

# CRS Report for Congress

## Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

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## Summary

Afghanistan's political transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005, but since then insurgent threats to Afghanistan's government have escalated to the point that some experts are questioning the future of U.S. stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and senior levels of the new parliament.

The insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime escalated in 2006, after several years in which it appeared the Taliban were mostly defeated. Taliban fighters have conducted several increasingly larger scale attacks on coalition and Afghan security forces in several southern provinces, possibly aided by popular frustration with slow reconstruction, official corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government authority into rural areas and provinces. In addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures, and independent militias remain throughout the country, although many have been disarmed.

U.S. and partner stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and its security forces and on promoting reconstructing while combating the renewed insurgent challenge. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army, deploying a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 21,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to help combat the insurgency, of which all but 8,000 are now under NATO/ISAF command.

To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave Afghanistan about \$4.35 billion in FY2005, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. Another approximately \$3 billion was provided in FY2006. Pending and enacted FY2007 appropriations measures would add another \$2.6 billion, including security forces funding.

This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government*, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

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# Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

## Background to Recent Developments

Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.

Zahir Shah's reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan's slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the *mujahedin* (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.

Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The *mujahedin* benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called "Stingers," which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The *mujahedin* also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the

reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.

On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

<b>Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics</b>	
Population:	31 million (July 2006 est.)
Ethnic Groups	Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions	Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
Literacy Rate	28% of population over 15 years of age
GDP:	\$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP per capita	\$800 (purchasing power parity)
GDP real growth	8% (2005)
Unemployment rate	40% (2005)
Revenues (2006 est.)	\$500 million
Expenditures (2005)	\$561 million, including \$42 million in capital expenditures
External Debt:	\$8 billion bilateral, plus \$500 million multilateral. U.S. said February 8, 2006, that the \$108 million in debt to U.S. would be forgiven.
Foreign Exchange Reserves	\$2 billion
Major Exports:	fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production	none
Oil Consumption	5 million barrels per day
Oil Proven Reserves	3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to Afghan government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports:	food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles

**Source:** *CIA World Factbook*, August 2006, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.; Afghan leadership press statements (October 2006).

The State Department has said that a total of about \$3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about \$20 million per year in FY1980 to about \$300 million per

year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.<sup>1</sup>

With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the *mujahedin* regime began April 18, 1992.<sup>2</sup>

## **The *Mujahedin* Government and Rise of the Taliban**

The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the *mujahedin* parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April - May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with the understanding that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions leader, particularly the nominal “prime minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.

The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former *mujahedin* who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among *mujahedin* parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were practitioners of an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,” which is similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan who viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.

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<sup>1</sup> For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from \$300 million the previous year to \$250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.

<sup>2</sup> After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

Immediately thereafter, Taliban gunmen entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides sheltered there, and subsequently hanged them.

## Taliban Rule

The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 60 years old.

The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they represented un-Islamic idolatry.

The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.

The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.<sup>3</sup> In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not at any of the camps at the time. Some observers assert that the Administration, for varying reasons, missed other

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<sup>3</sup> For more information on Al Qaeda, see CRS Report RL33038, *Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment*, by Kenneth Katzman.



purported opportunities to strike bin Laden. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with U.S. military force because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban's opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.

## The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban

The Taliban's policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Among them were the Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and Pashtun Islamist factions below (see also **Table 10** on “Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan”).

- **Uzbeks/General Dostam.** One major Alliance faction was the Uzbek militia (the *Junbush-Melli*, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, although Dostam had earlier contributed to efforts to force Rabbani from power. During the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, Dostam reportedly impressed U.S. military commanders by leading horse-mounted forces against fixed Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban's subsequent collapse.
- **Hazara Shiites.** Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups).
- **Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf.** Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated *mujahedin* faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.

## Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001

Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report adds that some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under

consideration as well.<sup>4</sup> In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.

Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud's charisma or undisputed authority.

**September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom.** After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:<sup>5</sup>

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 *or harbored such organizations or persons.*

Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period.

The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on

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<sup>4</sup> Drogin, Bob. "U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11." *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a "Radio Free Afghanistan" under RFE/RL, providing \$17 million in funding for it for FY2002.

November 12 to popular celebrations. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Bashir Noorzai brothers. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said “major combat operations” had ended.

## Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction<sup>6</sup>

The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, the *loya jirga*. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts, including one from the Karzai clan and one centered on former King Zahir Shah.

**The Bonn Agreement.** Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited the major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”<sup>7</sup> It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement included the following provisions:

- Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of an *emergency loya jirga*, which would choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004).

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<sup>6</sup> More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government*, by Kenneth Katzman.

<sup>7</sup> Text of Bonn agreement at [<http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm>].

Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration, weighted toward the Northern Alliance with 17 out of 30 of the positions, including Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks, in their 40s, had been close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the constitution of 1964.<sup>8</sup>

- Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security, at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics trafficking, crime, and terrorism. The international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).

### Hamid Karzai

Hamid Karzai, about 50, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a credible Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation of his opponents through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate corruption, resulting in a slower than expected pace of reform and professionalization of government. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani's government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election. Karzai said in August 2006 he might not run for a second term in 2009 presidential elections.

**Permanent Constitution.** An “emergency” *loya jirga* (June 2002) put a popular imprimatur on the transition government. Former King Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan in April 2002 for the meeting, for which 381 districts of Afghanistan chose 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the former King and Rabbani withdrew their candidacies and Karzai was selected to remain leader until presidential elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the

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<sup>8</sup> The last *loya jirga* that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a *loya jirga* in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

assembly approved a new cabinet, with a few changes. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “*constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)*” during December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. However, major powers were given to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and the ability to impeach a president.

**National Elections.** The October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were put off until later in 2006. (No date is set for these elections.)

Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. Even though many believe the Karzai supporters are a slight majority of the parliament, when it convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, engineered selection of former Karzai presidential election rival Qanooni for speaker of the lower house. Qanooni subsequently said he would work cooperatively with Karzai; the role of “opposition leader” was subsequently taken up by Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani, who won a seat, although Rabbani told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that he supports “reform” and not opposition to Karzai. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). The leader of that body is Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in a bombing of his convoy in March 2006.

The new parliament asserted itself in the process of confirming a post-election cabinet, deciding to confirm each nominee individually. Modernizers in the parliament also succeeded in forcing Karzai to oust several major conservatives from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence, and it has established itself in oversight of the national budget.

## **Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition**

The political transition has proceeded, but Karzai’s government suffers from lack of capacity and has expanded its writ only in a few outlying regions near Kabul, and Afghanistan continues to face challenges beyond the ongoing insurgency. A *Washington Post* report on June 26, 2006, said that confidence in Karzai on the part of Afghans and of some European nations that contribute forces to Afghanistan, is also waning because of government corruption and a lack of protection from robberies and other crimes, as well as some recent decisions that conflict with

comprehensive reform. Secretary of State Rice subsequently rebutted the criticism of Karzai and said the United States maintains confidence in his leadership. Subsequently, a reported CIA assessment in November 2006 found that increasing numbers of Afghans view Karzai's government as weak and corrupt.<sup>9</sup>

**Strengthening Central Government.** A key part of the U.S. stabilization effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government, an objective that has not to date succeeded in the southern provinces. Over the past year, the commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Carl Eikenberry, has worked to extend Afghan government authority by conducting visits to all provinces along with Afghan ministers to determine local needs and heighten the profile of the central government. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President Cheney attended Karzai's inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, First Lady Laura Bush visited. President Bush made his first visit on March 1, 2006.

The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build democratic traditions at the local level. At the local level, an Afghan government "National Solidarity Program," largely funded by international donors, seeks to create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been women.<sup>10</sup>

**U.S. Embassy Operations and Funding.** Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush's envoy to Afghanistan, was ambassador during December 2003-August 2005, and he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government decisions.<sup>11</sup> The current ambassador is Ronald Neumann. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs. As part of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly focused on helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop revenue-generating industries.

The U.S. embassy, now housed in a newly constructed building, has expanded its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process. The tables at the end of this paper discuss U.S. funding for Embassy operations and Karzai protection, which is now led by Afghan forces. An FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided a requested \$50 million for security costs to protect U.S. facilities and personnel.

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<sup>9</sup> Rohde, David and James Risen. CIA Review Highlights Afghan Leader's Woes. *New York Times*, November 5, 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). "Democracy Bubbles Up." *Wall Street Journal*, March 25, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Waldman, Amy. "In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power." *New York Times*, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan's ambassador in Washington is Seyyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide.

**Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias.** Karzai, as well as numerous private studies and U.S. official statements, have cited regional and factional militias as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of justice and generation of popular resentment. Some of these local militias have been accused of past human rights abuses in a report released in July 2005 by the “Afghanistan Justice Project.”<sup>12</sup> Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains the local militias.

In June 2006, suggesting that Karzai believes militias can play a useful role in filling security gaps, particularly the deficit of national police, he said he was authorizing arming some local tribal militias (*arbokai*) to help in local policing. Karzai said his assessment was that these militias would provide security and be loyal to the nation and central government and that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below. Several of these local militias are now operating.

Although the smaller militias persist, Karzai has succeeded in marginalizing some major regional faction leaders. Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed by Karzai in September 2004 and was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, he was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes that some in Kabul believe were stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his continued influence in Herat. Dostam (see above) was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his *Junbush Melli* faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed charismatic Northern Alliance commander Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, appointing him as governor of Balkh province, although he reportedly remains resistant to central government control. Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat Ali was subsequently elected to parliament. Karzai has tried to appoint some relatively young, pro-government technocrats in key governorships instead of local strongmen; three examples are Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, and Paktia governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. However, Taniwal was killed in a suicide bombing on September 10, 2006.

As noted above, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January 2005 (including four Scud missiles).

**DDR and DIAG Programs.** A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism was a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program:

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<sup>12</sup> See [<http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org>].

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai acted on the issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later reduced by Afghan officials to just over 60,000. According to UNAMA, a total of 63,380 militia fighters were disarmed by the end of the program. Of those, 55,800 exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options, although U.N. officials say about 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. The total cost of the program was \$141 million, funded by Japan and other donors, including the United States. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its partners.<sup>13</sup>

Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons. According to UNAMA, at least 36,000 medium and light weapons were collected; of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. In addition, about 11,000 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) were collected, nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia forces. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were collected.

Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called "DIAG," Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. The program seeks to disarm, by December 2007, a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different "illegal armed groups": militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. However, UNAMA officials told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that only "several hundred" groups (five or more fighters) are of sufficient concern to merit disarmament efforts. As of November 2006, over 22,000 weapons had been collected from these militia fighters, according to UNAMA.

Kapisa Province is considered a model for the program because 37 commanders believed receptive to disarmament attended a ceremony to formally inaugurate the DIAG program on May 1, 2006. Other provinces receptive to the program are Takhar and Herat; some commanders in Khost, which has sometimes been restive, agreed to disarm under the program in March 2006. No payments are available to fighters disarmed under the program, and the program depends on persuasion and negotiation rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG is not as

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<sup>13</sup> For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Denny. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?*, June 6, 2005, [<http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf>].



well funded as is DDR: thus far the program has received \$11 million in operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors are making available \$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded.

**Combating Narcotics Trafficking.**<sup>14</sup> Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan, generating funds to sustain local militias, Taliban and other insurgents, and criminal groups. Narcotics account for an estimated \$2.7 billion in value — about one third of Afghanistan’s GDP. In relatively pessimistic comments on August 22, 2006, Karzai called for a focus on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing and on targeting key traffickers, rather than on eradication of poppy fields. His statement reflected setbacks later confirmed by a November 2006 study by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank that the amount of land on which poppy is grown in Afghanistan increased by 61% over 2005 levels. Production increased 26% to 5,644 metric tons. Production in the restive provinces of Helmand and Uruzgan increased 132% in the year. Afghan officials said in early November 2006 that, based on observations of plantings now under way, the opium crop for 2006-2007 will probably rival that of this year’s crop.

To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and is now playing a greater role in counter-narcotics. It is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The U.S. military is still reportedly resisting calls by the DEA and other agencies to move to active attacks on drug bazaars and other narcotics-related targets.<sup>15</sup> NATO commanders, who have taken over security responsibilities throughout Afghanistan, say they are providing information to Afghan counter-narcotics officials to help them target their efforts and increasingly target operations against large drug traffickers. The Bush Administration has taken some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers;<sup>16</sup> in April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York.

The Bush Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.<sup>17</sup> However, the Administration also has not, to date, made a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that is required to provide

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<sup>14</sup> For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

<sup>15</sup> Meyer, Josh. Pentagon Resists Please For Help in Afghan Opium Fight. *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004.

<sup>17</sup> This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

more than \$225 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan (FY2006 funds). Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001 had dramatically decreased cultivation.<sup>18</sup> The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.

**Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy.** U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. U.S. economic reconstruction efforts are showing some results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed. International investors have returned to some extent, and there is substantial new construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005. A \$25 million new Coca Cola bottling factory was opened in Kabul on September 11, 2006. However, the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets, and some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan re-states that the sectors discussed below are priorities. The tables at the end of the paper show U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan.

- **Roads.** U.S. and international aid has thus far rebuilt about 1,800 miles of roads, as of October 2006. However, many villages remain isolated by poor and non-existent roads and U.S. Ambassador Neumann told CRS in February 2006 that expanding road building is a major U.S. priority to expand the writ of the Afghan government and build a viable legitimate economy. Among projects completed: the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I, completed December 2003, and Phase II, completed November 2004); the Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, was largely completed in late 2005; and a \$20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in late 2005. U.S.-funded (\$16 million) work began on July 5, 2006 for a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul; it is scheduled for completion in December 2006. New U.S. projects to build a Khost-Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province are under way. On October 19, 2006, the United States announced \$94 million in Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to build about 200 miles of new roads in Qandahar, Uruzgan, Nuristan, Kunar, Paktika, and Ghazni provinces.
- **Education and Health.** According to U.S. officials, 5.2 million Afghan children are now in school — up from only 800,000 in 2001 — and girls’ attendance is up sharply. About 525,000 girls were enrolled in school during 2005, according to UNAMA. However,

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<sup>18</sup> Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” *New York Times*, February 7, 2001.

those in school still represent only about half of the total Afghan child population. Additional work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding; at least 278 schools and 326 clinics have been built thus far, although that is far short of the 1,000 clinics that U.S. funds were estimated to be able to build. About \$152 million in U.S. funds were programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005. The Senate version of FY2007 appropriations measure (H.R. 5522, S.Rept. 109-277) earmarks \$81 million for Afghanistan education in FY2007. Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.

- **Agriculture.** According to the director of the USAID mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past four years. Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation. As noted in tables below, the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided a requested \$5 million for agriculture development. The Senate version of H.R. 5522 (FY2007 foreign aid appropriation) recommends \$20 million in ESF for Afghan agriculture assistance.
- **Electricity.** The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010. Currently, there is no national power grid, and only about 10% of Afghans have access to electricity. Press reports say that there are severe power shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to nearly 4 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power. The Afghan government, with help from international donors, plans to import electricity from Central Asian and other neighbors beginning in 2009 to help address the shortages. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) appropriated most of the \$28 million requested for key electricity projects (Northeast Transmission Project).

### **Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices.**

Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders, according to the State Department report on human rights practices for 2005 (released March 8, 2006).<sup>19</sup> According to the report, “The lack of an effective police force, poor infrastructure and communications, instability, and insecurity hampered investigations of unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths...” Some observers are likely to be disappointed by Karzai’s July 2006 decision to reconstitute a “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” although Karzai

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<sup>19</sup> For text, see [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm>].

says it would not abuse individual rights but rather promote moral behavior and seek to discredit alcohol, drugs, and corruption.

The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2006 (released September 15, 2006) indicates progress on religious freedom but says there continues to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities such as Sikhs and Hindus. On the other hand, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom said in a report released in May 2006 that there is rising religious persecution, a judgment that is consistent with observations of other experts. Some observers have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.<sup>20</sup> A major religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan constitution's commitment to international standards of human rights protections, President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case that demonstrated judicial conservatism on religious matters was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly "Women's Rights" magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for his articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. There are hopes that the replacement of the chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative, might accelerate judicial reform.

U.S. programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the "lead" coalition country on judicial reform. The United States has trained over 500 judges, according to USAID, and it trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.

An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women's Affairs minister Sima Samar.

**Funding Issues.** USAID plans to spend \$149.237 million on democracy and rule of law programs for FY2004-FY2007, composed of \$105.292 million in ESF and \$43.945 million in DA. Of these funds, about \$84 million has gone to support the national elections in 2004 and 2005. The funding includes support for the new parliament, civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, rule of law programs, and local governance.

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<sup>20</sup> Shea, Nina. "Sharia in Kabul?" *National Review*, October 28, 2002.

**Advancement of Women.** According to State Department report, the Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses continue, primarily because of Afghanistan's conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women's Affairs dedicated to improving women's rights. It promoted the involvement of women in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. There were three female ministers in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women's Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai proposed only one (Minister of Women's Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the new cabinet and she was voted down by opposition from Islamist conservatives in parliament. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women's Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women.

More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the *burqa* is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. On the other hand, women's advancement has made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls' schools have increased, and on September 25, the chief of the Women's Affairs Ministry branch in Qandahar, Safia Amajan, was assassinated.

The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women's rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women's Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush's visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women's empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women's Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.

**Funding Issues.** Recent congressional action includes the following.

- On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the Office of the President a \$40 billion Emergency Response Fund to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks) to fund educational and health programs for Afghan women and children.

- Subsequent appropriations for programs for women and girls are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized \$15 million per year (FY2003-2006) for the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Recent appropriations have required that about \$50 million per year, from various accounts, be used specifically to support programs and organizations that benefit Afghan women and girls.

## **Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building**

The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda and the Taliban from regrouping and posing a challenge to the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) continuing combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of "provincial reconstruction teams" (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force.

**U.S. Operations/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).** The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 20,000 troops in Afghanistan — a slight increase from the 19,000 there in 2005 — in response to the 2006 upsurge of Taliban attacks. However, as of October 5, 2006, NATO/ISAF is now the lead force throughout Afghanistan, and 11,250 of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan are under NATO/ISAF, although the U.S. component of the NATO/ISAF force is operationally still under U.S. command.

In conjunction with the assumption of NATO/ISAF peacekeeping responsibility in 2006 and prior to the increase in Taliban violence, U.S. officials had planned for a reduction of U.S. forces to about 16,500 by the end of 2006, but those plans are now on hold until at least February 2007, according to the commander of U.S.-led combat forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry. He heads the "Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A)," headquartered at Camp Eggers, near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

Nineteen coalition countries — primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy — contributed another approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF, but most of these have now been "re-badged" to the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. These forces will continue to operate in conjunction with the approximately 8,000 U.S. forces that will remain under direct U.S. command and will continue to conduct "counter-terrorism" combat against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant formations throughout Afghanistan ("Operation Active Endeavor"). As part of the U.S.-led combat, French aircraft have been flying strikes (after a hiatus during November 2005-May 2006) from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar as part of the "Combined Air Operations Center." Press reports in October 2006 said that air strikes are more frequent in Afghanistan than against insurgents in Iraq. Japan provides naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. Italy is leading the related naval interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea intended to prevent the movement of terrorists from Afghanistan/Pakistan across those waters. This operation had been led by the United States from a naval headquarters in Bahrain.

Prior to 2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had believed that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had weakened the insurgency to the point of virtual irrelevance.

In the upsurge of violence since mid-2006, Taliban insurgents, sometimes mimicking suicide and roadside bombing tactics used in the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for on July 31, 2006. Fighting was particularly intense between May and August 2006, as U.S.-led forces sought to expel large (300-person) Taliban formations from villages around Qandahar city, such as the Panjwai district. The Taliban resistance and resilience led to U.S. military comments that the Taliban is “growing in influence” in the south, and there has been debate among experts whether the Taliban resurgence has been driven by popular frustration with the Karzai government and the slow pace of economic reconstruction. Some believe that Afghans in the restive areas have been intimidated by the Taliban into providing food and shelter. Others believe that the population has, in some cases, welcomed the Taliban fighters as an alternative to what they see as a return of corruption in government and a tolerance of autonomy for local armed groups.

In response, the U.S. and NATO forces launched “Operation Mountain Lion” and “Operation Mountain Thrust,” the latter begun in June 2006 and intended to clear areas of the restive southern provinces in advance of the NATO assumption of responsibility. The operation formally ended on July 31 with about 700 Taliban killed, according to U.S. military officials. Another offensive, led by NATO, was conducted in August 2006 (Operation Medusa), which was considered a success in ousting Taliban fighters from positions around Qandahar. That Operation was also considered proof that NATO will conduct intensive combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of that operation, British forces entered into an agreement — still controversial to some experts — with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they would secure the main town of the district without an active NATO presence.

Following the recent operations, U.S. and NATO commanders have expressed optimism that the offensives had suppressed the new Taliban challenge, and Taliban commanders admitted they were conducting a “tactical retreat” from the southern provinces and began to operate in provinces more north and west, including Ghazni and Farah. Gen. Richards and U.S. Ambassador Neumann said that the operations needed to be followed up with intensified civilian reconstruction to win over the loyalty of the population in the south. There continue to be relatively large Taliban formations still attacking NATO positions in these areas, as of November 2006, although perhaps less frequently than earlier in 2006.

The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still intact. In addition to Mullah Umar, several key commanders remain at large: Jalaludin Haqqani (who some believe heads a completely separate insurgent faction, operating around Khost), Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and the purportedly ruthless Mullah Dadullah. In April 2005, Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. On the other hand, in early October 2005, Pakistan arrested and subsequently extradited to Afghanistan the Taliban’s chief “spokesman,” Abdul Latif Hakimi.

Some Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60 militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the reconciliation process, headed by Mojadeddi. Another Taliban figure, its former ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty, although Karzai reportedly has indicated a willingness to conduct peace talks even with Mullah Umar. Through a spokesman, on October 29, 2006, Umar rejected any talks.

***Whereabouts of Bin Laden and Other Militants.*** Complicating the U.S. mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value targets” — militant leaders believed to be in Pakistan but some of which might also be able to move into Afghanistan. The two most notable are bin Laden himself and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.<sup>21</sup> A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan are acquiring some intelligence on his whereabouts.<sup>22</sup>

Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. His fighters are operating in Kunar Province, east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have been searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was shot down, killing the 16 aboard.

***U.S. Military Presence/Use of Facilities.*** Even if the Taliban insurgency is defeated, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain a long-term

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<sup>21</sup> For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report RL33038, *Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment*, by Kenneth Katzman.

<sup>22</sup> Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. *New York Times*, November 10, 2006.



presence in Afghanistan, although U.S. officials have not committed to that outcome. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative *jirga* in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. Delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai his requested greater control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used to support combat in Afghanistan, include the following.:

- *Bagram Air Base.* This base, north of Kabul, is the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> At least 500 U.S. military personnel are based there. Bagram, along with thirteen other airfields in Afghanistan, handles the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in the country and substantial infrastructure is being added to it. A hospital is being constructed on the facility; one of the first permanent structures there. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided a total of about \$52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides \$20 million for military construction there. It is expected that NATO will be using the base — and sharing operational costs — in conjunction with the handover of NATO security responsibilities in Afghanistan.
- *Qandahar Airfield.* This airfield, just outside Qandahar, bases about 500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provided \$16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar.
- *Shindand Air Base.* This base is 20 miles from the Iranian border. It has been used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose forces controlled the facility.
- *Karshi-Khanabad Airbase.* This Uzbekistan base housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. U.S. forces ceased using it in September 2005, following deterioration in U.S.-Uzbekistan relations over a May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon.
- *Peter Ganci Base, Kyrgyzstan.* This base at Manas airport has about 1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising

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<sup>23</sup> Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the Long Haul.” *Stars and Stripes*, March 15, 2005.

against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from the new President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, in February 2006, Bakiyev said the United States should pay \$200 million per year to use the facility instead of the \$2 million it now pays. In July 2006, the dispute was resolved with a U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan \$150 million in assistance and base use payments over the coming year, pending congressional approval.

- *Persian Gulf Bases.* Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE (about 1,800 U.S. military personnel in UAE) and Al Udeid in Qatar (10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar). P.L. 109-13 appropriated \$1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra. As noted above, military facilities in Bahrain house U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF and Iraq-related naval operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. (About 5,100 U.S. military personnel are in Bahrain.)
- *Incirlik Air Base.* On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. (About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Turkey.)

**OEF Costs and Casualties.** As of December 5, 2006, 295 U.S. military personnel have been killed Afghanistan. In 2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, double the 2004 number. Additional U.S. casualties have occurred in other theaters of OEF, including the Phillipines and parts of Africa (OEF-Trans Sahara). No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be running about \$1.5 billion per month. For information on U.S. military costs, see CRS Report RL33110, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11*, by Amy Belasco.

**The NATO-Led International Security Force (ISAF).**<sup>24</sup> As discussed above, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF, consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus 11 partner countries) has, as of October 5, 2006, formally assumed command of the overall peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan. ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001),<sup>25</sup> initially limited to Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF in August 2003 paved the way for an expansion of its scope, and NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage

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<sup>24</sup> As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.

<sup>25</sup> Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).

1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively).<sup>26</sup>

The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-led 8,000 person “Regional Command South” was formed. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan, was agreed to at a NATO meeting in Slovenia on September 28, 2006, and was completed on October 5. The NATO/ISAF force is led by Britain’s Lt. Gen. David Richards, who heads “ISAF 9.” The next commander, who will take over in February 2007, is to be U.S. Army General Dan McNeil, subject to Senate confirmation. He would head “ISAF 10.” As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of command, the United States put the 11,250 troops operating in eastern Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF command; they form the bulk of the new “Regional Command East.” At the same time, NATO members Britain, Romania, Poland, and Canada have agreed to deploy most of the additional 2,000 - 2,500 troops that U.S. Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. James Jones says is needed in the south to combat the Taliban. Of those, about 1,100 will be from Poland, and they will constitute a reserve combat force, although they might not arrive until early 2007. Another additional 75 will come from the Czech Republic.

In conjunction with the restructuring, total NATO/ISAF force levels have increased to about 31,500 from the 2005 levels of about 12,000. During 2002-2004, ISAF’s force was about 6,400 troops from all contributors. **Table 8** lists each contributing country to ISAF and the approximate number of forces contributed. In order to avoid the impression that foreign forces are “occupying” Afghanistan, NATO officials said on August 15, 2006, that they would negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15 initiatives to secure Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces.

The NATO assumption of command represents a quieting of the initial opposition of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related peacekeeping with anti-insurgent combat. Some in the Dutch parliament opposed their country’s deployment to the south, but the parliament voted on February 3, 2006, to permit the move. On May 17, 2006, despite recent deaths of Canadian forces in Qandahar, Canada’s House of Commons voted to keep Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan until at least 2009. On the basis of that domestic opposition in the NATO countries, Afghan and some U.S. officials privately questioned the resolve of NATO nations to combat the Taliban resurgence, although the intensity of combat in 2006 might have assuaged Afghan concerns.

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<sup>26</sup> In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul.

In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that allow NATO/ISAF forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. Still, most NATO countries have so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that NATO leaders are trying to reduce. There reportedly are about 50 such “caveats” that NATO commanders say limit operational flexibility. Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example, refuse to deploy ground troops in the south where the mission is mostly combat, although German transport aircraft reportedly have been helping with airlift to southern Afghanistan. Others have refused to conduct night-time combat. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia during November 28-29, 2006, some NATO countries, particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove some of these caveats, and all agreed that their forces would come to each others’ defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan.

One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that NATO has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages (particularly helicopters) for the Afghanistan mission. Those shortages began to ease somewhat in December 2003 when NATO made available 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. In connection with their increased responsibilities as of July 2006, Britain has brought in additional equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, and the Netherlands is deploying additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces in the south. Italy is reportedly sending “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.<sup>27</sup> Additional pledges of helicopters and equipment, including from France, were made at the NATO summit in Riga in November. NATO/ISAF also coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located).

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).** NATO/ISAF expansion in Afghanistan builds on a December 2002 U.S. initiative to establish provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.<sup>28</sup> However, other relief groups do not want to associate with military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; the list of existing PRTs, including lead country, is shown in **Table 9**. U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects. Appropriations and USAID allocations for PRT-led reconstruction are noted in the tables at the end of this paper.

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<sup>27</sup> Kington, Tom. *Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan*. Defense News, June 19, 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” *Los Angeles Times*, April 11, 2003.

Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops.

In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United States has been turning over PRTs to its partners. The NATO agreement to take over the entire peacekeeping operation included a commitment for NATO/ISAF to eventually take over all PRTs in Afghanistan. In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command South, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province. As noted above, Italy and Spain, through their PRTs, now have primary control of western Afghanistan. Germany (with Turkey and France) took over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain and the Netherlands when those countries have deployed to the south.

Some other countries are considering taking over other PRTs. Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006. It will reportedly focus on providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that region. U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over the lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.

**Afghan National Army (ANA).** U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are training the new ANA. As of December 2006, the ANA numbers about 37,000 troops in 40 battalions, (5 Corps) of which 24 are combat battalions. That is about half its total target strength of 70,000 that it is expected to reach by 2010. The target level was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006, although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Defense Minister says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he says that the ANA is growing by about 1,000 per month.<sup>29</sup> The United States has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif).

The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about ten to twenty per battalion). Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. Fully trained recruits are paid about \$100 per month; generals receive about

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<sup>29</sup> DOD News Briefing With Major General Durbin. July 13, 2006.

\$530 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.

The ANA is earning mixed reviews. Some U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam's militia movement into that city. It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength operations, according to U.S. officers.

Other officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns.

An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment, according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan.

**ANA Armament.** Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or armor. In July 2006, the Administration announced it would be drawing down about \$2 billion worth of equipment for transfer to the ANA over the next 12 to 18 months. According to a GAO report of June 2005, in addition to direct funding, the United States drew down \$287 million worth of defense articles (including M-113 armored personnel carriers) and services for the ANA during FY2002-FY2004, plus \$11 million worth of military trucks and armored personnel vehicles. On June 16, 2005, the President authorized an additional draw-down of \$161.5 million. In FY2006, Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

International donors (primarily East bloc nations), Defense Ministry weapons stocks,<sup>30</sup> and the DDR program discussed above have previously furnished most of the ANA weaponry. International donors have also furnished \$120 million in cash for the Afghan National Police. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has already provided about \$100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. Egypt has made two major shipments of weapons to the ANA containing 17,000 small arms. The Czech Republic is said to be considering providing up to 10 refurbished helicopters to the ANA.

**Afghan National Police.** Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort was first led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005, and there are now about 375 U.S. advisers for the ANP. About 62,000 ANP are on duty, of which 58,000 are trained and 37,000 are both trained and equipped, according to CSTC-A on July 13, 2006. That is widely judged as inadequate, and the U.S.-led coalition began a program in August 2006 to hire 11,200 “auxiliary police” to serve in the restive south. To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A said on July 13, 2006, that the ANP will soon receive 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. A report by the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Department, circulated to Congress in December 2006, reportedly found that most ANP units have less than 50% of their authorized equipment.<sup>31</sup>

Some governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of 86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform committee. There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan, which includes training in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts. However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. Another problem is widespread corruption, because ANP officers only receive salaries of about \$70 per month, and they reputedly encourage bribery to supplement these earnings, causing popular resentment.

The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police

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<sup>30</sup> Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July 22, 2003.

<sup>31</sup> Glanz, James and David Rhode. U.S. Report Finds Dismal Training of Afghan Police. *New York Times*, December 4, 2006.

of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces (which are included in the figures cited above).

**U.S. Security Forces Funding.** U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the State Department.

**Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators**

(November 2006)

Force	Current Level	Target Level
Total U.S. Forces	21,000	Target level of 16,600 by end of 2006 was set in early 2006, but target has now been overtaken by events due to heavy Taliban resistance
U.S. Forces Not Under ISAF Command	8,000 for "Operation Active Endeavor" anti- Al Qaeda and other heavy combat missions. A few thousand of these are training Afghan security forces or are attached to PRTs.	
OEF Partner Forces		Number is moving toward zero after NATO/ISAF takeover of all peacekeeping on October 5, 2006
NATO/ISAF Peacekeeping	about 31,000 (incl. 11,000 U.S. now formally under ISAF command, but operationally led by a U.S. commander)	about 33,500 (following October 2006 NATO commander call for 2,500 additional forces)
Afghan National Army (ANA)	33,000	70,000 (official goal, by 2010)
Afghan National Police (ANP)	62,000 on duty, of which 37,000 are both trained and equipped	62,000 trained and equipped
Legally Armed Fighters	0 (Disarmed by DDR program by June 2005)	0
DIAG/Weapons Collected from Illegal Armed Groups	"Several hundred" significant illegal groups (five or more fighters) remain. 22,000 weapons collected thus far	goal is no remaining illegal groups by 2010
Number of Suicide Bombings (2005)	21	
Suicide Bombings (to date 2006)	100+	



## Regional Context

Although most of Afghanistan's neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan's factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan's neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Afghanistan now has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below.

### Pakistan

Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some Afghan leaders, still views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an Afghanistan sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents.

The efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations have not completely recovered from a setback in March 2006, when Afghan leaders openly asserted that Pakistan was exerting insufficient efforts to prevent Taliban remnants from operating there. That assessment was subsequently reinforced in comments by State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Henry Crumpton, on a visit to Kabul in May 2006. However, some progress was made during a September 6, 2006, visit by President Musharraf to Kabul where he pledged to seek out and destroy the Pakistan-based command structure of the Taliban. Despite continuing mutual accusations during visits by Karzai and Musharraf to Washington, D.C. in late September, further progress was made, according to senior U.S. officials, at a joint dinner for Karzai and Musharraf hosted by President Bush on September 28, 2006. Among other steps, the two leaders agreed to gather tribal elders on both sides of their border to persuade them not to host Taliban militants. Reflecting continued differences, in October 2006 Karzai said that Mullah Umar is hiding in the Pakistani city of Quetta, an allegation denied by Pakistan.

Suggesting it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on July 19, 2005, Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi. On August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

The United States has praised Pakistan for its efforts against Al Qaeda, although it has been less praiseworthy about Pakistan actions against the Taliban. After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has

arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).

Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. Pakistan has had nearly 80,000 forces poised near the north Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, many experts question whether a September 5, 2006, agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this region will result in the expulsion of foreign militants from the border area. That was promised by the elders in exchange for an end to Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas. Others say that “Pakistani Taliban” are gaining influence over the villages in these regions.

Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan.

## Iran

Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about \$205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of Iranian “meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized in the government. For his part, Karzai, who again visited Iran in May 2006 — and who met with hardline Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tajikistan on July 26, 2006 — says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September

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<sup>32</sup> Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” *New York Times*, April 27, 2005.

2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.<sup>33</sup> Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society.

Even though Iran's position in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,<sup>34</sup> and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban's offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.

## India

The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India's goal is to deny Pakistan "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India saw the Taliban's hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda's association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.

India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan's struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a \$25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan's parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development Bank, is financing the \$300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan.

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<sup>33</sup> Rashid, Ahmed. "Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation's Stability." *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 2004.

<sup>34</sup> Steele, Jonathon, "America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan." *Washington Times*, December 15, 1997.

## Russia, Central Asian States, and China

Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.

**Russia.** During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.<sup>35</sup> Russia, which still feels humiliated by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, views Northern Alliance figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.

**Central Asian States.** During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.<sup>36</sup> One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.

These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban; Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that Alliance. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.

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<sup>35</sup> Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” *New York Times*, July 27, 1998.

<sup>36</sup> The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.

Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan's leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan's fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan.

**China.** A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the "Wakhan corridor" (see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China's increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China.

## **Saudi Arabia**

During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden's fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime.

According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.

## U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan

Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction would do more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat. Afghanistan's economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war<sup>37</sup> another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary General Annan's April 19, 2001, report. Since January 2002, more than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned.

Although still heavily dependent on donors, the government has made significant progress in generating a growing portion of its budget domestically. It now raises domestically about half of its \$900 million annual operating budget from tax and customs revenues after succeeding in forcing customs revenue to be remitted to the central government. Tax revenue from such growing Afghan companies as Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell phone service), and Tolo Television are providing substantial funds as well. Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Nonetheless, the Afghan government still depends on international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs for operating as well as reconstruction funds. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

### U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan

During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985-1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.

**Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals.** Since the beginning of FY2002 and including funds appropriated for FY2006, the United States has provided approximately \$3.9 billion in civilian-related reconstruction and other civilian assistance and \$6.3 billion in military/security-related assistance. This latter category included training and equipping the ANA and ANP, DOD and INL counter-narcotics operations, Karzai protection, and de-mining/anti-terrorism. **Table 2** breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover FY2003-

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<sup>37</sup> About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.

FY2006. A history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in **Table 7**.<sup>38</sup>

**Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments.** A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over \$3.7 billion. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has been funded by contributing nations. It authorized the following:

- \$60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance (\$15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- \$30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections (\$10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
- \$80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight (\$15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and \$5 million per year for FY2003-2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
- \$1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid (\$425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- \$300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
- \$550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for \$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to \$450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
- \$1 billion (\$500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place.

A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives. The law did not specify dollar amount authorizations for FY2005 and FY2006.

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<sup>38</sup> In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund.

**FY2007.** On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Neumann signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister under which the United States pledges to provide Afghanistan with \$5.5 billion in civilian economic aid over the next five years. The U.S. aid plan is reportedly programmed for education, health care, and economic and democratic development. On February 6, 2006, the Administration requested, for FY2007, the following for Afghanistan:

- \$42.8 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH);
- \$150 million in Development Assistance (DA);
- \$610 million in ESF (an increase of about \$190 million over what is being provided in ESF for FY2006);
- \$297 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for counter-narcotics operations (an increase of about \$60 million over what is being provided for FY2006);
- \$1.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET);
- no funds specifically requested for Karzai protection (NADR) or Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and a
- total request of about *\$1.1 billion*, in line with the Administration pledge at the February 1, 2006, “London Conference.”

In congressional action, the House passed H.R. 5522, the regular FY2007 foreign aid appropriation. It (H.Rept. 109-486) contains \$510.77 million in ESF for Afghanistan and \$235 million for counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan, but appears to fully fund the remaining program categories. The Senate version (S.Rept. 109-277), which awaits Senate action, contains \$1.124 billion for Afghanistan, slightly more than the total request and matching the request in many of the aid categories. It funds only \$381 million in ESF but provides \$161 million for democracy programs in Afghanistan, a category not in the Administration request. The Senate version also provides \$30 million more than requested for Child Survival programs and \$36 million more than requested for Development Assistance (DA). USAID says it plans to spend about \$42 million on PRT-related reconstruction programs. The FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-289) provides \$1.5 billion to train and equip Afghan security forces and \$100 million for DOD counter-narcotics support operations in Afghanistan.

**Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance.** Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked over \$145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and another \$17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Another \$20 million in overflight fees withheld by U.N. sanctions on the Taliban were provided as well. Together with its allies, over \$350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment credits of \$100 million.

**World Bank/Asian Development Bank.** In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced



a \$108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional \$30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and \$30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged \$800 million in loans and grants and \$200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan \$372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about \$90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of \$80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system.

**International Reconstruction Pledges.** Afghan leaders said that Afghanistan needs \$27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At donors conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), and Kabul (April 2005), about \$9.5 billion in non-U.S. contributions were pledged. However, only about half has been received as of January 2006. At the London conference in February 2006, another \$6 billion (non-U.S.) in pledges was made for the next five years. Of the new pledges, Britain pledged about \$900 million. The London conference also leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor community. In exchange, the Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and effectively.

**Promoting Long-Term Economic Development.** In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan's acute humanitarian problems, the United States has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a \$2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost \$3.7 billion to construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.<sup>39</sup> The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power.

Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of

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<sup>39</sup> Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia's Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.

Afghanistan's prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provide some exports to its neighbors. Some Afghan leaders believe the government needs to better develop other resources such as copper and coal mines that have gone unused.

**Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership.** The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan's post-war economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.

## Residual Issues From Past Conflicts

A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan's many years of conflict.

**Stinger Retrieval.** Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles to the *mujahedin* for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.<sup>40</sup> The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States "dozens" of Stingers.<sup>41</sup> In late

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<sup>40</sup> Saleem, Farrukh. "Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan," *Friday Times*. August 17-23, 2001.

<sup>41</sup> Fullerton, John. "Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S." Reuters, February 4, 2002.

January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of \$150,000 each.<sup>42</sup>

In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about \$10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The *New York Times* reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about \$55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the *Washington Post* reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.

The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.<sup>43</sup> It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.

**Mine Eradication.** Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on demining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (**Table 2**), the U.S. demining program was providing about \$3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about \$7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

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<sup>42</sup> “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

**Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002**  
(\$ in millions)

	<b>FY1999</b>	<b>FY2000</b>	<b>FY2001</b>	<b>FY2002 (Final)</b>
U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP)	42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under "416(b)" program.	68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief)	131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b))	198.12 (for food commodities)
State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC	16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation	14.03 for the same purposes	22.03 for similar purposes	136.54 (to U.N. agencies)
State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)	7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan	6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs	18.934 for similar programs	113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs)
State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program)	2.615	3.0	2.8	7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining
Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs)	5.44 (2.789 for health, training - Afghan females in Pakistan)	6.169, of which \$3.82 went to similar purposes	5.31 for similar purposes	
Counter-Narcotics			1.50	63.0
USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives			0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan)	24.35 for broadcasting/ media
Dept. of Defense				50.9 ( 2.4 million rations)
Foreign Military Financing				57.0 (for Afghan national army)
Anti-Terrorism				36.4
Economic Support Funds (E.S.F)				105.2
Peacekeeping				24.0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>76.6</b>	<b>113.2</b>	<b>182.6</b>	<b>815.9</b>

**Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, 2003**  
(\$ in millions, same acronyms as Table 2)

<b>From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)</b>	
Development/Health	90
Food Aid	47
Peacekeeping	10
Disaster Relief	94
ESF	50
Non-Proliferation, Demining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)	5
Refugee Relief	55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)	21
<b>Total from this law:</b>	<b>372</b>
<b>From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)</b>	
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)	100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)	10
Afghan government support (ESF)	57
ANA train and equip (FMF)	170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR, some for Karzai protection)	28
<b>Total from this law:</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>Total for FY2003</b>	<b>737</b>

**Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004**  
(\$ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)

<b>From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)</b>	
Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF)	30
Afghan government (ESF) \$10 million for customs collection	70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF)	69
Roads (ESF)	181
Schools/Education (ESF)	95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF)	49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)	58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation	95
Water Projects	23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE).	170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations	73
Afghan National Army (FMF)	287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR)	35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations	92
<b>Total from this law:</b> (of which \$60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls)	<b>1,327</b>
<b>From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)</b>	
Development/Health	171
Disaster Relief	35
Refugee Relief	72
Afghan women (ESF)	5
Judicial reform commission (ESF)	2
Reforestation (ESF)	2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF)	2
Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by USAID for PRT-related reconstruction = \$56.4 million.)	64
ANA train and equip (FMF)	50
<b>Total from this law:</b>	<b>403</b>
<b>Total for FY2004</b>	<b>1,727</b>

**Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005**  
(\$ in millions)

<b>From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)</b>	
Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF)	225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF)	400
Assistance to benefit women and girls	50
Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-building	300
Reforestation	2
Child and maternal health	6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission	2
<b>Total from this law</b>	<b>985</b>
<b>From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)</b>	
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture, alternative livelihoods, government capacity building, training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs (ESF). (Total FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-led reconstruction = \$87.89 million.)	1,073.5
Aid to displaced persons (ESF)	5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF)	2.5
Women-led NGOs (ESF)	5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces. Of the funds, \$34 million may go to Afghan security elements for that purpose. Also, \$290 million of the funds is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated for this purpose.	1,285
DOD counter-narcotics support operations	242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)	220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE)	400
Karzi protection (NADR funds)	17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan	7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul	60
<b>Total from this law</b>	<b>3,317</b>
<b>Total from all FY2005 laws</b>	<b>4,302</b>

**Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006**  
(\$ in millions)

<b>From the FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102)</b>	
ESF for reconstruction, governance, democracy-building (ESF over \$225 million subject to certification that Afghanistan is cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts.) Total FY2006 funds to be spent on reconstruction by USAID via PRTs = \$20 million.	430
Counter-narcotics (INCLE). Of the funds, \$60 million is to train the ANP.	235
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries)	18
Karzai protection (NADR funds)	18
Child Survival and Health (CSH)	43
Reforestation	3
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission	2
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations	2
Programs to benefit women and girls	50
Development Assistance	130.4
<b>Total from this law:</b>	<b>931.4</b>
<b>From the FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 109-234)</b>	
Security Forces Fund	1,908
ESF (Includes \$11 million for debt relief costs and \$5 million for agriculture development)	43
DOD counter-narcotics operations	103
Embassy operations	50.1
Migration and Refugee aid	3.4
DEA counter-narcotics operations	9.2
<b>Total from this law:</b>	<b>2,116.7</b>
<b>Total for FY2006:</b>	<b>3,048.1</b>



**Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998**  
(\$ in millions)

Fiscal Year	Devel. Assist.	Econ. Supp. (ESF)	P.L. 480 (Title I and II)	Military	Other (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid)	Total
1978	4.989	—	5.742	0.269	0.789	11.789
1979	3.074	—	7.195	—	0.347	10.616
1980	—	(Soviet invasion - December 1979)			—	—
1981	—	—	—	—	—	—
1982	—	—	—	—	—	—
1983	—	—	—	—	—	—
1984	—	—	—	—	—	—
1985	3.369	—	—	—	—	3.369
1986	—	—	8.9	—	—	8.9
1987	17.8	12.1	2.6	—	—	32.5
1988	22.5	22.5	29.9	—	—	74.9
1989	22.5	22.5	32.6	—	—	77.6
1990	35.0	35.0	18.1	—	—	88.1
1991	30.0	30.0	20.1	—	—	80.1
1992	25.0	25.0	31.4	—	—	81.4
1993	10.0	10.0	18.0	—	30.2	68.2
1994	3.4	2.0	9.0	—	27.9	42.3
1995	1.8	—	12.4	—	31.6	45.8
1996	—	—	16.1	—	26.4	42.5
1997	—	—	18.0	—	31.9 <sup>a</sup>	49.9
1998	—	—	3.6	—	49.14 <sup>b</sup>	52.74

**Source:** Department of State.

- a. Includes \$3 million for demining and \$1.2 million for counternarcotics.  
b. Includes \$3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, \$7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about \$15 million, \$2 million for demining, and \$1.54 for counternarcotics.

**Table 8. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations**  
 (Numbers approximate)  
 (As of NATO Stage 4 transition, completed October 5, 2006)

NATO Countries		Non-NATO Partner Nations	
Belgium	300	Albania	30
Bulgaria	150	Austria	5
Canada	1,800	Azerbaijan	20
Czech Republic	100	Croatia	120
Denmark	320	Finland	100
Estonia	90	Ireland	10
France	1,000	Macedonia	120
Germany	2,750	New Zealand	100
Greece	180	Sweden	350
Hungary	200	Switzerland	5
Iceland	15		
Italy	1,800	<b>Total ISAF force</b>	<b>31,000</b>
Latvia	35		
Lithuania	135		
Luxemburg	10		
Netherlands	2,100		
Norway	350		
Poland	10		
Portugal	180		
Romania	750		
Slovakia	60		
Slovenia	50		
Spain	625		
Turkey	475		
United Kingdom	5,200		
United States	11,250		

**Note:** See NATO's Afghanistan page at [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan].

**Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams**  
(RC=Regional Command)

<b>PRT Location</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Lead Force/Country</b>
Gardez	Paktia (RC-East, E)	U.S.
Ghazni	Ghazni (RC-E)	U.S.
Bagram A.B.	Parwan (RC-C, Central)	U.S. (assisted by 175 troops from South Korea)
Jalalabad	Nangarhar (RC-E)	U.S.
Khost	Khost (RC-E)	U.S.
Qalat	Zabol (RC-South, S)	U.S. (with Romania)
Asadabad	Kunar (RC-E)	U.S.
Sharana	Paktika (RC-E)	U.S.
Mehtarlam	Laghman (RC-E)	U.S.
Jabal o-Saraj	Panjshir Province (RC-E)	U.S. (State Department lead)
Nuristan	Nuristan (RC-E)	U.S.
Farah	Farah (RC-W)	U.S.
<b>NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs</b>		
Qandahar	Qandahar (RC-S)	NATO/Canada (as of September 2005)
Lashkar Gah	Helmand (RC-S)	NATO/ Britain (with Denmark and Estonia)
Tarin Kowt	Uruzgan (RC-S)	NATO/Netherlands (with Australia)
Herat	Herat (RC-W)	NATO/Italy
Qalah-ye Now	Badghis (RC-W)	NATO/Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif	Balkh (RC-N)	ISAF/Sweden
Konduz	Konduz (RC-N)	NATO/Germany
Faizabad	Badakhshan (RC-N)	NATO/Germany
Meymaneh	Faryab (RC-N)	NATO/Norway
Chaghcharan	Ghowr (RC-W)	NATO/Lithuania
Pol-e-Khomri	Baghlan (RC-N)	NATO/Hungary (as of October 1, 2006)
Bamiyan	Bamiyan (RC-C)	New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF)
Maidan Shahr	Wardak (RC-C)	Turkey

**Table 10. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan**

<b>Party/ Commander</b>	<b>Leader</b>	<b>Ideology/ Ethnicity</b>	<b>Regional Base</b>
Taliban	Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan)/Mullah Dadullah/Jalaludin Haqqani.	ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east, and in Pakistan.
Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”)	Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (elected to lower house)/Muhammad Fahim (in upper house)/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan heads faction of the grouping in Herat area.	moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik	Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan	Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated his overthrow. Subsequently fought Rabbani government (1992-1995), but later joined Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces that captured his region by August 1998. Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, now Karzai’s chief “security adviser.”	secular, Uzbek	Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan, and environs
Hizb-e-Wahdat	Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city, the Hazara base.	Shiite, Hazara tribes	Bamiyan province
Pashtun Leaders	Various regional governors; central government led by Hamid Karzai.	Moderate Islamic, Pashtun	Dominant in southern, eastern Afghanistan
Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)	Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda; likely in Pakistan or eastern Afghanistan. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.	orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Small groups around Jalalabad, Nuristan and in southeast.
Islamic Union	Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. He lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.	orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Paghman (west of Kabul)

## Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted

Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.

- On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
- On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
- In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.
- On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
- On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan.
- On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government,

reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.

- On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999 declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about \$500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens' flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.
- U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban.
- P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan's receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph "Spike" Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)

Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 11/22/05)