Operation Group (COG), Operations Planning Group (OPG), Joint Planning Group (JPG), and the Information Synchronization Group (ISG). TNCC will man all positions 24/7.

4. Reporting Requirements. Network reporting is divided into Systems & Network Management (S&NM) and Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND). All components will report to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC as directed below:

a. Components and assigned Joint Task Forces (JTF) will report daily NETOPS status each workday to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC NLT 0600 Mountain Standard/Daylight Time (MST/MDT). Reporting times may be adjusted as mission and real world events require. Components will submit a Communications Spot (COMSPOT) report within 2 hour of an event. Reports can be of any format that provides the minimum information; event, time, estimated time of return to service, and mission impact (refer to Attachment1 for example COMSPOT). Components are welcome to email additional charts, spreadsheets, or text files that amplify NETOPS status.

(1) Information required to S&NM.

(a) Unscheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the following systems as applicable: Data, NIPRNET, SIPRNET/ADNET, JWICS, SATCOM; SHF, EHF, UHF, GBS, IRIDIUM, commercial, INMARSAT, Voice: DSN, DRSN, PSTN/Cellular, Line of Sight Ground Entry Station (LOS/GES – a system used by CADS), VTC, DMS/AUTODIN, and deployable communications suites (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

(b) Loss of service or issues with the following applications: GCCS, TBMCS, Missile Warning, Air Warning, email, web server, chat, JDISS, GBS, and DCTS (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

(c) Failure or issues with any DRSN conferences (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

(d) Pending scheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the systems listed above.
(e) Any issues with the above systems or other systems that affect mission capability or readiness (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

(f) Absence of Component Commander and J6/A6.

(g) Pending actions or issues you are awaiting action from the NORAD or USNORTHCOM J6 staff. These may include requests for information or staffing an action.

(2) Information required to IA/CND.

(a) Current INFOCON, attainment DTG, and any pending change.

(b) Status of Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) compliance and receipt acknowledgement for any new IAVA.

(c) Status of compliance with any current Computer Tasking Orders (CTO).

(d) Any incidents/intrusions/infections of component information systems (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

(e) Any IA/CND issues that affect readiness (refer to Attachment 1 of this tab for example COMSPOT).

b. POC for current and after hours NETOPS issues for each of the NETOPS areas are:

S&NM – DSN 692-8222
IA/CND – DSN 692-2365 (24/7)
DMS – DSN 692-2294

c. Components may send reports to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC at: northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil (SIPRNET), northcom.tccc@northcom.mil (NIPRNET), and norad.usnorthcom.tccc@norad.cas.spacecom.af.mil (RELCAN SIPRNET).

d. Reports produced by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC include the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC NETOPS briefing. Periodic reports include Event Assessment Reports (EAR, refer to Attachment 2 of this tab), Items of Interest slides for notifications of new IAVAs and CND events (refer to Attachment 4 of this tab), DOD situational awareness reports (SAR, refer to Attachment 3 of this tab), and DRSN Conference Summary slide (refer to Attachment 5 of this tab). These reports are sent via email from the TNCC. If your component is not receiving any of these reports, please contact the TNCC to be added to the distribution lists. Reports are also posted to www.northcom.smil.mil/dept/j/j6/tccc/index.asp.
5. **Relationships.** TNCC communicates with multiple federal agencies outside of NORAD-USNORTHCOM Combatant Command during a crisis. The TNCC uses collaborative tools to maintain communications. These tools include the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Portals, Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS), and the Dynamic Synchronization Event Log 4.1 (DSEL). TNCC conducts a daily DCTS session at 0745 MST/MDT, to present the USNORTHCOM TNCC NETOPS Assessment which is posted in the TNCC DCTS conference room. During a crisis or exercise the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC will conduct the NETOPS Assessment DCTS briefing twice daily at 0745 and 1945 MST/MDT to maintain SA.

Exhibits

1. -- COMSPOT Reports
2. -- Event Assessment Report
3. -- Situational Awareness Report
4. -- Item of Interest Report
5. -- DRSN Conference Report
EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2501-05
TNCC COMMUNICATIONS SPOT (COMSPOT) REPORT

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this exhibit is to specify the means for reporting of communications systems by service component commands, special agencies, and designated elements.

2. **General.** COMSPOT reports will be submitted when a disruptive condition exists or the potential for a disruption exists on a critical node or link, when a major change in situation has taken place, and when the disruptive event or threat of disruption has cleared. Reporting stations are required to send a COMSPOT within two (2) hours of being notified of a reportable situation. The report will be submitted via SIPRNET e-mail to: northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil.

3. **Report Content.** At a minimum, COMSPOT reports will include the following information:

   a. Classification: (Enter appropriate classification of event).
   b. Type of Report: (Initial, Update, or Final)
   c. Event that triggered report:
   d. System(s) affected:
   e. Start of outage:
   f. Apparent reason for outage:
   g. Estimated time of repair:
   h. Operational impact assessment:
EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO NORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
TCCC EVENT ASSESSMENT REPORT

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this exhibit is to specify the means for reporting on a C4I outage within the NORAD/USNORTHCOM AOR.

2. **General.** This report should be completed when Service component commands, special agencies, and designated elements report an outage of C4I systems and their impact to the NORAD/USNORTHCOM mission.

3. **Event Assessment Report (EAR).** The EAR will contain the following information at a minimum:
   
a. **Classification:** (Enter appropriate classification of event).
   
b. **Event:** (Event, effective times, duration of outage).
   
c. **Discussion:** (Summary of the event including details on cause of outage and fix actions).
   
d. **Impact to NORAD/USNORTHCOM:** (Assessment of impact, if any).
   
e. **Current Status:** (Status of identified outage).
   
f. **Way Ahead:** (Pending actions, if any and potential impact).
   
g. **Report POC:** (Rank, name, TCCC Watch Officer, DSN xxx-xxxx).
EXHIBIT 3 TO TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO NORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
TNCC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT (SAR)

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this exhibit is to specify the means for reporting on the release of a SAR form the JTF-CNO or DOD CERT.

2. **General.** This report should be completed when TNCC receives a SAR form the JTF-CNO or DOD CERT.

3. **Situational Awareness Report.** The SA report will contain the following information at a minimum:
   a. Classification: (Enter appropriate classification of event).
   b. Event:
   c. Summary:
   d. Recommended Countermeasures:
   e. DOD Impact:
   f. NORAD/USNORTHCOM Impact:
   g. Commercial and Industry Impact:
EXHIBIT 4 TO TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K SUPPORTING NORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
TCCC ITEM OF INTEREST REPORT

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this exhibit is to specify the means for reporting on items of interest to service component commands, special agencies, and designated elements.

2. **General.** This report should be completed when TCCC is notified of new IAVAs or CND events.

3. **Item of Interest E-mail Report.** The item of interest report will contain the following information at a minimum:
   
   a. Classification: (Enter appropriate classification of event).
   
   b. Message Sender:
   
   c. DTG:
   
   d. Subject:
   
   e. Summary:
   
   f. Impact to NORAD/USNORTHCOM:
   
   g. Message Text:
   
   h. (Paste text here from original message (AMHS/DMS)
   
   i. POC Information (rank, name, DSN: XXX-XXXX, Comm: (719) XXX-XXXX).
1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this Exhibit is to report the status of all NORAD/USNORTHCOM conference calls via the DRSN.

2. **General.** This report should be completed after a DRSN convenes for a JFACC, Noble Eagle or domestic events conference, and should state whether the conference was successful or had errors that hampered the call.

3. **DRSN Conference Summary E-mail Report.** The DRSN Conference Summary report will contain the following information at a minimum:

   a. **Classification:** (Enter appropriate classification of event).

   b. **Event Description:**

   c. **Information of Interest:**

   d. **Date/Time of Conference:**

   e. **Any Communications Issues Noted:**

   f. **Summary of Event:**

   g. **POC Information** (rank, name, DSN: XXX-XXXX, Comm: (719) XXX-XXXX)
1. Purpose. The purpose of this tab is to provide communications guidance to deploying QRFs and RRFs.

2. General

a. QRF Communications Guidance. In addition to equipment required to support internal C4 requirements, owning unit will ensure QRFs deploy with the following C4 capabilities to support external C4 requirements:

   (1) Minimum of one (1) VHF-FM radio to ensure voice communications in remote locations.

   (2) Minimum of one (1) secure cellular phone with wireless priority service to ensure voice communications within cellular coverage areas. QRF owning units will be required to establish an account to manage wireless priority service (WPS). Information on WPS can be found at HTTP://WPS.NCS.GOV.

   (3) Minimum of one (1) STU-III/STE with key/card to maintain secure voice communications.

   (4) Minimum of one (1) secure IRIDIUM or INMARSAT/STU-III satellite phone ensuring communications when there is no cell phone coverage and STU-III/STE is not available.

   (5) Minimum of one (1) secure voice/data capable single channel TACSAT radio (with VDC-400, laptop and required cables) to ensure communications coverage in remote areas.

   (6) Minimum of one (1) secure HF radio to ensure secure voice communications in remote areas.

   (7) Minimum of one (1) multi-band radio (30-512MHZ) for monitoring local and state bands as required.

   (8) Minimum of one (1) hatch-mount antenna for en-route communications.
b. **RRF Communications.** In addition to equipment required to support internal C4 requirements, owning unit will ensure RRFs deploy with the following C4 capabilities to support external C4 requirements:

1. Minimum of two (2) VHF-FM radio to ensure voice communications in remote locations.

2. Minimum of two (2) secure cellular phone with wireless priority service to ensure voice communications within cellular coverage areas. QRF owning units will be required to establish an account to manage WPS. Information on WPS can be found at HTTP://WPS.NCS.GOV.

3. Minimum of two (2) STU-III/STE with key/card to maintain secure voice communications.

4. Minimum of two (2) secure IRIDIUM or INMARSAT/STU-III satellite phone ensuring communications when there is no cell phone coverage and STU-III/STE is not available.

5. Minimum of one (1) secure voice/data capable single channel TACSAT radio (with VDC-400, laptop and required cables) to ensure communications coverage in remote areas.

6. Minimum of one (1) secure HF radio to ensure secure voice communications in remote areas.

7. Minimum of one (1) multi-band radio (30-512MHZ) for monitoring local and state bands as required.

8. Minimum of one (1) laptop/modem to permit dial-up NIPRNET access (if using same laptop for secure communications with TACSAT must have second removable hard drive). If no dial-up capability is available through RRF home station, contact USNORTHCOM/J6 TCCC at DSN 554-8222 or commercial (719) 554-8222, to arrange connectivity at USNORTHCOM.

9. Minimum of one (1) hatch-mount antenna for en-route communications.

3. **JFLCC JCEOI and JCSI.** The JFLCC will continue to maintain the Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (JCEOI) and the Joint Communications Supplemental Instructions (JCSI) for QRF/RRF operations.

4. **TACSAT.** The HLD/QRF net will be used for QRF/RRF operations. OPR FOR THIS NET IS NORTHCOM J637 (DSN 692-8040 or DSN 692-7771 SIPRNET MAIL: NC.SATCOM.OMB@NORTHCOM.SMIL.MIL or NIPRNET MAIL: NC.SATCOM.OMB@NORTHCOM.MIL). Alternate POC is the NORAD/NORTHCOM TCCC, DSN 692-8222.
a. JFLCC has operational control of this net for the duration of the operation.

b. JFLCC is the net control station during QRF/RRF deployment operations.

c. This net may be used for training purposes as operations permit. JFLCC will establish procedures for requesting block time access for training.

d. During training block times, the using unit will act as the NCS unless preempted by JFLCC.

5. **COMSEC Callout.** All units will use the Joint Staff Intertheater COMSEC Package (JSICP), as directed by CJCSI 6510.01. The Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO) promulgates a monthly effective edition status message to all COMSEC accounts holding the materials. It is the COMSEC custodian’s responsibility to obtain the required material and to ensure that the proper material is issued to the user.

6. **Reporting Instructions.** All net problems will be reported IAW NORAD/NORTHCOM TCCC reporting requirements.
TAB J TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
DEFENSE COORDINATING OFFICER (DCO)/DEFENSE COORDINATING ELEMENT (DCE) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this tab is to identify communications requirements for the DCO and DCE when they deploy.

2. **General.** DCOs/DCEs will deploy with the following C4 capabilities:

   a. Secure/non-secure phone (cell phone and STU-III/STE) with wireless priority service (WPS) and government emergency telecommunications service (GETS) cards to maintain communications with operations centers. ARNORTH will be required to establish an account to manage WPS for DCO/DCES. Information on WPS can be found at HTTP://WPS.NCS.GOV.

   b. Secure/non-secure satellite phone (IRIDIUM or INMARSAT with STU-III) for use should the cell phones not be available in the area where deployed.

   c. Secure/non-secure FAX to transmit and receive written communications.

   d. A computer with dial-up NIPRNET to access USNORTHCOM portals and communicate with other federal agencies. Access must be to a .GOV or .MIL domain to access all USNORTHCOM services.

   e. Data capable single channel TACSAT (VDC-400 and cables) to transmit and receive written communications should FAX and computer systems not be available in the area where deployed.

   f. Dial-up SIPR access to access secure USNORTHCOM portals and communicate with other federal agencies that have secure communications capabilities.

   g. Multi-band radio (30-512mhz) for monitoring local and state bands.

   h. Secure high frequency (HF) radio to ensure voice communications where other sources are not available.

   i. COMSEC as required to support above C4 systems.
Reference: USNORTHCOM COP CONOPS, 31 March 2005

1. **Purpose.** This tab provides an overview of the CONOPS for the USNORTHCOM Common Operating Picture (COP).

2. **General.** Common Operational Picture (COP) Management.

   a. A solid understanding of friendly, threat, and environmental information are key to maintaining Situational Awareness (SA) supporting Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support missions. USNORTHCOM, maintains a Common Operational Picture (COP) to fuse, analyze, and assess information required to create and share situational awareness. This is accomplished through common screens displayed within distributed operations centers. This situational awareness architecture includes static and dynamic track displays as well as briefings for senior officers. Awareness promotes knowledge. To make sound decisions, judgment applied against knowledge generates a level of understanding required for leaders at all levels of command. Properly integrated, a COP reduces elements of uncertainty, often referred to as the, “fog of war.”

   b. The end state for the USNORTHCOM COP is as follows: Each battle space domain (Land, Maritime, Air, SOF, NGB, Cyber, and Interagency) has a single integrator for that respective component of the COP. USNORTHCOM provides overall integration of each battle space domain to produce a “fused” COP. Inputs to the COP supporting DSCA are inherent to the missions of Joint Forces Land, Maritime, and Air Component Commands (JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFACC) and Joint Task Forces (JTFs). All USNORTHCOM JTFs report integrated COP information pertaining to their Joint Operations Area (JOA) per guidelines established by this CONOP. USNORTHCOM/J32 will provide COP inputs for all special operations forces in support of USNORTHCOM to the COP manager. Additionally, USNORTHCOM leverages the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) unique position as a conduit and channel of communications to the National Guard in the 54 States/Territories; NGB supports USNORTHCOM COP development and sustainment by reporting information pertinent to employment of National Guard capabilities employed by the Governor(s) in State Active Duty (SAD) and/or Title 32 status.
Figure K-2-K-1. COP Diagram

3. Detailed information about COP operations can be found on the USNORTHCOM portal.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
SATELLITE COMMUNICATION

References:

a. CJCSI 6250.01B, Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004

b. CJCSI 6251.01A, Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications Demand Assigned Multiple Access Requirements, 21 April 2005

c. DISA Global Contingency and Exercise (CONEX) Planning Guide, May 2003

d. Strategic Directive 714-2, Satellite Communications (SATCOM) System Expert (SSE) Responsibilities

e. Strategic Directive 714-3, SATCOM Support Center (SSC) Management

1. Situation

   a. General. Satellite planning and execution under this plan will be accomplished in accordance with (IAW) references a through e. Satellite requirements identified during deliberate planning and recorded in this appendix must be adjusted to account for assigned missions and options (i.e., other operations taking place in the USNORTHCOM AOR that also require the use of satellite resources and variations in this plan that will arise). This will be accomplished by the completion and validation of a USNORTHCOM Satellite DataBase (SDB) entry. When prioritizing satellite requirements, first prioritize by component within each operational area. After components prioritize their own nets, the USNORTHCOM prioritizes the aggregate of the nets. During execution, these requirements must be continuously reviewed and revalidated in light of emerging operations.

   b. Threat. Units deploying in the USNORTHCOM AOR must recognize that their C4 systems are vulnerable to frequency interference, deception, and/or possible physical attack and must take measures to protect their systems.

2. Satellite Resources. USNORTHCOM has UHF apportioned resources to meet the minimum requirements. Additional satellite requirements identified during execution will be filled from MILSATCOM satellites, other combatant commanders, and commercial services. Formats for satellite channel requests can be found on SIPRNET at http://strat.afspc.af.smil.mil/gssc/default.aspx.
3. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Requirements. UHF satellite network requirements are stated in Tab A to this Appendix. USNORTHCOM is the overall manager of USNORTHCOM UHF satellite resources apportioned by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS/J6Z) and will establish theater priorities based upon mission requirements. Priorities will be reviewed and adjusted prior to execution of a satellite channelization plan. The JTF J6 will validate and prioritize all UHF access requirements, then forward to USNORTHCOM IAW reference a. Upon USNORTHCOM validation, the Global SATCOM Support Center (GSSC) will assign satellite resources. Satellite Access Requests (SARs) for emerging requirements (i.e., not covered by this appendix) will be sent to the JTF Commander with information (info) copies to USNORTHCOM Theater Netops Control Center (TNCC), J635 and the GSSC.

4. Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Requirements. Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) SHF satellite network requirements are stated in Tab B to this Appendix. USNORTHCOM, in coordination with (ICW) the JTF J6, will establish satellite link priorities based upon mission and theater requirements. DSCS satellite access requests for operations will be forwarded to GSSC with information copy to USNORTHCOM. If requirements exceed available resources, access will be adjudicated by Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM J6 and the JTF J6. When priorities are validated, GSSC assigns DSCS access for ground mobile forces. SARs for emerging requirements (i.e., not covered by this Appendix) will be sent to the JTF Commander with info copies to USNORTHCOM TNCC, J635 and the GSSC.

5. Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Requirements. EHF network requirements are stated in Tab C to this Appendix. USNORTHCOM ICW JTF J6 will establish EHF based upon mission and theater requirements. EHF access requests will be forwarded to GSSC with info copy to USNORTHCOM. If requirements exceed available resources, access will be adjudicated by Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM J6 and the JTF J6. When priorities are validated, GSSC assigns EHF access. SARs for emerging requirements (i.e., not covered by this APPENDIX) will be sent to the JTF Commander with info copies to USNORTHCOM TNCC, J635 and the GSSC.

6. Commercial Satellite (SATCOM). Commercial SATCOM requirements are stated in Tab D to this Appendix. Emergent satellite requirements may be satisfied by using commercial resources. JTF Commanders can access DISN services through use of deployable commercial satellite terminals, typically operating in the C-, Ka-, or Ku-bands. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has available commercial satellite bandwidth that may satisfy a user’s operational requirements. Commercial satellite bandwidth can be obtained through the DISA Commercial Satellite Service Office (CSSO) in accordance with reference (c). Through CSSO, a user can lease access to a commercial satellite transponder plus use of a commercial ground entry point (teleport) and long haul circuits to transport the information from the teleport to a DISN point of presence. Authorization for frequencies to be used on commercial satellite platforms must be obtained through the Joint Frequency Management Office-North (JFMO-North).
7. **Global Broadcast System (GBS).** GBS requirements are stated in Tab E to this Appendix. GBS provides a high throughput satellite broadcast capability for transmitting video and data products to fixed, in-transit, and forward deployed forces. It supports military requirements by providing the capability to distribute large information products to deployed user platforms. Information managers at JTF and Component levels must develop information product lists that support their “DSCA operations” using a “Smart Push and/or Users Pull” philosophy to avert saturating deployed forces with information overload.

Tabs
A -- Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Requirements
B -- Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Requirements
C -- Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Requirements
D -- Commercial SATCOM Network List
E -- Global Broadcast System (GBS) Requirements
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND  
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016  
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270  
11 April 2006  

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05  
ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY SATCOM NETWORK LIST  

References:  
- a. CJCSI 3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 25 March 2003  
- b. CJCSI 6250.01B, Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004  

1. **General.** This tab provides guidance and direction for UHF SATCOM use during contingencies and exercises.  

2. **Voice Networks.** The following UHF Voice Nets will be established with identified participants.  

   a. **Homeland Defense Net (HLD Net).** The purpose of this voice net will be to maintain positive control of forces being deployed to secure infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM as critical. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) will be the Net Control of this net (and can delegate the NCS to a subordinate command). Quick Response Forces and Rapid Response Forces responding to taskings will all be users of this net as directed by JFLCC. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.  

   b. **Defense Support of Civil Authorities Net (DSCA Net).** The purpose of this voice net will be to maintain positive control of forces being deployed to assist civil authorities in consequence management as directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) will be Net Control of this net. Along with JTF-CS, any Defense Coordination Officers (DCOs) being deployed in this operation will use this net to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.  

3. **Data Networks.** The following UHF Data Nets will be established with identified participants.  

   a. **Homeland Defense Data Net (HLD Data Net).** The purpose of this data net will be to pass data to ensure positive control of forces being deployed to secure infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM as critical. JFLCC will be the Net Control of this net (and can delegate the NCS to a subordinate command). Quick Response Forces and Rapid Response Forces responding to taskings will all be users of this net as directed by JFLCC. Units deploying for this mission will resource
their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

b. Defense Support of Civil Authorities Net (DSCA Data Net). The purpose of this data net will be to pass data to ensure positive control of forces being deployed to assist civil authorities in consequence management as directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM. JTF-CS will be Net Control of this net. Along with JTF-CS, any Defense Coordination Officers (DCOs) being deployed in this operation will use this net to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

4. Resources. Specific classified allocations of channel assignments will be made under separate correspondence.
SUPER HIGH FREQUENCY SATCOM NETWORK LIST

References:

a. CJCSI 3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 25 March 2003

b. CJCSI 6250.01B, Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004

1. General.

a. This tab provides guidance and direction for SHF SATCOM use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.

b. Satellite Link. The following SHF Homeland Defense trunk will be established to provide broadband communications via satellite. This trunk will support Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Net (DSCA) by providing Internet, Defense Switched Network (DSN), commercial telephone service, and high-speed data capabilities to deployed forces. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Satellite Control Center will have control authority for this link. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) and any Defense Coordination Officers (DCOs) being deployed in this operation will use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own SHF terminal equipment.

2. Satellite/Gateway Requirements.

a. The SHF SATCOM trunk must have the following capabilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Satellite link</td>
<td>2072 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSSP Overhead</td>
<td>24 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Promina SA Trunk</td>
<td>2048 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promina SCLP Channel</td>
<td>16 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promina Framing Overhead</td>
<td>8 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET)</td>
<td>512 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET)</td>
<td>384 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN Trunks</td>
<td>384 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Telephone Trunks</td>
<td>84 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRSN Long Locals</td>
<td>64 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Trunk Group (DTG)</td>
<td>256 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>384 Kbps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. This list is only inclusive of the requirements. Individual components may modify as mission requirements dictate. Components modifying these requirements are required to address the modifications within their Annex K.

3. Resources. Satellite resources will be requested through the Satellite Access Request (SAR)/Gateway Access Request (GAR) system by the participating unit.
References:  
a. CJCSI 3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 25 March 2003  
b. CJCSI 6250.01B, Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004

1. General. This Tab provides guidance and direction for EHF SATCOM use.

2. Low Data Rate Networks. The following EHF Homeland Defense net will be established to provide voice or data communications via satellite. Homeland Defense Net (HLD Net). The purpose of this voice net will be to maintain positive control of forces deployed to secure infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM as critical. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) will be the Net Control of this net.

3. Medium Data Rate Networks. The following EHF Homeland Defense trunk will be established to provide broadband communications via satellite. This trunk will support Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Net (DSCA) by providing Internet, Defense Switched Network (DSN), commercial telephone service, and high-speed data capabilities from deployed forces to component and command headquarters. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Satellite Control Center will have control authority for this link. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) and any Defense Coordination Officers (DCOs) being deployed in this operation will use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own EHF terminal equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Type</th>
<th>Bandwidth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Satellite link</td>
<td>1544 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET)</td>
<td>384 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET)</td>
<td>256 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN Trunks</td>
<td>256 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Telephone Trunks</td>
<td>256 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRSN Long Locals</td>
<td>64 Kbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Trunk Group (DTG)</td>
<td>256 Kbps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Resources. USNORTHCOM Apportioned or allocated SATCOM resources will be used to support CONPLAN 2501-05 requirements. Joint Staff approved SAR templates posted on the GSSC home page will be used for access requests.
References: 

a. DISA Global CONEXPLAN Guide 01-2003, Appendix 1 to Annex N, SAR/GAR message format.

b. CJCSI 3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 25 March 2003

c. CJCSI 6250.01B, Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004

1. General. This tab provides guidance and direction for Commercial SATCOM use for USNORTHCOM exercises and operations. GMF or commercial satellite is the primary means for connectivity into the DII. Troposcatter or Line of Sight terrestrial media will be the secondary/tertiary means to provide a robust and reliable C4 network. Planned GMF is controlled by the USNORTHCOM TNCC. Additional GMF requirements will be approved on a case-by-case basis. Commercial SATCOM will be used to augment voice and data, narrowband and broadband requirements that are unsupportable through conventional MILSATCOM use.

2. Resources. Units deploying for USNORTHCOM missions will resource their own commercial terminal equipment and satellite bandwidth. Units will submit SARs per CJCSI 6250.01B. Annual verification of commercial usage and associated costs will be submitted to USNORTHCOM HQ the first month of each fiscal year.
GLOBAL BROADCAST SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

References:

a. CJCSI 6250.01B Satellite Communications, 28 May 2004
b. GBS Joint CONOPS, October 1998

1. General. This tab provides guidance and direction for Global Broadcast System (GBS) use during contingencies and exercises. The GBS is the medium for the war fighter to receive high bandwidth information such as imagery, intelligence, maps and graphics, commercial news feeds, weather, logistics, and national command information.

2. Access. Access to receive a GBS feed is requested through the GBS Mission Request (GMR) process. Send requests to the NC/J63 Theater Information Manager (TIM).

3. Products. The following are products available over GBS:

a. Immediate File Transfer. A one-time, instantaneous transfer of information.

b. File Transfer Service - (FTS). A scheduled, repeating, service which provides regular products to the user at a given time each day.

c. Web Products. Classified and unclassified - Teleport is the web crawler used by the GBS SBM (Satellite Broadcast Manager) to obtain the web material that is broadcast over GBS.

d. Black Cell. A UAV Predator Video feed with no Audio provided over UF0-10, UFO-9 and for training purposes over the KU band CONUS.

e. Buzz Lite.

f. Seawitch.

g. Commercial feed news broadcast.

4. Resources. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, GBS satellite resources are accessed via the Galaxy XR commercial satellite. Resources are dynamically allocated and scheduled through the TIM office through the GMR process.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM PLANNING

References:

a. USMCEB PUB 7, Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAF), 30 June 2005
b. ACP-190(B), Guide to Spectrum Management in Military Operations, May 2003
c. CJCSM 3320.01A, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battle space, 25 March 2003
d. CJCSM 3320.02A, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 16 February 2006
e. CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operation Instructions, 1 June 2005

1. **Purpose.** This appendix provides frequency management, JCEOI development, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) guidance upon implementation of the plan.

2. **Concept**

   a. **Pre-deployment.** This period is dynamic and characterized by an uncertainty about exact positioning of equipment or which equipment will be deployed. Using units, based on identified requirements, must request frequency support. These requirements must be determined early enough to allow for established lead-time as specified by the lead agency or supported Combatant Commander. Nominally, a minimum of 90 days notice is required for frequency coordination between agencies.

   b. **Deployment.** This period involves actions taken while forces are enroute to the AOR. It is critical for commanders to have frequencies free of harmful interference during this phase.

   c. **Employment.** This period involves actions taken while forces are installing equipment and initializing circuits. The assigned frequency manager must be totally involved in this process to assure electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of deployed frequency-dependent equipment. If components are assigned excess frequencies, they should turn back unused frequency assets to the JTF frequency manager so other units can utilize those frequencies. Likewise, if additional frequencies are required to support the required event or campaign, the deployed JTF frequency manager should
be notified of the unplanned requirement in order to begin coordination with higher levels.

d. Redeployment. This period involves actions, which are taken after the mission is completed and forces are departing the AOR. During this phase the deployed frequency manager should be advised as systems are deactivated or released, especially satellite systems, so those frequency resources can be re-assigned to support other organizations.

3. Spectrum Management

a. General. Joint Frequency Management Office USNORTHCOM (JFMO NORTH) is responsible for frequency management and coordination of the military electromagnetic spectrum-dependent systems dedicated to intergovernmental civil frequency support and Homeland Defense support in the USNORTHCOM JOA. JFMO NORTH will coordinate with Federal and State agencies including the National Guard Bureau, Service FMOs, and local civil authorities, as appropriate, to ensure comprehensive communications requirements are satisfied.

b. Concept of Support. Frequency managers assigned to all components operating in support Contingency Operations will consolidate their frequency requests (proposals), submit them in Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAF) per reference (a) and forward these to JFMO NORTH. A Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) will be deployed to the JTF HQ staffed IAW the C2 structure identified in the EXORD and CJCSI 3320.03.

4. JCEOI Concept. The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document jointly developed by the J3 and J6 that contains frequencies, nets, SINCgars information, call signs and words, and sign or counter signs for all event participants. To provide adequate lead-time to design, publish, and distribute the JCEOI, it is necessary that:

a. The JCEOI will be developed using Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) and will be distributed electronically whenever possible. Paper copies will be distributed as required.

b. Component headquarters will provide JCEOI input as required by JFMO NORTH. Optimally, input is required 90-days prior to the commencement of operations to allow adequate time for JCEOI development and distribution. In the event of Consequent Management Contingency Operations or other emergencies the 90-day requirement will be waived to accommodate the mission.

5. Spectrum Interference Resolution Reporting

a. Reports of EMI will be reported to the JTF-CS JSME, JCCC(s), USNORTHCOM TNCC and JFMO NORTH IAW the procedures outlined in reference d.
b. Follow-up reports will be submitted as additional information becomes available. The JCCC(s) will report on EMI within the JOA IAW Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) procedures and CJCSI 3320.02. Include USNORTHCOM TNCC on all messages.

6. Points of Contact. JFMO NORTH POC can be reached at (719) 554-4008, DSN 692-4008, Fax 692-0978. USNORTHCOM TNCC can be reached at (719) 554-6794, DSN 692-6794.

Tabs
A -- EMI Reporting
B -- JTF JCEOI Concept
C -- Frequency Management Deconfliction
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) REPORTING

References:

a. CJCSI 3320.02B, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 1 May 2005

b. CJCSM 3320.01A, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battle space, 25 March 2003

1. General. This tab provides guidance and direction for reporting radio frequency interference incidents.

2. Procedures

a. Interference incidents involving deployed systems will be reported using the enclosed format. All reports of suspected hostile interference will be submitted via secure means.

b. The operator/user experiencing the interference is responsible for submitting the interference report. All interference reports submitted will be coordinated and submitted IAW the C2 structure dictated by the EXORD and CSCSI 3320.03.

c. Attempt to resolve interference problems at the lowest levels possible before submitting JSIR reports to higher headquarters.

3. Definitions

a. Meaconing. A system of receiving radio beacon signals and intentionally rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation.

b. Intrusion. The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner with the objective of deceiving operators or causing confusion.

c. Jamming. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy to disrupt use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems.

d. Hostile Interference. A source, indicating an imminent or actual threat, purposeful interference, intrusion or attack on any U.S. or USNORTHCOM asset to include U.S. space systems.
e. **Non-Hostile Interference.** A source that does not involve any hostile characteristics or intent.

f. **Space System Unknown Source.** Any space system anomaly that cannot be definitively attributed to the space environment or caused by a known or previously documented source. When using this category of EMI reporting, describe what has already been ruled out as a possible source (equipment, operator error, predicted frequency conflict, etc) and indicate whether the EMI source is space-based or terrestrial if possible. Continue investigating possible sources and up-channel all relevant information in accordance with this instruction.

g. **Bandwidth.** For the purpose of EMI reports, bandwidth is defined as the necessary amount of radio spectrum needed to transmit or receive a hertzian signal.

4. **Specialized EMI reporting nodes**

   a. **Global Satellite Support Center (GSSC), Regional Satellite Support Center (RSSC)**
      
      (1) Provides the central operational focus for global satellite communications (SATCOM) constellation payload management.

      (2) Assists spectrum managers to track, coordinate and assist in radio frequency interference (RFI) identification and resolution for SATCOM systems.

      (3) Provides assistance to combatant commands and other SATCOM users when there is a disruption to services.

   b. **Global Positioning System (GPS) Support Center (GSC)**
      
      (1) The GSC coordinates responses to RFI in the use of GPS in military operations.

      (2) Provides tactical support for planning and assessing military missions involving the use of GPS.

      (3) Serves as USNORTHCOM DP03 interface to the civil community.

      (4) Routinely assesses the GPS service being provided to the civil community to determine compliance with US national policy guidelines.

5. **Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Reporting**

   a. The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the JSIR program. The JSC/JSIR also provides analytical and on-site assistance in resolving EMI problems. The JSIR program is structured to have interference
incidents resolved at the lowest level of the DOD component, using the chain of command. If the interference is not resolved through this process, then it is referred to JSC/JSIR to analyze and attempt to recommend corrective action by using the JSC/JSIR database and analytical tools. If needed, the JSC/JSIR, will provide personnel and equipment to perform on-site direction finding, equipment tests and problem solving. Call the JSC directly.

b. **Reporting Format.** Submit the following as minimum:

1. Organization affected by EMI. Point of contact information: Name and telephone number. Make sure when listing a POC that that individual is familiar with the problem.

2. Place name, latitude, and longitude where EMI occurred.

3. Times, dates, periods EMI occurred. Indicate whether the duration of the interference is continuous or intermittent, the approximate repetition rate of interference, and whether the amplitude of the interference is varying or constant. Indicate if the interference occurs at regular intervals during the day or if it is sporadic.

4. **Systems and equipment affected by the EMI.** Affected system function, name, nomenclature, manufacturer with model number or other system description.

5. Allocated frequency band or authorized frequency of equipment affected.

6. Station or equipment causing the interference and the location or call sign, if known.

7. Allocated frequency band or authorized frequency of the station or equipment causing the interference, if known.

8. Probable cause of interference (for example, co-channel assignment, harmonics, inter-modulation, spurious products, jamming, etc.).

9. Extent of impairment to operational capability of affected equipment. Characteristics of interference (reduced range, false targets, reduced intelligibility, data errors, etc.).

10. Corrective measures taken to resolve or work around the interference.

11. Effect of corrective measures.

12. Any additional remarks. Provide a clear, unstructured narrative summary on the interference and local actions that have been take to resolve the problem.
c. Addressees for EMI reports. Interference reports are submitted at a minimum to the following addresses depending on type of report:

(1) **Space System Unknown Source**

Action: JSME  
DEFENSE REGION JFMO  
SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER VANDENBERG AFB CA  
CMOC SCC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO  
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//SPJ36//  
CMOC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO//J3S//  
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J36/J36S//  
JSC ANnapolis MD//J3/JSIR//  
OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS  
GSSC PETERSON AFB CO (For SATCOM systems only)  
GSC PETERSON AFB CO (For GPS systems only)  
THEATER DEFENSE REGION  
Info:  
HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XORR//  
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J6S//  
COMARSPACE COLORADO SPRINGS CO//SMDC-AR-O//  
NAVSPOC DAHLGREN VA//N3/N33//

(2) **Space System Source Hostile**

Action: JSME  
DEFENSE REGION JFMO  
SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER VANDENBERG AFB CA  
CMOC SCC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO  
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//SPJ36//  
CMOC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO//J3S//  
JSC ANnapolis MD//J3/JSIR//  
OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS  
GSSC PETERSON AFB CO (For SATCOM systems only)  
GSC PETERSON AFB CO (For GPS systems only)  
THEATER DEFENSE REGION  
Info:  
HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XORR//  
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J6S//  
NSA CSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//W9M7//  
DIA WASHINGTON DC//TWI-3//  
HQ AFIWC KELLY AFB TX//SAV//  
COMARSPACE COLORADO SPRINGS CO//SMDC-AR-O//  
NAVSPOC DAHLGREN VA//N3/N33//

(3) **Space System Source Non-Hostile**
UNCLASSIFIED

Action: JSME
DEFENSE REGION JFMO
SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER VANDENBERG AFB CA
CMOC SCC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//SPJ36//
CMOC CHEYENNE MTN AS CO//J3S//
OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS
GSSC PETERSON AFB CO (For SATCOM systems only)
GSC PETERSON AFB CO (For GPS systems only)
THEATER DEFENSE REGION
Info: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XORR//
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J6S//
JSC ANNAPOULIS MD//J3/JSIR//
COMARSPACE COLORADO SPRINGS CO//SMDC-AR-O//
NAVSPOC DAHLGREN VA//N3/N33//

(4) Non-Space System Unknown Source

Action: JSME
DEFENSE REGION JFMO
JSC ANNAPOULIS MD//J3/JSIR//
Info: OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS
THEATER DEFENSE REGION //

(5) Non-Space System Source Hostile

Action: JSME
DEFENSE REGION JFMO
JSC ANNAPOULIS MD//J3/JSIR//
OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS
THEATER DEFENSE REGION
Info: NSA CSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//W9M7//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//TWI-3//
HQ AFIWC KELLY AFB TX//SAV//

(6) Non-Space System Source Non-Hostile

Action: JSME
DEFENSE REGION JFMO
OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDS
THEATER DEFENSE REGION
Info: JSC ANNAPOULIS MD//J3/JSIR//
JTF JCEOI CONCEPT

References:

a. CJCSM 3220.01A, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battle space, 25 March 2003

b. CJCSI 3220.01B, Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations, 1 May 2005

c. CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operation Instructions, 1 June 2005

d. CJCSI 3320.02B, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 1 May 2005

1. **General.** Provides information concerning the Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (JCEOI) concept and its use during execution of the Basic Plan. USNORTHCOM is directed to develop and use a Joint Communications-Electronics Operation Instruction (JCEOI) to support contingency operations, training, and exercises. USNORTHCOM has incorporated the described policies and procedures into their unique contingency operations, training, and exercises in order to facilitate a more seamless transition into a combined/joint operational environment.

   a. The JCEOI is a single document divided into two-parts. Part one is a directory of radio net or units and their associated frequencies, call signs, call words, and listed by time period. Part two contains supplemental procedures for electronic, visual, and verbal interactions such as sign/countersign, smoke/pyrotechnics, and suffix/expanders.

   b. The JCEOI offers some degree of communications security (COMSEC) protection by changing call signs, call words, and frequencies on a daily basis. Implementation of these daily changes increases the difficulty for an adversary to obtain essential elements of friendly information by monitoring unencrypted radio nets.

2. **Procedures**

   a. The Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) will be used during operations to create, modify, and generate the JCEOI. The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document that contains frequencies, nets, Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) information, and call signs/words for all participants. To provide adequate lead-time for submission of frequency requirements for
coordination and to design, publish, and distribute the JCEOI, the following relationships and milestones are established:

(1) Submit all JCEOI data through component headquarters for consolidation and forwarding to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) for inclusion in JCEOI.

(2) Inputs are required from FORSCOM, FFC, ACC, MARFORRES, JTF-CS, and all Component Headquarters supporting USNORTHCOM contingencies and training exercises.

b. The desired input method for JFC JCEOI inputs is electronic JACS format; however, as a minimum an electronic copy of the Master Net List, Net Groups, Separation Plans are required.

(1) To create the JCEOI, a list of all radio nets is required.

(a) Identify classification of the nets (i.e., U, C, and S).

(b) Identify radio nets, having a specific title; e.g., Command (CMD), or Antijam (AJ). Radio net titles may contain sixteen (16) characters including spaces; e.g., (10TH MTN DIV CMD). Also identify the frequency band that radio net will operate in; e.g., HF, VHF/FM, VHF/AM, UHF, SHF, or EHF.

(c) Identify radio nets requiring a fixed frequency.

(d) Identify nets that require frequency separation.

(e) Identify nets that can be included in a share plan.

(f) Satellite net names will appear in the JCEOI but may not have frequencies due to time constraints and availability of channels.

(g) HF DCS entry frequencies.

(h) Frequencies to be included in the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) must be identified prior to final generation of JCEOI.

(i) Nets requiring restriction codes and the restriction code definitions.

(j) List of all nets requiring a call sign to build the call sign vocabulary. Daily changing alphanumeric, trigraph (letter-number letter) call signs will be used; e.g., Z2F, R8J.

(k) Identify all net groups to ensure listing in your component layer of the JCEOI.
(l) Listing of units net names. These names can contain a maximum of sixteen (16) characters including spaces; e.g., 4TH MAR DIV CMD. Net names cannot be used more than once within your component; net names must be unique.

(m) List of all nets requiring a call word in order to build the call word vocabulary includes fixed and daily changing call words. The JTF JSME will deconflict the call word dictionary against any fixed call words that are requested.

(n) List of the suffixes that each component will use. The suffix is a two-digit number attached to a call sign or call word used to identify personnel or staff sections within a unit. The suffix vocabulary may contain a maximum of 99 assignments. There will be one master changing suffix vocabulary for the JCEOI.

(o) List of expander titles that your unit will use. The expander is a single letter assignment used to further identify personnel within a unit. Expander vocabulary can contain a maximum of twenty (20) expander titles. There will be one master changing expander vocabulary for the JCEOI.

(p) Instructions for the use of changing suffixes/expanders are provided in the Quick Reference pages of the JCEOI.

(q) The JCEOI when completed will be transmitted electronically to all component commanders.

c. The JFC JCEOI will be in half-page 52-line format, generated in three (3) editions. One active edition, one reserve edition transmitted to, but not distributed below component headquarters, and a third edition to be used in case of a compromise.
FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION

References:

a. AFI 10-707, Spectrum Interference Resolution Program, 20 June 2005

b. CJCSI 3220.01B, Electromagnetic Use in Joint Military Operations, 1 May 2005

c. DOD Directive 3222.4, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Countermeasures, Ch-2, 28 January 1994

d. CJCSI 3210.04, Joint Electronic Warfare Reprogramming Policy, 31 December 2003 (S)

e. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001

f. JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 7 April 2000

1. Purpose. This tab describes the process for ensuring friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum without adverse impact from friendly electronic countermeasures (ECM).

2. General. ECM operations have the potential to interfere with C4 systems. Frequency deconfliction is a management procedure for limiting the effects of this interference. This tab provides familiarization with electronic warfare frequency deconfliction in joint military operations.

3. Definitions

a. Frequency Deconfliction. Frequency deconfliction is the first process of EW deconfliction planning for the most effective employment of electronic countermeasures (ECM) assets against hostile targets while protecting friendly emitters from unintentional jamming.

b. TABOO. Friendly frequencies are of such importance that they must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces. TABOO frequencies are generally long standing but can be limited by geography and/or time. TABOO frequencies may include nets used to pass USNORTHCOM Emergency Action Messages and Atmospheric Tactical Warning information, international distress, stop (cease) buzzer, safety, and controller frequencies.
c. **Protected.** Protected frequencies are those used by friendly tactical forces for a particular operational requirement, identified and protected to prevent them from being inadvertently jammed by friendly forces while active EW operations are directed against hostile forces. These frequencies are of such critical importance that jamming should be restricted unless absolutely necessary or until coordination with the using unit is made. They are generally time and/or geographically oriented, may change with the tactical situation, and must be updated periodically. Air/Ground/Air frequencies for aircraft control are an example of protected frequencies.

d. **Guarded.** Enemy functions or frequencies that are currently being exploited for combat information and intelligence. A GUARDED frequency is time-oriented in that the list changes as the enemy assumes different combat postures. These frequencies may be jammed after the commander has weighed the potential operational gain against the loss of technical information.

e. **Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).** The JRFL is a time and geographically oriented listing of TABOO, Protected and Guarded functions, nets, and frequencies. It is limited to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish USNORTHCOM's missions.

f. **Deconfliction Process.** The NC/J3 defines the concept of operations with input from the J2 describing intelligence support requirements and enemy electronic systems targets. The J6 is responsible for the administrative and technical management of the spectrum requirements and assigns frequencies, analyzes and evaluates potential conflicts, resolves internal conflicts, recommends alternatives, and participates in spectrum-use conflict resolution. The assignment of frequencies is based on the J3 concept of operations. In the absence of a Unified Joint Frequency Management Office, USNORTHCOM has delegated responsibility for frequency management to JFMO NORTH. The responsible frequency management office will create a frequency background environment that encompasses all frequencies, DOD and Civil, which are used in the area of operations. The background environment will be used to deconflict all frequencies that will be used for operations/exercises and contingencies. USNORTHCOM/J6 will coordinate the NC/J2/J3 JRFL input to ensure accuracy and completeness. Once approved by NC/J2/J3, the NC/J3 will publish and disseminate through the C-E Annex and EW Appendix.

g. If no disruption occurs to friendly communications during the course of ECM operations, then no frequency conflict exists. However, if unplanned disruptions occur, the following two actions will be taken:

(1) For critical functions (generally those frequencies on the TABOO list), an immediate CEASE BUZZER (unclassified term to terminate electronic attack activities, including the use of electronic warfare expendables) notification will be promulgated if the offending friendly system can be positively identified. The CEASE BUZZER notification will be issued only on the control net of the offending jammer and no acknowledgment of interference will be made on the critical function net.
(2) Submit Spectrum Interference Resolution (SIR) in accordance with reference a.

4. Tasks and Responsibilities

a. USNORTHCOM/J6

(1) Coordinate frequency requests with appropriate agencies and lateral and higher commands as appropriate before compiling the JRFL and forwarding it to USNORTHCOM/J3 for publication.

(2) Nominate changes to the JRFL based on changing or reassigning operational frequencies used by friendly forces.

(3) Assist in minimizing the adverse impact of friendly ECM on critical networks by providing alternative communications frequencies/modes of communications where possible.

(4) Maintain the frequency database of allotments, assignments and coordination actions.

(5) Send CEASE BUZZER notifications, when appropriate.

b. USNORTHCOM Component Commanders

(1) Establish a unit point of contact responsible for frequency deconfliction.

(2) Provide the USNORTHCOM/J6 candidate nodes and nets with associated frequencies.
ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05 DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)
HEALTH SERVICES

References:

a. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

b. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

c. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

d. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

e. Joint Publication 3-11, 11 July 2000, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments

f. Joint Publication 4-01, 19 March 2003, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System

g. Joint Publication 4-02, 30 July 2001, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

h. Joint Publication 4-02.1, 6 October 1997, JTTP for Health Service Logistic Support in Joint Operations


k. DOD Directive 6010.22 National Disaster Medical System


m. National Response Plan, December 2004

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1. **Situation**

   a. **General**

      (1) **Purpose.** To provide a concept of operation for Joint Health Service Support, assign tasks, and provide guidance on military medical support provided as a part of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Joint health service support (HSS) response to DSCA events will be measured based on the scope and magnitude of the event(s). Response will be regionally based, and utilize installation, Joint Force and Joint Medical Force C2 as required. Within the supported commander’s concept of operation, the aim must be to protect forces from health hazards, prevent disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI), and to provide a standard of essential care in theater (resuscitation and stabilization) for all patients as close as feasible to peacetime US standards of healthcare.

      (2) **Applicability.** This annex applies to DOD forces deployed in support of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions.

   b. **Enemy Forces.** See Base Plan and Annex B, Intelligence.

   c. **Friendly Forces.** See Base Plan and Annex A, Task Organization.

   d. **Assumptions.**

      (1) Sufficient military medical personnel, units, and other medical assets may be limited due to competing operational commitments. Service Component augmentation and mobilization will be required.

      (2) Patient movement by civilian or military assets will be available, but may be limited, throughout the operation due to competing operational commitments.

      (3) Units or personnel in direct support of this plan will have access to sufficient individual protective equipment (IPE) for Chemical and Biological Warfare (CW/BW) and to adequate stocks of medical chemical defense materiel (nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK), convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA), Ciprofloxacin, and Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB) tablets).
(4) Units and personnel in direct support of this plan will have access to sufficient IPE for low to moderate radiation exposure and access to adequate stocks of medical radioprotectant pharmaceuticals (e.g., Potassium iodide and granisetron hydrochloride tablets).

(5) Simultaneous DSCA and Consequence Management (CM) efforts (relative to support of affected Federal Installations) may create a competing demand for patient movement and hospitalization assets that require prioritization at the strategic and operational levels.

(6) Simultaneous DSCA and CM efforts will require an appropriate regional response on the part of DOD to ensure effective asset utilization and timely response.

(7) The National Guard will respond at a Regional, State or local level.

(8) Consequence Management Sets are available on a Regional level.

e. Limitations.

(1) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive (CBRNE) attack or natural disaster may quickly overwhelm local and state response capabilities thereby creating requirements for patient movement throughout the OA and will pose many evacuation and other health service support challenges.

(2) The affected, or non-existent, local medical infrastructure could be severely stressed in the event of a CBRNE attack or natural disaster resulting in shortages in patient care capabilities, equipment, and supplies.

(3) Patient movement to and from airheads and medical treatment facilities will be problematic due to excessive congestion on local roads and limited movement alternatives.

(4) In addition to conventional casualties and possible CBRNE casualties, healthcare providers will see an increase of stress-related casualties.

(5) Most civilian and military medical treatment facilities (MTFs) are not hardened to operate in a CBRNE environment, and patient decontamination capability is limited.

(6) Due to immature, limited and sporadic surveillance programs, detection of disease outbreaks may not occur until large numbers of victims are affected.

(7) Communication between organizations will be limited due to non-compatible systems and equipment.

(8) Other operations will affect the availability of support with regard to personnel, equipment and supplies.
(9) Although DOD forces are expected to be healthy, fit, and to have received appropriate immunizations upon deployment, reality is that many units will be unidentified up to the time of deployment and not have received necessary work-ups and immunizations.

2. **Mission.** CDRUSNORTHCOM provides Joint Health Service Support (HSS) to U.S. Military Forces, coalition forces, and civilian personnel in support of this CONPLAN. DOD HSS assets deploy within the AOR for the purpose of protecting the force from disease and environmental threats, or manmade disasters to include CBRNE and assisting civil authorities by rendering responsive casualty care management continuously from Level I to Level V.

3. **Execution.**

   a. **Commander’s Intent.**

      (1) **Purpose.** Execute a timely, safe, effective, and efficient response to the President or SecDef DSCA tasking.

      (2) **Key Tasks.**

         (a) Provide DSCA to a Primary or Coordinating agency IAW the NRP.

         (b) Save lives, lessen human suffering, and prevent great property damage if applicable to the particular DSCA mission.

         (c) Employ qualified DCOs and DCEs. Utilize service expertise of qualified EPLOs as advisors of their service capabilities to the DCO.

         (d) Provide flexible C2 to cover a wide range of incidents.

         (e) Share Common Operating Picture while cooperating with interagency partners.

         (f) Coordinate a positive Public Affairs message.

   (3) **End State.** Civil authorities have regained control of the emergency situation for which they requested DOD assistance, SecDef approved HSS mission(s) have been completed, or military forces have been relieved by proper authority, and OPCON of deployed assets is transferred to their respective commands for redeployment.

   b. **Concept of Medical Operations.**

      (1) CDRUSNORTHCOM will, as a process of deliberate planning, designate Medical Commands regionally across the OA to coordinate Joint HSS in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) or Medical Support Area (MSA) as defined to support potential operational scenarios. These Medical Commanders will support an appointed Joint Task Force.
Commander and synchronize Levels I – V Joint HSS. The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMP) Branch will assist in coordinating this effort.

(2) In an effort to ensure awareness of bed capacity across the AOR, the USNORTHCOM Surgeon will obtain surge capacity data with National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) partners on a recurring basis, while also pursuing ways to incorporate State efforts that are currently not included in this data. End state occurs when there is a transition to a higher phase.

(3) CONPLAN (Annex) Structure. This Annex identifies a steady state (Phase I, Shaping) and four operational phases: Phase II (Staging); Phase III (Deployment); Phase IV (Support of Civil Authorities); Phase V (Transition).

(a) Phase I, Shaping. USNORTHCOM is continuously practicing sustained deterrence and prevention. Sustained deterrence and prevention are the two primary components of maintaining Joint HSS readiness. The purpose of deterrence and prevention is to discourage or avert health emergencies (natural or manmade) from occurring. The CDRUSNORTHCOM Surgeon will continue to refine plans, conduct training and exercises, leverage technology to improve the Common Operating Picture (COP), conduct surveillance, shape policy and legislation, and refine response concepts in coordination with all Intergovernmental and Joint HSS agencies to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Intelligence gathering and collection is critical to maintaining a forward leaning posture and situational awareness. As required, a DCO is alerted and a Response Task Force (RTF) or Joint Task Force (JTF) is established. Dependent on the type and projected scope of event, Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMP) may be alerted and task organized to support key activities. Continued coordination with DOD and Intergovernmental partners will focus on organizing response processes at the national, regional and, local levels. Exercises designed to improve preparedness and sustaining forces will occur regularly as a demonstration of Joint HSS capability and in support of escalating threat/responses levels. Force Health Protection methods will be implemented to detect unusual disease occurrences across the AOR.

1. Phase I, Shaping Tasks.

   a. CDRUSNORTHCOM.

      (1) Utilize Joint HSS assets within USJFCOM, the Services, and the National Guard in support of DSCA missions.

      (2) Coordinate with JCS, USJFCOM, Services, and interagency to identify joint health service support assets.

      (3) Coordinate exercise participation and response processes at national, regional, and local levels with other Unified Commands, DOD
Components, and Interagency to include but not limited to U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U. S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U. S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

(4) Develop Force Health Protection (FHP) Directives ICW OASD (HA), the Joint Staff, Component Commanders, the Services, NGB, and other Unified Commands. Supporting Commands will execute Directives.

(5) Obtain medical surge capacity and capability data ICW NDMS and TRICARE partners on a recurring basis, pursuing ways to incorporate State efforts currently not captured. Continue to coordinate with Health and Human Services (HHS), Veteran’s Affairs (VA), FEMA and DOD organizations to maintain current and surge capacity status of patient care assets. Joint Regional Medical Planners will be utilized to facilitate acquisition, aggregation, and integration of medical capabilities data into the USNORTHCOM medical Common Operating Picture (COP).

(6) Conduct patient movement planning with the USTRANSCOM. Joint Regional Medical Planning Offices will coordinate with local/regional planners for inter- and intra-state patient movement requirements.

(7) Plan, coordinate and execute HSS tasks in conjunction with designated regional medical command, component commands, other DOD components, State Health Authorities, Intergovernmental and Coalition partners at the national, regional and local levels.

(8) Integrate medical intelligence efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal agencies via early warning systems in order to identify potential health threats.

(9) Dependent on the type and projected scope of event, Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMP) may be alerted and task organized to support the DCO, RJTFs and other key activities.

(10) BPT designate Medical Commands, on a regional basis, as nominated by the Services, to support designated JOAs.

(11) Be prepared to (BPT) activate NDMS through the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

(12) BPT provide planning data to USTRANSCOM/AMC for anticipated patient movement requirements.
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(13) BPT request USTRANSCOM activation of the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) portion of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (AE CRAF) in support of this plan.

b. Services

(1) BPT nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities, as Joint Task Force Medical Commander in support of (ISO) a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.

(2) ICW CDRUSNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM, conduct bi-monthly and special event NDMS bed reporting, as directed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

(3) BPT expand infrastructure at Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) in response to surge requirements.

(4) BPT provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(5) Organize, train, and equip medical response and sustaining forces as described in specified appendices to this Annex.

(6) BPT provide Joint HSS and Base Operation Support (BOS) forces for DOD transportation hubs.

c. Component Commands. Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC); Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC); Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)

(1) Plan and coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components.

(3) BPT nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities, as Joint Task Force-Medical Commander (JTF-MED) ISO a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.

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(4) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

d. Subordinate Commands: Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-North); Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR); Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-Alaska)

(1) Plan and coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD Components.

(3) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

e. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS)

(1) Plan and coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components.

(3) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(4) Aggregate and provide periodic HSS planning and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

f. Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

(1) BPT provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(2) Organize, train, and equip medical response and sustaining forces as described in Appendix 10 to this Annex.
g. Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

(1) ICW the Services and CDRUSNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM will collect immediate, bi-monthly or special event NDMS bed reporting data via the TRANSCOM Regulating Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

(2) Provides transportation and in-transit visibility for patient movements and Class VIIIA and VIIIB distribution ICW NGB, USCG, and other federal agencies.

(3) Aggregate and provide periodic patient movement and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

h. National Guard Bureau (NGB).

(1) BPT nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities as JTF-MED ISO a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.

(2) Plan and coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(3) Aggregate and provide periodic HSS planning and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

(4) Implement FHP directives ICW DOD components.

(5) BPT provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(b) Phase II, Staging. Staging begins when USNORTHCOM identifies a potential DSCA event or when directed by SecDef, to execute this CONPLAN. During this phase, actions are undertaken to ensure maximum readiness for DSCA response execution. Medical Commands already identified by the CDRUSNORTHCOM Surgeon for regional support, will actively coordinate with Regional and State authorities, preparing for potential transition to higher phases of the Base Plan. Force Health Protection countermeasures will be implemented, along with a common operating picture at the national, state, and local levels. Medical Response and Sustaining Forces will be identified and placed on alert as required. USNORTHCOM, and designated Regional Medical Commanders and staffs may begin HSS crisis action planning. Transition plan development begins, to include Health Service
Support Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). Success is all military and interagency preparations complete and forces poised for deployment. Phase II ends when forces receive a PTDO.

(1) Phase II Staging Tasks.

(a) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   (1) Utilize Joint HSS assets within USJFCOM, the Services, and the National Guard in support of DSCA missions.

   (2) Coordinate with JCS, USJFCOM, and the Services to identify/alert required joint health service support assets.

   (3) Promulgate Force Health Protection (FHP) Directives ICW OASD (HA), the Joint Staff, Component Commanders, the Services, NGB, and other Unified Commands. Supporting Commands will execute Directives.

   (4) Obtain immediate/current medical surge capacity data ICW NDMS and TRICARE partners on a recurring basis, pursuing ways to incorporate State efforts currently not captured. Continue to coordinate with Health and Human Services (HHS), Veteran’s Affairs (VA), FEMA and DOD organizations to maintain current and surge capacity status of patient care assets. Joint Regional Medical Planners will be utilized to facilitate acquisition, aggregation, and integration of medical capabilities data into the USNORTHCOM medical Common Operating Picture (COP).

   (5) Conduct patient movement planning with the USTRANSCOM. Joint Regional Medical Planning Offices will coordinate with local/regional planners for inter- and intra-state patient movement requirements, with USTRANSCOM and ICW Department of Transportation (DoT) to ensure inter-agency plan integration as required.

   (6) Finalize coordination and initiate pre-mobilization HSS tasks in conjunction with designated regional medical command, component commands, other DOD components, State Health Authorities, Intergovernmental and Coalition partners at the national, regional and local levels.

   (7) Accelerate medical intelligence efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal agencies via early warning systems in order to identify and monitor spread of potential health threats.

   (8) Provide planning factors to USTRANSCOM for anticipated patient movement requirements.
In conjunction with NDMS partners, designate DOD transportation hubs as required for distribution of patients within CONUS.

Liaison Officers are identified and established with Primary Agency and key supporting agencies ensuring smooth integration for HSS planning.

Services.

Nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities, as Joint Task Force Medical Commander in support of (ISO) a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.

ICW CDRUSNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM, conduct NDMS bed reporting, as directed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

BPT expand infrastructure at Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) in response to surge requirements.

Provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

Alert potential medical response and sustaining forces.

Alert proposed Joint HSS and Base Operation Support (BOS) forces ISO DOD transportation hubs.

Component Commands. Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC); Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC); Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)

Coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components.

Nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities, as Joint Task Force-Medical Commander (JTF-MED) ISO a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.
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(4) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(d) Subordinate Commands. Commander, Army North (CDRARNORTH); Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR); Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-Alaska)

(1) Coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD Components.

(3) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(e) Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS).

(1) Coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components.

(3) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(4) Aggregate and provide periodic HSS planning and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

(f) Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

(1) Provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(2) Organize, train, and equip medical response and sustaining forces.

(g) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
(1) ICW the Services and CDRUSNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM will conduct immediate, bi-monthly or special event NDMS bed reporting, as directed by DHS.

(2) Provides transportation and in-transit visibility for patient movements and Class VIIA and VIIIIB distribution, ICW NGB, USCG, and other federal agencies.

(3) Aggregate and provide periodic patient movement and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

(h) National Guard Bureau (NGB).

(1) As directed, nominate Medical Commands on a regional basis and assume responsibilities as JTF-MED ISO a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA and/or MSA during an incident or event.

(2) Plan and coordinate Level I – V Joint HSS within designated JOAs with other JFCs, DOD components, State health authorities, intergovernmental and coalition partners at the State, regional and local levels.

(3) Aggregate and provide periodic HSS planning and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

(4) Implement FHP directives ICW DOD components.

(5) Provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

c. Phase III, Deployment. Initial Phase III operations begin when response forces deploy into the DSCA JOA. Organizations will be notified when it has been determined that there has been a transition to a higher phase. Success is defined as forces deployed, BSIs and liaison with the Primary Agency are established. Phase III ends with completion of initial force deployment, lodgment areas established and secure, and DCO, Commander of the RTF or JTF, and Regional Medical Commander determine that forces are ready to execute the mission. While Phase I and II tasks continue into Phase III, HSS roles and responsibilities are defined more clearly through continued operational assessments, mission assignments and refinement of plans. Medical Response Forces, at the installation level, create the foundation from which all joint operations build upon. They may be used to augment affected areas from unaffected areas. Sustaining Forces may be called upon if augmented forces are insufficient to manage the HLD or CS situation. During this phase, Services will deploy like capabilities as required from the installation level to counter current
asymmetric threats. At a minimum, Services will identify capabilities for deployment for: disease investigation, vaccination, preventive medicine, veterinary, medical logistics distribution, mental health, patient decontamination, and medical treatment at all existing Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) to support the Installation Commander, the Joint Force Commander, and when directed, the Primary Agency. Liaison Officers are established with the Primary Agency and key supporting agencies ensuring smooth integration for HSS planning. Federal Coordinating Centers (FCC) and transportation hubs are activated and placed on stand-by to support enhanced operations. MTFs prepare to expand surge capacity. Phase ends when initial forces reach the established lodgment areas and a DCO or JTF commander determines that forces are mission ready.

(1) Phase III Tasks.

(a) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(1) Deploy Joint HSS assets from USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and NGB within designated JOAs in support of HLD and CS events.

(2) Integrate medical intelligence efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal agencies via early warning systems in order to identify/track potential health threats.

(3) Employ designated Medical Commands as nominated by the Services, for regional operations ISO a Joint Force Commander in order to synchronize Levels I – V Joint HSS within a defined JOA.

(4) Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMP) provide direct support to DCOs (when activated) and ESF-8 authorities within designated JOAs when directed. JRMPs advise JFC Surgeon’s and JTF-MED Commanders
on the synchronization and integration of DOD medical assets with Federal, State, and local health and medical assets.

(5) In conjunction with NDMS partners, activate DOD transportation hubs as required for distribution of patients within CONUS.

(b) Services.

(1) Direct designated regional medical commander to assume responsibilities as JTF Medical Commander ISO JTF Commander to support a designated JOA and/or Medical Support Area (MSA).

(2) When directed, deploy medical response forces within designated JOAs from installation assets. Teams will alert, stage, and deploy in support of the Installation Commander, the JFC, or the PA. At a minimum, installations will organize, alert and employ teams for disease investigation, vaccination, preventive medicine, veterinary services, medical logistics distribution, mental health, patient decontamination, and medical treatment.

(3) BPT provide individual medical specialties or specialists (to include health care providers, ancillary specialists, nursing specialists, medics, and administrative/logistics personnel).

(4) When directed, provide deployable hospitals.

(c) Component Commands. Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC); Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC); Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)

(1) Direct designated regional medical commander to assume responsibilities as JTF Medical Commander ISO JTF Commander to support a designated JOA and/or MSA.

(2) When directed, provide deployable hospitals and designate casualty receiving ships (from CFFC assets ISO CDRUSNORTHCOM).

(3) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(4) Provide HSS to USCG as directed.

(d) Subordinate Commands. Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR); Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-Alaska)
(1) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(2) Provide HSS to USCG as directed.

(e) **Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS).**

(1) Manage and provide oversight for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) responsibilities (patient movement and hospitalization) within designated JOAs.

(2) Provide HSS to USCG as directed.

(f) **Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).**

(1) When directed, provide deployable hospitals and designate casualty receiving ships (from CFFC assets ISO CDRUSNORTHCOM).

(2) Provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(3) Continue organization, training, and equipping of medical response and sustaining forces.

(g) **Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).**

(1) Provides transportation and in-transit visibility for patient movements and Class VIII A and VIIIIB distribution, ICW NGB, USCG, and other federal agencies

(2) Execute patient movement mission, ICW State and federal partners.

(3) Exercise OPCON over patient movement forces.

(h) **National Guard Bureau (NGB).**

(1) If directed, assume responsibilities as JTF Medical Commander ISO JTF Commander to support a designated JOA and/or MSA.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components within designated JOAs and/or MSAs for the heightened period of risk.

(3) When directed, provide deployable Level II HSS capabilities.
(4) Provide HSS to USCG.

(5) Provide Joint HSS forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the period of heightened risk.

(6) Continue organization, training, and equipping of medical response and sustaining forces.

(7) Aggregate provide periodic HSS planning and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

c. Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. This phase begins with the commencement of DSCA response operations. Phase IV tasks incorporate all previous phases and involve the employment of forces in support of USNORTHCOM missions. The CDRUSNORTHCOM Surgeon coordinates and communicates within DOD, with NDMS elements, and with coordinating partners to determine requirements and ensure response capabilities meet the requirements. Medical Commanders, identified regionally, coordinate actively with Regional and State authorities. Refine and further develop a Command and Control (C2) structure at installations, within defined JOAs and/or MSAs, and at the theater level. Through Integrated Operations, continue to provide support to military installations and Civil Support agencies in the areas of medical treatment, medical logistics, transportation, force protection, and potential support to local law enforcement agencies when directed. The transition plan is finalized. Data collection will be implemented, as directed by USNORTHCOM, to include patient and fiscal information. Success is defined as fulfilling the assigned DSCA response missions and civil authorities are prepared to assume responsibility of the operation.

d. Phase V Transition. This phase begins with civil authorities assuming responsibility with no degradation of HSS operations. The Phase ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. The trigger is when civil authorities are capable of taking responsibility for the HSS items identified in the MOEs. The decision to implement the transition plan may be based on more than military factors (e.g. political). Success equals complete transfer of HSS responsibilities to civil authorities and timely and safe redeployment to home station functions. CDRUSNORTHCOM will direct when this effort is to occur. As casualties are significantly decreased, and when Regional, State or local facilities are able to provide sufficient levels of patient care and support the operation on their own logistically, Joint HSS units will be redeployed. DOD will continue to provide all levels of Joint HSS to operating forces as required and until transition of authority has occurred and all forces are redeployed. The JTF-MED Commander will be relieved at the advice of the Joint Task Force Commander. During this phase, we return to pre-Phase I tasks, maintaining situational awareness via medical surveillance. Lessons learned are captured and reported up the chain-of-command.

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4. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Force Health Protection/Preventive Medicine Guidance. Subordinate Commands and Service Components will comply with CDRUSNORTHCOM Force Health Protection/Preventive Medicine Guidance published in Appendix 6 Force Health Protection or via separate correspondence. Health Surveillance guidance will also be incorporated in this Appendix. Medical chemical defense material will be issued when directed.

b. JTF Medical Commander Responsibilities. The designated JTF-MED Commander will assume leadership of Task Force Medical (TF-MED), and will coordinate and synchronize levels I – V Joint HSS within a designated JOA. The JTF Medical Commander is in direct support of the designated JTF Commander. Joint HSS coordination will be with JFC’s, State and Regional health authorities, allied health authorities (if applicable), and supporting commands.

c. Foreign Medical Support. Acceptance of Foreign medical support, supplies, or assistance will be dependent upon Department of State policies and determination of legal and clinical appropriateness. See Annex E, Appx. 4.

5. Administration and Logistics. TBP.

6. Command and Control.

a. When appropriate, the JTFs will establish a Medical Task Force Commander (TF-MED).

b. Service Components will ensure that medical organizations nominated as subordinate commands to a JTF include a headquarters capable of commanding and controlling operational units.

c. DOD Medical forces will remain under the command and control of US military commanders but will support other Federal Agencies as outlined in the Base Plan.

d. Medical Communications

(1) Routine coordinating communication between CDRUSNORTHCOM, Service Components, Sub-Unified Commands, and the JTF Surgeons will be by telephone whenever possible. Alternate means of communications are Global Command and Control System (GCCS), teleconference, E-Mail, fax, or AUTODIN message.

(2) Official plans, orders, reports and requests for information (with the exception of blood management messages) will be passed by NIPRNET or SIPRNET, teleconference and AUTODIN message. Pass blood management messages by telephone, E-Mail, fax, or AUTODIN message.
(3) Service components, Sub-Unified Commands and JTF Surgeons will coordinate medical communications internal to their commands. The TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) will be the primary and preferred means of communicating patient movement requests (PMR’s).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

T. J. KEATING
Admiral, USN
Commander, U.S. Northern Command

APPENDIXES:
1 - Joint Patient Movement
2 - Joint Blood Program
3 - Hospitalization
4 - Return to Duty
5 - Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System
6 - Force Health Protection
7 - Medical Command, Control, Communications and Computers (Not Used)
8 - Host-Nation Medical Support (Not Used)
9 - Medical Sustainability Assessment (Not Used)
10 - Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations
11 – Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identification (Not Used)
14 - Veterinary Medicine

OFFICIAL:

JOHN A. POWELL
Colonel, USA, MC, MFS
Command Surgeon

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
JOINT PATIENT MOVEMENT SYSTEM

References:  
a. CJCS Instruction 4120.02, “Assignment of Movement Priority”, 15 April 2005
b. DOD Instruction 6000.11 Patient Movement (DRAFT)
c. DOD Directive 6010.22 National Disaster Medical System
d. USTRANSCOM Policy, October 2003
e. DOD Directive 6000.12 Health Services Operations and Readiness
f. DOD Directive 4500.9 Transportation and Traffic Management
g. DOD Directive 5158.4 United States Transportation Command
h. DOD 4515.13-R Air Transportation Eligibility
i. Command Arrangements Agreement (CAA) between CDR, USTRANSCOM and CDR, USNORTHCOM, 22 March 2005 (DRAFT)

1. Purpose. To provide a concept of operation for Joint Health Service Support, assign tasks, and provide guidance on military medical support to Department of Defense (DOD) forces for DSCA in the Operation Area with regard to the movement of patients, medical attendants, related patient movement items (PMI), specialized medical care teams, and non-medical attendants in support of this CONPLAN. The primary mission of the DOD PM system is to safely transport U.S. military patients within the DSCA OA to the appropriate level of care as required.

2. Assumptions.

a. Assumptions related to patient movement under Annex Q of this CONPLAN apply to this appendix.

b. Joint patient movement (DOD beneficiary patients/HLD operations) will be in accordance with existing patient movement TTPs until such time as requirements exceed capability. Expansion of capability will proceed by phases.
c. HLD patient movement will be incorporated with existing combat patient movement requirements and CONUS patient redistribution schemes.

d. Inadequate transportation assets exist within DOD alone to meet all patient movement requirements.

e. Coordination and planning with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will occur to ensure proper request for activation of NDMS to facilitate/support outbound and inbound joint patient movement as required.

f. USNORTHCOM is the supported commander.

3. Concept of Operations.

a. USNORTHCOM will fulfill its DSCA mission by responding to requests for assistance in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP uses the term Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) to describe the support DOD provides to civil authorities.

b. Within the NRP, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services provides the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs. ESF #8 is coordinated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) principally through the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (ASPHEP). DOD is a Supporting Federal Agency to ESF #8.

(1). In a major public health or medical emergency, local transportation assets may not be sufficient to meet the demand. State or tribal requests for Federal medical transportation assistance are executed by ESF #8 in coordination with ESF #1, Transportation.

(2). At the request of HHS, DOD coordinates and provides support for the evacuation of seriously ill or injured patients to locations where hospital care or outpatient services are available. ICW NDMS Medical Interagency Coordination Group (MIACG), DOD is responsible for regulating and tracking patients transported on DOD assets to appropriate treatment facilities (e.g., NDMS non-Federal hospitals).

c. The NDMS primarily supports ESF #8, Health and Medical Services, of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). There are four Federal partners in the NDMS including Department of Homeland Security, DHHS, Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and DOD. DHS is the lead federal agency for the NDMS. The NDMS has three missions of emergency medical care, transportation of patients and definitive medical care. DOD coordinates the evacuation of patients from the patient collection
point in or near the incident site to NDMS patient reception areas through the NDMS MIACG.

d. USNORTHCOM will, in coordination with the lead federal agency, set clear mission priorities. IAW ref d, USTRANSCOM will plan and execute patient movement and aeromedical evacuation support for USNORTHCOM DCSA operations through a supported/supporting relationship.

4. Responsibilities

a. **USNORTHCOM**

   (1) Ensure awareness of bed capacity across the OA. Obtain surge capacity data with NDMS partners on a recurring basis, while also pursuing ways to incorporate State efforts that are not included in this data.

   (2) Coordinate with USTRANSCOM and NDMS service coordinators in patient movement planning efforts.

b. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

   (1) IAW ref d, USTRANSCOM will plan and execute patient movement and aeromedical evacuation support for USNORTHCOM DCSA operations through a supported/supporting relationship.

      (a) 18 AF/TACC will act as USNORTHCOM’s Air Mobility Division (AMD)

      (b) 18/TACC execute USNORTHCOM AE requirements.

      (c) USTRANSCOM’s Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) will act as NORTHCOM’s PMRC.

      (d) CDR USTRANSCOM, through the AMC Commander, will retain and exercise OPCON of aeromedical evacuation forces executing the DSCA mission.

   (2) GPMRC shall:

      (a) Perform bed apportionment, lift-bed plan development, bed reservation, destination MTF designation, outpatient care condition, ITV as well as tracking procedures.

      (b) GPMRC assumes responsibility as PMRC in the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR.
(c) Serve as the PMRC for the NDMS, in accordance with the NDMS partnership agreement and guidelines provided by the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS).

5. **Coordinating Instructions**. USNORTHCOM will facilitate and identify requirements for joint patient movement and transportation issues through the Medical Interagency Coordination Group. Representation in this Group should include, but not be limited to, individual representatives from VA, DHS, DHHS, DOD(HA) USNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM, USAMEDDCOM, USAF SG, BUMED and DOT.

6. **Communications**

   a. Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with ESF #2, is tasked in the NRP to provide communications support required for ESF #8 execution.

   b. DoD is responsible for tracking patients transported on DOD assets to appropriate treatment facilities.

   c. The PMRC will be the focal point for patient tracking through the use of TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

   d. Requests for DoD to manage patient tracking on non-DOD assets is beyond any current NDMS or NRP agreement and must be staffed as a Request for Assistance through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Director Military Support (DOMS).

Tabs
A – List of Aeromedical Staging Facilities – Not Used
B – List of Aeromedical Evacuation Aircraft – Not Used
C – Evacuation Requirements – Not Used
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA

JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM

References:


1. **Purpose.** To provide guidance for full operation and management of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) Blood Program and interface with the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO).

   a. **Concept of Operations.**

      (1) The Department of Defense is prepared to support civilian authorities in the event of a DSCA mission which is simultaneous to a Homeland Defense event.

      (2) The Department of Defense will be aware of the fact that The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead federal agency for Emergency Support Function 8, Public Health and Medical Service. DHHS monitors blood availability and maintains contact with the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) Inter-organizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, and as necessary, its individual members to include the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO), to determine:

         (a) the need for blood, blood products and the supplies used in their manufacture, testing, and storage;

         (b) the ability of existing supply chain resources to meet these needs; and

         (c) any emergency measure needed to augment or replenish existing supplies.

      (3) If the blood product requirements exceed the capacity of the civilian blood agencies, or if blood distribution or storage assistance is required, DHHS will send a Request for Assistance (RFA), to JDOMS and OASD(HD).

      (4) The USNORTHCOM JBPO, in coordination with the ASBPO, will manage and coordinate all aspects of DOD blood product support and DOD blood distribution assets in the JOA, regardless of Service component.

      (5) The Armed Services Blood Program (ASBP) has different blood distribution and storage assets in CONUS. The Armed Services Whole Blood Processing Laboratories (ASWBPL) are major blood product distribution hubs. ASWBPL-East is located at McGuire AFB and ASWBPL-West is located at Travis AFB. Deployable blood distribution assets include Blood Supply Units (BSU) and Blood Transshipment Systems (BTS). Additionally, DOD medical treatment facilities can be used for limited expanded blood product storage capacity.

      (6) If DHHS requests distribution assets, the USNORTHCOM JBPO will coordinate with Joint Task Force Medical (JTF-MED) and USJFCOM to designate a BSU and/or BTS to accommodate JOA blood distribution and storage.

   b. **Coordinating Instructions**
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(1) The ASBPO is a Level I member on the AABB Inter-organizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism.

(2) Coordinate with transportation assets to ensure the most expeditious method is used for moving blood from all areas of the country to the JOA. This will become extremely critical is airspace is restricted. In this case, priority on MILAIR must be given for the movement of blood products. As an alternative, Angel Flights can be used to move critical medical supplies, to include blood, even with restricted air space.

c. Command and Signal.

(1) The USNORTHCOM JBPO will determine the format and frequency of DOD blood reports (BLDRPT) and DOD blood shipment reports (BLDSHPRPT).

(2) Since the ASBP and will be working closely with DHHS and other civilian blood agencies, classification of reports should be kept at the lowest possible level.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
HOSPITALIZATION

1. Purpose. To describe the concept of employment of hospitals in support of this operation.

2. Concept of Operations.
   a. In general, each unit is responsible for the medical support of his respective personnel and any functional areas for which he has been assigned responsibility. During this plan, Level III through Level V assets used in support of this plan will be considered joint-use assets. Levels I and II are considered organic to the respective unit.
   b. The Operational Area (OA) is to be defined under the Base Plan.

3. Coordinating Instructions.
   a. All US Level III through Level V medical treatment facilities are considered Joint assets and as such, they care for all US forces regardless of Service affiliation.
   b. Level I and Level II care will be organic to individual units.
   c. Casualties may be treated by civilian and coalition forces medical personnel in emergency situations when US medical treatment is not immediately available. Patients should be moved to US facilities when feasible and as rapidly as possible.
   d. Coalition Forces personnel will be provided Health Service Support and hospitalization by US medical personnel on an emergency basis and will be returned to unit facilities as soon as medically indicated.
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX Q to CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
RETURN TO DUTY

1. **Purpose.** To coordinate with NC J-1 an effective and efficient method of returning individuals to duty once hospitalization of treatment of care is completed.

2. **Concept of Operations.** All active duty members who are returned to duty must report to an established holding location to ensure proper transportation and accountability is obtained to move the individual back to their respective unit/Command. Evacuation policy is to be determined.

3. **Coordinating Instructions.** USNORTHCOM J-1 will provide a clear, concise, efficient and effective Return to Duty policy and procedure.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX Q to CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
MEDICAL LOGISTICS (CLASS VIII) SUPPORT


1. Purpose. To provide the concept of operations for Class VIII support.

2. Assumptions.
   a. The Army and Air Force have pre-positioned stocks located throughout the OA.
   b. Each unit will deploy with the anticipation they will need to provide for 30 Days of Supplies (DOS) of Class VIII supplies.
   c. FDA approved Class VIII is readily available for use on all forces.
   d. The DMSB will develop a USNORTHCOM formulary.
   e. The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) can deploy a Push Package within 12 hours to the incident. The Push Package can be operational within 48 hours.
   f. USAMEDCOM has SMART-Logistics Teams ready to deploy in support of the SNS and USNORTHCOM.
   g. The USNORTHCOM AOR is a mature theater for supply purposes.

3. Concept of Operations.
      (1) The JFLCC is designated as the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager.
      (2) The JFACC will develop and maintain a Patient Movement Items (PMI) package for the DSCA OA.
      (3) The SIMLM's Health Service Logistics Support (HSLS) mission will evolve in relation to the maturity of the supported operations of this plan. Initially, the SIMLM will provide logistics assistance to deployed medical elements, coordinate the flow of logistics information/flow of Class VIII materiel from a source of supply and CONUS based Class VIII national inventory control points and service item control centers. It will also coordinate the distribution/transportation of Class VIII materiel to U.S. forces deployed to the DSCA OA. When appropriately equipped, the SIMLM will maintain visibility (including intransit visibility) of theater Class VIII materiel assets, provide decision support tools, redirect shipments, and through coordination with the JTF Surgeon can direct cross-leveling of Class VIII assets.
      (4) SIMLM should be prepared to provide re-supply to all medical elements within the DSCA OA.
b. Facilities.

(1) The SIMLM will coordinate medical resupply using existing contracting mechanisms (e.g. DLA, Prime Vendor, and Installation Medical Support Activities).

(2) The Services can facilitate the delivery of HSLS through the following agencies: Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Naval Medical Logistics Command (NAVMEDLOGCOM), Air Force Medical Logistics Command (AFMLO), and the US Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA).

(3) Medical assets pre-positioned in the DSCA OA.

(a) JFLCC.
   1. Consequence Management (CM) Packages are located at Womack Army Medical Center, Madigan Army Medical Center, and Brook Army Medical Center.
   2. Installation Support Packages (ISP) are located at each Army Medical Treatment Facility (MTF)
   3. Clinically Operational Equipment Sets (COES) are located at various locations throughout the OA.

(b) JFACC. CM Sets are located at Air Force bases throughout the OA.

(c) JFMCC. The Navy does not currently have any pre-positioned CM sets located in the OA.

c. Policy. Deploying units will deploy with the anticipation they will need to provide for 30 days of supply (DOS) during the deployment. Initial resupply will be through Service Component channels until accounts are coordinated and established through the SIMLM.

4. Medical Materiel Sustainability Assessment. Medical logistics sustainability relies on early resupply of deployed medical forces. The expectation is units will initially deploy with the anticipation they will need to provide for 30 DOS.

5. Tasks. See Annex Q (Health Services) for specific tasks.

6. Communications. Requisitions will be forwarded via voice, teletype, data transmission or satellite in Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) format. Priority of requisitions will be in concert with existing Service regulations unless otherwise directed. Requisitioning procedures and requisitions will be unclassified unless the operational situation dictates otherwise.

7. Command and Control. As the principal medical advisor to CDRUSNORTHCOM, the USNORTHCOM Surgeon exercises directive authority for the Commander over all medical resources allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM and ensures their effective use to meet the mission. The relationships between medical units of the components are established within the organizational structure of the component commands.
8. Coordinating Instructions.

a. The Combatant Commander, through the Command Surgeon, is responsible for HSLS in the OA. The Command Surgeon will maintain close ongoing contact with all activities having command over medical material support to deployed forces in order to monitor the status of Class VIIIA sustainability.

b. The JFLCC is designated as the SIMLM for this plan.

c. Combat commanders shall be kept fully informed of medical sustainability posture and what measures are being instituted to alleviate critical shortfalls.

d. Liaison with air lifters and ground transportation agencies may be required to establish a higher priority for movement and distribution of Class VIII material. Ongoing coordination with theater logisticians to ensure adequate emphasis and priority for medical material is essential.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

References:


e. DOD Instruction 6490.3, “Implementation and Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for Deployments,” August 7, 1997


h. Updated Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness, JCS MCM-0006-02.

i. Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidelines, JCS MCM-0026-02

1. **Purpose.** Provide the concept of operations, define the threat, and assign tasks for force health protection support of the Basic Plan.

2. **Definitions and Assumptions.**

   a. The definition of deployment in reference h is expanded to include USNORTHCOM deployment orders within the continental United States as well as the OCONUS portions of the AOR.

   b. An “all hazard” approach to force protection applies to the USNORTHCOM AOR.
c. Health risks in the operational environment will not be well characterized by the civil authorities being supported as any situation requiring significant DSCA will be outside of the established norms for the JOA.

3. Concept of Operations.

a. Health services support goal under this CONPLAN is to minimize both disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) and battlefield injuries within the USNORTHCOM AOR in order to support the civil authorities and maintain freedom of action.

b. Phase I, Shaping.

(1) Installation medical assets will take measures to sense their environment, shield operational forces, and prepare for consequence management activities that will sustain operations. The assessment of hazards should include both on-base and off-base potential health hazards that may affect the ability of the installation to conduct assigned missions and project forces.

(2) Preparatory actions for responding to CBRNE attack must also be conducted in this phase.

(3) Vaccination of USNORTHCOM (NC) designated forces against anthrax and smallpox will also be conducted during Phase I Shaping operations in accordance with the latest DOD policy.

c. Phase II. Staging.

(1) During this phase, forces scheduled for deployment must be medically screened to ensure they meet the physical/mental requirements for the operation as specified by NC. Conduct pre-deployment health assessments (DD2755) if required.

(2) Deploying forces will receive a medical threat and countermeasures briefing for the hazards potentially present in the operational area to minimize adverse health outcomes.

d. Phase III, Deployment.

(1) During this phase, health service support assets will support operational forces by characterizing the potential operational health risks of the battlespace and providing commanders at all levels risk mitigative recommendations in order to sustain operations. Medical forces will also provide comprehensive occupational, environmental, and operational exposure surveillance for all forces deploying in support of USNORTHCOM operations or conducting consequence management at home installations. Exposure surveillance must foremost serve the real-time operational risk management decisions of the supported commander. Secondarily, exposure surveillance will be employed to conduct retrospective analysis in order to improve the force health protection of future operations and support follow-up medical care to previously deployed forces.
(2) Health service support assets will likely be required to conduct consequence management operations at their home installations or during deployment to support the civil authority. Installation level assets must be prepared to receive, decontaminate, and treat CBRN-contaminated casualties or have a mutual aid agreement in-place to provide transport of contaminated casualties to and acceptance by a prepared civilian or another federal facility.

e. Phase IV, Support to Civil Authorities: continue to refine Phases I and II activities, as necessary.

f. Phase V, Transition.

   (1) Continue to refine Phase I, II, and III activities, as necessary.

   (2) Conduct post-deployment health assessment (DD 2796) if required by NC FHP orders.

   (3) Conduct medical follow-up as indicated by the results of post-deployment assessments.

   (4) Ensure all health risk assessment data collected during the operation is sent to the appropriate Service support center for analysis and archiving.


   a. In general, the USNORTHCOM AOR is at low risk for endemic diseases during normal circumstances. This condition is subject to change when the infrastructure is challenged by a severe event such as a hurricane or flooding. Local (operation-specific) flora, fauna, food, and water may present hazards to deploying personnel (Refer also to Appendix 14, Veterinary Medicine).

   b. Man-made hazards (deliberate or accidental) may present the greatest potential health risk to forces in this AOR. The major nations in the AOR are heavily industrialized and have the potential for the accidental or deliberate release of a large variety of toxic industrial chemicals/materials at both production sites and during transportation.

   c. Terrorist organizations have made their intention known to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction although none are known to possess this capability. (See Annex B for the intelligence assessment supporting this plan.)

5. Tasks.

   a. CDRUSNORTHCOM
(1) Develop Force Health Protection (FHP) implementing guidance and directives ICW OSD, the Joint Staff, Component Commanders, the Services, NGB, DOD agencies, and other Unified Commands.

(2) Plan, coordinate and execute HSS tasks with component commands, other DOD components, State Health Authorities, Inter-Agency and Coalition partners at the local, regional, and national levels.

(3) Integrate medical intelligence, environmental surveillance, and syndromic surveillance efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal agencies via early warning systems in order to identify potential health threats (Refer also to Appendix 10, Medical Intelligence Spt to Mil Ops).

(4) Identify, prioritize, and coordinate risk mitigation for DOD health sector critical infrastructure ICW the OSD, the Joint Staff, Component Commanders, the Services, NGB, DOD agencies, and the private sector.

(5) Standardize and provide oversight for the health service aspects of vulnerability assessments, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

b. Services

(1) Plan, coordinate, and execute FHP program IAW USNORTHCOM, DOD, JCS, and Service directives and guidance.

(2) Ensure all deploying forces have met pre-deployment FHP requirements specified in the supported EXORD.

c. Component Commands: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC); Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC); Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)

(1) Plan and coordinate FHP implementation with other JFCs, DOD components, State and local health authorities, and interagency and coalition partners at the local, State and regional levels.

(2) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW DOD components.

(3) BPT assume responsibilities as Joint Task Force Medical Commander ISO a designated Joint Task Force Commander established to support a defined JOA during an incident or event. Responsibilities include ensuring adequate preventive medicine assets are requested and deployed to ensure comprehensive exposure assessments and health risk management as defined in FHP guidance documents.

d. National Guard Bureau (NGB).
(1) Plan, coordinate and execute FHP program IAW USNORTHCOM, DOD, JCS, and Service directives and guidance.

(2) Ensure all deploying forces have met pre-deployment FHP requirements specified in the supported EXORD.

e. DOD Agencies.

(1) Plan, coordinate and execute FHP program IAW USNORTHCOM, DOD, JCS, and Service directives and guidance.
APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE SPT TO MIL OPS

1. Purpose. To provide information on general medical intelligence needs, requirements, and inherent benefits gained from medical intelligence. Medical intelligence-related definitions (paragraph 5) and information sources are also provided (paragraph 4). The holistic integration of intelligence into medical plans is needed to address mitigation and identify prevention strategies. Robust all-source intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) augmented with medical and occupational/environmental health intelligence (e.g., endemic disease threats) needs to be accomplished to assess and manage risks.

2. Concept of Operations.

   a. Phase I, Shaping. Prior to event AFMIC and DOD GEIS Global Emerging Infections System (and DHS and CDC) collect and disseminate medical intelligence regarding adversarial and environmental threats to the joint force within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Use information to evaluate medically-related vulnerabilities in resources (e.g., personnel, plans, equipment, and infrastructure) and develop abatement or response actions, as necessary.

   b. Phase II, Staging. Based on SecDef order and location of event, AFMIC (and other medical intelligence agencies) gather and evaluate potential health threats through the collection and analysis of environmental sampling and health surveillance data, production of assessments and forecasts, and maintenance of databases on country- or location-specific military and civilian health care capabilities, disease, and environmental health exposure threats and hazards. Important intelligence-based activities include an analysis of relevant foreign disease trends, worldwide infectious disease risks, global environmental health risks and militarily-significant life science issues, CBRNE, and medical defense advancements. Intelligence from all sources need to be assimilated, analyzed, disseminated, and updated to conform to changes in the existing or forecasted threat/hazard environments.

   c. Phase III, Deployment. Collect medically-related intelligence information, on-site, evaluate and compare with intelligence from DOD and other agencies to confirm or supplement force health protection requirements (including surveillance and sample/data collection) evaluate civil support needs.

   d. Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities. Continually re-evaluate medical intelligence from DOD and civil authorities for force health protection and civil support purposes.
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e. Phase V, Transition. Move from utilizing DOD/civil authority medical intelligence to medical intelligence being developed solely by the civil authority.

3. Tasks.

a. USNORTHCOM:

(1) Develop and refine the medical intelligence needs and gather information for risk guidance and requirements pre-, during, and post-deployment. This information should be a combined effort between the J2, J3 (CBRNE), and SG functions.

(2) Pre-deployment vulnerability assessment of preventive medicine concerns (e.g., validating Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center [AFMIC] identified medical threats) also need to be accomplished. Assess vulnerabilities to local food and water sources, potential epidemiological threats, local medical capabilities, vector/pest threats, and hygiene of local billeting and public facilities. These assessments will provide the necessary information to determine the initial force protection strategies and resources required to mitigate risks to DOD personnel and assets.

b. AFMIC:

(1) Infectious disease and environmental health risk assessments, and disease occurrence worldwide regional updates are produced by AFMIC and should be reviewed. These resources are available through the intelligence component of the JS/combatant command staff (e.g., J-2, G-2, S-2). AFMIC maintains the Medical Environmental Disease Intelligence and Countermeasures (MEDIC) CD-ROM and up to date information on the following websites:

(a) http://mic.afmic.detrick.army.mil/ (unclassified)

(b) http://www.dia.smil.mil/intel/afmic/afmic.html

(c) http://www.dia.ic.gov/intel/afmic/afmic.html (SCI JWICS)

(2) The AFMIC also develops reports that identify potential local industrial operations and the hazards normally associated with those operations that should be used to develop initial health assessments.

c. USNORTHCOM or Subordinate Command:

(1) Ensure risk management and surveillance results are reflected in the overall Operational Risk Summary evaluation. Communicate this information to
subordinate units for inclusion into their unit-level planning. Medical threats should also be integrated into Annex B (Intelligence) as appropriate.

(2) Communicate results from newly accomplished risk assessments and data collection activities to all appropriate organizations, including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through AFMIC, Joint Task Forces (JTFs), combatant commands, Services, and Service Occupational and Environmental Health Centers.

(3) Ensure AARs are provided to the intelligence community (including AFMIC) and Service centers for incorporation of lessons learned into future operational planning.

4. Definitions.

a. Health Surveillance. The regular or repeated collection, analysis, and interpretation of health-related data and the dissemination of information to monitor the health of a population and to identify potential risks to health, thereby enabling timely interventions to prevent, treat, or control disease and injury. It includes occupational and environmental health surveillance and medical surveillance.

b. Medical Intelligence. That category of intelligence produced from the collection, evaluation, and analysis of information concerning the medical aspects of foreign areas that have immediate or potential impact on policies, plans, and operations; and includes the observation of the fighting strength of enemy forces, occupational and environmental information, and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors.

c. Medical Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. A systematic continuing process that analyzes information on medical and disease threats, enemy capabilities, terrain, weather, local medical infrastructure, potential humanitarian and refugee situations, transportation issues, and political, religious and social issues for all types of operations. It is a component of the HSS mission analysis process, and the resulting statistics serves as a basis for developing HSS estimates and plans. It includes: defining the battlespace environment, describing the battlespace effects on HSS operations, evaluating the battlespace threats, and determining courses of action to meet actual and potential threats.

5. Information Sources.

a. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is a field production activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the sole DOD producer of medical intelligence. The center provides all-source intelligence on foreign infectious disease and environmental health risks, foreign military and civilian health care systems and infrastructures, and foreign biomedical development and life science technologies of military medical significance.
b. The DOD Global Emerging Infections System (GEIS, to include Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics [ESSENCE]) strengthens the prevention, surveillance, and response to infectious diseases that (1) are a threat to military personnel and their families, (2) reduce medical readiness, or (3) present a risk to U.S. national security. This is accomplished through a centralized coordination and communication hub linking DOD resources with U.S. and international efforts.

c. Other Federal Department Information.

(1) National Bio-surveillance Integration System (Department of Homeland Security [DHS] lead) is a fusion center of health-related data for provision of near real-time warning of biological event.

(2) BioSense (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]) is designed to improve the nation's capabilities for real-time biosurveillance and situational awareness of health-related information systems that vary at the local state and national levels. BioSense provides access to data from hospitals and healthcare systems in major metropolitan cities across the nation. It provides immediate, constant, and comparable information needed to inform local, state, and national public health and to support national preparedness.

(3) Epi-X (CDC) is a web-based communications solution for public health professionals. It allows the CDC, state and local health departments, poison control centers, and other public health professionals secure access to and ability to share preliminary health surveillance information. Users can be notified of breaking health events as they occur.
APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
VETERINARY MEDICINE

References:
a. National Response Plan, December 2004 (U)


c. Army Regulation 40-905, SECNAVINST 6401.1A, ARI 48-131, 16 August 1994, Veterinary Health Services (U)

d. Army Regulation 40-657, NAVSUP 4355.4H, MCO P10110.31H, 21 January 2005, Veterinary/Medical Food Safety, Quality Assurance, and Laboratory Service (U)

e. FM 4-02.18, December 2004, Veterinary Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. (U)

f. MEDCOM Pamphlet 525-1, 1 October 2003, Medical Emergency Management Planning (U)


1. Situation

a. General

(1) Purpose. To provide a concept of operation of operation for military veterinary support, assign tasks, and provide guidance on military veterinary support as part of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the CDRUSNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(2) Domestic events involving agriculture, food, or animals occur due to various causes and may require the assistance of DOD. Terrorism or other intentional acts against agriculture and food are a threat and increase the likelihood that a disaster will occur that requires the augmentation of civilian veterinary resources by DOD.

b. Assumptions.
(1) There are several types of incidents where DOD veterinary or other assets might be tasked to respond and provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These include animal or plant disease outbreaks and national or man-made disasters.

(2) **Animal/Plant Disease Outbreaks.** The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for protecting American agriculture from exotic or foreign animal/plant diseases. It advises individuals, the private sector, and state, local, and tribal governments, on appropriate biosecurity measures both before and after a disease is introduced, and helps develop, support, and carry out surveillance for disease agents of concern. The USDA is designated a Primary Agency and the Coordinator for Emergency Support Function #11 (ESF-11), Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex of the National Response Plan (NRP). Similarly, state departments of agriculture through their authorities and corresponding state response plans provide the primary leadership of the state response although the USDA will still provide the bulk of the funding for local response operations.

- **(a)** The response will be organized using the Incident Command System (ICS) as prescribed by the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Depending on the circumstances of the outbreak and the population involved, the Secretary of Agriculture may declare an “extraordinary emergency” to enhance the response authorities of the USDA. Disease outbreaks that do not directly affect human health (non-zoonotic diseases) may or may not be accompanied by a Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD). If a PDD is not made, the USDA may request, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a declaration of an Incident of National Significance that would evoke the full support and coordination of the NRP. Response under this provision would be funded in accordance with the Economy Act (31 USC 1535) or other applicable authorities (see Financial Management Support Annex to the National Response Plan). If the outbreak becomes extremely large, there will be the need to utilize all potential sources of support.

- **(b)** The resources of agricultural agencies, including technical resources will quickly be overwhelmed in a multi-state event. USDA and many states have mechanisms in place to mobilize and deploy animal and plant health professional volunteers. Many of these professionals are employed in private veterinary practice or academia. The USDA can also request animal health and other medical professionals from the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service, the National Disaster Medical System, and other federal agencies. The number of these professionals is limited.

- **(c)** DOD support to animal health authorities in animal or plant disease outbreak responses is anticipated in several functional areas and may not all be veterinary specific. DOD may be tasked to provide support in the areas of
(3) **Natural or Man-made Disasters:** Large-scale disasters due to natural or man-made causes can occur at any time and may require the support of DOD veterinary and other personnel. Large disasters may not only impact humans, but may impact commercial animal herds and flocks, farms, food production facilities, and pets. Examples include hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, floods, blizzards, and explosions.

(a) In disasters, DOD may be required to provide veterinary support for such things as agricultural assessment, working dog support (e.g. search and rescue, law enforcement animals), food inspection support, animal and zoonotic disease surveillance, vector control, stray animal control/rescued, animal evacuation, animal treatment and/or treatment, and shelter management.

(b) DOD veterinary support will also be required to support military forces responding to disasters. Support includes food inspection (dining facilities, rations, procurement), disease surveillance, medical support to military working animals, and stray animal incident control.

(c) Support from DOD veterinary resources during a declared disaster will be requested and funded in accordance with the National Response Plan and existing mechanisms for requesting other DOD support, IAW with the Base Plan.

2. **Mission.** CDRUSNORTHCOM provides veterinary support in conjunction with or separate from other Joint Health Service Support (HSS) to U.S. Military Forces, coalition forces, and civilian support in support of this CONPLAN and annex.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Veterinary Operations**

   (1) DOD veterinary support for declared national emergencies or National Special Security Events (NSSE) will be requested IAW established procedures.

   (2) DOD veterinary support may be requested by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) or other federal agencies in response to Incidents of National
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Significance without a Presidential Disaster Declaration. An example is a significant animal disease outbreak such as Exotic Newcastle Disease or Low-pathogenic avian influenza. In such cases the Secretary of Agriculture may declare an “extraordinary emergency” and assistance from DOD may be requested. The Secretary of Agriculture or his designated representative will request assistance from the Department of Defense through the Executive Secretary. In coordination with the Defense Veterinary Liaison Officer (DVLO described below) and the Command Veterinarian, USNORTHCOM, the Executive Secretary will validate the authenticity and feasibility of the request and forward it for SECDEF approval.

b. Phases

(1) **Phase I, Shaping.** Phase I is continuous situational awareness and preparedness; actions include interagency coordination, exercises, and public affairs.

(2) **Phase II, Staging.** Phase II begins with identification of a potential DSCA mission or when directed by SECDEF. The phase ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a prepare to deploy order (PTDO) and deployment of DCOs/DCEs, or a Defense Veterinary Coordinating Officer (DVCOS) for specific agricultural and veterinary support operations.

(3) **Phase III, Deployment.** IAW Base Plan and Annex Q

(4) **Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities.**

   (a) In the event that a Defense Veterinary Coordination Officer (DVCO) is deployed in lieu of a DCO and/or a JTF, the DVCO will serve as DOD’s single point of contact in the Joint Field Office with DCO duties as outlined in the Base Plan and Annex Q.

   (b) Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Requests for Forces (RFFs) will be processed through the DVCO IAW Base Plan and Annex Q.

(5) **Phase V, Transition.** IAW Base Plan and Annex Q.

4. Tasks

   a. **CDRUSNORTHCOM.**

      (1) Integrate veterinary and agricultural intelligence efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal agencies via early warning systems in order to identify potential threats.
(2) Coordinate exercise participation and response processes at national, regional, and local levels with other Unified Commands, DOD Components, and other federal and state agencies.

(3) Establish and maintain contact with the Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, US Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS); Emergency Management, Veterinary Services, APHIS; and other federal and DOD agencies (particularly DOD Veterinary Services Activity) involved in an agricultural emergency response. The Command Veterinarian, USNORTHCOM, will normally coordinate this liaison. The Command Veterinarian will also assist the Defense Veterinary Liaison Officer and the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) in validating authenticity and feasibility of requests for veterinary assistance from federal and state agencies.

b. Services

(1) **Army (DOD Executive Agent for Veterinary Services)**

   (a) Designate a U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Officer as the Defense Veterinary Liaison Office (DVLO). Normally this officer will be an officer assigned to the DOD Veterinary Service Activity (DODVSA). This officer will establish and maintain contact with USNORTHCOM, the Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, US Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS); Emergency Management, Veterinary Services, APHIS; and other federal and DOD agencies involved in an agricultural emergency response. This officer will assist in validating authenticity and feasibility of requests for veterinary assistance from federal agencies.

   (b) BPT to provide veterinary resources to include military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, laboratory diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.

   (c) Ensure training and readiness of veterinary personnel for response to an agricultural emergency. In conjunction with the USDA, train Veterinary Officers as Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians to the maximum extent possible.

   (d) Ensure veterinary assets are trained and capable of working within the Incident Command System outlined by the National Incident Management System.

   (e) Develop veterinary assets capable of providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities using an all-hazards approach.
(f) In the event of an Incident of National Significance where a DCO and JTF are not deployed, nominate a U.S. Army Veterinary Corps officer as a Defense Veterinary Coordinating Officer (DVCO) to serve as an on-site point of contact for DOD veterinary functions.

(g) When a JTF is to deploy, nominate a U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Officer to serve on the staff of the JTF Commander and to advise the JTF Commander and JTF Surgeon on veterinary support issues.

(f) It is unlikely in instances where only veterinary assets are needed that a Defense Coordinating Officer and/or Joint Task Force would be deployed. In the event of an Incident of National Significance where a DCO and JTF are not deployed, BPT nominate a U.S. Army Veterinary Corps officer as a Defense Veterinary Coordinating Officer (DVCO) to serve as an on-site point of contact for DOD veterinary functions.

(g) When a JTF is expected to deploy, BPT nominate a U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Officer to serve on the staff of the JTF Commander and to advise the JTF Commander and JTF Surgeon on veterinary support issues.

(2) Other Services

(a) BPT to provide resources to include military specialists trained in laboratory diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.

(b) BPT to provide laboratory support to assist and augment the capabilities of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies.

5. Coordinating Instructions.

   a. The USDA will formally request DOD support through the Executive Secretary, DOD when other federal veterinary resources are inadequate or inappropriate to respond to an agricultural incident.

   b. The USDA will maintain and exercise plans for a coordinated Federal response. The USDA will integrate DOD and other federal and state response agencies into these plans.

6. Administration and Logistics. IAW Base Plan and Annex Q.

7. Command and Control.

   a. Deployed individuals and units remain under military command. In the case where only veterinary assets are deployed and no DCO or JTF has been designated, the senior deployed veterinary officer or the Defense Veterinary Coordinating Officer
will serve as the military officer-in-charge and will report to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Where there is a DCO and/or a JTF, the chain of command will go through the senior veterinary officer to the DCO or JTF commander, as appropriate, to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. USDA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or other agencies receiving support will reimburse DOD for all incremental expenses in accordance with established procedures and the NRP.
APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX Q TO CONPLAN 2501-02 DSCA
MORTUARY AFFAIRS

1. Purpose. To facilitate identification that mortuary affairs is a logistics issue and not a medical task. Information and guidance on mortuary affairs can be found in Annex D of this CONPLAN.
ANNEX V TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

References: See base plan

1. Situation

   a. General. Department of Defense (DOD) and USNORTHCOM interests are served through consistent and comprehensive involvement and coordination with other Federal Departments and Agencies (interagency).

   b. Assumptions. See base plan.

   c. Legal Considerations. See base plan.

2. Mission. The USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Center will integrate and synchronize USNORTHCOM interagency activities with other agencies to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and full spectrum support in all phases of DCSA.

3. Execution

   a. Commander’s Intent

      (1) The Interagency Coordination Center (ICC) will facilitate the integration and synchronization of interagency operations and activities by DOD and non-DOD agencies by promoting mutual understanding, unity of effort, and full-spectrum support to civil authorities. They will accomplish this through enhancing coordination and exchange of interagency information before, during, and after event. The ICC will conduct daily assessments to better support and anticipate the needs of civilian authorities.

      (2) Responsibilities.

         (a) USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Center. The Commander, USNORTHCOM faces many challenges that are unique to the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). For most events in the Continental United States (CONUS), the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) will direct USNORTHCOM to perform defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions in support of a primary or coordinating agency as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP). For most domestic events, DOD is not the primary or coordinating agency and USNORTHCOM must build the
relationships to best support other agencies. The relationships that USNORTHCOM builds on a daily basis with the governmental and non-governmental agencies play a critical role in our ability to anticipate and execute DSCA missions. The ICC sets the conditions for operational success by integrating and synchronizing activities with multiple national and international agencies and departments to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and full-spectrum support of all Command plans, operations, contingencies, exercises and initiatives. The ICC accomplishes this through the following;

1. Situation Awareness. The ICC members must maintain situational awareness of Interagency missions, planning and training through formal and informal relationships with Non-DoD Departments and Agencies (e.g., E-mail situation and news reports from DHS and other Federal Agencies).

2. Planning. The ICC in coordination with the JPC/NC/J5, or other staff sections, must continually query external Agencies for new, revised or obsolete USG, Non Governmental and Industry Incident Management Plans to assess any USNORTHCOM equities or the potential necessity to incorporate information into command’s plans.

3. Execution. The ICC uses a three-phased methodology to provide essential information into the Command’s processes.

   a. The ICC must assess an incident or the event to determine if it meets any command threshold (e.g., CCIRs). Add incident or event to COP and Web Portal as appropriate.

   b. The ICC must develop an assessment for the command and disseminate information concerning those incidents or events that meet Command thresholds. Inform the appropriate Battle Staff nodes and J-code staff using IM and communications tools, USGS Interagency Operating Picture (IOP) and COP.

   c. The ICC must analyze and package information in formats useful to senior decision makers and monitor and update IM tools with information related to the work planned and completed by the civilian agencies.

(b) ESF Coordinator. The ESF coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation phases of incident management. The role of the ESF coordinator is carried out through a “unified command” approach as agreed upon collectively by the designated primary agencies. Responsibilities of the coordinator include:
1. Pre-incident planning and coordination.

2. Maintaining ongoing contact with ESF primary and support agencies.

3. Conducting periodic ESF meetings and conference calls.

4. Coordinating efforts with corresponding private-sector organizations.

5. Coordinating ESF activities relating to catastrophic incident planning and critical infrastructure preparedness as appropriate.

(c) Primary Agency. A federal agency designated in the NRP as an ESF primary agency is responsible for coordination and execution of the ESF functions and responsibilities in support of (ISO) the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). When an ESF is activated, the Primary Agency is responsible for:

1. Coordinating federal support within their functional area for affected States.

2. Planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations.

3. Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities.

4. Notifying and requesting assistance from support agencies.

5. Managing mission assignments and coordinating with support agencies, as well as appropriate State agencies.

6. Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources.

7. Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational elements informed of ESF operational priorities and activities.

8. Executing contracts and procuring goods and services as needed.

9. Ensuring financial and property accountability for ESF activities.

10. Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency emergency response and support teams.

(d) Support Agency. When an ESF is activated in response to an Incident of National Significance, and when requested by Department of Homeland
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Security (DHS) or the designated Primary Agency and approved by the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and may be responsible for:

1. Conducting operations using DOD authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities or resources.

2. Participating in planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations and the development of supporting operational plans, SOPs, checklists, or other jobs in concert with existing first-responder standards.

3. Assisting in the conduct of situational assessments.

4. Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the Primary ESF Agency.

5. Providing input to periodic readiness assessments.

6. Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

7. Identifying new equipment or capabilities required to prevent or respond to new or emerging threats and hazards, or to improve the ability to address existing threats.

8. Nominating new technologies to DHS for review and evaluation that have the potential to improve performance within or across functional areas.

9. Providing information or intelligence regarding their agency’s area of expertise.

(e) Coordinating Agency. Coordinating agencies support the DHS incident management mission by providing leadership, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response. While DHS retains responsibility for overall domestic incident management, coordinating agencies implement processes and are responsible for:

1. Providing staff for operations functions at fixed and field facilities.

2. Managing tasks with cooperating agencies, as well as appropriate State agencies.

3. Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of available resources.
4. Supporting and keeping primary/coordinating agencies of ESFs and other organizational elements informed of Incident Annex activities.

5. Planning for short-term and long-term support to incident management and recovery operations.

6. Maintaining trained personnel to provide appropriate support.

(f) Cooperating Agency. Coordinating agencies notify appropriate cooperating agencies when their assistance is needed. Cooperating agencies are responsible for:

1. Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the Coordinating Agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities or resources.

2. Participating in planning for incident management and recovery operations and development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other tools.

3. Furnishing personnel, equipment, or other resource support requested by DHS or the Incident Annex Coordinator.

4. Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response and recovery capabilities.

5. Nominating new technologies or procedures to improve performance.

b. Concept of Operations.

(1) When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), USNORTHCOM will fulfill its Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission by responding to approved requests for Federal assistance (RFAs) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Plan (NRP) and DOD policy and guidance.

(2) The NRP provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the major pieces of legislation that govern the federal response, which includes DOD. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. This plan covers the full spectrum of DSCA from small to large-scale operations.

(3) Standup of Interagency Coordination Center (ICC). Upon pre
established incident triggers occurring or any significant incident-related Interagency activity with potential for implementation of this
CONPLAN, the IC Director/Deputy Director will make a determination to stand up the ICC based on triggers and recommendations from support staff and inform COG/NC/J3 of this decision.

(4) Detailed actions and responsibilities of the ICC as an entity and specific responsibilities of key members is provided in the USNORTHCOM Battle Staff SOP, dated December 2004.

(5) DOD serves as a support agency to all NRP Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and a Coordinating Agency to the majority of NRP Incident Annexes. (See Figure 1)

(6) DOD provides various levels of support under each of the NRP ESF’s (See Appendix 1 to this Annex).
Figure 1 - Designation of ESF Coordinator and Primary/Support Agencies

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C = ESF Coordinator; P = Primary Agency; S = Support Agency

c. Phased ICC Actions in Support of DSCA. Due to varying nature of potential DSCA operations, there may be instances were some phases identified in the base
UNCLASSIFIED

plan are bypassed or phased actions occur simultaneously. The determinations of which resources are required or ESF’s chosen for activation will impact what NORTHCOM resources are needed and at what phase they enter the DSCA operation. Situational events will therefore drive the extent of ICC involvement.

(1) Phase I (Shaping). Phase I is a continuous situational awareness and preparedness state (which continues through all phases). ICC actions in this phase include the following:

(a) Function as it does for normal, day-to-day operations.

(b) Continue to maintain situational awareness of ongoing or potential events that may require DSCA.

(c) Continue to refine day-to-day sharing of information with agency partners IOT develop a single, integrated interagency operations picture.

(d) Work closely with interagency partners through planning, collaboration and exercises to prepare for DSCA contingencies.

(2) Phase II (Staging Operations). Phase II begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with DSCA response forces in receipt of a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO). Phase II success for ICC equals full ICC operations in place, detailed situational awareness and close interagency communications between all external partners. ICC actions in this phase include the following:

(a) At the direction of the IC Director/Deputy Director the ICC will stand up for 24X7 operations and provide interagency coordination IAW with this plan and the NORTHCOM Battle Staff SOP.

(b) Provide liaison agencies and external interagency partners with unclassified version of N-NC SITREP.

(c) ICC will inform all Battle Staff nodes and appropriate external Interagency partners via inputs into Command Event Log, and phone and E-mail notifications.

(d) Support Phase III planning and operations of the Joint Planning Group (JPG) the Joint Operations Group (JOG) which consists of the Current Operations Group (COG) and the Operational Planning Group (OPG), and the Joint Support Group (JSG).

(e) Support and facilitate processing of increased requests for information (RFIs) to and from agency partners.
(f) Provide updated interagency assessments to the Commander.

(3) **Phase III (Deployment).** Phase III begins with the response force deployment. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. Phase III success for ICC equals effective 24 x 7 ICC Operations remaining in place, fully developed situational awareness and constant interagency communications between all external partners. ICC actions in this phase include the following:

(a) Continue appropriate actions from Phase II.

(b) Facilitate the successful deployment of assets/personnel to the JOA through effective interagency (IA) coordination.

(c) Support NC JOG/JPG in preparations for Phase IV planning and operations.

(d) Continue to provide updated assessments to the Commander and agency partners.

(4) **Phase IV (Support of Civil Authorities).** Phase IV begins when DSCA response operations commence. The phase ends with civil authorities prepared to assume responsibility for operations. Success equals civil authorities ready to respond effectively to continuing requirements. Phase IV success for the ICC equals full and open inter-agency coordination contributing to the ability of civilian authorities resuming responsibility for operations. ICC actions in this phase include the following:

(a) Continue appropriate actions from Phases II-III.

(b) Provide the Commander with SA of transition requirements from agency partners for mutual support.

(c) Continue to facilitate the execution of DOD support to the primary or coordinating agency(s) through interagency coordination.

(d) Support NC JOG/JPG in preparations for Phase V planning and operations.

(5) **Phase V (Transition).** Phase V begins with civil authorities assuming control with no degradation of operations. The phase ends when response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success equals a complete transfer of responsibilities to civil authorities. Phase V success for ICC equals standing down of 24 x 7 ICC Operations and transition to Phase I Shaping Operations. ICC actions in this phase include the following:
(a) Continue appropriate actions from Phases II-IV.

(b) Provide interagency coordination for Inter-agency requirements/actions in transition operations.

(c) At the direction of the IC Director/Deputy Director the ICC will stand down from 24X7 operations and provide interagency coordination support as required prior to pre DSCA operations.

(d) Conduct post operation After Action Review (AAR) IOT capture lessons learned for use in improving subsequent ICC support to DSCA operations.

4. Administration and Logistics. See base plan and supporting annexes

5. Command and Control. See base plan and Annex J

TIMOTHY J. KEATING
Admiral, USN
Commander

Appendixes
1 -- DOD Role by Emergency Support Function and NRP incident Annexes
2 -- Humanitarian – Not Used
3 -- Economic – Not Used
4 -- Political – Not Used

OFFICIAL:

BERND McCONNELL
Director, IC
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX V TO CONPLAN 2501-05 DSCA
DOD SUPPORT TO NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN EMERGENCY SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS (ESF) AND NRP INCIDENT ANNEXES

References: See base plan Annex V

1. **Situation.** See base plan and Annex V

2. **Mission.** This annex provides an outline of the roles within the National Response Plan that DOD could be requested to provide in support of the ESFs.

3. **Execution.** See base plan and Annex V.
   a. Commanders Intent. See base plan and Annex V.
   b. Concept of the Operation. DOD is a Supporting Agency to all ESFs as listed below. When requested and upon approval of the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA during domestic events and is a Cooperating Agency for a majority of NRP Incident Annexes. Incident Annexes are applicable to specific situations requiring specialized, incident-specific implementation of the NRP. The overarching nature of functions described in the NRP annexes frequently involves either the support to, or the cooperation of, all departments and agencies involved in incident management efforts. In some cases, actions detailed in the annex also incorporate various components of DHS and other departments and agencies to ensure seamless integration of and transitions between preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. The following assistance may be requested of DOD during each ESF; See Annex V.
   c. DOD Tasks and Responsibilities by ESF.
      1) **ESF #1 – Transportation.** ESF #1 supports the Department of Homeland Security, assisting federal agencies, state, local and tribal government entities, and volunteer organizations requiring transportation for an actual or potential Incident of National Significance. Through the Department of Transportation (DOT)’s coordination role, ESF #1 integrates the DOT responsibility for Emergency Management of the Transportation System (EMTS) in the prevention/mitigation, preparedness, recovery, infrastructure restoration, safety, and security of the Nation and its transportation system. DOD responsibilities as a Support Agency include:
(a) Provide staffing to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) ESF #1 function and the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) ESF #1 when requested and upon approval by SecDef.

(b) Provides military transportation capacity from the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to move essential resources and assist in the contracting for civilian airlift when requested and upon approval by SecDef. USTRANSCOM also provides staff to the Headquarters ESF #1 function and the Regional ESF #1 when requested and approved by SecDef.

(2) ESF #2 – Communications. ESF #2 ensures the provision of Federal communications support to federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector response efforts during an Incident of National Significance. The ESF supplements the provisions of the NRP for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies (also referred to as the National Telecommunications Support Plan (NTSP). Until the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator and ESF #2 are deployed and operational, DOD may be requested to provide a communications capability that might later be required to augment deployed ESF #2 assets.

(3) ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering. ESF #3 supports DHS by coordinating and organizing the capabilities and resources of the Federal Government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from emergencies and disasters. USACE, when functioning under ESF #3, is designated as the Coordinator and Primary Agency, as such, USACE is not considered to be performing DSCA for DOD.

(4) ESF #4 – Firefighting. ESF #4 enables the detection and suppression of wildland, rural, and urban fires resulting from, or occurring coincidentally with an Incident of National Significance. Responsibilities for DSCA as a Support Agency include supporting firefighting operations on non-military lands with personnel, equipment, and supplies under the terms of the existing interagency agreement, including the arrangement of liaison as required.

(5) ESF #5 - Emergency Management. ESF #5 is responsible for supporting overall activities of the Federal Government for domestic incident management. ESF #5 provides the core management and administrative functions ISO the NRCC, RRCC, and the Joint Field Office (JFO). DOD support requirements include:

(a) Provide personnel to assist the RRCC, NRCC and/or JFO to assist ESF operations.
(b) As appropriate, identify staff liaisons or points of contact to provide technical and subject-matter expertise, data, advice, and staff support for operations that fall within the domain of DOD.

(c) Support capabilities of other organizations as required.

(6) **ESF #6 – Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.** ESF #6 supports state, regional, local and tribal government and non-governmental organizations (NGO) efforts to address the non-medical mass care, housing and human services needs of individuals and/or families impacted by emergencies and disasters. DOD support requirements include:

(a) Fulfill mass care requirements for ice and water (ICW) mass care elements of ESF #6.

(b) Provide assistance by inspecting mass care shelter sites to ensure suitability of facilities to safely shelter victims.

(c) Provide assistance in constructing temporary shelter facilities in the affected area.

(d) Provide temporary housing support, such as temporary structures and expedited repair of damaged homes (to include temporary roofing or other repairs that facilitate reoccupation of minimally damaged structures), as necessary.

(7) **ESF #7 – Resource Support.** ESF #7 assists DHS in supporting Federal agencies and state, local, and tribal governments requiring resource support prior to, during, and/or after emergencies and disasters. DOD support includes:

(a) Transportation assets.

(b) Telecommunications assets.

(c) Locating and coordinating use of space for incident management activities.

(d) Security for Government property and assets ISO response and recovery activities.

(e) Assisting in establishing and managing mobilization centers.

(8) **ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services.** ESF #8 provides the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement state, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health issues when appropriate) for potential or actual
emergencies and disasters and/or during a developing potential health and medical situation. DOD support includes:

(a) Alerts DOD National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Federal Coordinating Centers (FCC) (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and provides specific reporting/regulating instructions to support incident relief efforts.

(b) Alerts NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS patient reception plans in a phased, regional approach, and when appropriate, in a national approach.

(c) At the request of Health and Human Services (HHS), DOD coordinates with ESF #1 to provide support for the evacuation of seriously ill or injured patients to locations where hospital care or outpatient services are available.

(d) Using available DOD transportation resources, ICW the NDMS Medical Interagency Coordination Group (MIACG), evacuates and manages victims/patients from the patient collection point in or near the incident site to NDMS patient reception areas.

(e) Provides available logistical support to health/medical response operations.

(f) Provides available medical personnel for casualty clearing/staging and other missions as needed including aero-medical evacuation and medical treatment. If medical capabilities are not provided through emergency management assistance compacts (EMACS), DOD may need to mobilize and deploy available Reserve medical assets and federalize the National Guard (NG) medical assets when authorized and necessary to provide DSCA.

(g) Coordinates patient reception, tracking and management to nearby NDMS non-Federal hospitals, VA hospitals, and DOD military treatment facilities that are available and can provide appropriate care.

(h) Provides available military medical personnel to assist HHS in the protection of public health (such as food, water, wastewater, solid waste disposal, vectors, hygiene, and other environmental conditions).

(i) Provides available DOD medical supplies for distribution to mass care centers and medical care locations being operated for incident victims with reimbursement to DOD.

(j) Provides available emergency medical support to assist state, local, and tribal governments within the disaster area and the surrounding vicinity. Such services may include triage, medical treatment, mental health support, and the use of surviving DOD medical facilities within or near the incident area.
(k) Provides assistance in managing human remains, including victim identification and mortuary affairs.

(l) Provides evaluation and risk management support through use of DCOs, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs), and Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMPs).

(m) Provides available blood products ICW HHS.

(n) Provides DOD confirmatory laboratory testing support ICW HHS.

(9) **ESF #9 – Urban Search and Rescue.** ESF #9 rapidly deploys components of the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) response system to provide specialized life-saving assistance to state, local, and tribal authorities during an emergency or disaster. US&R activities include locating, extracting, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures. DOD support includes:

(a) Serves as a primary source for providing fixed-wing and/or rotary-wing transportation for US&R Joint Management Teams (JMTs).

(b) Serve as secondary source for the following assistance.

1. Ground transportation for US&R task forces and JMTs within the affected area.

2. Mobile feeding units for US&R task forces and JMT personnel.

3. Portable shelter (tents) for use by US&R task force and JMT personnel for eating, sleeping, and working.

(10) **ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response.** ESF #10 provides Federal support in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or uncontrolled release of oil or hazardous materials when activated. The Federal Government also may respond to oil and hazardous materials accidents and incidents by pursuing mechanisms of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) without activating ESF #10. DOD support includes:

(a) Provides On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and directs response actions for releases of hazardous materials from its vessels facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons.

(b) Provide response and recovery assistance to incidents involving radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices, pursuant to development of Memorandum of Understanding between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DOD.
(11) ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources. ESF #11 supports state, local, and tribal authorities and other Federal agency efforts to address:

(a) Provisions of nutrition assistance.

(b) Control and eradication of an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic disease, highly infective exotic plant diseases, or economically devastating plant pest infestations.

(c) Assurance of food safety and food security (under Department of Agriculture (USDA) jurisdictions and authorities).

(d) Protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties resources prior to, during, and/or after an emergency or disaster. DOD support includes:

1. Assess the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities capable of storing dry, chilled, and frozen food.

2. Assess the availability of DOD transportation equipment, material handling equipment, and personnel for support. This responsibility is confined to the posts, camps and stations within or adjacent to the affected area.

3. Assess the availability of laboratory and diagnostic support, subject-matter expertise, and technical assistance that may be provided.

4. Assist animal emergency response organizations or others as requested and appropriate. Provide resources including senior Army Veterinary Corps Officers to function as Defense Veterinary Liaison Officers and Defense Veterinary Support Officers (who serve as the on-site point of contact for DOD veterinary functions) and other military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.

5. Provide laboratory support to assist and augment the capabilities of Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).

6. Assist in the development of response plans.

(12) ESF #12 – Energy. ESF #12 is intended to restore damaged energy systems and components during an emergency or disaster. Under Department of Energy (DOE) leadership, ESF #12 is an integral part of the larger DOE responsibility of maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through preventive measures as well as restorative actions. DOD support includes the
coordination of emergency power team missions with power system restoration activities to establish priorities and efficiently provide support to a facility having power restored.

(13) **ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security.** ESF #13 integrates Federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities associated with emergencies and disasters. DOD support would include providing physical and electronic security systems assistance and expertise.

(14) **ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation.** ESF #14 provides a framework for Federal Government support to State, regional, local, and tribal governments, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and the private sector designed to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of an emergency and disaster. This support consists of available programs and resources of Federal departments and agencies to enable community recovery, especially long-term community recovery, and to reduce or eliminate risk from future incidents, where feasible. DOD support includes:

(a) Provide technical assistance in community planning and civil engineering and natural hazard risk assessment expertise.

(b) Support the development of national strategies and plans related to housing and permanent housing, debris management, and the restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.

(15) **ESF #15 – External Affairs.** ESF #15 ensures that sufficient Federal assets are deployed to the field during an emergency or disaster to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace. ESF #15 provides the resource support and mechanisms to implement the National Response Plan – Incident Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures are described in the NRP Public Affairs Support Annex. The NRP does not detail specific DOD support that may be required. However, depending on the nature and scope of the incident, all Federal departments and agencies, including DOD, support the NRP and are responsible for providing appropriate support for ESF #15 as required.

d. **NRP Incident Annexes**

(1) **Biological Incident Annex.** This annex outlines the actions, roles, and responsibilities associated with response to a disease outbreak of known or unknown origin requiring Federal assistance, and supports policies and procedures outlined in ESF #8, #10, and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. DOD is a Cooperating Agency.
(2) Catastrophic Incident Annex. This annex establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident. The incident can be any natural or manmade incident. All catastrophic incidents are considered to be Incidents of National Significance. DOD is a Cooperating Agency for this Annex. Specific DOD responsibilities and actions are found in the Catastrophic Incident supplement (FOUO). DOD is assigned the specific responsibility to assist in Patient Movement.

(3) Cyber Incident Annex. This annex discusses policies, organization, actions, and responsibilities for a coordinated, broad-based approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber-related Incidents of National Significance impacting critical national process and the national economy. As a Coordinating Agency, DOD (specifically USSTRATCOM and Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) operates a network of Computer Response Teams (CERT) that are staffed 24/7. Other Coordinating Agencies with DOD include DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/National Cyber Security Division, and the Department of Justice. DOD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an imminent threat to national security, as authorized by applicable law and policy. Specific DOD responsibilities include:

- Exercising computer security and computer network defense ISO national response efforts for:
  1. DSCA.
  2. Intelligence and information sharing.
  3. Law enforcement investigations.
  4. Military operations to defend the homeland.
- Provide attack sensing and warning capabilities.
- Gather and analyze information to characterize the attack.
- Gain attribution of the cyber threat.
- Participate in information sharing.
- Offer mitigation techniques.
- Perform network intrusion diagnosis.
- Provide technical expertise.
(4) **Nuclear Radiological Incident Annex.** DOD is a Coordinating and Cooperating Agency along with the DOE, DHS, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), NASA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for this annex. The annex describes how the Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies support DHS’s overall coordination of the response to a nuclear/radiological Incident of National Significance. DOD responsibilities include:

a. Coordinates Federal actions for radiological incidents involving DOD facilities, including US nuclear powered ships, or material otherwise under DOD jurisdiction.

b. Provides DSCA in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception for support provided under Immediate Response Authority, the obligation of DOD resources to support RFAs is subject to the approval of the SecDef.

(5) **Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex.** DOD is a Cooperating Agency for this annex that describes roles, responsibilities, and coordinating mechanisms for managing certain oil and hazardous materials pollution incidents. As a Cooperating Agency, DOD may be called upon to make available those facilities or resources that may be useful in a response situation, consistent with agency authorities and capabilities.

(6) **Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and investigation Annex.** DOD is a Cooperating Agency for this strategic annex that facilitates an effective Federal law enforcement and investigative response to all threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. The annex establishes a structure for a systematic, coordinated, unified, timely, and effective national law enforcement and investigative response. Requests for DOD assistance for law enforcement and criminal investigation during an incident would come from the Attorney General to the SecDef for approval.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** See base plan and Annex V.

5. **Command and Control.** See base plan and Annex V.
ANNEX Z TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05
DISTRIBUTION

Plan is available on the USNORTHCOM J553 NIPR Portal:
https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j5/civil_support/default.htm

Plan may be reproduced for USG official use in planning and production of DOD supporting plans and supported USG Agency Plans.

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## GLOSSARY

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DITSCAP  DOD Information Technology Security
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DLA     Defense Logistic Agency
DMS     Defense Messaging System
DNBI    Disease and non-battle injuries
DNI     Director of National Intelligence
DOD     Department of Defense
DODD    Department of Defense Directive
DOD HLS JOC Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint
         Operations Concept
DODI    Department of Defense Instruction
DODM    Department of Defense Manual
DOE     Department of Energy
DOI/BLM Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
         Management
DOJ     Department of Justice
DOS     Department of State
DOT     Department of Transportation
DSCA    Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DTG     Date Time Group
DTRA    Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EA      Electronic Attack
EDD     Explosive Detection Dog
E-E     Emergency Essential
EEFI    Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EEI     Essential Elements of Information
EFAC    Emergency Family Assistance Center
EHF     Extremely High Frequency
EKMS    Electronic Keying Materials System
EM      Electromagnetic
EMAC    Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMTS    Emergency Management of the
         Transportation System
EMI     Electromagnetic Interference
EO      Executive Orders
EOC     Emergency Operations Center
EOD     Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP      Electronic Protection
EPA     Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO    Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ES      Electronic Warfare Support
ESF     Emergency Support Function
EW      Electronic Warfare
EXORD   Execution Order
FAA     Federal Aviation Administration
FBI     Federal Bureau of Investigation

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<tr>
<td>NAAK</td>
<td>Nerve Agent Antidote Kit</td>
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<td>NARP</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVFAC</td>
<td>Naval Facilities Engineering Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVNETWARCOM</td>
<td>Naval Network Warfare Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Coordinating Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capital Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Communications System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NC/JOC</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defense Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System</td>
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<td>NETOPS</td>
<td>Network Operations</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NGRF</td>
<td>National Guard Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NICCC</td>
<td>National Interagency Coordination Center</td>
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<td>NICCL</td>
<td>National Interagency Communications Conference Line</td>
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<td>NIFC</td>
<td>National Interagency Fire Center</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLW/NLC</td>
<td>Non-lethal Weapons/Non-lethal Capabilities</td>
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<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
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<td>N-NC</td>
<td>NORAD-USNORTHCOM</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>National Response Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP-CIS</td>
<td>National Response Plan – Catastrophic Incident Supplement</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSEP</td>
<td>National Security Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>NSSE</td>
<td>National Special Security Event</td>
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<td>NTSP</td>
<td>National Telecommunications Support Plan</td>
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<td>NWCG</td>
<td>National Wildfire Coordination Group</td>
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<td>OA</td>
<td>Operational Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASD (HD)</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASD (PA)</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIW</td>
<td>Operational Intelligence Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPG</td>
<td>Operational Planning Group</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<td>ORF</td>
<td>Official Representation Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>On Scene Commander</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<td>PAG</td>
<td>Public Affairs Guidance</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Pyridostigmine Bromide</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Posse Comitatus Act</td>
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<td>PERSTAT</td>
<td>Personnel Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFO</td>
<td>Principle Federal Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIOM</td>
<td>Provide, Install, Operate and Maintain</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirement</td>
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<td>PLANORD</td>
<td>Planning Order</td>
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<td>PMR</td>
<td>Patient Movement Requests</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>POTUS</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protection Equipment</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYREP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Report</td>
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<td>PTDOD</td>
<td>Prepared to Deploy Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organizations</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBECSS</td>
<td>Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Environmental Coordinator</td>
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<td>REPL</td>
<td>Regional Emergency Preparedness Officer</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Request for Federal Assistance</td>
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<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
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<td>RFI</td>
<td>Requests for Information/Intelligence</td>
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<td>RI</td>
<td>Routing Indicators</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RPL</td>
<td>Response Posture Levels</td>
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<td>RRCC</td>
<td>Regional Response Coordination Center</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Service Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, and Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Religious Support Plan</td>
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<td>RST</td>
<td>Religious Support Team</td>
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<td>RTF</td>
<td>Response Task Force</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Rules for the Use of Force</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Situational Awareness</td>
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<td>SAAM</td>
<td>Special Assignment Airlift Mission</td>
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<td>S&amp;M</td>
<td>Scheduling and Movement</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>Satellite Communications</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Space Coordinating Authority</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>State Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>SDB</td>
<td>Satellite Data Base</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Special Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECAF</td>
<td>Secretary of the Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECARMY</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECNAV</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPLO</td>
<td>State Emergency Preparedness Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEWG</td>
<td>Special Events Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFLEO</td>
<td>Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official</td>
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<td>SFO</td>
<td>Senior Federal Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHF</td>
<td>Super High Frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>SJFHQ-N</td>
<td>Standing Joint Force Headquarters North</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>SPINS</td>
<td>Special Instructions</td>
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<td>SRUF</td>
<td>Standing Rules for the Use of Force</td>
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<td>SYSCONS</td>
<td>Systems Control Centers</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<td>TACSAT</td>
<td>Tactical Satellite</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TALCE</td>
<td>Tanker/Airlift Control Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBP</td>
<td>To Be Published</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>Temporary Flight Restriction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNCC</td>
<td>Theater NetOps Control Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
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<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment List</td>
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<td>TRAC2ES</td>
<td>TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System</td>
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<td>TSP</td>
<td>Telecommunications Service Priority</td>
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<td>TTAD</td>
<td>Temporary Tours of Active Duty</td>
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<td>TTIC</td>
<td>Terrorist Threat Integration Center</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>Ultra High Frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCP</td>
<td>United States Capitol Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA/FS</td>
<td>US Department of Agriculture, US Forest Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
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</table>
GLOSSARY

PART II, DEFINITIONS

Agency: A division of government with a specific function offering a particular kind of assistance. In the incident command system, agencies are defined either as jurisdictional (having statutory responsibility for incident management) or as assisting or cooperating (providing resources or other assistance). (National Response Plan)

Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 3-07.2)

Area of Operations: An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation can be established within the operational area as necessary. Areas of operation should be large enough to accomplish DSCA missions and should not typically encompass the entire operational area.

Area of Responsibility (AOR):
1) The USNORTHCOM AOR for normal operations is the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and other islands (excluding Greenland).
2) The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02)

Base Support Installation: A military installation of any service designated by the Secretary of Defense, in or near an actual or projected domestic operational area. The BSI serves in general support of the JTF conducting response operations.

Catastrophic Incident: Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass causalities, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic events are Incidents of National Significance. (National Response Plan)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE): Emergencies resulting from the deliberate or unintentional release of nuclear, biological, radiological or toxic poisonous chemical materials, or the detonation of a high yield explosive. (JP 1-02)

Civil Authorities: Nonmilitary federal, state, local or tribal government agencies. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Civil Disturbance: Group acts of violence and disorders prejudicial to public law and order in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of assigned missions. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02)

Common Operational Picture (COP): A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 1-02)
**Computer Network Attack (CNA):** Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Electronic attack (EA) can be used against a computer, but it is not CNA. CNA relies on the data stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the electromagnetic spectrum. (JP 1-02)

**Computer Network Defense (CND):** Measures taken to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation or destruction. (JP 1-02)

**Computer Network Operations (CNO):** Defensive, offensive, and exploitation actions and operations conducted to ensure access to information, information systems, and networks; acquire intelligence and vulnerability information form adversary systems; and, when directed, deny an adversary access and use of their information and information systems. (DODD 3600.1)

**Computer Network Exploitation (CNE):** Activities by foreign intelligence collection entities involving intrusion into DOD computers and computer networks of the Global Information Grid (GIG). Some foreign intelligence and security services are using rapidly evolving technologies and methods to gain access to sensitive information by penetrating computer networks and their attached information systems. (DODD 3600.1)

**Consequence Management:** The requirements of consequence management and crises management are combined in the NRP into a single term of domestic incident management. Consequence management is actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. (HSPD-5)

**Continuity of Operations (COOP):** The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**Critical Infrastructure:** Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual are, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

**Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP):** The identification, assessment, and security enhancement of physical and cyber assets essential to the orderly functioning of the government, economy, domestic activities and for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. military operations. The primary responsibility for the protection of private and state property lies with private enterprise, and local and state authorities. DOD assets will only be utilized when requested by state authorities and approved by SecDef. Protection of civil infrastructure is a civilian
Responsibility led by DHS. DOD’s responsibility is to identify and coordinate protection of critical infrastructure necessary to execute the national military strategy.

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO): A military or civilian of any DOD Component, who has been designated to exercise some delegated authority to coordinate DSCA operations under DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft). The authority of each DCO will be defined in documentation and will be limited either to the requirements of a specified inter-agency planning process or to a specified geographical area or emergency. (DODI 3025.dd, Processing Requests for DSCA (draft))

Defense Industrial Base (DIB): The DIB consists of DOD product and service providers. Many services and products are essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations; these services and products constitute assets for the DOD.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): DOD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated support to law enforcement and other activities. The DOD provides DSCA when directed to do so by the President or SecDef. All DSCA is civil support; however, all of civil support is not DSCA. DSCA is performed within the borders of the United States and does not include Foreign Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance. (DODD 3025.dd (draft))

DOD Resources: Military and civilian personnel, including Selected and Ready Reservists of the Military Services, and facilities, equipment, supplies, and services owned by, controlled by, or under the jurisdiction of a DOD Component. (DODD 3025.dd (draft))

Domestic Emergency: Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger the life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term "domestic emergency" includes any or all of the conditions defined herein as civil defense emergency, civil emergencies, catastrophic or major disaster, emergency or natural disaster. (DODD 3025.dd (draft))

Economy Act: The Act authorizes Federal agencies to provide goods and services on a reimbursable basis to other Federal agencies when more specific statutory authority to do so does not exist.

Emergency: As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. (National Response Plan)
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO): The Federal officer who is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector. (National Response Plan)

Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC): The Federal official appointed to manage Federal resource support activities related to non-Stafford Act incidents. The FRC is responsible for coordinating support from other Federal Departments and agencies using interagency agreements and MOUs. (National Response Plan)

Force Protection: Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force Protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

Force Protection Condition (FPCON): A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved program standardizing the Military Services’ identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities. This program facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities.


Homeland Defense (HLD): The ability to protect U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.

Homeland Security (HLS): Defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize damage, and recover from attacks that do occur. (National Strategy for Homeland Security)

Immediate Response: Any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the authority of DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft), and any supplemental guidance prescribed by the head of a DOD Component, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions occurring where there has not been any declaration of major disaster or emergency by the President or attack. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities.
consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act. All such necessary action is referred to as “immediate response”. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Imminently Serious Conditions: Emergency conditions in which, in the judgment of the military commander or responsible DOD official, immediate and possibly serious danger threatens the public and prompt action is needed to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Under these conditions, timely prior approval from higher headquarters may not be possible before action is necessary for effective response. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Intergovernmental Support: Support provided by a DOD activity to a non-DOD Federal activity and vice versa (does not include support provided to or received from foreign governments).


Incident: An occurrence or event, natural or man-made that requires an emergency response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. (National Response Plan)

Incident Command Post (ICP): The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions is performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light. (National Response Plan)

Incident Commander (IC): The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management for all incident operations at the incident site. (National Response Plan)

Incident of National Significance: Base on criteria established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, paragraph 4, an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by and appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. (National Response Plan)
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**Information Operations (IO):** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (JP 1-02)

**Insurrection Act:** Recognizing that the primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in state and local governments, the Insurrection Statutes authorize the President to direct the armed forces to enforce the law to suppress insurrections and domestic violence. Military forces may be used to restore law and order, prevent looting, and engage in other law enforcement activities.

**Joint Field Office (JFO):** A temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point for federal, State, local, and tribal executives with responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The JFO will combine the traditional functions of the JOC, the FEMA DFO, and the JIC within a single Federal facility. (National Response Plan)

**Joint Information Center (JIC):** A facility established to coordinate all incident-related public information activities. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident. Public information officials from all participating agencies should collocate at the JIC. (National Response Plan)

**Joint Operations Area (JOA):** An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. (JP 1-02)

**Joint Operations Center (JOC) for Civil Authorities:** The JOC is the focal point for all Federal investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or potential terrorist incident or any other significant criminal incident, and is managed by the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO). The JOC becomes a component of the JFO when the NRP is activated. (National Response Plan)

**Law Enforcement Agency (LEA):** Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense) chartered and empowered to enforce US laws in the following jurisdictions: the United States, a state (or political division) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or within the borders of a host nation. (JP 1-02)

**Local Government:** A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under state law), regional or interstate government; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization...
or, in Alaska, a native Village or Alaska Regional native Corporation; or other public entity. (Homeland Security Act of 2002 and National Response Plan)

Major Disaster:  As defined by the Stafford Act, any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (National Response Plan)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): Memorandums that define general areas of conditional agreement between two or more parties, what one party does depends on what the other party does (e.g. one party agrees to provide support if the other party provides the materials). MOAs that establish responsibilities for providing recurring reimbursable support shall be documented on a DD Form 1144, Support Agreement, or similar format that contains all necessary information.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): Memorandums that define general areas of understanding between two or more parties (explains what each party plans to do; however, what each party does is not dependant on what the other party does. e.g., does not require reimbursement or other support from receiver)

Mission Assignment (MA): The vehicle used by DHS/EPR/FEMA to support Federal operations in a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency declaration. It orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable State or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the necessary work. (National Response Plan)

Mission Assurance: The ability to ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with the intended purpose or plan. Mission Assurance-such as force protection; antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection; information assurance; DOD continuity operation; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense; and installation preparedness-to create the synergistic effect required for DOD to mobilize, deploy, support, and sustain military operations throughout the continuum of operations.

Multiagency Command Center (MACC): An interagency coordination center established by DHS/USSS during NSSEs as a component of the JFO. The MACC serves as the focal point for interagency security planning and coordination, including the coordination of all NSSE-related information from other intra-agency centers (e.g., police command posts, Secret Service security rooms) and other interagency centers (e.g. intelligence operations centers, joint information centers). (National Response Plan)
National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC): The organization responsible for coordinating allocation of resources to one or more coordination centers or major fires within the Nation. The NICC is located in Boise, ID. (National Response Plan)

National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC): A facility located in Boise, ID, that is jointly operated by several Federal agencies and is dedicated to coordination, logistical support, and improved weather services in support of fire management operations throughout the United States. (National Response Plan)

National Special Security Events (NSSE): A designated event, which by virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious significance may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO): A nonprofit entity that is based on interests of its members, individuals, or institutions and that is not created by a government, but may work cooperatively with government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private benefit. Examples of NGOs include faith-based charity organizations and the American Red Cross. (National Response Plan)

Operational Area: The USNORTHCOM OA for DSCA is the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and any possession of the United States within the USNORTHCOM AOR. (DODI 3025.dd (draft))

Planning Agent: A military or civilian official of any DOD Component, who has been designated by the head of the Component to exercise delegated authority for DSCA planning for the entire Component (i.e., “principle planning agent”) or for certain subordinate elements or a specified geographic area (e.g. “regional planning agents”). Authorities and responsibilities of each planning agent will be defined by the DOD Component, and may include DSCA response as well as planning at the election of any Component. The actual authority of planning agents will be communicated to others, as determined by the DOD Component, or when requested by the DOD Executive Agent. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

Posse Comitatus Act (PCA): Prohibits the use of the Army or the Air force for law enforcement purposes, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. This prohibition applies to Navy and Marine Corps personnel as a matter of DOD policy. The primary prohibition of the PCA is against direct involvement by active duty military personnel (to include Reservists on active duty and National Guard personnel in federal service) in traditional law enforcement activities (to include interdiction of vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity; directing traffic, search or seizure; an arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity). For exception see Insurrection Act.

Preparedness: The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. (National Response Plan)

**Principle Federal Official (PFO):** The Federal official designated by the Secretary of HLS to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for Incident s of National Significance. (National Response Plan)

**Public Information Officer (PIO):** A member of the Command Staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media or with other agencies with incident-related information requirements. (National Response Plan)

**Public Health Service Act:** Provides that the Secretary of HHS may declare a public health emergency under certain circumstances, and that the Secretary is authorized to develop and take such action as may be necessary to implement a plan under which the personnel, equipment, medical supplies, and other resources of the Department may be effectively used to control epidemics of any disease or condition and to meet other health emergencies and problems. The Act authorized the Secretary to declare a public health emergency and to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.

**Rules for the Use of Force (RUF):** Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during civil support operations. These directives may take the form of mission execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans.

**Special Event:** A planned program of athletic competition and related activities involving participants from the U.S. and/or other nations. The SecDef may also designate non-athletic international or national events to receive support IAW DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft). Historic examples of such non-athletic special events include Summits, World’s Fairs, and the Universal Postal Union Congress. (DODD 3025.dd, DSCA (draft))

**Stafford Act:** Establishes the programs and processes for the Federal Government to provide disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. The provisions of the Stafford Act cover all hazards including natural disasters and terrorist events. Under the Stafford Act, as amended, it is the policy of the Federal Government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to State and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. Upon declaring a major disaster or emergency, the President may direct any Agency of the Federal Government to undertake missions and tasks (on either a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis) to provide assistance to state and local agencies.

**State:** Any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States. (Homeland Security Act of 2002)

**Supported Commander:** The commander having the primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. The commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

**Supporting Commander:** A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense Agencies as appropriate. See also supported commander. (JP 1-02)

**Terrorism:** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

**United States:** When used in a geographic sense, means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, any possession of the United States, and any waters within the jurisdiction of the United States. (Homeland Security Act of 2002)

**Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002:** If funded, directs the VA and DOD to develop training programs for current health-care personnel and those emergency/medical personnel in training in the containment of nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks and treatment of causalities.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of Mass Destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling them where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02)