

USING BATs, CATs, AND RATs TO DEFEAT TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST AND CONTROL UNGOVERNED SPACE

**A Monograph
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The Department of Defense must establish specially trained and selected advisory teams that immerse themselves in the country for 2-3 years, and who work at the regional, country and unit level, provide the cultural understanding and regional coordination that is required to defeat transnational terrorist and control ungoverned space. Many countries around the world lack the resources and experience to control all of their territory and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Transnational terrorists capitalize on this weakness and use these ungoverned spaces as sanctuary from which to launch attacks. Poor regional coordination between nations and even within the U.S. interagency hinders efforts to defeat the terrorist and control ungoverned space. Military operations in Malaya, Vietnam, El Salvador have demonstrated the need for a coordinated regional counterinsurgency approach along with the need to understand the nation's language and culture.

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Abstract

USING BATs, CATs, AND RATs TO DEFEAT TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST AND CONTROL UNGOVERNED SPACE by MAJOR Michael A. Csicsila, U.S. Army, 50 pages.

The Department of Defense must establish specially trained and selected advisory teams that immerse themselves in the country for 2-3 years, and who work at the regional, country and unit level, provide the cultural understanding and regional coordination that is required to defeat transnational terrorist and control ungoverned space. Many countries around the world lack the resources and experience to control all of their territory and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Transnational terrorists capitalize on this weakness and use these ungoverned spaces as sanctuary from which to launch attacks. Poor regional coordination between nations and even within the U.S. interagency hinders efforts to defeat the terrorist and control ungoverned space. Military operations in Malaya, Vietnam, El Salvador have demonstrated the need for a coordinated regional counterinsurgency approach along with the need to understand the nation's language and culture.

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INTRODUCTION

“ [In order] [t]o prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny them sanctuary anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and ultimately defeat them, the United States must also work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world. This means the Department [of Defense] must be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages, and cultures and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence-rather than through military force alone.”¹

At the turn of the 20th century, a young British officer named Wyndham Deedes commanded an Ottoman Gendarmerie in North Africa. Over the next few years, he mastered the Turkish language and culture and transformed his charge from an ineffective, ragtag group into an effective security force. Over the next few decades, Wyndham Deedes continued to live, work and travel in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, building an unequalled understanding of the Ottoman “environment”. His knowledge coupled with the relationships that he built greatly assisted the British in their operations in World War I.²

Wyndham Deedes was not an abnormality in those times. T. E. Lawrence “Lawrence of Arabia”, LTG "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, and Fitzroy Maclean are all men who whose governments sent them out to some of the most remote areas of the world to learn about the culture and the people of these foreign nations. Their governments found that deploying individuals for extended periods was an economic way to gain an in depth understanding of the remote area and to developed relationships with the local power brokers.

¹ 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2006), 89.

² John Presland, *DEEDES BEY: A study of Sir Wyndham Deeds 1883-1923* (London: Macmillan & CO. LTD, 1942).

The United States needs to reintroduce this practice in order to wage its Global War on Terrorism more effectively. Small groups of specially selected and trained advisory teams that live in remote regions of the world will enhance our Partner Nations' (PN) ability to control ungoverned spaces and defeat transnational terrorists.

This monograph begins by examining Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory to demonstrate that successful COIN operations require a detailed understanding of the population and its culture along with the need for a unified governmental approach. The paper then looks at historical examples of how these tenets were either upheld or violated by the British in Malay, and the United States' in Vietnam, and El Salvador, and what the consequences were for them.

The monograph then delves deeper into methods for gaining an understanding of foreign peoples and cultures. The paper looks at not only how governments have historically attempted to gain an understanding of foreign populations, but also how business and humanitarian organizations use Social Marketing to learn about the population's wants and needs.

Next, the monograph shows how the United States government traditionally tries to enhance PN's ability to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency through its embassies, Regional Combatant Commands and Security Assistance programs. The paper demonstrates that while this approach has been successful, its ability to enhance PN's capability is limited by a lack of manpower and information.

The monograph concludes by demonstrating how this deficiency in manpower and information can be surmounted by using specially select and trained advisory teams. The teams, which are embedded at the PN unit, country and regional level, provide the United States with a greater understanding of the population and the scope of the problem, and provide trained personnel who can enhance the PN's ability to control ungoverned space and defeat transnational terrorist. What makes this advisory team concept most appealing, besides from its proven historical record, is that the teams can be established from the existing force, and does not require the creation of new units or organizations.

COIN THEORY

An insurgency develops in a country because of some perceived socioeconomic disparity by the population. The insurgent organization capitalizes on this perceived disparity in order to build its own “moral legitimacy” so that it can gain external and internal support. Historically, successful COIN strategies have approached the insurgency with a unified effort to regain the “moral legitimacy”, isolate the insurgents from their support and apply appropriate force to defeat the insurgent infrastructure.

Start of the insurgency

An insurgency stems from a perceived socioeconomic disparity amongst the population.³ Part of the population may feel that it does not have an equitable stake in the politics or the economy of the country, or that another ethnic faction or political party has a disproportional share. Every society experiences this amongst their population at some level. No matter how democratic or fair a society may be, there will always be the haves and the have-nots; but not every society has an active insurgency that threatens the government. Although part of the population is disenfranchised, they do not take up arms either because they still believe that a legitimate avenue exists to affect change or because they lack a vehicle to bring about change. It will only support the insurgency when it feels that the insurgents have a reasonable chance for success, and that the population has no other options.

Insurgent organizations capitalize on the perceived disparity to seize the “moral legitimacy”⁴ away from the government and to cast themselves as being the rightful representatives of the people. The insurgents use a “charismatic leader”⁵ or “salesmen”, to

³ Bard E. O'Neill, *INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 4.

⁴ Max G. Manwaring, *INTERNAL WARS: RETHINKING PROBLEM AND RESPONSE* (Carlisle Barracks, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001),19.

⁵ Eric Hoffer, *THE TRUE BELIEVER: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York : Perennial Library, 1989), 147.

convince the population to support their cause as a means of affecting change. They will play-on the population's concerns about their situation and place the blame for it on the "corrupt" government that has abandoned them. The insurgent translates the internal feelings of the people into an effective message that arouses the population into action. His goal is to get the population to believe in his message and convince them that the moral legitimacy rest with the insurgent and not the government. However, the population will not pledge their support because of words alone. Aware of the risks associated with supporting the insurgent, the population will want proof that the insurgency can deliver as promised, before they mobilize their support.

The insurgent organization conducts operations against the government to build the insurgent's credibility and reduce the government's, in order to gain the population's support. He will show the population that his organization is in control, not the government. His actions do not need to be grandiose in the beginning; in fact, they must be within, what Dr. McCormick calls, the "maximum and minimum acceptable threshold of violence."⁶ Too much violence risks isolating the population or bringing a government response down on them that they are not prepared for. Too weak of an action will fail to convince the population of the insurgent's ability to improve their situation.

At first, the insurgent organization may only provide an essential service for the people, such as access to cheap health care, jobs, or neighborhood security against thieves. Later, the insurgents will stage small-scale attacks against state institutions to demonstrate the government's weakness and ineffectiveness. Ideally, the insurgent hopes to induce an over-reaction by the government that is outside the population's acceptable threshold of violence. This would further reduce the government's moral legitimacy and credibility. These small acts by the insurgent will gradually increase in scope, until the population reaches a tipping point and supports the insurgency.

⁶ Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling", *Special Warfare* 18 (September 2005) : 5.

Once support for an insurgent organization begins to grow, it behaves like an epidemic, gradually increasing in the number of people “affected” until almost overnight it appears that the entire population supports the insurgency. The support begins with a few supporters in isolated regions or communities who are persuaded to support the cause by the insurgent’s initial actions and words. These supporters spread the insurgent’s message to their friends. Then, reinforcing actions by the insurgents or overreaction by the government accelerates the spreading of the message until; seemingly, overnight entire parts of the country have fallen under the insurgent’s control.

Hush Puppies Shoes illustrates how popularity can spread like an epidemic. In 1994, Hush Puppies brand shoes sold only 30,000 pairs annually. Then suddenly sales increased to 430,000 pairs in 1995 and to over 1.6 million pairs in 1996. This trend continued to accelerate until Hush Puppies once again became a staple of the wardrobe of the young American.⁷ The “epidemic” like spread of the shoe’s popularity started when a few trendy kids began to wear Hush Puppies again as a means to stand out in a crowd. This attracted the attention of other kids who bought the shoes because they wanted to be trendy too. Then famous fashion designers began to use the shoes in their shows, and even more people wanted to join the trend, until over the course of a few years just about everyone had a pair. Popular support for an insurgency behaves the same way. A charismatic leaders garnish initial supporters who help spread the insurgent’s message to others. Reinforcing action by the insurgents accelerate the spreading until the population shifts to the insurgent’s side. Unless the government has the ability to stop this cycle and demonstrates that it can better meet the population’s needs, it will lose its “moral legitimacy” and the population to the insurgency.

Internal and external popular support is vital to the insurgency. It gives legitimacy to the insurgent’s operations and provides it with intelligence, resources, infrastructure, security, and the

⁷ Malcolm Gladwell, *THE TIPPING POINT: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Boston : Little, Brown, 2000), 4.

recruits it needs to regenerate and expand its base.⁸ If the insurgency is not able to generate sufficient external and internal popular support, it will not be able to survive.

Tipping Popular Support Away From the Insurgency

An effective COIN strategy reduces the insurgent's support and perceived legitimacy, while increasing the government's credibility and support. The COIN strategy needs to have a unified effort, be intelligence and information intensive and have the appropriate use of force. The goal of the COIN strategy needs to be to meet the population's needs so in order to regain the moral legitimacy and isolates the insurgency.⁹

The first step is to have a unified effort by the government that uses all of its resources, not just the military, to defeat the insurgency. Robust security forces alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Killing insurgents will only bring temporary relief. Another insurgent will come forward to take the place of those killed if the government does not address the underlying causes for the popular support. "An undue focus on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency. An inability to match the insurgent's concept with an appropriate government response, likened by Sir Robert Thompson to trying to play chess whilst the enemy is actually playing poker, is conceptually flawed and will not achieve success."¹⁰ Instead, it is necessary to have a unified political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and security-stability

⁸ O'Neill, 154.

⁹ Manwaring, 19. The underlying premise of the Manwaring paradigm is that 'the ultimate outcome of any counterinsurgency effort is not primarily determined by skillful manipulation of violence in military battles. Rather, the outcome will be determined by (1) legitimacy of the government, (2) organization for unity of effort, (3) type and consistency of support for the targeted government, (4) ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents, (5) intelligence (or action against subversion), and (6) discipline and capability of a government's armed forces. These elements can be applied in understanding LIC environments that transcend different regions or stages of political economic development. Testing of the paradigm has shown that each of these dimensions is of the utmost importance in determining the effectiveness of responses to a LIC situation.

¹⁰ John A. Nagl, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAY TO VIETNAM: Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002), 27.

effort against those who would violently depose the government.¹¹ Only when the government subordinates the military approach to the overall unified strategy that addresses the needs of the population, will they achieve success and defeat the insurgency.

Stopping sources of external support requires international coordination in addition to a unified internal strategy. Borders work against the government when the government has not coordinated its fight with the international community. International borders are an easily crossed boundary that has little impact on the insurgent. He will use other countries for resources and sanctuary. An internationally coordinated COIN strategy works to increase information sharing, closes external means of support and de-legitimizes the insurgency in the eyes of the international community.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Red Brigades and other leftist groups staged various terrorist and insurgent attacks in Italy. The Italian government capitalized on the terrorists' brutal acts, to isolate the organizations internationally. The government launched an information campaign, which portrayed the groups as criminals who staged violent attacks for their own benefit, instead of as a means to help the people. This isolated the groups from sources of external and internal support, and in turn restricted the terrorists' abilities to recruit new members and organize significant actions.¹²

Intelligence is another essential component of an effective COIN strategy. COIN operations rely heavily on accurate intelligence to locate the insurgents, and to identify the reasons why the population supports it. Mass sweeps by security forces usually yield little useful intelligence and may further erode the government's credibility. The government needs to have an intelligence apparatus that can locate and isolate the insurgent, so that security forces can then conduct surgical operations that will hurt the insurgents, while preventing collateral damage against the population.

¹¹ Manwaring, 24.

¹² Ibid., 21.

One of the insurgent's main advantages is that he can blend in with the crowd. He does not usually wear a uniform or do things that bring him to the attention of security forces. However, his greatest vulnerability is that he must rely on the same population to protect him. Even though security forces cannot tell the difference between an insurgent and a regular civilian, there are people in the insurgent's community who can. To find the insurgent in a sea of "innocent" civilians requires patient efforts by an intelligence organization that acts more like a detective than a soldier. The population will not just give up an insurgent; they may believe in the insurgent's cause, fear retribution from the insurgency, or lack of trust in the government. Collecting information depends on the cultivation of relationships with the community and the careful gathering of information. Once this occurs, the government will better understand the community, be able to locate the insurgents, and know which carrots and sticks to use against the population to affect the insurgent organization.

In 1967, the U.S. government implemented the Phoenix Program in Vietnam to identify the Vietcong's shadow government in South Vietnam, the Vietcong, and then to kill, capture or convince them to surrender.¹³ U.S. advisors worked with their South Vietnamese government counterparts at the village, regional and national levels to identify and neutralize the Vietcong. CPT Tim Miller was part of the Phoenix Program and was responsible for the Trang Bang district outside of Saigon. The district was strategically located along Vietnam's highway 1 and adjacent to the Vietcong's sanctuary in Cambodia. Trang Bang became the home of a strongly entrenched insurgent infrastructure where most of the population supported the insurgency. CPT Miller worked with his counterparts to collect, check and crosscheck "voluminous bits of information and leads that fell their way, hoping for a big break. As is the case in most police operations, the successful resolution of the toughest cases often turns on a major break."¹⁴ The Vietnamese

¹³ Stuart A. Herrington, *SILENCE WAS A WEAPON: The Vietnam War in the Villages* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 101-110.

government had publicized an amnesty program for insurgents to turn themselves in and agree to help the government. In 1971, a Vietcong named Ba Trung surrendered and agreed to help the Vietnamese and CPT Miller. CPT Miller carefully cultivated a relationship with Ba Trung who eventually provided CPT Miller with the missing pieces of information that enabled him to arrest over 300 members of the Vietcong's infrastructure in the Trang Bang district, including the infamous N-10 Sapper Battalion.¹⁵ CPT Miller's patient efforts and "detective work" decimated the Vietcong's support base in the Trang Bang region and severely affected their operations.

The government also needs to gain an accurate understanding of the population and the reasons that are supporting the insurgency. They need an unbiased assessment of the country's demography, social structures and values, economic trends, and political culture, in order to uncover the causes of the insurgency and to identify the obstacles to implementing their strategy.¹⁶ One would think that a government would already know this about its people. However, it is not always the case, especially in countries under an insurgency threat. Even the U.S. government continuously refines its understanding of its population, in order to serve it better. It uses surveys, polls, and collected data to gauge the current pulse of the nation, and predict what their future needs may be. Governments facing an insurgency must take similar measures. Accurate information verifies or refutes its assumptions behind the causes of the insurgency. With a clearer picture of the situation, the government will be able to focus its efforts and limited resources where it will do the most good.

Finally, the government needs a strong and competent security force as part of the unified effort to defeat the insurgency. The military part of the security force needs trained soldiers who can use controlled violence against the insurgents. An undisciplined military, which acts

¹⁵ The N-10 Sapper Battalion had been responsible for scores of bombings in Saigon, including the Brinks hotel officer billets. They attacked police stations, nightclubs, restaurants and other establishments that captured to Americans. The antiwar Senator George McGovern was photographed in 1970 amid the ruins of a hotel that the N-10 battalion had blown up to coincide with his visit. The N-10's operations were always highly political and provided news agencies with newsreel documentation of the Vietcong's influence in Saigon.

¹⁶ O'Neill, 133.

indiscriminately or flees from conflict, will severely undermine the government's credibility. The government does not need a military full of elite commandos; rather, they need a professional and balanced force that contains good strike forces and good support forces. It needs to develop and devote just as much attention to logistic, intelligence, planning, and command and control units.

The government also needs to train the non-military elements of its security force (border control, law enforcement, finance...) as part of a unified effort to defeat the insurgents. The non-military elements may actually play a larger role in preventing the flow of external support, identifying internal support and providing a secure environment for the population. A strong security force working in union with the rest of the government's efforts will be effective at identifying and isolating the insurgents from popular support.

In 1948, the British government in Malaya faced a communist insurgency based out of the country's jungle regions. The insurgents gained the support of the ethnic Chinese population by capitalizing on their socioeconomic disparity. The Chinese population did not have the same rights as the rest of the population and over 400,000 had become squatters due to the economic downturn in the 1930's and WW II. The British initially used a military centric approach that was not coordinated with other government agencies, and conducted large military sweeps through the jungles that destroyed suspected insurgent homes and businesses. However, since the government lacked good intelligence on the insurgent organization, their efforts were counterproductive and drove more supporters to the insurgent's side. By 1952, the British COIN operations were in shambles and the insurgency flared to over 400 incidents a month.¹⁷

In 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer became the High Commissioner to Malaya. The British government gave him authority over both the civilian and military agencies in Malaya. With this authority, he unified the government's efforts against the insurgency and gave the campaign a political direction, instead of a purely military one. Gen Templer began by obtaining

¹⁷ Nagl, 61-72.

ground truth information on the insurgency and the causes of popular support. Armed with this understanding, he implemented organizational and operational changes to the military, security, intelligence, and information forces to more effectively fight the insurgency. These changes helped the British identify and isolate the insurgency from the population and surgically attack them. By 1954, the back of the insurgency was for all intense purposes broken.¹⁸

An insurgent organization capitalizes on a perceived socioeconomic disparity in order to build its own “moral legitimacy” and gain external and internal support. A successful COIN strategy must develop a unified effort to regain the “moral legitimacy”, isolate the insurgents from their support and apply appropriate force to defeat the insurgent organization.

UNDERSTANDING THE POPULATION

“A popular Government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.”

-James Madison

In COIN operations, the PN government needs to sway the support of the population away from the insurgent or terrorist organizations, and back towards supporting the government. The PN, in effect, seeks to influence human attitudes and behavior. They need to take political, military, and ideological actions in order to induce behavioral, emotional, and attitudinal changes in the population so that they support the attainment of the PN’s objectives.¹⁹ This is only achievable if the government understands the population. Understanding the population encompasses knowing what their needs and desires are, but also includes understanding the environment.

¹⁸ Ibid., 87-103.

¹⁹ Alfred Paddock, Jr., “Military Psychological Operations”, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, edited by Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 45.

Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)

A country's environment is a "composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences" that bear on that area.²⁰ It is how the country's economic, political, security, education, information, and social subsystems operate, and how they interact with each other. OPE attempts to gain an understanding of the country's environment through non-intelligence activities, conducted under Title 10 authority, that plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations.²¹ OPE is more than just getting to know the lay of the land or finding potential sites for military airfields. OPE are activities aimed at learning about the "environment.", it helps one to understand the various subsystems and their interactions so that one can make more informed decisions. Without fully understanding a country's environment, good intentioned operations could result in wasted effort or even negatively effect the situation.

The United States and the United Nation's lack of understanding of Somalia's environment resulted in well-intentioned operations that actually worsened the situation there. The United States began its involvement in Somalia in 1992 in the hope of saving millions of Somali people from starvation. The first U.S. envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, understood Somalia's "environment" and had established an amicable relationships with the key Somali warlords to help ensure the successful delivery of aid shipments to the people.²² However, in 1993, Jonathan Howe replaced Oakley as the U.S. envoy to Somalia and he "knew nothing about Somalia and was unaware of how little he knew."²³ Howe's unfamiliarity with Somalia's environment facilitated the interjection of U.S. forces into Somalia's civil war. Howe pressured the U.S. government to support the UN's request to conduct a manhunt for Mohammed Aidid, a

²⁰ Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* August 2005 [database on-line] (accessed on 13 January 2006); available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dodict/data/o/03861.html>; Internet.

²¹ Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, Revision Final Coordination, 05 July 2005, V-3.

²² Dale R. Herspring, *THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (University press of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas 2005), 344.

²³ *Ibid.*, 345.

powerful Somali warlord whose forces were responsible for killing or wounding 73 Pakistani peacekeepers. The ensuing manhunt for Aidid caused the already desperate situation in Somalia to deteriorate, and after 18 members of the U.S. Task Force Ranger died in October 1993, the United States withdrew all of its military forces. The subsequent security vacuum enflamed Somalia's civil war, exacerbated the effects of the famine, and led to the deaths of millions of Somali citizens. The operations in Somalia demonstrate how even the best-intentioned efforts can worsen a situation when an area's environment is not understood.

Knowing a country's environment requires obtaining a cultural and societal understanding of its people. A country's culture is the beliefs, customs, practices, and social behavior of its people. A country may have a national culture that can be generally applied to all of its countrymen, and also have several sub-cultures within it that greatly affect the way society functions.

Iraq, for example, has an overall Islamic culture; comprised of specific beliefs, practices, customs, and acceptable social behavior, as promulgated by Muhammad through the Muslim's sacred scriptures called the Qur'an (Koran).²⁴ However, Iraq's culture is much more complex, consisting of several diverse sub-cultures. The Kurdish society in Northern Iraq has different practices and social behaviors than the more fundamentalist Sunni Society in Southern Iraq. Moreover, within each of these sub-cultures are several tribal cultures that dictate behavior within their community. Behavior that is acceptable in one sub-culture could cause the people of another sub-culture to revolt. U.S. Representative "Ike" Skelton comprehended the importance culture plays when he wrote: "... if we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, the plan for the postwar period and all of

²⁴ M.F. Lindemans, *ISLAMIC MYTHOLOGY* (accessed on 30 January 2006); available at http://www.pantheon.org/areas/mythology/middle_east/islamic; Internet.

the challenges would have been far better, and we [would have been] better prepared for the ‘long slog’ ...to win the peace in Iraq.”²⁵

Iraq is no different from most countries around the world. Countries have several sub-cultures within its borders that need to be located and understood before COIN operations are conducted there. If U.S. forces are to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs.²⁶ This is not something that can occur overnight, one must live amongst the people and study their way of life for long periods in order to understand them.

Throughout history, governments have come to appreciate the importance of understanding a country’s environment. They realized that “warfare is controlled in a major way by the environment in which the warfare occurs, by the sociological and anthropological characteristics of the people involved in the war, and by the nature of the conflict itself.”²⁷ In order to understand the people and the nature of the conflict, governments have used anthropologists and others trained to study a country’s culture to help them solve problems in foreign lands.

Great Britain began training anthropologists as early as 1908 to work in their foreign service because they believed that anthropological knowledge could solve the problems faced by their colonial administrators.²⁸ The United States also had “culturally-oriented” individuals who helped them use an understanding of the environment to fight or gain the support of the native people in operations in the Philippines, World War II and Vietnam. In World War II, the Allies

²⁵ Montgomery McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship”, *Military Review* (March-April 2005), 27.

²⁶ U.S. Army Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operation*, (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 1 October 2004), sec 4-11.

²⁷ Eric Wakin, “Anthropology Goes to War: Professional Ethics and Counterinsurgency in Thailand” (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 85. Quote published in McFate’s article, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship”, *Military Review* (March-April 2005), 35.

²⁸ McFate, 28.

knew that the Japanese were averse to surrendering and would continue to fight as long as their emperor demanded them to defend the homeland. The U.S. Office of Strategic Services studied Japan's culture and learned that if the Allies did not try to make the emperor surrender, they could use him to convince the Japanese people to accept the Allied occupation of Japan and prevent them from fighting to the last man. A country's environment and culture affects the way the population behaves and the nature of the warfare, and it is essential to study and understand a country's environment and culture prior to initiating action there.

Understanding the Population's Perceptions of Reality

A holistic study of a country is only the first step towards understanding its environment, to be of use in COIN operations it must be supported by more detailed information. When one studies a specific tribe or sub-society, they still approach the group as a homogenous organization that is generally reflective of the individuals that belong to it. While this information is a part of the solution, COIN operations often require a more nuanced understanding of the individuals within the tribe or sub-society. Not only must we understand the environment and the culture, we must also identify and understand how the population perceives the PN's and the terrorist's actions. Every action that is taken must be analyzed not from our (the U.S. Government and the PN's) perception, but instead from that of the population. It is irrelevant if the government thinks that its actions are causing the population to tip towards supporting the PN; what is important is how the population views those actions. The government could think that its actions are an overwhelming success, while the population views them as failures.

In Vietnam, the U.S. military used body counts as a measurement to gauge how successful they were in defeating the Vietcong insurgency. They thought that the more Vietcong they killed proved that they were winning the fight. In the most simplistic terms, they perceived success from their viewpoint instead of the population's. The population viewed the Vietcong as more successful and provided them with support, even though the U.S. military was "winning"

the fight. When the PN understands how the population perceives its efforts, it will be able to conduct operations that are more effective at influencing the population to move its support away from the terrorists and towards the PN government.

Understanding the population's perception requires the PN to explore and comprehend the population's motives and thought processes. To do this, it needs to look at things from the population's point of view, or reality, and understand what it associates as the costs or benefits for a certain action. In a western culture, most citizens would inform the authorities of the location a car bomb or IED before it detonates and possibly injures an innocent bystander. However, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan that is not how their citizens behave. They have a different culture and perceive actions in ways that are different from western perceptions. They do not behave the way westerners think they would because we do not fully understand their thought process, motivations, or how they perceive the situation. Only when we understand this will we be effective in changing their behavior.

One of the easiest ways of gaining an understanding of a population's thought process, motivations, or perceptions is to ask them what they are. This is what commercial marketers do when they are trying to sell a new product to people. They conduct market research by asking the target population a series of questions in an effort to determine how to produce a product that has the greatest appeal to the people. While marketers have volumes of literature on the buying habits of people and the latest marketing theory on how to influence people's behaviors, they still conduct marketing research to gain ground truth information on the specific segment of the population that they want to influence.

The same approach is necessary if the PN hopes to control its ungoverned space and defeat the terrorist. The PN will need to use civilian marketing techniques to gain a better understanding of the population's thought processes, motives, and perceptions of its actions and those of the insurgents, so that the PN can construct operations that increase the population's support for its actions and decrease the popular support for the terrorists.

Social Marketing

Social Marketing is “the application of commercial marketing techniques to the analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of programs that are designed to influence the voluntary behavior of targeted audiences in order to improve their personal welfare and that of their society”.²⁹ Corporations, charities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOS) have used Social Marketing throughout the world to influence diverse types of behavioral change; from non-controversial issues such as child immunization to polarizing and more challenging ones like condom use among sex workers. Even the United States Army doctrine calls for the use of Social Marketing techniques when designing their Psychological Operations campaigns.³⁰

Social Marketing targets the individual rather than the behavior. It begins by looking at the issue or action from the targeted individual’s perspective. This allows the researcher to analyze the problem more effectively, without conveying their biases. While Westerners may be completely convinced of the desirability of our basic ideals, a person from a different culture may not always agree. Sometimes the perception of a reluctant or antagonistic individual is deadly accurate, and changing his behavior requires fundamental, real changes to the way they are dealt with.

If the population’s perception of events does not reflect reality, the PN needs to understand what has led to this misconception and understand how to alter it. The PN cannot afford to look at the problem as ignorance or apathy on the population’s part, nor can the PN’s government just convince the population that they are wrong and the behavior the PN wants is right.

Instead of thinking that the population’s behavior is the problem that needs to change, a Social Marketing approach takes the stance that the PN does not understand the population well

²⁹ Alan R. Andreasen, *MARKETING SOCIAL CHANGE* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 7.

³⁰ United States Army Field Manual 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, May 1994), 5-2.

enough to bring about the change it desires. The PN's government can't just try to overcome the population's "ignorance"; it must learn what is stopping the population from supporting the PN government and what the best approach is to demonstrate to them the benefits of changing their behavior. To accomplish this, the PN must conduct an extensive formative evaluation of the population.

Formative evaluation is the systematic application of research procedures to understand the conceptualization, design, implementation, and utility of interventions.³¹ Evaluations or surveys contribute to one's knowledge and understanding of the population in each targeted community so that the PN can implement actions that meet the population's needs and accomplish the PN's goals.

Formative evaluation answers questions about the targeted population and refines the scope of the problem that the PN faces. Once we have a greater understanding of the population's ideas, feelings, beliefs and social, educational, and financial background, our task of influencing their behavior will be much easier.³²

This research determines whom to specifically target within a town by identifying the groups or segments of the population who are most susceptible to the PN's message, and who the opinion leaders and power brokers are in their society. Since people do not make decisions in a "social vacuum," the PN needs to target the social influencers and opinion leaders of the community to effect change. In tribal or patriarchal cultures, individuals get their guidance and social cues from the clan, family members, co-workers, employers, or religious leaders. These individuals direct the community on the correct behavior or way to think. Formative research identifies the group with the most influence on their society and determines the best ways to gain their support for the PN's actions.

³¹ Thomas W. Valente, "Evaluating research campaigns." in R. Rice and C. Atkin (eds.) *Public Communication Campaigns* 4th ed., (New York: SAGE Publications, 2001), 105-124.

³² Arlene Fink and Jacqueline Kosecoff, *HOW TO CONDUCT SURVEYS: A Step-By-Step Guide* (New York: Sage Publications, 1985), passim.

For example, one such social influencer may be the leader of the clan or family. The individual who emplaces an IED may only be doing it because he needs the money to support his family. He sees nothing wrong with his actions and perceives it as a legitimate means of employment. If he cannot be influenced to stop, one may be able to influence someone whose opinion he values, so that he finds a different source of income. If the PN could get members of his tribe to believe that emplacing IEDs or working for the terrorists is likened to selling drugs or some other socially unacceptable behavior, the tribe could bring enough pressure to bear on the individual to get him to change his behavior. Since his tribe no longer found his actions acceptable, he would be “socially” forced to find another means of income. By understanding where the societal boundaries are and who the best social influencer is for each particular theme, the PN can more effectively target the segment of the population that is most susceptible to its intervention.

The formative evaluation also identifies the costs that the target population associates with reporting and which benefits might entice them to report. For each benefit and cost, the research will determine how likely the specific target thinks that the consequences will occur, and how important each benefit and cost is. An individual may think that he has little to gain (benefit) by reporting the location of a terrorist sanctuary camp and could even lose his life (cost) if his involvement is discovered. However, if through our formative evaluation the PN discovers that most of the population places a high value on having good schools for their children, the PN could design a campaign that somehow offers new schools for the communities which report on the terrorists.

Evaluation will also identify the competition that the PN faces for influencing the population.³³ Is there a specific organization or group that is influencing the citizens or social influencers? Which groups do people pay the most attention to? How likely are individuals to

³³ Andreasen, 157.

comply with the perceived wishes of the group? Knowing who the challengers are, what their message is and how effective it is, helps PN more precisely target their responses so that the population listens to it instead of the competition.

Once the PN begins its COIN operations, it will need to continue to monitor the population to gauge how they perceive the government's actions and messages. Although a good indicator of the effectiveness the government's actions may be things like an increase in the incidences reporting on the terrorists locations by the population, the government still needs to discover any places for improvement while there is still opportunity for action. If they are getting 10 reports a week but could get 30 more by modifying our approach, it will need to know that.

The PN government will also need to monitor public opinion to determine if the population's attitudes towards the PN are leaning, either for or against them. If people are working with the PN on a regular basis and the town's people are starting to think more positively about the PN government, the government may be able to implement additional actions to capitalize on its success and reinforce the population's support. Conversely, if support has decreased dramatically from initial surveys, the PN will need to determine if it did something that angered the population.

Changing the Population's Behavior

People do not undertake important or high involvement behavioral changes rapidly or in one-step. They move towards a desired outcome in definable stages where different strategies are needed to move them from stage to stage. According to the Transtheoretical Model, these stages of change are pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and confirmation.³⁴

In the pre-contemplation stage, people are not really thinking about changing their behavior. People in a terrorist influenced area are often in this stage at, due to patriarchal

³⁴ DiClemente CC et al. "The process of smoking cessation: an analysis of pre-contemplation, contemplation and preparation stages of change." *Journal of Consulting Clinical Psychology* 1991, no.59(2), 295-304.

influences, apprehension of getting involved, or fear of terrorist retribution. To move them to the next stage, contemplation, where they start to consider cooperating with the PN, requires the creation of an awareness and interest of cooperating. This is done by demonstrating the benefits of supporting the PN, and the cost of not.

In the contemplation stage, individuals begin to think about adopting the desired behavior, but are thinking of all the reasons why they cannot carry it out. Moving people towards action at this point may only involve reducing the cost, rather than promoting the benefits. If the PN identifies that the population feels that supporting the PN will put their family in danger, then the PN needs to reduce this perceived feeling of danger by increasing security or developing anonymous means for the population to provide support.

In the preparation stage, the population has decided to act and is trying to put in place whatever is needed to carry out the behavior. All that may be necessary for action at this point is a convenient mechanism to report and the positive reinforcement that they are doing the right thing. While the surveys may help the PN identify when people are entering this stage, it will more importantly help identify the obstacles that people are running into when trying to change their behavior.

Once individuals begin to change their behavior (action phase) or when they are committed to the behavior and have no desire or intention to return to the earlier behavior (confirmation phase), the PN will need to maintain their momentum through reinforcing actions and by capitalizing on the success stories. Reports that show the benefits that the population received for behavioral change or that reinforce the PN's role as a protector of the people and as the legitimate authority figure need to be advertised and reported in the media.

ENHANCING THE PARTNER NATION'S CAPABILITIES

In counterterrorism assistance, how we do things is as important as how much we have to spend. Measurable, lasting improvement in a partner's capability to confront terrorist activity in

or emanating from its territory usually demands customized programs, hands-on training, locally appropriate equipment and ongoing mentoring. It requires frequent face-to-face contact between U.S. Government personnel and the host nation's security establishment, and it requires that our diverse Federal agencies, both military and civilian, work together to ensure that distinct initiatives are complementary and collaborative.³⁵

Embassy and the Country Team

The U.S. government has several organizations and programs to help PN free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. This assistance flows through and is controlled by the U.S. Ambassador and his Country Team. The ambassador is the President's personal representative to the PN and except for those personnel under the command of the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC), he is in charge of all United States Government Executive Branch activities, operations, and personnel, and their conduct in the PN.³⁶

The Country Team is comprised of representatives from the interagency and its job is to coordinate with and advise the ambassador on the full range of issues and events facing the U.S. mission at any given time. The country team is also a planning body, which analyzes the situation in country, formulates plans and strategies for executing U.S. foreign policy in country.³⁷

³⁵ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, *ELIMINATING TERRORIST SANCTUARIES; The Role of Security Assistance*: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation. 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2005, Committee print 15, 6.

³⁶ U.S. President. May 9, 2001. Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, "Green Book", *The Management of Security Assistance*, (accessed 3 March 06), available at <http://disam.osd.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.asp>; Internet.

³⁷ Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management "Green Book", Chapter 5, *The Management of Security Assistance*, (accessed 3 March 06), available at <http://disam.osd.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.asp>; Internet, 17.

The ambassador's and Country Team's ability to understand the PN's environment is often constrained by the size of the Country Team. It only makes sense that embassies with larger staffs have more resources to gain information about the PN. However, the United States' diplomatic priorities have not yet adjusted from the cold war and Europe, Russia, and China still have some of the largest embassies. The State Department has the same number of personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million, as they do in India, a country of one billion people.³⁸ Unfortunately, third world countries that have large ungoverned spaces that are threatened by transnational terrorists were not the main focus during the Cold War and as a result have U.S. embassies with smaller staffs. Although the Department of State (DoS) is moving towards refocusing their diplomatic efforts away from the Cold War paradigm and towards countries that are critical to fighting and winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), State is still limited in the number of personnel it can station abroad. DoS is much smaller than the Department of Defense (DoD). More people work in the Pentagon than there are in the entire DoS. With the limited number of personnel the DoS has access to, there can never be enough DoS personnel to fully meet their requirements overseas.

Security Assistance (SA) is the primary means by which the United States, through the ambassador and his Country Team, helps enhance the PN's ability to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SA is a group of programs, authorized by law, which allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. SA programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by increasing the ability of PN to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability.³⁹

³⁸ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., January 18, 2006

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense Publication, DoD 5105.38-M, *SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT MANUAL*, October 3, 2003, (accessed 3 March 06), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>; Internet, 29.

By Executive Order, the Secretary of State is responsible for supervising and directing the government's SA program. The Secretary determines when and where there will be a program or sale for a particular PN and its size and scope. She also decides on SA budget requests and how much SA funds to allocate for military SA programs.⁴⁰

Once the Secretary of State determines the need for a SA program in a PN, DoD is then responsible for establishing the PN's specific military requirements and for implementing SA programs to transfer defense articles and services to the PN.⁴¹ DoD executes its responsibilities within the PN through its Security Assistance Organization (SAO). An SAO is a DoD organization within the Country Team with assigned responsibilities for carrying out the SA management functions.⁴² Older terms for SAO includes such designations as Military Group, Office of Defense Cooperation, Military Liaison Office, Joint United States Military Assistance Group, and Office of Military Cooperation.

The SAO by law works for the ambassador and is Country Team's primary interface with the host nation on security assistance issues. SAO⁴³ personnel act in a management, coordination, and liaison capacity for SA programs and not as trainers or advisors to the PN. A majority of the SAO workload is divided up in: liaising and coordinating foreign military sales to the PN; managing all military training within the PN and for PN personnel who train back in the United States; providing input to the ambassador's Mission Performance Plan, the RCC's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy, and to DoD/DoS for an annual submission and justification for SA funds; and finally for monitoring the PN's utilization of all equipment and training provided

⁴⁰ Ibid., 39.

⁴¹ Ibid., 39

⁴² U.S. Department of Defense Directive, DoDD 5132.12, *CONSOLIDATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICES AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS*, October 8, 1991, (accessed 3 March 06), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir2.html>; Internet, 2.

⁴³ When the amount of SA to a PN is small and does not justify having a separate SAO, the Defense Attaché Organization assumes the SAO's responsibilities. For the rest of this paper SAO implies either a Country Team that has a separate SAO or one that has only a DAO.

under SA.⁴⁴ This workload requirement consumes almost all of the SAO's time and focus, and can be difficult to accomplish even when they have a large staff. The size of most SAO vary from large organizations comprised of 14 Foreign Area Officer (FAO) attaches under a general/flag officer in Moscow, to smaller ones that only have a single junior officer.⁴⁵ Moreover, when there is a small SAO staff, and the PN has large ungoverned spaces and a terrorist threat, it becomes difficult for the SAO to handle their core management responsibilities, and to expand their understanding of the PN's environment and culture. To gain this understanding of the environment and build relationships with the PN's security forces requires additional personnel that can work in conjunction the embassy to enhance the PN's ability to control ungoverned territory and defeat transnational terrorist.

USING CATS, BATS, AND RATS TO FIGHT TERRORISM

*"America's war on terrorism cannot be fought alone. Historically, proactive security costs... are significantly less expensive than reactive missions to the world's hotspots."*⁴⁶

-Rear Admiral Tallent, Director of Operations, United States European Command

The use of properly trained advisory teams, that immerse themselves at the country, unit, and regional level, provides an integrated solution that supports the embassy's and RCC's objective of enhancing the PN's ability towards controlling ungoverned space and defeating trans-national terrorists.

⁴⁴ Green book CH 5 pg 1

⁴⁵ Timothy C. Shea, "Transforming Military Diplomacy", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), 49.

⁴⁶ (U.S. Congress, House 2005, 22)

Battalion-Level Advisory Teams (BAT)⁴⁷

The Battalion-Level Advisory Teams (BAT) are the primary trainers and advisors to the PN's military units that are responsible for defeating transnational terrorists and controlling ungoverned spaces. The BAT's continuous presence enables it to achieve lasting changes in the PN's forces, provide the RCC and Country Team with a better understanding of the operating environment, and leverage PN relationships to defeat the terrorists and control ungoverned space.

A BAT is a team of advisors who work and live with the PN's units that are responsible for defeating transnational terrorists, controlling ungoverned spaces, and reducing popular support for the insurgency. The BAT may work with a PN's combat forces (i.e. counterterrorism units, reconnaissance units, rapid reaction force) that are responsible for destroying the terrorist units; or it could advise the PN's non-combat units (i.e. engineers, medical units, gendarmerie...) that are responsible for measures that reduce the causes for popular support of the insurgency (i.e. lack of security, infrastructure, medical care...). What differentiates a BAT from traditional forms of security assistance training is the duration of training. The BAT will have a continuous presence with the PN unit so that the training causes an enduring change in the abilities of the PN unit.

Traditional forms of security assistance training, such as Mobile Training Team (MTT) or Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), are short duration training events that usually last only a few weeks. Training for such a short time period can only achieve limited and temporary results because the unit's culture or behavior is not changed. For example, it only takes a few weeks to teach someone how to shoot a weapon well, or how to move tactically across a battlefield, but this is only a basic level of knowledge requiring reinforcement and further development before that person becomes proficient in the skill. Without the organizational

⁴⁷ The section on BATs, CATs and RATs was developed with the help of several officers who provided invaluable input, advice and critique of the authors work. The author is especially grateful to COL Wilhelm, MAJ Kelly Smith, MAJ Todd Simmons and Maj John "Smash" Schaefer for their common sense advice.

culture that has the understanding and capability to reinforce and develop these skills, the skills will rapidly entropy. The U.S. Marine Corp takes about 20 weeks to transform a civilian with no military knowledge into a Marine.⁴⁸ However, even after this long and intensive training, the Marine still has very limited capabilities and only becomes a skilled warrior after he joins his unit. At his unit, the NCOs refine and develop the new Marines skills until he is proficient enough to function properly. The Marine Corps, along with other professional militaries, has an institutional culture of continually developing and improving its Marines. This culture is critical to preventing skill entropy and it is usually lacking in most PN that are facing a terrorist threat.

The BAT works to not only train the PN on military skills, but also improve its military culture so that it can sustain and expand its martial abilities.

Cultural change is only achievable through continuous contact with the PN unit. The BAT's initial surge training provides the PN unit with a primary skill set. This requires intensive training by several U.S. advisors over a few weeks, leaving little time to work on changing the unit's culture. Once the surge training is completed, the focus can then shift to teach the PN skills to make them more professional and to change the overall culture! Since this type of training is only focused on key leaders in the PN unit (Officers and NCOs), it is less intensive, and may require fewer U.S. Advisors. Professionalism training is a combination of classroom work and practical application, with the most important learning and cultural change occurring in the daily interactions between the unit's leaders and its soldiers. Through observing and advising the unit's leaders on their daily interactions, the BAT can slowly make cultural changes in the unit that will result in a more professional unit that reinforces training and develops its soldiers, instead of allowing their skills to degrade.

For example, the BAT for PN "X", in coordination with the PN and the Embassy Country Team, identifies the 5th Commando Battalion as being a unit that is essential to controlling the

⁴⁸ Information accesses on January 11, 2006, from <http://www.lejeune.usmc.mil>; Internet.

countries vast northern ungoverned space and for defeating the terrorist residing there. A twelve-man U.S. Special Forces (SF) Team, ODA 095, is selected because of their cultural, language and military skills to be the BAT for the 5th Commando Battalion. ODA 095 deploys to PN "X" for three weeks to train the Commandos in urban warfare. Since the Commandos are already proficient in basic weapons and movement skills, the BAT focuses the training on how to conduct precision assaults on buildings to kill or capture terrorist, while minimizing collateral damage. At the end of the training, 10 of the SF Team members redeploy to their home station, while the other two remain behind to advise, train, and live with the commando unit. They will be responsible for assisting the commandos in continuing to refine and maintain their new skills, develop their leaders and prepare the unit for the next surge training in six months.

The BAT works with the command's officers and NCOs to teach them how to train, lead and develop their soldiers. Every day the BAT is in contact with the commando's leadership and begins to build relationships with the leaders that allow the BAT to understand their counterpart's strengths and weaknesses. Once the relationship is established, the BAT can then tailor its coaching/mentoring/ influencing approach so that it has the greatest impact on the individual commando leader. Over the next six months, the BAT makes small changes that begin to make lasting alterations to the command's culture.

Six months later, the rest of the ODA 095 returns to the commando unit to teach them new skills. At the end of this training, the two Team members that lived with the commandos for the past few months redeploy and two different SF Team members take over as the BAT to remain with the commandos until ODA 095 returns six months later for the next surge training. Even though the BAT members that stay behind are different, the commandos know them since they have trained together before. The reoccurring training between ODA 095 and the 5th Commando Battalion establishes a baseline relationship between the two units that allows for closer more personal relationship to more easily develop. This surge-stay behind cycle continues

until the commandos evolve into a professional military organization that can sustain and improve its military abilities.

The BAT's intimate knowledge of the PN unit is also important when the U.S. and PN conduct combined operations. It is extremely difficult to conduct effective combat operations if the first time that the U.S. and PN units work together is during the actual operation. Imagine conducting combat operations with a group of people you have never met before. This is difficult when one is conducting operations with a fellow U.S. unit who have the same resources, training and standard operating procedures (SOP). But when you do not know the PN unit's strengths and weaknesses, how they operate, or how they traditionally behave in similar situations, the magnitude of difficulty exponentially increases. Throw in a different language and culture and you have a situation that breeds confusion, distrust and may lead to disaster. The continuous contact and the relationships that the BAT has with its PN unit greatly decreases the obstacles to effective combat operations. The BAT will have intimate knowledge of the PN unit's capabilities, limitations, and SOPs. Moreover, the BAT will have established a mutual trust with the unit, so that the PN unit knows that the BAT will help them if the operation gets difficult. This knowledge and trust is only developed through continuous contact and is essential to ensuring successful U.S. and PN counter-terrorist operations.

Having a BAT that maintains a constant presence with the PN unit provides the RCC and the Country Team with ground truth situational awareness of the area that the BAT lives in. Although the BAT will continue to work with the PN unit's leaders and soldiers, the BAT's schedule will slow down to that of the PN unit. The PN unit, just like a non-deployed U.S. unit, will have working hours and down time. The down time gives the BAT the opportunity to gain an understanding for the culture and general situation of the area that the PN unit lives and operates in. It is likely that this area will be a part of the country that is far away from the capital and where the Country Team may have only occasional access.

In most cases, the BAT will be able to talk and interact with the local population. The BAT's relationship with the PN unit could enhance this interaction, if members of the unit are from the area and have friends and family there. This interaction will provide the BAT members, along with the RCC and Country Team, with valuable information, such as how the society operates, what their needs are, who the decision makers are, and how the population feels about the insurgency.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, teams of soldiers called Joint Combined Observers (JCO) and Liaison Teams (LT) lived in the communities instead of on the heavily fortified military bases with the rest of the soldiers. By living in the community, the JCO and LT teams became the Coalition Commander's main source of ground truth information on the situation in their sectors. The JCO and LT teams built relationships with the villagers and power brokers in their areas and these relationships facilitated the gathering of a tremendous amount of information. When a situation or disturbance did occur, the JCO and LT teams knew who to go to in order to find out what the problem was and usually were able to deescalate the situation before it became violent. They were also able to identify where it was important to do a civil-military operation, such as school repair or road improvements, that would positively affect the community and help improve the coalition's relationship with the community.

The BATs can fill a similar role. Living in the area for extended periods will give the BATs access to the communities. This access can be leveraged to find out the ground truth situation on the area and to identify civil-military projects. The RCC and the Country Team will use this valuable information to develop operations and programs to maintain the population's support for the PN government and not for the insurgent.

Close interaction with the PN unit and the community gives the BAT the opportunity to help the PN develop methods to find the terrorists and disrupt the terrorist's infrastructure. Finding terrorists and uncovering their infrastructure requires an approach more like police work than that of a military operation. It requires the detail collection of bits of information that are

gained through the interaction with the local population. The information by itself could be meaningless, but when properly linked with other seemingly innocuous bits of information start developing a picture of the terrorist's infrastructure. The Phoenix Program in Vietnam was an example of working with the PN unit and the local population to identify and disrupt terrorists' infrastructure. Through patient detective work, the South Vietnamese Soldiers and their U.S. advisors had great success in identifying and disrupting the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam.

The current system of security training does not provide the change in PN unit's culture that is required for them to improve their capabilities. The BAT's continuous presence with a PN unit enables it to achieve lasting improvements in the PN's forces, provide the RCC and Country Team with a better understanding of the operating environment, and leverage PN relationships to defeat the terrorists and control ungoverned space.

Country-Level Advisory Teams (CAT)

Country-Level Advisory Teams (CAT) are a resource for the RCC to use to enhance its and the embassy's understanding of the PN's environment and build relationships with the PN's security forces. The CAT accomplishes this by conducting Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) and by working with the PN's units throughout the county. These actions, in conjunction with those of the embassy and other advisory teams, enhance the PN's capability to defeat transnational terrorists and control ungoverned spaces.

The CAT is comprised of specially selected and trained individuals, whose composition and size varies depending on the mission. CAT members deploy to the PN for 2-3 years in order to have enough time in country so they can understand the PN's environment and build relationships PN's security forces. The duration of the deployment is critical for mission success. One cannot build relationships or learn about a culture overnight. This is because the CAT members are not just becoming familiar with the area, they are also learning the standard patterns

of behavior that is considered normal in that particular society, along with learning whom the power brokers and social influencers are. The CAT will map out tribal, cultural, or societal boundaries, so that the PN, RCC, and the embassy have a better understanding of the cultural lay of the land, which will better inform their COIN operations.

Selecting individuals with the right personality is critical to the success of the CAT. The CAT's members must be able to build rapport with the key players in the PN and the Country Team in order to ensure mission success. As the CAT conducts OPE and works to enhance the PN's capabilities, it will encounter groups that have different outlooks and agendas. These groups may oppose anything that the CAT wants to do just because it is U.S. military. They may wield a lot of power and sway within the PN (or embassy), restricting or facilitating the CAT's movements, actions, or ability to accomplish its mission. Opposition to the CAT may be a result of a misunderstanding or come from a fear of losing influence or power if the CAT is successful. Even supporters may have occasional doubt about what the CAT is doing. The CAT's members must have the ability to reassure the opposition and persuade them to support the CAT. This is no easy task and it requires the right kind of individual.

Although a person may be an expert on the region and have all the right military, cultural, and language skills, they will be ineffective in an environment that functions by persuasion and consensus if they cannot build and maintain rapport. Many military people are use to an environment where everyone works together towards a common goal and where orders are always carried out. However, the CAT will function in an environment where none of the key players in the country work for them. Any attempts by the CAT to force their will on the key players will be met with inaction, resistance, or could actually cause the individuals to work to undermine the CAT's efforts.

From 1955 through 1960, the Chief of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group in South Vietnam, LTG Samuel T. Williams, had an adversarial relationship with the U.S.

Ambassador to South Vietnam, which had an adverse affect on COIN operations there.⁴⁹ While both men wanted to help the South Vietnamese Government improve its capabilities and stabilize its country, they fought over the direction and control of the U.S. aid and assistance to South Vietnam. The ambassador thought that aid and assistance should go towards economic development first, and then towards developing South Vietnamese's military capabilities; while LTG Williams thought it should be in the opposite order.⁵⁰ The situation between the two men gradually worsened as each tried to undermine the actions of the other. Their feud led to delays and actions that adversely affected the United States' ability to help the South Vietnamese military and government fight the North Vietnamese supported insurgency when it was at its infancy and most susceptible to interdiction.⁵¹

A similar situation occurred with the United States' efforts to assist the government of El Salvador defeat an insurgency in their country. In the early 1980's, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which had responsibility for El Salvador, did not work well with the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. The two disagreed on the nature and manner of help that the U.S. should provide the government of El Salvador. The Ambassador wrongly believed that the CINC was trying to take actions that would widen the conflict. His perception of any action that the CINC took was clouded by his prejudices towards the military. Although the CINC did not intend to broaden U.S. Military involvement in the area, he did very little to alleviate the ambassador's fears. As a result of this adversarial relationship, the ambassador worked against the CINC and took actions to undermine his efforts, such as preventing him from even entering El Salvador. As a result, the CINC was unable to effectively coordinate the military's support, which resulted in an unsuccessful COIN campaign strategy. It was not until the Ambassador and CINC were replaced that the U.S. was able to develop and

⁴⁹ Frederick W. Schneider, *ADVISING THE ARVN: Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams in Vietnam, 1955-1960* (Ann Arbor Michigan: UMI, 1992).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 35-45.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

provide a coordinated COIN strategy to help the EL Salvadorian Government defeat the insurgency.⁵²

In addition to having the right type of personality, CAT members must come from a background where they have trained and worked with foreign militaries and must fully understand COIN operations. This is more than just being familiar with the doctrine or having a rotation in Iraq or Afghanistan. The individuals need to come from an environment where working with PN forces to fight insurgencies or terrorists is what their units were created to do. Individuals who come from conventional military units do not normally have the depth of experience that is required. Conventional units are not normally trained, equipped, nor organized to train PN units on a regular basis to conduct COIN operations. Moreover, any wholesale change in their training would restrict their ability to conduct their own mission-essential tasks. Although, conventional units are conducting COIN operations and training indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan successfully, this is not what they were designed and trained to do. Their activities in Iraq and Afghanistan are more of a reaction to a critical situation instead of an evolution in their core missions. The nation will always rely on its regular Army units to fight and win conventional land battles as their main focus. This requirement drives the conventional units training, focus, and culture. While they are highly effective in conducting COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they may not be as well suited to conduct COIN in remote areas of the world, with a very small footprint, and for an extended period of time. Only Special Operation Forces (SOF) personnel are specifically designed, trained and organized for this type of mission.

“SOF personnel perform two types of activities; they perform tasks that no other forces in the DoD can conduct, and they perform tasks that other forces conduct, but do so to a unique set

⁵² A J. Bacevich, *AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY IN SMALL WARS: The Case of El Salvador* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), III-VII.

of conditions and standards.”⁵³ “SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the following nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information operations.”⁵⁴

Of these core tasks, FID uniquely qualifies SOF personnel to be members of CATs. FID consists of operations “that involve participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”⁵⁵ Although “both conventional and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID missions, SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity is to assess, train, advise, and assist PN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities.”⁵⁶ What differentiates SOF from conventional units in this regard is that SOF personnel receive extensive language, cultural, and military training that enables them to work directly with the PN’s forces for an extended period of time. If the CAT members do not come from a SOF background, they will need to receive a great deal of additional training to bring them up to the level of SOF personnel. Even with this additional training, there is the risk that they will fall back on conventional means of fighting and training when faced with an unfamiliar situation, because they come from a background where the conventional methodology is ingrained in their culture.

In Vietnam and El Salvador, military advisors came largely from a conventional military background where they trained their whole career to fight conventional wars against the Soviet hordes. When they became military advisors, they naturally fell back on their experiences, and

⁵³, pg II-3.

⁵⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, JP 3-05, *DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS*, 2003, (accessed on March 23, 2006), available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm>; Internet, II-4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, II-7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, II-7.

organized and trained the Vietnamese and El Salvadorian militaries to fight using conventional tactics instead of COIN tactics.

LTG William's strategy for training and organizing the South Vietnamese military was influenced by his experiences in WWII and the Korean War. Guerrilla warfare was "totally alien to anything he had experienced previously"⁵⁷ and he therefore organized, trained and equipped the South Vietnamese military in such a way that was appropriate for a conventional fight against a standing army-such as the North Koreans, but was inappropriate for the COIN fight against the Viet Cong insurgents.

In El Salvador, U.S. military advisors, who studied and trained to fight the Soviet Army in the Fulda Gap in Germany, initially trained the El Salvadorian military to fight the same way. Their conventional tactics, while effective on the planes of Europe, were disastrous and counterproductive against an insurgency. It was not until later in the conflict, when U.S. Special Forces took over a majority of the advisory missions, that the advisors were able to encourage the El Salvadorian military to abandon large-scale sweeps and saturation patrolling, for more effective COIN operations.⁵⁸ The change in tactics led to greater success against the communist insurgents, and eventually contributed to the insurgent's defeat.

Once selected, the CAT members will need targeted training so they can operate effectively in the PN. The CAT members will need an understanding of the PN's culture and language so that they will be familiar with the general social norms, customs and history of the country and region as a foundation, which they can build upon while deployed there.

⁵⁷ Schneider, 19.

⁵⁸ Benjamin C. Schwarz, AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY DOCTRINE AND EL SALVADOR: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1990), 17-19.

They will need advanced language training in order to have a “general language proficiency”.⁵⁹ This general proficiency will enable the CAT members to read, speak, and understand the PN’s language at a level where they will not need to rely exclusively on interpreters. This is very important, while using an interpreter unavoidable at times; even the best interpreters act as a filter and do not pass on all of the conversation, which could cause important information to be lost. Only when the CAT members have a strong grasp of the language will they be able to function without an interpreter.

The CAT will also need training that provides them with the skills they need to work more effectively with the Country Team and NGOs. Most members of the military work at the tactical level, where their actions only directly affect the area they are working in. Few have been exposed to situations where their actions have far-reaching influence on neighboring countries and regions. The members of the Country Team, interagency, and NGOs understand that actions by a few in one part of the world could have global ramifications. The CAT members must also think in this way and need to receive training on not only how the interagency works and thinks, but they also need to develop a comprehensive understanding about the current political, and international security issues for their region. This knowledge will equip the CAT with new approaches, insights, and problem solving tools that could be applied to their mission, and give them a regional-security context within to operate. When they understand how their actions and the PN fit into the regional “big picture”, they will be better prepared to work with and enhance the RCC and Country Teams efforts.

This specialized training can be achieved in a number of ways. The Marine Corps and the Air Force send some of their regional specialist and foreign area officers (FAO) to the Naval Postgraduate School for a graduate degree, then to the Defense Language Institute for language

⁵⁹ United States Army Regulation 611-6, section 2-1, page 4, describes a language proficiency skill level 3 as being of a general proficiency. It has been the author’s experience that any language level less than that would require the individual to rely almost exclusively on an interpreter to translate documents and conversations.

training, followed by emersion training in their targeted country."⁶⁰ The U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASOC) and other SOF organizations already train their soldiers to a basic level of cultural and language proficiency. The SOF personnel would therefore only need to attend graduate school and a shorter duration language refresher training to bring them to the necessary level to operate on a CAT.

Once the CAT members are trained, they will be deployed to the areas of the PN's country that most directly influence the PN's ability to control ungoverned spaces and defeat the terrorist. Although there may be a need to have CAT members in the PN's capital in order to coordinate U.S. and PN actions, the CAT is most effective in the remote areas of the country where the PN and the embassy have less of a presence, and are not as familiar with the environment of these areas. The CAT can then conduct OPE, build relationships with the PN security forces and local population, and provide information back to the embassy and RCC. This information can then be used to inform the embassy's and the RCC's plans for enhancing the PN's capabilities.

The main focus for the CAT is to conduct OPE. The CAT's *raison d'être* is to learn about and absorb the culture of their targeted area by immersing themselves into its society. The CAT will do what the smart traveler does when visiting a new city or country. A smart traveler goes to places where the locals congregate and learn where the good places are to eat, where the local places of interest are, and they discover which bad parts of the city to avoid. Although the CAT is not interested in the local hotspots for the same reason as the tourist, they take a similar approach in order to achieve the desired end state of learning about the area's environment. This should not be viewed as a "boondoggle" or a bunch of military people hanging out in coffee shops and sipping cappuccinos. This is very important, demanding, and sometimes-dangerous work and it is essential to the COIN effort.

⁶⁰ "International Affairs Specialists to Enter Training Pipeline", *Air Force News* (accessed 14 February 2006); available at <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123016250>; Internet.

The CAT will also be responsible for establishing relationships and building rapport with the PN's security forces in their area. These relationships will provide the CAT, embassy, and RCC with detailed information on the capabilities, limitations and needs of the PN's security forces. The CAT's relationships complement those created by the BATs because they focus on the PN's units that do not have a BAT directly operating with them. The BAT works to enhance the tactical skills of battalion-sized elements, while the CAT helps enhance the capabilities of the PN's regional and supporting units.

The CAT receives its security or protection through its close relationship with the security forces. To be effective and cover the most territory possible, the CAT will operate in small 2-3 man teams. Lightly armed and traveling throughout the countryside, the CAT can potentially be very vulnerable. Adding additional U.S. security forces as guards for the CAT would create a large U.S. footprint and hinder the CAT member's ability to get close to the local people. However, the CAT member's will be able to use their strong relationships with the PN's security forces for protection. If necessary, security forces can accompany the CAT members to protect them, or put the word out that the CAT is not to be attacked. Moreover, if the CAT identifies individuals from the security force who come from a certain town, tribe, or area, they can leverage their relationships to make inroads in those areas.

Another focus of the CAT is to help coordinate interagency and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) programs in the remote parts of the PN. Most of the solutions to the social-economic problems that cause the population to support the insurgents or terrorist are not military in nature. They are solutions such as providing jobs, clean drinking water, an equitable voice in the political process, better law enforcement, or a fair and transparent judicial process. These issues are best resolved by the interagency or NGOs who are trained to handle them. Unfortunately, these organizations do not have the same manpower resources that the U.S. DoD has. Embassies in these parts of the world are small and NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières cannot be in every place that needs them. While the CAT members cannot duplicate the work nor

take the place of these organizations, they can identify the population's needs and coordinate through the Country Team and RCC to have these organizations provide the right kind of help to the places where it will have the greatest impact.

Not only does this include training and humanitarian assistance that the interagency or NGOs provide, it could also be skills that only the business world can provide. If the RCC, embassy, or PN wants to conduct Social marketing to identify how to meet the population's needs better, the CAT is in an excellent position to identify and hire locals who can be trained by civilian contractors to conduct social marketing and conduct surveys. Using individuals from the targeted area puts a local, trusted face on the surveys, and people are more likely to be forthcoming with surveyors that they feel they can trust. Not only will using locals to conduct surveys give the PN feedback that is more honest, it will provide jobs for the local population and establish a lasting mechanism that the PN can tap into later on. The CAT member's familiarity with the area, which comes from living amongst the people, puts them in the best position to facilitate other organization's efforts to provide needed services to the PN.

The CAT members can also gauge the population's opinion through local media sources. Local newspapers, radio, and television stations are more focused on the local issues than are the national media outlets. While the U.S. government and the embassies review media sources from all over the world, they do not have the time and resources to review the smaller media sources. The CAT members can fill this important gap by reading and listening to the relevant media sources in their area, or by hiring trusted locals to provide them with an "early-bird" like summary. This second option requires identifying the right locals and teaching them what is and is not important news. Moreover, once the right person is hired, he could provide non-intelligence information such as the mood and feelings of the population he lives with, along with speeches and sermons from town council meetings and Mosques. Identifying and training the right locals is not something that can be as effectively accomplished by the Country Team since they would not be as familiar with the locals as a CAT member who lives amongst them.

The CAT's efforts will only be successful if they have a good working relationship with not only the PN, but also the embassy and the Country Team. The CAT also needs to have a command and control (C2) relationship that is not only acceptable to the RCC and the embassy, but which also allows the CAT freedom to accomplish their mission. This C2 relationship is a complicated and contentious issue. The Ambassador is the President's representative to the PN, and as such, is responsible for all U.S. personnel's actions in the country. The Ambassador or Chief of Mission may be concerned that the CAT could unintentionally damage politically sensitive relationships if they do something that embassy does not know about or has not approved. However, the RCC cannot give the embassy operational or even tactical control of the CAT, because the embassy does not have command authority and the RCC would be concerned that the CAT could be used inappropriately. The solution may be that the RCC retains operational control of the CAT, while the Ambassador exercises his "Chief of Mission Authority."⁶¹ Prior to the deployment of the CAT, the RCC would sign a memorandum of agreement or understanding with the Ambassador that generally describes what the CAT will do, where it will operate, how it would coordinate its actions with the embassy, and its reporting requirements to the embassy. The intent of the memorandum is to respect the Chief of Mission Authority by getting an upfront approval the CAT's mission, and establishing the mechanisms for coordinating the CAT's actions with the embassy. At the same time, it allows the CAT a degree of freedom to operate by not having to go back to the Ambassador every time they want to do something, as long as they operate within the agreed operational boundaries.

⁶¹ This solution was developed through e-mail discourses by the author with individuals who work at DoS, JS, OSD and the RCC.




Figure 1: CAT Command and Control Relationship with the RCC and the US Embassy

Regional-Level Advisory Teams (RAT)

As their name implies, the RAT has a regional focus in order to synchronize efforts against transnational terrorist organizations, which are not tied to a single country. This regional focus allows the U.S. Government and multiple PN to work together to control ungoverned space and defeat the terrorists. The RAT will coordinate and synchronize the actions of all of the CATs and BATs in the region in order to achieve this unified effort.

The U.S. government currently has several methods for the development of a regional strategy. DoD has the RCC’s develop Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) to synchronization their activities on a regional basis, and to demonstrate how these activities support national strategic objectives.⁶²

⁶² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*, 24 May 2005, pg A-1, sec 3.

The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) develop annual Strategic Plans to provide direction and priorities for both organizations in the coming years. The Strategic Plan defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance as well as DoS's priorities in the coming years, and presents how the Department and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance in support of the policy positions set forth in the National Security Strategy.⁶³

Although DoD and DoS take regional approaches and link their strategies to the National Security Strategy, regional level coordination does not always occur. While the RCC controls and directs all of the military forces operating in his region, DoS does not have the same control over its embassies. DoS has "regional bureaus" which "deal with U.S. foreign policy and U.S. relations with the countries" in their regions, but the bureaus do not directly control the ambassador.⁶⁴ Although the ambassadors are subordinate to the Secretary of State, the President appoints the ambassadors and they have direct access to him. If the ambassadors have plans that are different from those of the regional bureaus, they can by-pass them and appeal directly to the President. This causes some breakdown in DoS's efforts to develop a regional strategy, and is especially troublesome because the most effective COIN strategies need to have DoS and the interagency as a main effort and DoD as a supporting effort. Any DoD efforts to coordinate directly with DoS on a regional strategy must also be coordinated with each ambassador.

The RAT can help facilitate interagency coordination to enable a regional approach to enhancing PN's capabilities. The RAT, located on the staff of the RCC's Theater Special Operations Command, would work for the RCC and be responsible for synchronizing PN enhancement and COIN actions in a specific region. The RAT would synchronize and manage the actions of the CATs and BATs and coordinate with the embassies in his region. His regional

⁶³ U.S. Department of State. *Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan* (accessed February 23, 2006), available at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat>; Internet.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State. *Department of State's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs's Mission Statement* (accessed on 23 February 2006), available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eap>; Internet.

expertise, which comes from previous experience as a CAT, enables him to work more effectively with the different embassies, as opposed to a typical RCC staff officer who has little experience in the region. This experience and regional knowledge will enable him to build strong working relationships with the different embassies and the relevant PN units. His position on the RCC staff gives him access to coordinate directly with the rest of the interagency for a unified interagency approach to the region.

The RAT synchronizes and manages the actions of the CATs and BATs by working with the RCC and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to ensure a continuous flow of trainers and support for the PN. The RAT would coordinate with USSOCOM and the RCC to have continuous BAT and CAT support for the PN units that needs them the most. The RAT would also coordinate with the interagency for specialized trainers, like those that train security forces in forensics, and for development aid to the regions that need them the most. The RAT also supports the CATs and BATs by coordinating IMET training for promising PN officers, identified by the CATs and BATS. The IMET training will enhance the PN officer's capabilities, provide him with a higher standing in his military, and build U.S. influence with him.

Additionally, the RAT would sponsor regional training events and workshop to enhance the region's effectiveness. These events would aim to enhance the skill of the PN representatives who attend them, and facilitate the building of relationships between members of different PN. Once PNs form these relationships, it will be that much easier for the RCC to coordinate a regional response.

Finally, the RAT plays an essential role during combat operations by turning borders into boundaries. Transnational terrorists are not constrained by international borders. When threatened in one country, they can move their operation to another country without fear of being pursued. The country with the terrorist problem does not have the same freedom of maneuver. His forces must stop at the border and watch helplessly as the terrorists escape. He also probably has no means to coordinate with the security forces of the neighboring country to alert them of

the terrorist's movements or to work together to defeat the organization. The RAT can help turn international borders into boundaries where information and coordinated action flows freely across. The RAT leverages the CAT's and the embassies' connections with the different PNs and acts as a conduit for the sharing of information between PNs, while coordinating military action between two or more PN. For example, in Figure 2, a transnational terrorist organization operates in the ungoverned territory where countries A, B, and C meet. The RAT, in conjunction with the RCC and the embassies, facilitates the flow of information and intelligence on the organization between the CATs in each country. The CATs share this information with the PN and work to develop a plan to defeat the terrorists. The RAT coordinates the blocking action of Country A's forces, as Countries B's, and C's forces attack the terrorists. If Country C finds itself in hot pursuit of terrorists across Country A's border, the RAT helps coordinate for Country C to continue the pursuit into Country A or to handover the attack to Country A's forces so that they can finish the job. All the while the CATs and BATs are embedded with their PN units to pass information, and advise and assist the PN on its fight.




Figure 2: The Role of the RAT and RCC During Regional Operations

RAT and CAT vs. FAO

The RATs and CATs complement DoD's FAO program by providing individuals with similar training as the FAO, but who come from a COIN background and who stay in the Operational Career Field.

DoD directed the military services to establish a FAO program that "uses commissioned officers with a broad range of military experiences; have knowledge of political-military affairs; have familiarity with the environmental factors of the countries and regions in which they are stationed; and have professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant languages in their regions of expertise."⁶⁵ The program's purpose is to "facilitate close and continuous military-diplomatic interaction with foreign governments and, in particular, with their defense and military establishments, which is essential to developing and maintaining constructive mutually supportive, bilateral and multilateral military activities and relationships across the range of operations."⁶⁶

At first glance, the FAO and the RAT/CAT members seem the same, but the difference lies in the individuals' experiences. Both the FAO and the advisory teams receive language, cultural, and graduate level training so that they can operate effectively in the PN. However, only the advisory team members are selected for their background and experiences of working with PN units and conducting COIN operations. The RAT/CAT members all have an extensive background in COIN operations that will enable them to more effectively organize, train, and advise the PN in its COIN fight. This is not a skill that a typical FAO has because they are drawn from across the military community, and it is not one that can be learned in a classroom. A RAT/CAT member comes from a background that cannot be duplicated elsewhere in the military. Throughout their career, they learn about, and train on COIN skills, and execute COIN operations

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of Defense Directive DoDD1315.17, *MILITARY DEPARTMENT FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) PROGRAMS*, 2005, (accessed March 23, 2006), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir1.html>; Internet, sec 3-3, pg 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, sec 3-1, pg 2.

around the world. Most members of the military become experts in their specific functional areas (armor, finance, signal...) and are trained with a conventional background. This causes them to develop a conventional mindset or culture, as opposed to a RAT/CAT member with their COIN mindset.

For example, a Special Forces (SF) officer typically begins his military career as regular officer in an infantry or combat arms unit. He will most likely deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan at least once while he is in their unit and gain initial exposure to COIN operations. Around his third or fourth year of service, the officer goes through Special Forces Officer Qualification Course (SFOQC) where, among other things, he learns a language, more about COIN operations, and working with foreign militaries. For the next two to three years, the SF officer will command a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SF ODA), and will deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan, and as a member of a BAT to train PN units in COIN operations. Around his seventh year of service, selected SF officers would enter the RAT/CAT program and attend the Naval Postgraduate School Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict program for graduate training, and receive additional language, cultural and specialty skills training to prepare them to serve on a CAT.⁶⁷ The officer will then deploy for two to three years to a PN. After the officer has returned from his tour as a CAT member, and has served as a SF company commander and staff officer, where he will continue to work in Iraq, Afghanistan, or training PN in COIN operations, the officer is again available to serve on a CAT or RAT.

⁶⁷ The Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA., is an 18 month, thesis based program designed to provide a student with a broad based course of instruction focused on strategic, operational, and tactical employment of special operations; insurgency/counterinsurgency theories; and unconventional warfare. This program is unique in its approach because it utilizes the entire curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School by providing a set of core instruction followed by modular areas of specialization. The program confers a Masters degree and meets MEL 4 requirements for SF officer's career progression. Additional language, cultural, and specialty skills training would occur at the U.S. Army's Special Warfare School at FT. Bragg, N.C.




Figure 3: Example of a Career Timeline for a SF Officer Serving on a CAT or RAT

This career path provides DoD with an officer who has unique COIN, language, and cultural training and experiences, and also keeps the officer competitive for promotion and career progression. This provides DoD with an operational career field officers that can serve at higher levels of command where his PN and interagency skills are invaluable. The FAO program does not provide its officers with the same career progression opportunities. Although a few FAOs go on to be high-ranking officers, they have significantly less of a chance of attaining higher rank and positions of command than does an operational career field officer.

Another significant difference with the FAO program is that the RATs/CATs will also have Warrant Officers (WO) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) as its members, as opposed to the FAO program that selects only officers. In the SOF community, WOs and NCOs have a tremendous amount of experience and expertise in training PN units and COIN operations. These mature individuals bring a wealth of knowledge and capability to the RATs/CATs, and with the same additional training as the RAT/CAT officers, can increase the pool of capable operators to serve on RATs/CATs.

One alternative that could provide the FAO program with individuals who have the same level of expertise as the advisory program, is to select individuals with a COIN background for

the FAOs program, but this is not realistic. The individuals who have extensive COIN training and experience are found predominantly in the SOF career fields. SOF personnel are in high demand in the Global War on Terrorism and DoD cannot afford to permanently transfer them to the FAO career field where they could end up as a security assistance officer in France. Additionally, most of these individuals joined SOF for the specific kind of missions that they do and would not be interested in permanently changing jobs to be a FAO.

The RAT/CAT program allows DoD to capitalize on an current SOF capabilities (language and cultural skills, along with a COIN background) to enhance DoD's existing programs, without reducing the number of SOF forces available for other operations.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

The Department of Defense must establish specially trained and selected advisory teams that immerse themselves in the country for 2-3 years, and who work at the regional, country and unit level, provide the cultural understanding and regional coordination that is required to defeat transnational terrorist and control ungoverned space.

Through out history governments have successfully deployed uniquely skilled men and women to some of the most remote countries of the world to learn about its culture and people, with an eye towards enhancing their allies' abilities to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. They found that deploying individuals for extended periods was an economic way to gain an in-depth understanding of the remote area and to develop relationships with the local power brokers.

The United States needs to reintroduce this practice in order to wage its Global War on Terrorism more effectively. Small groups of specially selected and trained advisory teams that live in remote regions of the world will enhance our PN's abilities to control ungoverned spaces and defeat transnational terrorists.

By immersing themselves in the PN's society, these advisory teams will acquire a detailed understanding of the population and its culture, and also ensure a unified U.S./PN governmental approach to the COIN operations. An informed, regionally oriented, and interagency approach to enhancing the PN's capabilities will enable the U.S. Government to achieve its goal of, "denying terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength, train, plan, and execute their attacks. ...to choke off the lifeblood of terrorist groups—their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit.

This approach will therefore weaken terrorist organizations and their ability to conduct operations.”⁶⁸

DoD must be form these new advisory teams comprised of operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures, and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence-rather than through military force alone. These advisory teams must be focused on the nations that are critical to the U.S.’s GWOT and be develop at the regional, country and PN unit level, to improve the U.S. Government’s ability to enhance the PN’s capability to defeat transnational terrorist and control ungoverned spaces.

The advisory teams will be under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC), but will operate under Chief of Mission authority, thru a memorandum of understanding, to ensure a coordinated interagency effort towards the PN and the region. The main effort of the program will be with the Country Advisory and Training (CATs) and Regional Advisory and Training (RATs) teams. These team will be comprised of specially selected SOF officers, warrant officers, and NCOs who receive language, and cultural training, and a graduate level education, so they may operate more effectively in the PN. They will deploy to the PN for 2-3 years in order to understand the PN and region’s environment. The Battalion Advisory and Training (BATs) teams concentrate on maintaining a continuous presence with the PN units in order to increase their capabilities and improve their professionalism by helping them evolve their military culture.

⁶⁸ U.S National Security Council, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 2003, (accessed March 23, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>; Internet, 17.

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