

**Repressive States and Insurgencies: Implications for Future
Campaigns**

by

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Abstract

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Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Coalition forces discovered that the military, security, and intelligence agencies of Iraq were well suited to transition into an insurgency after conventional defensive measures had failed. This paper argues that this is the habitual norm for repressive totalitarian regimes when faced with invasion. This paper examines existing counterinsurgency theories, and then uses the case study method to compare the werwolf movement in 1945-46 Nazi Germany, the partisan resistance movement in the 1941-44 Soviet Union, and the ongoing Iraqi insurgency. It compares how these movements were planned, organized, manned, and executed. It examines the three insurgencies for common threads and themes.

The conclusions of this paper are that repressive regimes are well suited to defend themselves through post-hostility guerrilla movements, and the decision to do so is common. The success or failure of such decisions is a function of several factors. These are the speed and strength of the occupying force, the ability of the defeated government's survivors to demonstrate unity of effort, and adequate time and safe areas for the regime survivors to rally and organize. Military planners should expect such movements as a likely outcome of victory and plan accordingly. Defeating such insurgencies is intensive in terms of time, troop commitment, and resources, however. Regardless of its prowess in fighting in high-intensity conflicts, the US military should expect to execute counterinsurgency operations as part of future expeditionary operations.

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INTRODUCTION

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States' homeland on 11 September 2001 the U.S. military has conducted two large scale expeditionary operations to topple the regimes in the failed states of Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, rapid defeat of the enemy conventional forces has been followed by a counterinsurgency period against insurgents that bear ties to the recently deposed regime. Significant portions of the enemy order of battle are composed of fighters whose training and equipment were products of their recent status within the former government's militia, military, or police. In repressive police states the organizations the state uses to police, repress, and maintain power over its population are readily adapted into an existing insurgency. Following the conventional defeat of the Iraqi Armed Forces, coalition forces have faced an insurgency composed and led by former regime loyalists and others who owe their allegiance to the previous regime, such as members of sympathetic ethnic groups, Iraqi Army, Republican Guard, secret police, and others.¹ The rapid conventional victory has been followed by a long-term counterinsurgency. An examination of members of the "Axis of Evil" states identified by the President in his 29 January 2002 speech as well as Ba'athist states such as Syria demonstrates that states that possess similar repressive state instruments and militaries would be similarly prepared to launch and maintain an insurgency. Such states can not be defeated or destroyed rapidly, invalidating several previous models and requiring a planned counterinsurgency phase for operational planning and an army structure different from that currently envisioned. As the U.S. military prepares for the future the ability to determine how such insurgencies begin and are maintained will continue to be important. If future military opponents are likely to include guerrilla warfare as part of their resistance planning than our future planners must increase their emphasis on this likely scenario.

¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 12.

The United States gained a great deal of experience combating insurgencies in the Cold War period following the end of World War II. American counterinsurgency efforts were mainly in combating Communist revolutionaries such as Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara, who spread the influence of communist-backed guerrillas across the globe.² As a result our understanding of insurgencies is chiefly of those that attempt to overthrow a friendly government from within, following either the most common Maoist model or other revolutionary models such as Leninist, urban, or focoist. What these models fail to address is in the case where a previously sovereign nation has been defeated by a conventional opponent, and the insurgency springs from the previously defeated tools of power possessed by the government. In an era where the possibility of preemption against states that sponsor terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction, or both is a real possibility this future model may be more relevant than the previously common revolutionary approaches.

This paper will examine three insurgencies that all sprang from repressive regimes that had been attacked by a rival power. In the case of the Soviet Union from 1941-1944 the party remained in control of the nation while the Partisan struggle developed behind German lines. In the cases of postwar Germany in 1945 and Iraq in 2003 the nation was completely occupied during the insurgencies that resulted.

The framework of this paper will be to examine the insurgency in Iraq since 2003, analyze insurgencies that bear a strong correlation to the present Iraqi situation, and attempt to draw conclusions as to the implications for the future. In broad terms, the nation of Iraq was invaded by a coalition of nation-states that toppled the ruling government and established political control in what was termed at the time as “Phase IV operations”, where stability and reconstruction efforts gained primacy. An insurgency movement began, where those fighting in the resistance were many of the same people that had fought in the initial invasion. This

² Stephen Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*. (Carlisle, PA: Army War College 2004), 9.

insurgency is similar in its beginnings to those following the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 by the armies of Nazi Germany and her allies, and the insurgency following the invasion of Germany by the Allied armies in 1944 and 1945.

The framework will include an examination of the totalitarian government and its relation with the army, secret police, and its own citizens, as well as its attitude toward guerrilla warfare. Of particular interest will be the actions of the nation's leaders when under attack, how they developed the initial plans for an insurgent movement, the timelines of these plans, and who executed them. One of the ongoing questions in Iraq as this paper is written is who the insurgents in Iraq are, what they are fighting for, who is supporting them, and how they can be convinced or forced to lay down their arms. The insurgency in Iraq is a complex mix of different groups with competing interests and objectives. As will be seen, this is not a unique or historically unprecedented state of affairs; I will attempt to focus some effort on the groups that were most influential in the beginnings of their nation's insurgencies, the organization of the insurgent structure, and what populations are most likely to join the fight. I will also attempt to examine how promptly the governments under attack mobilized the insurgency efforts, and with what degree of success. Throughout the individual case studies I will compare and contrast trends in one country with those of the others, rather than attempt to conduct all analysis at the conclusion of the paper.

It is this paper's conclusion that a postwar counterinsurgency phase following a conventionally achieved victory is a probable event against most likely state threats, and that an examination of the trends and conclusions resulting from these campaigns will be a useful tool for future military planners. As part of the framework I will minimize the focus on the conduct of the counterinsurgent force, with the exception of studying counterinsurgent troop strength requirements. This is chiefly due to the reality that the German counterinsurgency in Russia was a historical anomaly; its association with the "Final Solution" flies in the face of counterinsurgency theory. A military planner considering action against a sponsor of state

terrorism, for example, may find this paper of use when attempting to predict how an insurgency may commence and grow following the defeat of the defender's conventional armies.

THEORY

In discussing counter insurgency generally, one factor needs to be borne in mind: regular soldiers believe they exist primarily to fight large scale conventional wars. In reality, this is usually not their actual experience of practical soldiering.

Ian Beckett ³

The problems associated with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are not new to the armies of the world, and many theorists and writers have addressed these issues over time. Prior to an examination of the specific case studies it is pertinent to address the most prevalent theories on guerilla warfare.

Carl von Clausewitz is one of the most noted theorists of the Western world, and included in his work On War a brief study of the role of guerrillas.⁴ Clausewitz based his study on his observations of the Frenchmen, mostly Catholic, who opposed the revolution in the Vendee region and spent little time on the study of how a national resistance could prove detrimental to an invader.⁵ He wrote briefly as to how an insurgent campaign could support a regular army at the operational level, no doubt influenced by the Anglo-Spanish relationship in defeating Napoleon, but did not consider its implications as an independent political movement. A politically conservative individual, Clausewitz did not consider a revolutionary political movement as something that could be harnessed or controlled.⁶ His German countrymen shared

³ Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*. (London: Routledge, 2001), 24.

⁴ Robert B Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. (Lincoln, NE: Universe, 2002), 148.

⁵ Beckett, 14.

⁶ Asprey, 148.

this limited view of guerrilla warfare and acted accordingly a hundred years later, in the waning hours of World War II.⁷

The historian Bard O'Neill, in the 1990 edition of Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, established that one of the grounds for internal warfare is the legitimacy of the political system. The most authoritarian system is totalitarian rule. In this case the government controls all aspects of the life of the citizens, be it political, economic, or social.⁸ Participation is controlled by leadership elite, which pass itself off as a political party that reflects the popular will. O'Neill identified seven forms of insurgency. They are anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist.⁹ By O'Neill's measurements, the most prolific form of insurgency in the post World War II era was the egalitarian insurgency, which generally was associated with an attempt by a motivated underclass to reallocate wealth and services in their favor. These insurgencies were often associated with the Soviet Communist party, who attempted to rally the people against corrupt ruling classes that possessed a preponderance of the national wealth. Preservationist insurgent movements, on the other hand, attempt to maintain the status quo. Their goals are to maintain the relative political advantage that they possessed earlier by effecting violence against those who would cause change.¹⁰

Another relevant factor that differentiates insurgencies is the type of guerrilla strategy employed. The most complicated and copied form of insurgency was the protracted war model, as practiced by Mao Tse-tung. There were several key aspects to Mao's strategic vision.

Mao utilized the protracted warfare model to make time a weapon he could use to his benefit. Additionally, he gained the political support of the people, and mobilized rural peasants as opposed to relying on the urban proletariat in the previously sacrosanct Leninist model.

⁷ Perry Biddiscombe, *Werwolf! The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement 1944-1946*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 10.

⁸ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Coming at a time in world history where many nationalist leaders sought to separate themselves from European colonial powers, Mao created a model that allowed militarily weak nations to compete with powerful Western, colonial, and Communist militaries.¹¹

One of the basic adaptations of Mao's concept of warfare was the nature of those who would be fighting in it. In the first half of the twentieth century the most successful revolution of the day had been the rise to power of Lenin and the Communist party in the Soviet Union. Lenin and the Communists were influenced by the writings of Karl Marx, who believed that the urban proletariat or workers would rise up against the ruling bourgeoisie and gain power. The Soviets, who were more than willing to advise fellow revolutionaries, advanced their doctrine that the urban class must be the linchpin of any guerrilla struggle. Mao disagreed. He realized that in China there was a small and weak urban class to begin with, but the rural peasant, far from the center of power, could be of great use. They could provide food, labor, intelligence, and were an easy source of replacement fighters.¹²

Far from urban centers of government, it was difficult for the Chinese Nationalists to project power. Mao could infiltrate his political officers and military leaders into rural areas where they could rest and refit. Rival Communist leaders, who disagreed with Mao's tactics, were more likely to be destroyed when they recruited and conducted operations in Chinese cities where Chiang Kai-Shek's secret police were more able to maintain situational awareness.

A second area where Mao adapted to circumstances is his introduction of the three phase concept. This concept was a function of several realities of the fighting in China. Recruiting from the uneducated rural population, Mao realized that there were long periods of the campaign where he would have to reduce his operational tempo and train guerrillas. Similarly, upon advancing into a new province it would be suicidal to conduct offensive operations without

¹¹ COL Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*. (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 49.

¹² *Ibid.*, 47.

consolidating the local political base. Bluntly, the Communists would have to execute pro-government leaders, give political speeches to the peasants, and recruit spies, soldiers, and establish base camps. Another reality was the influence of the Long March. At one point in his campaign Mao's force was beaten and had to retreat to sanctuaries in isolated Yenan province. Only 5,000 completed the march of the 86,000 who began.¹³ Mao understood that there would be periods when a guerrilla leader must be prepared to reduce the pace of operations when pro-government forces gained the upper hand. His doctrine, therefore, was to incorporate three phases: Phase One incorporated organization, consolidation, and preservation. Phase Two was progressive expansion and small unit raids and ambushes, followed by Phase Three, which represented decision, or destruction of the tired and exhausted enemy.¹⁴

Mao realized that guerrillas would initially be unable to match the firepower of government forces and would be lacking in combat power. He also understood that the political will for his fight originated with the people and that it would take time to spread his cause and motivate his power base. He accepted this reality by beginning his campaigns in new provinces with condition setting: establishing base camps, positioning supplies, setting up intelligence nets, and killing those who would spy for the government. Only after setting the proper conditions would the guerrillas begin to fight the government forces openly, but even then most of the fighting consisted of raids and ambushes, conducted to harass and exhaust the government troops. If the government conducted an effective counterattack the guerrillas, like the Chinese communists in the Long March, retained the flexibility to retreat into Phase I operations. Mao understood that there would be setbacks and tactical defeats and acknowledged these in his guerrilla doctrine. This proved very useful for his followers. In the Vietnam War, for example, the Communists attempted three Phase III nationwide seizures of power. The first, in 1968, was the ill-fated Tet Offensive. The second, the 1972 Easter offensive, also met with failure. On both

¹³ Ibid., 51.

¹⁴ Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 21.

occasions the North Vietnamese withdrew to sanctuaries to wait out and exhaust the Americans in Phase I and Phase II operations, harassing the enemy where they were weak and biding their time where the South Vietnamese and Americans were too strong. Only in April 1975, after the American forces had withdrawn, did the North's third Phase III attempt end successfully.¹⁵

Mao's doctrine, often copied, is a successful method of maintaining flexibility and retaining the initiative. It is based on the reality that as long as the society can remain mobilized and political will is not destroyed, the guerrilla movement can continue, often for years and decades.

Mao's strategy was most successful in the use of time as a weapon. Mao realized that armies that seek to rapidly win decisive campaigns were less suited to fight protracted wars. While true in his campaigns to seize power in China, it is especially true where foreign or colonial powers are attempting to maintain control abroad, such as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Algeria. Mao attempted to win by outlasting his enemy and using the protracted duration of the conflict as a way to sap the enemy's political will. In Vietnam, for example, US casualties were a fraction of the losses in World War II, but the never-ending nature of the war (over three times as long as World War II) had a political power on the home front. Robert Leonhard refers to this as "low-frequency warfare."¹⁶ Armies that seek decisive resolution through rapid victories have difficulty adapting to a climate of low-frequency combat, where they are less prepared for small unit actions for years on end. This allows the militarily weaker guerrilla to impose his political will on the regular forces. When successful, the enemy army is rarely defeated in battle but withdrawn at the orders of an exhausted government which has lost its political will for the fight.

An alternative to Mao is the urban warfare strategy. O'Neill argues that the urban warfare model has had a much weaker history of success than the protracted warfare model.¹⁷ Unlike Mao's protracted model, the urban based strategy is less able to seize power as it is more difficult

¹⁵ Asprey, 1047.

¹⁶ Robert R Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 88.

¹⁷ O'Neill, 47.

to mass a large army to seize power as the government's strength wanes. As a result it is more conducive against colonial powers that can negotiate their withdrawal after a campaign of exhaustion against the insurgents. While it may succeed in exacting concessions, an internal insurgency that is based in the urban areas is less likely to overcome a determined military campaign. It is noteworthy that in the Middle East, specifically in Beirut Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq that this strategy dominates when the terrain and enemy firepower makes it impractical to conduct a protracted campaign in the countryside, due to lack of concealment and suitable terrain.

One of the more penetrating analyses of the legacy of Maoist protracted war was conducted by Metz and Millen in their Strategic Studies Institute publication, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.

They argued that the “Golden Age” of insurgency, the mid to late 20th century, was marked by the examples of Maoist guerrilla movements in what they termed “nationalist insurgencies.”¹⁸ These were defined as conflicts between insurgents and a national government that has some degree of legitimacy and support. The insurgents were generally citizens dissatisfied with the legitimacy of their government who sought to overthrow the ruling power by force.

In contrast, “liberation insurgencies” pit insurgents against a ruling group considered to be outside occupiers, and the insurgents can use nationalist motives to paint their struggle as an attempt to liberate the country from the occupying forces. As a result, reforms, jobs, schools, and other concessions will be insufficient to defeat a liberation model. Metz and Millen identify that the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men, the easier the task for insurgent organizers¹⁹

In the case of the liberation model, an effective regime with the means to defeat the insurgents is absent, as the chaos surrounding the defeat of the nation will result in a power

¹⁸ Metz and Millen, 8.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

vacuum; the occupier has the means to defeat the insurgent but lacks situational and cultural awareness. The existing political structures are “weak or nonexistent.”²⁰ In either case, the protracted nature and ambiguity of guerrilla warfare in general mitigate an effective U.S. response. Other theorists have classified insurgencies along similar lines; the authors’ definitions approximate O’Neill’s use of egalitarianism and preservationism as motivations for guerrillas.

Metz and Millen are concerned that “to simply extrapolate the ideas, strategy, doctrine and operational concepts from several decades ago and apply them to 21st century insurgency is a recipe for ineffectiveness.”²¹ Similarly, they argue that “while Joint and Service doctrine does deal with insurgency, it tends to overlook the ongoing mutations, treating 20th century Maoist peoples’ war as a universal model for insurgency.”²² Similarly, they argue that U.S. doctrine is reliant on Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, which is designed to help a friendly power defeat a nationalist insurgency. They identified several solutions: rapid stabilization of the state or area, rapid shift to minimum U.S. presence, rapid creation of local security forces, changing the perception of the populace, encouragement of local reform, and cauterization of surrounding states to deny guerrilla sanctuaries.²³

While Metz and Millen accurately describe that there are new dynamics at work in the nature of insurgencies, they miss several key points. The first is that while the Vietnam War and other cold war nationalist insurgencies have had a defining impact on US COIN doctrine, liberation strategies are not new. As will be seen, two of the most significant insurgent efforts of World War II were liberation insurgencies, formed around the remnants of the German and Soviet war machines. The second is that while the U.S. is likely to see a liberation insurgency attempted in the post conflict phase of any expeditionary operation, the nature of our foreign policy indicates that future enemies are more likely to look like repressive states than

²⁰ Ibid., 20.

²¹ Ibid., 1.

²² Ibid., 16.

²³ Ibid., i.

representative democracies, and that the nationalist and liberation themes adopted by future insurgents will be hampered by the poor track records of human rights abuses and the atrocities they perpetuated to remain in power. The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and previous conflicts in Germany and the Soviet Union all witnessed significant segments of the population that were at best, ambivalent at witnessing the return of the previous regime. This is a significant advantage to future planners.

O'Neill makes several pertinent points as to the role the societal structure places on the conduct of the insurgency.²⁴ Societies are organized among hierarchical, pyramidal, and segmentary constructs. Segmentary societies in particular, according to O'Neill, are not ideal for protracted warfare where the segments, such as tribes, will have difficulty bridging the political gaps between them. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, at first glance, appear to be examples of hierarchical societies. In practice, these totalitarian nation-states functioned in a generally pyramidal fashion. To maintain control over the population these totalitarian rulers were reluctant to distribute power among any one agency which could be subverted into attempting a coup. As a result once the leader's control over the nation lapsed (or in the case of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and western region) the separate power bases coalesced or failed to coalesce based on their interrelationships, either unsuccessfully in the German case (based on rivalries between the SS, Wehrmacht, Hitlerjugend, and population) or successfully in the Soviet case (as directed by Stalin between the Communist party, NKVD, Red Army survivors, and peasants.)

SOVIET UNION, 1941-1944

On 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The invasion, codenamed Operation Barbarossa, would result in a calamitous defeat for Hitler's armies. In a campaign that would last four years the Soviets would return from the brink of defeat to ultimately drive the Germans back, invade Eastern Europe and Germany, and seize Berlin. The fighting, which lasted

²⁴ O'Neill, 61.

slightly under four years, would result in three million German dead, and close to 10 million Soviet dead, as well as upwards of 7 million dead civilians. It was the bloodiest theater of World War II, and represented a level of severity that has rarely been seen before and will probably not be seen again, short of nuclear war.

The history of the fighting behind the German lines, pitting various German security divisions, commands, and leaders against Soviet partisans, can be useful to military planners and historians. Unlike well-known insurgencies from more recent eras, such as Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam, the Soviet partisan effort was not an attempt to overthrow an existing government, evict a colonial power or establish a new political ideology. Rather, the partisans fought on behalf of an existing totalitarian regime to defeat an invading force. They fought not for change, but to reintroduce the existing status quo. That status quo, however, was to reintroduce the power of an oppressive regime that many of the population had little loyalty to. As a result, certain unique aspects of guerrilla warfare resulted that differ significantly from the popular movements that have been the norm since.

There are several specific aspects of the partisan war along the Eastern front that may appear, at first glance, to invalidate a deep study of the subject. Foremost among these is the conduct of the counterinsurgency itself. The German attempt to counter the partisan's success was, from a policy level, an unmitigated disaster. The German policy consisted, for the most part, of increasing amounts of terror and increasing use of atrocities, mass executions, and other war crimes that incited the population to greater and greater levels of support.²⁵ Hitler and his leaders regarded the Russians as Untermenschen, or sub humans, and felt fully justified in how they implemented their repressive techniques. Coupled with similar acts, such as willful neglect of Soviet prisoners of war and the implementation of "The Final Solution", or deportation and execution of Jews, gypsies, communists, and other undesirables, the Germans did much to further

²⁵ Ben Shepherd, *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans*. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 220.

the cause of their enemy. Additionally, the Germans did not regard the partisan war as decisive; as long as lines of communication to resupply the front remained open the Germans did not commit troops in significant numbers to clear partisan strongholds.²⁶ For these reasons a deep examination of the German counterinsurgency techniques, with the exception of how they impacted partisan recruiting and propaganda, will not be included

A second aspect of the partisan war that bears examination is the relation of the partisans to their chain of command. The partisans fought under the express direction of the Communist Central Staff, safely located throughout much of the war in Moscow.²⁷ As a result they were able to be directed and resupplied from secure bases behind Russian lines. This is in contrast to the current situation facing US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, although a closer examination indicates that some leadership may in fact be taking place from safe havens in Northern Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. The possibility of such a situation occurring in the future is far from remote, where guerrillas and insurgent leaders escape across international borders to direct the resistance from safe havens.

These differences notwithstanding, there are several aspects of the partisan conduct of their war that bear a closer look. How they assembled following the invasion, recruited, fought, and were reintroduced into the national fold are topics that bear no small passing resemblance to aspects of the Iraqi and Afghan resistance today. Coupled together, they present trends and lessons relevant to a military planner considering expeditionary operations into a region that has used repression to control and manipulate the population.

Prior to the German invasion the Soviets were no strangers to guerrilla warfare, but neither had they done much to gain the support of those in the path of the Germans. In 1917 they had ridden to power behind the leadership of Vladimir Lenin and the Communist party, who

²⁶ Matthew Cooper, *The Nazi War against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944*. (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 43.

²⁷ John Alexander Armstrong, *Soviet Partisans in World War II*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 122.

seized power from Czar Nicholas II. The Communist Reds were able to retain power against the Whites, but their rule was not without cost. Lenin supported Marx' view that power would be seized by the urban proletariat from the ruling bourgeoisie.²⁸ The Soviet revolution began in the cities and did not originate among the rural peasants. Later, as the Soviets embarked upon multiple "five-year plans" to increase their level of industrialization the disenfranchised peasants would continue to pay the price. Under the reign of Stalin the forced collectivization of peasant farms to generate revenue unleashed great dissent among the very people who would find themselves in the path of the German 1941 invasion. Wealthy peasants, known as kulaks, were arrested and deported to Siberia as the survivors were herded into collective farms. Their food was exported to support industrial growth. Famine was widespread. Peasant farmers resented the loss of their farms, their forced labor into collectives, and the introduction of the state into their lives. As a result, years later they would be at best an ambivalent source of manpower for Stalin.

The concept of partisan war was not foreign to the Soviets. The first combat decoration issued by the Soviets in the Russian revolution was to Vasili Bliukher, who received the Order of the Red Banner for leading his 6,000 man 'Urals Partisan Army' on a 900-mile raid behind White lines.²⁹ Later, in 1919, the Reds published a document called *Instruction for Organizing Local Partisan Detachments* that would be included in Soviet official documents in the 1941-44 fighting.³⁰ While the Communists were effective practitioners of partisan warfare in their rise to power, they were ambivalent of its uses; they believed that "*Partisanshchina* was...incompatible with the need to create a regular army since it encouraged independent attitudes subversive of centralized authority."³¹ As a result they were kept firmly under party control through the central committee, under Ponomarenko.

²⁸ Asprey, 291.

²⁹ Leonid Grenkevich, *The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944*. (London: Frank Cass and CO, LTD. 1999), 4

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

³¹ Beckett, 60.

The state had several means of control and sources of power. Broadly speaking they were the Communist party, the secret police, and the army. Stalin routinely used the powers of each separately to control the other, and the NKVD, or *Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was especially powerful. A government bureau established after the fall of the Czar, its duties included the police, secret police, and running of Stalin's gulags. A key sub organization of the NKVD was the OGPU, or joint state political directive, which in turn was formerly known as CHEKA, translated as "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counterrevolution and Sabotage." The NKVD was notorious for repressing dissent by violating the rights of Soviets, foreign citizens, and other illegal activities.³² Prior to World War II hundreds of thousands of Soviets were executed and millions deported to the gulags, or Siberian prisons. The Communist Party dominated Russian life. It was extremely difficult to rise in the Soviet bureaucracy without party membership, and in urban areas all significant government officials had party cards. It also bears mentioning that within the Soviet Army commissars, or Communist political officers, served to ensure that the Army was politically reliable and loyal to the cause of the state.

The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union achieved complete strategic surprise, catching the Soviet war machine off guard. As a function of Stalin's purges, many of the Soviet units were poorly led by commanders chosen more for political reliability than tactical skill. The Red Army suffered defeat after defeat on the retreat back toward Moscow. It did not take long, however, for partisan activity to take place in the German rear areas.³³ Rapidly moving German columns, led to the east by armored spearheads, did not place great emphasis on securing their rears and were vulnerable to attacks by irregulars.

³² Armstrong, 132.

³³ Edgar M. Howell, *Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944*. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 43.

It is interesting to note that the initial partisan attacks, while rapidly following after the start of Barbarossa, were not the result of extensive pre war planning. Much like the initial attacks of the Fedayeen Saddam and other insurgents in 2003, the short time lag between invasion onset and irregular activity seemed to indicate that some prewar planning had taken place. Post war analysis indicates otherwise.³⁴ What little planning existed in the event of Nazi invasion was general rather than specific and highly restricted to a select few. Within the Soviet system, which relied on the presence of the state in all facets of daily life and an omnipotent eye in the form of the NKVD controlling the people, an admission that some portions of Russia would be occupied by the enemy would be an incitement to a revolt. We should also remember that like southern Iraq, western Russia and the Ukraine were regions less than completely loyal to the state. What little advantage gained by prior planning would have been offset by “defeatist tendencies” that the Communists would have been reluctant to disseminate. Following the end of the war the Communists attempted to portray the Partisan war as “spontaneous” and a natural showing of loyalty.³⁵ This was not the case either, but a rapid reaction of the well-organized Communist machine functioning in a new way.

During the initial fighting the Communist Party provided much of the organizational support for the initial recruitment and supply of Partisan organizations. The Soviet army units that were disintegrating in the fall of 1941 did not have the local ties that the Communist Party did due to its regional base. The staunchest members of local party committees were entrusted with the initial recruitment and control of operations after the German blitzkrieg advanced by. However in some cases the Communists did not appreciate their unpopularity with the population. Almost the entire underground Party Committee in Minsk, for example, was infiltrated and destroyed by the spring of 1942.³⁶

³⁴ Armstrong, 6.

³⁵ Ibid., 67.

³⁶ Grenkevich, 8.

As early as 3 July 1941 Stalin began issuing public proclamations calling on Soviets behind German lines to attack the enemy.

Partisan units, mounted and dismounted, must be formed in the area occupied by the enemy; diversionary groups must be activated to combat enemy forces, to foment Partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to forests, stores, and transport. Conditions in the occupied areas must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures must be frustrated.³⁷

At the outbreak of the war in the east Stalin referred to the Nazi attacking “suddenly and treacherously.”³⁸ This is an important aspect of both Soviet planning for the defense of their country and Iraqi planning sixty years later. Despite the sophistication and scope of the Soviet partisan movement there was minimal preparation prior to the German invasion. To recommend that the Soviets begin preparation for guerrilla warfare would smack of defeatism and an acknowledgement that the Red Army would not adequately defend the Motherland. It can be inferred that while totalitarian states may make adequate preparation for guerrilla warfare the initiation of such operations is rarely timely and usually improvised. Decision-making rests with the supreme political leadership, and the risk of appearing disloyal is a strong impetus to delay their employment until the last minute. Victor Kravchenko, a former Soviet official, commented that

...the initiative, of course, could only come from the top. For anyone else to raise the question would have opened him to charges of ‘defeatism’ and ‘demoralizing rumors’ ...faced with a decisive war of immense weight, we were helpless. We had to improvise everything from scratch – evacuation, mobilization, and guerrilla resistance in the enemy’s rear.³⁹

The Soviet partisan effort ultimately became a centrally managed operation closely integrated into Soviet conventional planning. On 30 May 1942 the Soviets established the

³⁷ Ibid., 75.

³⁸ Ibid., 74.

³⁹ Ibid., 75.

Central Headquarters [Staff] of the Partisan Movement, or CQHPM. This headquarters had several departments: operations, intelligence, and security. The intelligence department was closely tied to branches of the NKVD.⁴⁰

One of the first signs of the Soviet approach to total war lay in the aptly named “destruction battalions.” On 26 June 1941, Lavrentii Beria, head of the NKVD, ordered the establishment of these units. A mix of up to one third NKVD men, coupled with local manpower that was otherwise unfit for service in the Red Army, these units were originally slated to guard rear areas from airborne attack. As the Germans did not use airborne operations in the opening of Barbarossa, some units melted away to become cores for partisan formations while others were overrun by advancing German columns. It is significant that some of the first indication of future partisan activity took place in this way, as some party loyalists rashly chose to defend in a more conventional manner rather than allow the Germans to bypass them. Much like the disorganized resistance in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, these irregulars were indicators of a future guerrilla war yet to come.⁴¹

One of the great questions that have arisen regarding the Soviets’ partisan war rests in a measure of their military accomplishments. Estimates have varied widely, based more on perspective and opinion than fact. The Soviets broadcast wildly exaggerated accounts of partisan effectiveness, as high as 300,000 Germans killed in action being one example. The reality was far less, as low as 35,000 by some estimates.⁴² Yet despite the limited losses inflicted upon the Germans, one of the greatest acts of the partisans was to maintain the presence of the state in the eyes of the occupied.⁴³ Unlike democracies, which rely upon the consent of the governed as a source of political power, the Communists in the Ukraine ruled through force, and by conditioning the people to believe that the state, especially organs such as the NKVD, were

⁴⁰ Armstrong, 343.

⁴¹ Howell, 44.

⁴² Asprey, 462.

⁴³ Armstrong, 36.

everywhere. Even in regions where minimal initiative was displayed against the Germans, attacks against sympathetic civilians were widespread. While from the perspective of the Germans these attacks were militarily inconsequential, from the perspective of the Ukrainian and Russian peasants they were signs that the state was still watching and capable of enforcing party discipline, either in the near future or later, following an ultimate Soviet victory. The presence of the Soviet government in existence behind the lines was a significant political force not easily appreciated.

Many of the victims of this presence were the starostas, or village elders. The Germans appointed starostas in many of the German-held villages as an individual responsible for reporting anti-German activity. The starostas were rapidly either turned by the partisans or killed; the partisans followed NKVD SOPs and included family members of the starostas as victims.⁴⁴ One of the goals of the partisans, as directed by the Central Committee in Moscow, was to prevent the establishment of any routine governmental or economic oversight. Partisan units that were militarily weak were nevertheless effective at these tasks.

Another aspect of the partisan duties was a means of broadcasting propaganda to the Soviet populace behind German lines. This message could be very sophisticated. One of the great rumors the Soviets disseminated was that of the end of the despised collective farm; rumors abounded that the collective farm would be abolished by Stalin after the war, and the Soviets went so far to refer to the peasants as *krestyanin* (the traditional translation) then the Stalinist *kolkhoznik*. (“Collective farm worker”).⁴⁵ This propaganda, while false, maintained a façade that there was something positive about the return of the party. A second major theme was that all actions would have consequences, and that the party would look dimly on those who did not fight for the Motherland.⁴⁶ This resulted in a great deal of “jump on the bandwagon” type performance

⁴⁴ Ibid., 41.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 43.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

as the Soviets advanced to the west, later in the war. One can surmise that this may well be a common tactic in the future in the closing and withdrawal phase of future U.S. deployments. Even here, the Soviets displayed unusual sophistication. In the prewar Soviet Union it was acknowledged that treasonous acts would invariably result in death at the hands of the NKVD. There were three main types of collaborators working behind German lines: Red Army veterans who wished to escape the slow death of the prison camps, opportunists with personal advancement in mind who appeased the occupiers, and true ideological anti-communists. The Soviets took the unprecedented step of relaying that past mistakes could be offset by loyal service in the partisans and provided the messenger and the opportunity for those who had escaped into the German camp to realize the error of their ways and repent. As can be imagined, these initiatives received a much better response as the Red Army advanced west and closed on the homes of the collaborators. As a result, some German units formed of captured Russians, the *Osttruppen*, were withdrawn to France, rather than allow them to melt away through the inevitable mass desertions that began in the forefront of the Red Army advance.⁴⁷

One of the more interesting aspects of the partisan war was the question of who actually did the fighting for the Soviets. Due to the high casualties in many of the partisan units, the long duration of the war, and simple availability, unit composition varied widely. Unlike classical theories involving guerrilla warfare, it was often unnecessary to recruit politically malleable civilians and train them to be guerillas. Moreover, during the course of the war the composition of the insurgent order of battle went through several radical changes due, largely, to political reasons.

The first influx of partisans in 1941 consisted of civilian volunteers, with as many as 30% being members of the Communist party.⁴⁸ The Germans, due to their decision to execute all

⁴⁷ Cooper, 119.

⁴⁸ Armstrong, 145.

party members, contributed to the influx of party members that went into hiding. Some of these professionals remained in their pre war jobs but were utilized as spies and informants.

The second wave of recruits consisted of members of the Red Army who were on the run from German invaders. This group was markedly different from the first. They had professional skill and technical ability to fight the Germans, and were able to rapidly build the partisan forces up to some military capability, faster than if local civilians were the only source of manpower. They were also marked men. Unlike local volunteers, Red Army men had few ties to the local area and could not have been hidden by the locals. Realizing the poor treatment given to Soviet prisoners of war many joined the partisans. They were more likely to show loyalty toward the state, realizing that their lack of zeal in fighting in the 1941 invasion could cause disciplinary proceedings when the Red Army returned. Unlike the local peasants, the risk of collateral damage and German retribution did not concern the former Red Army men, who were also more likely to use force or coerce the population, especially collaborators.⁴⁹

Despite their prewar influence, NKVD numbers were rarely numerically significant. They were usually in key leadership positions, and in the postwar MVD and KGB partisan NKVD service was considered a prestigious mark of distinction. The Red Army did not concur, and Red Army men who returned from partisan service were not rewarded for their time away from conventional forces.⁵⁰

The last groups that joined the partisans had more complex motives. As numbers sagged due to attrition, partisans were not reluctant to coerce and draft local peasants into service. One would assume that the peasants would provide local knowledge of the area and be an asset; yet postwar documentation indicates their performance was generally poor. These partisans were reluctant fighters, easily influenced by collateral damage and the fear of retribution, and economically disenfranchised by the Soviet collectivization. Red Army men were far more likely

⁴⁹ Ibid., 144.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 182.

to conduct a raid in the vicinity of a friendly village, for example, knowing but disregarding the likely fate of the citizens should the suspicious Germans retaliate. The peasants, as a result, were far less motivated, generally apathetic, and harshly treated. They were one of the more suspect groups within the partisan organization and internal discipline (the threat of capital punishment, specifically) was a common disciplinary tool.

One of the last groups can be identified as those who “jumped on the bandwagon”—sympathizers or collaborators who had fought alongside the Germans. Many of these men, in fact, had been prisoners of war who joined the Germans only to avoid the slow death of the prison camps. They were not considered trustworthy and were considered the lowest form of fighter. Yet even though they added little to the organization their presence validated one of the missions of the partisans—a form of purgatory for those who had either voluntarily or involuntarily been pressed into German service. As the Red Army advanced in 1943 and 1944 a “bow wave” of desertions preceded their advance; this is indicative of how the fear of retribution by the Communists was far stronger than its positive appeal. It is also indicative of the requirement to portray strength at all phases of a campaign against a repressive state. The insurgents will be quick to threaten coercive means against those who fight on the side of U.S. forces, and if the staying power of American forces is ever in doubt widespread desertion among local military and police forces will be a significant enemy propaganda victory. We should also note that many of the partisans were summarily drafted as the Red Army advanced to the west, and while the Soviets portrayed the partisans as heroes while the fighting was ongoing they minimized their contribution in their postwar propaganda messages.

The organization of the Soviet partisan efforts reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet political system. The Central Committee in Moscow was organized by regional committees. While today we consider our current enemy to be “network-centric”, in the Soviet system the resistance was run by the Central Committee that had complete control of partisan operations. While the Soviets provided centralized direction they also deliberately subdivided

control along the three main instruments of power that they used in the prewar administration. NKVD, Communist Party, and Red Army all had a share in the control of partisan operations, although it was understood that as the Red Army advanced closer to partisan held areas their operational and tactical requirements would be of the highest priority. There was an overlap between how best to separate the rival sources of power in peacetime and counterproductive methods that defeated unity of effort. In fact, in some cases the partisans clung to outdated methods of the past that the conventional Red Army had discarded; for example, the political commissar was retained as an advisor for partisan commanders even after Red Army commanders had discarded the system in 1944.

The Soviet partisan war was a topic of great importance in the Soviet postwar propaganda efforts. The opportunity to portray common Soviet people as patriotically and spontaneously rising to fight the invader held great symbolic importance, regardless whether it was true or not. The Communists “simply omitted certain setbacks in the history of partisan fighting and ignored some of the more unpleasant facts and figures related to it.”⁵¹

Those Partisan units that did appear were small, ineffective, usually isolated, and in constant danger of disintegrating. Communist party and NKVD [secret police] attempts to leave behind a network of Party and Partisan groups failed because of a lack of time and because the local party authorities, on whom the burden of the work fell, either had no concept of what was required or lacked enthusiasm for underground activity. It was clear that, contrary to propaganda claims, neither the masses, nor the Party elite would voluntarily spring to the defense of the Soviet system in a time of crisis.⁵²

The differing pools that produced manpower for the Soviet resistance represent the differing motivations and skill sets of the population behind the German front lines. Sixty years later, in his book Fighting for the Future, writer Ralph Peters examined the types of men that joined irregular military and paramilitary formations. Unlike disciplined soldiers, he defined

⁵¹ Grenkevich, 107.

⁵² E. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin, The German Defeat in the East* (Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1968), 103.

them as warriors—“erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.”⁵³

Peters identified five separate population sources that provide warriors for armed groups, paramilitary formations, militias, and the like. The first of these were the underclass. These fighters have little financial incentive in peace, as they have no education, earning power, or status in a peaceful nation state. The second pool consisted of the course of conflict “joiners”. This group is composed of the reluctant fighters who are the least motivated, among the last to join, and potentially first to quit. They can be co-opted or encouraged to desert, and will be exposed to harsh penalties if the outcome is in doubt. A third pool is composed of the opportunists who are also rarely are the first wave of recruits. These are cynics who will be willing to mouth the slogans of their cause but whose chief motivation is personal gain in power, money, and influence. Peters’ fourth group consists of the patriots. This group fights for ideological reasons and are the most psychologically committed to their cause. They may be peacefully reintegrated into society, depending on the terms of negotiation and the attitude of their society. Their population often considers these men heroes due to the purity of their motives. Peters’ fifth group consists of the former military men who possess vitally needed tactical skills. These men are the most skilled among their irregular comrades and “the fittest of these men become the warrior chieftains or warlords with whom we must finally cope on the battlefield.”⁵⁴

Peters’ classification of warriors was directed mainly at the irregular fighters and mercenaries that have contributed to the chaos in the Balkans and Caucasus in the decade following the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. His model bears utility for planners today and has some fidelity in an assessment of the Soviet’s partisan war. Due to the Soviet

⁵³ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future. Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, PA. Stackpole Books, 1999), 32.

⁵⁴ Peters, *Fighting For The Future*, 37.

repression of the peasants and Stalin's successful efforts to collectivize the peasant's farms, those who were the most economically disadvantaged (Peters' first group) were far from willing contributors until they were press ganged late in the war. Peters' second group, the "joiners", is a more accurate depiction of the peasants. They were reluctant fighters and frequently considered the lowest in stature among the partisans, due to their economic dissonance with the Communist motives and the realization that their homes were most at risk of reprisals. Of the remaining three groups, the fourth, the patriots and true believers, were the largest initial body. They consisted of the NKVD, destruction battalions, and the Communist party members who had no choice but to tie their fate to that of their regime. The Soviets made great efforts to recruit the fifth group, the cut-off and bypassed members of the Red Army and conducted a successful information operations campaign to recruit them to join the nearest partisan band. They were better fighters than any of the other groups, especially the first. The Soviets made little effort to recruit peasants, choosing instead to coerce and force them to fight, but they were undeniably effective in providing an avenue for the opportunists to cross over late in the war. It is likely that few of the opportunists avoided an ultimately harsh penalty, but in 1943 and 1944 it was easier to convince whole units to cross over from the Germans than to fight them.

Peters' model is applicable in varying degrees to the current insurgency in Iraq. Economic factors have played a role in the recruitment of some members of the insurgency, and Moqtadr al-Sadr's Shiite militia was recruited from the poorest sections of Baghdad, in the area known as Sadr City where the standard of living is dismal. Exceptionally hazardous missions, such as initiating IED attacks on passing convoys, is commonly assigned to impoverished males who are paid for their efforts. Within Iraq especially there has been opportunism on both sides, as members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and police deserted in large numbers in the April 2004 uprisings, for example. The most dangerous fighters, however, have been the members of Peter's fourth and fifth group. The "patriots", or those ideologically tied to the old regime, like Stalin's party members and NKVD are the former members of the secret police, the

Mukhabbarat, the irregulars of the Fedayeen Saddam, and the Sunnis of the Ba'athist party. Members of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Republican Guard have also joined the insurgency. The CPA's policy to disband the army has made the first group, the economically disenfranchised, synonymous with the fifth, the militarily skilled. In the guerrilla warfare that has grown since the fall of Saddam the most ideologically willing to fight have military skills that are in some cases more applicable than the conventional military. The skill sets required in running clandestine informer networks and performing surveillance, for example, are better practiced by the former secret police than by conventionally trained members of the Iraqi Army. While not applicable in the Soviet model, one of the important aspects of Peters' fifth group is that professional military men may seek to export their trade elsewhere if the local skill set is not present in adequate numbers.

GERMANY, 1945-1946

One of the largest post-conflict operations in US history was the occupation of Nazi Germany in the period following the end of World War II. At first glance the Nazi resistance movement was ineffective. While the German resistance plans, referred to under the code name of Werwolf, were poorly executed and post V-E day resistance crumbled in short order following the Allied occupation, the abortive German resistance movement is illustrative for several reasons. First, the manner in which the German planning began, and the areas in which it succeeded and failed provide some lessons as to how post-conflict guerrilla movements originate. The organization of the German war machine inhibited the development of any organized resistance capability, yet simultaneously allowed organizations that were ill-suited for its supervision to develop a leadership role. While the actual guerrilla movement itself was short-lived, its near term impact on the Allies significantly affected their conduct toward the Germans, as well as the size of the occupation force. Lastly, the partition of Germany by the Western Allies and Soviets resulted in two significantly different occupation strategies against a unified

movement, that provide lessons as to what techniques were relatively successful in the immediate days after the war.

One of the most significant aspects of the Werwolf program was the organization of the Nazi government itself. As the Third Reich crumbled and the beginnings of a resistance movement took form the inefficiencies and weaknesses of the government took hold in the development of the resistance. This appears to be a universal trend. In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, the influence of the NKVD resulted in them having a major role in the initial structure of the Partisans, and communist propaganda was delivered to the peasants in a manner that illustrated the role of the State had not diminished. For the Germans, the states' role was much more counterproductive.

While the Third Reich has gone down in history as an example of the evils of totalitarianism, the Nazi government itself was far more disorganized than it may have appeared at first light. In a regime that, by design, dictated that all power emanated from the Fuhrer, it should come as no surprise that agencies and bureaus could expand their influence by pandering to Hitler's desires. In the case of the Werwolf program, unity of command was notably absent. Several government bureaus, in succession, were handed responsibility for the training and organization of resistance cadre. Some individuals refused responsibility for the mission, regarding it as a drain on existing priorities; others saw it as a means to gain influence and took a role that their organizations could not competently support.⁵⁵ This sense of anarchy and administrative chaos intensified toward the end of the Third Reich.

Naturally, this atmosphere characterized the guerrilla program, which was perhaps the last initiative of the fading Reich worth a bureaucratic battle. 'The inner chaos,' as a British intelligence document noted, 'was never better exemplified than in the Werewolf movement.'⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 11.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 12

As the German forces retreated in the face of Allied advances, initial planning began in 1943 to develop the organization for any future resistance movement. The SS were the original proponents of the original concept, and their organization was formed in September 1944. One of the more influential leaders was General Richard Hildebrandt,⁵⁷ who developed the organizational outline. He was a member of the SS Police on the Eastern Front, an organization that, for better or worse, would gain much of the proponentcy for the Werwolf resistance. The design was influenced by a Prussian understanding of partisan warfare, and the readings of Clausewitz were studied by the Werwolf architects. Clausewitz, as a politically conservative Prussian, did not trust a peasant class that would fight for a cause that could not be rigidly controlled by the state. He saw partisans as an adjunct to fighting by the regular army, where irregulars conducted resistance behind enemy lines to support the Army's leadership, which retained primacy.

In fairness, the problems associated with the Nazi development of Werwolf were similar to those of the Soviets; planning for resistance after the destruction of the state implies that someone must publicly voice the possibility of defeat to the national leader. In a repressive organization where political loyalty upward is paramount this was not possible. As a result, the limited means available to the Werwolf program were committed just prior to V-E Day, minimizing its impact.

In addition to problems associated to the fundamental, Clausewitz employment of this capability, Werwolf was hobbled by a dysfunctional organizational system. Even more so than in the Soviet model, Hitler distrusted the Army following the failed 20 July 1944 assassination attempt and did not want to give them control of any resistance force. This left Heinrich Himmler's politically reliable SS. Himmler, in turn, did not allocate the program to the Waffen SS, the military component of the SS that had the best chance of rapidly organizing such a force.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 13.

Himmler saw the Werwolf program as a way of maintaining control of the population as well as a way to attack vulnerable Allied rear areas. As a result he divorced it from the SS security service, or SD, as well as the organization that controlled the SD, the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Himmler allocated control to the HSSPF, the Higher SS and Police Leaders. Predictably, the generals in charge of the RSHA sought to limit the authority of Werwolf and the SD had to be coerced into reluctantly providing intelligence support.⁵⁸

The first leader of the Werwolf movement was General Hans Prutzmann. Prutzmann was a veteran of the SS Police on the Eastern front where his preferred tactics included scorched earth tactics and frequent atrocities. From the Nazi perspective, Prutzmann was well qualified, with 2 ½ years of experience in security operations in the Ukraine and southern Russia. His personal qualities made him a less optimal choice; Prutzmann suffered from a notable lack of attention to detail and the Werwolf program bore this stamp of great promises that were seldom realized by the results, coupled with a lack of support and a general sense of disorganization and inefficiency. Prutzmann's staff reflected these problems. His Chief of staff, SS-Colonel Karl Tschiersky, was the former head of the eastern front's SD (foreign intelligence) desk⁵⁹ Part of his duties there included supervising Operation Zeppelin, the insertion of anti-Soviet guerrillas behind Communist lines. Tschiersky's requests for support frequently ran afoul of the highly influential head of SD, SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, and the lack of support from SD was one of several factors in Tschiersky's replacement by an SS Police crony's of Prutzmann.

There is one additional consideration of the command structure that is worth noting. The HSSPF was originally developed in the early 1930's by Himmler as a way to counteract the parochialism of several of the rival organizations in the SS (Waffen SS, SD, etc.) that had a tendency at the local level to be less than responsive to requests from the national headquarters

⁵⁸ Perry Biddiscombe, *The Last Nazis: SS Werewolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe 1944-1947*. (Charleston, SC.: Tempus Publishing, 2000), 26.

⁵⁹ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 17.

level. The police were established on a regional level, generally along the preexisting military districts, or Wehrkreis. The regional leaders had a direct line to Himmler and in turn were frequently expected to execute special requests and special missions where Himmler wished to bypass the existing command structure. This had tremendous impact on the development of the Nazi resistance movement. The HSSPF had a reputation within the SS hierarchy as a counterproductive and politically supported drain on more established and larger bureaucracies. Programs associated with the HSSPF suffered due to a lack of interagency material support and outright personal animosity between respective bureaucrats. Additionally, the regional leaders owed most of their support to their personal loyalty and responsiveness to Himmler and his personal headquarters; their assistance in bypassing the system gave them political power in the short term while promoting long term rivalries.⁶⁰

As a result, the German resistance structure was highly decentralized. The effectiveness and energy of the German resistance varied wildly from region to region; in part due to the political reliability of the populace, and largely to the competence and energy demonstrated by the individual Nazis tasked with local and regional execution. The differences between areas that resisted violently with those that did not appeared random to advancing Allied formations. In a system that existed to bypass the routine command structure the destruction of Himmler's personal headquarters in the closing days of the war had equally uneven repercussions. Some regions continued to resist in absence of orders; in others, where Nazi loyalty was less pronounced, the resistance quickly collapsed.⁶¹

There are some obvious lessons to learn from these developments. In repressive states the means of control is rarely one overarching organization, but rather a balance of powers among multiple agencies that are played off against each other to control the people and secure the head

⁶⁰ Biddiscombe, *The Last Nazis*, 21.

⁶¹ Fritz, Stephen G. Fritz, *Endkampf*. (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 29.

of state. In the development of resistance movements one organization is usually given operational control, and in both the Soviet and German cases the original controlling agencies were ones that shared the traits of political reliability and skill at repression and internal policing, skills that did not necessarily make them the most adept in a strictly military sense. The SD and military component of the Waffen SS would have been better potential sources for operational control and possessed differing skill sets, but due to the feudal nature of the Nazi regime they were left out of the chain of command and promptly became counterproductive. A future planner examining the system of systems that make up a nation's government may discover that internal police forces and agencies with loyalty, but lacking capability, may well be assigned tasks for which they are less suited, as the intelligence services will be politically unacceptable to begin preparations for internal resistance.

A second, obvious conclusion rests in the area of preparation. A consistent trend of repressive regimes is that the risk of appearing as a "defeatist" is a brake that prevents resistance movements from developing past the initial planning stages. Units may be trained, and preparations made, and the necessary capabilities may in fact exist, but the final act of preparing post-surrender resistance planning is marked in its absence. Given enough time the reality of defeat will take hold; however in the case of Nazi Germany the window of vulnerability was promptly closed by Allied countermeasures, as will be discussed shortly.

A function of the decentralized nature of the HSSPF and the organization based on the respective Wehrkreis is that German resistance varied dramatically upon the inclination of the local inhabitants to identify with the Nazi party. In regions where there was relatively little enthusiasm for the Nazis resistance of the Werwolf teams collapsed immediately. Strictly military considerations had little impact on the respective effectiveness of the sub-organizations. Additionally, because the Werwolf were envisioned as a behind the lines capability to augment the operations of regular formations, the regions along the outskirts of the Germany border

received a higher priority than those in central Germany.⁶² Areas where the Germans did not believe the Allies would reach prior to their culmination received little support or planning.

Despite the German efforts to prioritize Werwolf resistance teams along the German periphery, heavier resistance was found in central German regions. Areas where the local population showed strong prewar support for the Nazi party were more likely to support guerrilla fighters, regardless of Prutzmann's planning or lack thereof. For example, the Ruhr, an urbanized and predominantly Catholic region, showed little support for the resistance. More rural areas such as the Saar, Saxony, and Hesse showed greater Werwolf activity.⁶³ Rural areas and small towns in regions such as these had been spared much of the bombing attacks of the Allies, and the lack of industry, class distinctions, and generally Protestant populations had marked regions that had initially supported the Nazi party. The German plan was for conventional formations to fight in central Germany, coupled with Werwolf formations to initiate attacks on Allied rear areas. Instead, the Rhineland witnessed sporadic resistance along the German border, but as the Allies advanced deeper into Germany civilian irregulars fought fiercely, in some cases alongside regular formations. In sum, the German rudimentary operational plan was derailed by the uneven levels of support to the Nazi Party exhibited by the locals. Two particular Wehrkreis where the leaders were hand selected by Prutzmann was Wehrkreis XIII, Franconia, home of the Nazi Party Rallies at Nuremberg, and Wehrkreis XVIII, the Tyrol, the mythical "Alpine Redoubt." These regions witnessed fierce resistance.⁶⁴

One of the more unique aspects of the final German resistance, to include the Werwolf program, was the role of children and underage youth. As the SD, Waffen SS, and Werwolf programs fought for the increasingly scarce manpower reserves, the adult leaders of the Hitlerjugend, or Hitler Youth, weighed in as a readily available and influential source of

⁶² Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 56.

⁶³ Fritz, 26.

⁶⁴ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 151.

manpower.⁶⁵ The national headquarters- the “Reich Youth Leadership”- had already attempted to gain prominence within the Reich hierarchy by forming battle groups of HJ personnel. Some fought to the last man; others broke and ran. While the actual performance of the Hitlerjugend assigned to the Werwolf is mixed, it is worth noting that organizations that exist to promote the repressive regime’s party philosophy must be seen as potential sources for future resistance cells, regardless of their actual military capability. The HJ themselves fell into three groups: diehard adult leaders who exhibited many of the traits of hardcore Nazis, idealist youth who had been indoctrinated into the Nazi cause and were a random presence throughout the HJ, and impoverished youth who saw their service as an opportunity to earn upward mobility on the German society. These “free poor” have been identified by Eric Hoffer, among others, as especially vulnerable to fascist movements.⁶⁶

While the Hitlerjugend leadership, what could best be described as a paramilitary organization with limited military capability, displayed an unusual interest in the Werwolf program, the regular army, or Wehrmacht, was far more ambivalent. The army distrusted any attempts to pull high quality personnel off to form any new forms of resistance, and was similar to the SS in regarding military manpower as a zero sum game. However in this case, as similar to the Soviet model, some transactional relationships took place. The Werwolf were able to pass intelligence from behind Allied lines; in return for a decreased amount of autonomy they received logistical support. The OKH, or German high command, provided some recruits, mainly engineers, but demanded in return that the Werwolf conduct demolition and reconnaissance missions in support of Wehrmacht defensive operations. Prutzmann fought a futile battle to retain authority over his organization, but the Army’s resources, and successful attempt to place Werwolf liaison officers at Army level Headquarters, diminished his level of control. One of the more aggressive officers, General Reinhardt Gehlen, head of the OKH eastern front intelligence

⁶⁵ Ibid., 66.

⁶⁶ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 74.

section, was influential in diverting assets toward local reconnaissance. Gehlen also advocated an orientation toward post-capitulation operations. Himmler rejected these plans:

‘This is complete nonsense.’ He bawled. ‘If I should discuss this plan with Wenck I would be the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Fuhrer. You need not tell this to your Gehlen, you need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides – it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in the Frankenstrupp nursing post-war plans instead of fighting.’⁶⁷

Toward the end of the war the Wehrmacht’s relationship with the Werwolf program began to sour. This is due to several possible reasons. One is that the army viewed partisans as subordinate reconnaissance efforts to the regular forces, as Clausewitz dictated, and could not envision the resistance carrying on after the demise of the state. A second was simple pragmatism. The senior army leaders that had relatively clean records and that would be unlikely to be prosecuted for war crimes realized they would have much to lose by advocating further resistance after the war was lost. Their personal identification with Nazism, while strong with some individuals within the Wehrmacht, was not as universally accepted as with the more paramilitary Hitlerjugend and SS. Prolonging the fight could result in personal repercussions for the Army’s leadership after the war and involved a personal risk they were unwilling to take. Some units refused to allow their soldiers to volunteer, and distancing themselves from the irregular forces began in an attempt to plead for leniency. The army was a more politically conservative group than the SS as a whole, and guerrilla warfare held connotations of a radical political nature that the general staff did not advocate.⁶⁸

The same could not be said of the SS. A military organization which had many members that faced a high likelihood of prosecution for war crimes, many SS men took the reasonable step to escape into southern Germany and attempt to link up with any resistance organization that could keep them out of the hands of the Allies. While this never reached the extremes of the

⁶⁷ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 97.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

“Alpine Redoubt” the escape of these personnel into Bavaria represents a trend similar to that of the Soviets as they were overrun by the Germans in 1941; the most politically committed were most likely to continue to escape and evade. Some stayed active as late as 1946.⁶⁹

Prior to occupation of Germany the Allies had already determined that a “hard peace” would be a requirement, and initial Allied policies were punitive. Prohibitions included a strict curfew, bans on public gatherings, and surrendering of weapons. Additionally, following V-E day German POWs were frequently held for several months in prison camps, and in April 1945 Churchill announced that German officers would be held as prisoners as long as the threat of Nazi guerrilla warfare existed. The Allies conducted interviews with French and other Allied resistance leaders and concluded from a technical aspect that an aggressive and numerically overwhelming occupation force would be required to prevent a resurgence of Nazi underground organizations.⁷⁰

Force ratios were an important aspect of the Allied occupation policy. Some counterinsurgency scholars regard a ratio of ten soldiers per insurgent as sufficient to maintain public order. This is a difficult standard to meet as determining the strength of the resistance movements at any one time was problematic. A comparison of Allied strength in Germany with current operations is illustrative, however. In the French sector, the ratio of French soldiers to German civilians was 11.8 per 1000. In the American sector it was 9.0 per 1000, and in the British sector 6.6 per 1000. By way of comparison, current strength of coalition forces in Iraq is a relatively low 5.8 soldiers per 1000.⁷¹ The Allies understood that against an enemy who had the capability to attempt to prolong the fighting a robust force structure was a prerequisite to maintain flexibility.

⁶⁹ Fritz, 197.

⁷⁰ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 253.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 260.

To a great degree the Allied campaign in the closing months of the war was influenced by the requirements that would be posed by anticipated Phase IV operations. One of these was the “broad front” strategy. Rather than advancing on Germany along a series of narrow armored penetrations, the Allied advance in the west was specifically oriented to leave no bypassed Germans in the Allied rear area and no towns unoccupied. This was resource and personnel intensive. In the fall campaign of 1944 this resulted in the abandonment of some offensives due to gasoline shortages. As the Allies completed the liberation of France and the Low Countries and began the advance into occupied Germany Eisenhower’s force oriented focus on the destruction of the Nazi ability to resist slowed the advance, but prevented a large scale buildup of guerrilla forces.⁷² More controversial still was the decision to advance on the “Alpine Redoubt.” Ultra intercepts that identified the Alpine Redoubt as a possible assembly area for further resistance were later found to be in error, but several points can be gained from Eisenhower’s decisions. One is that when the threat of further guerrilla warfare was likely the final campaign planning focused on the guerrilla capabilities, rather than a headlong advance to Berlin. Secondly, the Allies realized that some regions within the Reich were politically and geographically suitable for marshalling an insurgent capability and these regions were significant strategic objectives, even though they were proven to be less significant than imagined. It is not clear that recent campaigns have similarly considered such issues. For example, rapid advances in Iraq and Afghanistan bypassed potential guerrilla sources of power, such as the southeastern Afghan mountain ranges near Tora Bora along the Afghan-Pakistani border, and the cities in the western regions of Al Anbar province in Iraq. Rather, the headlong advance toward Kabul and Baghdad were based on an assessment that regarded the enemy capitol city as more important objectives than the staff of SHAEF regarded Berlin in 1945.⁷³

⁷² Fritz, 20.

⁷³ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 267.

IRAQ, 2003-PRESENT

An analysis of the current Iraqi insurgency is more of a challenge than the previous two case studies, as our knowledge of the insurgency is limited. The history of how the insurgency began, was conducted, and ended has yet to be written. Nevertheless, we have some insight into the inner workings of Saddam Hussein's regime, and can conduct some analysis as to how it was similar to and differed from the German and Soviet case studies.

The rise of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party was a formative experience that had great impact on his actions since, in how he controlled the Army, and in turn how the ongoing insurgency has grown and acted since 2003. The Iraqi military and secret police possessed an unprecedented role in the government affairs. "Between 1958 and 1968 there were more than 10 coups and attempted coups, two armed rebellions, and a semi continuous civil war against the Kurds"⁷⁴ In 1971 Hussein said "with our party methods, there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government."⁷⁵ By 1980 there were 242,000 men in the army to protect a country of 14.6 million. The largest branch of the government was the Ministry of the Interior; by 1980 it had reached a strength of 260,000 policemen and was rivaled by party militias that had 175,000. 677,000 people or 20% of the Iraqi 3.4 million labor force, (51 personnel for every 1000 members of the population as a whole) were engaged in some aspect of repression and/or violence.⁷⁶

Overwhelmingly Sunni Republican Guards were used as a means of repression against the Shia in their 1991 uprising. Ba'athists had remembered the lessons of 1963, when they had successfully killed Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim and temporarily seized power. The Ba'ath had accepted General Abd al-Salam Arif as president, supporting him against the Communists. The coalition of the Army and the Ba'athists fragmented and on 18 November

⁷⁴ Samir Al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 22.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

1963, nine months after Qasim was killed, the Army consolidated power by attacking and deposing the Ba'athist contingent. Arif died and his brother was deposed in 1968, following a failure of the Iraqi Army to save face by contributing wholeheartedly in the 1967 war against Israel. The Army "failed to grasp that the experience of 1963 had branded on the psyche of every Ba'ath leader the essential mark of survival—never share power."⁷⁷ Hussein was the founding member of Jihaz Haneen, "instrument of yearning," the first of the Ba'athist vehicles to suppress the army and anyone else who got in their way. Jihaz Haneen later became the core of what would become the Mukhabbarat. The party brought its secretive command and control structure into daily life. Ba'athists were carefully selected and recruited over a long, drawn out process that commonly lasted five to eight years. This later became a prerequisite for advancement into prestigious fields such as medicine, law, engineering, and education.⁷⁸

Later revolts and instability prompted the Ba'athists to expand the idea of treason to the point that treason was portrayed as an attitude or an idea that had no relation to specific acts. People were hauled away for treasonous offenses minus any evidence that would have been a prerequisite elsewhere. Hussein took three specific steps. His chief rivals were tried and imprisoned. A series of raids were conducted to destroy cells loyal to Saddam's opponents; these raids were conducted by party militias loyal to Hussein and excluded the Army, as a specific message that the party could offset the army's political power. Lastly, the state security police was overhauled, into three agencies. The Amn, state internal security, was modernized, and established close ties with the Soviet GRU and KGB. The Estikhbarat, or military intelligence, became responsible for intelligence against Iraqis abroad, and the establishment of the Mukhabbarat, or Party Intelligence, became the primary vehicle for controlling the state and organizations such as the army and government. The party therefore became a series of rival organizations that played each other off against one another, where "treason" was a nebulous

⁷⁷ Sandra Mackey, *The Reckoning* (New York: Norton, 2002), 200.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 204.

term that could be applied to anyone and no one's position was safe. Such a chaotic and complex system was evident in the growth of the Iraqi resistance following Coalition occupation in 2003.⁷⁹

Tribes were incorporated into this system. Some tribes, notoriously the Al Tikriti, received land, money, and power for encouraging their youth to join the Ba'athist government organs. Land reform in the south however drove a wedge between the Shia sheiks and their peasant followers. Loyal tribes became embedded in the Ba'athist process. Disloyal tribes were weakened.⁸⁰ Hussein took the mantle of sheik mashayikh, or chief of chiefs, as the Ba'athists accepted and increased the role of tribalism in to their doctrine.⁸¹ It also weakened the traditional power of the capitol, Baghdad, and transferred to an alliance among the Sunnis, tribes, and security forces, centered in Tikrit.

The Ba'ath of today is an interlocking hierarchy of people who maintain the personal power of the Iraqi tyrant. In descending order under the "hero president," there are the sycophants--the ministers and party officials; the enablers—the secret police, the Republican Guards, and the myriad of security services; the allies—the tribal sheiks who have sold themselves into service; the entrapped—the people of the bureaucracy enslaved to the regime by the necessity of survival; and the thugs—the street level enforcers of rural values. Together they keep the chains of bondage wrapped around the victims, the people of Iraq. The whole miserable, repressive system is centered in Tikrit, what is now the de facto capitol of Iraq.⁸²

At the zenith of Hussein's control, one in seven Iraqis was a party member of one rank or another.⁸³ A joke or derogatory comment against the RCC, Ba'ath Party, or National assembly was punishable by death according to a November 1986 state decree. Within a year of Saddam Hussein's seizure of power in 1979, the Popular Army was more than doubled, from 100,000 to 250,000. During the Iran-Iraq war it was to reach a force of one million strong; while not armed

⁷⁹ Al-Khalil, 14.

⁸⁰ Mackey, 206.

⁸¹ Ibid., 319.

⁸² Ibid., 320.

⁸³ Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*. (London: Brassey's, 1991), 178.

with the latest firepower or professional training it reflected Hussein's preoccupation with protecting the party and the state from the Army.⁸⁴

The Iraqi security structure and the culture it imposed on the military can be seen by the dispositions of the Iraqi forces on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Concentric rings of defense, based on political reliability rather than military prowess, marked Iraqi deployments. The numerous but poorly trained and equipped regular army, with 17 divisions assigned to five corps, was assigned to sectors in the first line of defense. Saddam's displeasure with the Army is indicated by the fact that in the past decade, over 40 generals defected, 150 were fired, and a number shot for disloyal acts.⁸⁵ More politically reliable Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units, forces of 60,000 and 15,000 respectively, were deployed in concentric rings with the most reliable troops assigned in ever closer proximity to the capitol. In addition to this were the irregulars of Saddam Fedayeen, "Saddam's Martyrs." Organized into irregular formations, many of these half trained organizations resemble Stalin's NKVD destruction battalions. One estimate accounted for 2,000 paramilitary fighters in Basra, over 12,000 in the vicinity of Najaf, and 2,000 near Karbala.⁸⁶ Fighting in civilian clothes and ignoring the laws of land warfare, hastily thrown into ill-planned hasty defenses in the path of the American advance, these units did little to stop or even slow the mechanized attacks en route to the capitol. Like the reflexive and poorly executed Soviet efforts in 1941, they were an ominous indicator of the larger insurgency to come.

And it was not long in coming. On 16 July 2003 the commander of CENTCOM, General John Abizaid, was among the first to describe the new threat:

I believe there are mid-level Ba'athists, Iraqi intelligence service people, Special Security Organization people, Special Republican Guard people that have

⁸⁴ Ibid., 190.

⁸⁵ Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr. *The Iraq War: A Military History*. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 84.

⁸⁶ Fontenot, Gregory. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 101.

organized at the regional level in cellular structure and are conducting what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us.⁸⁷

At least part of the problem, in addition to many of the former security forces personnel as described by General Abizaid, is the role of the former members of the Iraqi Army. Initial plans were to use 1.6 billion dollars of confiscated Iraqi money to fund a force of 300,000 Iraqi soldiers. General Jay Garner, the initial Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq, anticipated the Coalition would capture 100,000-150,000 prisoners, of which many would be recruited back into the new Iraqi Army. In mid-May, however, the decision was made by the CPA to disband the Army.

John Abizaid beat on me every day to hurry up and get the army back...So it took us the first month we were there to begin to round them up. By the end of the first week in May, we had thousands of them showing up, wanting to come back. We were getting ready to bring them back when the decision was made not to do that, which caught me by surprise.⁸⁸

Following the seizure of Baghdad Coalition forces began to lose control of the situation. Many of the former members of the Iraqi security organizations, men who by the nature of their duties would not have been front line fighters and were likely to have suffered relatively few casualties in the initial advance to Baghdad, began to regroup. Coalition mismanagement aided them. "With the stroke of the pen, Bremer put several hundred thousand armed Iraqis on the street with no job and no salary."⁸⁹ Large numbers of former soldiers, out of a job, began to coalesce around the core of Ba'athist security professionals, who, if prior conflicts were any indication, would be the rallying point for any prospective resistance.

⁸⁷ Hammes, 174.

⁸⁸ Jay M. Garner, "Iraq Revisited" in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign*. ed. LTC Brian M. Le Toy. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press. 2004), 260.

⁸⁹ George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 193.

This is precisely what happened. As MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, one of the command historians of the campaign, wrote,

In the two-three months of ambiguous transition, US forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative that they had gained from an off-balance enemy. During the calm before the next storm, the US Army had had its eyes turned toward the ports, while Former Regime Loyalists and budding insurgents had their eyes toward the people. The United States, its Army, and its Coalition of the willing have been playing catch up ever since.⁹⁰

The insurgent strength and tempo of operations steadily increased. In November 2003 there were an estimated 5,000 insurgents nationwide. These numbers steadily increased: June 2004, 15,000; and 20,000 in November 2004.⁹¹ While these indicators are open to debate and interpretation, insurgent attacks steadily increased over the same period. Over the same three month windows, insurgent daily attacks were 32 per day in November 2003, 45 in June 2004, and 77 in November 2004.⁹²

The structure imposed by the Ba'athists to control Iraq lived on after the demise of the party. As an American reporter in the Sunni Triangle remarked, following a meeting with local resistance leaders in 2003,

Despite its secrecy, the basic contours of the resistance seem clear. There are distinct but overlapping networks of groups, organized into autonomous cells. The most common type of resistance cell seems to be Ba'athist and made up of former military or intelligence veterans, many of whom are deeply religious and work with the communities in their mosques.⁹³

The makeup of the Iraqi resistance movement is complex, constantly changing, and hidden by the ever present fog of war. Nevertheless, there are trends. The leadership of the Iraqi Army was predominantly Sunni. Many of the lower ranking members tended to be Shia. Unlike

⁹⁰Packer, 147.

⁹¹ Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "Iraq Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq." (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 30 January 2006) 16.

⁹² Ibid., 20.

⁹³ Christian Parenti, *The Freedom*. (New York: The New Press, 2004), 80.

the German and Soviet examples where the regular army soldiers were not so neatly divided along political and ethnic fault lines, there are subdivisions of the former army willing to fight against Coalition forces. It is safe to assume Shia veterans of the Army are far less likely to attack the Coalition. Most studies consistently portray the majority of the insurgents as “ex-army officers, security force personnel, and Ba’ath Party members [that] lost their privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated.”⁹⁴ Unlike the Soviet example where many of the partisans were former Red Army men that had minimal ties to the local peasantry (and at any rate hid from the Wehrmacht in the local forests and swamps), or in Nazi Germany where the diehards attempted to rally in areas suitable by harsh terrain and/or the political sympathies of the locals, in the case of the Iraqi insurgency many of the insurgents fell back on the areas where their families and tribes lived. This, in turn, was a function of how the Ba’athist regime rewarded its citizens for loyalty.

As of 2006 it is difficult to assess to what degree the insurgency is manned by former Ba’athists, military personnel, and security specialists. One source indicates that the Iraqi insurgency has cost them in excess of 50,000 killed or captured, with a current strength of approximately 20,000 fighters.⁹⁵ Clearly, this would indicate heavy turnover and attrition in the previous 2 ½ years. Yet this does not contradict previous studies. The Soviets were ultimately forced to recruit untrained peasants into the partisans. In the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom, former military personnel were the most readily available source of manpower to begin attacking the occupying forces.

As this paper is being written our understanding of how the Iraqi resistance was organized and sustained may yet be revised. However the information currently available indicates that the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency was consistent with the factors that affected

⁹⁴ Amatzia Baram, “Who are the Insurgents? Sunni Rebels in Iraq.” (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, April 2005), 1.

⁹⁵ O’Hanlon and Kamp, 15.

the development of the Werwolf and Partisan efforts, and that the development of insurgencies following the defeat of a totalitarian government is an event that can be predicted with some certainty.

One of the contentious debates that arose in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq is the role of manpower and the size of armies required to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In all of the preceding cases the size of the forces arrayed had great impact on their relative success. Prior to an analysis of these force structures, we should consider what data is pertinent in the first place. A simple comparison of the size of the regular army relative to the guerrillas is insufficient. A small security force attempting to protect a large population from a guerrilla force is doomed to failure, as the larger the population the more troops required to protect the citizens, support infrastructure, secure key nodes, and the like. As a result, the ratio of troops to the civilian population is a better indicator of requirements. Richard Clutterbuck, one of the leaders of the British COIN effort in Malaya, remarked that

Much nonsense is heard on the subject of tie-down ratios in guerrilla warfare--that 10 to 12 government troops are needed to tie down a single guerrilla, for instance. This is a dangerous illusion, arising from a disregard of the facts.⁹⁶

James T. Quinlivan, in his article "Force Requirements in Stability Operations" argued that troop strength as a function of population size is a fundamental indicator of strength and failure. An inability to adequately protect the population is a fundamental failure of any counterinsurgency effort that is difficult to overcome. Quinlivan identified three separate levels of security in his study.

During routine policing of societies at peace, a force ratio of fewer than four security personnel per thousand is usually sufficient. In the United States the proportion of police to civilians today varies from 2.3 to 3.1 per thousand civilians, for example. In stability operations

⁹⁶ Richard L Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam*. (New York: Praeger, 1966), 42-43.

of relatively low risk numbers from four to ten per thousand can be sufficient. The Indian Army has used numbers of 5.7 per thousand against Sikh separatists, and US operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965 employed a force ratio of 6.6 per thousand. Stability operations that require significant counterinsurgency effort will usually require in excess of 10 security personnel per thousand civilians. As an example, the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya in 1952 and Northern Ireland prior to recent draw downs were nearly 20 per thousand.⁹⁷

In the German invasion of the Soviet Union the forces arrayed to fight the partisans were a secondary effort and consistently suffered for a lack of resources. Originally nine, and later twelve, divisions worth of combat power were assigned to secure the German rear areas from Partisan operations. The Germans allocated no more than 110,000 troops⁹⁸ to secure a Soviet population that was estimated as high as 70 million people.⁹⁹ This ratio of 1.5 Germans per thousand civilians was completely inadequate, and the Germans were incapable of doing much beyond securing their own supply lines; defeating the partisan effort was beyond their limited means. The Germans, realizing this, attempted to recruit local forces. They recruited as many as 160 battalions of Osttruppen, but the desertion rate among these unreliable soldiers became so high that as the Soviets counterattacked to the west those remaining were transferred to the Western front.¹⁰⁰ In fairness to the Germans, their anti-partisan operations were only a secondary effort to the larger, more conventional fight against the Red Army. Nevertheless, a lack of military resources was a crippling blow.

In contrast, the Allied effort at the close of World War II was much larger in scope. As related previously, the ratio of French soldiers to German civilians was 11.8 per thousand. In the

⁹⁷ James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters*, Winter 1995, 69.

⁹⁸ Grenkevich, 45.

⁹⁹ Cooper, 17.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

American sector it was 9.0 per thousand, and in the British sector 6.6 per thousand.¹⁰¹ These numbers quickly decreased as Allied soldiers were demobilized and returned home. The American occupation, for example, decreased from a force of sixty divisions to a constabulary which had “limited objectives of enforcing public order, controlling black market transactions, and related police functions.”¹⁰²

The occupation of Germany raises other questions, however. The occupation of Germany never dipped below five soldiers per thousand and averaged ten per thousand for the ten years following V-E Day. Moreover, the large scale troop presence dropped rapidly in 1945-47 from 100 per thousand to 10 per thousand, but then stabilized for a long period of time. In this case the long term occupation can be attributed as more of a deterrence function against the Soviets in the Cold War. Limiting our analysis to the first two years following V-E Day, when deterring the Soviet Union was less of a factor, indicates that the exceptionally large troop strength had a great deterrent effect against the Werwolf and other Nazi insurgent efforts.

A history of U.S. efforts in Operation Iraq Freedom indicates the perils of an undermanned force. A study of coalition troop strength in Iraq by the Brookings Institution resulted in a May 2003 figure of 173,000 troops, a low in February 2004 of 139,000, and a current coalition presence of 183,000 personnel. The same study concluded that Iraqi security forces for the same periods numbered 7000-9000 personnel in May 2003, 125,000 in February 2004, and 215,000 today. These produce force ratios (against a 2006 Iraqi population of 26 million people) of 6.9 per thousand, 10 per thousand, and 15 per thousand over the previous 2 ½ years.¹⁰³

The issue of force ratios and troop strength carry several implications. The model of success is Eisenhower’s successful counter-Werwolf operation in 1945. Clearly, however, the

¹⁰¹ Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* 260

¹⁰² Kendall. D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*. (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press. 2005), 10.

¹⁰³ O’Hanlon and Kamp, 24-25.

overwhelming troop strength he possessed in 1945 is out of the question for any future operation the US conducts-the required force structure is prohibitively large. Unlike fighting Maoist revolutionary movements, the host nation's army and government will be destroyed by such conventional operations that occur in phase III. Barring a significant coalition presence that may or may not be present, rapid recruitment and fielding of host nation forces is a prerequisite. Ideally they should not be disbanded, but even if they are the ability to rapidly train and advise an indigenous army is a core task of leaders in any expeditionary operation. The sheer scope of the problem and personnel requirements necessary to rapidly augment U.S. forces indicate that this is a function that would overwhelm the Army's Special Forces groups. Additionally, the requirement to equip and resupply indigenous forces must be initially undertaken by U.S. forces; it is uncertain, under the Army's transformation concepts, that additional logistical infrastructure exists to support a rapid indigenous increase in capability as well as the core competency of supporting US forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several recommendations that can be drawn from the study of these three totalitarian states, and how, to varying degrees, they attempted to mobilize insurgent forces to supplant or replace their conventional military capabilities when under attack from invasion by conventional forces.

One of the first recommendations is that we must consider the role of repressive organizations within the national command structure. As Americans, we are comfortable with the concept of separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial political bodies. The relationship between the party, the army, and the secret police closely parallel these concepts, although obviously all use force and coercion as substitutes to the political process common among western democracies. The Army has the most latent power and given suitable leadership has the potential to launch a coup to destroy the government. In the governments of Stalin,

Hitler, and Hussein, elaborate police and security agencies existed to control the military and prevent such occurrences.

Given the tension between these two communities, it should not be surprising that they infrequently worked together in peacetime or that there would be great animosity, as long as all responded to the direction of central leadership. The Gestapo's pursuit of the Wehrmacht's conspirators who attempted to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, Stalin's purges of his party and army by the state police, and Saddam's control of his people and army by the Mukhabbarat, Republican guard, and other regime loyalists are examples of the routine use of this type of force.

We must consider that when under attack by an external agent, or under collapse of the regime, that these separate agencies rally to defend themselves through guerrilla warfare. The evidence suggests that the role of politicians and political party members is limited. Professional military officers and soldiers will, presented reasonable options, fragment. Many will elect to go home and disband; some will fight on due to a variety of personal and professional reasons. Given a lack of opportunity, due to inhumane treatment (Soviet Union 1941-1944) or economic disenfranchisement (Iraq) it is more likely that a larger percentage will continue to resist. Members of secret police and paramilitary organizations, and generally those responsible for internal security, tend to be responsible for initial planning and establishing the cellular structure that others, chiefly military, rally around. Arguably, greater party participation could be a useful tool to promote the cause among the people. At any rate, the most trusted members of the internal security apparatus, the NKVD, SS-PD, Special Republican Guard, Fedayeen Saddam, and other similar agencies, are the most likely players one would expect to see in the initial beginnings of Phase IV insurgency.

It takes time and a lack of viable options to enlist the support of the remnants of the Army. The Red Army initially elected to surrender en masse before the rank and file understood the suicidal implications of surrender to the Nazis: three million of the five million Russian

POWs did not survive German captivity.¹⁰⁴ Under normal conditions army personnel live in terror of security personnel and it will take time to coalesce a resistance movement cobbled together from these groups. In the Soviet Union, six months appears to have been a reasonable time before widespread guerrilla operations were organized. The Allied mass internment of many members of the Wehrmacht helped separate this pool of recruits while pursuit of the Werwolf continued.

There have been claims in some publications that Saddam Hussein planned guerilla warfare in order to continue the fight after his inevitable loss of power. Historical trends indicate this is doubtful, and in future cases highly unlikely as a trend. In the cases of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union the use of guerrillas to supplement active duty forces was planned, but what we equate to “Guerrilla war planning” equaled “defeatism.” Discussing in an open forum that planners anticipated the ruler’s loss of power did not happen under Hitler, nor Stalin, and the indicators that it was time to accept defeat is a message considered unacceptable by the rulers. Future planners should consider that some initial planning, caches, and organization will be present, but beyond initial stages of resistance it will take time to organize the resistance that is politically impractical prior to actual defeat.

Therefore, we can conclude that a window of opportunity will exist immediately following the defeat of the conventional army of an enemy state. It will take time for the enemy fragments that wish to resist to begin coalescing into a guerrilla force. During the first six to twelve months of an occupation several steps must be undertaken. Internment of the conventional army, with pay, under humane conditions must take place until the core units of potential insurgencies are identified and defeated. Allowing conventional militaries to melt away is a recipe for disaster and an invitation to offer these personnel up for recruitment by the insurgent core. The Allies in Europe following V - E Day understood this, and while German

¹⁰⁴ Cooper, 22.

soldiers in general were eventually allowed to return home, this was not an immediate occurrence. It is, of course, possible for soldiers to desert from a defeated army and return home. Enticements to return to duty will have to include payment and other incentives, and funding for local commanders must be a part of prewar planning. The German policy toward their Russian prisoners was inhumane, as well as foolish. Coupled with an insufficient rear area security force, the German advance forced former Red Army men into the hands of the Partisan cadre. Steps such as “De-Naziification”, “De-Ba’athification”, and other such steps may be necessary on a limited basis. Evidence shows that civilians such as doctors, politicians, businessmen, and others who may be party members do not necessarily have a great initial role in the resistance movement. The potential to continue resistance and violence should be the indicator of whom to pursue and detain. Many of the Communists who went underground in 1941 and Nazi burgomasters in 1945 had limited role in the resistance. Unless concrete intelligence exists to prove otherwise, local police forces in totalitarian states are not reliable and should be disbanded (if not detained) under most cases.

A second point is that we should consider the role of occupation vs. liberation. They have different implications, and the media has debated and polled repeatedly to address the question of whether the US military in Iraq is a liberator rather than occupier. While public information operations messages of “liberation” can be useful, U.S. forces should conduct themselves in the initial phase IV as occupiers. Regardless of the oppressed nature of the population, some of the organs of state government will be hostile and can not be relied upon to assist U.S. or coalition forces. If internal security and police forces are likely sources of future resistance, than an invaded country has, de facto, no means of providing internal security or controlling its population. The coalition must be prepared to conduct these tasks until the police forces are either vetted or replaced. The assumption that rapid turnover to a friendly, liberated government is possible is unrealistic. Its means of control and public security will be tainted.

A third recommendation is that we reconsider how operations toward the end of Phase III, major combat operations, can either support or hinder the Army's efforts to succeed in Phase IV. There are two specific observations that we can draw from these case studies: the role of geographic centers of support, and how the scheme of maneuver of the advancing armies toward the end of Phase III effected the immediate post-war aftermath.

The German campaign in the beginning of Barbarossa was aimed at conflicting goals. Some generals believed that a rapid seizure of Moscow would cause the Communist regime to collapse. Others argued that destruction of the Red Army should be the goal of the campaign. As a result, Barbarossa began with a series of armored spearheads advancing rapidly toward the enemy capitol, with infantry holding the lines of communication open and an undermanned security force securing the rear from the budding partisan threat. On occasion the Germans launched envelopments and pincer operations to surround large Soviet Armies, one of the most notable being at Minsk and Smolensk in 1941, where 600,000 Soviets were captured.

Similarly, the Coalition invasion of Iraq advanced along two high speed avenues of approach, with the US V Corps in the west and the I Marine Expeditionary Force in the east. At one point multiple battles were being fought at An Nasariya, Najaf, and Al Samawah to allow the US main effort, the 3rd Infantry Division, to seize the capitol city of Baghdad.¹⁰⁵

In contrast, toward the closing days of World War II General Eisenhower dictated a "Broad Front" advance into Germany, ensuring that no German towns were bypassed and that German Werwolf groups could not be allowed to reform and regroup in the Allied rear. Subordinate generals such as Patton and Montgomery on occasion advocated "Narrow Front" options to rapidly seize Berlin and end the war, but in hindsight these courses of action may have been less successful in preventing an outbreak of guerrilla activity in bypassed areas. Eisenhower's focus on Phase IV operations can be demonstrated by his willingness to shift the

¹⁰⁵ Fontenot, 258.

advance of his forces south, toward the perceived threat of the “Alpine Redoubt.” This has generally been regarded as an intelligence failure, and the US unwillingness to seize Berlin before the Soviets has been criticized by some historians. It is an idea we should reconsider. As the author Victor Davis Hanson wrote,

We sometimes downplay the need to liquidate the charismatic leaders of our enemies. Our grandfathers did not. Thus in almost paranoid frenzy they diverted troops to hunt down a mythical National Redoubt where purportedly a Hitler on the lam might plan terror and guerrilla resistance that could re-galvanize a demoralized populace. We ridicule their silliness and error, but perhaps they understood something we have forgotten.¹⁰⁶

In Nazi Germany there were regions within the country that were especially conducive to further guerrilla warfare. The mountain regions of Bavaria, for example, offer obvious advantages. As described previously, the Protestant, rural areas near Nuremburg in South Central Germany were an early political stronghold of the Nazis in the 1920’s and the site of some of the most bitter civilian resistance as well as Werwolf activity. In Iraq, the area around Tikrit was a source of power for Saddam as well as his ancestral home, and the place where Phase IV resistance was fierce. Similarly, cities in the Sunni Triangle, such as Ramadi and Fallujah, have been hotbeds of guerrilla resistance as well as sources of manpower during the heyday of Saddam’s power; neither was occupied in force by US troops until well after the capture of Baghdad. The journalist Bing West observed that Fallujah changed hands from the 82nd Airborne, to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, to the 3rd Infantry Division, and back to the 82nd in the 4 ½ month period from late April to early September 2003.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the US intelligence at the time indicated that close to 43,000 veterans of the Iraqi Army and intelligence services lived in and around Fallujah.¹⁰⁸ In the case of the Soviets much of the Ukraine and

¹⁰⁶ Victor Davis Hanson, “War’s Bitter Laws,” National Review Online, 11 July 2003

¹⁰⁷ Bing West, *No True Glory*. (New York: Random House, 2005), 27.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

western Soviet Union was ambivalent at best to the Communist party, but dense marshes and forests represented ideal terrain for guerrilla operations. Such ready-made concealment, coupled with the sheer scope of the Soviet territory to be occupied, doomed the paltry German attempts to do anything beyond securing their immediate lines of communication.

Given the preeminent dominance of US fires and capability in high-intensity conflict, future planners should consider the political landscape of any hostile region prior to reflexively labeling the enemy capitol as the center of gravity. A rapid, narrow advance toward the enemy capitol may well cause collapse of the enemy army. By emphasizing speed over mass and capture of an enemy capitol over control of the enemy countryside, a rapid success in phase III operations can cause negative second and third order effects in phase IV. If an enemy leader or government began its rise to power in a particular region of the country, and owns the allegiance of tribal, clan, or local politicians in that region, than that region possesses great latent potential to become the source of a post-conflict guerrilla movement. We should expect those willing to prolong resistance (the aforementioned security agencies, secret police, and others) to head to these regions where they will expect aid, comfort, and support. In World War II the U.S. placed great effort to prevent the Werwolf and the Nazis from securing a base area in the regions around Nuremburg, Bavaria, and the “Alpine Redoubt.” In 2003 the Iraqis were more successful in establishing a base of operations in the “Sunni Triangle” and in the area around Tikrit. Future conflicts may well revolve around the ability of the US to rapidly isolate and control such regions. To do so requires US to realize that one or two axes of advance toward an enemy capitol will not serve to gain a successful political end state; and that the sources of guerrilla power must be proactively neutralized before they are able to coalesce into a long-term threat.

Many of the previous recommendations address issues planners should consider prior to conducting combat operations against a repressive state, and how Phase III to Phase IV transition can be hindered or aided. One lesson we can draw from the Soviet partisans is the role of accountability. Simply put, the presence of the partisans and their sympathizers allowed the

Communists to convey the message to the Soviet people in occupied territories that they were being watched and would be held accountable when the Communists regained power. This is a powerful incentive. Organizations that go underground and are seemingly ineffective against American occupiers can have a powerful coercive effect against their own countrymen. The understanding that when the Americans leave violence can be visited upon collaborators and sympathizers can impede popular support. The Germans, for their part, were focused on maintaining lines of communication and rarely willing to commit to large scale operations against partisan base camps.¹⁰⁹ They discovered that as the Soviets advanced to the west that large scale defections were commonplace. It is not clear to what degree this will happen following a potential U.S. withdrawal from Iraq or Afghanistan. We can conclude that casualties among US troops are not reliable indicators or metrics of a region's level of pacification. The demonstrated reliability and size of host nation military and security forces is a better indicator. A quiet sector that has seen limited combat can erupt into chaos if troops are withdrawn too rapidly and indigenous government forces fold. Coalition forces must seek to identify attempts by guerrillas to communicate their messages of intimidation among the population. This must be countered.

A clear outline of the vision of the future state must be presented to the people—guerrillas will contrast this with previous reality and combine a message of nationalism with threats against those who collaborate and show loyalty to the new government.

One of the important issues that arise from a study of such insurgencies is the issue of whether the United States military is prepared and equipped to fight under these new situations and challenges. If not, then the military must examine how to better prepare themselves for such future conflicts. Governments that have the ability to prolong war from a conventional fight between nation-states to an insurgency oriented on guerrilla warfare will present new difficulties. The ability to deploy and win rapidly will be a less useful indicator of future success.

¹⁰⁹ Cooper, 43.

Conversely, the military's ability to accomplish strategic victories will be based on long-term staying power and the ability to defeat the insurgents that will survive high-intensity conflicts. We will fight and win conventional battles using a faster operations tempo than the enemy to get inside of their decision cycle but we will win campaigns and operations based on our ability to defeat the long-term insurgencies that result.

This begs the question as to whether one force can accomplish both missions. Can a force structure that is optimally suited for high intensity conventional operations transition to a completely different style of fighting? While possible, this is not an optimum use of available assets. The forces that are best suited to rapidly defeat enemy forces and cause regime collapse will be fundamentally different from those that are best suited to conduct counterinsurgency operations against members of foreign regimes and security forces. The former force, reliant on overwhelming firepower, is not suited for long term stability operations. On 25 February 2003 Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki predicted that a post-war occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of troops. Two days later, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz broke with Shinseki, saying that his estimate was "wildly off the mark"¹¹⁰ and that the actual number of occupation forces would be closer to 100,000. Future wars against repressive regimes will support General Shinseki's perspective: fewer ground forces in the initial invasion or operation and far more in the follow-on stability and support phases. In Afghanistan, fewer than 1,000 special operations soldiers, supported by USAF assets, were able to topple the Taliban government. Three years later over ten times as many soldiers were present in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, in his book The Pentagon's New Map, addressed many of these issues. Government procurement and manning following the Cold War was a function between competing demands, between operating forces best configured for "The Big One" against the

¹¹⁰ George Friedman, "Wolfowitz Contradicts Shinseki over Iraqi Occupation" STRATFOR Online, Feb 28, 2003.

former Soviet Union or another potential near peer competitor, or “lesser included,” small scale contingencies as seen in Somalia, the Balkans, and Haiti.¹¹¹ The Department of Defense, in effect, tried to do both. It continues to do so today, maintaining a policy of buying a force optimized for future major conventional wars while operating a second. The conflict between short term conflicts and long term acquisitions remains unresolved.

Barnett’s solution was, in effect, two different forces, which he termed the Leviathan and the System Administrator. His Leviathan was a force structured much like the military that trained for and stared down the Communists during the Cold War. It was technologically oriented, Air-Force and Navy-centric, and focused on firepower and speed of deployment to destroy enemy militaries. It would retain the mechanized and armor-centric forces that were effective against the Iraqis in 1991 and 2003. The acknowledgement that another force is necessary to accomplish those tasks for which the Leviathan is ill-suited is a demonstration that the military as a whole is poorly structured.

It is a first-half team playing in a league that keeps score through the end of the game...Outside of Vietnam, America is basically undefeated in war, but its historical record of post conflict nation building is way below .500, and that has to end.¹¹²

Barnett’s second force was termed the System Administrator. This force departs from the Leviathan in that it is prepared for the post-conflict operations, guerrillas, terrorists, and devastation that result from the rapid fought, conventional interventions. This second force will be Army-and Marine centric, and focus on different additional skill-sets: fighting long-term and long duration campaigns that require multicultural awareness, the ability to interface with non governmental organizations, humanitarian relief, and allied armies that are not interoperable with the high-tech components of the US military.

¹¹¹ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 79.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 319.

Regardless of whether the military has the troop strength necessary to subdivide into two different task-organized structures, as Barnett recommends, historical evidence indicates that the conventional phase of expeditionary operations, such as the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, will near-certainly be followed by insurgency composed of the remnants of elements of the deposed regime. The alternative, and the course of action currently chosen by the U.S. government, is to multi-task the military and have the same units that conducted the high-intensity initial invasion to conduct the counterinsurgency as well. This will require a smaller end strength and budget, but place a greater strain on the requirement to ensure all military personnel are trained and educated for all possible contingencies. This, in turn, will place a great strain on the Army's training and education system, as soldiers must be prepared to fight under wildly different conditions and win in both.

CONCLUSIONS

The ongoing campaign in what has been referred to as the Global War on Terror has ushered in a sea change in how US forces will train and fight. The most influential period for many of the Army's senior leaders was the Cold War, where the US and its NATO allies successfully faced down an alliance centered on the Communist Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact satellites. The Cold War was waged through proxy wars, guerrilla conflicts that frequently pitted Maoist organizations that fought using a "protracted war" model. As a result, the Department of Defense was faced with a dilemma. It was forced to prepare and plan for the worst case scenario, conventional war in Europe, while conducted much of its actual fighting against guerrillas in third world nations.

The future for the US military will be different. The most likely enemies of our foreign policy are terrorist organizations that are the recipients of state-sponsored aid. Those nations that sponsor them, in turn, are the ones most likely to reject democratic institutions, repress their own populations, and foster military and security apparatus uniquely suited to prolong warfare through

guerrilla and terrorist means. The reward for a rapid military victory will be a protracted counterinsurgency. An analysis of nations of this type, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and pre-OIF Iraq indicates that the behavior of these nations are generally consistent with each other and predictable within this model.

What makes these nation-states consistent with each other is not the prevailing culture of their populations, but rather the inherent tendencies of their repressive, totalitarian forms of government. Communism, Nazism, Pan-Arabism, and Islam were influences to the respective leaders and their governments, but the repressive nature of the state had more influence on the conduct of the insurgency than the political underpinnings of what the state originally stood for. We can conclude, therefore, that a repressive government in North Korea, for example, may act similarly to a Ba'athist regime in Syria or one of multiple of possible scenarios in the Mideast. We must accept that we are most likely to face in combat those regimes and rogue states that use internal force and repression to remain in control. Many of those individuals who apply this force and repression will have little incentive to peacefully integrate into a post-conflict society. Therefore, any expeditionary operation conducted by US forces can expect to face the sorts of liberation or preservationist movements that were readily observed in these case studies.

The implications are significant. Expeditionary operations by US conventional forces in the 21st century may start in a variety of ways but will consistently end in a counterinsurgency. The destruction of their nation will not result in a willingness on these enemies to go quietly into the night. As a result, the types of conflicts that the US Army must train and prepare for will increasingly bear resemblance to the current Iraqi model, which, in turn, bears string resemblance to the werewolf and partisan campaigns of the 1940's. The revolutionary Maoist model of insurgency will be augmented by a post-conflict "liberation" model that will be frequently seen in action by our soldiers, one that we will all too rarely avoid facing. The notion of rapid, decisive victory will be rarely achieved. As a result, the capability to fight against an elusive guerrilla

opponent is one that the Army will be increasingly forced to embrace; war against insurgents is one the U.S. Army will find itself unable to avoid.

The U.S. Army must therefore increase the degree to which it trains, mans, and equips itself to consider this new reality. All formations within the army must train on tasks that support mission accomplishment in Phase IV operations. Moreover, high intensity conflict operations must be conducted in a manner that contributes to success in a possible counterinsurgency phase. Rapid, blitzkrieg like advances that seek to seize an enemy capitol and destroy an enemy army are less useful then deliberate advances that prevent the establishment of an insurgency in the rear of an expeditionary force. Training a host nation army to provide security is essential to mission accomplishment. The ability to serve as an advisor to a foreign military is a key attribute that future leaders must be skilled in.

In addition to skilled personnel, the U.S. defense community must come to a realistic appraisal of what the size of a future army needs to be. To defeat an enemy force, train host nation security forces, conduct a counterinsurgency, and maintain the strategic flexibility to meet worldwide commitments requires an army significantly larger then the present one. We must assume that conventional operations against a repressive enemy regime will be followed by guerrilla warfare and cannot afford to maintain the illusion that technological advantages can offset numerical weakness. In all three case studies the size of the counterinsurgent force placed a significant role in the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency.

Another conclusion will be that the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to provide information on the political nature of our future enemies will be of paramount importance. Enemy states are not homogeneous entities, but are composed of military, political, and security agencies that share different skill sets, motivations, and outlooks. A realistic understanding of what enemy forces can be co-opted or convinced to serve a future friendly government, what forces are irreconcilable enemies and beyond redemption, and where the political fault lines lie in a future enemy are vital details that planners must have to successfully plan for future conflicts.

While it is vital that we realize the increased importance that the successful conduct of counterinsurgency will bear on the role of the US military, we should not be blind of the difficulties presented to the insurgent. The repressive regimes examined were able to gain and maintain power through the use of force, terror, and repression. When defeated on the field of battle the government and its security apparatus went underground to continue the fight, but long term recruitment and popular mobilization was a difficult and problematic affair. Few civilians or peasants rallied to the causes of the insurgents without the wholesale use of force as demonstrated by the Soviets. The insurgents' list of offenses while in power may intimidate the public from support of the new government, but is equally likely to retard the growth of a political vision worth fighting for. The insurgents can be beaten, and their lack of a political vision is a weakness that can be exploited. However the road to victory against these types of insurgents is bloody, messy, and slow. We must not deceive ourselves as to the difficulty of types of conflicts, nor the magnitude of the challenges of tomorrow that the US military will face.

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