

CRS Report for Congress

Pakistan-U.S. Relations

Updated February 2, 2007

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Prepared for Members and
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Pakistan-U.S. Relations

Summary

A stable, democratic, economically thriving Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional terrorism; Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights protection; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials regularly praise Islamabad for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about Islamabad's commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. In late 2003, Pakistan's army began conducting unprecedented counterterrorism operations in the country's western tribal areas. In 2006, Islamabad shifted to a strategy of negotiation with the region's pro-Taliban militants, a tack which has elicited scepticism in Western capitals and which may be failing.

Separatist violence in India's Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989, with some notable relative decline in recent years. India has blamed Pakistan for the infiltration of Islamic militants into Indian Kashmir, a charge Islamabad denies. The United States reportedly has received pledges from Islamabad that all "cross-border terrorism" would cease and that any terrorist facilities in Pakistani-controlled areas would be closed. Similar pledges have been made to India. The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a cease-fire along the Kashmiri Line of Control and continued, substantive dialogue between Islamabad and New Delhi. Pakistan and India have fought three wars since 1947. A potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Attention to this issue intensified following nuclear tests by both countries in May 1998. More recently, the United States has been troubled by evidence of the transfer of Pakistani nuclear technologies and materials to third parties, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Such evidence became stark in early 2004.

Pakistan's macroeconomic indicators have turned positive since 2001 and some meaningful poverty reduction has been seen in this still poor country. President Bush seeks to expand U.S.-Pakistan trade and investment relations. Democracy has fared poorly in Pakistan; the country has endured direct military rule for more than half of its existence. In 1999, the elected government was ousted in a coup led by Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president. Supreme Court-ordered elections in 2002 seated a new civilian government (Musharraf ally Shaukat Aziz serves as prime minister), but it remains weak, and Musharraf has retained his position as army chief. The United States urges restoration of democracy and expects Pakistan's planned 2007 general elections to be free and fair. Congress has annually granted one-year presidential authority to waive coup-related aid sanctions. Pakistan is among the world's leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining more than \$3.5 billion in direct U.S. assistance for FY2002-FY2006, including \$1.5 billion in security-related aid. Pakistan also has received billions of dollars in reimbursement for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations.

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Most Recent Developments

- An ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan remain matters of grave concern. Although Islamabad still defends its September 2006 truce with militants in North Waziristan, Pakistan's efforts to make peace with pro-Taliban tribals are widely viewed as having failed, with cross-border infiltrations continuing at an accelerated pace, and suicide bombings, the targeted killings of pro-government tribal leaders, and executions of accused "U.S. spies" costing scores of lives since October. (See "Infiltration into Afghanistan" section below.) Legislation in the 110th Congress seeks to address this issue (see 1/9 entry below).
- On January 27, a **bomb blast in Peshawar killed 15 people, most of them policemen including the city's police chief**, and injured some 60 other people in a possible sectarian attack. A rash of other lethal anti-Shia attacks struck several more Pakistani cities in recent days. One day earlier, a **suicide bomber killed himself and a security guard at a major Islamabad hotel**. Six other Pakistani nationals were injured.
- On January 25, the **U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission** held its 20th session and included establishment of the first joint intelligence sharing center in Kabul to boost cooperation against Taliban and other extremists.
- On January 24, President Musharraf ended a four-day tour of capitals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the U.A.E., where he exchanged views with Arab leaders on "the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, especially the Palestine issue."
- On January 16, **the Pakistan army launched an airstrike on a suspected militant training camp in South Waziristan**, reportedly killing up to 20 "miscreants," some of them foreigners. The attack came just hours after Secretary of Defense Gates arrived in Afghanistan. Some locals claimed the attack had in fact been launched by an American drone, a charge denied by Islamabad. On the same day, **U.S. military commanders in Kabul said Taliban militants were "taking advantage" of the 9/06 peace deal to triple the rates of their cross-border attacks in Afghanistan**. Also, **Afghan intelligence agents arrested a purported Taliban**

spokesman after he crossed into their country from Pakistan. A subsequent “confession” from the suspect placed Taliban chief Mullah Omar in the Pakistani city of Quetta. Prime Minister Aziz later insisted that the root of the ongoing Taliban insurgency lay in the Afghan government’s weak authority, and he called “ridiculous” claims that Islamabad or Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were supporting or providing safe haven to pro-Taliban militants.

- On January 13, **Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri hosted a visit to Islamabad by the Indian external affairs minister**, the first such visit in more than one year. The two men agreed to launch in mid-March a fourth round of the Composite Dialogue that began in 2004. On December 22, two days of Pakistan-India talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended with agreement to conduct a joint survey.
- On January 11, **Director of National Intelligence Negroponte told a Senate panel** that, “Pakistan is a frontline partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders,” adding that Al Qaeda’s “core elements ... maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hideout in Pakistan” Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Maples told the same panel that, “Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remains a haven for Al Qaeda’s leadership and other extremists,” and that tribal leaders in Waziristan had not abided by most terms of their September 2006 truce agreement with the Islamabad government. Islamabad later called “incorrect” allegations that Pakistan was a haven for Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.
- On January 9, **H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007**, was passed by the House. The bill includes a provision that would end U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to Pakistan in FY2008 unless the President certifies that the Islamabad government is “making all possible efforts” to end Taliban activities on Pakistani soil. The Bush Administration opposes the provision on the grounds that it would be counterproductive to the goal of closer U.S.-Pakistan relations, and it instead urges that the certification be replaced with a reporting requirement. (A Senate version, **S. 328**, which has not emerged from committee to date, contains no certification requirement.) Another section of the bill would suspend all arms sales licenses and deliveries to any “nuclear proliferation host country” unless the President certifies that such a country is, *inter alia*, fully investigating and taking actions to permanently halt illicit nuclear proliferation activities.
- On December 26, **Islamabad announced intentions to fence and mine sections of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border** in an effort to halt the movements of Taliban militants in the region. A U.N.

human rights official later expressed concern that the mining would endanger civilians, and the plan came under fire from tribal leaders in the FATA, as well as from Afghan leaders. Two weeks later, after meeting with a Canadian government official opposed to Islamabad's plan Foreign Minister Kasuri said his government might be willing to reconsider.

- On December 22, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists called for a full investigation into **the reported beating of *New York Times* reporter Carlotta Gall** and the detention of her photographer by apparent Pakistani government officials in Quetta. Gall later described her ordeal in a January 21 news article.
- On December 12, **Afghan President Karzai again blamed Pakistan for supporting pro-Taliban militants** and for seeking to “enslave” the Afghan people. Days before, a visit to Kabul by Pakistani Foreign Minister Kurshid Kasuri ended without resolving differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the composition of proposed tribal councils (jirgas) to stem the Taliban insurgency. In late October, in an apparent expression of frustration with the Musharraf government, President Karzai had bypassed Islamabad and appealed directly to influential Pakistani Pashtun politicians, including leading Islamist figure Fazlur Rehman, for support in tackling the Taliban insurgency.
- On December 4, **President Musharraf told an interviewer that Pakistan is “against independence” for Kashmir**, instead offering a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-governance,” defined as “falling between autonomy and independence.” Many analysts saw the proposal as being roughly in line with New Delhi's Kashmir position. Some opposition political parties and Kashmiri separatist groups rejected Musharraf's proposal as an abandonment of Islamabad's long-held policy, but the Foreign Office insisted that Pakistan's “legal position” continues to be based on relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions.

See also CRS Report RS21584, *Pakistan: Chronology of Recent Events*.

Setting and Regional Relations

Historical Setting

The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and Pakistan's desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the

Central Treaty Organization (or “Baghdad Pact”). As a result of these alliances, Islamabad received nearly \$2 billion in U.S. assistance from 1953 to 1961, one-quarter of this in military aid, making Pakistan one of America’s most important security assistance partners of the period. Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties, however. During and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship and a perception among many in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally.

In the mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s 1974 underground nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. U.S. aid was suspended by President Carter in 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility. However, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year, Pakistan again was viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration offered Islamabad a five-year, \$3.2 billion aid package. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as home for some three million Afghan refugees, most of whom have yet to return.

Despite this renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained troubled by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the Pressler amendment) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be provided. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under intensive U.S. scrutiny and, in 1990, President George H.W. Bush again suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the so-called Pressler amendment, most bilateral economic and all military aid ended, and deliveries of major military equipment ceased. In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of sanctions to allow for food assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations. Among the notable results of the aid cutoff was the nondelivery of F-16 fighter aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989. Nine years later, the United States agreed to

PAKISTAN IN BRIEF

Population: 166 million; *growth rate:* 2.1% (2006 est.)

Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice the size of California)

Capital: Islamabad

Head of Government: President and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf

Ethnic Groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, Baloch, Muhajir (immigrants from India at the time of partition and their descendants)

Languages: Punjabi 58%, Sindhi 12%, Pashtun 8%, Urdu 8%; English widely used

Religions: Muslim 96% (Sunni 81%, Shia 15%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4%

Life Expectancy at Birth: female 64.4 years; male 62.4 years (2006 est.)

Literacy: female 35%; male 62% (2004 est.)

Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): \$411 billion; *per capita:* \$2,580; *growth rate* 6.2% (2006 est.)

Currency: Rupee (100 = \$1.65)

Inflation: 7.8% (2006 est.)

Military Expenditures: \$4.0 billion (3.6% of GDP; 2005)

U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. \$3.72 billion; imports from U.S. \$1.75 billion (2006 est.)

Sources: CIA World Factbook; Departments of Commerce and State; Government of Pakistan; Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; Military Balance

compensate Pakistan with a \$325 million cash payment and \$140 million in goods, including surplus wheat, but the episode engendered lingering Pakistani resentments.

During the 1990s, with U.S. attention shifted away from the region, Islamabad further consolidated its nuclear weapons capability, fanned the flames of a growing separatist insurgency in neighboring Indian-controlled Kashmir, and nurtured the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, where the radical Islamist group took control of Kabul in 1996. After more than a decade of alienation, U.S. relations with Pakistan were once again transformed in dramatic fashion, this time by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a pivotal ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. A small trickle of foreign assistance to Pakistan again became a prodigious flow and, in a sign of renewed U.S. recognition of the country's importance, President George W. Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States in June 2004. One month later, a Congressional Pakistan Caucus was formed and has since been joined by 71 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Current U.S.-Pakistan Engagement

U.S. engagement with Pakistan continues to be deep and multifaceted. President Bush traveled to Pakistan in March 2006 for the first such presidential visit in six years, and numerous high-level governmental meetings have ensued. During the visit, President Bush and President Pervez Musharraf issued a Joint Statement on the U.S.-Pakistan "strategic partnership" that calls for a "strategic dialogue" and "significant expansion" of bilateral economic ties, including mutual trade and investment, as well as initiatives in the areas of energy, peace and security, social sector development, science and technology, democracy, and nonproliferation.¹ In the wake of that meeting, diplomatic engagements have continued apace:

- In April 2006, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns and Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan formally launched the **Strategic Dialogue**, with counterterrorism cooperation and increased trade as leading topics.
- In early May, Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman hosted a Pakistani delegation in Washington for a meeting of the **U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group**, the first since February 2005.
- The Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid, and State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Henry Crumpton paid separate May visits to Islamabad for meetings with top Pakistani officials.
- Later in May, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Josette Shiner completed a visit to Islamabad, where she sought to advance the **U.S.-Pakistan Economic Dialogue**.
- In early June, a meeting of the **U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission** in Rawalpindi included discussions on intelligence sharing and border security.

¹ See [<http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h06030404.html>].

- Later in June, a meeting of the **U.S.-Pakistan Energy Dialogue** was held in Washington.
- In late June, Secretary of State Rice visited Islamabad, where she reiterated U.S. commitment to Pakistan, urged Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate more closely in efforts to battle Islamic militants, and discussed with President Musharraf the importance of Pakistan holding free and fair elections in 2007.
- Foreign Minister Kasuri met with Secretary Rice in Washington in July for further discussions on bilateral relations.
- The inaugural meeting of the **U.S.-Pakistan Joint Committee on Science and Technology** was held in Washington in July.
- Later in July, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, met with President Musharraf in Rawalpindi to discuss issues of mutual interest and to urge Islamabad's further cooperation with Kabul in fighting the Taliban.
- In August, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid, returned to Pakistan to consult with top Pakistani leaders.
- In September, President Bush met with President Musharraf at the White House to discuss a variety of bilateral issues, and he later hosted a dinner for both Musharraf and Afghan President Karzai.
- In November, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher met with top Pakistani officials in Islamabad to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues.
- Later in November, Education Secretary Margaret Spellings hosted a meeting of the **U.S.-Pakistan Education Dialogue** in Washington. The Pakistani delegation was led by Education Minister Javed Ashraf Qazi.
- In December, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker met with President Musharraf in Islamabad to discuss bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.
- In January 2007, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher met with President Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders in Islamabad to discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations and efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. Secretary Boucher subsequently paid visits to Peshawar and the western tribal areas.
- Later in January, House Speaker Representative Nancy Pelosi and six other Members of Congress met with President Musharraf in Islamabad.

Political Setting

The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one, marked by tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 59 years of existence, interspersed with periods of generally weak civilian governance. From 1988 to 1999, Islamabad had democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved from its traditional role of "kingmaker" to one of power broker. Benazir Bhutto (leader of the Pakistan People's Party) and Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Pakistan Muslim League) each served twice as prime minister during this period. The Bhutto government was dismissed on charges of corruption and nepotism in

1996 and Nawaz Sharif won a landslide victory in ensuing elections, which were judged generally free and fair by international observers. Sharif moved quickly to bolster his powers by curtailing those of the president and judiciary, and he emerged as one of Pakistan's strongest-ever elected leaders. Critics accused him of intimidating the opposition and the press.

In October 1999, in immediate response to Prime Minister Sharif's attempt to remove him, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf overthrew the government, dismissed the National Assembly, and appointed himself "chief executive." In the wake of this military overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related U.S. sanctions under section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act (Pakistan was already under nuclear-related U.S. sanctions). Musharraf later assumed the title of president following a controversial April 2002 referendum. National elections were held in October of that year, as ordered by the Supreme Court. A new civilian government was seated — Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali was replaced with Musharraf ally Shaukat Aziz in August 2005 — but it has remained weak. In apparent contravention of democratic norms, Musharraf continues to hold the dual offices of president *and* army chief. Many figures across the spectrum of Pakistani society welcomed Musharraf, or at least were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, as a potential reformer who would curtail both corruption and the influence of religious extremists. Yet his domestic popularity has suffered following indications that, as with Pakistan's previous president-generals, expanding his own power and that of the military would be his central goal.

Pakistan's next national (assembly) elections are slated for late 2007. President Bush has said that electoral process will be "an important test of Pakistan's commitment to democratic reform" and, during his March 2006 visit to Islamabad, said President Musharraf understands the elections "need to be open and honest." Secretary of State Rice repeated the admonition during her June 2006 visit to Islamabad. In that same month, the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486) expressed concern about the Pakistani government's "lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law." Under the Pakistani system, the president is elected by an electoral college comprised of the membership of all national and provincial legislatures. Major controversy has arisen over Musharraf's apparent intention to seek re-election by the current assemblies, which are considered likely to be more favorable to his continued rule than assemblies elected in 2007 might be. (See "Democracy and Governance" section below. See also CRS Report RL32615, *Pakistan's Domestic Political Developments*.)

Regional Relations

Pakistan-India Rivalry. Three full-scale wars — in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) into

the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad [Free] Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has taken from 41,000 to as many as 66,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only to lending moral and political support to the rebels, and it criticizes India for human rights abuses in “Indian-held Kashmir.”

India held Pakistan responsible for late 2001 terrorist attacks in Kashmir and on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi. The Indian response, a massive military mobilization, was mirrored by Pakistan and within months some one million heavily-armed soldiers were deployed at the international frontier. During an extremely tense 2002 another full-scale war seemed a very real possibility and may have been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including multiple visits to the region by top U.S. officials. An April 2003 peace initiative brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit meeting in Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”²

During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations, and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful progress toward normalized relations. Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third round of Composite Dialogue talks was held in 2006. Numerous confidence-building measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unhappiness that more substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring.

Following July 2006 terrorist bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability of the already slow-moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba in September, President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations and also decided to implement a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. The Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four-month hiatus when Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. No progress was made on outstanding territorial disputes, and India presented no evidence of Pakistani involvement in the 7/11 Bombay terrorist bombings, but the two officials did give shape to a joint anti-terrorism mechanism proposed in September and they agreed to continue the dialogue process in early 2007. A notable step came in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended with agreement to conduct a joint survey. In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri hosted a visit to Islamabad by his Indian counterpart. The two men agreed to launch a fourth round of the Composite Dialogue in mid-March. In February, Musharraf opined that Pakistan-India relations were more positive than ever before in the two nations’ histories.

² See [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].

The “IPI” Pipeline Project. Islamabad insists it is going ahead with a proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and on to India. In January 2007, officials from the three countries reportedly resolved a long-running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for further progress. As part of its efforts to isolate Iran economically, the Bush Administration actively seeks to dissuade the Islamabad government from participation in this project, and a State Department official recently suggested that current U.S. law dictates American opposition: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24) required the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make an “investment” of more than \$20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The 109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). Some independent analysts and Members of Congress assert that completion of this “IPI” pipeline would represent a major confidence-building measure in the region and could bolster energy security while facilitating friendlier Pakistan-India ties.

Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and “strategic depth” with regard to India through friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President General Zia ul-Haq’s support for Afghan mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893 “Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.

Following Islamabad’s major September 2001 policy shift, President Musharraf consistently has vowed full Pakistani support for the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and he insists that Pakistan is playing a “totally neutral role” in Afghanistan. Islamabad claims to have arrested more than 500 Taliban militants in 2006, remanding 400 of them to Afghan custody, and reportedly has provided \$300 million in economic assistance to Kabul since 2001. Nevertheless, the two leaders continuously exchange public accusations and recriminations about the ongoing movement of Islamic militants in the border region. Moreover, Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of “strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001 opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic militancy. Continuing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to U.S. interests (see also “Infiltration into Afghanistan” section below).

The China Factor. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship was further strengthened (see CRS Report RL31555, *China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles*). Indian leaders have called the

Islamabad-Beijing nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of serious concern in New Delhi, and U.S. officials remain seized of this potentially destabilizing dynamic.

Analysts taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-wide influence.

In April 2005, the Chinese prime minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and China signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf’s five-day visit to Beijing in February 2006 saw bilateral discussions on counterterrorism, trade, and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu’s November 2006 travel to Islamabad was the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years; another 18 new bilateral pacts were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and plans for joint development of airborne early warning radars. Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including potential provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington’s categorical refusal of Pakistan’s request for a civil nuclear cooperation similar to that being planned between the United States and India. The Chinese government has assisted Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near the border with Iran; Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port a major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some analysts are concerned that the port may be used for military purposes and could bolster China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most important strategic ally.

Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues

U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, South Asian and Afghan stability, democratization and human rights, trade and economic reform, and efforts to counter narcotics trafficking. Relations have been affected by several key developments, including proliferation- and democracy-related sanctions; a continuing Pakistan-India nuclear standoff and conflict over Kashmir; and the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. In the wake of those attacks, President Musharraf — under intense U.S. diplomatic pressure — offered President Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Pakistan became a vital ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. U.S. sanctions relating to Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup quickly were waived and, in October 2001, large tranches of U.S. aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance programs include training and equipment for Pakistani security forces, along with aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, human rights improvement, counternarcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits. The United States also supports grant, loan, and debt

rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various major international financial institutions. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Revelations that Pakistan has been a source of nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran, and Libya may complicate future Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Terrorism

After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and has provided major support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistani anti-terrorism efforts. In a landmark January 2002 speech, President Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan's use as a base for terrorism of any kind, and he banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India and designated as terrorist organizations under U.S. law. In the wake of the speech, thousands of Muslim extremists were detained, though most of these were later released. In the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Pakistani authorities have remanded to U.S. custody approximately 500 such fugitives to date.

Important Al Qaeda-related arrests in Pakistan have included Abu Zubaydah (March 2002), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (September 2002), Khalid Sheik Mohammed (March 2003), several key captures in the summer of 2004, and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Other allegedly senior Al Qaeda figures were killed in gunbattles and missile attacks, including in several apparent U.S.-directed attacks on Pakistani territory from aerial drones. Yet Al Qaeda fugitives and their Taliban allies remain active in Pakistan, especially in the mountainous tribal regions along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, numerous banned indigenous groups continue to operate under new names: Lashkar-e-Taiba became Jamaat al-Dawat; Jaish-e-Mohammed was redubbed Khudam-ul Islam (the former was banned under U.S. law in April 2006).

President Musharraf repeatedly has vowed to end the activities of religious extremists in Pakistan and to permanently prevent banned groups from resurfacing there. His policies likely spurred two lethal but failed attempts to assassinate him in December 2003. Nonetheless, some analysts call Musharraf's efforts cosmetic, ineffective, and the result of international pressure rather than a genuine recognition of the threat posed. In recent years, some Pakistani nationals and religious seminaries have been linked to Islamist terrorism plots in numerous countries. In a January 2007 review of global threats, U.S. Director of Intelligence John Negroponte issued what may be the strongest relevant statements from a Bush Administration official to date, telling a Senate panel that, "Pakistan is a frontline partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders." He identified Al Qaeda as posing the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests, and warned that the organization's "core elements ... maintain active connections and relationships that

radiate outward from their leaders' secure hideout in Pakistan" to affiliates on four continents.³ (See also CRS Report RL32259, *Terrorism in South Asia*.)

The Continuing Hunt for Top Al Qaeda Leaders. Pakistani authorities reportedly have remanded to U.S. custody approximately 500 wanted Al Qaeda fugitives to date, including some senior alleged operatives. Still, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and his lieutenant, Egyptian Islamic radical leader Ayman al-Zawahri, are believed by many to be hiding somewhere in Pakistan's western border region. Pakistani officials generally insist there is no evidence to support these suspicions, but numerous U.S. officials have suggested otherwise. While some mid-2006 reports placed the Al Qaeda founder in the remote Dir Valley of northwestern Pakistan, the country's prime minister said those hunting bin Laden had no clues as to his whereabouts, a claim bolstered by a September 2006 *Washington Post* report that clandestine U.S. commandos tasked with finding bin Laden had not received a credible lead in years. In the same month, President Bush said he would order U.S. forces to enter Pakistan if he received good intelligence on Osama bin Laden's location.

Infiltration Into Afghanistan. Tensions between the Kabul and Islamabad governments — which stretch back many decades — have at times reached alarming levels in recent years, with top Afghan officials accusing Pakistan of manipulating Islamic militancy in the region to destabilize Afghanistan. Likewise, U.S. military commanders overseeing Operation Enduring Freedom have since 2003 complained that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain able to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan, then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They have expressed dismay at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urge Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. U.S. government officials have voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of Pakistan's intelligence agency might be assisting members of the Taliban. In June 2006, State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Henry Crumpton told a Senate panel that elements of Pakistan's "local, tribal governments" are believed to be in collusion with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but that the United States had no "compelling evidence" that Pakistan's intelligence agency is assisting militants. In September, the Commander of the U.S. European Command, Gen. James Jones, told the same Senate panel it was "generally accepted" that the Taliban headquarters is somewhere in the vicinity of Quetta, in Pakistan's southwestern Baluchistan province.⁴

Pakistan Launches Internal Military Operations. During the autumn of 2003, in an unprecedented show of force, President Musharraf moved 25,000 Pakistani troops into the traditionally autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghan frontier. The first half of 2004 saw an escalation of Pakistani Army operations, many in coordination with U.S. and Afghan forces just across the international frontier (U.S. forces have no official authorization to cross the border into Pakistan). Combat between Pakistani troops and militants in the two

³ Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 11, 2007, at [<http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=2467>].

⁴ See also Elizabeth Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban," *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 2006.

Waziristan agencies has killed more than 1,000 Islamic extremists (many of them foreigners), Pakistani soldiers, and civilians. The battles, which continued sporadically throughout 2005 and again became fierce in the spring of 2006, exacerbated volatile anti-Musharraf and anti-American sentiments held by many Pakistani Pashtuns.

Kabul's October 2004 elections were held without major disturbances, apparently in part due to Musharraf's commitment to reducing infiltrations. Yet concerns sharpened in 2005 and, by the summer of that year, Afghan leaders were openly accusing Islamabad of actively supporting insurgents and providing their leadership with safe haven. Islamabad adamantly denied the charges and sought to reassure Kabul by dispatching additional troops to border areas, bringing the total to 80,000. Still, 2005 was the deadliest year to date for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and, at year's end, there were growing indications that Islamabad's efforts to control the tribal areas were meeting with little success.

President Musharraf's "carrot and stick" approach of offering amnesty to those militant tribals who "surrender," and using force against those who resist, clearly has not rid the region of indigenous Islamic militants or Al Qaeda operatives. Late 2005 and early 2006 missile attacks on suspected Al Qaeda targets — apparently launched by U.S. aerial drones flying over Pakistani territory — hinted at more aggressive U.S. tactics that could entail use of U.S. military assets in areas where the Pakistanis are either unable or unwilling to strike. Yet the attacks, in particular a January 13, 2006, strike on Damadola in the Bajaur tribal agency that apparently killed women and children along with several alleged Al Qaeda suspects, spurred widespread Pakistani resentment and a perception that the country's sovereignty was under threat.

A series of deadly encounters between government forces and militants left scores dead in the spring of 2006, among them many civilians. Pakistani troops reportedly are hampered by limited communications and other counterinsurgency capabilities, meaning their response to provocations can be overly reliant on imprecise, mass firepower. Simultaneously, tribal leaders who cooperated with the federal government faced dire threats from the extremists — as many as 200 were the victims of targeted killings in 2005 and 2006 — and the militants have sought to deter such cooperation by periodically beheading accused "U.S. spies."

Islamabad Shifts Strategy. As military operations failed to subdue the militants while causing much "collateral damage" and alienating local residents, Islamabad in 2004 began shifting strategy and sought to arrange truces with Waziri commanders, first at Shakai in South Waziristan in April 2004, then again in February 2005. Officials in Islamabad recognized that the social fabric of the FATA had changed following its role as a staging and recruiting area for the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s: the traditional power base was eroded as the influence of religious elements had greatly increased. President Musharraf lambasted the creeping "Talibanization" of the tribal areas and has sought to implement a new scheme, shifting over time from an almost wholly militarized approach to one emphasizing negotiation and economic development in the FATA, as well as (re-)elevating the role of tribal "maliks," or elders, who would work in closer conjunction with federal political agents. The aim, then, became restoration of a kind of enhanced status quo ante with a limited state writ (maliks would enjoy

more pay and larger levies), and the reduction and ultimately full withdrawal of army troops.⁵ Some reports had the U.S. government initially offering cautious support for this new political strategy.⁶

Cease-Fire and North Waziristan Truce. In late June 2006, militants in North Waziristan announced a unilateral 30-day cease-fire to allow for creation of a tribal council seeking resolution with government forces. The Islamabad government began releasing detained Waziri tribesmen and withdrawing troops from selected checkpoints in a show of goodwill. Hundreds of Pashtun tribesmen and clerics later held a tribal council with government officials, and the cease-fire was extended for another month. Throughout July and August, Pakistan reported arresting scores of Taliban fighters and remanding many of these to Afghanistan. Then, on September 5, the Islamabad government and pro-Taliban militants in Miramshah, North Waziristan, signed a truce to ensure “permanent peace” in the region. The key government participant was a political agent representing the NWFP governor, who agreed on behalf of the government to end army operations against local tribesmen; release all detainees; lift all public sanctions, pay compensation for property damage, return confiscated vehicles and other goods; and remove all new army checkpoints. In turn, two representatives of the North Waziristan “local mujahideen students” (trans. “Taliban”) agreed to end their attacks on government troops and officials; halt the cross-border movement of insurgents to Afghanistan; and evict all foreigners who did not agree to live in peace and honor the pact.⁷ There was subsequent talk of extending the scheme to other FATA agencies and perhaps even to Afghanistan.

News of the truce received lukewarm reception in Washington, where officials took a “wait-and-see” approach to the development. By the final weeks of October 2006, there was a growing concern among both U.S. government officials and independent analysts that the September arrangement in North Waziristan represented a Pakistani “surrender” and had in effect created a sanctuary for extremists, with the rate of Taliban activities in neighboring Afghanistan much increased and some reports having the militants failing to uphold their commitments. Still, Islamabad pressed ahead with a plan to extend a similar truce to the Bajaur tribal agency. Then, only hours before such a deal was to be struck on October 30, 82 people were killed in a dawn air attack on a madrassa in Chingai, Bajaur. The Pakistani military claimed to have undertaken the attack after the school’s pro-Taliban leader continued to train terrorists and shelter “unwanted foreigners,” yet many observers speculated that the attack had in fact been carried out by U.S. Predator drones, perhaps after intelligence reports placing fugitive Al Qaeda lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahri at the site. Nine days later, after a local pro-Taliban militant leader vowed to retaliate against Pakistani security forces, a suicide bomber killed himself and 42 army recruits at a military training camp at Dargai in the North

⁵ Author interview with Pakistan government official, Islamabad, Sep. 2006; “President General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” July 20, 2006, at [<http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/SpeechAddressList.aspx>].

⁶ See, for example, Jonathan Landay, “White House Backing New Plan to Defuse Insurrection in Pakistan,” McClatchy Newspapers, Aug. 16, 2006.

⁷ A translated version of the pact is at [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/etc/nwdeal.html>].

West Frontier Province, not far from the sight of the Chingai attack. The bombing was the most deadly attack on the Pakistani military in recent memory.

Current Status. The situation in the FATA at the close of 2006 was highly unstable, with a large trust deficit between government forces and tribal leaders, and renewed suspicions among Pakistanis that the United States is able to violate Pakistani sovereignty with impunity. In January 2007, the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, told a Senate panel that, “Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remains a haven for Al Qaeda’s leadership and other extremists,” and that tribal leaders in Waziristan had not abided by most terms of the 9/06 truce agreement.⁸ Meanwhile, it appears the “Pakistani Taliban” in North Waziristan has sought to establish a local administrative infrastructure much as was done in South Waziristan following a similar truce there in April 2004.⁹ Many analysts insist that only by bringing the tribal areas under the full writ of the Pakistani state and facilitating major economic development there can Islamabad’s FATA problem be resolved.¹⁰

Infiltration into Kashmir and India. Islamabad has been under continuous U.S. and international pressure to terminate the infiltration of separatist militants across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). Such pressure reportedly elicited a January 2002 promise from President Musharraf to then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that all such movements would cease. During a June 2002 visit to Islamabad, Deputy Secretary Armitage reportedly received another pledge from the Pakistani president, this time an assurance that any existing terrorist camps in Pakistani Kashmir would be closed. Musharraf has pledged to India that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism, and he insists that his government is doing everything possible to stop infiltration and shut down militant base camps in Pakistani-controlled territory. Critics contend, however, that Islamabad continues to actively support separatist insurgents as a means both to maintain strategically the domestic backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue as fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, and to disrupt tactically the state government in Indian Kashmir in seeking to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.

Positive indications growing from the latest Pakistan-India peace initiative include a cease-fire at the LOC that has held since November 2003 and statements from Indian officials indicating that rates of militant infiltration were down significantly. However, Indian leaders periodically reiterate their complaints that Islamabad has taken insufficient action to eradicate the remaining “infrastructure of

⁸ Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 11, 2007, at [<http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=2467>].

⁹ See, for example, “Miramshah Taliban Open Office,” *Dawn* (Karachi), Sep. 28, 2006; “Pro-Taliban Militants in Tax Move,” BBC News, Oct 23, 2006.

¹⁰ See, for example, Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report, 176, Oct. 2006; “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 125, Dec. 11, 2006; Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and Alexander Thier, “Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” U.S. Institute for Peace Briefing, Dec. 2006.

terrorism” on Pakistani-controlled territory. With indications that terrorism on Indian soil beyond the Jammu and Kashmir state may have been linked to Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Indian leaders repeat demands that Pakistan uphold its promises to curtail the operations of Islamic militants and violent Kashmiri separatists originating on Pakistani-controlled territory.

Following conflicting reports from Indian government officials about the criminal investigation into July 2006 Bombay terrorist bombings that left nearly 200 people dead, India’s prime minister claimed in October that India had “credible evidence” of Pakistani government complicity in the plot. Islamabad has rejected such allegations as “propaganda” designed “to externalize an internal [Indian] malaise.”¹¹ Several other terrorist attacks against Indian targets outside of Kashmir have been linked to Pakistan-based groups, including lethal assaults on civilians in Delhi and Bangalore in 2005, and in Varanasi in 2006. Indian security officials routinely blame Pakistan’s intelligence service for assisting the infiltration of Islamist militants into India from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, as well as across the Kashmiri LOC.

Domestic Terrorism. Pakistan is known to be a base for numerous indigenous terrorist organizations, and the country continues to suffer from terrorism at home, especially that targeting the country’s Shia minority. Until a March 2006 car bombing at the U.S. consulate in Karachi that left one American diplomat dead, recent attacks on Western targets had been rare, but 2002 saw several acts of lethal anti-Western terrorism, including the kidnaping and murder of reporter Daniel Pearl, a grenade attack on a Protestant church in Islamabad that killed a U.S. Embassy employee, and two car bomb attacks, including one on the same U.S. consulate, which killed a total of 29 people. These attacks, widely viewed as expressions of militants’ anger with the Musharraf regime for its cooperation with the United States, were linked to Al Qaeda, as well as to indigenous militant groups.

From 2003 to the present, Pakistan’s worst domestic terrorism has been directed against the country’s Shia minority and included suicide bomb attacks that killed scores of people in May 2005 and February 2006 (in addition, some 57 Sunnis were killed in an April 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi). Indications are that the indigenous Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) Sunni terrorist group is responsible for the most deadly anti-Shia violence. Two attempts to kill Musharraf in December 2003 and failed efforts to assassinate other top Pakistani officials in mid-2004 were linked to the LJ and other Al Qaeda-allied groups, and illuminated the grave and continuing danger presented by religious extremists. Following a July 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi that killed a prominent Shiite cleric, Musharraf renewed his pledge to crack down on religious extremists; hundreds of Sunni clerics and activists were subsequently arrested for inciting violence against Shiites through sermons and printed materials. However, serious sectarian violence flared anew in late 2006 and early 2007. Bomb attacks, many of them by suicidal extremists motivated by sectarian hatreds killed many people; some reports link the upsurge in such attacks

¹¹ “We Have Credible Evidence: Manmohan,” *Hindu* (Madras), Oct. 25, 2006; Anand Giridharadas, “India’s Police Say Pakistan Helped Plot July Train Bombings,” *New York Times*, Oct. 1, 2006; Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media Briefing, Oct. 2, 2006.

to growing sectarian conflict in Iraq. Among recent events was a late January bomb blast in Peshawar which killed 15 people, most of them policemen including the city's police chief, and injured some 60 other people in a likely anti-Shia attack. Some analysts believe that, by redirecting Pakistan's internal security resources, an increase in such violence can ease pressure on Al Qaeda and affiliated groups and so allow them to operate more freely there.

Other Security Issues

Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation accelerated quickly after 2001, and President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO U.S. ally in June 2004. The close U.S.-Pakistan security ties of the cold war era — which came to a near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — have been restored as a result of Pakistan's role in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In 2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft. In March 2005, the United States announced that it would resume sales of F-16 fighters to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus. A revived high-level U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (DCG) — moribund since 1997 — sits for high-level discussions on military cooperation, security assistance, and anti-terrorism; its most recent session came in May 2006. In 2003, a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission was established to bring together military commanders for discussions on Afghan stability and border security; its 20th session was held in Pakistan in January 2007 and included establishment of the first joint intelligence sharing center in Kabul to boost cooperation against Taliban and other extremists.

Major government-to-government arms sales and grants in recent years have included 6 C-130 military transport aircraft; 6 Aerostat and 6 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars; air traffic control systems; military radio systems; and 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (in May 2006, Congress was notified of the possible sale of another 130 Harpoons). Sales underway include 6 Phalanx guns (with upgrades on another 6) and 2,014 TOW anti-armor missiles. In 2004, 8 excess P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft were granted to Pakistan and plans for their major refurbishment and service by U.S. firms could be worth nearly \$1 billion in coming years. Other pending sales include 300 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 115 self-propelled howitzers. Major Excess Defense Article grants have included 40 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters in 2004 and 2 F-16A fighters in 2005. Potential arms sales notifications in the latter months of 2006 included costly plans to refurbish and modify three excess P-3 aircraft with the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning suite and the transfer to Pakistan of thousands of military radio sets. The Pentagon reports Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth \$344 million in FY2003-FY2004, growing to \$492 million in FY2005. In-process sales of F-16 combat aircraft have raised the preliminary FY2006 value to nearly \$3.5 billion. The Department of Defense has characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications, a claim that elicits skepticism from some analysts.

Security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said aimed especially at bolstering Islamabad's counterterrorism and border security efforts, and have included U.S.-funded road-building projects in the NWFP and FATA; and the

provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, and transport helicopters and aircraft. The United States also has undertaken to train and equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements. Modest U.S.-funded military education and training programs seek to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan's military leaders, and develop respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. U.S. security assistance to Pakistan's civilian sector is aimed at strengthening the country's law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group. U.S. efforts reportedly are hindered by Pakistani shortcomings that include poorly trained and poorly equipped personnel who generally are underpaid by ineffectively coordinated and overburdened government agencies.¹² (See also CRS Report RL32259, *Terrorism in South Asia*.)

Renewed F-16 Sales and Congressional Concerns. In June 2006, the Pentagon notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan worth up to \$5.1 billion. The deal involves up to 36 advanced F-16 combat aircraft, along with related refurbishments, munitions, and equipment, and would represent the largest-ever weapons sale to Pakistan. Congressional concerns about the sale and displeasure at the Bush Administration's apparently improper notification procedures spurred a July hearing of the House International Relations Committee. During that session, many Members worried that F-16s were better suited to fighting India than to combating terrorists; some warned that U.S. military technology could be passed from Pakistan to China. The State Department's lead official on political-military relations sought to assure the committee that the sale would serve U.S. interests by strengthening the defense capabilities of a key ally without disturbing the regional balance of power and that all possible measures would be taken to prevent the onward transfer of U.S. technologies. H.J.Res. 93, disapproving the proposed sale, was introduced in the House, but was not voted upon.

Secretary of State Rice subsequently sent a letter to Congress indicating that no F-16 combat aircraft or related equipment would be delivered to Pakistan until Islamabad provided written security assurances that no U.S. technology will be accessible by third parties. Islamabad has, however, denied that any "extraordinary" security requirements were requested. After further negotiations on specifics, including a payment process that will require a major outlay from the Pakistani treasury, the United States and Pakistan in September signed a letter of acceptance for the multi-billion dollar F-16 deal. Since then, several major U.S. defense corporations have won contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply F-16 parts and munitions to Pakistan. (See also CRS Report RL33515, *Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications*.)

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. Many policy analysts consider an apparent arms race between India and Pakistan to be among the most likely potential causes of the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998,

¹² See, for example, Seth Jones, et. al., "Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?," RAND Corporation Monograph, Jan. 7, ch. 6, 2007, at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG550.pdf].

India conducted unannounced nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed. The tests created a global storm of criticism and represented a serious setback to two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Pakistan currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched uranium, for 55-90 nuclear weapons; India, with a program focused on plutonium, may be capable of building a similar number. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs (U.S.-supplied F-16 combat aircraft in Pakistan's air force reportedly have been refitted to carry nuclear bombs). Pakistan's military has inducted short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea), while India possesses short- and intermediate-range missiles. All are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant distances. In 2000, Pakistan placed its nuclear forces under the control of a National Command Authority led by the president. According to the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan is building its stockpile of fission weapons and is likely to continue work on advanced warhead and delivery systems.¹³ (See also CRS Report RL32115, *Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia*; and CRS Report RS21237, *India and Pakistan Nuclear Weapons*.)

The A.Q. Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network. Press reports in late 2002 suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang's covert nuclear weapons program by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. Islamabad rejected such reports as "baseless," and Secretary of State Powell was assured that no such transfers were occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national security. In early 2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts "do not warrant imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws." Press reports during 2003 suggested that both Iran and Libya benefitted from Pakistani nuclear assistance. Islamabad denied any nuclear cooperation with Tehran or Tripoli, although it conceded in December 2003 that certain senior scientists were under investigation for possible "independent" proliferation activities.

The investigation led to the February 2004 "public humiliation" of metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and a national hero, when he confessed to involvement in an illicit nuclear smuggling network. Khan and at least seven associates were said to have sold crucial nuclear weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. President Musharraf, citing Khan's contributions to his nation, issued a pardon that was later called conditional. The United States has been assured that the Islamabad government had no knowledge of such activities and indicated that the decision to pardon is an internal Pakistani matter. While Musharraf has promised President Bush that he will share all information learned about Khan's proliferation network, Pakistan refuses to allow any direct access to Khan by U.S. or international investigators. In May 2006, days after releasing from detention nuclear scientist and

¹³ Statement of Lt. Gen. Michael Maples before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 11, 2007, at [<http://intelligence.senate.gov/070111/maples.pdf>].

suspected Khan collaborator Mohammed Farooq, the Islamabad government declared the investigation “is closed.” Some in Congress remained skeptical, however, and a House panel subsequently held a hearing at which three nongovernmental experts insisted that U.S. and international investigators be given direct access to Khan, in particular to learn more about assistance given to Iran’s nuclear program. No alleged Pakistani participants, including Khan himself, have faced criminal charges in the case. (See also CRS Report RL32745, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission*.)

A Major New Nuclear Reactor? Revelations in July 2006 that Pakistan is in the midst of constructing a major heavy water nuclear reactor at the Khushab complex brought a flurry of concern from analysts who foresee a regional competition in fissile material production, perhaps including China. Upon completion, which could be several years away, a reactor with 1,000-megawatt capacity might boost Pakistan’s weapons-grade plutonium production capabilities to more than 200 kilograms per year, or enough for up to 50 nuclear weapons. While Islamabad has not commented directly on the construction, government officials there insist that Pakistan will continue to update and consolidate its nuclear program for the purpose of minimum credible deterrence. The Bush Administration responded to the public revelations by claiming it had been aware of Pakistani plans and that it discourages the use of the facility for military purposes. Some in Congress, who were not briefed about the new Pakistani reactor, have sought to link the development to U.S. plans for major new arms sales to Pakistan, along with an initiative to begin U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India. Moreover, a January 2007 report warned that Pakistan may soon be reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium at its Chashma facility, a capability that would allow Islamabad to build more and more powerful nuclear weapons.¹⁴

Pakistan’s New Nuclear Transparency. During October 2006, Islamabad appeared to launch a public relations effort aimed at overcoming the stigma caused by Khan’s proliferation activities. The effort included dispatching to Washington the chief of the country’s Strategic Plans Division, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who attempted to make more transparent Pakistan’s nuclear command and control structure, and who acknowledged that Pakistan’s past proliferation record had been “poor and indefensible.” The general reiterated Islamabad’s request for U.S.-Pakistan civil nuclear cooperation, saying that such cooperation should be based on an objective set of criteria rather than on a “discriminatory,” country-specific approach that benefits only India.¹⁵ U.S. officials have emphatically and repeatedly rejected such admonitions.

U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. The United States has long sought to halt or limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In May 1998, following the

¹⁴ “U.S. Critical of Pakistan’s New Nuclear Reactor,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006; David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan With Possible Reprocessing Plant,” Jan. 18, 2007, at [<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/chashma.pdf>].

¹⁵ Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, Oct. 24, 2006.

Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on all non-humanitarian aid to both countries as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act. However, Congress and the President acted almost immediately to lift certain aid restrictions and, in October 2001, all remaining nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan (and India) were removed. Officially, the United States continues to urge Pakistan and India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and it offers no official recognition of their nuclear weapons capabilities, which exist outside of the international nonproliferation regime.

During the latter years of the Clinton Administration, the United States set forth nonproliferation “benchmarks” for Pakistan and India, including halting further nuclear testing and signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halting fissile material production and pursuing Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refraining from deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; and restricting any and all exportation of nuclear materials or technologies. The results of U.S. efforts were mixed, at best, and neither Pakistan nor India are signatories to the CTBT or the NPT. The Bush Administration quickly set aside the benchmark framework. Concerns about onward proliferation, fears that Pakistan could become destabilized by the U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, and confusion over the issue of political succession in Islamabad have heightened U.S. attention to weapons proliferation in the region. Section 1601 of P.L. 107-228 outlined U.S. nonproliferation objectives for South Asia. Some Members of Congress identify “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward South Asia, particularly as related to the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT and indications that the United States seeks to build new nuclear weapons.

Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue. In the interests of regional stability, the United States strongly encourages an ongoing Pakistan-India peace initiative and remains concerned about the potential for long-standing disagreements to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. Relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked on the issue of Kashmiri sovereignty, and a separatist rebellion has been underway in the region since 1989. Tensions were extremely high in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999, when an incursion by Pakistani soldiers led to a bloody six-week-long battle. Throughout 2000 and 2001, cross-border firing and shelling caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. A July 2001 Pakistan-India summit meeting failed to produce even a joint statement, reportedly due to pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.”

The 2002 Crisis. Secretary of State Powell visited South Asia in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir, but an October 2001 bombing at the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly building was followed by a December assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (both incidents were blamed on Pakistan-based terrorist groups). India mobilized some 700,000 troops along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatened war unless Islamabad ended all “cross-border infiltration” of Islamic militants. This action triggered a corresponding Pakistani military mobilization. Under significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India’s use of force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence

of terrorist entities on Pakistani soil, and he outlawed five militant groups, including those most often named in attacks in India: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued, and a May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and caused Islamabad to recall army troops from patrol operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Intensive international diplomatic missions to South Asia reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and appear to have prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S. officials were involved in this effort and continued to strenuously urge the two countries to renew bilateral dialogue.¹⁶

The Most Recent Peace Process. Pakistan and India began full military draw-downs in October 2002 and, after a cooling-off period, a “hand of friendship” offer to Pakistan by the Indian prime minister in April 2003 led to the restoration of full diplomatic relations. Yet surging separatist violence that summer contributed to an exchange of sharp rhetoric between Pakistani and Indian leaders at the United Nations, casting doubt on the nascent peace effort. A new confidence-building initiative got Pakistan and India back on a positive track, and a November 2003 cease-fire was initiated after a proposal by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. President Musharraf subsequently suggested that Pakistan might be willing to “set aside” its long-standing demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, a proposal welcomed by the United States, but called a “disastrous shift” in policy by Pakistani opposition parties.

Although militant infiltration did not end, New Delhi acknowledged that it was significantly decreased and, combined with other confidence-building measures, relations were sufficiently improved that the Indian prime minister attended a January 2004 summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad. There Pakistan and India issued a joint “Islamabad Declaration” calling for a renewed “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”¹⁷ A major confidence-building development came in April 2005, when a new bus service was launched linking Muzaffarabad in Pakistani Kashmir and Srinagar in Indian Kashmir, and a summit meeting produced an agreement to address the Kashmir issue “in a forward looking manner for a final settlement.” Still, many Kashmiris reject any settlement process that excludes them.

Even as the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward — and likely in reaction to their apparent marginalization in the face of this development — separatist militants continue their attacks, and many observers in both India and the United States believe support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani state policy. Yet many indicators show positive long-term trends. Steadily reduced rates of

¹⁶ See Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis” at [<http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/USCrisisManagement.pdf>].

¹⁷ See [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].

infiltration may be attributed to the endurance of the Pakistan-India dialogue. Moreover, President Musharraf has made considerable efforts to exhibit flexibility, including December 2006 statements that Pakistan is “against independence” for Kashmir, and his offering of a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-governance ... falling between autonomy and independence.”¹⁸ This was seen by many analysts as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Indeed, the Indian prime minister welcomed Musharraf’s proposals, saying they “contribute to the ongoing thought process.” Prospects for a government-to-government accommodation may thus be brighter than ever before.

Baluchistan Unrest. Pakistan’s vast southwestern Baluchistan province is about the size of California and accounts for 44% of the country’s land area, but only 5% of its population. The U.S. military made use of bases in the region to support its operations in neighboring Afghanistan. The province is the proposed setting for a pipeline that would deliver Iranian natural gas to both Pakistan and India, a project which, if brought to fruition, could bring hundreds of millions of dollars in annual transit fees to Islamabad’s national treasury. The United States opposes this “IPI” pipeline project as part of its effort to isolate Iran internationally. Security problems in Baluchistan reduce the appeal to investors of building a pipeline across the province. More broadly, such problems raise serious questions about Pakistan’s internal stability and national cohesion.

Over the decades of Pakistani independence, many of the ethnic Baloch and some of the Pashtun tribes who inhabit this relatively poor and underdeveloped province have engaged in armed conflict with federal government forces, variously seeking more equitable returns on the region’s rich natural resources, greater autonomy under the country’s federal system, or even outright independence and formation of a Baloch state that might include ethnic brethren and some territories in both Afghanistan and Iran. Non-Baloch (mostly Punjabis) have been seen to benefit disproportionately from mineral and energy extraction projects, and indigenous Baloch have been given only a small role in the construction of a major new port in Gwadar. Many Baloch complain of being a marginalized group in their own homeland. Long-standing resentments led to armed conflicts in 1948, 1958, and 1973. The latter insurrection, which lasted four years, involved tens of thousands of armed guerillas and brought much destruction to the province; it was put down only after a major effort by the Pakistan Army, which made use of combat helicopters provided by Iran. Some 8,000 rebels and Pakistani soldiers were killed.

The Current Conflict. Mid-2004 saw an increase in hit-and-run attacks on army outposts and in the sabotage of oil and gas pipelines. The alleged rape of a Baloch doctor by Pakistani soldiers in January 2005 sparked provincial anger and a major spike in such incidents over the course of the year. In December 2005, rockets were fired at a Baluchistan army camp during a visit to the site by President Musharraf. A Baloch separatist group claimed responsibility and the Pakistani military began major offensive operations to destroy the militants’ camps. In the midst of increasingly heavy fighting in January 2006, Musharraf openly accused India

¹⁸ Somini Sengupta, “Pakistani Says Concessions Could Produce Kashmir Pact,” *New York Times*, Dec. 6, 2006.

of arming and financing militants fighting in Baluchistan. New Delhi categorically rejected the allegations. U.N. and other international aid groups soon suspended their operations in Baluchistan due to security concerns. Shortly after, Baloch militants shot and killed three Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, causing disruption in Islamabad-Beijing relations.

President Musharraf calls Baloch rebels “miscreants” and “terrorists”; the Islamabad government officially banned the separatist Baluchistan Liberation Army as a terrorist organization in April 2006 and at times suggests that Baloch militants are religious extremists. Yet most rebel attacks are taken against military and infrastructure targets, and — despite a government campaign to link the two movements — Islam appears to play little or no role as a motive for Baloch militancy.¹⁹ Islamabad has employed helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft in its effort to defeat the rebel forces.

The Death of Nawab Bugti. Fighting waned in the middle of 2006, with hundreds of rebels surrendering in return for amnesty. The main rebel tribal leader and onetime Baluchistan chief minister, 79-year-old Nawab Akbar Bugti, had gone into hiding and was believed cut off from his own forces. In June, President Musharraf declared that all “terrorists” had been eliminated from Baluchistan, yet combat flared again in July, reportedly leaving dozens dead, and periodic bombings in the capital city of Quetta continued. Then, in late August, Bugti was located in a cave hideout and was killed by Pakistan army troops in a battle that left dozens of soldiers and rebels dead.

Recognizing Bugti’s popularity among wide segments of the Baloch populace and of the potential for his killing to provide martyr status, government officials denied the tribal leader had been targeted, calling his death an inadvertent result of a cave collapse. Nevertheless, news of his death spurred major unrest across the province and beyond, with hundreds of people being arrested in the midst of large-scale street demonstrations. Bugti’s killing was criticized across the spectrum of Pakistani politicians and analysts, with some commentators calling it a Pakistani Army miscue of historic proportions.²⁰ Days of rioting included numerous deaths and injuries, but the more dire predictions of spreading unrest and perhaps even the disintegration of Pakistan’s federal system have not come to pass. By October, Pakistan’s interior minister was identifying a “normalization” and decrease in violence in Baluchistan, although a low-intensity insurgency continues and the overarching problem remains unresolved.

Narcotics. Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in Afghanistan then distributed worldwide by Pakistan-based traffickers. The State Department indicates that Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control “remains strong,” and the Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating indigenous opium poppy cultivation. However, opium production spiked in post-

¹⁹ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Paper No. 65, Jan. 2006, at [<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf>].

²⁰ “Bugti’s Killing is the Biggest Blunder Since Bhutto’s Execution,” *Daily Times* (Lahore), Aug. 28, 2006.

Taliban Afghanistan, which is now said to supply up to 90% of the world's heroin. Elements of Pakistan's intelligence agency are suspected of past involvement in drug trafficking; in March 2003, a former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan told a House panel that their role in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 was "substantial." Some reports indicate that profits from drug sales are financing the activities of Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

U.S. counternarcotics programs aim to reduce the flow of opiates through Pakistan, eliminate Pakistan as a source of such opiates, and reduce the demand for illegal drugs within Pakistan. Islamabad's own counternarcotics efforts are hampered by lack of full government commitment, scarcity of funds, poor infrastructure, and likely corruption. Since 2002, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has supported Pakistan's Border Security Project by training border forces, providing vehicles and surveillance and communications equipment, transferring helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to the Interior Ministry's Air Wing, and road-building in western tribal areas. Congress funded such programs with more than \$54 million for FY2006. (See also CRS Report RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*.)

Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas

With some 160 million citizens, Pakistan is the world's second-most populous Muslim country. An unexpected outcome of the country's 2002 elections saw the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or United Action Front), a coalition of six Islamic parties, win 11% of the popular vote and 68 seats in the National Assembly — about one-fifth of the total. It also controls the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in the Baluchistan assembly. These Pashtun-majority western provinces border Afghanistan, where U.S.-led counterterrorism operations are ongoing. In 2003, the NWFP provincial assembly passed a Shariat (Islamic law) bill. In 2005, and again in November 2006, the same assembly passed a Hasba (accountability) bill that many fear could create a parallel Islamic legal body. Pakistan's Supreme Court, responding to petition's by President Musharraf's government, has rejected such legislation as unconstitutional. Still, such developments alarm Pakistan's moderates and Musharraf has decried any attempts to "Talibanize" regions of Pakistan.

Pakistan's Islamists are notable for expressions of anti-American sentiment, at times calling for "jihad" against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they believe alliance with Washington entails. Most analysts contend that two December 2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by Islamist militants angered by Pakistan's post-September 2001 policy shift. Some observers identify a causal link between the poor state of Pakistan's primary education system and the persistence of xenophobia and religious extremism in that country.

Anti-American sentiment is not limited to Islamist groups, however. Many across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at U.S. global foreign policy, in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim

world (as in, for example, Palestine and Iraq).²¹ In 2004 testimony before a Senate panel, senior U.S. expert Stephen Cohen opined: “Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.” A July 2005 Pew Center opinion poll found 51% of Pakistanis expressing confidence in Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden to “do the right thing in world affairs” and, in subsequent *Time* magazine interview, President Musharraf conceded that “the man on the street [in Pakistan] does not have a good opinion of the United States.”

A Pew poll taken shortly before the catastrophic October 2005 earthquake found only 23% of Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest percentage for any country surveyed. That percentage doubled to 46% in an ACNielsen poll taken after large-scale U.S. disaster relief efforts in earthquake-affected areas, with the great majority of Pakistanis indicating that their perceptions had been positively influenced by witnessing such efforts. However, a January 2006 missile attack on Pakistani homes near the Afghan border killed numerous civilians and was blamed on U.S. forces, renewing animosity toward the United States among segments of the Pakistani populace. An October 2006 missile attack in the same border area ostensibly was launched by Pakistani forces, but widespread suspicions of U.S. involvement further engendered anti-Americanism and concerns about Pakistani sovereignty. Another noteworthy episode in 2006 saw Pakistani cities hosting major public demonstrations against the publication in European newspapers of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims. These protests, which were violent at times, included strong anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf components, suggesting that Islamist organizers used the issue to forward their own political ends. Subsequently, a June 2006 Pew Center poll found only 27% of Pakistanis holding a favorable opinion of the United States, suggesting that public diplomacy gains following the 2005 earthquake may have receded.

Pakistan’s Religious Schools (Madrassas).²² Afghanistan’s Taliban movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools (madrassas). Among the more than 10,000 madrassas training many hundreds of thousands of children in Pakistan are a small percentage that have been implicated in teaching militant anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell once identified these as “programs that do nothing but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists.”²³ Contrary to popularly held conceptions, however, research indicates that the great majority of Pakistan’s violent Islamist extremists does not emerge from the country’s madrassas, but rather from the dysfunctional public school system or even from private, English-medium schools. One study found that only 17% of international terrorists sampled had Islamic education backgrounds.²⁴

²¹ Author interviews in Islamabad, Sep. 2006.

²² See also CRS Report RL32009, *Education Reform in Pakistan*, and CRS Report RS21654, *Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas*.

²³ Statement before the House Appropriations Committee, Mar. 10, 2004.

²⁴ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
(continued...)

Many of Pakistan's madrassas are financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist political parties such as the JUI-F (closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by multiple unknown foreign entities, many in Saudi Arabia. As many as two-thirds of Pakistan's seminaries are run by the Deobandi sect, known in part for traditionally anti-Shia sentiments and at times linked to the Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist group. In its most recent report on international religious freedom, the U.S. State Department said, "Some unregistered and Deobandi-controlled madrassas in the FATA and northern Baluchistan continued to teach extremism" and that schools run by the Jamaat al-Dawat — widely considered to be a front organization of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group — serve as recruitment centers for extremist groups. Musharraf himself has acknowledged that a small number of seminaries were "harboring terrorists" and he has asked religious leaders to help isolate these by openly condemning them.²⁵

International attention to Pakistan's religious schools intensified during the summer of 2005 after Pakistani officials acknowledged that suspects in the July London bombings visited Pakistan during the previous year and may have spent time at a madrassa near Lahore. While President Musharraf has in the past pledged to crack down on the more extremist madrassas in his country, there continues to be little concrete evidence that he has done so, and even the president himself has admitted that movement on this issue has been slow.²⁶ Some observers speculate that Musharraf's reluctance to enforce reform efforts is rooted in his desire to remain on good terms with Pakistan's Islamist political parties, which are seen to be an important part of his political base.²⁷ The U.S. Congress has appropriated many millions of dollars to assist Pakistan in efforts to reform its education system, including changes that would make madrassa curriculum closer in substance to that provided in non-religious schools. More than \$200 million has been allocated for such assistance since 2002. In November 2006, the U.S.-Pakistan Education dialogue was launched in Washington to bolster further engagement.

Democratization and Human Rights

Democracy and Governance. The status and development of Pakistan's democratic institutions is a key U.S. policy concern, especially among those analysts

²⁴ (...continued)

See also Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks* (Columbia University Press, 2004); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandney, "The Madrassa Myth," *New York Times*, June 14, 2005.

²⁵ See [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm>]; "Some Madrassas Bad: Musharraf," *Daily Times* (Lahore), Sep. 8, 2004.

²⁶ See "Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector," International Crisis Group Report 84, Oct. 7, 2004; Charles Sennott, "Radical Teachings in Pakistan Schools," *Boston Globe*, Sep. 29, 2006. Author interviews with Pakistani government officials and scholars have tended to confirm that movement on madrassa reform is slow, at best.

²⁷ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "At an Islamic School, Hints of Extremist Ties," *Washington Post*, June 13, 2004; Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal* 58, 2, Spring 2004.

who view representative government in Islamabad as being a prerequisite for reducing religious extremism and establishing a moderate Pakistani state. There had been hopes that the October 2002 national elections would reverse Pakistan's historic trend toward unstable governance and military interference in democratic institutions. Such hopes were eroded by ensuing developments, including President Musharraf's imposition of major constitutional changes and his retention of the position of army chief. International and Pakistani human rights groups continue to issue reports critical of Islamabad's military-dominated government. In 2007, and for the eighth straight year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as "not free" in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. While praising Pakistan's electoral exercises as moves in the right direction, the United States expresses concern that seemingly nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true democracy in Pakistan more elusive, and U.S. officials continue to press Pakistani leaders on this issue.

Pakistan's Military-Dominated Government. General Musharraf's assumption of the presidency ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial April 2002 referendum marked by evidence of fraud. In August 2002, Musharraf announced sweeping constitutional changes to bolster the president's powers, including provisions for presidential dissolution of the National Assembly. The United States expressed concerns that the changes could make it more difficult to build democratic institutions in Pakistan. The 2002 elections nominally fulfilled Musharraf's promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power. The pro-military Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing. The civilian government was hamstrung for more than a year by fractious debate over the legitimacy of constitutional changes and by Musharraf's continued status as army chief *and* president. A surprise December 2003 agreement between Musharraf and the Islamist opposition ended the deadlock by bringing the constitutional changes before Parliament and by eliciting a promise from Musharraf to resign his military commission before 2005. Non-Islamist opposition parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted that the new arrangement merely institutionalized military rule in Pakistan.

Other apparent reversals for Pakistani democratization came in 2004, including the sentencing of ARD leader Javed Hashmi to 23 years in prison for sedition, mutiny, and forgery, and the "forced" resignation of Prime Minister Jamali for what numerous analysts called his insufficient deference to President Musharraf. Musharraf "shuffled" prime ministers to seat his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz. Aziz is seen to be an able financial manager and technocrat favored by the military, but he has no political base in Pakistan. Moreover, in the final month of 2004 Musharraf chose to continue his role as army chief beyond the stated deadline.

U.S. Policy. The United States indicates that it expects Pakistan's scheduled 2007 general elections to be free and fair throughout the entire process. In July 2005, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern with "the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan" (S.Rept. 109-96). Pakistan's nominally non-party August-October 2005 municipal elections saw major gains for candidates favored by the PML-Q and notable reversals for Islamists, but were also marked by widespread accusations of rigging. The Bush Administration made no comment on

reported irregularities. In June 2006, the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486) expressed concern about “the lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law.” The leadership of the country’s most popular, moderate, secular party — the Pakistan People’s Party — seek greater U.S. support for Pakistani democratization and warn that the space in which they are allowed to operate is so narrow as to bring into question their continued viability as political forces.²⁸ (See also CRS Report RL32615, *Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments*.)

Human Rights Problems. The U.S. State Department’s *Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005* determined that the Pakistan government’s record on human rights again “was poor and serious problems remained.” Along with concerns about anti-democratic practices, the report lists extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape; “rampant” police corruption; lack of judicial independence; political violence; terrorism; and “extremely poor” prison conditions among the serious problems. Improvement was noted, however, with government efforts to crack down on human trafficking.²⁹ (The most recent State Department report on trafficking in persons again said, “Pakistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.”³⁰) The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and international human rights groups have issued reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms, lawlessness in many areas (especially the western tribal agencies), and of the country’s perceived abuses of the rights of minorities. Controversial statutory restrictions include harsh penalties for blasphemy. In H.Rept. 109-486 (June 2006), the House Appropriations Committee expressed concern about “what appears to be the Government of Pakistan’s increasing lack of respect for human rights” In S.Rept. 109-277 (July 2006), the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed being “gravely concerned with violations of human rights” in Pakistan.

Gender Discrimination. Discrimination against women is widespread and traditional constraints — cultural, legal, and spousal — keep women in a subordinate position in society. In 2005, Pakistani gang rape victim Mukhtaran Mai — and Islamabad’s (mis)handling of her case — became emblematic of gender discrimination problems in Pakistan. The Hudood Ordinance was promulgated during the rule of President Gen. Zia ul-Haq and is widely criticized for imposing stringent punishments and restrictions under the guise of Islamic law. Among its provisions, the ordinance criminalizes all extramarital sex and makes it extremely difficult for women to prove allegations of rape (those women who make such charges without the required evidence often are jailed as adulterers). In November 2006, the Hudood laws were amended in the Women’s Protection Bill. President Musharraf supported the changes and the ruling PML party joined with the opposition PPP to overcome fierce resistance by Islamist parties. Musharraf called the bill’s passage “just the beginning” and “a victory for moderates,” and said his

²⁸ Author interviews with PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, Washington, DC, Feb. 2006, and PPP officials, Islamabad, Jan. 2004 and Sep. 2006.

²⁹ See [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61710.htm>].

³⁰ See [<http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65989.htm>].

government would soon introduce further legislation to improve the status of women. The step is viewed as a landmark in efforts to create more a moderate Pakistani state.

Religious Freedom. The State Department's *International Religious Freedom Report 2006* again found that in practice the Islamabad government imposes limits on the freedom of religion in Pakistan. The report noted "some steps to improve the treatment of religious minorities," but indicated that "serious problems remained," including discriminatory laws and violence against religious minorities.³¹ The State Department has rejected repeated U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommendations that Pakistan be designated a "country of particular concern." The 2006 annual report from that Commission claims that, "Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in Pakistan, and the government's response to this problem, though improved, continues to be insufficient and not fully effective."³²

Press Freedom. Press freedom and the safety of journalists recently has become a major concern in Pakistan, spurred especially by the June 2006 discovery of the handcuffed body of Pakistani journalist Hayatullah Khan in a rural area of North Waziristan. Khan, who had been missing for more than six months, was abducted by unknown gunmen after he reported on an apparent U.S.-launched missile attack in Pakistan's tribal region. Khan's family is among those who suspect the involvement of Pakistani security forces; an official inquiry into the death was launched. Other journalists have been detained and possibly tortured, including a pair reportedly held incommunicado without charges for three months after they shot footage of the Jacobabad airbase that was used by U.S. forces. Pakistani journalists have taken to the streets to protest perceived abuses and they complain that the government seeks to intimidate those who would report the facts of Pakistani counterterrorism operations.

"Disappeared" Persons. In November 2006, Pakistan's Supreme Court ordered the government to disclose the whereabouts of 41 suspected security detainees who have "disappeared." Human rights groups claim to have recorded more than 400 cases of such secret detentions since 2002. London-based Amnesty International has criticized Islamabad for human rights abuses related to its cooperation with the U.S.-led "war on terror," including the arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture of hundreds of people. In 2005, New York-based Human Rights Watch released a list of 26 "ghost detainees" thought to be in U.S. custody, at least 16 of whom were arrested in Pakistan.

Economic Issues

Overview. Pakistan is a poor country, but the national economy has gathered significant positive momentum in recent years, helped in large part by the government's pro-growth policies and by post-2001 infusions of foreign aid. However, presently high rates of domestic inflation have many analysts concerned

³¹ See [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm>].

³² See [<http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/index.html>].

about the country's macroeconomic stability. According to the World Bank, nominal GDP per capita in 2005 was only \$644, but poverty rates have dropped from 34% to 24% over the past five years. Severe human losses and property damage from an October 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan have had limited economic impact, given a large influx of foreign aid and the stimulus provided by reconstruction efforts. The long-term economic outlook for Pakistan is much improved since 2001, even as it remains clouded in a country still dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic commodities. Substantial fiscal deficits and continued dependency on external aid counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax collection system and what have been major gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange, which nearly doubled in value as the world's best performer in 2002 and was up 56% in 2005. Along with absolute development gains in recent years, Pakistan's relative standing is also improving: The U.N. Development Program ranked Pakistan 135th out of 177 countries on its 2005 human development index, up from 142nd in 2004 and 144th in 2003.³³

Output from both the industrial and service sectors has grown substantially since 2002, but the agricultural sector has lagged (in part due to droughts), slowing overall growth. Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country's work force, but only about one-fifth of national income. Pakistan's real GDP grew by 6.6% in the fiscal year ending June 2006, driven by a booming manufacturing sector and greater than expected agricultural expansion. However, overall growth was down from 8.4% the previous year and fell well short of Islamabad's target of 7%. Expanding textile production and the government's pro-growth measures have most analysts foreseeing solid expansion ahead, with predictions at or above 6% for the next two years.

Pakistan stabilized its external debt at about \$33 billion by mid-2003, but this rose to nearly \$39 billion in 2005. Still, such debt is less than one-third of GDP today, down from more than one-half in 2000. The country's total liquid reserves reached a record \$13.1 billion by mid-2006, an all-time high and a four-fold increase since 1999. Foreign remittances have exceeded \$4 billion annually since 2003, up from slightly more than \$1 billion in 2001. High oil prices have driven inflationary pressures, resulting in a year-on-year wholesale rate of 6.7% in October 2006. While inflation is expected to ease in 2007, many analysts call it the single most important obstacle to future growth. Defense spending and interest on public debt together consume two-thirds of total revenues, thus squeezing out development expenditure. Pakistan's resources and comparatively well-developed entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid economic growth and development in coming years. This is particularly true for Pakistan's textile industry, which accounts for 60% of Pakistan's exports. Analysts point to the pressing need to further broaden the country's tax base in order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health, and education, all prerequisites for economic development.

Attempts at economic reform historically have floundered due to political instability. The Musharraf government has had notable successes in effecting macroeconomic reform. Rewards for participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition eased somewhat Pakistan's severe national debt situation, with many

³³ See [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf].

countries, including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large amounts of external aid flowing into the country. In October 2005, the World Bank's country director for Pakistan said there are plenty of risks for pessimists to worry about with regard to Pakistani growth and poverty reduction, but claimed "today the optimists have the upper-hand." According to the Asian Development Bank's *Outlook 2006*:

Over the medium term, the outlook is favorable for growth in the range of 6-8%, though this requires the [Pakistani] Government to maintain its robust performance in economic management, greater investment to ease infrastructure bottlenecks, and continued security and political stability.³⁴

In December 2006, the World Bank's country director said Pakistan's economy "has built up a strong momentum for growth," and he lauded Islamabad for putting in place "a sound framework for fiscal management" and restoring investor confidence.

Trade and Investment. The United States is by far Pakistan's leading export market, accounting for about one-fifth of the total. Pakistan's primary exports are cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products. During 2006, total U.S. imports from Pakistan were worth an estimated \$3.72 billion (up 14% over 2005). About two-thirds of this value came from the purchase of cotton apparel and textiles. U.S. exports to Pakistan during 2006 were worth an estimated \$1.75 billion (up 40% over 2005), led by fertilizers and cotton fiber (2005 figures had been depressed as a result of completed delivery of civilian aircraft in 2004).³⁵ According to the 2006 report of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Pakistan has made substantial progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. Progress also has come in the area of intellectual property rights protection: estimated trade losses due to copyright piracy in Pakistan were notably lower in 2005. Book piracy accounted for about half of the 2005 losses, however, and remains a serious concern. Pakistan also has been a world leader in the pirating of music CDs and has appeared on the USTR's "Special 301" Watch List for 16 consecutive years (in 2004, continuing violations caused the USTR to move Pakistan to the Priority Watch List).³⁶

According to Pakistan's Ministry of Finance, total foreign direct investment in Pakistan exceeded \$3 billion for the year ending June 2006 — an unprecedented amount that more than doubled over the previous year — but investors remain wary of the country's uncertain security circumstances. Islamabad is eager to finalize a pending Bilateral Investment Treaty and reach a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, believing that its vital textile sector will be bolstered by duty-free access to the U.S. market. The establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones that could facilitate development in Pakistan's poor tribal regions, an initiative of President Bush during his March 2006 visit to Pakistan, may require congressional action in 2007. The Heritage Foundation's *2006 Index of Economic Freedom* — which may overemphasize the value of absolute growth and downplay broader

³⁴ See [<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2006/default.asp>].

³⁵ See [<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/index.html>].

³⁶ See [http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/Section_Index.html].

quality-of-life measurements — noted significant improvements, but again rated Pakistan’s economy as being “mostly unfree,” identifying restrictive trade policies, a heavy fiscal burden, weak property ownership protections, and a high level of “black market” activity.³⁷ Corruption is another serious problem: in 2007, Berlin-based Transparency International placed Pakistan 142nd out of 163 countries in its annual ranking of world corruption levels.

U.S. Aid and Congressional Action

U.S. Assistance. A total of more than \$15 billion in U.S. economic and military assistance went to Pakistan from 1947 through 2005. In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, \$3 billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of \$600 million each, split evenly between military and economic aid, began in FY2005. The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new base program of \$300 million for military assistance for Pakistan. When additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement, and other programs are included, the non-food aid allocation for FY2005 was about \$688 million (see **Table 1**). Significant increases in economic support, along with earthquake relief funding, may bring the FY2006 total to around \$874 million. The Bush Administration’s FY2007 request calls for another \$739 million in aid to Pakistan, although the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486) recommended reducing that amount by \$150 million (ostensibly for domestic budgetary reasons unrelated to Pakistan-U.S. relations). In S.Rept. 109-277, the Senate Appropriations Committee called for redirecting some of the requested FY2007 U.S. economic aid to Pakistan toward development and democracy promotion programs.

Congress also has appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. At the close of 2006, a total of about \$6 billion had been appropriated for FY2002-FY2007 Defense Department spending for coalition support payments to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations.” Pentagon documents indicate that disbursements to Islamabad — at \$4.75 billion or an average of more than \$80 million per month — account for the great majority of these funds. The amount is equal to more than one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditures. The Defense Department Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-289) allows that up to \$900 million in Pentagon funds be used for FY2007 reimbursements.

Proliferation-Related Legislation. Through a series of legislative measures, Congress incrementally lifted sanctions on Pakistan resulting from its nuclear weapons proliferation activities.³⁸ After the September 2001 terrorist attacks

³⁷ See [<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=Pakistan>].

³⁸ The Agricultural Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194) allowed U.S. wheat sales to Pakistan after July 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (in P.L. 105-277) authorized a one-year sanctions waiver exercised by President Clinton in November 1998. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79) gave the President (continued...)

on the United States, policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan. President Bush's issuance of a final determination that month removed remaining sanctions on Pakistan (and India) resulting from the 1998 nuclear tests, finding that restrictions were not in U.S. national security interests. Some Members of the 108th Congress urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in response to evidence of Pakistani assistance to third-party nuclear weapons programs. However, the Nuclear Black-Market Elimination Act (H.R. 4965) died in committee. Legislation in the 109th Congress included the Pakistan Proliferation Accountability Act of 2005 (H.R. 1553), which sought to prohibit the provision of military equipment to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan has verifiably halted all proliferation activities and is fully sharing with the United States all information relevant to the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. This bill also did not emerge from committee.

In the 110th Congress, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (**H.R. 1**), passed by the House in January 2007, contains provisions that would suspend all arms sales licenses and deliveries to any "nuclear proliferation host country" unless the President certifies that such a country is, *inter alia*, fully investigating and taking actions to permanently halt illicit nuclear proliferation activities.

Coup-Related Legislation. Pakistan's October 1999 military coup triggered U.S. aid restrictions under Section 508 of the annual Foreign Assistance appropriations act. Post-September 2001 circumstances saw Congress take action on such restrictions. P.L. 107-57 (October 2001) waived coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2002 and granted presidential authority to waive them through FY2003. A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 108-106) extended the President's waiver authority through FY2004. The foreign operations FY2006 appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102) extended it through FY2006. The House-passed foreign operations appropriations bill for FY2007 (**H.R. 5522**) would have provided another one-year extension, but the Senate did not take action on this bill. President Bush has exercised this waiver authority annually.

Other Legislation. In the 108th Congress, conference managers making foreign operations appropriations directed the Secretary of State to report to Congress on Pakistan's education reform strategy and the U.S. strategy to provide relevant assistance (H.Rept. 108-792; see CRS Report RS22009, *Education Reform in Pakistan*). Also in the 108th Congress, the House-passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2004-2005 (H.R. 1950) would have required the President to report to Congress on Pakistani actions related to terrorism and WMD proliferation. The Senate did not take action on this bill. The House-passed version of the Intelligence Authorization Act, FY2005 contained similar reporting requirements; this section was removed in the Senate. In the 109th Congress, the Targeting

³⁸ (...continued)

permanent authority to waive nuclear-test-related sanctions applied against Pakistan and India after October 1999, when President Clinton waived economic sanctions on India (Pakistan remained under sanctions as a result of the October 1999 coup). (See CRS Report RS20995, *India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions*.)

Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005 (S. 12) and the Real Security Act of 2006 (S. 3875) contained Pakistan-specific language.

9/11 Commission Recommendations. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, released in July 2004, identified the government of President Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it recommended that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of “enlightened moderation.” In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress broadly endorsed this recommendation by calling for U.S. aid to Pakistan to be sustained at a minimum of FY2005 levels and requiring the President to report to Congress a description of long-term U.S. strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. A November 2005 follow-on report by Commissioners gave a “C” grade to U.S. efforts to support Pakistan’s anti-extremism policies and warned that the country “remains a sanctuary and training ground for terrorists.” In the 109th Congress, H.R. 5017 and S. 3456 were introduced to insure the implementation of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The bills contained Pakistan-specific language, but neither emerged from committee.

The premiere House resolution of the 110th Congress (**H.R. 1**, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) was passed in January 2007 and contains discussion of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, including statements of policy and a requirement that the President report to Congress a long-term U.S. strategy for engaging Pakistan. The bill also includes a provision that would end U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to that country in FY2008 unless the President certifies that the Islamabad government is “making all possible efforts” to end Taliban activities on Pakistani soil. The Bush Administration reportedly opposes the provision. The Bush Administration opposes the provision on the grounds that it would be counterproductive to the goal of closer U.S.-Pakistan relations, and it instead urges that the certification be replaced with a reporting requirement. A Senate version, **S. 328**, which has not emerged from committee to date, contains no certification requirement.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2007
(in millions of dollars)

Program or Account	FY2001 Actual	FY2002 Actual	FY2003 Actual	FY2004 Actual	FY2005 Actual	FY2006 Estimate	FY2007 Request
CSH	—	5.0	15.6	25.6	21.0	32.2	21.7
DA	—	10.0	34.5	49.4	29.0	40.6	29.0
ERMA	—	25.0	—	—	—	—	—
ESF	—	624.5	188.0 ^c	200.0 ^c	297.6	377.6	350.0 ^g
FMF	—	75.0	224.5	74.6	298.8	297.0	300.0 ^g
IDFA	—	—	—	—	—	70.0 ^e	—
IMET	—	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.9	2.0	2.1
INCLE	3.5	90.5 ^b	31.0	31.5	32.1	56.3	25.5
NADR	—	10.1	—	4.9	8.0	7.8	10.3
PKO	—	220.0	—	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	\$3.5	\$1,061.0	\$494.6	\$387.4	\$688.4^d	\$873.5^f	\$738.6^g
Food Aid ^a	87.5	90.8	18.7	24.0	18.0	26.7	—
Total	\$91.0	\$1,151.8	\$513.3	\$411.4	\$706.4^d	\$900.2^f	\$738.6^g

Sources: U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development.

Abbreviations:

CSH:	Child Survival and Health	IMET:	International Military Education and Training
DA:	Development Assistance	INCLE:	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security)
ERMA:	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance	NADR:	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related ^h
ESF:	Economic Support Fund	PKO:	Peacekeeping Operations
FMF:	Foreign Military Financing		
IDFA:	International Disaster and Famine Assistance		

Notes:

- a. P.L.480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs.
- b. Included \$73 million for border security projects that continued in FY2003.
- c. Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 ESF allocation to cancel \$988 million and the FY2004 allocation to cancel \$495 million in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
- d. Included Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 109-13) funding of \$150 million in FMF and \$4 million in counterdrug funding for Pakistan.
- e. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-234) did not earmark IDFA funds for Pakistani earthquake relief but allocated sufficient funds to meet the Administration request.
- f. The FY2006 estimate includes Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-234) funding of \$40.5 million in ESF and \$18.7 million in counterdrug funding for Pakistan.
- g. In passing the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2007, the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486) recommended reducing FY2007 ESF by \$50 million and FMF by \$100 million, ostensibly for domestic budgetary reasons unrelated to Pakistan-U.S. relations.
- h. The great majority of NADR funds allocated for Pakistan are for anti-terrorism assistance.

Figure 1. Map of Pakistan



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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