

CRS Report for Congress

Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

Updated January 24, 2007

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Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

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Summary

The 110th Congress may well face several decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a major subset of which is peace operations. A November 28, 2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive that designates stability operations as “core missions” of the U.S. military marks a major shift in attitudes regarding peacekeeping and related stability operations (also known as stabilization and reconstruction operations). Since then, DOD has worked to define specific changes that must be made to better accomplish such missions, some of which the U.S. military could implement on its own, while others would require Congressional approval.

For well over a decade, some Members of Congress expressed reservations about U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations. The Bush Administration initially opposed such missions and took steps to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping. This action reflected a major concern of the 1990s: that peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to military “readiness” (i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nation). Many perceived these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces, better left to other nations while the U.S. military concentrated on operations requiring high-intensity combat skills. Others thought that the United States should adjust force size and structure to accommodate the missions.

The events of September 11, 2001, brought new concerns to the fore and highlighted the value to U.S. national security of ensuring stability around the world. The 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists, pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist. In 2003, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a “stabilization and reconstruction” operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), reinforced the argument.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations, although the number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s to some 26 in five operations under U.N. control. In the Balkans, some 1,700 U.S. troops serve with the NATO Kosova Force (KFOR). About 35,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops are involved in a variety of stability tasks, including “nation-building” activities that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations as well as combat operations.

A major issue Congress continues to face is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions — in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take on more of the burden.

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Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

U.S. policymakers have grappled for a decade and a half with issues involved in deploying U.S. military personnel to conduct “peacekeeping” missions. This broad, generic term is most generally used to denote missions to maintain peace and establish the basis for representative governance and economic growth. Since the first U.S. troops were deployed to post-Cold War peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s, Congressional debate has ranged from the broad strategic question — how and when do such operations serve U.S. interests? — to a myriad of practical questions that has evolved over time. See Table 1 at the end of this report for a breakdown of the Department of Defense (DOD) Incremental Cost of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991 to FY2005. For the 110th Congress, the most salient practical issues focus on two central questions: how are U.S. forces to be best prepared to undertake such missions and what part of the responsibility should they bear for such missions?

The Bush Administration has launched several initiatives intended to equip the United States to conduct peacekeeping and related post-conflict operations (such as the occupation of Iraq in 2003) more efficiently and effectively. Most importantly for the U.S. military, on November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive setting forth a new DOD policy regarding stability operations, particularly peacekeeping and related post-conflict operations. DOD is developing recommendations that are likely to become the center of Congressional debate shortly.

This report will provide background information on the development of U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping and related stability operations, the evolution of terminology, and current U.S. participation in such operations. It will then discuss DOD Directive 3000.05, providing a guide to the issues addressed by the directive, as well as proposed reforms and legislation pertaining to it. These issues involve practical questions such as: How should the U.S. armed forces be resized, reorganized, educated, trained and equipped to perform these operations effectively without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions? What tasks must be performed by the U.S. military in such operations and which can be delegated to other entities? This report will provide an overview of these issues and references to other sources which explore them.¹ It will be updated as warranted.

¹ Although the costs of peacekeeping assistance and participation are not as salient an issue as in the 1990s, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., costs over (continued...))

The Evolution of U.S. Military Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations²

The 1990s was the first decade in nearly half a century in which the U.S. military was deployed on missions that involved the reconstruction of governments, infrastructure, and economies after quelling the chaos of internecine conflicts. The post-World War II occupations in Germany, Japan, Italy and Austria were the most prominent and successful mid-century precedents. Before that, U.S. military troops were active in attempts to install more democratic governments in the Philippines, Central America, and the Caribbean in the last years of the 19th and early years of the 20th century. The most recent round of such activity began soon after the end of the Cold War in 1989 with a rise in the number of intrastate conflicts.

Such “peacekeeping” missions require limitations on the use of force by combat forces, as well as the assignment of numerous personnel to provide security and to carry out political and economic activities to construct or reconstruct state institutions. These requirements have been problematic for many policymakers and for the U.S. armed forces, which have preferred to confront an enemy with the degree of force necessary to quickly defeat armed opponents (often referred to as “decisive” or “overwhelming” force) and to reserve its highly-skilled troops for combat missions. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s, peacekeeping and related limited force operations became a staple of U.S. military forces, particularly the U.S. Army.

During the 1990s, the United States took a leading role in four large multinational operations with peacekeeping phases under U.S. or NATO and U.N. auspices: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, (all under U.N. mandates) and Kosovo. At the same time, it provided varying degrees of support through the Department of Defense (DOD) for U.N. missions in which few or no U.S. soldiers took part, e.g., Cambodia, Angola, the Western Sahara and East Timor.

¹ (...continued)

and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime) of the larger stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. This report does not address cost issues. For more information on incremental costs and attempts to create more efficient methods of funding such operations, see CRS Report 98-823, *Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers*, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Report RL32141, *Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents*, by Jeffrey Chamberlin. For information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Report RL33700, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, by Marjorie Ann Browne.

² Numbers of troops in this section were taken from CRS Report RL30184, *Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons Learned” for Kosovo*, May 20, 1999, except for figures in the paragraph on UNOSOM II, which were compiled from *The Blue Helmets: A Review Of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edition*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 317, and Kenneth Allard. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1995, pp. 18-19.

U.S. military involvement in this new era of state-building (or “nation-building”) missions began with the U.S.-led *ad hoc* multilateral coalition operation in Somalia. The Unified Task Force or UNITAF with 25,800 U.S. troops at peak and over 10,000 from other countries, was launched in December 1992 as a humanitarian aid mission to provide protection for relief workers and food convoys. (It was preceded by a smaller U.S. humanitarian relief mission from August-December 1992.) Nevertheless, contingents from other countries were active “in community development projects such as rebuilding schools, building roads, and repairing irrigation canals and tube wells...” and the “Australians, Canadians, and French worked hard to revive broad community leadership, encouraging the creation of local councils and Somali police units.”³ Informal political development at the local level and the repair and rebuilding of physical infrastructure (including road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals) became *de facto* UNITAF tasks, although the participation of U.S. military personnel in such activities appears to have been limited. U.S. military personnel were involved, however, in the development of a Somalia police force, even though that was never officially a UNITAF function.⁴

The U.S.-led Somalia operation was turned over in May 1993 to the smaller U.N. UNOSOM II force, with an authorized strength of 28,000 military personnel but which operated for the most part with fewer. UNOSOM II included some 2,800 civilian staff and had a broad mandate to build new local, regional, and national political and administrative institutions. Some 3,000 U.S. soldiers served in the U.N. mission, primarily providing logistics support. (Another 17,700 in a separate operation under U.S. command supported UNOSOM II, including a 1,150-soldier Quick Reaction Force.) The failure of the Somalia operations led to chaos. The U.S. assisted with the U.N. withdrawal in March 1995, in the midst of continuing instability. The U.S. had withdrawn its separate combat force in March 1994, five months after Somali rebels dragged the body of a U.S. soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, the capital city.

U.S. troops were deployed in September 1994 to Haiti to restore to power deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide. When U.S. troops were dispatched, it was with the expectation that the multinational force (MNF) would complete its limited mission and soon cede to a U.N. force with a state-building mandate. Largely comprised of U.S. soldiers, who totaled 21,000 at peak strength, the MNF turned the operation over to the follow-on U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1994. This was not, however, before the general lawlessness throughout Haiti drew U.S. troops into assisting with the reconstruction and improvement of rule of law institutions and facilities (i.e., the police, court system, and prisons), as well as in disarming and demobilizing Haitian soldiers.⁵ In the absence of sufficient civilian personnel, the

³ John L. Hirsch and Robert Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995. p 75.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp 81-89.

⁵ See Michael Bailey, Robert Macguire and J. O’Neil G. Pouliot. *Haiti: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security* in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg.

(continued...)

U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of its primary task of establishing security. A large number of U.S. soldiers, some 2,400, were assigned initially to the 6,000-man UNMIH force.

U.S. military experiences in Somalia and Haiti stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient and inappropriate use of military resources, leading to restrictions on U.S. involvement in dealing with deteriorating conditions in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. U.S. involvement in that region began in 1992 when the United States contributed a relatively small number of troops, about 1,000 of the 38,000-soldier UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was deployed in February to Croatia and in June to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States took a leading role, however, in NATO air operations which supported the UNPROFOR) to quell the conflict that accompanied the 1991 break-up of Yugoslavia, as well as related air drops of humanitarian relief. The NATO air operations provided UNPROFOR with information collected by reconnaissance aircraft, supervised established no-fly zones, and supported UNPROFOR troops when they came under attack.

The United States also took the initial lead role in the two subsequent NATO ground forces that were sent to enforce the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords among Bosnia's warring factions: the one-year Implementation Force or IFOR, with 16,500 U.S. troops of a total of 54,000 soldiers, and the 1996-2004 Stabilization Force or SFOR, with 6,900 U.S. troops at peak. In the Bosnia mission, responsibility for state-building tasks was divided among many organizations. The Dayton accords assigned disarmament and demobilization to the NATO force, which also provided security for elections organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The U.N. Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH) was responsible for the establishment of a police force, as well as other law enforcement assistance, and coordinating other U.N. agencies. Overall coordination of civilian contributions and monitoring of the implementation of the Dayton accords was carried out by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement, an innovative post established by the Dayton accords. Foreign military troops carried out "nation-building" civic action projects as a supplement to their patrolling duties. U.S. military troops mostly did not because of U.S. policymakers' concerns for their safety and political opposition to concept of "nation-building" as an appropriate role for U.S. troops.

The United States led the NATO air mission in Kosovo in April-June 1999 and the initial NATO ground mission — Kosovo Force or KFOR — but the civilian U.N. "transitional" administration (UN Mission in Kosovo or UNMIK) has overseen most tasks of administering governmental tasks from the outset.

Each deployment was accompanied by vigorous debate as to what U.S. interests were served by that particular mission and by peacekeeping operations in general. In the wake of the Cold War, with the demise of U.S.-Soviet superpower competition and support for clients in strategic areas, some policymakers cherished hopes that the

⁵ (...continued)

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. 1998.

“new world order” would provide the opportunity for the spread of freedom and democracy. Instead, the number of intrastate conflicts rose as weakened autocrats faced challengers who perceived new possibilities to achieve power, often with assistance from neighboring states and influences. Many argued that the prospects for global instability and humanitarian concerns demanded an international military response to such conflict, with U.S. participation or leadership, to forestall the immeasurable but often nonetheless substantial human, social, and economic costs of instability and conflict.⁶ They argued that the U.S. should be willing to commit forces to prevent abuses of power and to support other peoples’ struggles for freedom. Others argued that instability in many other countries did not meet the test of a threat to U.S. vital interests, which was the threshold for many policymakers for the use of U.S. force.⁷

The terrorist acts against the United States of September 11, 2001, changed the debate. It illustrated for many policymakers and analysts the dangers of allowing instability to fester and conflicts to go unchecked, even in areas of minimal or no strategic or economic interest. While there is not a universal consensus around the argument that international terrorists will find safe haven in weak and failed states, there are powerful examples. The perception that they may do so has convinced many policymakers of the need to enhance the ability, including the military capacity, of the United States and other countries to deal with instability and conflict.⁸

⁶ In addition to the social costs of lives lost and the creation of many, indeed sometimes tens or hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees seeking safety in other nations, political instability — including tensions between armed groups, sporadic hostilities, and continuing conflict — has significant economic costs. These include new or continuing defense expenditures for the countries involved and perhaps also for neighboring countries seeking to protect their borders. lost opportunities in trade, contracts, and domestic and foreign investment. For international donors, they include the costs of providing food, shelter, medical care and relocation assistance.

⁷ The “Weinberger doctrine” of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, outlined in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, DC on November 28, 1984, that combat forces should only be committed where a “particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.” George Schulz countered in a speech at Yeshiva University, New York, on December 8, 1984, with the guidelines that U.S. power was legitimately used if it “can help liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom...” and “prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or oppression....” Both speeches are reproduced in CRS Report 94-805 F, *The Use of Force: Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and Perry*. (archived available from author)

⁸ For arguments on the dangers of weak and failed states, see *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and *On the Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security*, sponsored by the Center for Global Development, May 2004. Countering arguments are found in: Patrick Stewart. *Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.”* Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global Development, January 2006; and Justin Logan and Christopher Preeble. *Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office*. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006.

Evolving Terminology and Definitional Problems

Over the past decade and a half, there has been an evolution in the vocabulary used to refer to activities that are undertaken to maintain, enforce, promote and enhance the possibilities for peace in unstable environments. “Peacekeeping” has been the traditional generic term for the operations undertaken for those purposes by the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes *ad hoc* coalitions of nations or individual nations. More recently, in an attempt to capture the ambiguity and complexity of such operations, and perhaps also to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping, they have become known as “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) operations, or, more simply, “stability” operations. Use of any term with the word “peace” created a semantic dilemma, conveying the misleading impression that an operation is without risk, when in fact, peacekeeping operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. As knowledge increased about the conditions needed to establish peace, operations increasingly included extensive “nation-building” (or state-building as some prefer to call it) components to build or reform government structures.

The term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when U.N. peacekeeping mostly fit a narrow definition: providing an “interpositional” force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed, but it continued to be used as the range of activities grew. In 1992, the U.N. began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of activities in securing and keeping peace. It created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force to maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.⁹ “Peacebuilding” was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions (including re-creating police or civil defense forces), election-monitoring, and promotion of political participation and human rights. Organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts can be a part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The U.N., NATO, and *ad hoc* coalition missions that the United States participated in with significant forces in the early 1990s (Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia) were generally referred to by the generic term of “peacekeeping” by Congress, even though U.S. executive branch agencies replaced “peacekeeping” with “peace operations” as the generic term.

Recently, such operations have been referred to by an Army doctrinal term “stability operations” that also encompasses the diverse missions of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This may be a more precise term for such operations, as many include not only peace operations (i.e., peacekeeping and peace enforcement), but also related missions such as humanitarian and civic assistance, counterterrorism, counter-drug, and counter-insurgency (i.e., foreign internal defense) efforts, all of

⁹ For some analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has a degree of local consent.

which also are included under the term “stability operations.”¹⁰ Stability operations are sometimes referred to as “Phase IV” or “post-conflict” operations, although reoccurrences of conflict are often possible.

In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building,” and if it does, how it should prepare for it. Like peacekeeping, nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. (A 2003 RAND report, *America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and S&R.)

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of economic infrastructure, including roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities, and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities. They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators

The November 2005 DOD stability operations directive cites the specific tasks of rebuilding indigenous institutions (including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems) necessary to stabilize a situation; reviving or building the private sector, including bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure, and developing representative government institutions as among those tasks that are performed in stability operations. These tasks are also part of the continuum of activities that fall under the term “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) which also has been used to describe these complex operations.

Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Missions

The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the 1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the U.N.

¹⁰ The other types of operations are security assistance, support to insurgencies, noncombatant evacuations, arms control and shows of force. For further information on the activities which fall under each of these types of operations, see Army Field Manual FM-307, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, February 2003.

Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command. As of December 31, 2006, 26 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs), Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs), Liberia (5 milobs and 6 troops), and Haiti (3 troops). Other U.S. forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with U.N. authority.¹¹

In the Balkans,¹² U.S. troops were largely withdrawn from Bosnia with the December 2, 2004 end of the NATO operation there, but as of December 2006 some 100 U.S. troops supported the European Union operation in Bosnia as part of NATO’s supporting headquarters unit. A U.S. peacekeeping contingent, numbering 1,700 or so as of December 2006, remains with NATO operation in Kosovo (KFOR). Roughly 700 U.S. troops serve in the Sinai-based Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) *ad hoc* coalition operation, which has no U.N. affiliation.¹³

The United States also has thousands of other troops abroad in operations that are related stability operations, but are not counted as peacekeeping *per se*. As of December 2006, about 10,400 U.S. military personnel were assigned to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. (See section on Afghanistan below.) Roughly 29,500 U.S. troops are serving in South Korea under

¹¹ While the reduction in U.S. troops involved in peacekeeping, especially U.N. peacekeeping, from the early 1990s responded to perceptions that peacekeeping excessively strained U.S. forces without significantly serving U.S. interests, some analysts continue to argue that greater participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping would be desirable. In June 2005, the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the U.N., chaired by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, called for greater U.S. support of U.N. operations. The Task Force report recommended that U.N. Member States should substantially increase the number of trained and equipped forces for rapid deployment for peace operations and that the Department of Defense should “prepare options for additional means to support U.N. peace operations with logistics, capacity-building assistance, and other means” and “for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with U.S. national interests.” It specifically recommended that the United States “consider upgrading its participation” in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements system, through which countries volunteer capabilities for U.N. peace operations. (*American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005. Quotes taken from pp. 11, 24 and 97.)

Some military analysts argue that the U.N. does not necessarily need more U.S. troops to place in field-level observer slots in U.N. missions. What is needed, they say, are staff officers at the headquarters command level whose training and mindset enables them to think proactively about dealing with developing problems. Others believe that U.S. soldiers with engineering and skills using advanced communications technologies would also be useful.

¹² Numbers of U.S. troops in Bosnia and Kosovo are taken from the *Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate*, dated December 15, 2006, as posted on the White House website [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-5.html>].

¹³ Information on the U.S. and other nations’ contributions to the MFO can be accessed through the MFO’s official website [<http://www.mfo.org>].

bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority.¹⁴ (Although technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence mission.) An ongoing drawdown is scheduled to reduce the number still further.

The Bush Administration’s Policy

Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as President he has been willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. During his Administration, President Bush sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for patrolling and other peacekeeping tasks with the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Bush Administration sought to minimize forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia dropped steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004. U.S. participation ended on December 2, 2004, when the European Union assumed responsibility for the operation. A small number of U.S. troops, some 100 as of the end of 2006, work with the NATO Headquarters unit providing support to the EU in Bosnia. (See CRS Report RS21774, *Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Transition*.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,700 of the total 16,000-17,000 KFOR force from about 35 nations. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.) In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces.

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan.¹⁵ With the 2006 geographic expansion of the responsibility of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to encompass all of Afghanistan, NATO assumed the lead for international military operations and the responsibility security throughout the country. As a result, a large number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan which previously had been attached to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were assigned to ISAF as of early October 2006. As of December 2006, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan totaled roughly 21,000, with some 10,400

¹⁴ This number was obtained from an on-line Associated Press news dispatch of January 18, 2007, *U.S. General in S. Korea Warns of Changes*, as posted at [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070118/ap_on_re_as/skorea_us_military], accessed on January 23, 2007.

¹⁵ For more information on military operations in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL33503, *U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert; and CRS Report RL33627, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, by Paul Gallis.

assigned to ISAF and the remainder participating in OEF.¹⁶ According to the NATO website, ISAF now comprises some 30,000 troops from 37 NATO and non-NATO nations (including the United States).¹⁷

The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has expanded steadily since it began in January 2002 as an *ad hoc* coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under British command. Its original purpose, under a U.N. Chapter VII mandate was to patrol Kabul and the immediate surrounding area. NATO assumed command of ISAF just 18 months later, in August 2003, shortly before the UN expanded the mandate to include other areas. At the time of the transfer of responsibility for Afghanistan's security to ISAF in October 2006, most U.S. military personnel deployed to Afghanistan (which ranged in number roughly from some 10,000 to some 23,000) were engaged in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda). Others, numbering in the low hundreds, were engaged in support, training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provided some assistance to the ISAF (i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support), but they did not engage in ISAF peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani national military force, an activity which some analysts label "nation-building."

The most salient non-combat U.S. role has been the establishment and operation since December 2002 of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. These teams consisted of both military and civilian personnel.) As of April 2006, the United States operated 13 PRTs. ISAF involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the German-led PRT in Konduz. ISAF assumption of responsibility for security in all Afghanistan in 2006 includes running all 25 PRTs operating at the time. Although the U.S. military role in PRTs is not identified as "peacekeeping," its objectives — enhancing security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts consider it "nation-building." Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with them.¹⁸ (See discussion on nation-building in the section on Apportioning Responsibilities, below.)

Airlift in Africa. The United States military occasionally provides airlift assistance for peacekeeping missions in Africa. For instance, the United States has participated under NATO in airlifting African Union troops to the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan.

¹⁶ Numbers of troops in Afghanistan and assigned to NATO taken from *Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate*, dated December 15, 2006, op. cit.

¹⁷ Accessed January 24, 2006: [<http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html>].

¹⁸ For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, by Kenneth Katzman; and the United States Institute of Peace's Special Report 147, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*.

The Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq.¹⁹ U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are counterinsurgency operations, but some of which are generally classified as peacekeeping duties. The activities undertaken by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some commanders have noted that their troops are doing a mix of both types of operations. The United States is also establishing military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq such as it established in Afghanistan.

DOD Directive 3000.05: Mandates, Background, and Related Legislation

In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there. Yet, the situation in Iraq appears to have prompted the two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies²⁰ that constitute the foundation for Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05.

DOD Directive 3000.05 sets forth a radically new policy regarding missions known as “stability” operations, a major subset of which are peacekeeping and other peace operations. The *Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* designates stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission.” By elevating stability missions to the same priority level as combat missions, DOD seems to acknowledge expectations that future operations will regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and to assist with reconstruction during those transitions. For several years, some military officers and defense analysts have argued that such efforts required the systematic development of doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities to enable the armed forces to perform those operations

¹⁹ For more on the U.S. military present in Iraq, see CRS Report RL31701, *Iraq: U.S. Military Operations*, by Steve Bowman; CRS Report RL31339, *Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance*, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RS22449, *U.S. Forces in Iraq*, by JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse.

²⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *Defense Science Board Summer 2004 Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, December 2004, and *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD*, September 2005. (Access through the Defense Science Board website [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/report.htm>]). The Board was tasked in August 2005 with a further study on the organizational changes that would be needed within DOD to conduct, support, and manage stability operations. This has not been completed.

proficiently, as well as the reconfiguration and acquisition of organizations, personnel, facilities, and matériel to support them. The directive catalogues such needs and calls for the development of specific recommendations to fulfill them.

Two more recent documents make no mention of any further steps to enhance DOD capabilities for such operations. The DOD February 6, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR), the document in which senior DOD civilian and military leaders identify the capabilities and resources needed to carry out a comprehensive defense strategy, did not specifically address the issue of post-conflict operations. DOD officials state privately, however, that proposals regarding these types of operations are being considered under the category of “irregular warfare” because of problems arriving at a consensus on the appropriate terminology for categorizing them. The March 2006 National Security Strategy mentions the development of U.S. civilian and international military capabilities to carry out post-conflict operations, but does not mention augmenting U.S. military capabilities.

The U.S. military, particularly the Army, has made many adjustments over the past several years to enable troops to perform more effectively in peacekeeping operations in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo.²¹ Nevertheless, events in Iraq since the United States invaded in 2003 have reinforced arguments that still greater efforts must be made to raise the possibilities for successful transitions. The directive provides the basis for instituting significant changes and dedicating substantial resources to prepare troops to perform proficiently in such missions, although the eventual effect on armed services is not known.

The directive calls for changes in a wide variety of areas, some of which could be implemented in short order, others of which would take considerable time. DOD is beginning to develop specific proposals to implement Directive 3000.05. There are still areas where the directive lays out policy, but DOD currently is unsure of the steps that it will take to implement it. DOD may bring to Congress during 2006 and

²¹ The increased frequency of operations (“optempo”) demanded by peacekeeping operations in the 1990s took time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training. The problem of frequent deployments of individuals (“perstempo”) was particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment. In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a major regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully-trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots. The Army took steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as did the Air Force, and by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by deployments to Iraq).

2007 several requests for changes in laws, authorities, and regulations necessary to implement the directive and the QDR, as well as for additional funding.

The House Armed Services Committee (HASC), in its report accompanying the FY2007 DOD authorization act (H.R. 5122, H.Rept. 109-452) noted that it was pleased that DOD had issued the directive and stated its belief that DOD “should integrate, to the greatest extent possible, SSTR-related requirements across its doctrine, training logistics, organization, materiel, personnel, and facilities (DTLOMP).” HASC directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the armed services committees of both chambers an implementation report for all items, with “a special focus on professional military education and training, including but not limited to revisions to Academy and War College curricula, if any; training plans at the service and joint operational levels; the possible creation of SSTR [Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction] fellowships within the Agency for International Development or related organizations (including non-governmental organizations); and any reorganization that will be required to implement the Directive.”

Improving Military Capabilities

The Directive states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should identify the personnel and training needed for stability operations and evaluate DOD progress in developing those forces and training. It does not provide specific recommendations regarding the size and structure and specific capabilities needed for stability operations, but does call for the incorporation of stability operations instruction at all levels of education and training.

Force Size and Structure. Whether U.S. military forces should be sized and organized specifically to facilitate peacekeeping and related stability operations has been a longstanding issue. Since the 1990s, many Members have questioned whether U.S. military forces could maintain their “readiness” to perform their “core” war-fighting mission if they engaged extensively in other activities.²² The size of the force and the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks have been recognized as two key factors in the military’s ability to perform peacekeeping and related stability operations while retaining its preparedness to fight wars. (Also important are the

²² Critics were disturbed by declines in ratings which measured combat readiness in the 1990s. There were a variety of reasons for these declines, some of which were addressed by changes in military practices: (1) military personnel could not practice all their combat skills while engaged in peacekeeping operations; (2) in the 1990s, the U.S. military performed these operations at the same time the armed forces, particularly the army, were reduced substantially; (3) funds for training and equipment were diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and (4) units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals. If one looked at the larger readiness problem of the 1990s and early 2000s, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in poor shape, that spare parts were in short supply, and that the military could not recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.

size, length and frequency of deployments and opportunities for training in combat skills while deployed on such operations.)

The November 2005 stability operations directive points to possible increases in the numbers of certain specialties in high demand in peacekeeping and related stability operations (i.e., civil affairs officers, foreign area specialists, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel) as mentioned above, but no further changes in size or structure.²³ Others have urged more extensive changes in the force to better accommodate such missions. The Army has long rejected proposals for dedicated peacekeeping forces, primarily on the grounds that they would divert resources from combat functions. (For information on proposals for dedicating forces to peacekeeping and related operations, see CRS Report RS22473, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Proposals for Army Force Structure Changes*.)

Any recommendations regarding force size and structure for stability operations are likely to provoke intensive debate. Proposals to add troops are controversial in large part because the basic cost of each added soldier is high and increases in troop strength involve either additional costs or trade-offs with other military requirements, particularly modernizing equipment and weapons systems. In the mid- to late 1990s, some policymakers and military experts suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be a more appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major theater wars (which was then the standard for sizing force structure) and also to engage in peacekeeping missions. (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000, with fluctuations.) The extent to which additional military U.S. forces are needed for such roles may depend heavily on what other capabilities are developed for such operations, including civilians and foreign military forces.

²³ The September 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations notes that DOD lacks “a sizing concept” that would enable the department to prepare “for concurrent domestic stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which will call upon some of the same resource base.” (p. 11.) The 2006 QDR report states that Army end-strength should be stabilized at 482,400 Active and 533,000 reserve component personnel by FY2011. (p. 43) The 2006 QDR report calls for further increases in certain specialties. It calls for increasing the number of Special Forces battalions by one-third starting in FY2007 and expanding psychological operations and civil affairs units by one-third (3,700 personnel). In another area that may be at least partially related to conflict transitions and post-conflict operations, it also calls for the establishment of a Marine Corps Special Operations Command of 2,600 personnel to train foreign military units and conduct direct action and special reconnaissance.

For FY2007, the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization bills (H.R. 5122 and S. 2766) would increase the active duty Army end-strength to 512,400, an increase of 30,000. The legislation would also increase the size of the Marine Corps by either 5,000 (House) or 10,000 (Senate). (For further information, see CRS Report RL33405, *Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations*, by Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report RS21754, *Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?*, by Edward F. Bruner.)

Stability Operations Curricula and Training. The directive calls on DOD to ensure that military schools and training centers incorporate stability operations curricula in joint and individual service education and training programs at all levels. It particularly calls for developing and incorporating instruction for foreign language capabilities and regional area expertise, including “long-term immersion in foreign societies.” It would also broaden the exposure of military personnel to U.S. and international civilians with whom they would work in stability operations by providing them with tours of duty in other U.S. agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

Apportioning Responsibilities

Establishing security in a post-conflict environment is indisputably a military responsibility, but assigning specific responsibility for the state-building tasks is problematic. Some policymakers and military officials have long believed that nation-building is an inefficient and inappropriate use of military force. Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement in such tasks, particularly when others are not available to undertake them in the immediate aftermath of major combat.

Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizational infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security situation in an area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the Congressionally-mandated 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to use all elements of national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run...”²⁴

In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments, armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance. In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and makes them targets of armed opponents. Because of that, many humanitarian groups have objected to the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are well established in Afghanistan and are being set up in Iraq.

²⁴ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, op. cit., p 367.

Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks.²⁵ Several proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced. No legislation was passed in the 108th Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the proposed ideas were taken into consideration in the State Department's establishment, in July 2004, of a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS' function is to develop mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities, and to improve inter-agency coordination in planning and conducting S&R operations.

Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the concept of developing civilian capabilities for S&R missions. The DSB's summer 2004 study supported the development of civilian capabilities. According to the unclassified version published in December 2004, the study described the S&R mission as "inescapable, its importance irrefutable" and argued that both DOD and the Department of State need to augment S&R capabilities and to develop "an extraordinarily close working relationship." In addition, the study found that the State Department needs "to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not currently possess" and to develop "a more robust capacity to execute such plans."²⁶ The follow-up September 2005 DSB study expressed concern that S/CRS "is not getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed." If DOD actions in critical areas where there is an overlap between DOD and civilian responsibilities "are not complemented by growth of capabilities in other agencies, the overall U.S. ability to conduct successful stability operations will be far less than it should be."²⁷ The February 2006 QDR stated that DOD will support "substantially increased resources" for S/CRS and for the establishment of a Civilian Reserve Corps and a conflict response fund. (p 86)

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in its report accompanying the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69), commended DOD's "active support of and cooperation with" S/CRS and urged DOD "to continue to deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts. The conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163) provided authority to transfer in each FY2006 and FY2007 up to \$100 million in defense articles, services, training or other support to the Department of State and other federal agencies for reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance. The Administration had requested \$200 million for a State Department Conflict Response Fund for such purposes, but neither authority nor funding was provided in non-military legislation. According to a DOD official, this authority is intended to support S/CRS in carrying out its activities.

²⁵ For further details on S/CRS and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.

²⁶ *Transition to and from Hostilities*, op. cit., pp 38-39.

²⁷ *Institutionalizing Stability Operations*, op. cit., pp 5-6.

FY2007 Legislation. Section 1035 of the FY2007 DOD National Defense authorization bill (P.L. 109-364, signed into law July 16, 2007) requires the President to submit a report to Congress no later than April 1, 2007, “on building interagency capacity and enhancing the integration of civilian capabilities of the executive branch with the capabilities of the Armed Forces to enhance the achievement of United States national security goals and objectives.” The report is to include recommendations for specific legislative proposals that would build interagency capacity by removing statutory or budgetary impediments to improved interagency cooperation and coordination in SSTR operations and by enhancing the integration of civilian and military capabilities when deployed on national security missions. It is also to include a plan to establish interagency operating procedures for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.

Improving Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination

Responding to calls to enhance the ability of the wide variety of participants in stability operations to work together, the directive provides a number of ways to improve inter-agency (and international) cooperation and coordination in multinational operations. To that end, the directive called for the incorporation of military personnel and civilians of many backgrounds in military education and training courses, including personnel from U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercises. It also proposes that DOD ensure that instructors and students from elsewhere in the U.S. government be able to receive or provide instruction in stability operations at military schools.

The directive also calls for the creation of “a stability operations center to coordinate operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.” The U.S. military has two institutions currently devoted exclusively to such operations, neither of which serves a coordinating function: the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Naval Post-Graduate School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Study (CSRS). PKSOI assists with the development of Army doctrine at the strategic (i.e., the leadership and planning) and operational levels, and helps the Army’s senior leadership develop operational concepts. It works with the UN, U.S. government interagency groups, inter-service groups, and foreign militaries (<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/>). CSRS’s mission, according to its website, is “to educate the full spectrum of actors” involved in S&R activities through educational, research, and outreach activities (<http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/>).

Military Personnel and Contractors

The directive reflects longstanding concerns that the U.S. armed services may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations, in particular peace operations. The directive calls on the department to identify the personnel needed for such operations and to develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DOD personnel with relevant skills. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to recommend all necessary

changes in laws, authorities, and regulations to accomplish this. In particular, the directive reflects concern about developing enough foreign area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel. These specialties have long been noted as having insufficient personnel to meet the demands of the last dozen years. The DSB Task Force report of September 2005 report recommended that DOD develop special strategies to recruit at mid-career, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills needed for stability operations, to serve as Civil Affairs officers.

Certain points of the directive also suggest that DOD may wish to depend on contractors for any additional personnel needed in stability operations. In addition to the mandate mentioned above that would bring former DOD personnel into the mix of persons participating in stability operations, the directive mandates a check for adequate oversight of contracts in stability operations and in the ability of U.S. commanders in foreign countries to obtain contract support quickly. The DSB Task Force on institutionalizing stability operations labeled the private sector as DOD's "fifth force provider" for stability operations (in addition to the four branches of the armed services) and recommended that DOD design a new institution that would effectively use the private sector in stability operations.

Many analysts raise concerns about the appropriate role for private for-profit contractors in stability operations. Private contractors — both armed and unarmed — have been used by the United States as well as other countries and the United Nations to perform a wide variety of functions in peacekeeping as well as other stability operations. The costs of unarmed contractors for tasks such as facility construction, facility and equipment maintenance, and food and housekeeping services have generated controversy. More sensitive, however, is the appropriateness of armed contractors for security and other services. Many analysts argue that private contractors should not carry out inherently governmental functions as the government cannot exercise the same control over them that it does over government personnel, nor hold them accountable in the same way for offenses. Some also argue that contractors — both armed and unarmed — can be unreliable in dangerous circumstances, complicating military operations or jeopardizing mission objectives. In a paper prepared for the 1994-1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), two analysts argued that private contractors are not appropriate when the specific actions for achieving desired ends are very important, unpredictable, or politically sensitive.²⁸

Improving International Capabilities

Directive 3000.05 calls for DOD to support the development of other countries' security forces in order to ensure security domestically and to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere. This includes helping such forces, including police

²⁸ Christine Cervenak and George T. Raach, "Contracting and Privatization in Peace Operations," in Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach. *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995, p. 145.

forces, develop “the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors....”

Thus far, the United States supports training for international peacekeepers in two ways, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, run by the State Department, and through DOD-sponsored training. The February 2006 QDR report stated that DOD would continue to support initiatives such as GOPI, and that it also supports efforts to develop a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability, a European constabulary force, and the African Union’s development of a humanitarian crisis intervention capability. It also stated DOD “stands ready to increase its assistance” to the U.N. peacekeeping operations department for doctrine, training, strategic planning, and management.

The Global Peace Operations Initiative.²⁹ The Bush Administration proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations. GPOI’s primary goal is to train and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to develop gendarme forces (also known as constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills) to participate in peacekeeping operations. The Administration estimated the U.S. cost at \$661 million from FY2005-FY2009. Funding provided for the program in FY2005 and FY2006 was roughly \$100 million each fiscal year.

Other Training. In 2005, Congress authorized DOD to establish a new program for training and educating foreign military forces under Section 1206 of the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163, signed January 6, 2006.). This provision permits U.S. military personnel to train foreign military forces for counterterrorism operations and for military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. Training and education under Section 1206 are intended not only to increase the ability of foreign forces to take part in military operations, but also to increase “interoperability” with U.S. forces. (Interoperability is the ability of military forces to communicate and otherwise interact effectively in order to avoid losses due to increased confusion in hostile situations). Congress turned down the Administration request to broaden the authority to include education and training for police forces, but through Section 1206 of the FY2007 National Defense authorization bill (P.L. 109-364) it did raise the amount of funding from \$200 million to \$300 million per year through FY2008 for training purposes. That section also increased flexibility by permitting the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize the training rather than requiring a presidential order. SASC did not broaden the authority, as DOD requested, to include other security forces (i.e., police forces) nor raise the amount of funding.

Two related sections of P.L. 109-364 provide new authorities to support training and education of foreign forces. Section 1205 (Participation of the Department of Defense in Multilateral Military Centers of Excellence) provides authority for the Secretary of Defense to assist multilateral Centers of Excellence (CoE) with up to \$3

²⁹ For more information on GPOI and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32773, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Nina M. Serafino.

million (in total) to pay the U.S. share of operating expenses of CoEs in which the United States participates, and with other personnel, facility, and equipment support. Section 1207 (Authority for Distribution to Certain Foreign Personnel of Education and Training Materials and Information Technology to Enhance Military Interoperability) allows DOD to provide electronic educational materials, along with related technology and software, for the education and training of military and civilian personnel of a friendly foreign government. In cases where such education and training is not authorized by another provision of law, the Secretary of State must concur with the provision of such assistance.

Providing Flexible Funding

DOD Directive 3000.05 calls for the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller to “institutionalize procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, goods, and services, with appropriate accountability safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries in support of stability operations.” Many defense analysts argue that Congress should provide geographic Combatant Commanders with flexible funding through discretionary funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction to benefit local populations, based on the model of the Commander’s Emergency Response Programs (CERP) funds for Afghanistan and Iraq. Section 1206 (c) of the SASC version of the FY2007 National Defense authorization act (S. 2766) would have authorized such funding in FY2007 and FY2008 for all commanders of a geographic combatant command, (with an annual limit of \$200,000 per commander). The conference version of the bill (P.L. 109-364, signed into law July 15, 2006) does not contain this particular provision. However, a similar effect may have been obtained through the Section 902 expansion of the uses of the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. These now incorporate “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.”

Table 1. DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005
(Millions of current year dollars)

| Operation | FY1991- FY1995 | FY1996 | FY1997 | FY1998 | FY1999 | FY2000 | FY2001 | FY2002 | FY2003 | FY2004 | FY2005 (Est.) | TOTAL |
|---|-------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Southwest Asia/Iraq | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) | | | | | | | | | 38,322.0 | 52,148.0 | 56,200.0 | 146,670.0 |
| Provide Comfort/Northern Watch | 773.1 | 88.9 | 93.1 | 136.0 | 156.4 | 143.7 | 148.6 | 1,372.4 | 626.2 | — | — | 11,023.7 |
| Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force | 1,517.3 | 576.3 | 597.3 | 1,497.2 | 954.8 | 755.4 | 963.5 | | | | | |
| Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring | | | 102.7 | 5.6 | 13.8 | 239.8 | 261.6 | | | | | |
| Vigilant Warrior | 257.7 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 257.7 |
| Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98) | | | | | 43.5 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 43.5 |
| Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98) | | | | | 92.9 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 92.9 |
| UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group) | 32.4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 32.4 |
| Total Southwest Asia/Iraq | 2,580.5 | 665.2 | 793.1 | 1,638.8 | 1,261.4 | 1,138.9 | 1,373.5 | 1,372.4 | 38,948.2 | 52,148.0 | 56,200.0 | 158,120.0 |
| Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) | | | | | | | | | 15,788.1 | 9,849.2 | 11,800.0 | 37,437.3 |
| Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War) | | | | | 34.6 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 34.6 |
| Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99) | | | | | 20.3 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 20.3 |
| Noble Anvil (Air War) | | | | | 1,891.4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1,891.4 |
| Joint Guardian (KFOR) | | | | | 1,044.5 | 1,803.1 | 1,383.9 | 938.2 | 590.4 | 552.9 | 693.3 | 7,006.3 |
| Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance) | | | | | 141.6 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 141.6 |
| Total Kosovo | | | | | 3,132.4 | 1,803.1 | 1,383.9 | 938.2 | 590.4 | 552.9 | 693.3 | 9,094.2 |
| Korea Readiness* | 160.6 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 160.6 |
| COMPLETED OPERATIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge | | 2,231.7 | 2,087.5 | 1,792.8 | 1,431.2 | 1,381.8 | 1,213.4 | 932.9 | 742.2 | 667.8 | 150.7 | 14,405.1 |
| Other Former Yugoslavia Operations* | 784.0 | 288.3 | 195.0 | 169.9 | 155.4 | 101.3 | 79.4 | | | | | |
| Total Bosnia | 784.0 | 2,520.0 | 2,282.5 | 1,962.7 | 1,586.6 | 1,483.1 | 1,292.6 | 932.9 | 742.2 | 667.8 | 150.7 | 14,405.1 |
| Totals of Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor and Liberia | 2,458.2 | 86.9 | — | — | 1.5 | 56.8 | — | — | 3.1 | — | — | 2,606.5 |
| GRAND TOTALS | 5,983.3 | 3,272.1 | 3,075.6 | 3,601.5 | 5,981.9 | 4,481.8 | 4,050.0 | 3,243.5 | 56,072.0 | 63,217.9 | 68,844.0 | 221,823.6 |

Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003; FY2004, and FY2005 (est) provided by the DOD Comptroller's Office, June 24, 2005. The FY2005 figures are from the FY2005 Supplemental Request of February 2005 and do not reflect approximately \$31.6 billion in other support and related costs applicable to OIF and OEF.

Notes: This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations (including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise (humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there as incremental costs.