Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations

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Summary

Public diplomacy has been officially acknowledged as a tool in the foreign policy arsenal since World War I. Later, during World War II, it became part of the U.S. government structure when in 1942 the President issued an executive order to create the Office of War Information (OWI). OWI aired the first Voice of America program on February 24, 1942, in Europe. These activities were carried out without any authority or formal recognition by Congress.

More recently, during the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was viewed as a low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap for other programs. This culminated in 1999 when Congress abolished the agency primarily concerned with public diplomacy — the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) — and merged its public diplomacy functions into the Department of State.

Following the elimination of the USIA and after the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. government officials, foreign policy experts, and academicians began to assess the direction of, and the increased need for, public diplomacy.

This report looks at 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified by the Department of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions. Various recommendations from these studies are similar. This report organizes the recommendations and provides a brief discussion of them. CRS takes no position on the recommendations.

This report will not be updated.
Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations

Introduction

Background

Public diplomacy is the promotion of America’s interests, culture, and policies by informing and influencing foreign populations. From 1977 to the 1990s, all functions of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the USIA’s international information and broadcasting activities merged to become the International Communication Agency (ICA). Subsequently, in 1982, Section 303(b) of P.L. 97-241 renamed ICA to be the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). In 1994, the international broadcasting activities were consolidated by Title III, P.L. 103-236 and administered by a new entity referred to as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. As of October 1, 1999, USIA was abolished and its functions were merged back into the Department of State.

Currently, public diplomacy primarily consists of three categories of activities: (1) international information programs, (2) educational and cultural exchange programs, and (3) international nonmilitary broadcasting. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs administers the Bureau for International Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs, while the Broadcasting Board of Governors manages and oversees international broadcasting. Other public diplomacy efforts involve the White House, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD).

After the abolishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and the terrorist attacks two years later, the U.S. government expedited implementation of public diplomacy to help win its war on terrorism. Some observers noted as evidence that the Administration was new at conducting public diplomacy when immediately after 9/11 it referred to the U.S. response as “Operation Enduring Crusade,” a name that experts pointed out could be viewed by Muslims as inflammatory.”

Over the past four years, the Bush Administration has taken numerous actions to improve the effectiveness of its public diplomacy. For example, in November 2001, two months after the terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration created the

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1 Bin Laden referred to the crusades (undertaken by the Christians of Europe in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims) as one of the historical issues for which he was trying to retaliate.
Coalition Information Center (CIC) headquartered in the Old Executive Office Building. The CIC, which was touted by the Administration as public diplomacy, coordinated U.S. government agency press conferences and talking points, dispersing them rapidly and around-the-clock worldwide. Soon thereafter, the President created, by Executive Order, the Office of Global Communications (OGC), which replaced the CIC with a primary mission to “coordinate strategic communications with global audiences.” Also, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in September 2002. The PCC mission was to coordinate interagency activities, develop the White House message, and disseminate it abroad.

More recently, the President created the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in July 2004 which replaced the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee. The State Department also established an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Informally in 2002 and officially in 2003, the Pentagon created the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to oversee military propaganda and other information related to the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense dissolved OSI after press coverage claimed the Office was to place disinformation deliberately in foreign media. In October 2003, the Department of Defense issued Information Operations Roadmap which involves the direction that DOD wants to take in public diplomacy and other information operations. DOD has appointed its Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the Defense point person for public diplomacy and will be continuing to define DOD’s role in public diplomacy.

USAID became more involved in public diplomacy after the 9/11 Commission reported to Congress that some of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid had very strong anti-American sentiment among its population. Since 2004, USAID has acted to more prominently inform U.S. aid recipients that the aid they have received was a gift from American taxpayers. Also, by establishing a State-USAID Policy Council and a Public Diplomacy Working Group, it has established closer ties with the Department of State and embassies around the world to publicize America’s humanitarian and development aid initiatives.

The Public Diplomacy Matrix

Since 1999, U.S. public diplomacy has been rigorously examined to determine whether improved methods, structure, and goals could help the United States win the war on terrorism. This report reviews 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified by the Department of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions and compares the recommendations.

These 29 documents, listed in reverse chronological order from 2005 to 1999 in Appendix A, vary in scope, depth, and purpose. Some focus on public diplomacy

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and include numerous, specific recommendations; others are more general in nature and deal with public diplomacy in the context of broader foreign policy issues. Some reports represent the consensus of a group of authors; others state the views of a series of individuals. For the purposes of this review, each document has been given an abbreviation, for example, “PDC” for the Public Diplomacy Council, to make it easier to identify. Appendix B provides each report’s specific recommendations.

Following in Table 1 is a matrix indicating the major recommendations of all 29 reports. (Note, however, that the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP1) report from 2003 did not have relevant recommendations for this review.) The matrix lists 14 categories of recommendations that appeared most frequently. A second matrix in Table 2 lists only those reports that include specific recommendations concerning international broadcasting. A brief discussion of recommendation similarities and differences follows each matrix. Note that this discussion deals only with the content of the documents. An author or organization listed in the Appendix may have written on public diplomacy at an earlier or a later date, and the views expressed in a particular document may not represent those of the organization that published the document. (For more detail on public diplomacy, in general, please see CRS Report RL32607, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein.)
Table 1. Key Recommendations for Public Diplomacy Reform

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Note: See Table 2 for recommendations for international broadcasting reform.


b. Public Diplomacy
General Recommendation Comparisons

From 1999 through 2005 numerous reports, articles, studies, and op-ed pieces have been written touting the importance of public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool and focusing on how the United States government can improve its public diplomacy operations to help win the war on terrorism. Among the many writings are the 29 considered here. (See Appendix A for a reverse chronological list of the reports included in this CRS review.)

Define Overall Strategy

Several reports suggest that the Administration has not sufficiently defined or verbalized an overall strategy for the use of public diplomacy to both improve the U.S. image around the world, but also counter the threat of terrorism against Americans. The 9/11 Commission Report states that the United States should identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. Of the ten reports that recommend defining an overall strategy, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the United States needs to do a better job of defining its public diplomacy message, and that while the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) does have a strategy for its broadcasting activities, the Department of State (DOS) does not have an integrated strategy for its public diplomacy operations. GAO states that the “absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages.” Furthermore, GAO offers that the Administration needs to define public diplomacy success and determine how it can be measured.

The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World report recommends that the White House establish strategic goals and oversee the implementation of programs that meet those goals. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy study claims that the State Department lacks authority to implement an overall strategy for the various agencies engaged in public diplomacy and recommends that the DOS Policy, Planning and Resources Office coordinate all public diplomacy efforts. The Heritage Foundation recommends that the U.S. government view public diplomacy as a long-term effort, saying that public diplomacy should be “enshrined in a doctrine that emphasizes consistent efforts.” The more recent Council on Foreign Relations report recommends rethinking how the United States formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy and should “move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign policy making.” The National War College report notes a “lack of strategic planning,” and the earlier Council on Foreign Relations study says there is an absence of an overall strategy and recommends the Administration develop a coherent strategic and coordinating framework for public diplomacy activities.

Presidential Directive/Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the White House

Ten of the studies discuss the White House taking a more proactive role in promoting public diplomacy, coordinating public diplomacy activities throughout the executive branch agencies, and reorganizing or initiating public diplomacy task forces or coordinating committees at the White House. For example, reports by the
Defense Science Board Task Force and the Council on Foreign Relations urge the President to issue a directive to strengthen the importance of communication and public diplomacy and coordinate all activities through the White House. The Heritage Foundation also recommends that inter-agency coordination of public diplomacy activities be carried out through the White House. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World report recommends the President appoint a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy. This person would, in consultation with the President and other agencies, establish strategic goals and messages, and oversee the implementation of programs that meet those stated goals, the report suggests. Similar ideas are offered by the Public Diplomacy Council which suggests that a cabinet level Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy should be established by Presidential Directive, cochaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and the Director of a new U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD).

Create a New Agency

Several of the studies suggest that the existing public diplomacy structure at the Department of State is not working. The Washington Post op-ed piece by Marks, Wick, Gelb, and Catto states that “shutting down the USIA was a major mistake,” a sentiment that has been expressed by others in recent years. The op-ed piece goes on to say that public diplomacy is not very effective under DOS and “the re-creation of an effective instrument of public diplomacy has been urged by many.” Other reports propose establishing an entirely new agency to have primary responsibility for U.S. public diplomacy activities and coordination with other government entities. The Council on Foreign Relations recommends establishing a Corporation for Public Diplomacy to be modeled after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The Public Diplomacy Council suggests establishing an agency, the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), within the Department of State and the National Security process. The Defense Science Board reports that the President should establish a permanent strategic communications structure within the National Security Council (NSC). That report goes on to state that “the President should work with Congress to establish and fund a non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC, departments, and organizations represented on a newly-recommended Strategic Communication Committee.”

Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the Department of State

Since the 1999 elimination of the USIA, numerous experts and observers have critiqued how the Department of State has conducted public diplomacy. According to the GAO, public diplomacy activities at State are fragmented among various organizational entities within the Department, with insufficient direction from the top. Many of the studies here agree that public diplomacy in the Department of State could be working better, but there are differing views as to how DOS should improve it.

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3 For example, Congressman Frank Wolf, Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee expressed this view at a hearing on Public Diplomacy February 4, 2004.
The 2002 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report says there should be a review of the 1999 consolidation of USIA into State with the Secretary of State making recommendations on new training, location, and reporting structure of public diplomacy personnel at the Department. The Defense Science Board’s 2004 report recommends redefining the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy to be policy advisor and manager. Furthermore, it suggests raising the public diplomacy office Directors to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary. The report urges DOS to strengthen the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) with an Assistant Secretary and modernize and diversify its products.

The Heritage Foundation suggests restoring the independent reporting and budget channels that public diplomacy lost during the USIA merger and recreating a public diplomacy hierarchy within the Department of State as previously existed at USIA.

Another suggestion by author William Kiehl proposes creating a new public diplomacy organization within the State Department, including a new Bureau of Public Diplomacy Operations. Also, he writes, “regional bureaus must include senior public diplomacy officers at least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level.”

The Hart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing laws that establish an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrate to an Assistant Secretary level official reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Other functions could be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs, according to the Commission. Overhauling the Foreign Service system, including ending the oral exam’s policy so that applicants could be better matched to particular cones, like public diplomacy, would be beneficial, the Commission asserts.

Beyond reorganizing public diplomacy at State, several of the reports refer to the need for a new “culture” at State: seeking to change the perception that public diplomacy personnel are second class citizens in the Department; recruiting and hiring practices that would encourage public diplomacy skills to be highly valued; and a “much more open approach in which innovation trumps the caution,” according to the National War College report.

**Redefine the Role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy**

Six of the studies refer to the need for redefining the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Most call for strengthening the role, the chain of authority leading to the Under Secretary, and the authority to make decisions regarding public diplomacy funding, policy, personnel, and direction. In contrast, the Hart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing the laws establishing an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrate to an Assistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Other public diplomacy functions should become the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs, the Commission said.
Increase Embassy Involvement

Several reports speak of a need to increase embassy involvement in public diplomacy activities. Suggestions include expanding U.S. diplomats’ personal contacts in the host country, sending the message from the top tiers of the Administration and the Department of State that public diplomacy is central to U.S. foreign policy, and requiring at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment for Foreign Service Officers to be promoted to Senior Foreign Service Officers or Chief of Mission. Another suggestion involves embassies maintaining networks of individuals (such as former Peace Corps volunteers, exchange students, and retired Foreign Service Officers) who could be tapped to help portray America in the best light.

Coordination

Several studies suggest a lack of coordination of U.S. government public diplomacy activities by the White House and within the Department of State. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there have been attempts to improve coordination, citing the January 2003 creation of the Office of Global Communications within the White House, as well as the September 2002 formation of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordination Committee and the December 2002 interagency Strategic Communications Fusion Team. Nevertheless, coordination is still inadequate, according to several of the reports. Recommendations on improving government coordination of public diplomacy entities and programs include

(1) the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy suggests assigning the State Department’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources with the responsibility for overseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming and resources;

(2) the Heritage Foundation seeks better coordination through the White House, specifically through the Office of Global Communications;

(3) the Public Diplomacy Council recommends that a new U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy be responsible for coordinating all U.S. government public diplomacy efforts and establish an Interagency Committee on PD at the Cabinet level to coordinate and direct the national PD strategy;

(4) the Council on Foreign Relations recommends that a coherent strategic and coordinating framework for public diplomacy be developed, including a presidential directive on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by the president’s personal designee;

(5) the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World advises a strengthening of the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to coordinate government-wide public diplomacy activities, review country program plans with respect to public diplomacy, allocate human and financial resources, and play a role
in performance evaluations. The Group asserts that strengthening the Under Secretary’s role is essential.

Increase Financial and Human Resources

About half of the reports state that public diplomacy resources are inadequate and call for increased monetary and human resources. The Council on Foreign Relations said that funding should be increased to “significantly higher levels” to be more in line with public diplomacy’s role as a vital component of U.S. foreign policy and national security. The Council put forth the idea of establishing a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps patterned after FEMA’s disaster-relief model. The Public Diplomacy Council specifically recommends a 300% increase in public diplomacy overseas staffing and a four-fold budget increase over five years. Some, such as the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, state that additional professional staff dedicated only to Arab and Muslim issues would be valuable.

Increase Public Diplomacy and/or Language Training

Coupled with the view since 9/11 that public diplomacy is an essential tool in U.S. foreign policy and national security is the belief that all personnel involved with conducting U.S. foreign policy should be trained about the importance of public diplomacy and given skills needed to fully utilize public diplomacy effectively. The Council on Foreign Relations states that there is a deficit of trained professionals regarding public diplomacy. GAO suggests expanding public diplomacy and foreign language training of Foreign Service Officers; the Council on Foreign Relations offers the idea of establishing an independent public diplomacy training institute; and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World recommends that all State Department personnel receive public diplomacy training. Taking that a step further, the Foreign Policy Association argues that “public affairs diplomacy officers should be encouraged to develop language fluency and country and regional expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other FSOs [Foreign Service Officers].”

Increase Technology Use

Most of the eight reports that speak about increased, more effective, and creative uses of technology referred to use of the Internet. For example, the National War College report states that there are “deficiencies in information technologies and the mindsets needed to integrate new technologies into the conduct of diplomacy.... State Department needs to learn how to leverage the Internet’s capabilities and potential in the conduct of diplomacy.” In addition, some reports promote increased satellite broadcasting and more creative use of all available information technologies.

Increase Private Sector Involvement

Some studies make the observation that the private sector has many advantages in getting things done quickly, being highly effective, and efficient in influencing people. By incorporating the best practices of the private sector in U.S. government
public diplomacy activities, it is believed that public diplomacy can become a more valuable foreign policy tool. RAND suggested that “outsourcing” public diplomacy would put some distance between a “favorable message and an unfavorable messenger,” and that identifying private sector talents could be motivated through a competitive bidding process. Another idea comes from the Public Diplomacy Council to create a public-private partnership “Foundation for the Global Future” to provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by civilian and military federal agencies. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy agrees with the Council on Foreign Relations about creating an independent Corporation for Public Diplomacy. Additionally, the Commission would encourage overseas posts to explore local public-private partnerships, find ways for visitor exchanges to take advantage of private sector generosity, and develop Internet and media programming that would utilize public/private partnerships. The Advisory Commission also proposes that private sector communication consultants could become more involved in public diplomacy efforts with advertising, as well as entertainment programs, and that the academic community could offer public diplomacy majors at American colleges and universities. GAO adds that the U.S. government could collaborate with the private sector to develop optimal methods for measuring effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts.

**Improve Communication**

Improved and increased communication between the United States and foreign, particularly Arab and Muslim, populations was cited by a few of the studies. The Defense Science Board’s 2004 report asserts that “nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials.” The Board suggests that the President communicate directly with overseas audiences.

The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that the United States should identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. The 9/11 Commission observed that many foreign populations receive large amounts of aid from U.S. citizens and never know from where it came.

The Council on Foreign Relations proposes a more customized, “two-way” dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way, “push-down” mass communication, including an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue, and debate that increases the amount and the effectiveness of public opinion research. Furthermore, communication should foster increasingly meaningful relationships between U.S. government, foreign publics, and foreign journalists. The Council says the U.S. government should: support voices of moderation, especially among the young; identify and develop indigenous talent; and craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world.

The RAND study encourages finding different ways of promoting two-way communication, such as call-in talk shows, live interaction among different elements of an audience, and broadcasting debates, rather than offering monologues. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposes establishing an Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications Unit under the
direction of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to work closely with the Office of Global Communications and coordinate U.S. government media outreach to Arab and Muslim populations and promote a ‘rapid response’ team to react and correct inaccuracies and distortions in foreign media.

**Increase Exchanges and Libraries**

More than half of the 29 reports recommend expanding U.S. exchange programs and/or U.S. libraries overseas, making it the most common proposal among this group of reports. Some ideas for exchanges include expanding the U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program, expanding shorter duration exchange programs, creating American studies programs in local universities in Arab and Muslim populations, creating a public-private partnership, “Foundation for the Global Future,” to provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by civilian and military federal agencies, significantly broadening Middle East/U.S. exchange programs, and expanding exchanges to government officials and business professionals. Several studies echoed recommendations to expand American overseas libraries as well as the American Corners Program. In addition, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposes implementing a new American Knowledge Library to translate the best American books and make them available to local libraries and universities.

**Increase Oversight**

A few of the studies recommend greater and continuous oversight of public diplomacy activities. One suggestion was for Congress to provide legislative authority for a quadrennial review of public diplomacy. Another would create a new congressional committee structure with sustained oversight of all U.S. government public diplomacy programs and activities.

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4 The American Corners is a program that was initiated in October 2000 whereby a library in a host country provides space, staff and overhead expenses for the United States to offer publically-accessible research facilities and information on U.S. culture.
### Table 2. Key Recommendations for International Broadcasting

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<th>Study&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Define Overall Objectives</th>
<th>Reorganize Broadcasting</th>
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<sup>b</sup> Broadcasting Board of Governors
Broadcasting Recommendation Comparisons

Of the 29 reports and articles, 11 offer recommendations specifically for U.S. government international broadcasting. Recommendations range from having strategic objectives to reorganizing the broadcasting entities to increasing resources and using more technologies to focusing on combating jamming. (See Table 2.)

Define Overall Objectives

GAO, the Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), and the PBS News Hour broadcast suggest the need for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to better define its overall objectives and strategy of obtaining the objectives. The 2002 PBS broadcast states that there is no grand strategy or coordinated approach of U.S. broadcasting with other public diplomacy activities. GAO’s 2004 report states that while the BBG does have a strategic plan and has made progress in some measuring of its progress, the BBG has not defined a plan to adequately measure audience size or its programming credibility overseas. The PDC’s January 2005 report urges the “Administration and Congress to take a hard look at how international broadcasting is managed to serve broad U.S. public diplomacy goals and the American taxpayer and integrate broadcasting more closely with other public diplomacy tools.” The PDC believes that international broadcasting should be more closely integrated with other elements of strategic communication.

Reorganize Broadcasting

Although the U.S. government international broadcasting structure was reorganized in 1994, some reports recommend reorganizing U.S. international broadcasting again. The U.S. Institute of Peace states that, “the current array of US government broadcasting services is duplicative, expensive, and even counterproductive.”

The Heritage Foundation’s May 2003 report asserts that international broadcasting has “lapsed into a jumble of duplicative efforts, led by a part time Board of Governors.” Reorganizing broadcasting would make it more streamlined and more efficient, the report claims. Furthermore, according to Heritage, revitalizing the Voice of America’s resources and program content is in order as VOA has been neglected while Middle East programing has “proliferated in a confusing array.”

The Council on Foreign Relations (July 30, 2002) “supports an independent and well-qualified broadcasting board with a full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive Officer who would report to the current BBG and be empowered to direct and supervise all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting activities. Furthermore, the Department of State and the BBG should strengthen the Secretary of State’s role in providing information and guidance on foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying and specifying the Secretary’s role in making decisions on broadcast languages and other foreign policy matters.”
Develop Rapid Response to Anti-American Messages

The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World proposes that U.S. government media should reach out to Arab and Muslim populations and promote a ‘rapid response’ team to react and correct inaccuracies and distortions in foreign media.

Bring Broadcasting Board of Governors under White House

The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World states that about half of the fund for public diplomacy goes for international broadcasting. The Group believes that U.S. government international broadcasting should be brought under the strategic direction of their proposed new Special Counselor to the President, saying “[broadcasting] must be part of the public diplomacy process, not marching to its own drummer with its own goals and strategy, sources of funding and board.”

Special Attention to Arab/Muslim Populations

Five reports provide various proposals regarding additional broadcasting to Arab and Muslim populations. As previously mentioned, the Heritage Foundation argues that the various Middle East surrogate broadcasting entities such as Radio Sawa and Al Hurra TV have distracted the BBG from properly maintaining VOA resources and programming. The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World recommends a thorough independent review of the Middle East Television Network, saying that there is a high level of skepticism in the Middle East region about state-owned television of any sort. The Group suggests that paring up with private sector programming might be more effective. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recommends expanding communication with Arab press by creating a network of 24-hour message dissemination and monitoring centers. The Public Diplomacy Forum (February 2004) held a panel discussion on Middle East broadcasting. One panelist referred to Radio and Al Hurra TV as being state-run, and therefore, less successful with Middle East audiences. The panelist said that, “the Arab public is interested in American programming, but they are not necessarily interested in programming that is under tight U.S. government direction.” Another panelist said that “there is no market waiting for Al Hurra’s message.” The third panelist strongly disagreed and said that “the United States should have started Radio Sawa and Al Hurra a long time ago.”

Other reports generally support ongoing Middle East broadcasting or think more resources and expanded programming to Muslim and Arab populations should be forthcoming.

More Resources

As with public diplomacy, most reports that addressed resources urged a greater long-term monetary commitment for international broadcasting. Reaching larger audiences and improving the ability to measure impact are two primary needs for additional broadcast funding.
New Technologies

International broadcasting is one area of foreign policy that can make use of new technologies to become more effective. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy encourages the BBG to look for better software to improve broadcasting’s reach to foreign audiences over the Internet. The Commission suggests the educational programs teaching the English language or American culture might be useful. Also, the Commission recommends that satellite television programs can be further developed to increase local language programming available via satellite TV. The Public Diplomacy Council recommends more innovative broadcasting, Internet programs for youth, and interactive radio programming.

Combat Jamming

The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there are some areas of the world such as North Korea, China and Cuba where the United States has difficulty reaching audiences because of local government jamming. The Commission notes that technologies such as the Internet and direct broadcast satellite have made it more difficult, but not impossible, for governments to block American programming from their citizens. The Commission urges the BBG to continue to develop new methods to combat jamming.
Appendix A — Reports


Appendix B — Recommendations by Report


This editorial by former USIA directors is a general call to rebuild U.S. public diplomacy. While it does not make specific recommendations, it does call for the United States to explain its policies directly and openly; argues for the importance of public affairs officers and USIA libraries; states that shutting down USIA was major mistake; and supports the Public Diplomacy Council’s recommendation to create a U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (see below).


Recommendations:
- Establish U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy;
- Increase public diplomacy staffing overseas by 300% and budgets for international broadcasting and exchange programs by 400% over five years;
- Provide long-term resources necessary for global international broadcasting capability;
- Establish an Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy at the Cabinet level; and
- Create a public-private partnership “Foundation for the Global Future” to provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges.


This statement of dissent refutes each of the five recommendations made in a *Call for Action on Public Diplomacy* (see above), arguing that the report draws too heavily on the past. The dissent emphasizes that understanding what is credible in the context of other societies is the foundation upon which effective public diplomacy is constructed; that the reference point for U.S. public diplomacy must be the hopes, aspirations, and fears of foreign citizens; and that the United States’ first priority must be observing and listening.

Recommendations:

Message dissemination
- Have more U.S. government staff employed abroad serve as messengers of public diplomacy;
- Expand the London Media Outreach Center’s ability to communicate with Arab press by creating a network of 24-hour message dissemination and monitoring centers;
- Model a public diplomacy strategy in a test region through concentrated programs, programming, exchanges, and initiatives;
- Evaluate the success by measuring public perception.

Coordination
- Bridge disparate public diplomacy mechanisms within the State Department by tasking the Policy, Planning and Resources Office with overseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming and resources.

Third party credibility
- Require embassies to maintain networks of individuals interested in communicating positive concepts on behalf of the United States;
- Provide electronic products, through the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), to support the efforts of individuals interested in advocating U.S. policies and perspectives.

Cross-cultural communications
- Implement the language continuum strategy aggressively to help Foreign Service officers achieve language proficiency, and provide cross-cultural and language training for other government personnel and contractors abroad;
- Support the Administration’s efforts to negate certain terrorist messages and convey ideas through the skillful use of semantics.

Border security
- Fund a significant marketing campaign, either through the private sector or the government, to explain visa processes and recruit visitors, and help the United States maintain its competitive advantage;
- Encourage Congress to ensure that international citizens not bear the entire costs of new security measures dedicated to visa processes;
- Phase out redundant and duplicative checks based primarily on ethnic origin and gender once US-visit is completely functional, and encourage Congress to allow Visa Waiver Program countries sufficient time to incorporate biometric identifiers in their passports.

Exchange programs
- Allocate the resources necessary to develop a comprehensive exchange alumni database;
• Encourage the resourcefulness of posts in offering exchange programs by requiring the submission of competitive proposals for such programs.

Centers, corners, virtual consulates, and libraries
• Encourage each American Corner with Internet access to provide a virtual consulate Website as a start-up page on all workstations;
• Fund American centers/libraries wherever security constraints permit their existence, in order to continue benefitting from the great public diplomacy value they provide;
• Encourage Congress to give the Secretary of State the authority to create American presence posts, and thereby expand this concept, by notifying the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

USAID and public diplomacy
• Create, for multiple areas of the globe, director of public diplomacy positions in the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs, as has been done for the Middle East;
• Continue to enhance efforts to publicize the substantial amount of financial aid that the American people contribute abroad;
• Continue to coordinate with USAID to better publicize the numerous contributions America makes to foreign societies.

English language programs
• Seek the support of the private sector to bolster programs designed to increase knowledge of the English language around the world;
• Continue efforts to reach English teachers through official training programs and exchanges, for better use of government resources and greater results from the programs.

Private sector
• Encourage individual posts to explore public-private partnerships on a local level;
• Create a means of allowing visitors to overcome restrictions and take advantage of private sector generosity while on visitor exchanges;
• Use the small Cultural Affairs budget as seed money to initiate projects that ultimately will be self-sustaining;
• Continue to foster the kinds of Internet and media programming developed by the private sector that exemplify mutually beneficial public-private partnerships in public diplomacy.

Broadcasting: War on Terror
• Grant more resources.

Broadcasting: Educational Programs
• Continue circumventing heavy jamming and reaching Chinese audiences through websites and teaching products that educate users in both the English language and American culture.
Broadcasting: Satellite Programs
- Develop satellite television technologies further and expand on recent successes in making native language programming available via satellite television to missions of viewers in other countries.

Internet
- Encourage the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to actively look for ways to use emerging software developments to expand its broadcasting reach over the Internet.

Hard-to-reach areas
- Continue the BBG development of new transmission methods to combat jamming.


- The President should issue a directive to strengthen, understand, and communicate with global audiences; coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and provide a foundation for new legislation for planning, coordination, conduct and funding of strategic communications.
- The President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security Council (NSC) and work with Congress to create legislation and funding.
- The President should work with Congress on legislation to establish and fund a non-profit and non-partisan [501(c) (3) hybrid organization such as Rand or the National Endowment for Democracy] Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and departments and organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Department of State should provide a core funding grant for the Center.
- The President should redefine the role of Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. Responsibilities should include approving public diplomacy assignments, setting program direction and evaluation, reviewing performance ratings of the public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. Personnel and funding resources should be tripled and placed under the control of the Under Secretary.
- State Department public diplomacy office directors should be raised to level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission or Senior Foreign Service should have at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment related to public diplomacy. The Bureau of IIP should be directed by an Assistant Secretary.
DOD’s Under Secretary for Policy should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the DOD’s principal on NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee.

DOD’s Under Secretary for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with DOS and with theater security cooperation plans. DOD should triple resources — personnel and funding — available to combatant commanders for DOD support to public diplomacy and reallocate information operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM (U.S. Strategic Command) for expanded support for strategic communication programs.


This report discusses some findings of post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts. The report includes criticisms, including some by public affairs officers, of insufficient time spend on public diplomacy, insufficient public affairs resources; the amount of time devoted to public diplomacy training is inadequate; and often the Foreign Service Officers lack foreign language skills. This report did not list specific recommendations, but the following were implied in the text of the report:

- Implement an overall public diplomacy strategy;
- Improve interagency communication and coordination efforts;
- Define success and how it should be measured;
- Collect polling data and establish reporting requirements;
- The Department of State public diplomacy operation is fragmented among various entities within State and needs better organization;
- The U.S. Government must define its message;
- BBG’s strategic plan does not, but should, include a single goal or related program objective to gage progress;
- BBG’s plan needs measurable program objectives to support its strategic goals;
- U.S. public diplomacy resources need to be expanded to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities.


- Expand funding for public diplomacy activities, such as information programs, broadcasting, exchanges, scholarships, libraries, and U.S. aid;
- Clearly identify that U.S. assistance comes from the citizens of the United States;
- The U.S. should identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly;
- The U.S. government should join other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund to improve
education and provide textbooks that do not teach hate, offering a choice of schools other than madrassas;

- Establish a forum for engaging both Western and Arab/Muslim representatives to discuss each culture’s needs and perspectives. This would help create long-term relationships and understanding among cultures.


**Recommendations:**

- Substantially increase public diplomacy resources;
- Conduct a careful assessment of America’s public diplomacy readiness;
- New broadcast programs (e.g. Radio Sawa and Al Hurra) have to be initiated and adequately funded;
- Better coordination with White House, other government agencies, and the private sector is needed.


This forum dealt specifically with American public diplomacy in the Arab/Islamic world. Its recommendations and comments include:

- Public diplomacy must be more engaged in advising the policy community;
- Increase resources and trained personnel;
- Elites must lead in creating a civil discourse and in breaking down stereotypes;
- Use the potential of Radio Sawa and Al Hurra TV;
- Increase foreign language training and knowledge of culture and history;
- Create a White House Counselor for Public Diplomacy at the Cabinet level;
- The Djerejian Report (see **DJE**) should be adopted;
- Arabs and Muslims need to study and understand the United States much more deeply;
- Break down stereotypes on both sides; reveal more of U.S. diversity and complexity;
- Improve personal contact by professionals, especially public affairs, political, and economic officers and ambassadors;
- Strengthen foreign press centers;
- Send American speakers abroad;
- Encourage more robust educational exchange programs.

Rand Observations:

- Public diplomacy should not come from government alone;
- The United States should seek creative talents in the private sector, business, and academia which could be motivated through a competitive bidding process;
- It may be useful to find different modes of communicating big picture ideas of public diplomacy through debate and discussion, call-in shows, live interaction among different elements of the audience, rather than through the typical monologic conveyance of the message;
- Outsourcing public diplomacy may be helpful to put some distance between a favorable message and an unfavorable messenger (i.e. the United States).


This edition of the annual “Great Decisions” series offers mostly historical and background information. While it refers to recommendations of other reports, it makes relatively few of its own. Among its recommendations and comments are:

- Educational exchange programs are important;
- The evidence on international broadcast programming effectiveness is mixed;
- The USIA realignment has reduced flexibility and independent action;
- Foreign public opinion of the United States has declined even as financial support for public diplomacy has increased in the last three years;
- Significant investment in number and quality of trained public diplomacy officers is needed;
- Public diplomacy officers need language proficiency and regional expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other foreign service officers;
- The United States should create special libraries of key books on America in accessible libraries, rather than in security-conscious embassy libraries;
- The United States should consolidate exchange, cultural, and information programs into one agency. Public diplomacy is now lost within overall operation of the State Department;
- America should dramatically increase the number of international visitors from the Muslim world;
- The possibility of policies being profoundly unpopular overseas should be taken into account when developing the policy; modifications should be considered that might make them less so.

Among Kiehl’s comments and recommendations:
- Public diplomacy must be proactive, more akin to psychological operations than to public relations;
- Regional bureaus must include senior public diplomacy officers at least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level;
- Establish a new organization for public diplomacy that would be a middle ground between the old USIA and the current weak structure [includes organizational chart];
- Amend Smith-Mundt to lift restriction on domestic dissemination of American international informational material.


This article presented a question and answer session between the moderator, Peter G. Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations and the speaker, Edward Djerejian of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. In this article, Mr. Djerejian presents Advisory Group recommendations that the U.S. government:
- needs strategic coordination at the top — Special Counselor to the President;
- should create an office to monitor what is being done and said about America and immediately craft talking points to support or refute;
- would benefit by getting the private sector more involved in public diplomacy;
- should create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (modeled after the Council on Foreign Relations concept);
- should get embassies more involved in public diplomacy;
- identify policies that would benefit the people in a region, such as outreach to high school students;
- recognize solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the center of most of U.S. public diplomacy problems;
- realize that there is a gap between what we stand for and what we do.


This report organizes recommendations under three specific headings: Structure, Financial and Economic Resources, and Programs.

Structure — The White House should:
- create a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy which would, in consultation with the President, and other government agencies, establish strategic goals and messages,
oversee the implementation of programs that meet the strategic goals, and ensure effective measurement of those programs;

- establish a board — President’s Public Diplomacy Experts’ Board;
- reactivate the interagency Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee to be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy as well as a high-level representative from the National Security Council.

Structure — The Department of State should:

- emphasize to all its personnel that public diplomacy is of primary interest in doing their job;
- encourage every employee abroad to participate in public diplomacy activities;
- provide training on the basics of public diplomacy to every employee who serves abroad;
- strengthen the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy to coordinate public diplomacy government-wide and set strategic public diplomacy guidance, review country program plans, allocate human and financial resources, monitor public opinion and program results, and play a role in performance evaluation. The Advisory Group is convinced that strengthening the Undersecretary’s role is essential.
- establish an Office of Policy, Plans, and Resources within the Undersecretary’s office to coordinate the development of strategy and strategic guidance, oversee country-specific plans, monitor execution of plans, and assist in allocation and management of financial and human resources;
- establish an Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications Unit under the direction of the Undersecretary; it would work closely with the Office of Global Communications in the White House and would coordinate the U.S. government’s media outreach to Arab and Muslim nations and promote ‘rapid response’ in disseminating messages and reacting and correcting inaccuracies and distortions in foreign media;
- find creative ways to measure effectiveness of public diplomacy programs.

Structure — The U.S. Agency for International Development should:

- get the same public diplomacy training as the Department of State;
- publicize that aid is from the United States.

Structure — The Department of Defense should:

- be better connected to the other agencies involved in public diplomacy and better coordinated with strategic plan.

Structure — The Broadcasting Board of Governors should:

- be brought under the White House’s Office of Special Counselor to the President.

Financial and Human Resources — U.S. Public Diplomacy:

- needs a dramatic increase in funding;
needs additional professional staff dedicated to Arab and Muslim issues;
should increase funding AID scholarships;
needs a greater concentration of budget on tapping into uses of the Internet and information technology;
should provide a greater effort to aiding Arabs and Muslims to gain access to U.S. education.

Programs — The U.S. government should:

- expand English language training programs;
- expand the American Corners Program;
- implement a new American Knowledge Library — to translate the best American books and make them available to local libraries and universities;
- create American studies programs in Arab and Muslim countries in collaboration with local universities;
- expand the U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program;
- expand shorter duration exchange programs;
- thoroughly review the Middle East Television Network.


Originally this was presented as a speech at the Conference on Crisis Management and Information Technology in Helsinki, Finland, which focused on ways of developing interoperable communications systems that can facilitate information sharing during crises. The speech did not directly address public diplomacy.


Recommendations:

That the Secretary of State:

- develop and widely disseminate throughout the Department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives;
- consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research;
- designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden;
- strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages;
• program into State’s assignment process adequate time for public diplomacy training.

The Department of State’s response to this GAO report was that it generally concurred with the report and intended to implement recommendations and said it has already begun to do so in some areas.


In addition to the following recommendations, this report includes appendices on State Department organizational reforms, a draft mission program plan on public diplomacy, and an overview of U.S. international broadcasting.

I. Rethink how the U.S. formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy.
   • Make the formulation of foreign policy more sensitive to public diplomacy concerns;
   • Strengthen the public diplomacy coordinating structure so that it resembles the National Security Council;
   • Issue Presidential Decision Directive on public diplomacy;
   • Initiate a “Quadrennial Public Diplomacy Review;”
   • Improve U.S. capacity to listen to foreign publics, e.g. polling and research;
   • Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world.

II. Build new institutions to bolster public diplomacy efforts
   • Create independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy” as focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy;
   • Establish an “Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute;”
   • Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps (patterned on FEMA’s disaster-relief model).

III. Improve the practice of public diplomacy
   • Through State Department reforms, ensure that public diplomacy is central to the work of all U.S. ambassadors and diplomats;
   • Enhance training for U.S. ambassadors;
   • Expand the range of America’s messengers abroad. Identify and develop credible local messengers and increase the use of independent, diverse U.S. messengers;
   • Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S. government and foreign journalists;
   • Support voices of moderation in other countries, especially among young people;
   • Adopt an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialog, debate, and relationship building, as opposed to our traditional “push-down” method;
   • Make better use of satellite broadcasting and the Internet;
Create bridges between U.S. society and others using common cultural pursuits in every genre of art, music, theater, religion, and academia.

IV. Improve funding and allocation
- Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vital component of foreign policy and national security;
- Build congressional support for public diplomacy.


Recommendations — The U.S. government should:
- provide control of the public diplomacy budget and personnel to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and create reporting channels in State Department from embassy personnel up to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy;
- expand academic exchanges and U.S.-supported libraries;
- reorganize and streamline international broadcasting and eliminate waste;
- enhance public diplomacy and public affairs career training at the State Department;
- improve inter-agency coordination through the White House Office of Global Communications. OGC should do more than keep senior political leaders on message; it should ensure that all agencies involved with public diplomacy cooperate to do the best job possible to win hearts and minds of foreigners;
- adopt a doctrine that would enshrine public diplomacy practices of emphasizing consistent efforts to explain to foreign publics U.S. policies.


This article recommends that the Bush Administration and Congress should:
- recognize that public diplomacy is a long-term effort;
- restore public diplomacy’s independent reporting and budget channels that were lost during the USIA/State merger in 1999;
- return public diplomacy currently dispersed among other State Department bureaus into a public diplomacy hierarchy;
- strengthen exchange programs and revive overseas libraries;
- reorganize foreign broadcasting to streamline management, eliminate duplicative and ineffective services, and improve programming;
- enhance public diplomacy career training and increase the number of experienced foreign service personnel in State Department's public affairs office;
- strengthen inter-agency coordination through the White House and define DOD communications efforts for use on the battlefield;
modify outdated legislation, such as the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act that place irrelevant restrictions on public diplomacy activities.


This document is comprised of the text of speakers’ statements and of transcripts of discussions from three sessions. Key comments from the discussions include:

- It is not enough for U.S. to change its public diplomacy; it must change its foreign policy. The U.S. must address [Arab] peoples’ real problems and do something to change the Arab condition;
- Mutual understanding between American and Muslim worlds is the most important first step;
- The U.S. must change (particularly regarding the Palestinian issue) before Muslims embrace Americans;
- Examples of what the State Department is doing to improve communication between the United States and the Middle East include live video on their website, links with secondary schools, expanded Fulbright program, English language teaching, teacher training, sports and music exchanges;
- Much more is needed in the way of resources. Public diplomacy resources have been dismantled over the past years;
- Better coordination between civilian and military public diplomacy efforts is needed;
- The U.S. should seek and embrace coalition efforts as opposed to unilateralism;
- The dialogue between Americans and Muslims should be broadened and deepened;
- Expand exchange programs and fund major exchange programs with the Islamic world;
- The United States is most successful when Americans interact with foreign citizens in business, education, culture, music, and technology, outside official American foreign policy.
- Engage in real dialogue; be more humble; practice what we preach;
- Stop the contradictions between rhetoric and action.


This series of individual articles looks ahead to diplomacy in 2015. Among its predictions and recommendations are:

- State broadcasting will continue as element of public diplomacy. Current array of U.S. government broadcasting services is duplicative, expensive, and even counterproductive;
- Training of diplomats must give greater attention to interaction in cyberspace, public diplomacy, international financial markets, and results-oriented management;
Public diplomacy needs to be thought of as at the core of foreign affairs. The job done well by USIA must be carried on at an intensified level;

- Exchange programs are important;
- U.S. diplomats must have language skills;
- The State Department should change the perception that public diplomacy generalists are second class citizens in the Foreign Service Officer corps;
- The State Department should change its culture and personnel system to recruit “change agents”;
- Public diplomacy will be a key element in dealing with new national security challenges;
- Public diplomacy requires active engagement with both domestic and foreign publics and their representation in civil society, based on transparency and information sharing;
- Internet-based technology has a big impact on public diplomacy;
- Effective public diplomacy requires a willingness to search for commonality through well-funded cultural diplomacy;
- Americans need to fund, support, and embark on genuine voyages of discovery — bilaterally through embassies, at home, and through global forums (e.g. UNESCO);
- Educational exchanges have become the cornerstone of public diplomacy;
- International broadcasting is an important element in the conduct of public diplomacy;
- Traditional diplomacy will increasingly need to be supplemented by public diplomacy;
- The Department of State needs to follow the example of the Department of Defense and train and educate its employees to meet the Department’s requirements.


Comments and recommendations include the following:

- A truthful and accurate information campaign, if both persuasive and credible, can set the record straight about U.S. policies and intentions;
- There is no substitute for long-term educational exchange programs. It is especially important to bring responsible Muslim opinion-makers to the United States;
- There is a need for serious, but not solemn, cultural activities regarding the United States that would appeal to Muslim audiences, especially to the young;
- Adequate funding is necessary.


The Council on Foreign Relations offered the following recommendations:
I. Develop a coherent strategic and coordinating framework for public diplomacy
   • Issue a presidential directive on public diplomacy;
   • Create a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by the president’s personal designee;
   • Move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign policy making.

II. Increase customized, “two-way” dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way, “push-down” mass communication
   • Adopt an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue, debate, and relationship-building and increases the amount and the effectiveness of public opinion research;
   • Support voices of moderation, with particular attention over the longer term to the young to empower them to engage in effective debate through means available or created in their societies;
   • Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S. government and foreign journalists;
   • Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world.

III. Significantly increase private sector involvement
   • Broaden use of credible and independent messengers from diverse sectors of American life;
   • Create an independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy.”

IV. Raise the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources
   • Initiate State Department reforms (details are included in an appendix to the report).
   • Initiate a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness and prioritized spending through a “Quadrennial Diplomacy Review;”
   • Establish a quasi-public/private “Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute;”
   • Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps;
   • Use Internet-age technologies effectively.

V. Increase public diplomacy resources
   • Build congressional support for public diplomacy through sustained oversight and the formation of a new congressional committee structure;
   • Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vital component of foreign policy and national security;
   • Build a stronger public diplomacy through enhancements in key areas: foreign public-opinion research, recruiting, training, media studies, program evaluation, significantly expanded field staffing and exchanges, increases in U.S. international broadcasting via the Middle East Radio Network and American Embassy Television Network, and enhancements of content, marketing, and branding of multi-language websites.
Appendix V deals specifically with the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Task Force supports an independent and well-qualified broadcasting board with a full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive Officer who would report to the current BBG and be empowered to direct and supervise all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting activities. Furthermore, the Department of State and the BBG should strengthen the secretary of state’s role in providing information and guidance on foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying and specifying the Secretary’s role in making decisions on broadcast languages and other foreign policy matters.

PBS — “Public Diplomacy, U.S. Outreach to Arab World.” OnlineNewsHour, the website of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 18, 2002.

This series of interviews with four individuals examines the U.S. government’s efforts to counter anti-American sentiment in the Arab world through broadcasts and ad campaigns. Among the speakers’ comments and recommendations are:

- The United States is not spending or doing enough on international broadcasting. There is no grand strategy or coordinated approach;
- The United States needs more official representation on the ground around the world;
- More cultural exchanges are needed ($1.5 billion budget suggested);
- The United States needs a “salesperson,” preferably local or, at least, people who are close to local sentiment, to sell the U.S. message;
- Need to know basic facts about Arab media consumption and nature of the audience;
- Any person carrying the U.S. message [to Arab world] should be Muslim or a native speaker of the language in which they are broadcasting;
- There must be a meticulous, careful, methodical selection of broadcasters;
- Help from businesses and governments in the region to get U.S. message across would be useful;
- There’s been a significant drop in human and material resources for public diplomacy since the Cold War.


Recommendations:
I. Structural Reform
- Issue a Presidential mandate that public diplomacy has strategic importance in U.S. foreign policy and significant reform is needed;
- Fully implement the White House Office of Global Communications — coordinate various agencies’ efforts and work closely with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs;
- Review the consolidation of the USIA into the Department of State — the Secretary of State should review and make recommendations on training, location, and reporting structure of public diplomacy units at the Department of State;
Integrate Congress into public diplomacy efforts — legislative authority for a quadrennial review of public diplomacy should be provided;

Involve the private sector — communications consultants, the academic community (i.e., colleges offering majors in public diplomacy), advertising, and entertainment sectors.

II. Expanding resources

Money alone will not fix the problems — assess the state of America’s public diplomacy readiness worldwide;

Examine the nation’s public diplomacy investment relative to other areas.


The earlier of two reports done by the Defense Science Board recommends:

The President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to strengthen, coordinate, assess impact, and develop strategies;

The NSPD should establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination to be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank to specify who and which agencies will be on the PCC;

The NSPD should delegate to the PCC authority to coordinate public diplomacy activities including analysis for foreign public opinion, development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications, identification of appropriate media channels, and production of information products;

The Secretary of State should support the PCC through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the DOS consisting of the current interagency working group on International Information Programs, augmented by an expanded staff, budget, and executive staff drawing on expertise from DOS, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 4th PSYOP Group, the CIA, commercial media, and communication entities to facilitate audience research and develop channels and information products;

DOS should strengthen International Information Bureau under an Assistant Secretary, substantially increase funding for the Bureau, with much of the increase going for contracted products and services; DOS should make these assets available to support the strategic objectives of the PCC;

DOS should modernize and diversify products of the Information Bureau to include expanded use of: Internet websites, streaming audio/video, leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcasts channels, American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services, the Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics, interactive information networks containing key foreign audiences, Joint State-DOD training and increased interagency assignments, and a reserve
cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DOD officers available for crisis response deployment;

- DOD should establish an International Public Information Committee to coordinate all DOD open information programs carried out under the authority of the PCC;

- The Secretary of Defense should implement DOD’s draft guidelines to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the Commander in Chief (CINC)/Joint Forces (JFC) staff, revitalize CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans, strengthen PSYOP capability to support the U.S. government’s strategic information programs, and effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the PCC Secretariat;

- The Secretary of Defense should enhance DOD’s information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the PCC. Enhancements include expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV; additional use of regional magazines such as *Forum* and *Dialogue*; expanded use of regional Internet websites; and establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

- The President and his senior national security advisors should strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by 1) insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution, 2) taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and 3) significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.

**NWC — *Information Age Diplomacy*. National War College/Northwestern University Symposium. April 5-6, 2001.**

Symposium overview followed by statements by individual speakers.

**Symposium Overview:**

- Change is needed in State Department culture, i.e. more open approach in which innovation trumps caution;

- State Department change efforts have fallen short due to: inadequate financial and personnel resources, lack of training and strategic planning, and deficiencies in information technology and the mindsets to integrate new technologies into the conduct of diplomacy;

- Public diplomacy should be given higher priority;

- The merger of USIA into the State Department hasn’t been accompanied by a fundamental change in the culture of diplomacy.

From individual speakers:

- Public diplomacy and information technology must be at the center of statecraft;

- Diplomats need to give much more attention to public diplomacy;
The Jeffersonian concept of the State Department didn’t distinguish between internal and external functions. This concept has relevance today;

Unlike the Department of Defense, the State Department personnel system is antiquated and doesn’t put proper emphasis on training;

No government agency is in greater need of reform than the State Department. It must revamp culture, procedures, and infrastructure and give greater attention to public outreach;

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy needs to be at the table on the first day of a crisis. Public diplomacy is substantive engagement over a long period of time with a broad range of people.


This report was prepared for the incoming Bush administration and is broader in scope than public diplomacy. The main body of the report states that the State Department is impaired by a professional culture that emphasizes confidentiality over public diplomacy and public affairs. Among the additional views included at the end of the report are: Merging of USIA and the State Department hasn’t enhanced public diplomacy; and State Department leadership should do as much as it can to ensure that the talents, perspective, and methodology of former USIA officers aren’t lost.


Phase I contains a series of broad conclusions, but no recommendations.

Phase II report:
- Public diplomacy is an important part of American diplomacy;
- The United States should help spread information technology worldwide;
- The United States should employ new technologies creatively to improve its public diplomacy.

Phase III report:
- State Department was weakened by having many of its core functions parceled out to other agencies, e.g. USIA;
- Tailor public diplomacy to policy goals and integrate these activities with other aspects of U.S. diplomacy;
- Overhaul the U.S. Foreign Service system, including ending oral exam’s blindfolding policy so that applicants could be better matched to particular cones, e.g. public diplomacy;
- Repeal *the United States Code* provisions establishing an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and have some of those functions migrate to an Assistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to the Secretary of State, and others be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs.