

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90281

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 14, 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-33),  
U.S. Approach to START Negotiations

The President has decided upon the U.S. approach to the START negotiations incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-33).

In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-33 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
William P. Clark

Attachment  
NSDD-33

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified/Released on 8/12/92  
under provisions of E.O. 12356  
by S. Tilley, National Security Council

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Review May 13, 2002~~

~~Classified and Extended by William P. Clark~~

~~Reason for Extension: NSC 1-13(c)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90281

May 14, 1982

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 33

U.S. Approach to START Negotiations

The main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance. This is due to the increasing destructive potential and numbers of warheads delivered by the most inherently destabilizing Soviet systems, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs. The clear and primary focus of U.S. efforts should be to achieve a significant reduction in these systems, the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential.

At the same time, the U.S. will continue to require the essential contribution made by effective strategic nuclear forces to deter conflict and to meet our own legitimate security requirements. In addition, given the advantage in non-nuclear forces enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its allies, U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be required to fulfill our commitments to our Allies and friends.

The U.S. Goal in Negotiations

Therefore, the goal the United States sets for itself in strategic arms negotiations is to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, while maintaining an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, underwrite our national security, and meet our commitments to Allies and friends.

The U.S. Approach

To achieve this goal, the U.S. approach will emphasize the basic difference between slow-flying, clearly second-strike systems, and the more destabilizing ballistic missiles. The U.S. proposal will include significant reductions in the number of ballistic missiles, the number of warheads carried on these missiles, and their overall destructive potential. It will use both direct and indirect means to reduce, and then eliminate, the Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw weight.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Review May 4, 2002~~

~~Classified and Extended by William P. Clark~~

~~Reason for Extension: NSC 1-13(e)~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

Partially Declassified/Released on  
under provisions of E.O. 13526  
by S. Tiley, National Security Council

8/10/92

**UNCLASSIFIED**


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

At the same time, the U.S. will propose separate constraints on slow-flying systems. The differences in treatment of bombers and cruise missiles will provide us a means of maintaining sufficient nuclear force to meet U.S. security requirements, even while significantly reducing our ballistic missile capability. It should also encourage the Soviet Union to turn to less destabilizing systems to meet its deterrent requirements.

The United States will propose a phased approach to the START negotiations. During the first phase, as in the INF negotiations, we will focus on the most threatening systems, in this case ballistic missiles.



(b)(1)  
(ts)

- Explain our intent to focus on ballistic systems during the first phase. Stress the basic difference between ballistic systems and slow-flying, clearly second-strike systems.
- Agree to equal limits on bombers at roughly current levels with BACKFIRE included, but defer further reductions or discussion of constraints on slow-flying systems (i.e., bombers and cruise missiles) until the second phase.


~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Declare our intent to seek in the second phase: (1) direct reductions in throw weight to equal levels; (2) further reductions in missiles, and missile warhead levels if conditions permit; and reductions and other constraints on slow-flying systems.
- Assure effective verification procedures for the above.



(b)(1)  
(TS)

Additional Study Required

The START Interdepartmental Group will prepare recommendations on interim restraint measures and other elements of the U.S. approach needed to complement the decisions reached on the basic proposal. These will be provided for NSC review not later than May 18, 1982.

*Ronald Reagan*

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED