

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE BUSH AFRICAN POLICY: FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

Lieutenant Colonel Charlene D. Jefferson
United States Air Force

Ambassador Margaret K. McMillion
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “disease, war, and desperate poverty threaten the U.S.’s core value of preserving dignity as well as our strategic priority of combating global terrorism.” Africa, torn apart by war, religious strife, disease and poverty, and marked by corruption, weak judicial and financial regulatory systems, porous borders and unregulated coastlines, unfortunately epitomizes this NSS excerpt and is emerging as a haven for terrorists. These and other factors such as lack of education create an atmosphere of hopelessness that nurtures breeding grounds for international terrorist groups. Although these factors do not automatically create terrorism or a terrorist, they are likely factors in determining whether an alienated person turns to extremist violence if potential sources of dissatisfaction are not addressed through effective and meaningful programs.

The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that the fight against international terrorism is a long-term battle against the “underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism.” This campaign thus involves tackling broader societal problems: poverty, social disorder, lack of democracy, and poor governance.

This paper establishes the link between each pillar of the Bush African policy and the goals of our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and makes recommendations to strengthen those links.

THE BUSH AFRICAN POLICY: FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Traditionally, Africa has had a marginal role in U.S. foreign policy. After 9/11 the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism identified East Africa and the Horn, especially Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Tanzania, to be at great risk to terrorist organizations determined to strike U.S. allies and interests.¹ East Africa, particularly Somalia, continues to pose the most serious threat to American interests due to the presence of al Qaeda elements.²

Northern Africa serves as a transit route for terrorists headed to Europe.³ Additionally, growing numbers of North Africans, mainly from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco have been identified fighting with the jihadists engaged in the insurgency in Iraq according to the U.S. European Command.⁴ Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 2003 Moroccan bombings, extremist Islamist cells of the Salfiya Jihadiya were uncovered in nearly every major Moroccan city. These cells were in various stages of planning and organizing terrorist actions against the Government of Morocco.⁵

The Sahel region's immense size and physical geography, combined with weak central authority, make border control and law enforcement exceedingly difficult; vast areas are ungoverned or ungovernable. No longer isolated from the rest of the world, the traditional caravan routes in this region now serve as conduits for illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking, as well as a hideout and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and criminals.⁶

In parts of West Africa, we have seen dramatic rises in the level of anti-American and extremist Islamic rhetoric, most notably in northern Nigeria, a country of 133 million (of which 67 million are Muslim). The armed insurgency is a serious problem in the delta region of Nigeria, where the bulk of the oil industry is concentrated. Violent acts against the oil industry pose a serious threat to American interests and to the inexperienced democratic government of Nigeria.⁷ The U.S. currently gets 17% of its fuel supplies from West Africa and Angola and will soon rise to 21 percent and then 40 percent by 2020.⁸

Lack of sovereign control and general weakness characterize the terrorist threat in Central Africa.⁹ The Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) dominant position in Central Africa is key to overall stability in the region. The crisis in D.R.C. has its roots both in the use of the Congo as a base by various insurgency groups attacking neighboring countries and in the absence of a strong Congolese Government with a military capable of securing Congo's borders.¹⁰

Organized crime supporting terrorism such as smuggled weapons and narcotics trafficking is more prominent in South Africa than other regions. The use of violent tactics to achieve a political goal is very familiar to South Africans who have emerged from an era where violence was used both by the government to maintain the status quo and by forces antagonistic to the government in attempts to end apartheid.¹¹

Although the emergence of an exportable African type of terrorism is unlikely, the inability of African states to control their own territory and to protect potential targets of terrorist attacks suggests that Africa could be the weakest link in this war. The relatively porous nature of African states and the weakness of the African governments in detecting terrorists mean that the continent may well serve as either a transit point or a sanctuary for transnational terrorists. Poverty, another key issue, does not create terrorists but it can create the conditions in which terrorists flourish.¹² This situation of an unlikely African terrorism could change if potential sources of dissatisfaction are not addressed through effective and meaningful programs; America's war on terrorism must not neglect Africa if it is to succeed.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that "disease, war, and desperate poverty threaten the U.S.'s core value of preserving dignity as well as our strategic priority of combating global terrorism."¹³ As recognized in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the fight against international terrorism is a long-term battle against the "underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism." The strategy details four goals: "(1) **defeat** terrorist organizations of global reach; (2) **deny** further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; (3) **diminish** the underlying conditions, as stated previously; and, 4) **defend** the U.S., its citizens, and interests at home and abroad."¹⁴

The three pillars of the Bush African policy are: (1) a strategic approach requiring engagement with key African anchor states and the African Union (AU); (2) clear policy priorities, to include the HIV/AIDS pandemic; advancing political and economic freedom; and promoting peace and regional stability; and (3) furthering the principles of bilateral engagement to include good governance, economic reform, promotion of health and education, and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).¹⁵ This paper establishes the link between each pillar of the Bush African policy and the goals of our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and makes recommendations to strengthen those links.

A Strategic Approach

Anchor States. The partnership between the U.S. and Africa is the key to stability, prosperity, and the spread of democracy. The NSS looks at Africa in terms of its sub-regions with anchor states to pursue our four priorities in each: Kenya-East Africa; Ethiopia-the Horn of Africa; Nigeria-West Africa; and, South Africa-Southern Africa.¹⁶ It does not, however, identify an anchor state in Central Africa mainly because at the time the NSS was drafted, Central Africa was a region of tremendous turmoil and conflict.

The Republic of Congo (ROC) is an increasingly strong candidate to be Central Africa's anchor state particularly with its president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, becoming the newly-elected chairman of the AU endorsed by the U.S.¹⁷ Although relations between the U.S. and the Congo were strained during the Congolese-Marxist era, tensions eased with the onset of democracy in 1991 with both countries expressing interest in expanding interactions with each other. Unfortunately, the outbreak of war in the Congo in 1997 caused the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville; however, the suspension of operations was lifted in 2001. As a result, U.S.-Congo bilateral relations have been revived with a goal of reestablishing a permanent new Embassy.¹⁸

Additionally, the administration has declared that African oil is "of national strategic interest" to the U.S. given that the U.S. is likely to import two out of every three barrels of its oil by 2020.¹⁹ The ROC is one of sub-Saharan Africa's main oil producers. Oil is the dominant sector of the economy, representing about 52 percent of GDP, 83 percent of exports, and 71.8 percent of total government revenue.²⁰

For the last two years, the ROC government has embarked on a program of economic reforms, supported by the Bretton Woods institutions, and in particular by the World Bank under an Emergency Recovery Credit, and by the International Monetary Fund under the emergency post-conflict assistance policy. The overall improvement of political and security conditions allowed the government to make good progress towards restoring macroeconomic and financial stability. Structural reforms have also been launched in economic governance, public expenditure management, poverty reduction, transparency, the financial sector, and public enterprises.²¹ These reforms, coupled with its oil dominance and the AU's affirmation by electing ROC's president as chairman, make ROC a clear choice for Central Africa's anchor state.

The African Union. Over the last decade there has been a dramatic rise in U.S. strategic interests in Africa: in combating terrorism, ensuring steady and reliable energy supplies,

combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, promoting democratization, and ending Africa's chronic wars that undermine hope for economic growth and development within an expanding global economy. To meet these rising U.S. national interests in Africa requires an effective U.S. policy that looks out into the future and that identifies competent and like-minded partners on the continent.²² The African Union is just such a key emergent partner. It has embraced many of the same values and goals that mirror U.S. policy, and is showing early progress.

In 2001, the transformation of the AU indicated a new determination among several key African leaders to take greater responsibility for shaping the continent's future. Most significantly, these leaders consciously committed the AU to play a proactive role in ending Africa's conflicts and in setting credible new norms for economic and political governance.²³ In concert, the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is anchored on the determination of Africans to free themselves and the continent from the depression of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world.²⁴

With the formation of the AU and the parallel initiative, NEPAD, a new consensus began to emerge around the paradigm of human—versus state—security, and the collective responsibility of Africans to protect that security. This has translated into a far greater willingness by African leaders to mediate conflicts among their continental neighbors and to begin to lay down standards of good governance, economic stewardship, and meeting basic needs in health, education, and other social services.²⁵

Today's terrorists operate worldwide. Terrorists often raise funds in one country, plan and train in another, and conduct operations in a third—all the while communicating, recruiting, and traveling across borders. No single nation can defeat this multinational threat alone. With the aid of international institutions (like the U.N.) and regional and sub-regional groups (like the AU), countries can join together to take the necessary actions to defeat terrorists. Nations can prevent and disrupt terrorist activity by working to secure borders, control illegal immigration, strengthen customs enforcement, and develop strong legal and financial regulatory systems to criminalize terrorism and terrorism finance. Furthermore, by organizing shared resources to provide capacity-building assistance, nations may be able to deter terrorists from targeting weaker states or from using them for safe havens or fundraising. And by sharing information, as well as coordinating joint investigations and efforts to bring terrorists to justice, a serious blow can be dealt to terrorism. This is why it is so important to strengthen and energize international, regional, and sub-regional organizations and groups.

Multilateral efforts start at the U.N. Through the U.N. Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, the U.S. has worked to assist Africa to implement U.N. Security Council

Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 requiring all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, suppress terrorist recruitment, and deny terrorists safe haven. Thirty-three of the 48 African countries have taken steps to implement UNSCR 1373²⁶ helping to defeat terrorist organizations by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control and communications and deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary by cooperating with other states.

To build a more systematic, reliable, bi-partisan, and long-term engagement with the AU, the U.S. will need to implement two steps. A critical first step is for the U.S. to appoint a fully accredited U.S. ambassador to the AU.²⁷ The U.S. has taken this step with several other regional organizations (NATO, OAS, APEC, and EU) to the considerable benefit of U.S. foreign policy interests. Such an appointment to the AU, with adequate authority and staff support, will help ensure consistency of U.S. approach, signal the seriousness of U.S. purpose, and allow a single focal point for U.S. engagement on both immediate priorities and the longer-term challenges, all with a view towards stamping out the seeds of terrorism. A second, critical step is for the U.S. to define a realistic, dynamic strategy of long-term engagement with the AU, and to tie that strategy systematically to consistent, reliable baseline funding. If the U.S. is to be credible and reliable in assisting the AU to acquire key new capacities it should be looking out at least a decade in this engagement and begin setting targets for support in the following areas: (1) helping build the AU's capacity to resolve conflicts through targeted training and strengthening regional peacekeeping capacities; (2) helping to standardize and strengthen emerging norms on governance and economic stewardship; and (3) helping strengthen approaches to chronic and infectious diseases (to include HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria) and the environment.

Clear Policy Priorities by Furthering the Principles of Bilateral Engagement.

The idea of what constitutes a security threat has changed. These threats are much more likely to accelerate in places where government is weak and where there are a large number of people who live painful and difficult lives. Simply put, a disturbing new formula may be emerging; AIDS creates economic devastation. Economic devastation creates an atmosphere where stable governments cannot function. When stable governments cannot effectively function, terrorism thrives by exploiting the underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change.²⁸ The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has extraordinary reach into the African community with missions in 25 sub-Saharan countries to help reverse this formula. As such, USAID has embraced three goals

to diminish underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit: supporting transformational development (governance, human services such as health and education, and economic growth); strengthening fragile states; and, supporting U.S. geostrategic interests (for example, aiding allies to move toward becoming a more stable, prosperous, democratic society). These three goals support the Bush African policy of advancing political and economic freedom. A fourth USAID goal of addressing transnational problems supports the HIV/AIDS priority of the Bush African policy. USAID's Primer also echoes these sentiments stating "each of these goals is vitally relevant to combating terrorism and strengthening American security at home and abroad."²⁹

Combating the HIV/AIDS Pandemic. The growing HIV/AIDS pandemic threatens to compromise the economic, social, and democratic gains made in Africa in recent decades. Sub-Saharan Africa has been far more severely affected by AIDS than any other world region.³⁰ Although little research has been done to link the orphan crisis and terrorism, it is undeniable that AIDS has created a steady stream of orphans who can be exploited and used for terrorist activities. Without caring adults to protect them, children can be manipulated into doing almost anything. Hundreds of thousands of children as young as 10-years-old have been forced to fight in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo Rwanda, and other African countries. However, not all children are forced to become fighters. Some join out of desperation. The AIDS epidemic has created thousands of parentless households headed by children as young as five, and armed groups are often the only entities that can provide children with the basic necessities to secure food, water and shelter for themselves and their siblings.³¹

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), implemented by the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, overall appears on target to meet the administration's five-year spending plan with \$8.7 billion funded from FY 2004 through 2006. As of June 2005, the U.S. has supported HIV/AIDS counseling and testing services for over 3.5 million people. Moreover, the goal to fund care for over 1.1 million HIV positive persons, AIDS orphans and vulnerable children was exceeded by supporting over 2 million people between September 2004 and March 2005.³²

In contrast, the Global Fund, which relies on multiple donors, is reporting a funding gap that may prevent it from awarding new grants to fight the pandemic. The Fund estimates that it needs \$3.3 billion in 2006 and 2007 to cover the renewal of its existing grants, in addition to an additional \$3.7 billion in order to fund new rounds of grant-making. At a September 2005 Global Fund pledging conference, donors offered a total of \$3.7 billion for the two years. Unless

additional pledges are made, the Fund will be able do little more than fund existing grants. Legislative provisions limit the U.S. contribution to 33 percent of the amount contributed by all donors. U.S. 2006 funding for the Fund is \$650 million.³³

Two options should be considered to resolve shortfalls within the Global Fund. The first option would be a concerted U.S. effort to persuade other donor countries to increase their contributions to the Global Fund arguing that the U.S. is using its substantial bilateral capabilities to carry out a large scale effort against AIDS under PEPFAR. This should not be left to the Global AIDS Coordinator; the President and Secretary of State should also strongly advocate support for the Global Fund in public forums and in their meetings with foreign leaders. A second option would be an effort to persuade private sector donors, foundations, and the general public to contribute to the Global Fund. To date, non-governmental sources apart from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have contributed only modest amounts to the Global Fund³⁴ suggesting great untapped potential for larger contributions from alternative sources.

Additionally, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe have higher rates of adult HIV prevalence than five of the current PEPFAR focus countries.³⁵ USAID expends millions of dollars each year in assistance to Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe through its Regional HIV/AIDS Program (RHAP). Since the RHAP programs in Lesotho and Swaziland may include the range of prevention, treatment, care and support activities that are necessary to accomplish the goals outlined in PEPFAR, the administration should consider adding them as focus countries to increase the odds of reaching PEPFAR goals. Conversely, until the Mugabe government of Zimbabwe allows a return to democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, and a restored economy,³⁶ the U.S. should not elevate its diplomatic standing by making Zimbabwe a PEPFAR focus country.

Advancing Political Freedom through Good Governance. In its findings and recommendations to the U.S. Congress, the 9/11 Commission Report examined how political instability could create an ideal breeding ground for terrorism in Africa.³⁷

Good governance and political stability are closely intertwined and, if present, address all four counterterrorism goals. Another important factor is the lack of civil liberties: the more civil liberties a nation has, the less likely people are to engage in terrorism. It is not hard to understand why this might be so. When a person is able to participate in society openly and to promote their ideas to others, there will not be as much of a temptation to participate by resorting to violence. When they have a chance to make their ideas count through the ballot

box, they are less likely to make their ideas count with a bomb. Excluding some from participating in what happens in society is a sure way to push them to find other means, and very often, the only other means available to them is violence of some sort.

USAID supports the application of democratic principles and good governance by promoting representative political processes and institutions, the rule of law, the growth of civil society, and respect for human rights. In countries undertaking decentralization of government functions, USAID promotes policy dialogue between citizens and public officials at the local level. One of USAID'S key aims in Africa is to strengthen democratic principles by promoting representative political processes and greater access to information. For example, throughout rural Mali, access to information largely depends on access to a radio. Yet women often lack direct access and control over the family radio and money for batteries is hard to come by. In April 2004, the USAID-financed Women in Governance Project began distribution of more than 500 radios in 16 communities in four Malian regions. As a result, women are speaking out. Many ran in the May 2004 local elections, and the number of elected women doubled in the targeted communities, from 21 to 42 women.³⁸

USAID's five-year Anti-Corruption Initiative (ACI) is also designed to reduce corruption in sub-Saharan Africa by addressing the enabling environment. For example, Madagascar launched a USAID good governance program, building on a program that had already achieved important success, including the development of a national anti-corruption strategy and the establishment of an anti-corruption agency. In South Africa, USAID began training prosecutors in the skills to try commercial crime, which includes fraud as well as corruption. The Specialized Commercial Crime Court in Pretoria proved such a success that a second court was opened in Pretoria as well as additional courts in three other cities. These courts maintain conviction rates of over 90 percent and have successfully prosecuted members of parliament, police officials, including a commissioner, and members of the legal community. The implementation of ACI in the Republic of Congo would facilitate it becoming a key anchor for Central Africa. The ACI efforts [linking back to the strategic approach pillar] support governance principles under NEPAD, the AU, and the Southern Africa Development Community.³⁹

Advancing Economic Freedom. Stimulating growth requires pro-market policies, trade, and development assistance. Thirty-seven African countries are eligible for the benefits offered by AGOA, which provides duty free access to the U.S. for a wide range of products and trade-related technical assistance to Africa, and offers duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. for certain apparel products assembled in Africa. AGOA promotes democratic reform in Africa by

providing incentives for these nations to extend freedom and opportunity to all of their citizens. Sub-Saharan countries are eligible to receive the benefits of AGOA if they are making progress in such areas as: establishment of market-based economies; development of political pluralism and the rule of law; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increase availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights, and elimination of certain practices of child labor. Progress in each area is not a requirement for AGOA eligibility.⁴⁰

The Lesser Developed Country (LDC) provision of AGOA allows 24 poor African states to source the yarn and fabric used in apparel assembly from outside Africa. Many eligible countries have been slow to take advantage of the benefits offered by AGOA, in part because of their limited capacity, but the program is credited with boosting apparel exports to the U.S. from Kenya, Lesotho, and Swaziland.⁴¹ The administration is also negotiating a free trade agreement with the five countries of the Southern African Customs Union, and has expressed an interest in other African free trade agreements. At the same time, 78 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) enjoy preferential access to European markets through the European Union-ACP Partnership, while South Africa has its own trade agreement with the EU.⁴² However, across-the-board reductions in developed trade barriers may strengthen Africa's competitors in China and elsewhere, reducing the value of such special arrangements as AGOA and the ACP Partnership.

Key highlights from the 2005 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of AGOA are as follows: In 2004, U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa increased 25 percent from 2003, to \$8.6 billion; AGOA imports were \$26.6 billion (petroleum products made up 87 percent) in 2004, an increase of 88 percent over 2003. Non-oil AGOA imports totaled \$3.5 billion, an increase of 22 percent from 2003; and, the U.S. devoted \$181 million to trade capacity-building activities in sub-Saharan Africa in FY04, up 36 percent from FY03. Kenya and Nigeria, two anchor states vulnerable to terrorist activity, report significant AGOA achievements. Kenya's 2004 exports under AGOA were valued at \$287 million, representing 81 percent of total Kenyan exports to the U.S. The government reports that AGOA-related industries have created more than 30,000 new jobs. However, there are reports of textile factories shutting down and dismissing employees as a result of the end of global apparel quotas in January 2005. Nigeria's duty-free exports under AGOA – almost entirely petroleum and energy products – were valued at \$15.4 billion, representing 95 percent of total Nigerian exports to the U.S.⁴³

Agriculture remains integral to sub-Saharan economies, representing 30 to 40 percent of gross domestic product and is the primary source of income for 65 percent of the region's people. USAID's main program in the agriculture sector, the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), is helping to generate more agricultural income and employment, strengthening regional cooperation, and promoting policy and program changes. The IEHA has already benefited nearly 3 million people and provided \$67 million in 2004 to support efforts with six country-specific and three regional programs to improve food security.⁴⁴

Advances in education are critical to Africa's economic and political development. Much of USAID's work in education is achieved through the administration's Africa Education Initiative (AEI). Through AEI, nearly 220,000 new and current teachers have been trained and over 1.8 million textbooks have been distributed to primary school students in six countries.⁴⁵ In North Africa, the illiteracy rate remains high particularly for women in Morocco. USAID's basic education and workforce training is one of its three strategic objectives for assistance to Morocco in decreasing its illiteracy rate.⁴⁶

In March 2002, President Bush announced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to provide \$10 billion in additional assistance to countries committed to far-reaching economic, anti-corruption and political reforms over three years beginning in fiscal year 2003 and \$5 billion dollars a year as of FY2006.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, the MCA has not fared well at all. The concept is great, but the administration took two years to secure legislation setting up the program and three years to disburse funds. While Congress has appropriated \$2.5 billion for the MCA over the past two years, MCA has so far approved \$110 million for Cape Verde and \$108 million for Madagascar, the lowest of the four approved--Honduras, \$215 million and Nicaragua, \$175 million. As a result, the President pledged that the account would be sending \$5 billion a year to poor countries by 2006 will not be realized. Because MCA has failed to gain any traction, Congress may now sharply cut its budget because it has been so slow in disbursing aid.⁴⁸

Additionally, the U.S. MCA is a unilateral aid initiative operating under a strategy that does not embrace international institutions or leverage its money through coordination.⁴⁹ Furthermore, with the large number of different aid programs, MCA could be vulnerable under another administration because of having its own management structure which is independent of USAID. The administration should put equal emphasis on greater coherence among aid programs within the U.S. government, the efforts of international organizations, and complementary programs like trade, debt relief, and investment.

Promote peace and regional stability. It was only after President Bush launched the “global war on terror” following the 9/11 attacks on America that Africa became a major issue in present U.S. foreign policy.⁵⁰ The 9/11 Report stated that “international terrorist organizations continue to use Africa as a safe-haven, staging area, or transit point to target U.S. interests” and “in general, concluded that the international terror threat against the U.S. and local national interests is likely to continue to grow in several parts of Africa because of porous borders, lax security, political instability, and a lack of state resources and capacities.”⁵¹ Following the events of 9/11, numerous counter-terrorist (CT) initiatives have been launched in Africa undeniably addressing all four CT goals of defeat, deny, diminish and defend.

The East Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI) involves military training for border (goods and people) and coastal security, CT equipment, aviation security capacity-building, assistance for regional efforts against terrorist financing, and police training. The EACTI also includes an important program of education to prevent extremists’ fundamentalist influences from gaining the upper hand in the targeted countries. To counter extremist influence and diminish the conditions terrorists seek to exploit for safe haven and recruitment, EACTI funds teacher education in disadvantaged Muslim communities, encouraging greater access to education for girls, and improving community involvement in education. EACTI programs also include media and information outreach and English language teaching. Both activities serve to depict a more accurate picture of the U.S. and its values, and to counter Islamist-controlled media outlets.⁵² Furthermore, the Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) is working with East African countries on anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regimes in these states.⁵³ The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) operating in a number of selected airports in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda traces the movement of potential and/or real terrorists when entering or leaving these states and produces a watch list that provides states with the capacity to collect, analyze, and compare traveler data to help the world to understand the methods of terrorists and track their movement. And finally, Kenya is an example of the numerous Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs that have shaped the formation and training of an interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force to coordinate nationwide CT efforts, draft a National CT Strategy, convene a NSA Committee, create a National CT Center, and establish an AT Unit.⁵⁴

In response to the State Department’s determination that East Africa and the Horn of Africa were potential terrorists threats, the Department of Defense established in October 2002 the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. Members of terrorist organizations have been arrested in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. CJTF-HOA

has devoted most of its efforts to CT and counterinsurgency training with allied forces and the armies of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya and to conducting a number of civic action programs to refurbish schools and clinics and provide medical services.⁵⁵

The North African initiative and PSI/TSCTI overlap to some extent. Furthermore, the CT initiatives include only three countries: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The U.S. is assisting Morocco in a number of CT initiatives such as the State Department's (ATA) program and TIP. Under ATA, Moroccans have been trained in targeted CT skills, such as airport, seaport and land boundaries security, investigations, forensics, and post blast investigation. In February 2004, the Moroccan authorities disrupted two Salafiya Jihadiya cells arresting 37 people and finding explosives, detonators and weapons in safe houses. Tunisia has worked closely with the U.S. on information sharing, military cooperation and tracking and financing assets of terrorists groups. As with Tunisia, Algerian cooperation with the U.S. has increased in terms of information sharing, military cooperation and tracking a freezing of financial assets of terrorist organizations. In addition, these initiatives assist North Africa in disrupting transit routes for terrorists headed to Europe.⁵⁶

The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), designed to protect borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism and enhance regional cooperation and stability, has already paid dividends and has been relatively successful in curbing terrorism.⁵⁷ The issue of an Algerian fundamentalist terrorist organization is a case in point. In 2004, forces from Niger and Chad engaged the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) elements in their respective countries. Chadian military forces killed or captured 43 operatives in northern Chad in March 2004, forcing GSPC second-in-command Amari Saifi into the hands of a Chadian rebel group, which eventually led to Saifi being turned over to Algerian custody in October 2004.⁵⁸

Building on PSI, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) further strengthens and expands regional CT capabilities, enhances and institutionalizes cooperation among the region's security forces, promotes democratic governance and human rights, and ultimately benefits the U.S.'s worldwide CT goals and bilateral relationships. TSCTI officially started in June 2005 with Exercise Flintlock, a training exercise with 3,000 troops from nine states in North and West Africa, to ensure all participating nations continue developing their partnerships; further enhance their capabilities to halt the flow of illicit weapons, goods and human trafficking in the region; and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuary in remote areas.

Nigeria is the U.S.'s major concern in West Africa due to its large Muslim population and rising anti-American and extremist Islamic rhetoric.⁵⁹ This situation provides a unique

opportunity for the U.S. to engage the Muslim world. While the U.S. thoroughly engages Nigeria through educational programs, humanitarian assistance, anti-corruption training, and American Corners, the administration should significantly invest in building up the number of Hausa-speaking diplomats to more effectively engage Muslim leaders.

The U.S. is also involved in CT initiatives in Southern Africa, with the aim of capturing known terrorists and freezing their assets. The U.S. sponsored a major conference in Botswana that focused on ways to strengthen CT laws and held a CT legislation seminar in Washington. South Africa took the initiative to introduce its own Financial Intelligence Unit to track terrorists' movements and assets and to freeze them. These actions help to eradicate the patterns of organized crime supporting terrorism such as smuggled weapons and narcotics trafficking. The U.S. is encouraging South Africa to export training, intelligence and other assistance to neighboring Southern African countries.⁶⁰

It is heartening to see greater U.S. involvement in and an upgrading of Africa's status in American national interests in its fight against terrorism. There are CT programs in all regions, in addition to the fact that certain volatile countries have been singled out for special CT training. Africa, with its porous borders, lack of financial institutions with programs that can trace monies for terrorist purposes, and the number of failed states, makes international and especially U.S., EU and UN assistance of utmost importance in the struggle against terrorism.

What is disheartening is that the continent is divided among three geographical commands: U.S. Central Command in East Africa and the Horn of Africa; and U.S. European and Pacific Commands take responsibility for the rest of the continent. The administration should seriously consider centralizing responsibility for Africa's military training, intelligence, and deployment. Africa's almost seamless borders and networks of both trafficking and conflict demand a more unified command structure in the U.S. for military training, intelligence, and as necessary, deployment. The 9/11 Report's observations should compel the administration to take action to centralize the U.S.'s focus on the continent. This type of centralized organization could help facilitate the establishment of a more effective African-led military intervention force, reducing the need for direct U.S. involvement. It would also increase the chances of success if intervention is required. A dedicated command could also more efficiently oversee U.S. anti-terrorism efforts and provide policy makers with more thoughtful, informed military advice based on in-depth knowledge of the region and continuous planning and intelligence assessments. In turn, better situational awareness of military-political developments could preclude the need for intervention or limit the prospects for engaging in open-ended or unsound military operations.

Conclusion

With its vast natural and mineral resources, Africa remains strategically important to the U.S. The Bush administration has demonstrated a willingness to commit resources in support of its overall African strategy, particularly in key states such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya, yet the potential impacts of increased aid are being undercut by the lack of long-term planning and budgeting. Short-term U.S. policies continue to take priority; most initiatives are five-year programs. The initiatives outlined in this paper are short- to medium-term; however, the strategy to combat terrorism in Africa must be longer-term to reduce disease, war, and desperate poverty. Our adversaries are committed for the long-term, and our strategies to address the factors that create an enabling environment for terrorism must be long-term if the U.S. is going to help African governments defeat terrorists and eliminate their support base in Africa.

The struggle against terrorism is also in part the struggle for a better society. Success in improving the lives of the people is success against terrorism. In Africa, improving the quality of life through assistance, whether it is peace and security, health, education, governance or economic reform, may create a region stable enough to squeeze out the cancerous cells of terrorism. But for Africa to fulfill its dreams of democracy, security and prosperity, the U.S. and other developed nations have a responsibility to help, with Africa in the lead. Until the U.S. is prepared to develop a longer-term strategy to devote far more resources into improving the environment that encourages terrorism in Africa, it will be difficult to see lasting progress against this enemy.

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