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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 22, 1970

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National Security Decision Memorandum 73

TO: The Members of the National Security Council
 The Attorney General
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Supplemental Guidance for Strategic Arms Limitation
 Talks

After considering the Delegation's request for changes in NSDM 69 and the views of the Verification Panel, the President has directed that the following supplemental guidance be issued:

1. The limit in paragraph 2(B) of NSDM 69 would entitle the United States as well as the USSR to 250 launchers for modern, large missiles (i. e., missiles with a volume in excess of 70 cubic meters and of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later), within the overall limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the sub-limit on launchers for ICBMs and sea-based missiles. The force permitted each side by paragraph 2(B) could be obtained by retention of existing launchers already associated with modern, large missiles, by retrofitting such missiles into existing launchers not hitherto associated with such missiles, by basing such missiles on sea-borne platforms, or by building new silos for them.

2. The limits set forth in paragraph 2(E) and (F) on relocation of existing ICBM silos, modification of existing ICBM silos in externally observable ways, on construction of new silos for IR/ MRBMs, and on construction of all new ICBM silos are particularly intended to enhance confidence in verification by national means of the

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by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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limit of paragraph 2(B). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These limits would be interpreted to mean that any silo whose construction was initiated after an agreed date would be counted against the paragraph 2(B) limit. Similarly, any externally observable modification of existing silos would require that the modified silos be counted against that limit. The Delegation is to explain that these provisions are required because, while we do not wish to interfere unnecessarily with the flexibility of each side to determine its own force mix, we regard it as essential that there be a verifiable and effective limit on modern, large missiles. [REDACTED]

3. Obtaining a separate limitation on modern, large missiles and assuring that such a limitation is adequately verifiable are absolutely essential. Preservation of particular possible means of building a U.S. force of modern, large missiles must not interfere with obtaining an effective and verifiable limit on the Soviet force of such missiles. This priority must be borne in mind in discussing with the Soviets the U.S. proposals with respect to offensive forces and in evaluating any possible modifications of the U.S. position.


4. The privilege of substituting among bombers, ICBMs and sea-based missiles set forth in [REDACTED]

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5. It is recognized that the Soviets may not accept all of the collateral constraints on offensive systems set forth in NSDM 69 and that they may object to other provisions as well. However, possible changes in the U.S. position will be considered in the context of concrete situations and proposals as they arise through the negotiating process and in the light of possible Soviet counter-concessions.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U.S. Delegation
to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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