THE FUTURE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: EASING CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION

by

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The Contemporary Operating Environment facing the United States Army is much different today from even fifteen years ago. Leaders at every level of government recognize that we must adapt to address these contemporary challenges. The National Guard is in the process of transforming with this in mind. Transformation is always difficult. There are many aspects of transformation that are both essential and challenging. Foremost among these is changing organizational culture. However, deliberate efforts can bring about timely, positive adaptation. This paper explores the factors bearing on cultural changes that will speed effective transformation in the Army National Guard. The paper will examine factors bearing on change including the Contemporary Operating Environment and transformation efforts within the Departments of Defense and the Army. This paper will also consider the growing demands for an operational reserve for federal forces balanced with the needs for Homeland Security, a major area of consideration since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. This paper recommends both conceptual and practical actions to speed cultural change in the National Guard necessary for successful strategic transformation.
The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) facing the United States Army is much different today than even fifteen years ago. The United States (US) no longer faces a superpower rival or even a near peer competitor. Today, we face highly determined foes that recognize our strength and seek to overcome our power through asymmetric means. The US government is in the process of transforming itself to meet this new enemy. The President, the Secretary of Defense and leaders throughout the government recognize that the US must depart from the Cold War way of thinking. We must adapt our institutions, infrastructure and more importantly our culture that were shaped under this old system in order to address contemporary challenges.

The Department of Defense (DOD), the US Army and the National Guard (NG) are all in the process of making these difficult changes. Many factors influence transformation but culture plays a particularly important part. This paper will explore many factors that influence the Army National Guard (ARNG) culture and affect its strategic transformation. These factors include our contemporary environment, the ongoing demands for an operational reserve and the critical Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD) missions that have risen to prominence since the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. Also relevant is an exploration of the nature of transformation, the guidelines under which the NG must adhere and other considerations that leaders must balance to create the ARNG of the future. Finally, this paper will offer conceptual and practical recommendations to speed cultural change that facilitates needed transformation.

The Contemporary Operating Environment

The fall of the Soviet Union (USSR) was one of the seminal events of the twentieth century. The fifty-year Cold War competition between the US and the USSR shaped much of the current culture, politics and certainly defense establishment within the US. The principle strategy at work during the cold war was that of containment. This concept focused mostly on “…United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” 1 The strategy was to avoid direct confrontation that may lead to nuclear war. However, military planners had to assume that war could break out between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact at any time. Such a war would initially be an intense, conventional fight in central Europe to defend the territorial integrity of our NATO allies and defeat the invading Soviet forces.2
Divisions deployed forward in Europe, along with NATO partners, planned to fight any incursion by Soviet forces. These forces would delay the enemy until more divisions could arrive to support the engaged army. Reserve forces would mobilize, train, certify and deploy into theater to bolster our side and ultimately defeat the Soviet aggression. This system was well thought out and appropriate to the threat.

When the Soviet Union disbanded in 1991, the old paradigms became less relevant. The government's first reaction was to cut the size of the military and reuse these resources for other programs – create a "peace dividend." The US downsized the DOD by about 600,000 service members and a cumulative $100 billion between 1986 and 1997.

While the government debated the size and scope of the drawdown, US national security strategists set to work thinking about what threats would dominate our future. Early on, the military strategy recognized terrorism, international crime, and weapons of mass destruction as serious threats to our national security. Early manifestations of our new environment arose in the Balkans and East Africa. The first World Trade Center bombings and subsequent bombings of US Embassies in Africa demonstrated the realities of the new threat environment. However, the 1990 Gulf War was the driving force that focused our attention on the gaps between the old Cold War strategic concepts and the new world realities.

The Guard as a Federal Reserve

The Gulf War was a conventional warfight. The armed forces were well trained and equipped to win it. However, the war also identified a number of strategic issues. One of these issues was how well the ARNG was suited to augment the federal Army in a modern war. During this war, the Army successfully deployed a number of ARNG organizations to support the operation. The bulk of the ARNG forces actually employed in the war were Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units. Of the three ARNG combat brigades activated for the war, none were actually deployed.

During the post-mobilization assessments, the Army determined that these brigades were inadequately trained. One reason was that many of the leaders were not well trained. Professional education for ARNG officers and NCOs was below targets. The duration of courses and the competition with collective training time were key reasons for the shortfall. Reserve Component (RC) courses relied (and continue to rely) heavily on correspondence courses with highly condensed active duty periods. The final conclusion was that these units needed more training time than what was available to get them into the first Gulf War (Gulf One).
Gulf One touched off a sometimes acrimonious debate about the relevance of the NG and the validity of the “One Army” concept. At the heart of this debate was a schism between the contemporary need for an operational reserve and the cold war system designed to provide a strategic reserve. This event also brought to light the perception by some that the Army Active Component (AC) thought of the NG as “second class citizens” and a threat in times of tight budgets.10

Things have changed substantially since 1991. The reduced size of the military coupled with the increased frequency of operations around the world requires a robust NG. This higher tempo has effectively changed the NG’s role from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve.11 This new role differs from its 20th Century role as a strategic reserve in significant ways. The old paradigm of mobilize, train, certify deploy is appropriate when there is time to ramp up. In this old paradigm, existing operational forces (mostly from AC formations) carry the fight until the additional, strategic forces (RC) are ready and needed.

This model for making reserve forces available later in the warfight is no longer appropriate. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other operations have placed very different demands for reserve forces. Today, the model for reserve forces must be train, mobilize, deploy.12 Combat Arms, CS and CSS units from the NG are an extensive part of the mix of forces used to fight today’s wars from the start.

The shift to an operational reserve coupled with an expectation to deploy has significantly impacted the relationship between AC and RC. OIF and OEF have driven significant growth in mutual trust between the Army components. Working and fighting together forms a bond of trust that has enormous implications on the beliefs and norms that tie directly back to cultures. The AC has more trust in the capabilities of their RC counterparts and RC members have new confidence in themselves and respect for their colleagues. All components of the Army have to nurture this mutual respect.

This shift from strategic to operational reserve has many implications both practical and conceptual. How US forces are resourced will always require a lot of attention. One example is the old Enhanced Brigade program in the ARNG. Under this program, Enhanced Brigades in specific geographic locations received a higher priority of resources than other ARNG units. These resources included new equipment fielding, abundant training support assets and operational funds. However, even these Enhanced Brigades generally received fewer resources or received them later than their AC partners. This method of prioritization had logic relative to how ARNG units would mobilize under the old, cold war model. Under the present transformation direction, every ARNG brigade will seek comparable resourcing to prepare for
eventual deployment. The implication is that RC training sites will see increased demands and costs.

Today’s Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) puts all Army brigades through a common lifecycle for deployment. The ARFORGEN model is the same in concept for both the NG and AC. They both have a three-phase cycle: Reset/Train, Ready and Available. The active component uses a three-year cycle. The NG uses a six-year cycle with 48-60 months in the first two phases, 3-24 months in validation and 9-24 months in a mobilized / deployed status. The actual duration of the phases is variable based on US military commitments.

The process of transformation is still in its early stages. Under the current schedule, the NG will complete its conversion to Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in 2011. Fielding these BCTs with the most current equipment sets is a key question. Today, many argue that the NG is significantly under resourced. The NG Association of the United States (NGAUS) argues that full-time manning is at 55% of requirements, and decries equipment fielding policies:

Until the just-in-time fielding of equipment for ARNG units deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq, modern equipment also continued to be disproportionately allocated to active duty forces, resulting in ARNG units remaining equipped with older, hand-me-down equipment that is not operable with active duty units.

The Government Accountability Office, as well as many Governors, Congressmen and NG leaders have already spoken out about inadequate equipment and funding for NG units. Most ARNG units preparing for deployment overseas are getting full equipment sets before their non-deploying AC counterparts, but often have to leave their modern equipment in theater. Complaints abound at the slowness of re-equipping these units to make them ready for HS/HD or other missions. This situation is not as prevalent for AC units who do not have a direct HS mission. Admittedly, some of the attention is political rather than objective assessments.

Other assumptions underlie the ARFORGEN concept. Existing models for RC training time may not fit the ARFORGEN requirements. For decades, NG units have had one weekend drill per month and 15 days of training each year. This tempo may be too much for the early phases of the ARFORGEN cycle and not enough for the later ones.

Deployment expectations lead to other latent resourcing issues. The demands on the professional education system for the RC requires greater investment. This system was one of the contributing factors to the unavailability of several ARNG brigades in the Gulf One; many officers and NCOs were not qualified. One reason was that funding existed for either school or unit training but not both. Another reason was the duration of courses and implicitly the dry nature of correspondence courses. The RC educational system has not significantly changed since the Cold War.
There is still a significant gap in understanding. Ignorance of the unique challenges that RC leaders face is still pervasive with AC leaders and vice-versa. This gap reduces the speed of integration and effectiveness of inter-component cooperation. Bridging this gap requires an effort that is both mutual and synchronized.

The need for an operational reserve is critical to the success of US national strategy. However, the NG has another equally, perhaps more important role to fill in today’s COE: HS/HD. This HS/HD mission is not new to the NG. Defending the homeland was the militia’s (the forerunner of the NG) original purpose dating back to 1636. This role is embedded in the traditions and culture of the NG. What is new about this mission is the real and immediate threat against the homeland that the nation now faces.

Natural disasters, civil disturbances and now terrorist attacks are the primary focus of NG organizations when not facing mobilization for federal service. The US structure for jurisdiction begins at the local and state level, not at the federal level. The Stafford Act spells out the process for disasters:

All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary. Based on the request… the President may declare under this Act that a major disaster or emergency exists.

A Governor’s request can include a range of assistance including federal troops if necessary. This was true for Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and Hurricane Katrina last year. It is noteworthy that the Governor of Mississippi did not request federal troops in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, unlike the Louisiana Governor. It is also significant that most of the military response was ARNG.

The NG is uniquely suited to perform HS/HD and Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA). First, the NG is the only military component that can operate in Title 10 (T10), Title 32 (T32) or State Active Duty (SAD) status. Each legal status confers different authorities and limitations on the force. Federal military forces operate exclusively in T10. This is significant because Posse Comitatus Act generally prevents T10 forces from performing civilian Law Enforcement (LE) except at the direction of Congress or the President to quell insurrection. The government extends this to all T10 forces as a matter of policy.

T32 applies to NG forces performing domestic federal tasks, albeit under federal funding. In this status, as with SAD, NG forces can perform LE missions in either SAD or T32. LE is ingrained in NG culture.
Another important advantage the NG has over federal forces domestically is presence. AC forces are concentrated in only a few military bases. The NG on the other hand, is located in every state and territory and in over 2,700 communities. This is an enormous factor in terms of response time and availability of equipment. Local communities have a special relationship with the NG unit that is markedly different from an AC unit; the Guard unit is the “hometown” Army. The presence of Guard members in a community provides a human dimension to the Army that is often abstract for AC counterparts. The implications are that neighbors will be helping neighbors in the event of a crisis where the NG is involved. This perception is not as true for the AC. Although the US Army Reserve (USAR) has many of the same attributes as the ARNG, it is seldom used in natural disasters, and therefore has different cultural traditions and perceptions with the unit’s community.

Nature of Transformation

The new reality is that the US faces an ambiguous threat that challenges the old ways of doing business. Not only do the US armed forces face greater demands around the world but also the need for protecting in the homeland. Recognizing this new environment, the President made transformation a part of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Specifically, the NSS states “A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.”

The DOD is also making major strides to implement transformation in each of the services. Each state’s NG organization is working within this effort as well. The National Military Strategy (NMS) amplifies the concept of transformation. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, described transformation in the military in three parts: technological, intellectual and cultural.

In the context of transformation, US leaders have spent a lot of time and effort talking about changes in attitudes and behaviors to effect cultural change because it is not only the most important part of transformation but also the most difficult and no small task. The federal government is one of the largest bureaucracies in the world, and forcing change is often painful. Complacency, lack of “buy-in” and a host of other obstacles often impede progress towards even a clearly articulated vision.

The tangible aspects of transformation such as organizational restructuring and technological development are easier to grasp than social or cultural aspects. This does not mean that any part of transformation is easy. The conversion from a divisional structure to a BCT structure for example demands modification of the tactics and doctrine most senior leaders
grew up with, but most leaders can visualize the changes. The real core of transformation however is the military culture. Many recognize the importance of the cultural dimension. LTG Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) reinforced this idea when he said, “This [transformation] will require a new way of thinking, and most real transformation happens right here – it’s right between your ears.”

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the NMS talk about transformation. Absent from these documents is a description of transformation in the NG. The NGB as well as the Adjutant Generals (TAGs) and Governors of each state are wrestling with the challenges of transformation to meet the unique demands on the NG. On 1 October 2003, the NGB took a large step at transformation by reorganizing the headquarters of each state. Before this action, each state and territory had a State Area Headquarters (STARC) that included an overall headquarters and separate headquarters for the Army and Air Force. STARCs operated more as an administrative headquarters. Reorganization converted the 162 STARC headquarters into 54 Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).

There were several purposes for this reorganization. The first was to shake up the old STARC mentality shifting away from the administrative inclinations in favor of a Combatant Command (CC) mindset. The move also pushed the States to step up their readiness to deal with the real threats to the homeland. Obviously, an increased reliance on joint operations is necessary for transformation and influenced this reorganization. Readiness requires a synchronized, joint approach that a JFHQ brings. Likewise, the TAG’s role as the senior leader of the state has more importance now with much greater visibility and expectations for defending their states.

One can consider a TAG like a Combatant Commander (COCOM). They are both responsible for an Area of Responsibility (AOR). They both manage forces assigned to them. They develop, coordinate and execute plans for operations within the AOR. They maintain close relationships with military and civilian leadership advocating support. Both have ultimate responsibility for achieving military and political goals within their AOR. Many political, AC and even NG leaders do not understand the political role as well as they could. Ultimately, the State NG reorganization reduced redundant activities and streamlined the headquarters.

LTG Blum reorganized NGB into a joint headquarters in 2003, a task made easier by its history. Since Congress established NGB in 1957 as both an Army and Air Force bureau, NGB has had a joint mentality. This reorganization not only strengthens its joint interdependent traditions but also improves its unique position with every element of the HS/HD system. NGB history positively contributes to transformation.
The NG has very close ties with state, local and federal civilian agencies borne of centuries of experience working together on homeland crises. Adding to these relationships are the obvious ties with federal military counterparts. The NG is better positioned to address HS/HD and MSCA than any other US organization. It is noteworthy that the 50,000 NG troops deployed in support of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita constituted only about 10% of the total NG force. Beyond relationships and experience, the NG brings a military capability unlike any civilian agency. President Bush recognized the awesome capabilities to deal with extraordinary crises in his speech to the nation after Hurricane Katrina. In the speech, he called for the US to examine a greater role for the DOD in times of catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina. The basis for his conclusion is the results orientation, vast organization and self-contained infrastructure that DOD represents. The complicating question is whether an expanded role for federal troops is necessary and appropriate in light of the NG mission and culture.

There is significant debate today over the role of the NG and AC forces in HS. One point of view is that the federal government is the ultimate authority. One driver for this opinion is the primacy of the federal government in most areas. Foremost among these areas is the responsibility to defend the nation against its enemies as expressed in the Constitution. It is logical to include foreign terrorists as enemies of the nation.

Others default to the federal government for the primary responsibility for HS due to its vast resources relative to any state or local government. This is certainly true. One of the greatest assets of the federal government is the AC military and its reserves. The AC also has senior leaders (three star and above) that the NG does not. This AC asset is awesome in terms of its effectiveness and flexibility to handle any situation. However, the federal military was never intended to be the main provider of domestic support. Such a mission would distract our military from its expeditionary combat competency. This is not to say that there is no place for federal troops when needed.

A more popular view still exists that all disasters are local first and should be dealt with at the lowest level possible, and escalating only when lower level capabilities are overcome. The Governor retains control over what and how much federal support joins the effort. This concept applies to most disasters. When the rare catastrophe occurs that clearly overwhelms state and local governments, many argue immediate federal intervention is appropriate.

States use a mutual support agreement system called Emergency Military Assistance Compacts (EMACs). EMACs provide states with established procedures to borrow resources, equipment and people from each other. EMACs virtually eliminate the need for the requesting and providing States to negotiate the terms of the agreement during a crisis. This improves
response time and effectiveness. Access to the resources of other states generally lessens the demand for federal support in a crisis. The robustness of EMACs positively affects the nature of transformation in the ARNG.

The most important concept with an EMAC is that it provides each state individually the flexibility and resources vastly greater than its organic NG and state agency structure. This capability is especially important today in light of the heavy deployments overseas for the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Since September 11, 2001, states have mobilized almost 330,000 NG personnel for T10 or T32 duties. The GWOT affects the ability of states to react to large crises and makes the EMACs more important than ever.

**Balancing State and Federal Missions in Transformation**

The heavy deployments for federal service also highlight important strategic questions – What is the right composition of NG units? What is the real maximum level of mobilization available to the federal government? Even though NGB puts the baseline level of 50% for state use, there is no single answer for all states. Each state is unique, and has different threats from natural and man-made disasters. Some are concerned with hurricanes while others must prepare for forest fires. States with major urban areas face higher risks of mass civil unrest or WMD strikes. A state’s unique characteristics are essential when considering its ARNG transformation.

Each state also has a distinct size and composition of forces, and therefore a varying capability – an important consideration. An Engineer company of 135 soldiers with construction equipment has a different capability than that of a 45-soldier company of linguists. Likewise, not all units are equally mission capable. A TAG will not eagerly select a transportation company that recently demobilized from duty in Iraq. Also, the unit’s equipment may not have returned with them or be unavailable. A unit’s deployment status complicates the decision.

The domestic support mission is a critical factor to consider for transformation of the NG. The ability to react quickly and with appropriate resources to a disaster or WMD attack is vitally important to our national security. However, the operational demands of the federal Army are distinct but equally vital to the national interest. The NG must fulfill both missions.

One of the key demands in this balancing act is stabilizing the deployment of all RC component units and soldiers, not just those of the ARNG. Deploying reserve soldiers too often risks ‘breaking’ the RC. LTG James Helmly, the Chief of the Army Reserve expressed his concern that “[The USAR is] rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force [due to] current demands … [and] dysfunctional mobilization and personnel management policies.”

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RC soldiers join with full knowledge that they may be called up to fight a war. However, they do so with the understanding that they will typically be able to carry out their normal, civilian life in balance with this commitment. There are numerous examples where the Army involuntarily mobilized some soldiers repeatedly. Although these are the exception rather than the rule, the possibility of these heavy commitments has an effect on recruiting and morale of reserve troops.

The mobilization process referenced by LTG Helmly is mired in cold war thinking. Today’s validation process for RC is broader in scope than for AC units. The RC process starts with individual level skills and certifies at each collective unit level in addition to a battalion or brigade Mobilization Readiness Exercise. Every RC unit faces the same validation process regardless of proficiency when they arrive. The mobilization process gives no credit for even individual proficiency before troops arrive at the mobilization station. For those units that arrive well trained, the “cookie cutter” mobilization process wastes precious time, resources and degrades warrior morale. Furthermore, the expectation in units of a validation process oriented on the lowest common denominator may influence the training of RC units.

Additional Considerations

The concerns are not only those of the soldiers. Employers and families have an urgent need to not only understand the potential demands but to also have some basis for expectations. Expectations are enormously important for the mental well being of a soldier and the influences on those who consider joining the military.

Employers are greatly concerned about their employees. The loss of even one employee can greatly affect some businesses, especially a small business. Most employers, like most Americans, are willing to do their part to defend the nation. They find ways to get around the absence of a worker for twelve to eighteen months while he or she is gone for active duty. It is a sacrifice though; the loss of even unskilled employees negatively affects the bottom line. This financial impact is greater in some cases because it is temporary. A permanent loss would enable the business to hire a permanent replacement. The Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Act protects the service member from adverse impacts of being activated. However, repeated mobilizations will ultimately damage the employability of RC personnel. Employers invest in hiring someone, training them and balancing their work forces. Losing an employee repeatedly for long periods in unplanned intervals degrades the return on investment. If this perception comes to dominate the job market, reservists will be far less
desirable. If joining the Guard makes individuals less likely to get a job and earn a living, they will be much less likely to join at all.

The ARFORGEN model seeks to provide the stability needed to avoid excessive deployments by both active and reserve forces. This concept has second and third order effects. Culturally, a shift will likely happen to adapt to the expectations of a more stable deployment cycle. Recruits who volunteer to serve will likely do so in full expectation that they will deploy at some point in their enlistment. This is a new reality that was not so in the past.

This model also has an important personnel distinction for the RC from its AC counterpart. Soldiers assigned in AC units in the Reconstitution phase will remain in the unit throughout the cycle. This kind of stability is not the same in RC. Guardsmen travel to their unit which may mean traveling hundreds of miles to drill. Some soldiers spend an entire career in a single company. Others enlist, serve their time and leave the service. This means that soldiers naturally come and go within each unit. One option is for the Guard to simply accept instability. Another is find creative, non-traditional manning methods to achieve lasting stability. Either way, the critical need for stability may affect the traditional culture of the Guard or the Army.

These circumstances bring us back to the central question of how transition should look for the NG. The highest-level leadership of the AC and NG institutions understand the issues and earnestly seek a strong NG – in principle. The reality is that bureaucracies such as the Army are slow to change, while much work remains to effect transformation goals.

Formal Transformation Guidance

Leaders from the Secretary of Defense on down are on record advocating a stronger, more integrated NG, recent proposals to cut RC forces notwithstanding. Articulation of support is very important to moving the cultural norms of the past into the norms of the future. Unfortunately, the role of the NG is vaguely included or entirely absent from key strategic documents such as the NMS and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Clear statements about the place the NG will play in the defense of the nation and other defense programs would help clarify budgeting and employment. Clearly, words alone are not enough to bring about transformation, but they help.

The true measure of priorities is the allocation of resources. There is never enough money for everything an organization seeks to do. The DOD is no exception. Elements at every level within the Department compete for finite resources. Although the leadership goes to great lengths to objectively weigh competing projects, subjective assessments play a role in the ultimate decision. Congress often requires investment in some projects for political purposes,
and complicates the process. Historically, the NG received funding far below its requirements compared to AC forces. This trend may be changing with the current high demand for mobilized NG formations.

**Recommendations**

Several changes would improve transformation in the ARNG. The first is to think of state NG organizations more like small CCs. The AOR is the state boundary. Readiness of assigned forces remains the COCOM’s or TAG’s responsibility. Planning for and executing major operations in the state would continue as with any CC. The TAG has input for budgeting and resourcing similar to that of a COCOM though still through NGB. The commander has a responsibility for fostering cooperative relationships with government and non-governmental agencies and various supporting and supported military organizations. These aspects would change little, but the conceptual model of a TAG as a COCOM-like figure would drive cultural transformation a long way.

Transformation has much to do with the cultural norms and expectations. HS remains the top priority for the nation, and the ARNG is the principal military player. Disasters have much greater importance today than before September 11, 2001. Citizens have higher expectations than ever for an effective responses to a crisis. States must redouble their efforts to develop robust plans to deal with the full range of potential crises that may occur in their AOR, some of which may have national importance. These plans must be linked to intrastate, interstate and federal resources to a higher degree than in the past. The COE demands a new way of behaving for the NG and all of DOD. Relating to a leader with familiar responsibilities such as a COCOM will alleviate some of the ARNG related questions about roles and command relationships with AC forces and other federal agencies.

Another major transformational recommendation is to reinforce the ARNG as the lead military contributor for HS. Many citizens including some Congressmen have a worldview that the federal government should lead in any crisis as a rule. This is contrary to the local nature of most disasters. Many federal leaders, including administration officials do not appreciate the effectiveness of the current system where federal support acts as a “reserve” that can be committed to help and augment state efforts. This concept requires broader and deeper understanding at all levels. Domestic crisis response should remain an essential mission for the NG. The logical place to start this clarification of roles, missions and associated resourcing is the NDS, NMS and QDR. From this clarification effort must spring a more robust interagency doctrine that crystallizes the roles and responsibilities for each organization in a crisis. Although
doctrine already exists such as *Joint, Publication 3-26: Homeland Security*: a key part of this
document is reinforcement of the idea that AC troops may be under the control of a NG task force
commander. Reinforcing this expectation will alleviate some confusion and reduce the burden
on AC commanders and staffs.

The Army also needs to expand its embrace of the NG in its federal reserve role.
Culturally, this is happening at the lower levels. What needs to happen is the same acceptance
at the Pentagon. Resource allocation for equipment, training funds and facilities should be
based on the ARFORGEN schedule for deployment regardless of a unit’s active or reserve
status. There is progress here, but improvement is necessary.

The professional education system for RC leaders needs reexamination. The historical
conflict between sending a leader to professional education or conducting unit training must
change. The priority for professional education should be in the early phases of the ARFOGEN
cycle. This may not always be possible. In that case, sufficient training funds must be available
to enable concurrent participation in unit training and education. In addition, the Army needs to
accelerate its improvement in the quality and quantity of distance education offerings.

The Army must consider changing the historical RC drill tempo. In the Reconstitution and
Training phases, a low intensity schedule may be acceptable. This could look like the current
tempo or possibly less than one weekend per month and 15 days each summer. The Validation
period, however, will likely need to increase this tempo to as much as twice that amount of time.
If a unit is not actually deployed in the deployable phase, then a sustained but vigorous tempo
probably greater than our historical tempo may be necessary. This concept would allow a
sustainable tempo not only for mission requirements but also for the soldier, family and
employer perspectives.

The Army needs to add flexibility to the mobilization process. One size does not fit the
readiness of all mobilizing RC units. One credible suggestion is to allow the first General Officer
in the unit’s chain of command to certify the individual training readiness for mobilization
purposes.42 This has several benefits. It reduces one step of the validation process at the
mobilization station. Another important step is to enable the certifying commander the authority
to accelerate the validation steps for NG units that arrive highly trained. Having this flexibility
may affect the details of transformation within each state particularly as it impacts the traditional
expectations for mobilization station activities.

Personnel stability during the pre-mobilization phases of the ARFORGEN cycle is a
challenge to traditional ways of managing people in the NG. One concept to explore is surging
recruiting efforts to batch enlistment terms by unit to coincide with its deployment schedule.
This would reduce efforts to fill out of cycle units in the state. The concept may also dilute the “hometown” composition of the targeted unit. However, having a stable group of soldiers is important for building a real and sustainable team in combat. This too may have long term impacts on the way the ARNG adapts for the future.

The final recommendation focuses on bridging the gap of understanding of the unique challenges of active and reserve duty. An exchange program between RC officers and AC officers will help bridge this gap. There are already past examples of AC officers performing tours in the NG – some as battalion commanders. There is also a history of active duty tours for NG officers in relevant and current operations assignments. Increasing this cross-fertilization will benefit both components. Reintroducing this concept and expanding it to NCOs is also worth consideration. AC officers and NCOs will gain additional first hand knowledge of the unique capabilities and challenges of the RC. NG officers should learn more about the AC and hone their skills as well. The exchanges will have second and third order effects as participants return to their component and share their experiences. A corollary requirement is to diminish the administrative wall that separates those in the RC and AC. Transitions between the two must be made significantly easier not only to facilitate exchanges but also to improve retention of those seeking engagement in the other component as their careers progress.

Conclusion

The COE has forced changes on the US military. The environment is more ambiguous, less structured and more dangerous than ever. Operations abroad combined with a smaller AC force demand an ongoing reliance on the NG as a federal, operational reserve. At the same time, domestic threats from the omnipresent reality of terrorist attacks and natural disasters demand an improved NG capability at home. Transformation of the US military is an imperative from the President.

ARNG transformation is a difficult process with its own characteristics that leaders must consider as they shape the future. Foremost is the role of culture on how the ARNG or any organization adapts to a new form. Old ways of doing business, traditions and biases perpetuated over years stand in the way of cultural change. However, recent experiences both in combat zones and at home enable cultural changes, trust building and integration between AC and RC.

Several actions are worthy of consideration to address issues that support transformation that also have important cultural dimensions. Thinking of State organizations like CCs is one way to improve understanding of the role of the NG. Reinforcing the NG as the leading military
organization for HS issues within national strategy documents such as the NDS, NMS and QDR will help. This will better focus AC forces on expeditionary war and build on the NG’s traditional role.

Another recommendation is that the Army must continue its efforts to allocate resources in accordance with ARFORGEN unit deployments regardless of RC status. Professional education for RC leaders needs improvement to enhance the effectiveness of training and the proficiency of RC leaders. The RC training tempo that is very ingrained in cultural expectations is ripe for reconsideration. Varying the tempo of drills and annual training based on ARFOGEN cycles is worth further review. The mobilization process is too rigid to accommodate varying levels of unit proficiency. Allowing flexibility in training will impact how units behave and prepare for mobilization. Non-traditional manning concepts may help the ARNG adapt from old ways to achieve better stability in units. Finally, an AC/RC exchange program will create better understanding between leaders in both active and reserve units.

Transformation is difficult as is any deliberate effort to change cultures. There are many influences that will affect how the US adapts and moves forward. However, the people of this nation demand that its military meets current and future threats effectively and decisively. The ARNG must meet this challenge as well.

Endnotes


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41 Lowenberg, 4.

42 Renaud, 9.