Small Arms and Light Weapons Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility, and Lessons Learned

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Approved for Public Release
Executive Summary

Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation has contributed to the sustaining of many of domestic violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have thus become an essential step in the internal conflict resolution processes in these affected nations. Though these programs are well-intended, and attempt to address the deep-rooted problem of SALW availability, they are not met without challenges. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan each tried differing approaches to this process and in some cases achieved a varying result, though they faced similar challenges. However, cross cutting patterns in disarmament in particular, suggest that future practitioners in this area can learn from their experiences and apply those lessons to better implement future programs in other post-conflict societies.

This paper attempts to lay out the benefits and challenges of SA/LW disarmament programs in post-conflict societies, by examining four cases in varied parts of the world (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique and Afghanistan) using open-source primary and secondary sources. It notes the common challenges, common lessons learned, and varied experiences of each program to develop a cross-cutting set of common issues that disarmament program developers and executors now and in the future, should be aware of as they try to develop and execute similar programs.

This is not meant to be a guide for conducting disarmament programs, but is intended to provide contemporary context to issues that practitioners in this area have faced, and will likely continue to face in the future by addressing and identifying ways that non-government, government, international, and domestic practitioners in this area have dealt with these issues, with some success. It is a cursory look at “what worked” and what “did not work” in these cases.

Those common issues are the following:

- Achieving support and making leadership decisions
- Addressing mandate, policy, and coordination issues
- Addressing implications of the local culture and history
- Using a buyback or a non-monetary incentive program structure
- Addressing the implications of amnesty
- Informing the public, building local relationships, and using the media
- Addressing questions of "what can I bring?" and safety
- Choosing locations of collection centers
- Addressing processing concerns
- Addressing collection quality issues
- Implementing appropriate destruction and deactivation processes
- Using ad-hoc seizure methods
- Using education and deterrence initiatives
• Using a development approach to disarmament

The paper concludes that though disarmament programs have achieved some success on a local level, it is unlikely that such a program would have a great positive effect on a global scale. Local societal factors play an enormous role in helping to determine whether or not a program will be successful or not and help shape the challenges that program officials will face. Though the experience in the Balkans, Mozambique, and Africa indicate that such programming can be difficult, they can achieve a modicum of success on a local level. Overall, though, success in one nation may not be success in another because any program will have to take local factors into account. Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan’s experience highlights an important lesson for future practitioners in this field. A disarmament program will not result in total resolution of a SALW problem at a local level but it can be an important step in the conflict resolution process, if certain challenges are recognized and addressed in a local context.
Small Arms and Light Weapons Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility, and Lessons Learned

In the post-Cold War era, there has been a substantial increase in internal conflicts relative to international ones. Given this shift, it is imperative that those involved in conflict resolution are aware of the unique situations that many of these war-torn states face as they try to rebuild their society. Governments and NGOs alike have to cope with the lengthy and broad-based reconciliation process, which often tugs at deep-rooted socio-political and cultural problems that may have been factors in kindling the internal conflict in the first place. In places like the Balkans, Mozambique, and Afghanistan, the reconciliation and peacemaking process have included small arms and light weapons (SALW) collection programs to quell the violence and perhaps hinder the widespread illegal use of these readily available weapons in the future. These programs take place within the affected society to provide physical security for its citizens, initiate or perpetuate a reconciliation and recovery process for the victims, and aid in prevention.

Because SALW proliferation has contributed to the sustaining of many of these violent conflicts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have become an essential step in the internal conflict resolution processes. Though these programs are well-intended, and attempt to address the deep-rooted problem of SALW availability, they are not met without challenges. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan each tried differing approaches to this process and in some cases achieved a varying result, though they faced similar challenges. However,
cross cutting patterns in disarmament in particular, suggest that future practitioners in this area can learn from their experiences and apply those lessons to better implement future programs in other post-conflict societies.

This paper will focus on the disarmament aspect of the DDR program. It will give an overview of the program structure and implementation in each of the four case societies and address some of the major issues and challenges across the cases to see what lessons future DDR strategists can draw upon in the next area of operation. It will also try to elaborate on some of the benefits and drawbacks of such programs.

Though disarmament programs have achieved some success on a local level, it is unlikely that such a program would have a great positive effect on a global scale. Local societal factors play an enormous role in helping to determine whether or not a program will be successful or not and help shape the challenges that program officials will face. Though the experience in the Balkans, Mozambique, and Africa indicate that such programming can be difficult, they can achieve a modicum of success on a local level. Overall, though, success in one nation may not be success in another because any program will have to take local factors into account. Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan’s experience highlights an important lesson for future practitioners in this field. A disarmament program will not result in total resolution of a SALW problem at a local level but it can be an important step in the conflict resolution process, if certain challenges are recognized and addressed in a local context.

**Case Studies: Program Structure and Implementation Processes**

This section is intended to give an overview of the program structure in each of the four case societies. It is not intended to give a comprehensive overview of each
program. Specific challenges and issues will be addressed in a broader context in the next section, which seeks to give a cross-cutting look at some of the common issues that each program faced.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

The disarmament programs in Bosnia after the 1992-1995 war employ a holistic and broad approach to collecting illegal SALW, which have a “widespread and uncontrolled presence in the country” (IANSA: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003). Various actors have tried to combat this proliferation through a variety of initiatives which have included ad hoc confiscations (NATO), Operation and Project Harvest (SFOR/AF/local authorities), and a Small Arms Project (UNDP). Each initiative targets security institutions, communities, and society as a whole.

NATO conducted ad hoc confiscations of unregistered SALW from 1996-1998 in Bosnia. Using coercive cordon and search techniques, they routinely sought out illicit SALW in various communities. This process ended in 1998 and was replaced by a more collective, volunteer approach under Operation Harvest.

The NATO Forces in Bosnia (SFOR) initiated Operation Harvest in 1998 as part of its peace enforcement mission. The Bosnian Armed Forces (AF), SFOR, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and local authorities cooperated to implement the program, which aims "to gather illegal, unregistered weapons and ordnance, such as hand grenades, from private houses and caches" (SFOR, 2004). It also seeks to "remove illegally held weapons, munitions and warlike-materials from circulation" (SFOR, 2004). In 1999, Operation Harvest became Project Harvest. It has been extended indefinitely due to its success in Bosnia.
Using information campaigns to garner public support and awareness, this program allows people to turn in weapons and munitions without penalty at pre-determined mobile and fixed sites that are staffed by local police and SFOR personnel. Collection efforts intensify during certain time periods. Disarmed individuals do not receive any incentive for turning in weapons (except during pre-determined campaigns in certain regions). The program also provides a framework for people to inform officials about weapon cache locations and an opportunity for people to turn in weapons (especially explosives) on the spot through door to door collection and other routine measures. Explosives are deactivated on the spot and other arms are put into a pit to be melted at a civilian factory by trained individuals. To date, Operation/Project Harvest has destroyed 20,000 illegally-held SALW and 7,500,000 rounds of ammunition (IANSA: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003).

The Harvest program also uses some deterrence and educational initiatives to supplement the collection process and promote long term awareness of SALW issues and consequences, especially among young people. SFOR and AF use a variety of multimedia techniques, contests, and school visits to convey their message.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also works to combat SALW in Bosnia. It launched its two year Small Arms Project in April 2003. The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) also supports the program. This cooperative initiative has five objectives, which are similar to those posed by SFOR/AF:

- To assess the current SALW situation through needs analysis (weapon collection, awareness, campaigns, capacity building of government officials, legislative framework)
• To establish and strengthen a state level coordination Board to deal with SALW policies, initiatives and legislation across the various layers of government
• To implement a series of specialized capacity building seminars for board members, parliament, and government staff dealing with SALW-related issues at the entity, district and canton levels.
• To increase awareness of the dangers posed by the presence of SAL through campaigns to promote improved security by way of weapons collection and destruction activities
• To undertake activities to destroy and therefore reduce the existing levels of stockpiled ammunition (United Nations Development Program, 2002)

Overall, the $350,000 program seeks to develop an institutional capacity to tackle the SALW challenge and to reduce the risk posed by SALW (United Nations Development Program, 2002). The first phase (24 months) focused on the implementation of assessments; institutional capacity building activities; awareness campaigns; and development of the demilitarization feasibility study (United Nations Development Program, 2002). The second phase is focusing on weapons collection; weapons and ammunition destruction and demilitarization; and more advanced awareness campaigns (United Nations Development Program, 2002).

Overall, all the programs have the same goal of curbing illicit possession and use of SALW which contribute to insecurity in post-conflict Bosnia.

Kosovo

Like in its neighbor to the West, SALW proliferation is a widespread problem in Kosovo. Though disarmament programs have tried to limit the problem, the UNDP estimated in June 2003 that there were an estimated 333,000 to 460,000 civilian small arms in Kosovo, many of them assault rifles and pistols (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.
viii). The majority of these weapons are illegal or illicit; only 20,000 hunting weapons were legally held as of May 2003 (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. viii).

The disarmament programs in Kosovo after the 1998-2000 conflict employ varying techniques that utilize law enforcement, deterrence, and development approaches to disarmament and provide for a safer and more secure society. Among those programs are: ad hoc intelligence based confiscations and seizures (UNMIK/KFOR/KPS); the Illicit Small Arms Control Project, otherwise known as ISAC (UNDP); and weapons collection, destruction, and amnesty programs (KFOR/UNMIK).

Since 2001, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) have worked together to confiscate illegal SALW based on intelligence. As of 2003, this collaboration has resulted in more than 4,600 weapons and 700,000 rounds of ammunition (Avramovic, 2003). KFOR usually carries out these random operations as part of their daily work, with the support of the other collaborative partners, including local police. UNMIK collects the weapons during law enforcement operations that require house searches as part of criminal investigations. KFOR and UNMIK collect evidence that they can use against those they find in possession of illegal weapons (Avramovic, 2003). Punishment for possession can be anywhere from (up to) eight years in prison, a fine of (up to) to 7,500 euros, or both prison and a fine (Avramovic, 2003).

The UNDP also launched a more formalized weapons collection program in Kosovo. The Illicit Small Arms Control Project (ISAC) is intended to "sensitize the population to the small arms problem; remove illicit weapons from society; reduce the negative effects of small arms; foster popular participation in political decision making,
while at the same time promoting development at local level" (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 2). To meet these objectives, UNDP uses a variety of programming initiatives. To support the development of a small arms regulatory framework, ISAC funded the establishment of a UNMIK Police Hunting and Recreational Weapons Registration Office (WRO) in February 2003. This civilian office allows Kosovars to register their hunting and recreational weapons without fear of punishment to control possession and promote accountability. Using a grace period technique, they put legal mechanisms in place to allow a punitive approach to illegal possession as of May 2003.

The ISAC Project also includes developmental and educational components. Under ISAC, programmers developed regional initiatives for youths to raise awareness about SALW and create an open environment to discuss the issues with their peers and elders. They also launched the Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) program to allow communities to receive funding for development if they comply and turn in weapons. Tied to the September 2003 amnesty, the program encouraged a participatory approach to small arms reduction and economic development.

The Kosovo disarmament initiatives also include amnesty-oriented, weapons collection and destruction programs. KFOR and UNMIK jointly organized amnesty programs via UNMIK Executive Decisions. As of time of press, they have launched three one-month programs (May-June 2001, March-April, 2002, and September-October, 2003). These initiatives allowed the community to anonymously turn in illegal weapons and ammunitions to the police or KFOR at designated collection centers without being arrested or prosecuted at the collection point or en route, provided they immediately declared the weapons (KFOR, 2003). It also allowed people to call KFOR to report the
location of any explosive devices for an ordinance team to pick-up without fear of punishment. KFOR also launched their confiscated weapons destruction program in April 2000 with ISAC funding to prevent redistribution of the collected weapons. This program ensures that all collected weapons are melted down and turned into useful objects at a civilian factory.

**Mozambique**

There are an estimated seven million guns buried in caches all over Mozambique, which is a legacy of the country's bitter 16-year civil war that ended in 1992 (Christian Aid, 2001). Many former soldiers failed to demobilize at the end of the war and hid their weapons in case they had to use them again (Christian Aid, 2001). Because illiteracy and unemployment rates are high and “fewer than one in three people have access to safe drinking water”; weapons remain an attractive method of dealing with the instability and lack of options (Christian Aid, 2001).

The disarmament programs in Mozambique attempted to address the development concerns in Mozambique while reducing the number of illegally held SALW because those “without education, work, and food can be sorely tempted to use their guns to rob others, or to sell them to crime syndicates at home or in South Africa” (Christian Aid, 2001). Mozambique used a variety of techniques and programs to deal with the problem- the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the Tools for Arms Project (CCM), and Operation Rachel (Mozambican Police and the SAPS).

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) had a disarmament component from 1992-1995 as part of their peacekeeping initiative and demobilization process. Disarmament was implicit in ONUMOZ's mandate as part of demobilization
because a demobilized soldier was defined as an individual who "subsequent to E-Day was demobilized at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession” (Vines, 2003). To accomplish this, ONUMOZ collected weapons from soldiers and placed them in "secured" temporary assembly areas (AA) for storage until they were to be destroyed. This program suffered from lack of resources, lack of will among the civilian and military peacekeepers, and a weak and unclear mandate (Vines, 2003). Many soldiers failed to demobilize and proliferation concerns remained.

After ONUMOZ's initiative failed to produce positive results, The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) and the Foundation for Community Development (FCD) launched the Tools for Arms Project, which applied a more formalized development approach to disarmament to combat the deeper rooted problems. Tools for Arms, also known as Swords into Ploughshares and Transforming Arms into Ploughshares (TAE), launched on October 20, 1995 and continued for 5 years, with the support of the Mozambican Ministries of Home Affairs and National Defense and organizations in Africa, Europe, Japan and North America. The amnesty program targeted illegal arms holders, former combatants, and others with information concerning existing arms caches (Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1999).

Tools for Arms targeted the most problematic districts first (urban and rural) and then expanded the program to the more remote areas, using fixed, mobile, and on the spot collection facilities and techniques (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999). In exchange for a weapon (or information), participants received a tools or materials for home or business use, depending on number, type, and weapon quality. Beginning in
May 1995, demobilized soldiers also received "high quality beans and flour" in exchange for guns as part of an Association of Demobilized Soldiers (AMODEG) initiative to encourage them "to exchange some of their weapons in times of food shortages rather than using them to commit crime to survive” (Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1999). After weapons were collected, they were publicly destroyed immediately under appropriate conditions, depending on weapons type. Trained individuals destroyed firearms either by sawing them into pieces (for use in art or sculpture projects) or by controlled explosion. Project technicians deactivated and destroyed explosives (landmines, grenades, bazooka rockets) by exploding them. As a result, the program collected more than 61,000 different types of weapons and accessories, including 2,155 guns and gave out more than 1000 tools (Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1999).

Operation Rachel (March 1995 to present) is a disarmament program that tries to combat crime and weapons proliferation across the Mozambique/South Africa border while reducing the number of illegal weapons in Mozambique, training the Mozambican Police Force to handle SALW issues, and promoting cooperation between the South African and Mozambican police. This program tries to combat the weapons proliferation problem in both South Africa and Mozambique because weapons holders in Mozambique were "generally believed to be finding new markets among criminals in South Africa and contributing to that country’s surge in rates of violent crime during its post-apartheid transition period” (Faltas, McDonald, Wasznik, 2002, p 15). Using an ad-hoc approach to disarmament, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, engage in large scale operations and smaller ad hoc removals of
abandoned and hidden weapons caches. SAPS and other donators such as Belgium, the European Union, and the international private sector have contributed funding at one time or another for these efforts.

After Mozambique and South Africa signed a bilateral security agreement in March 1995, the two police forces began to combat arms trafficking in Southern Mozambique through information exchange, shared access to detainees, and joint arms destruction operations. Some SAPS units helped train the Mozambican force in skill development, provided operational oversight of the operations, and provided some funding for operations (SaferAfrica, 2003, p. 17-19). From 1995 to 1999, they engaged in large scale operations that used informers and Mozambican police intelligence to locate arms caches. Informers who gave information that led to an arm cache were paid either in cash or through some other value-appropriate means. Once located, police specialists would destroy the weapons caches using weapon-appropriate methods. In 1999, financial constraints limited the operations to smaller scale removals, which are still continuing on an ad hoc basis. Overall Operation Rachel has resulted in the on-site destruction of over 20,000 rifles, over 7,000 grenades, 8,700 mortars and mortar bombs and several million rounds of small arms ammunition (SaferAfrica, 2003, p. 3).

**Afghanistan**

Unlike the disarmament programs in the Balkans and in Mozambique, the disarmament program in Afghanistan is relatively new and so preliminary results, or comprehensive lessons learned are not yet known. Disarmament is a necessary component in securing a future Afghanistan, given a pervasive warlord and militia presence, and 23 years of almost non-stop war; some estimates indicate there are
anywhere from 150,000 to 200,000 soldiers in Afghanistan (JT, 2003). The Afghan government has indicated that disarming the militiamen is "top priority to improve security outside of Kabul" (UN Announced Timetable, 2003). To meet the disarmament goal in Afghanistan, the Afghan police engage in ad hoc seizure operations. The UN has also developed a “New Beginnings” Program to disarm militia members.

The Afghan police use an ad hoc approach to seizing and confiscating illegally held weapons. In 2002, law enforcement in some cities, including Kandahar, instituted a password system to help them curb illegal SALW possession and illicit behavior during key hours. This password system helped enforce a locally-adopted policy that made it illegal for any person, except those who are police on patrol or working checkpoints, to be on the streets after 2200 hrs (Bury, 2002). To combat fraud, any passerby has to give the police a secret password, which changes nightly; in turn the police respond with a secret answer (Bury, 2002). If an individual does not know the password, the police can seize any weapons; even those who are eligible to be on the streets are also subject to this policy aimed at curbing illicit possession among officials (Bury, 2002). Confiscated weapons are turned over en masse to U.S. Special Forces.

The UN led New Beginnings Program offers a more formalized approach to collective disarmament for militia members. UN officials named the program "New Beginnings" to quell any pre-determined negative attitudes about the program's motives among the population. "Disarmament" is synonymous with defeat in Dari and Pashto (Lakshmanan, 2003). Neil Cossins, a Senior Advisor to the program says it is aimed at "breaking up power structures" and offering combatants an "alternative way of living" (Afghanistan’s Old Warriors, 2003). It is part of a wider effort to reform Afghanistan's
security sector and create a new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police. The UNDP and the United Nations Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) facilitate the program and rely on donations and support from foreign governments (Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada) as well as support from the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA).

The program aims to disarm demobilized forces and give them a chance at a new life. UN officials establish temporary collection centers in selected locations so that these forces can voluntarily turn in their weapons "in the presence of their commanders" (Kitchen, 2003). In the initial stages, the program will operate in four cities (Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, Gardez, and Kabul) and then gradually expand nationally with a three year completion goal. ATA, Japan, and UNAMA outlined the plan, which was then endorsed by the participants. Under the plan, ATA authorities conduct the actual disarmament and international observers monitor the process to ensure transparency and accountability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003).

In each city, officials launch the program with an official ceremony where every demobilized man receives a metal (Prusher, 2003). Upon arrival at the collection center, fighters (predetermined number) register for the program and turn in their weapons. The weapons are inspected and in return the fighter receives an ID card, $200, a change of civilian clothes, a box of food, vocational training and employment counseling, and a certificate of service (Kitchen, 2003). The target number for disarmament depends on the city. In Kunduz, officials met their goal to disarm 1000 men, but not without difficulties (Constable, 2003). Though results are unknown, it is hoped such measures will reduce illegal SALW proliferation and actively contribute to the security reform in the country.
Cross Cutting Challenges, Issues, and Lessons Learned

The four cases that we profiled all sought to limit the number of weapons on the streets to prevent further violence, destroy illicit weapons, and to offer opportunities to move away from illicit SALW usage through development, promises of amnesty, and/or education. Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan tried various approaches in pursuit of this goal and met some common challenges and learned some of the same lessons. Given the transcendent nature of some of the challenges, it is likely that future programs will also face all or some of these issues and must utilize past experiences to shape appropriate procedures.

Though it is important to analyze the commonalities for this purpose, it is also imperative to note that success in this area cannot be concretely defined, the programs are recent (and in some cases ongoing), and what worked in one area may not work in another due to unique social and locale factors. Many reports have used Mozambique as a model for effective disarmament procedures. It’s difficult to say whether such a program, in its original form, would work anywhere else because intrinsic local and societal factors may have contributed to its success. Mozambique faced many of the same challenges as the programs in Bosnia and Kosovo. These programs also produced some positive results and could potentially reap further positive results with the passage of time. Afghanistan also offers some insight into what can work, and what might not work, though it is impossible to offer a comprehensive analysis of lessons learned at this early stage in their process.
These common challenges and associated lessons learned can be placed under three broad categories: support and policy issues, program structure and logistics, and wider challenges and impact. Specific challenges include:

- Achieving support and making leadership decisions
- Addressing mandate, policy, and coordination issues
- Addressing implications of the local culture and history
- Using a buyback or a non-monetary incentive program structure
- Addressing the implications of amnesty
- Informing the public, building local relationships, and using the media
- Addressing questions of "what can I bring?" and safety
- Choosing locations of collection centers
- Addressing processing concerns
- Addressing collection quality issues
- Implementing appropriate destruction and deactivation processes
- Using ad-hoc seizure methods
- Using education and deterrence initiatives
- Using a development approach

This section will attempt to give an overview of these challenges and tough decisions, applying them to situations in the Balkans, Mozambique, and Afghanistan and how each program dealt with the issues to guide future approaches to disarmament based on lessons learned.

**Support and Policy Issues**

**Achieving Support for Disarmament and Making Leadership Decisions**

Once the decision has been made to initiate a disarmament program in the country or a region, officials are likely to face the question of how to achieve government and
local support and leadership for disarmament. Though government and local support can be instrumental in making the programs nationalized, garnering enthusiasm and participation, and achieving long lasting success, it can also be a barrier. If there is little trust in the local, state (provincial), and/or national leadership, a government connection or sponsorship of a program can hinder success if the public does not trust the leaders or think that all leaders are corrupt and engage in scandals. The political atmosphere in the country or region at the time of the disarmament program will be a major factor as to whether local and government participation and/or leadership will contribute positively or negatively to the process.

Local participation can be effective in achieving collaboration and a sense of different groups coming together to achieve a common goal. Operation/Project Harvest in Bosnia is structured so that the NATO Forces in Bosnia (SFOR), the Bosnian Armed Forces (AF), and local authorities (support role) share programmatic responsibility. Though, SFOR/AF collected 80% of the weapons, as of January 2004 (SFOR, 2004), collection rates increased in 2003 from 2002, which NATO attributes to greater local participation (King, Dorn, Hodes, 2002). This local participation is indicative of a greater sense of responsibility at a local level, which is imperative for long-term effectiveness. In Mozambique's Operation Rachel, local participation was also effective in building a joint relationship between the South African and Mozambique police forces. This collaboration allowed officials to collect more weapons and to help modernize the Mozambican security force through South African-led training. The program in Afghanistan also is following this shared responsibility approach by having the Afghan
Transitional Authority (ATA) conduct the actual disarmament with UN and international observation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003).

Leadership involvement can also gently enforce compliance from subordinates. In the case of Afghanistan, militia commanders are expected to help facilitate disarmament from their soldiers. They are present when the soldiers turn in their weapons at collection facilities. This approach can also help ensure compliance at a force/troop level. As General Mir Alam, a Tajik commander said: "Just as I gave orders on the first day to start fighting the Taliban, so now I order them go and start reconstruction… no one disobeys me" (Afghanistan’s Old Warriors, 2003).

Leadership involvement in the process does have some drawbacks and associated challenges. Their involvement cannot be very effective when the population does not trust them to begin with. One deeply rooted obstacle can be strained police and civilian relations at a local, regional, or national level. British Staff Officer Captain Dennison Taniya, MND-SW, noted that this was a problem in Bosnia: "The most difficult [thing in BiH] is the facts that [in] many cases [the] local populations do not trust the local police and the Entity Armed Forces (EAF)” (King et al., 2002). Often, as was the case in Mozambique, the lack of trust can be tied to the perception that local leaders and security forces are corrupt and engage in scandalous behavior for their own personal gain. Some Mozambican and South African authorities in Operation Rachel tipped off arms traffickers prior to raids (Vines, 1998). The program leadership responded by dismissing those team members from the project, but public awareness of corruption can lead to higher levels of mistrust in the disarmament programs.
Whether local participation is effective or not, is tied to the political atmosphere. In Kosovo, the amnesty disarmament programs had a low turn in rate among Serbs. This was attributed to their negative perception of the main official security providers in Kosovo, especially the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the UN Civil Police (CIVPOL) (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 2). Serbian political leaders especially had little involvement in the processes, which could have negatively contributed to the lack of Serbian involvement (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 22). This political struggle has also been an issue in Afghanistan. Militia commander support has been difficult to come by in some regions that the Afghan New Beginnings program targets. Some commanders have adopted the attitude of "if I give up my gun, then who will ensure my security and the security of my men" (Prusher, 2003)? Without the commander support, it will be difficult to encourage lower ranking militia members to participate. The problem extends beyond the single commander level to a regional level. One commander in one region might await another commander in another region to make the first move towards participation. This "you first" attitude can be a barrier towards national compliance and indicates that regional/turf issues, at least in Afghanistan, still come into play.

Garnering leadership support for disarmament can be a problem when leaders ask "what is in it for me?" In Afghanistan, because the program is focused only on militias, one of the major hurdles is to find alternative employment incentives for those militia leaders who disarm and encourage their soldiers to do the same. Even if New Beginnings officials do convince the militia leaders to participate, recent experience shows they can argue that they are not getting enough personal gain out of the deal. Rewards for participation are slim, especially for mid and top level leaders because it’s difficult to
provide these individuals with job placement as a reward for participation. Midlevel commanders, often complained because "they're used to getting more important jobs and more money" (Prusher, 2003). The "what is in it for me" attitude may be difficult to overcome and may hinder future expansion of the program as more militia leaders become aware of the limited post-disarmament employment incentives.

**Addressing mandate, policy, and coordination issues**

At the start of each program, organizers soon realized that local and government support for an initiative was not always enough to get the program running smoothly. Though policy and legal issues must be considered in a local context, the issue of mandate and a plan for cooperation is also something to consider on a global level.

One programmatic challenge is the lack of a unified policy for implementation. In the case of Bosnia, the post-conflict Dayton Accords did not establish a DDR strategy, though SALW availability was a major sustainer for the violence. As a result, the agreement did not offer a guide for international or national actors on how to implement a disarmament program as part of the peace and reconciliation process. Because there was no single guide or policy in place, there was no co-coordinating mechanism to bring all the potential players together in the various disarmament programs (King, 2001). The result was a "pieced together", uncoordinated delivery.

Even if a mandate is in place, program officials will still be challenged if the mandate is not clear. A mandate, which in itself is not a guarantee for success, must provide a framework for execution. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) had a mandate for disarmament but it was implicit in the mandate for demobilization and not very clear or well defined (Vines, 1998). It did not say what disarmament should entail or outline criteria for success. Coupled with an impossible
goal, and a lack of surety about the mandate, the program was doomed to fail (Vines, 1998).

Even with a mandate, it can also be difficult to achieve a stated goal if participants do not have the will to fulfill that mandate, as ONUMOZ's experience shows. Amongst many of the UN civilian police and infantry units, there was also little will to confront the disarmament issue. As one ONUMOZ Uruguayan peacekeeper said, "Active disarming is dangerous. That is not why we are here. We are here to watch and if they give us their weapons then fine. ONUMOZ's mandate is not to send back body bags to Montevideo" (Vines, 1998). This sentiment was echoed throughout the civilian and infantry troops.

A mandate or unified policy also can't always overcome deep-rooted hindrances to coordination, even if some political will exists. In Kosovo, even if a unified policy was in place, it would have not guaranteed successful coordination among all the parties because of continued ethnic tensions and loyalties. Coordination would have meant that the local police forces, both Kosovar Serb and Albanian, would have to work together. Even with international oversight (UNMIK/KFOR), trust and coordination at a local level was still an issue, not only among participants, but also the community at large.

A good coordinated policy and implementation process can be a key to success. Though an NGO-led program does not guarantee more success than an IO or government-implemented program, the Mozambican Tools for Arms Project provides an example of good coordination because it had support (financial, human, material) from NGOs in Mozambique, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States, in addition to the support of the
national government and the rebel opposition. The multilateral support from both the
government and the opposition was crucial in getting cooperation and consent (Christian
Aid, 2001). Operation Rachel also showed how co-implementation is possible between
two police forces (Mozambican and South African). This program led to a long term
mutual relationship between the two forces.

A unified plan of coordination and cooperation can help facilitate the
implementation process, build relationships that will outlast the disarmament program,
and help in the overall peace process at a local level. A "task-oriented approach" allows
for each cooperator to do what it does best to contribute to the overall program
development and execution. Operation Rachel used this approach with some success.

**Addressing Implications of Local Gun Culture and Legacies**

A disarmament program does not stand alone. It takes place within a given
locale, society, and culture. Program organizers must consider what gun ownership
means in a local context and the implication of the legacy of conflicts, whether recent or
in the distant past, to build a program that could be effective in that unique environment.
Even with a thorough review of such matters, local culture and historical factors can
challenge the execution and success of any disarmament program, as was the case in all
four of the cases.

One major challenge is overcoming the place of a weapon in society. In some
societies, gun ownership is a source of cultural pride. In Kosovo, for example, the deeply
rooted sentiment that all "our forefathers carried weapons and so will we" pervades
throughout almost every community, regardless of ethnicity, because hunting is so central
to their way of life (Quin et al., 2003). As a result, seizures of hunting rifles are met with
fierce resistance (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 25). Though no disarmament program can deter people from using hunting weapons to commit violence against humans, the challenge remains on how to reconcile a local affinity for hunting with the macro goal of the disarmament program.

However, this challenge can be addressed as it was in Kosovo. In Kosovo, UNMIK attempted to meet the challenge through a Hunting and Recreational Weapon Campaign that started in February 2003. The media advertised the Weapons Registration Office (WRO) as the sole entity responsible for issuing registration cards for hunting and recreational weapons. The WRO, as part of the UNMIK Police, has a staff of international civilian police officers, KPS officers, and Kosovar civilians that try to track the number of hunting and recreational weapons in Kosovo (previously, there were few estimates on numbers) while acknowledging a local appreciation for hunting. The initial campaign allowed people to register as many guns as they wanted at local police stations without fear of prosecution. In return, they received a non-transferable card that was valid for two years that allowed them to legally hold the weapon. The campaign resulted in 20,000 weapon registrations (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 34). When the "grace period" ended in May 2003, the registration process continued, but officials reserved the right to impose legal consequences (fine, imprisonment, and weapons seizure by UNMIK/KFOR) on those who illegally held such weapons. To curb the illicit use of both registered and unregistered weapons, UNMIK instituted official hunting seasons and required any shooting club to be certified. They put legal and legislative mechanisms to allow officials to use punitive measures for non-compliance. However, prosecution for this type of crime has been relatively rare (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.
33). Even though a legal approach can help deter and punish illicit use of SALW, it is ineffective when the legal mechanisms are not enforceable or there is no will or resources to enforce them. If such mechanisms are enforced, they can be a useful tool to curbing and deterring illicit SALW proliferation and use.

A related social challenge can be a widespread notion that gun ownership is equal to having status or a purpose in life. This attitude is particularly common in societies where conflict has been long-term and people have few options for a better quality of life. In all of these societies, high unemployment rates and limited access to education in the post (and even pre) conflict environment contributed to a local sense of "what other options do I have?" A gun can also be a symbol of having a purpose in society. This was particularly pronounced in Mozambique and Afghanistan as child soldiers faced an uncertain future and role in the aftermath of the violence. With disarmament, a person may feel that he or she has lost their position and place in society. This fear could deter an individual from participating in such a program.

Promises of job placement, education skills, and tools can be effective in combating these fears. Such initiatives have been successful in Mozambique (Tools for Arms) and are currently underway in Afghanistan. Even with these promises, program officials face another challenge: giving the newly disarmed people jobs that they can feel the same sense of pride about that they did in their previous positions. This is not always possible, as the situation in Afghanistan shows. A job and skills learning approach in Mozambique has been successful in giving those who disarm tools and skills to be economically self-sufficient, but the situation of mid to high level commanders in Afghanistan shows that sometimes "any skill" is not always enough.
In some cases, there may not be one institutional solution to some of the local challenges. The legacy of past conflicts can be hard to overcome with one programmatic approach. Disarmament program officials must consider that though conflict is over, memories of the conflict (and perhaps others) still are fresh in people's mind. These emotions can be a powerful force in determining whether or not a person will disarm. A weapon can be a symbol of achievement or "success" or it can also be a reminder of being a victim of violence, depending on one's perspective. These past conflicts, particularly in the Balkans, though theoretically over, also may not be completely resolved. Faced with an uncertain future and constant wondering about whether conflict will ensue once again, people may want to keep weapons to provide protection and security if the situation once again becomes precarious. These fears are further complicated when the society in question has previously been subjected to forced and brutal disarmament, to achieve political objectives, such as was the case for the Albanian population in Kosovo, in 1844, 1910, the 1950s, and again in the 1990s when the Yugoslav federation dismembered (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 31-32).

A precarious sense of security can give way to a fear of insurgency or actual insurgencies, which can also hinder disarmament. Critics of the UN New Beginnings Program in Afghanistan have suggested that it could provoke an armed conflict between factions that do and don’t support a disarmament program (Disarmament Process Suspended, 2003). This fear became a reality in January 2003 when insurgencies postponed/suspended programs in the Faryab province in northern Afghanistan. Assessing and limiting the prospect of an insurgency prior to a flare-up can help, but is
not always possible. Guerilla campaigns can be so well-entrenched within society that simple coordination with the opposition may not achieve a desired result.

Mozambique's experience shows that if possible, program organizers should coordinate with rebel and opposition leaders and try to achieve their support prior to program execution. The Tools for Arms Project achieved some success in this area, but this could be attributed to the particular post-conflict environment in Mozambique. In some cases, a culture of violence cannot be overcome by any one new program or initiative. A culture of violence can also become more pervasive in the post-conflict environment, which is true for Kosovo (Mustafa and Xharra, 2003). Deterrence and educational programs can be effective in treating the symptoms. As has been the experience in Kosovo, these programs can help but do not and cannot introduce a complete cultural overturn in a short period of time. The power of myth, experience, and legacy are especially strong in a post-conflict context, when the community at large is attempting to cope with its recent and distant past, and framing its place in the future.

**Program Structure and Logistics**

**Using a Buyback or Non-Monetary Incentive Approach**

Once a plan is in place, organizers in each place faced with the decision of whether to use a buyback approach or to use non-monetary incentive schemes. Some have suggested that:

"Because most conflict-prone poor countries lack the capacity to detect and seize illicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives. Outright buy-back programs may simply stimulate arms
imports from neighboring countries, but non-monetary reimbursement schemes have worked in Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama. In return for weapons, individuals may receive tools, such as sewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction materials, and entire communities have been provided with new schools, healthcare services and road repairs." (Larson and Gex, 2001)

Though both methods have produced actual or perceived positive results; they are also both susceptible to similar problems. The programs in the Balkans used a non-monetary approach, as did the Tools for Arms program in Mozambique. New Beginnings organizers in Afghanistan used both monetary and non-monetary incentives in combination.

Either approach provokes organizers to think about whether incentives alone can push people to turn in weapons. In Bosnia, for example, SFOR troops in the north offered a pre-determined number of raffle tickets to people over 18 who turned in munitions for a chance to win daily prizes, during pre-determined time periods and campaigns (Dunphy, 2003). Even though people turning in mines or UXOs were not eligible to receive these tickets, many continued turning in such devices alongside of those who turned in firearms and munitions (Dunphy, 2003). This observation begs the question of whether incentives are really necessary to encourage people to disarm overall.

Incentives can bring about a higher turn in rate and encourage local involvement. In Bosnia, the SFOR 13 random daily raffles encouraged local support, as media outfits, merchants, and local governments played an integral role in providing financial and/or informational resources. The media provided the tickets and advertisements and the
Mayors of each municipality as well as local merchants provided prizes, which included dinners, memberships at fitness centers, and new cars (Dunphy, 2003). Mozambique's Tools for Arms Project gave out necessary tools for home and business use based on local conditions to encourage development and self-sufficiency in exchange for weapons. Under this program, arms holders could "express" what they wanted but the value of incentive was determined by the "number, type, and functionality" of the weapon (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999).

The use of incentives, even those that are non-monetary, can cause other problems. In both Kosovo and in Mozambique, organizers confronted situations where weapons holders or those who have information on weapon locations, sought incentives not to get rid of all of their weapons, but to gain material reward. In Operation Rachel in Mozambique, the possibility of incentives sometimes drove up the cost of information or collections. Some officials reported that people, who said they had information, really did not. This program could not overcome the human condition of wanting more or the propensity for some to take advantage of opportunities without giving something back. Organizers in Kosovo reported the same problem.

Another problem is slow turnover by some individuals to collect more rewards. In Mozambique's Tools for Arms Project, organizers learned that one young man was using more than one family member to slowly turn in weapons without attracting personal attention (Vines, 1998). He had a store of weapons, and one by one family members would turn in a single weapon for a sewing machine (his sister) or bicycles (several to various family members). Each time they would receive an award. Doing this over a period of time allowed for them to collect many rewards. While this is not
inherently bad for the collection process (the weapons were still collected), it raises moral question and resource ones. What should an organizer do if resources are running low? What if there are not enough incentives to go around because of these situations? Can a program be sustained this way and effective for the long term? While it is impossible to concretely answer these questions, these are important issues to consider.

While material incentives can give some immediate and perhaps long term benefits to those who turn in weapons, amnesty is also an alternative and/or addition to material incentives. While a plow can help in an agricultural society like Mozambique, and a sewing machine can provide a means towards employment and economic prosperity, and a bicycle can help a person get to a place of employment, amnesty can also deal with some deep-rooted structural problems while encouraging people to come forward with weapons. The challenges associated with amnesty will be addressed further in the following section.

A monetary approach is also not inherently bad. It can encourage people to come forward but can cause concerns about the black market and whether or not such an approach gets to the root of the problem and can initiate positive steps to reform. Another issue to consider when using this approach is how long lasting an initial payback can be and how organizers can ensure the money is not used to provoke or engage in further deviant behavior.

None of our cases illustrate a solely monetary approach to collection. However, the case of Afghanistan introduces some of the problems that can potentially occur with this approach. The UN program/ATA organizers use a combined approach to encourage demobilized forces to disarm. In return for weapons, each fighter receives a plastic ID
card that entitles him to $200, a change of civilian clothes, a box of food, vocational training and employment counseling, and a certificate of service and a military medal.

The monetary award has caused considerable concern because there have been reports of cases where people turn in a few guns, when they have many, for the monetary award. Then, they go back and sell those remaining guns they have, furthering profit. The use of a monetary incentive also can be an invitation for profit for some commanders. There have been allegations that in Kunduz, some people who turn in weapons are not turning over their own weapons (they may not have any) but those of their commander; the commander then receives the money and makes a profit (Afghanistan: Paper Takes Dim View, 2003).

Another related challenge in Kunduz has been the situation where people turn in weapons they turned in two years ago to the Kunduz Army Corps and Division (Afghanistan Paper Takes Dim View, 2003). Those in question brought out those weapons from depots to benefit from this new program. Though the weapons are now out of the hands of the people, there are new problems related to trust, ethical behavior, and honesty, which may come back to haunt the program in the future.

Overall, incentives programs can be effective but can bring about other problems to deal with. There is little indication as to whether the monetary component of the Afghan UN program does more harm than good in dealing with weapons proliferation. It is simply too early to tell. Likewise, though material incentives and amnesty programs offer potential challenges, they can be helpful in generating turnout for collection programs. All of these issues, as well as the local culture and circumstances should be considered before making a determination of which approach to use.
Addressing the Implications of Amnesty

One non-monetary incentive approach that has achieved some degree of success is an offer of amnesty to those who bring in weapons or disclose the location of a weapons cache. The programs in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and the Balkans all offered amnesty to varying degrees, though each experienced the positive and negative drawbacks and/or effects of this approach.

Amnesty allows people to turn in weapons without fear punishment. An advantage of this approach is that reassures the public about the motive behind the program. Such programs provide the community a way to engage in the peace and reconciliation process, push towards a physically secure environment, and "symbolically" show their willingness to look toward the future instead of focusing on the past without fear of punishment. This approach also allows for third parties who do not have weapons to inform authorities of cache locations without fear of being questioned or approached for "doing the right thing." Similarly, weapons holders are protected from arrest or fine if they personally turn in a weapon, or are en route to a collection center. In Kosovo, to avoid potential abuse of the system, amnesty only applies to people en route to a collection center if they immediately declare their weapons (KFOR, 2003). Despite the potential long-term rewards, this approach is not risk free or guaranteed to work in all circumstances.

First, amnesty, as a legal term, can be easily misunderstood, as it was in Bosnia’s Harvest programs. Various SFOR reports from many areas of operation indicated that community members still thought they had to register their names if they personally brought in a weapon and potential informers also thought that they had to give their name to authorities, not just the location of a cache, especially in early stages of the program.
This lack of clarity was also an issue in Kosovo and Mozambique. Officials in Kosovo failed to explain the term clearly prior to the program start, causing some initial hesitation (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.22). Sometimes a "backtracking" approach can create even more confusion and mistrust from the people if the term is not clearly explained prior to the program start.

Even if amnesty is clearly explained, it can be difficult to achieve a common understanding on a national level if the authorities in one area accept the policy while leaders in other regions do not. This was especially true in fragmented post-Dayton Bosnia. The Federation government passed the amnesty law while the Republika Srpska did not as of the time of an SFOR Report in June 2001 (Hardy, 2001). Kosovo faced a similar problem. Amnesty had less support from the Kosovar Serb political leaders than the Albanian ones; support was already limited, but this ethnic divide complicated the matter (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.22). Without this legal mechanism in place, the amnesty promise is worthless. It may result in further confusion if amnesty is advertised at a national level, when it is only guaranteed in a local context.

An offer of amnesty will not always overcome trust issues. Amnesty as an incentive can be seen in a positive light or a negative light, among different sectors of the population, depending on their place and role in the conflict and in wider socio-political and economic relations. Though amnesty does offer anonymity, the offer does not guarantee a freedom from continued violence. This can be a concern for those who see themselves largely as the victims or the losers in a conflict. In Kosovo, amnesty was more successful in influencing Kosovar Albanians to turn in weapons than the minority Kosovar Serbs because more Serbs felt that they had to protect themselves and firearms
were necessary to achieve "political security" (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.22).

Though the Serb population generally also sees themselves as victims in the conflict, other factors come into play in determining their attitude toward amnesty.

Political uncertainty can also hinder amnesty success. In Kosovo, a September-October 2003 amnesty program only resulted in 155 guns being collected partly because there was political uncertainty about Kosovo's final status (Mustafa and Xharra, 2003). A freedom from punishment may seem a minimal incentive when the people face an uncertain future and could be planning an uprising in the near future, depending on the outcome of any negotiations. Socio-political factors must be considered when pursuing this option.

**Informing the Public, Building Local Relationships, and Using the Media**

In many cases, the media was a positive influence in generating enthusiasm and information about the disarmament programs in each country or region. Program leadership personnel also played a key role in informing the public at large about the upcoming programs and building local connections and relationships. This was integral in generating trust among community members because information was out in the open and readily available. A few techniques proved to be effective in this area. They include: preliminary information campaigns, making use of the media, personal interaction with the local community, and methods which facilitate clear understanding of what is being collected.

Information campaigns were especially effective in the lead up to disarmament projects if they involved local authorities, the project performers, and the community at large. These campaigns can ensure an equal and overall understanding of the motivation.
and intent of the collection process. This was especially important in BiH because it had "recently seen bitter and destructive warfare and had a long culture of owning guns for self-protection and for hunting" (SFOR, 2004). Pre-collection campaigns can increase awareness and understanding before the onslaught of actual collection activities.

Effective information campaigns made use of the already existing media apparatus such as television, radio, and newspapers to spread the word fast and easily in Mozambique (Tools for Arms), Kosovo, and Bosnia. In Bosnia, program organizers provided public service announcements (PSA) to reach the masses in a short period of time; the television announcements used local U.S. soldiers to add a personal influential touch. SFOR personnel cited these television spots as the most “effective influence” in creating awareness during the information campaign in February 2003 (Kovalenko, Bezborodov, Zakharov, 2003). In Kosovo, PSAs were available in all official languages to target all groups.

Still, many people in post-conflict societies may not have ready access to such technologies or sources of information or hesitate to use them because they had previously been utilized for propaganda. To supplement mass-outreach activity in Bosnia, teams also went into local areas with loudspeakers, posters, and leaflets. Kosovo also utilized this technique in 2002 when American and Russian KFOR troops publicized the amnesties village by village using megaphones (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.22). This was particularly important in Kosovo because it reach both Serbs (via Russian troops) and Albanians (via American troops) and played on their loyalties and perceptions of who they could and could not trust. This method is also effective in remote areas, which may not be equipped with the latest technology necessary for mass communication.
Media can also help clarify the programs intentions and promote a clear understanding of what the program is. Regardless of form, each PSA in Bosnia clearly emphasized that the project was a voluntary opportunity to surrender any illicit weapons or munitions. PSAs in Kosovo emphasized the amnesty incentive to alleviate concerns of punishment or lack of anonymity (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.22).

The media can also help establish a good reputation for the project. In Mozambique, Tools for Arms project organizers used the media extensively to target most areas of the country and generate international support and awareness (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999). When the program expanded, the media was aware of the expansion and was able to generate a good “word of mouth” that the program was doing well (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999). If people are aware of the success of a program, it might be easier to generate enthusiasm in areas where the program has not yet reached implementation.

It is also possible to stimulate interest and attention without the media, even after a program has started. A ceremonial approach can be effective in garnering interest in a program at all levels (local, national, international), even if media resources are limited. In Afghanistan, officials marked the program launch in Kunduz with an official parade and ceremony. Top Afghan and UN officials attended the event and every demobilized man received a military medal; President Hamid Karzai also symbolically locked up a truck full of weapons (Constable, 2003). It is expected that there will be a ceremony in every city that has a collection center (Prusher, 2003).

It is also effective to use local connections to establish a personal connection and sense of trust and awareness with the community. In Bosnia, any national effort to
inform was done in coordination with local authorities to reach people down to the lowest level. Sometimes, people were not well informed of the project, which contributed to lack of turn out, such as was the case in Doboj, BiH in May 2003 (Nikolla, 2003a). To combat this problem, many SFOR teams increased "low profile patrolling" to not only inform the people of the harvest but to "win their hearts and minds." SFOR troops chatted with the locals on a variety of subjects to help them understand what was going on in the area from community insiders, and build trust and a sense of mutual respect; this aided in effective implementation and targeting at local level (Nikolla, 2003b; Farley, 2002). They acted on the premise that if there is no trust or confidence in the collectors, it is unlikely that the community will talk or turn over anything, especially if there is no history of personal contact (Maddox, 2000).

Even when done properly, information campaigns can produce a negative effect. They can over-inform/misinform the public to the degree that people think the disarmament program is a permanent fixture, when it may not be. This was a problem in Bosnia, though media campaigns are generally seen as a factor contributing to the success of Project Harvest. Over-information can lead to information overload (i.e. too much information so people don't take it seriously anymore) or a sense of "I can bring in my weapons later, because this program will always be around." This can lead to a dangerous situation and concerns about safety. Well-intended media campaigns should deemphasize the permanent quality without limiting the long-lasting prospects of such a program.

Another challenge is overcoming societal and cultural barriers that would hinder the utility of an information awareness campaign. Informing the public, building local
relationships, and using the media can be easier said than done, especially in places like Kosovo. Their experience is perhaps indicative of the unique challenges that societies with internal, unsettled ethnic hatred face. Officials there faced the immense challenge of building trust and generating awareness for a program that targets both ethnic groups, each with a long history of hatred and resentment toward one another. Though this situation applies to Bosnia as well, one unique challenge is that Kosovo's independence status is still an unsettled issue, generating a continued sense of mistrust.

Informing all local officials and the community of a common disarmament program can be difficult when certain sectors of the population mistrust the informers more than others. Information campaigns seek to emphasize a clear and common understanding of the motivation and intent behind a disarmament program, but this can be difficult when the motivation message can be perceived in different ways by different groups. If security assistance providers in Kosovo are relaying the message, the Serbians will most likely distrust it if it comes from the KPS and Albanians will distrust it if it comes from any of the Serb security assistance providers.

Kosovo, however, teaches another important lesson. Readily available public information is not a guarantee of success or even improvement in disarmament programs. No public campaign will reach everyone. There will always be people who do not have access or ignore the information. Even when UNDP program organizers launched a 3 month public awareness campaigns prior to the September 2003 amnesty, there was little improvement in collection rates. This indicates that media and awareness alone, especially in post-conflict societies like Kosovo, where mistrust and hatred abound, is not
the only factor in achieving success in any disarmament program. Other factors are also at work.

**Addressing Questions of "What Can I Bring In?" and Safety**

Even if the community is aware of a disarmament program in the area, there may be some confusion as to what constitutes a small arms and light weapon. To combat this issue in Bosnia, SFOR troops developed and distributed a list of military weapons so that there was a clear understanding of what a weapon was, and which weapons could be turned in during the program. Distributed lists cannot completely cure the problem. Some people brought in unstable or aging items to collection centers in Bosnia, perhaps because they were on the list of military weapons; on the flip side, others thought that because a weapon was old, disabled or lacked a fuse (in the case of explosives), it was “harmless”, and therefore, not a weapon that could or should be collected (Adams, 2000). This well intentioned list perhaps did not clearly address safety concerns, contributing to another problem.

In Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK dealt with this problem by clearly pointing out in media releases what to do in the case of an unstable device. They told potential participants to turn in all weapons; take a direct route; and unload and/or dismantle if possible; to prevent public accidents they asked participants to come to the collection centers in private vehicle or arrange for pick up; and not transport explosives, grenades, or mines, but arrange for pick-up/disabling by trained individuals (KFOR, 2003). Operation Harvest in Bosnia also addressed these concerns by allowing for at- home pick up, especially for explosive devices. Deactivation occurred on site to prevent
unnecessary accidents. Mozambique also engaged in on-spot removals, deactivation, and destruction as part of Operation Rachel.

**Choosing Locations for Collection Centers**

An important step in collecting SALW is determining the right locations for collection centers. This is a time consuming and challenging process that requires prior planning and scouting of locations. Appropriate location decisions can help program officials in gaining public trust and involvement, but they can also bring about local suspicions and concerns, especially if information about their location is not clear.

One of the major challenges is public access to the collection centers. For those people who do not have privately owned vehicles, it may be difficult to access collection centers without using public transportation, if it exists. Using public transportation to transport weapons can bring about safety concerns as it did in Bosnia when someone brought an armed anti-tank mine into a collection point by public bus (Adams, 2000). This can be resolved, as it was in both Balkans cases, by having EOD teams or engineers go to personal residences to pick up unstable items. This option, however, could bring about fears of anonymity and mistrust towards collectors (i.e. "Now that they know where I live they could come back to investigate whether I have other arms or illicit materials that I do not want to get rid of"). Another option, which was used in Kosovo, is to have mobile collection points so that there are alternative options to consider for those who may not be able to reach central points easily.

If a location is too central, it can bring about concerns about anonymity even if there is an amnesty incentive. SFOR troops in Bosnia faced this problem in Otoka in May 2003 when they chose the town square as a collection point because it was not only...
central, but also near local cafes and markets, making it more convenient and visible to those passing by. A low turn out during the first few days of collection indicated that people were reluctant to turn in weapons at that location because they were embarrassed that they still had weapons or did not want others to see them turn in weapons (Hynes, 2003). The Company realized that a collection point a little off the main road would have been a better location because it was still central but would provide a little more privacy for people who are turning in weapons (Hynes, 2003). Any decision on collection points should not only take into account logistical concerns, but the perceptions and emotions of locals. This requires prior investigations and planning.

Sometimes there is no opportunity for a central collection point. Operation Rachel officials found it difficult to collect weapons in remote Northern Mozambique. The terrain made it difficult for vehicles to pass through and there were few paths to follow because cars had to not gone into those areas in a long time (Christian Aid, 2003). Even if individual collectors could get to those areas on foot, access would be limited for most people and it would be difficult to spread the word about the collections and their locale, especially at the most local level. Constant floods and heavy rains complicated this issue, so that even the most rugged vehicles had difficulty passing through the remote areas. To combat this problem, some have proposed to use an on call method for collection. Operation Rachel organizers moved to put people in those remote provinces and supply them with the means to get to a from weapon locations as needed in 2004 (Christian Aid, 2003).

**Addressing Processing Issues**
One main component of a collective disarmament program is facilitating the weapons collection procedure. An organized and pre-planned approach can help limit confusion, delays, and chaos and make it a pleasant experience for all involved. In achieving this objective, the media can be a useful tool. If participants are aware of the procedures before they arrive at a collection facility, the process will go quicker. If the process is "painless" participants are perhaps more likely to urge their family, friends, and neighbors to participate. An organized approach can help facilitate a high turn out rate and positive word of mouth.

Without attention to processing issues, chaos can ensue, as it did in the Afghanistan. In this program, participants had to be pre-approved before they arrived at the collection centers to turn in their weapons and receive compensation. Though this presumably was meant to avoid last minute surprises and confusion, program organizers ran into some difficulties with this approach in Kunduz. The "lists of the approved participants arrived so late from the Defense Ministry that there was little time to properly verify their identities" (Constable. 2003). In a non-anonymous program that is restricted to certain sectors of the population, one challenge can be ensuring transparency and accountability in targeting the appropriate people in the program.

Chaos can also ensue if people are unsure of collection center locations and the "dos and don'ts" of what center takes what, and when. A continuous dialogue with the media can help limit confusion and help the collection process run in its allotted time without delays. UNMIK/KFOR used this approach in their collection programs in Kosovo. Using the media, the community was informed of the location, how to bring in
items, and what time the collection centers would be open, as well as other procedures to follow for quick collection (KFOR, 2003).

**Addressing Collection Quality Issues**

Once a collection center is in place, program organizers also face the challenge of controlling the quality of the weapons that are turned in. Though the goal of the disarmament programs is to collect/control all SALW in the country or region, operators in all of the cases discovered that many of the collected weapons were old and unusable rather than those that are usable or can be repaired.

Collection quality was a particular problem in Operation Harvest in Bosnia, where many years have passed since the end of the conflict. Many people used the collection facilities to discard rubbish they did not want/need any more, and kept the functioning weapons; others turned in some usable weapons but kept others. Others still turned in only grenades and unexploded shells that they found in fields (Maddox, 2000). Though program operators wanted to collect such items, they did not want to collect only these items and needed to keep up the enthusiasm in the community to actively participate in the harvests and prevent another (or further) proliferation outbreak.

Quality control was also a problem in Afghanistan and in Kosovo, where only a few years have passed since the conflict. According to the reports, the arms handed over in Kunduz were almost out of use and many of the weapons (which were assumed to be looted) were from World War 1 (Afghanistan: Paper Takes Dim View, 2003). In Kosovo, a worker who puts the collected guns in the furnace for melting, revealed that the ones in the furnace were "old anyway" and that "we'll buy new ones- better ones, with any luck" (Quin et al., 2003). Quality control issues are tied to rearmament.
Another issue relates to corruption. In Mozambique, there were reports of soldiers deliberately being ordered to hide higher quality weapons during the ONUMOZ operations. Subsequently, soldiers, the target population for the ONUMOZ program, turned in mainly low quality weapons and munitions (Vines, 1998). Boundaries and zoning system helped those who hid quality weapons. One Zimbabwean military official involved in the program revealed how complex the situation was:

"We see wandering groups with guns frequently. We record this but can't do much. The quartering areas are closed and nobody wants to know about this stuff; [it is] the same with arms caches. We get reports of where these are. Some are in no-go zones. They know, and we know that these are out of bounds. The ones we get to are the old weapons. [They are] the ones that they no longer want. In that sense we offer a free clearance service.” (Vines, 1998)

A similar problem could also potentially exist in the New Beginnings program in Afghanistan, which also targets the militia population. Though this program is succeeding in collecting weapons, many of them are old, rusting, and unusable. These quality issues may be indicative of a situation where militia leaders are complying with UN officials by participating in the program, reaping the incentives, but also turning in old weapons to get new and better ones. Each participant receives a $200 payment for turning in a weapon, which is about “twice the market value of an AK-47 assault rifle, the weapon of choice for Afghan militias”; this disarmament process could “result in the possible re-arming of these groups with more powerful weapons” (Kitchen, 2003).

These cases show that quality control problems do not only stem from an unwillingness to part with weapons. There is the larger problem of determining how many weapons are in a society, especially those that are post-conflict and highly divided. Even if there are estimations of how many SALW are in an area, they may not be
legitimate. Without accurate or semi-accurate notions of how many weapons there are in a country or region, it is difficult to say whether quality weapons are, in fact, being turned in. In Kosovo, guns are considered family possessions, though the adult males generally control them (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.16). It is difficult to say how many guns a family owns, let alone a community, especially when they are not individually owned. It is even more difficult to determine ownership statistics with especially when the distinction between a civilian and a militia/paramilitary member is blurred in times of political strife (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.10). Numbers and estimations are often politicized or manipulated to fit the agendas of certain groups. In Kosovo, it is a contentious issue to determine which group has more weapons, given lingering and unsettled ethnic tensions (Quin et al., 2003). This situation applies to any post-conflict society where group tensions still remain.

**Implementing Appropriate Destruction and Deactivation Processes**

The disarmament process does not end with weapons collection. The weapons destruction/deactivation processes are an integral part of the process. These processes do not only physically get rid of weapons, but also create a symbolic picture of an end of an era in SALW usage, which is important for post-conflict recovery and reconciliation. People who turn in weapons need to be assured that when they turn in a weapon, it will be properly secured and eventually destroyed. This process poses some unique challenges in ensuring adequate destruction of both non-explosive and explosive weapons and munitions in terms of both safety and transparency.

One of the major challenges in the destruction process is ensuring safety. An integral part of this is ensuring that all personnel are fully trained on how to carry out their duties safely and effectively. Without appropriate training, the destruction process
can give way to a dangerous situation for the community and collection personnel. Special training is also needed for those deactivating weapons that are highly explosive, even if it is time consuming.

To deal with this safety challenge, SFOR troops in Bosnia included specialists on their teams. All other SFOR personnel also received prior training in destruction/deactivation based on their job duties; they in turn provided technical expertise and training to local participants and authorities, adding to the long-term knowledge and performance base. Both of these training initiatives intended to prepare local authorities to gradually assume full responsibility for the process. This educational development process contributes to a longer lasting program that is able to continue even when the preliminary actors are no longer involved in the program. Operation Rachel used a similar process. SAPS trained the Mozambican police on how to destroy weapons, which helped foster a cooperative relationship between the two forces.

Another challenge is to determine where the destruction and/or deactivation processes should occur. Deactivation, in every case, occurred on site to alleviate security concerns in transportation. Trained technicians deactivated all explosives. One challenge was to inform and convince the population at large not to transport explosive devices. Most officials combated this through media campaigns on EOD on site destructions. Though not entirely effective, information proved to be the best weapon in discouraging people from transporting explosive materials themselves. An on-site approach allowed trained technicians to operate in a controlled environment and determine how each weapon should be dealt with on a case by case basis.
Safe transport of the weapons from collection sites to destruction facilities is another challenge. Bosnia confronted this challenge through training and ensuring that all weapons were accounted for during the transportation office by employing careful counting methods (Vicente, 2001). However, human error and a lack of vigilance in this process could have grave effects. It is impossible to prevent every lapse in judgment or inadvertent error, but training and planned procedures can limit these occurrences.

Another necessary decision is where to destroy the weapons, which can be challenging due to the massive quantities and lack of infrastructure. Officials also need to determine whether the destruction should be private or public. If an operation is public, it can be used as a model for transparency and promote a sense of community involvement and general awareness. This approach, on the other hand, presents unique safety challenges. A private destruction allows for a more controlled environment but may not have the reconciliatory power of a public destruction.

Public destructions can help foster community involvement in the process and create jobs for civilians. SFOR in Bosnia chose a major civilian steel factory in Zenica as a destruction site. Operating in a transparent environment, civilian employees and the Bosnian AF melted the weapons down in a cast iron furnace at 2000 degrees Fahrenheit once a month in accordance with OSCE regulations (Wood, 2004). Kosovo also used this same approach in destroying their weapons; personnel cut and melted the collected weapons at a metal welding factor in Javjevo. The destruction process for the Tools for Arms Project took place at a Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) facility in Maputo. Weapons were destroyed publicly immediately after collection to alleviate...
safety concerns; they sawed them into tiny pieces or used other appropriate means depending on the weapons type.

Though the transparent use of civilian factories can help involve the community, there are some safety concerns when destruction takes places within in a largely civilian community. Weapons must first be secured as they are not destroyed everyday. In Bosnia, SFOR secured weapons by putting them in a pit after they were collected. Mozambique (ONUMOZ) also used temporary storage facilities, which they called assembly areas. Though there were few reports of security breaches, this method could potentially lead to security issues and concerns about how much information on the pit location and contents should be provided to the public. Security concerns also arise. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ assembly areas suffered from “lax” security; though only the Camp Commander and the UN military officer at the held the keys, the assembly areas were secured “only by two padlocks” (Vines, 1998). With some creativity, the structures could have easily been broken in to.

After weapons are destroyed, officials face the challenge of what to do with the remaining material. In the Balkans, the material was turned into useful tools. In Kosovo, they recycled the residual metal in the metal welding factory to make manhole and stove covers (KFOR, 2003). In Bosnia, the factory in Zenica recycled the high quality steel (about one ton) to construct new schools, factories, and bridges, helping not only the steel industry and the wider economy, but also contributing to institutional growth and development (Bouysson, 2002; Rolofs, 2003). This type of approach not only promotes economic development and resourcefulness, but it can also help in the reconciliation process and promote a "new beginnings" mindset. This approach can also aid in
symbolically turning away from the past. In Kosovo, some of the material was transformed into medallions to commemorate the disarmament/amnesty program (Poultnay, 2003). The Tools for Arms approach in Mozambique was especially creative in this area. Some of the firearm remnants were turned into sculptures or monuments and others were used to produce other works of arts or ornaments. This artistic approach involved local artisans and gave them an opportunity to use their skills for positive purposes. Tools for Arms organizers gave some of the fragments to a Mozambican art association (Nucleo de Arte) to turn them into pieces of art, which they exhibited to the public and sold to support project operations. This approach also fostered international awareness as the art association exhibited their products in the United States, Canada, Portugal, Germany, Zimbabwe, and Sweden (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999).

**Using Ad Hoc Seizure Methods**

Though collection centers and mass destructions can be effective in eliminating weapons in the short term, some programs have also used ad hoc methods of collecting and destroying weapons. Operation Rachel operators used ad hoc seizure methods instead of collection centers in some remote areas of Mozambique that were not conducive to static (or even mobile) collection centers. Other programs also used this approach in addition to collection centers. Though this collection means can be effective in some ways, such as reaching hard to reach areas, it can also present some challenges for disarmament officials.

Ad hoc collection measures can be effective in reaching hard to reach places where centralized collection facilities are not a possibility or would not be beneficial.
They can be viable alternatives to structured collection points and give program implementers some flexibility in their approach depending on current needs. Some advocates of this technique point out that ad hoc removals do not require as much manpower or financial resources. They can also be implemented quickly, while centralized collections take time to plan and execute; advertisement is also unnecessary. They can exist alone or in coordination with centralized efforts. Organizers can easily implement them as a supplement and discontinue them with little notice or planning and can target potential problem areas on a routine basis and provide a stable framework for those who find weapons to notify authorities of their existence, location, and type, as has been the case in both the Balkans and in Mozambique.

Kosovo has had some success in this regard. KFOR continues to engage in intelligence-based confiscation operations in addition to their centralized voluntary collections and have had high turnover rates, when they work closely with UNMIK and KPS. In one week, they confiscated 15 rifles, 21 rockets or anti-tank weapons, one grenade and 406 rounds of ammunition (Avramovic, 2003). Mozambique, which employed such methods in Operation Rachel, also reported some success. Overall this operation has resulted in the on–site destruction of over 20000 rifles, over 7000 grenades, 8700 mortars and mortar bombs and several million rounds of small arms ammunition (SaferAfrica, 2003,p.3).

These measures also allow authorities to combat weapons proliferation among populations that would not ordinarily hand over weapons to these authorities. It also provides a framework and authority for collection as a regular part of law enforcement operations and criminal investigations. Criminals, using this method, can be punished for
weapons possession, addressing the proliferation concern among this sector of the population. Organized crime is a major issue in Kosovo as well as Bosnia, so these methods would theoretically work well in targeting this population.

Though ad hoc methods have many advantages there are also logistical and attitudinal drawbacks. On the logistics end, seizures rely on intelligence and the use of informants. Though this approach has a high pay off, it can be risky. In societies where there are high degrees of corruption, pay offs are the norm especially among officials. These situations can direct attention away from potential high pay off caches to places where few or limited caches exist. Faulty intelligence, whether intentional or not, can lead to wasted time, efforts, and financial burdens for project team members.

Despite this barrier, it is possible for intelligence-based operations to be effective. Operation Rachel in Mozambique provides a good example. The Mozambican police faced difficulties in maintaining a proper intelligence network with both credible and constant information because of insufficient resources to sustain such a network and to pay informants whose information resulted in positive outcomes (SaferAfrica, 2003, p.19-20). Despite this challenge, about 90% of the information collected in Operation Rachel VIII that led to the destruction of arms caches came from the Mozambican teams (SaferAfrica, 2003, p.20). Resource problems can hinder success but do not necessarily prevent any positive outcome from ad hoc removals. However, the high risk, big pay-off issue has to be considered.

Ad hoc removals and seizures also present unique safety concerns that collection centers do not. There is more travel involved in these measures, which compounds safety concerns, especially in areas with many marked and unmarked mine fields. This was a
major problem in Northern Mozambique where Operation Rachel team members had to use landmine resistant vehicles to pass through mine fields. These vehicles protected the workers but were slow to move and caused many delays in reaching suspected cache locations (SaferAfrica, 2003, p.22). These delays could have potentially resulted in missed opportunities. Recognizing the problem, the program officials adopted a new approach and used helicopter and single and double cab 4x4 vehicles to execute operations. Delta Motor Corporation in South Africa sponsored the 4x4 vehicles, fostering a sense of cooperation and helping to alleviate the safety and transportation concerns (SaferAfrica, 2003, p.22).

Using such methods also pose some social and perception challenges. Ad hoc seizures can suffer from being effective at first and not so effective in the later years. While they can provoke a sense of fear among populations, routine operations can also foster greater creativity in hiding weapons, because people know such operations can take place at any place and/or time. KFOR often engages in random vehicle searches. Though these were effective in the early years of the program, people started to realize that unmoved vehicles would be a target and used more creative ways of transporting weapons (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.20). Now, random vehicle searches result in less than a 1% seizure rate (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.20). Similarly, “as a direct response to KFOR searching, the storage of household weapons has become increasingly sophisticated (i.e. purpose-built concealment facilities, storage outside homes, weapons buried in gardens, cached further a field)” (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.20).

A related issue is that such measures can alienate those who could have weapons from the weapons collectors. By nature, seizures tend to employ coercive search
techniques. In many cases they are also non-voluntary. This can result in increased tensions with community members, and a sense of alienation of the community from the collectors (i.e. “us against them”) as it did in Bosnia in 1996-1998 (King et al., 2002). Though ad hoc measures collections continue on a routine basis (to supplement the more extensive, intensified collections under Operation/Project Harvest), some NATO/SFOR troops noticed that the locals get suspicious and uncomfortable if soldiers visit their area multiple times in a short period of time (Girault, 2001). This sense of alienation can be counterproductive in achieving a long lasting enthusiasm for overall disarmament.

**Wider Challenges and Disarmament Issues**

**Using Education and Deterrence Initiatives**

A disarmament program allows for many chances for community interaction and involvement apart from the physical collection process. Such programs can help educate the community to help prevent future SALW proliferation and illicit use by promoting anti-SALW attitude. The disarmament programs in the Balkans and in Mozambique employed some interesting educational techniques to raise awareness, encourage safety, and contribute to long term positive change.

In Bosnia, SFOR/AF launched media campaigns to inform people of the bad consequences of SALW use. They used “real examples of tragedies” (death, permanent disabilities) that happened as a result of unregistered SALW in their area of responsibility (AOR) to influence locals and point out the hazards (Kovalenko et al., 2003). There were campaigns for children and ones for adults, reaching all sectors of the population. The child-oriented campaigns used coloring books and board games to help children recognize dangerous weapons or ordinances and understand why it is dangerous to handle
such items; SFOR/AF also put together TV spots with Mirko, a well-known cartoon character, which aired from 1700-1900 hrs, when most children watched TV (Campuzano, 1999).

Recognizing that an entertainment approach to the problem might generate a larger response particularly among young people, SFOR/AF also established a nationwide drawing and catchphrase competition for children (7-18 years) focused on the dangers of handling ordinances and weapons (Campuzano, 1999). The rewards were symbiotic- the children and their schools received prizes for participating and it allowed the organizers to learn how children perceive weapons, to shape further efforts (Campuzano, 1999). SFOR/AF personnel also visited schools to make presentations to children in hopes that they would learn about the dangers of such weapons and then discuss the issue with their parents, thereby reaching the older generations. This approach recognized that these children would be the future of Bosnia and could pass the information on to future generations (Clement, 2000).

UNDP launched a similar program as part of the Illicit Small Arms Control Project (ISAC) in Kosovo, but with a more participatory approach. These regional "Youth Awareness Projects" allowed 38 youth groups (18,000 young people) to implement and participate in radio, television, and public demonstrations, concerts, forums, sporting events, and art, photography and drama exhibitions aimed at mobilizing the youth population against illicit SALW use (United Nations Development Program, 2002). The Tools for Arms Project in Mozambique also targeted the youth population by conducting interactive demonstrations on disarmament. Program officials
demonstrated the process to school children by “destroying plastic guns in exchange for toys” (Mills, 2000).

A disarmament program should also educate community leaders. The UNDP Small Arms Project in Bosnia incorporated seminars for capacity building, awareness, and education of people involved in SALW issues at every level in government (United Nations Development Program, n.d.). The Operation Rachel program in Mozambique used this approach in training the Mozambican police; South African police helped teach these community leaders on issues relating to SALW, through demonstrations, classes, and hands-on training. They taught their counterparts appropriate safety, handling and identification procedures; map reading and communication skills; how to use the Global Positioning System; and how to start and maintain an intelligence network (SaferAfrica, 2003, p.18). The Tools for Arms Project also integrated documentaries, seminars, workshops, speeches on reconciliation and peace with other community groups as part of their disarmament program (Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1999).

Despite the overall positive approach to education, these programs had to overcome the challenge of breaking the taboo of talking about SALW possession, use, and effects of usage. Regardless of approach, an educational program will not be very effective if there is a fear of talking about the issue. Concerns of anonymity and “face” come into play here, especially in cultures where acceptance into the community is held at high regard. The UNDP/ISAC program in Kosovo effectively combated this problem through a youth documentary, which would not only reach youths, but also older people. "In the Hands of Youth" broke these “taboos” and directly addressed the SALW issue (United Nations Development Program, 2002). It is held up as an example of successful
outreach with a far reaching capability, and has since been “used in the police training curriculum and integrated into the Kosovar education curriculum” (United Nations Development Program, 2002).

**Using a Development Approach**

In Mozambique and Kosovo, some of the disarmament initiatives were tied to development programs that were focused on the individual or a whole community. Though these efforts theoretically contributed to long term economic development and self-sufficiency, these initiatives also illustrate some challenges associated with this kind of an approach.

The Tools for Arms Project in Mozambique focused on the individual. It used a Biblically-based approach to practically encourage development by giving disarmed individuals tools that could contribute to economic self-sufficiency and growth, based on local needs. Mozambican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Chairman of CCM's peace and reconciliation committee, described the approach in the following way:

"I say to people that sleeping with a gun in your bedroom is like sleeping with a snake - one day it will turn round and bite you. We tell people we are not disarming you. We are transforming your guns into ploughshares, so you can cultivate your land and get your daily bread. We are transforming them into sewing machines so you can make clothes. We are transforming them into bicycles so you don't have to spend money traveling to work and so you can collect the fruits of your fields to sell. The idea is to transform the instruments of death and destruction into instruments of peace and of production and cooperation with others."(Christian Aid, 2001)

Though Tools for Arms officials encountered a few situations where some individuals abused the system and collected tools on a regular basis by slowly turning in one weapon at a time, the program is considered by many to be one of the most successful approaches to weapons in exchange for development.
The UNDP/ISAC program in Kosovo also had a development component but it focused on community level. The Japanese government-funded Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) pilot program launched in summer 2003. It was tied to the September 2003 amnesty initiative and drew attention to development concerns in terms of infrastructure, employment, and education to reduce violence and insecurity, which can be attributed in part to economic instability (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. viii). It allowed communities to turn in weapons for funding for development while encouraging local community involvement and common action. The two stage program was adopted in three municipalities. As a first step, the leaders and citizens in each community had to collectively indicate how many weapons they could turn in and come up with a concrete development proposal; then the community had to mobilize to collect weapons to get the funding for development (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 3). To be considered for funding, each community had to surrender a minimum of 300 weapons (Poultney, 2003). The municipalities that collected the most weapons received a share of a pot of money ($675,000 divided among the winners) to finance local school projects, health services, and general repairs (Mustafa and Xharra, 2003).

Despite this incentive, there was some local reluctance to comply with the standards, and participation was not as extensive as it could have been. The program did not combat corruption among public officials and many communities were suspicious about where the money would go once UNDP gave the development funding to the local municipality councils. One student noted that: "The municipality administration is viewed as corrupt. Many people believe that they would not benefit by handing over weapons, as any money won by the authorities will simply disappear" (Mustafa and
When the public is apprehensive about trusting public officials, who are often perceived to be corrupt, development funding incentive programs might not be extremely effective in promoting actual development.

Overall, a developmental approach to disarmament that is coupled with culturally appropriate educational initiatives can help make a weapons collection program more successful. It can also help address wider issues such as promoting education, encouraging sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency, and adopted a long term vision and mindset towards a more peaceful and stable society.

**Disarmament Programs: An Overall Assessment of Utility**

In spite of challenges, disarmament programs should be considered an important part of the peace process. Collecting weapons, even if limited, can provide a safer and more secure environment in the future, especially if the programming addresses the local concerns, needs, issues, and culture. Encouraging an end to weapons use among civilians and militias can also help prevent future insurgencies, which can lead to larger conflicts. Educational, development, and collection initiatives all contribute to this goal. They can also help encourage a new anti-SALW mindset and make people more aware of the dangers in using such weapons on the streets.

However, the major critique of such programming is that it does not address or try to combat the underlying root problems (geo-political, economic, social, cultural, and historical) that contribute to proliferation in the first place. Though the overall peace process might address these factors, a collection program might limit the current proliferation problem, but might not prevent an upswing in proliferation in the future. If weapons are collected now, it does not prevent more weapons from entering into the
society, rekindling the cycle again. In this way, disarmament programs do not address the problem of weapons making their way into a society, nor the reasons why people feel they need weapons in the first place.

**Positive Contributions**

A disarmament program can help limit small arms and light weapons proliferation, by focusing on the current problem in a post-conflict environment. This type of programming is also adaptable based on local, regional, and cultural context so it can be effective in more than one place. Overall, a local disarmament program can try to curb SALW proliferation by:

- Drawing local (and sometimes international) attention to the problem in a culturally and socially appropriate way
- Promoting a chance for a move away from weapons use (incentives)
- Educating the population about the dangers of weapons use, including the younger generations, the future leaders
- Promoting economic development and providing alternatives for financial sustainability and self-sufficiency
- Building trust in authorities
- Building personal relationships with international actors who are working in the peace and conflict resolution area
- Promoting cooperation in the community- the community that has a common goal is less likely to begin fighting one another
- Highlighting the importance of addressing the SALW issue for community leaders and other authorities, which is a requisite for long term change
- Attempting to limit existing stockpiles
- Destroying weapons so they can never be used again
- Contributing to the overall peace and reconciliation process
Though a program can face some challenges in achieving these goals, any viable attempt is better than no attempt at all to address the proliferation problem.

**Drawbacks**

A disarmament program cannot put an end to small arms and light weapon proliferation. One reason is that the proliferation problem is widespread and so many weapons exist, even in a small area. There may not be time, resources, opportunities, or even will to address the problem in a whole country or region. Also, they do not address the questions of why people have weapons, what motivates them to use them, and what societal, political, economic, and cultural factors frame the use of these weapons as being legitimate. Further, some programs that fuel proliferation may be stronger and more well entrenched that any collection program. In short, though weapons collection programs can limit SALW proliferation and promote a move away from illicit weapons usage, they cannot completely combat some programs that help sustain SALW proliferation on both a domestic and international level. A disarmament program, as these cases show, cannot completely:

- Curb illicit international SALW surplus programs
- Eliminate SALW trades and purchases on the black market
- Deter smuggling and trafficking of SALW
- Address border security issues related to SALW
- Curb rearmament and redistribution of weapons in the militias and paramilitaries
- Prevent organized crime and associated SALW trade and use

Without addressing these issues and others, proliferation will continue, if not in present day, but in the future.

**International SALW Surplus Programs**
One of the major criticisms of a disarmament program is that it is unlikely to adequately curb surplus programs for SALW, which often thrive in unstable economic conditions in post-conflict environments. While a disarmament program can help limit this type of activity by, in theory, reducing the number of available SALW, it cannot completely deter it. The disarmament program in Bosnia shows the challenges that program officials can encounter in disarming a society where illicit underground economic activity is prevalent.

Illicit surplus programs thrive when there is a lack of oversight and clarity on the weapons transfer process. A weapons collection program cannot compete with the potential for profit in this arena, as Bosnian case shows. A lack of official oversight and international confusion on who approves such transfers and how to do it allows this type of trade to go on with little notice or accountability. Some reports highlight that BiH continues to sell some of its surplus weaponry abroad, "most recently to Cameroon via Israel," indicating that despite disarmament programs, proliferation continues and there is still a surplus of SALW in the country that can be used for profit (King et al., 2002).

**SALW on the Black Market**

Black market activity also occurs on a domestic level in spite of a weapons collection program. Black market activity is often deeply entrenched in post-conflict societies and is "a way of life" and a way to make a profit. For example, Kosovo's black market for SALW remains strong even though disarmament programs have been underway for a few years (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 25). The Kosovar experience shows that SALW seller can still get a high price particularly in the central part of the region, even though the disarmament initiatives continue (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.
25). Many people still want these guns and feel they need them for their own security. This is especially true in Kosovo where its final status (independent or not) has not yet been determined and there is little trust in the security organizations whose job is to "protect". Further, violent outbreaks from extremist groups and other agitated actors, still continue despite the end of the conflict. To some, no words of wisdom from KFOR soldiers or fancy media campaigns that urge people to disarm can change this attitude. SALW sales also present an alluring possibility of profit to those trying to make ends meet where unemployment is high, the currency is in constant fluctuation, and the economic situation is generally unstable, even with international development initiatives. Weapons collection programs cannot overcome a more powerful, longer sustained, and better organized black market program, which has wider community "support" and better possibilities for economic rewards.

**Smuggling and Trafficking**

Another criticism of weapons collection programs is that they can't fully prevent SALW smuggling at the domestic or international level. Smuggling is a major source of continued SALW proliferation, and the rate of incoming weapons may be higher than the collection rate for disarmament programs. It is impossible for any program, given resources, time, and issues with compliance and perception, to collect every illegally possessed weapon in the country. One survey shows that in spite of "continuous efforts" by UNMIK and KFOR, assault rifles and pistols continue to be trafficked from Serbia and Albania" and "some 330,000–460,000 [of these weapons] are still in the hands of civilians, organized criminal actors, and political factions" (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.40).
Internal smuggling is also a very organized and well entrenched activity. Throughout Kosovo, it is easy to purchase SALW at coffee shops and markets (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 29). It is easier to purchase weapons with personal or family contacts with sellers, but individuals can also place orders with some traders for “specific weapon models” (including Western ones), even if there is no personal relationship (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.29). When this happens, the seller (or his cohorts) purchases the weapon abroad and smuggles it across the border “specifically for the customer in question” (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.29).

Disarmament programs also do not effectively deter smuggling because those involved in the disarmament process can simultaneously be contributing to smuggling operations on the side for profit or for other purposes. Though most of these trafficking efforts are thought to involve fuel and other materials, there is the potential for disarmament officials, in particular those who receive low wages, to also smuggle weapons. Some reports allege that this was a problem in Kosovo. Some German KFOR soldiers were allegedly involved in one highly publicized arms smuggling incident where small arms collected in Prizren were smuggled to Macedonia and then to Darmstadt, Germany (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p. 30). This was also a problem in Mozambique when some Mozambican and South African officials in Operation Rachel tipped off arms traffickers on cache whereabouts (Vines, 1998). Though they are not thought to have actually smuggled any weapons, they aided in the process.

Disarmament programs also cannot effectively address "gun running" and arms trading among police and community leaders, particularly when there is a lax attitude toward this activity. Though such groups are sometimes regarded as "supporters" in the
disarmament cause, they can also contribute to proliferation and trafficking, while at the same time, theoretically helping disarm civilians. In Mozambique, "police and military officials are often the main sources for gun running" and many "weapons fuelling arms trade have been sold out of police stations" (Vines, 1998). A disarmament program cannot address these disciplinary issues, even if they involve only a few officers, especially if there is little internal willingness or know how on how to address the issue. As one provincial governor in Mozambique put it, "there is nothing we can do about indiscipline of certain officers, which is making the problem worse" (Vines, 1998).

**Border Security**

Spotty border security also contributes to SALW proliferation. Though disarmament programs can limit the number of weapons in a given country, they cannot adequately address the constant smuggling of weapons across borders. Once a weapon is collected at a collection facility, the potential for another one to come across the border and replace the collected one always exists. This is especially true in places that do not have “indigenous production capability” for SALW, such as Kosovo (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.10).

Most disarmament programs, with the exception of Operation Rachel in Mozambique, do not address foreign sources of many illegally held weapons. In Kosovo, many of the now illegally held firearms came from raided Albanian military stockpiles (Quin et al., 2003). Though these weapons were raided in 1997, the potential for further raids still exist due to lack of border security. This problem is prevalent not only in Kosovo, but in the rest of the Balkans.
A disarmament program also is not effective at dealing with border security resource issues. Collecting guns is one thing, providing customs services with adequate technology to inspect all packages is another task. Collecting weapons will not effectively limit proliferation when actors can bring more weapons into a country with relative ease. In Kosovo, the UNMIK Customs Service does not have a "society protection" mandate but at times, will seize guns when checking cargo and hand them over to border police (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.28). However, seizures, even among officials who have the mandate to do so, are limited because they do not have the technical equipment to examine all cargo and must rely on limited and poorly paid manpower (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.28). This deterrence capability is also limited because there are “few resources to conduct any follow-up investigation”, even if a weapon is seized (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.28).

**Rearmament and Redistribution**

Weapons collection programs are also incapable of fully preventing rearmament and redistribution of arms, particularly among militia groups. Though there are strict regulations and limitations for rearmament of heavy convention weapons in Bosnia, for example, there are no agreed limits on SALW rearmament (King et al., 2002). This can be a particular concern in overall disarmament when the line between civilian and organized militia member is blurred. Once a weapon is collected, it does not mean that other weapons are not being put back into the hands of quasi-civilians, sustaining the illegal civilian possession such weaponry.

They also cannot prevent weapons that are part of a military rearmament program from going into civilian hands, particularly if the rearmament program is not transparent.
In Bosnia, for example, some of the “same sponsors” of the weapons disarmament and destruction programs were also simultaneously rearming the BiH Federation Army with light (and heavy) weapons (King et al., 2002). Though legitimate, some critics argued that the non-transparent nature of these well-intended programs allowed for the weapons to potentially "spill over" into civilian hands (King et al., 2002). If this were to occur, it would not only limit any utility of a disarmament program, but allow civilians access to better, and perhaps more lethal and automatic weapons.

Disarmament programs also do not have a mechanism to prevent collected weapons from being redistributed, especially if the caches do not make it to the authorities that will destroy them. In Afghanistan, the police play an integral role in routinely seizing and confiscating weapons to be handed over to U.S. Special Forces. West of Kandahar, a police commissioner and his people collected weapons as instructed but Afghanistan's most popular weapon, the AK-47, was missing from their confiscated stockpile (Bury, 2002). When questioned, the commissioner said "his people collected hundreds of them, but instead of handing over the guns to the Americans, they redistributed them to their own police" (Bury, 2002). Disarmament programs cannot effectively prevent unregulated distribution, even among the security forces. If the redistribution process is informal at that level, it could be an indicator that such redistribution is also occurring in informal, and perhaps more dangerous, networks and groups.

**Organized Crime and SALW Trade and Use**

Disarmament programs also do not target organized crime groups, which are major contributors to the SALW proliferation problem. This problem is compounded
when organized criminal groups are well connected with the political leadership, who may use these weapons for intimidation purposes. Disarmament programs do not work to break up these crime structures and interlinks with political structures, which are often very well organized with many resources, including weapons.

Many analysts believe that this interlink is one of the major reasons why weapons collection programs have not led to a substantial decrease in the SALW proliferation problem in Kosovo. Since the end of the internal conflict, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) split up and moved to “organized crime, politics”, and other “paramilitary activities”, which are “all linked” (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.7). As the KLA never disarmed, a weapons stockpile left untouched by disarmament programs “could still remain” (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.7). They can still use their weapons to intimidate key leaders to achieve their objectives (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, p.7).

Because weapons are still readily available, the proliferation and use of such weapons will most undoubtedly continue, unaffected by amnesty programs or other such means to collect weapons. This problem extends beyond the Kosovo case and can be applied to any society where organized crime is prevalent. These criminal actors do not see the benefit of disarmament relative to cost. A promise of amnesty or material incentives may not be enough of a carrot to provoke disarmament of these individuals. SALW are a means to achieve their objectives and goals. They can be used to intimidate, to exert power, and to trade for financial gain. The prospect of overall gain as a result of SALW use outweighs what the actor would gain if he were to disarm.

**Concluding Remarks**
The programs in the Balkans, Mozambique and Afghanistan all offer relevant examples of how disarmament programs can be implemented to address SALW proliferation problems in post-conflict societies. Though the program organizers, ranging from NGOs, the UN, NATO, to local security organizations, faced many challenges in implementing disarmament programs, they provide some good examples of how challenges can be overcome, or at least limited. These lessons learned transcended national boundaries - from Africa, to Europe, to Central Asia. Even though local factors can contribute to the success or failure of a disarmament program, it is important to address these common challenges and questions.

Though meeting all of the above challenges, using either tried and true methods or new ones, does not guarantee that SALW proliferation in a given location will cease to exist, it can help achieve some success in disarming a population. Though future programming officers should proceed with caution in trying to achieve disarmament in any country, it is possible to achieve some success in disarming demobilized forces and civilians. Mozambique, in particular, is a good example of this. The Bosnian, Kosovar, and Afghan experiences also illustrate the "good" that can come out of such programming. It is important to recognize that disarmament programs can help curb proliferation but not end it, but it is also important to note that any organized, well-planned, locale/culturally appropriate program can achieve more success in disarmament than no attempt at all.
References


