

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 9, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 69

TO: The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

After considering the report of the Delegation on the talks to date and the recommendations of the Verification Panel, I have made the following decisions with respect to the U.S. position in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks:

1. It apparently being impossible to reach agreement along the lines of either of the two approaches I authorized in NSDM-51, the United States will attempt to reach an initial agreement concentrating on imposing numerical limits on the most important strategic weapons systems, with the collateral constraints necessary to make such limits adequately verifiable.

2. The U.S. proposal for such an agreement will have the following main elements:

A -- The aggregate total of ICBM launchers, sea-based ballistic missile launchers and strategic heavy bombers would be limited to an agreed number. We would initially propose 1900 as this number.

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By the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 13085
by B REGER

D -- Within these numerical limits sea-based ballistic missile launchers, land-based ICBM launchers, and strategic heavy bombers could be substituted for each other on a one-for-one basis.

F -- In addition we would initially propose a ban on land-mobile ICBMs and on other land-mobile ballistic missiles and launchers not externally distinguishable from them and a ban on all new ICBM silos (after a transition period for reaching agreed levels).

H -- There would be no limitation on substitution of new strategic heavy bomber types nor would there be other qualitative limitations on such bombers or their armaments.

I -- Either of two alternative provisions, of equal status as United States positions, could be agreed for limitation on deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems:

-- "NCA" level. Deployment of ABMs would be limited to a system appropriate for defense of the Nation Command Authority on each side (Moscow and Washington). One hundred fixed ABM launchers and one hundred deployed ABM interceptors would be permitted each side together with associated radars. The Soviet Union would retain its present Try Add and Dog House type radars and ABM launchers operational and under construction, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated Try Add radars around Moscow to

serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors. The United States would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising up to 6 PAR faces at no more than two sites, 4 MSR faces at no more than two sites, and 100 ABM launchers and interceptors.

-- "Zero" level. Deployment of ABM launchers and interceptors and radars would be prohibited. Existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

J -- Under either of these alternative ABM levels limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. Soviet Hen House-type radars configured for tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard the continued existence of these radars as tolerable and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build additional early warning radars to provide equivalent capability to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses.

3. In such an agreement, there would be no limitations on forward-based aircraft, bombers of less than intercontinental range, submarine-launched cruise missiles, or intermediate or medium range ballistic missiles, except for those limits on IR and MR EMs which are necessary to insure adequate verification of the limits imposed on ICEMs. The Delegation is to take the position that any form of "compensation" for excluding forward based aircraft in the form of permitting the Soviets additional missiles of intercontinental range,

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6. Pending receipt of the detailed statement of the new position, the Delegation is authorized to present the main elements, as outlined in paragraphs (2) and (3), to the Soviets. After consultation with Washington, the Delegation may, in making such presentation, use a formal statement or less formal means, and may present all the elements at once or present them in stages, as it deems most advantageous from the negotiating point of view. In making any such presentation, however, and particularly in any presentation of the elements in stages, the Delegation must emphasize that the acceptability to the United States of each individual provision is contingent on agreement on the other elements of the new position, including particularly corollary verification provisions and sub-limitations within the overall aggregate.

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Paul M.
July 4, 1970

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U.S. Delegation to the
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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