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THESIS

**21st CENTURY POLICING-
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HOMELAND
SECURITY IN LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS**

by

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March 2006

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**21st CENTURY POLICING:
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations face a new and significant challenge — homeland security. On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States were thrust into the “war on terrorism.” The current law enforcement business-as-usual attitude and incremental programmatic responses do not ensure a long-term success. Any act of terrorism will initially be a local issue that requires immediate response by various local agencies, such as medical, fire, and police—the communities “first responders.” Thus local law enforcement organizations must recognize and embrace the critical and essential role they play in homeland security and the war on terrorism.

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This thesis attempts to identify the need for homeland security institutionalization in local law enforcement organizations. The thesis argues that community-based policing principles combined with other progressive law enforcement practices such as Intelligence-led policing are crucial aids in that effort.

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**A nation that draws too broad a distinction between its scholars and its warriors
will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.
~ Thucydides**

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM

On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States were thrust into what was to become a “war on terrorism.” Most Americans believe that their local law enforcement organizations and other first responders are prepared to address any emergency, including a terrorist attack. Since the attacks of September 11th, most law enforcement organizations have responded to the terrorist threat in the most reasonable and appropriate manner possible, though they have often had limited means and lacked a thorough understanding of the scope and significance of their important role. In the future, local organizations’ response to this monumental challenge may determine the ultimate success of the war on terrorism in the United States and, consequently, throughout the world. The current U.S. business-as-usual attitude and incremental programmatic responses will not ensure a long-term success in the war on terrorism. Thus, local organizations have a very real, but and incorrigible, role to play in the global war on terrorism. “When considering the response to terrorist attacks, the resources and assistance provided by state and local authorities is often regarded as critical.”¹

But if the United States is to have an efficient and effective response to homeland security issues, law enforcement organizations, especially local law enforcement organizations, must begin a long-term process of evolvement. First, they must recognize and embrace the critical role they play in homeland security and the war on terrorism.²

¹ Alejandro del Carmen and Jonathan R. White, et al, *Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, ed. Alejandro del Carmen (Toronto, Canada: Patterson, 2003), 7.

² Department of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2002), vii-x.

Terrorism is no longer a phenomenon that occurs only in far-away lands; it is a serious domestic issue that local organizations must address: “Every act of terrorism is a local event.”³

“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.⁴ Ultimately, our success in the realm of homeland security will depend on law enforcement organizations’ open-mindedness, progressive thought, and innovative strategies. Terrorist organizations and individual terrorists quickly can and will adapt to new and more challenging environments. Local law enforcement organizations must do the same.

One of law enforcement’s, especially the local agencies’, most successful strategies is community policing, which has been primarily championed by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS). As described by COPS,

Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.⁵

Community policing has had a dramatic positive effect on America’s communities. For example, the Chicago Police Department has experienced significant success with their community policing efforts, known as the Chicago Alternative Policing

³ David L. Carter, “Homeland Security Threat Levels: Developing a Guide for Executives,” in *National Community Policing Conference Held in Washington D.C., June 21-June, 23, 2004*, ed., Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice (Washington D.C.: Community Policing Consortium, Community Links Magazine, August 2004), 7.

⁴ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 2.

⁵ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “What Is Community Policing?” Cops Office, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?item=36/> (accessed July 17, 2005).

Strategy (CAPS). “CAPS works- and because of CAPS, Chicago is a safer place to live. Ten years after Chicago first debuted the groundbreaking crime-fighting initiative, which relies heavily on cooperation between police, residents and City agencies, proof is in the numbers. In 2002, there were 93,655 fewer incidents of serious crime than in 1993 — more than 14,000 fewer sexual assaults, almost 17,000 fewer robberies.”⁶

Although many organizations have experienced some success by applying community policing principles on a limited or programmatic basis, it is clear that organizations that have *institutionalized* community policing, adopting it as a core philosophy or philosophical underpinning, have experienced by far the greatest successes. Organizations that desire long-term success in their critical homeland security efforts should seriously using community policing principles as a template along with their other progressive policing principles. To achieve the greatest effectiveness, “Homeland Security, like community policing, must be adopted agency-wide to realize its full potential and effectiveness. This adoption should be reflected by integrating the homeland security responsibility into the agency’s mission statement, goals, policies and procedures, training programs and other systems and activities that define organizational culture.”⁷

⁶ Chicago Police Department, “Caps At 10: A Decade Of Cooperation, Creativity and Commitment Has Made Chicago Safer,” Chicago Police Department Official Web Site, <http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/webportalContentItemAction/> (accessed July 18, 2005).

⁷ Jose Docobo, “Community-Policing As the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level,” (Master’s Thesis, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2005), 35.



Figure 1. Homeland Security Institutionalization

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

Local law enforcement organizations play a critical role in protecting America from terrorist attacks by responding to attacks that may occur and assisting in the recovery effort if a terrorist attack is successful.⁸ At present, most law enforcement organizations address homeland security issues as discrete projects. Agencies have responded to homeland security issues on a limited or project basis, partially from necessity, as in the response to the 9/11 attacks and other threats that became known post-9/11. However, in this rapidly changing world, law enforcement agencies' future success will require a more holistic approach to homeland security. And to implement a holistic approach, the law enforcement community must first phase out its current practice of addressing homeland security on a project basis and adopt homeland security instead as a

⁸ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, vii-x.

philosophical underpinning. In effect, this means that a homeland security mindset must *permeate* law enforcement organizations: only that will ultimately result in a homeland-security institutionalization of policing in the twenty-first century. It is essential, therefore, that local law enforcement organizations discover and formulate the steps necessary to encourage and facilitate the institutionalization of homeland security in their own agencies.

The challenge that this thesis addresses is the challenge that faces each and every local law enforcement agency in America today: the need to develop appropriate strategies, procedures, and guidelines that will effect the institutionalization of homeland security in their individual organizations. The thesis is grounded on the premise that community policing, with all that that model encompasses, is the most effective way to deliver police services in the war on terrorism. This institutionalization of homeland security will assist local agencies to achieve the primary goals of homeland security:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.
- Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism.
- Minimize the damage and maximize recover from possible attacks.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. TOPICS FOR STUDY/ REVIEW

Local law enforcement agencies must develop appropriate strategies, procedures, and guidelines for implementing their homeland security policies and practices, their success in that endeavor will depend largely on a synergetic application of theories from multiple disciplines. An abundance of information related to homeland security is readily available in a variety of forms and from multiple sources. Numerous periodicals are now devoted to this subject and publications from both private and governmental entities are published daily. To stay abreast of this increasingly complex and ever-changing subject, it is essential to draw information from diverse sources, not just traditional journals, texts, and books. The new topical magazines such as *Homeland Protection Professional*, *HS Today*, and *Homeland Defense Journal* offer valuable and timely information, and informational and organizational Web sites and Web journals (blogs) often prove invaluable to the critical reader or researcher.

1. Terrorism

This thesis is designed to address the problems and issues surrounding the twenty-first-century threat of terrorism. The thesis requires, therefore, some background knowledge of both the threat and its implicit impetus for institutional change. For our purposes here, it is the causes and effects of terrorism in and on the United States that are especially pertinent. In this regard, one of the most respected scholars is Bruce Hoffman, whose book *Inside Terrorism* provides meaningful insights into the nature of the terrorist threat.⁹ Hoffman emphasizes the need for change or evolvement in response to terrorist activity, noting that “the emergence of this new breed of terrorist adversary means that nothing less than a sea-change about terrorism and the policies required to counter it will be required.”¹⁰ In considering the future of terrorism in America in particular,

⁹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 212.

Christopher Hewitt points out the “general agreement that two groups, Islamic and rightist extremists, are likely to engage in terrorist activity in America.”¹¹ Jonathan R. White highlights the changing face of terrorism in America, arguing that “terrorism is changing, groups and infrastructures are disappearing, and violent religious zealots and ideological fanatics are replacing them.”¹² None of the claims and arguments in the terrorism literature has been seriously contested. Indeed, most scholars agree that terrorism will continue to be a threat to America and that terrorism is changing. Thus, those of us who are challenged to address terrorism and are responsible for homeland security issues must also change to meet the threat.

2. Organizational Change

Having recognized and acknowledged the threat of terrorism to America’s communities, local law enforcement’s challenge now is how to quickly and sufficiently meet the requirement for dramatic organizational change. To do so, a thorough review and understanding of change theory is essential. An initial problem that John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger note is that “people resist change due to self-interest, due to misunderstanding of the facts or lack of trust, because they assess the situation differently than the leadership of an organization, and because they have a low tolerance for change.”¹³ As Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo, and Robert Taylor demonstrate, change theory is readily applicable to police administration.¹⁴ The management of change in police organizations has also been thoroughly explored by the Community Policing Consortium, which comprises five of the leading police organizations in the United States:

¹¹ Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 119.

¹² Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 3rd edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomas Learning, 2001), 219.

¹³ John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” in *Managing People and Organizations*, ed. John Gabarro (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992), 395–408.

¹⁴ Leonard Territo, Charles R. Swanson, and Robert W. Taylor, *Police Administration*, 2nd edition (New York: MacMillan, 1988).

- International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
- National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE)
- National Sheriffs Association (NSA)
- Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
- Police Foundation

These five organizations play a principal role in the development of community-policing research, training, and technical assistance. The Community Policing Consortium's contribution to the topic is significant and provides practical, real-world strategies to facilitate change in law enforcement organizations.¹⁵

3. Community Policing

The seminal work on modern community policing is Herman Goldstein's *Problem-Oriented Policing*.¹⁶ Among the topics that Goldstein effectively addresses are change and problem solving. No study of community policing would be complete without a reference to Goldstein. The organization most responsible for the effective implementation of community policing in America is the United States Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), through its training, research, and funding activities. The COPS office publishes numerous works related to community policing and has made excellent reference materials available on-line. The COPS publication "Local Law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism,"¹⁷ published shortly after 9/11, readily applies community policing principles to homeland security issues. Partnerships within the community and with other law enforcement agencies are also integral to the community policing effort and its application to homeland security issues. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) provides outstanding publications related to community policing and problem solving. For example, PERF provides advice to local

¹⁵ *The Police Organization in Transition: Organization and Framework* (Washington D.C.: Community Policing Consortium), Community Policing Consortium, <http://www.communitypolicing.org/pforgtrans/> (accessed April 13, 2004).

¹⁶ Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

¹⁷ Robert Chapman et al., *Local law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism: Lessons in Prevention and Preparedness* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2002).

law enforcement agencies to assist in addressing homeland security issues with the aid of community policing principles.¹⁸ Most progressive organizations in the law enforcement community fully embrace and have institutionalized community policing. There is little disagreement related to its necessity, applicability, or effectiveness. A comprehensive longitudinal study of community policing implementation and effectiveness in the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department highlights the positive and necessary role of community policing.¹⁹

In sum, the multiple disciplines, theories, and strategies associated with homeland security require not only a thorough and meaningful review of the literature, but a flexible and pragmatic review of both traditional and nontraditional sources.

B. HYPOTHESIS

The challenges American law enforcement agencies face changed radically on September 11, 2001. In addition to their traditional crime-fighting mandate, agencies became responsible for protecting their communities from terrorism, hopefully in partnership with other local as well as state and federal organizations. To address terrorism efficiently, agencies must now institutionalize homeland security policies and procedures. Doing so effectively means applying existing community policing principles to homeland security in their efforts to secure their communities against terrorist attacks.

C. METHODOLOGY

My research began with a substantial review of the existing literature pertaining to defense against terrorism at the local level. This thesis focuses in particular on the exploration and synthesis of three discrete topics: community policing, organizational change, and homeland security. Its overall purpose is to demonstrate that local law

¹⁸ Gerard R. Murphy, Martha R. Plotkin, et al, *Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement* (Washington D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, March 2004).

¹⁹ Wesley G. Skogan, *Longitudinal Evaluation of Chicago's Community Policing Program, 1993–2001* (Ann Arbor, MI: Northwestern University, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2004), 2nd ICPSR version, <http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/policing.html> (accessed 27 April 2005).

enforcement organizations have a significant role to play in homeland security, a role that is not being addressed in the most efficient and effective way possible. The thesis will show that the institutionalization of homeland security, through a synthesis of proven strategies such as community policing, will provide a greater likelihood of success by local law enforcement organizations as they undertake and embrace their critical homeland security role. Finally, the thesis will cover practical strategies and matrices for developing a timely and accurate assessment of all phases of homeland security institutionalization.

First, the threat—terrorism—is defined and discussed, because it is essential that local law enforcement bodies understand the overall nature of the threats that the institutionalization of homeland security is intended to address. Thus the examination of terrorism includes a discussion of both domestic and foreign terrorism. And the crucial impact of technology, especially the intranet, on those is also presented.

Second, community policing, which provides a model for this thesis, is defined and discussed as a fundamental aspect of homeland security institutionalization at the local law enforcement level. The application of community policing principles to homeland security practices is then described to provide practical and scalable examples that organizations can apply in their own homeland security efforts. A discussion of intelligence-led policing and community fear reduction is included to ensure a more holistic approach to homeland security–related issues and concerns.

The ideas, information, and data used in this thesis are derived from numerous sources. My personal experiences and knowledge gained as a line officer, manager, and member of the command staff of a very progressive local law enforcement organization became the bonding agent for the application of information and data gleaned from academic sources. In addition, my experience as a private security consultant specializing in providing homeland security–related services to public entities provided much practical insight, including a good understanding of their real-world affect on organizations outside the official law enforcement community such as private and governmental agencies.

Professional journals dedicated to policing and homeland security issues provide the most current relevant information on these topics. However, since many of the topics are fundamental principles of modern policing and homeland security, related books and governmental publications are also appropriate and necessary sources. In addition, I found that a review of texts and articles related to organizational change was also useful.

In regard to community policing in particular, as David Carter points out, in his article *Law Enforcement Intelligence*, “Community policing has developed skills in many law enforcement officers that directly support new counterterrorism responsibilities: The scientific approach to problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communication with the public, fear reduction, and community mobilization to deal with problems are among the important attributes community policing brings to this challenge.”²⁰ Community policing skills, because of a common understanding in the law enforcement community, can form a template for the application of homeland security principles and strategies using an appropriate change model. The synergy that results from its exploration and synthesis provides appropriate academic support for the concept of homeland security institutionalization.

²⁰ Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence*.

III. THE THREAT: TERRORISM

A. TERRORISM DEFINED

Prior to examining terrorist organizations, it is important that a proper foundation is laid and that terrorism is fully operationalized and conceptualized. The primary guide to the response to terrorism (both prevention and post-incident response) in the United States is the National Response Plan. The National Response Plan defines terrorism as any activity that:

- (1) involves an act that
 - (a) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and
 - (b) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and
- (2) appears to be intended
 - (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - (b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - (c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.²¹

The Federal Bureau of Investigation further defines terrorism as “The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”²²

B. TERRORIST GROUPS

People are drawn into right-wing terrorist organizations incrementally and usually through social networks. Seemingly innocent relationships can draw individuals into terrorist organizations. However, “In a few cases, individuals become terrorists because of anger at perceived mistreatment or injustice.”²³ Another possible reason that people

²¹ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 73.

²² *Terrorism in the United States* 199.

²³ Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, 78.

are attracted to right-wing terrorist organizations or activities is that the “American extremist right seeks an outlet for social frustration in a paramilitary culture.”²⁴ These terrorists may see themselves as “Dream Warriors”²⁵ And as self-described warriors, they submerge themselves in the paramilitary culture, are social outcasts, and base their individual identity in violence and their perception of a “warrior” subculture. Persons drawn into or who engage in terrorism as Dream Warriors are likely to operate as lone-wolf-type terrorists, targeting a wide range of enemies whom they believe are attempting to destroy their idea of American society and culture. In reality, it is likely that many of these so-called dream warriors would not be able to cope with the mental and physical challenges associated with public service in one of the fields or units they imitate.

For many terrorists a profound distrust of government is the motivation. For example, a large number of Americans believe that, at Waco, the FBI set fire to the Branch Davidians’ compound, or shot at the Davidians when they were trying to escape the fire. Many of these same people also believe that the federal government is setting up concentration camps for dissident Americans, especially white Protestant Americans, and is planning a takeover of the United States by United Nations troops. The supposed aim of the takeover is to set up a “new world order” that will include a one-world government led by Jews.

“American terrorism differs from terrorism in other countries in that a significant proportion of terrorist acts have been carried out by unaffiliated individuals rather than by members of terrorist organizations.”²⁶ These terrorists are called “lone wolves.” “Many law enforcement officials and terrorism analysts think that such loners will pose the greatest threat to the security of the United States since they are hard to identify before they act, and hard to track down afterwards.”²⁷ One example of a “lone wolf” operation is Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma

²⁴ James W. Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in the Post-Vietnam America* (New York: Hill & Wang), quoted in White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 29.

²⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 111.

²⁶ Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, 78.

²⁷ Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, 79.

City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, which killed 168 people. The bombing is believed to have been intended as an act of revenge for the perceived mistreatment of the Branch Davidians, and thus some consider McVeigh's act as an attack by a terrorist engaged in a leaderless resistance.

During the 1980s, law enforcement agencies made significant strides in combating domestic terrorism. By 1990 American law enforcement bodies had developed techniques for dealing with terrorism that included the infiltration of domestic right wing groups and effective monitoring of suspected terrorist organizations. Informants were effectively used at all levels of the suspected terrorist organizations, and for a time, it appeared that law enforcement had turned the tide on threat of domestic terrorism. However, in an effort to survive, many groups decided to change their tactics and organizational structure.

The concept of "leaderless resistance has been adopted by many right-wing extremists, so that several recent deadly attacks have been carried out by lone terrorists, who have only tenuous links with any extremist organization."²⁸ Ku Klux Klan leader Louis Beam was one of the first domestic terrorists to expose the idea of "leaderless resistance." Beam believed that "extremists groups did not need to have extensive organizations; it was necessary to do something. Resistance in any form was acceptable. There was no need to coordinate activities, resistance was enough."²⁹ Because, as James Wilson points out in his study of political organizations, "the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself."³⁰ Although the organization and operation of right-wing terrorists has shifted to a leaderless resistance-type strategy, in many instances, it continues to appear in the broad public perception that these groups are operating from a broad and unified base. It is likely that the promotion of this perception by domestic extremist organizations is directly related to the need to raise funds. "The

²⁸ Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, 102.

²⁹ White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 43.

³⁰ James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), quoted in Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10: 4 (Dec. 1987), 13-31.

perception of a unified threat is the result of the need to raise money,”³¹ often for personal gain rather than some idealistic adherence to an overall strategy.

C. NETWAR

“Netwar” is a phenomenon very similar to leaderless resistance that is being used by terrorists both in and outside the United States. The term “netwar” is used to describe terrorist activities by groups that have “relatively flat hierarchies, decentralization, and delegation of decision-making authority and loose lateral ties among dispersed groups and individuals.”³² In reality, these are not new concepts. In past conflicts, “underground” forces engaged in guerilla warfare mastered this concept. For example, during the occupation of France in World War II, there was a significant underground movement that fought against the Germans and supported allied efforts. Today, that underground would likely be classified as a leaderless resistance or, perhaps, “netwarriors.”

Increased lethality has accompanied this shift in organizational structure. Like many foreign terrorist groups, domestic militant right-wing Christian terrorist organizations have embraced the “legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, a sense of alienation, and the existence of a terrorist movement in which activists are the constituents, and preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of enemies” (i.e., Jews, Blacks, Gays, foreigners).³³ “The Christian Patriots do not appear to recognize any of the political moral or practical considerations that constrain most other terrorists groups from causing mass death and destruction.”³⁴ The adoption of such a philosophy makes it much more likely that this group, and others like them, will escalate

³¹ David W. Brannan, “Right-Wing Terrorism,” lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, CA, November 4, 2004.

³² Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ron Feldt, and Michael Zanini, *The New Terrorism* (RAND, 1999), 61.

³³ Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” in Paul Wilkinson, ed., *Technology and Terrorism* (London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 17.

³⁴Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 114–115.

their operations to a level that would allow them to utilize chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks (CBRN) if they were to develop those capabilities.

In addition to the philosophical shift associated with organizational structure that is seen among right-wing extremists, there has been a shift in their actual ability to cause mass casualties. “If, however, terrorist lethality continues to increase and the constraints, self-imposed and otherwise, imposed on terrorists in the commission of mass murder erode further, actions involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could become more attractive to some terrorists groups.”³⁵ A key factor contributing to terrorism’s raising lethality is the ease of adaptations across the technological spectrum.³⁶ The almost limitless availability of technology in the United States affords terrorists the unfettered ability to develop weapons, delivery systems, and systems that inhibit their detection.

Like most Americans who use the internet on a daily basis, many right-wing militias in the United States have already been actively using the internet. They use the internet to communicate with each other and to share propaganda and other information. In fact, right-wing terrorists were on the cutting edge when it came to the use of the internet. Louis Beam, “in the early 1980s pioneered the use of computer bulletin boards as a means for like-minded hate-mongers to both communicate with one another and circulate literature and information otherwise outlawed by the U.S. and Canadian postal services.”³⁷ As any organization, military, or business will confirm, effective communication is the key to successful operations. Right-wing terrorists have adopted the Internet as a primary tool for communicating within their organizations and with the rest of the world. While their message may seem nonsensical to the “average rational person,” they have mastered the art of delivering their message to their desired audience. Other communication devices such as mobile telephones (many of which are disposable

³⁵ Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting,” 23.

³⁶ Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering The New Terrorism*, 7–38, prepared by RAND, 1999.

³⁷ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 118.

and untraceable), pagers, and BlackBerry devices also enable terrorists' limitless, unfettered, and almost untraceable communication, thus increasing their opportunities for lethality.

Ease of communication throughout the world may also have increased the likelihood of more significant attacks for another reason. The dissemination of information and news, and America's voracious appetite for news the very second an event occurs, may actually have spawned terrorist acts or threats. In his book *Terrorism*, Walter Lacqueur, for instance, states that "The rise of indiscriminate terrorism is partly a product of the modern electronic mass media, as terrorists may commit these acts almost exclusively for the publicity that they generate."³⁸ However, there is not complete agreement among the experts on this subject. Some believe, to the contrary, that "because terrorists may no longer be completely dependent upon the news media to disseminate their point of view, the indiscriminate violence that is so often employed to attract news-media attention may no longer be as necessary."³⁹

D. RELIGIOUS/NATIONALISTS TERRORISM

"Another key reason for terrorism's increased lethality is the growing incidence of violence motivated by religious, as well as a nationalist/separatist imperative."⁴⁰ In 1998, in his book *Inside Terrorism*, Bruce Hoffman found that "the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today."⁴¹ "Terrorism motivated in whole or part by religious imperatives has often led to more intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations."⁴²

³⁸ Walter Lacqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1977), 105, quoted in Kevin Soo Hoo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenburg, *Survival* 39: 3 (autumn 1997, Military Module), 137.

³⁹ Lacquere, *Terrorism*, 105, quoted in Soo Hoo et al., 140.

⁴⁰ Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting," 16.

⁴¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 87.

⁴² Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 93.

E. ECO-TERRORISTS

Eco-terrorist likely pose the greatest threat of an domestic terrorists in the United States at this time this assertion is reinforced by Larry Copeland's more recent finding that since 1976 "eco-terrorists have committed more than 1,100 criminal acts; have caused property damage estimated at least \$110 million,"⁴³ while going to lengths to ensure that people are not harmed. In June of 2004, the FBI stated that eco-terrorism "was the nation's top domestic terrorism threat."⁴⁴

F. DOMESTIC RIGHT-WING TERRORISTS

It seems reasonable that with the ever-increasing concern about the deployment of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and the likelihood that right-wing groups are much more predisposed to using WMD, right-wing terrorist are now the more serious domestic threat. Many right-wing terrorists in the United States justify their actions by asserting a religious justification. In this respect they are no different than the terrorists that pervert Islam to justify their actions. In addition, like foreign terrorists, domestic terrorists have shifted their operational philosophies and structures in efforts to avoid detection and increase effectiveness. The effective use of technology by domestic terrorists is, alarmingly, much like that of foreign terrorists. It is quite possible that the tactics used in the Middle East today will soon be used in the United States. Roadside bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, snipers, all effective terrorist tools, will likely be deployed in America as extremists increase operations in response to the diversification of America, or, possibly, just because some common criminals choose to expand their forte by including terrorist acts. Domestic terrorism must become a priority for government at all levels, and it will, when it becomes necessary to shift finite resources to more adequately address this issue. Fortunately, the lessons learned in the fight against international terrorism can be readily applied to domestic terrorism. There is no need to "reinvent the wheel" when it comes to combating domestic terrorism. First

⁴³ Larry Copeland, "Domestic Terrorism: New Trouble at Home," USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2004, A1 <<https://www.usatoday>> (accessed November 14, 2004).

⁴⁴ Copeland, "Domestic Terrorism."

responders, as well as first preventors, can readily apply the lessons learned in the broader struggle against terrorism to the domestic threat.

G. THE GATHERING STORM?

Is America ignoring “a gathering storm,” the domestic terrorist threat? Probably not, the external threat is a much greater priority at this time, and the appropriate tactics and tools can be easily turned against the domestic terrorists when it becomes necessary. Perhaps success in foreign lands will preclude the need for a major battle against domestic terrorism in the United States.

However, homeland security leaders should seriously consider and be prepared to respond in light of the recent trend in terrorist activity in which Islamists perpetrate violent and deadly terrorist attacks in their home or adopted countries. The July 7, 2005, attacks on London’s transit system that killed fifty-two people and wounded approximately 700 were carried out by Islamic extremists who were British citizens of Pakistani origin.⁴⁵ Likewise, the Madrid train bombings and the bombings in Morocco, Bali, and Turkey were all perpetrated, entirely or in part, by homegrown Islamists with no outside guidance or direction from a larger organization such as Al Qaeda. This apparent fusion of Islamist extremism, leaderless resistance, and netwar may provide significant challenges for American homeland security professionals in the very near future.

⁴⁵ Glenn Frankel, "Four Britons Tied to London Blasts," *Washington Post*, July 13 2005, A1.

IV. THE RESPONSE

A. COMMUNITY POLICING

One of the most successful strategies employed by law enforcement, especially local law enforcement agencies, is community policing. The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the organization most responsible for the advent of community policing:

Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.⁴⁶

Community policing, especially the commitment to partnerships, problem solving, and organizational change, is credited by most law enforcement professionals for the ongoing drop in both crime rates and the public's fear of crime. The nationwide decrease in crime rates corresponds strongly with the acceptance and application of community policing throughout the law enforcement community.

Moreover, the law enforcement community, at all levels, plays a critical role in the ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and to minimize the damage and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The law enforcement community in cooperation with other first responders/preventers must evolve to meet this challenge. Programs and projects, while a temporary and very necessary fix at this point, are not sufficient to meet the nation's ongoing and future challenges and secure the safety and security of its communities. To be truly effective and to appropriately fulfill its vital role in homeland security the law

⁴⁶ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, "What Is Community Policing?," *Cops Office*, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?item=36/> (accessed July 17, 2005).

enforcement community must evolve, adapt, and integrate homeland security into its very fiber as a basic tenet and philosophy. Community policing is a readily available, understandable, and adaptable tool for achieving these goals.

The law enforcement community plays a major role in many of the critical mission areas included in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.⁴⁷ Therefore, it is essential that law enforcement take a long-term approach in fulfilling its role. By the 1980s the law enforcement community had evolved into a professional model of policing. Although very effective for a time, especially in quelling the rampant corruption that had engulfed many organizations, this model eventually could not effectively keep up with the rising crime rates. As a result, the primary reasons for this professional model's demise was its focus on response rather than on prevention, addressing the root causes of crime, and the fact that law enforcement officers had, in effect, become separated from their communities.

Thus community policing was created—actually, re-created—as a response to the obvious shortcomings of the current professional model. Community policing is an organization-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes proactive partnerships and community engagement to address the causes of crime and disorder, the fear of crime and disorder, and other community issues. And, at this point in history, there is no “other” community issue that is more critical than homeland security.

Research shows that law enforcement organizations throughout the world have reaped tremendous rewards from the application and integration of community policing principles. Crime rates across America continue to decline. Crime in New York City, for example, has been declining for the past seventeen years.⁴⁸ Similar achievements are possible in the homeland security realm. The wheel need not be reinvented. Most progressive law enforcement organizations have adopted community policing as their core philosophy and are already engaged in the process of needed change. A similar

⁴⁷ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, viii-ix.

⁴⁸ Al Baker, “Crime Numbers Keep Dropping Across the City,” *Nytimes.com*, December 31, 2005 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/31/nyregion/31crime.html>> (accessed December 31, 2005).

model, if applied to law enforcement's homeland security goals, could prove very effective. For example, if law enforcement organizations simply applied eight major principles of community policing to their homeland security efforts, a seamless transition from addressing homeland security on a programmatic basis to homeland security institutionalization could occur. The eight principles of community policing that are most applicable to the nation's homeland security efforts are:

- **Partnerships**
- **Problem-Solving**
- **Accountability**
- **Change**
- **Trust**
- **Vision**
- **Empowerment**
- **Leadership**

Table 1. Community Policing Principles

Community policing is not without its detractors. Since its inception, community policing has been criticized as being “soft on crime” and “turning cops into social workers.” Neither criticism is warranted; both have been thoroughly refuted. Lower crime rates, safer communities, and a marked decrease in fear of crime are testaments to the effectiveness of community policing. However, some in the law enforcement community believe that 9/11 and the advent of local law enforcement's homeland security responsibilities sounded the death knell for community policing. One academician, in describing community policing's future, asserts that “homeland security and community policing are not complementary philosophies.”⁴⁹ Thus far, there has not

⁴⁹ Willard M. Oliver, “Homeland Security: The Death Knell for Community Policing,” *Crime & Justice International* (March/April 2006), 9.

been a wholesale abandonment of community policing; however, this possibility must be recognized and resisted if organizations are to be holistically successful over the long term.

The law enforcement community must evolve if it is to meet its homeland security commitments. This evolution should include the adoption of homeland security as a philosophy and core value: homeland security institutionalization is key. Since the law enforcement community has recently (over the last 15–20 years) experienced a successful paradigm shift to the community policing model, it is completely appropriate that this model be adapted for homeland security purposes. Such adaptation and application would enable organizations to quickly, efficiently, and effectively provide long-term, lasting solutions to homeland security problems, thereby fulfilling their vital role in our nation's security.

B. PARTNERSHIPS

Partnerships at all levels are the key to successful community policing efforts and therefore are also essential to the successful prevention of terrorist attacks. To be truly effective, first responders and members of the private sector must work together in a coordinated effort toward this common goal. Strong partnerships with other first responders at all levels of government and with citizen groups and the rest of the private sector will greatly enhance communities' preparedness for and prevention of a terrorist attack, their mitigation and management of a disastrous incident, and their response to and recovery from an attack, should one occur. Organizations must ensure that those partnerships are mutually and wholly beneficial and that the relationships, processes, and outcomes are agreed upon by all stakeholders.

1. Community Partnerships

Law enforcement organizations must continue and enhance their partnerships with individual community members and organizations such as Crime Watch and Citizens on Patrol. These community groups should be given access to as much

information and training as is possible and practical. Community groups and the general public should be given every opportunity to participate in preparedness and protection efforts, including participation in preparedness and response drills. Local Crime Watch and Citizens on Patrol groups have been successful and beneficial partners to law enforcement organizations. “Neighborhood Watch groups deter crime not only by using traditional approaches such as foot and car patrols, but also by focusing on quality of life issues that can enhance neighborhoods.”⁵⁰ The activities and strategies employed by community groups prior to 9/11 are still effective and readily applicable to communities’ homeland security needs. In addition, organizations should understand that many, if not most, members of the community want to have an active role in homeland security. Law enforcement should facilitate that role whenever practical and possible. “Citizenship carries responsibilities, which include contributing more than just tax dollars to the cause of protecting our way of life. In times of national emergency we have an obligation to play a more active role. This principle is well grounded in our history, dating back to the minutemen, who traded in plowshares for muskets so they could fight the American Revolution.”⁵¹

2. Partnerships with the Business Community

Partnerships with the business community and private sector as a whole are essential. Eighty-five percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.⁵² Law enforcement organizations should ensure that the business community (including entertainment venues) is completely aware of all the resources provided by all levels of the government. Those resources include, but are not limited to, guidelines and directives issued by the Department of Homeland Security, participation

⁵⁰ Office of The New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, “Neighborhood Watch Groups Cited for Achievements,” October 23, 2001 <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/crime/neighborhood_watch/oct23_01.html> (accessed March 9, 2006).

⁵¹ Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 159.

⁵² *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, vii.

in state-sponsored preparedness exercises and intelligence-sharing opportunities, and other regional cooperative efforts. Successful public-private partnerships include twelve essential components:⁵³

- Common goals
- Common tasks
- Knowledge of participating agencies' capabilities
- Well-defined projected outcomes
- A timetable
- Education for all involved
- A tangible purpose
- Clearly identified leaders
- Operational planning
- Agreement by all partners as to how the partnership will proceed
- Mutual commitment to providing necessary resources
- Assessment and reporting

Table 2. Essential Components for Successful Public-Private Partnerships

Coordination with the business community, including planning and operations, to ensure smooth and efficient daily operations, business continuity, the operation of long-term seasonal events, as well as large one-time events, pays tremendous dividends in preparedness and prevention and response efforts.

3. Partnerships with Other First Responders/Preventers

Effective homeland security requires an interdisciplinary approach and seamless cooperation between disciplines. Traditional disagreements between the organizations involved in homeland security must be forgotten. In December of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security released the National Response Plan (NRP).⁵⁴ Organizations from every discipline associated with homeland security should recognize the need to embrace the NRP and should fully cooperate with and participate in the full implementation of the

⁵³ Andrew Sheldon and Greenburg Morabito, *Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private Security Partnerships* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, September 2005), NJC 210678, 5.

⁵⁴ *National Response Plan*.

plan. The NRP describes: “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; minimize the damage and recovery from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.”⁵⁵ The purpose of the NRP is: “To establish comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.”⁵⁶

In addition, law enforcement organizations must move beyond what has been traditional hubris related to the prevention of and response to terrorists acts. All portions of government should work together in a truly interdisciplinary approach to homeland security. The law enforcement community can learn much from other disciplines. For example, most fire service organizations have mastered the incident command system (ICS) that they use every day on almost every operation. Unfortunately, law enforcement organizations seldom use ICS and therefore encounter a very steep learning curve when ICS and a unified command system are needed and implemented. Law enforcement organizations should partner first responders/preventers on a proactive and ongoing basis, thereby ensuring appropriate responses to critical incidents as well as day-to-day homeland security.

C. PROBLEM-SOLVING

The linchpin of effective modern law enforcement is problem-solving. Once they are engaged in effective and mutually beneficial partnerships, all the stakeholders must be committed to a systematic and effective method of problem solving. One problem-solving model very well suited to preventing and responding to homeland security incidents is the SARA (scanning for, analyzing, responding to, and assessing) problem-solving model.⁵⁷ The SARA model, when adapted as needed by individual organizations,

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 1.

⁵⁶ *National Response Plan*, 2.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “The Sara Model,” Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2003 <<http://www.popcenter.org/aboutsara.htm>> (accessed January 3, 2006).

serves as an effective tool for organizational homeland security efforts. The SARA problem-solving model is flexible and can be easily applied to most problems, large and small. The model should be seen and applied, not as a linear fill-in-the-blank model, but as a circular model with multiple feedback loops. It makes it possible for an organization to be actively engaged simultaneously in scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. In addition, at times it may be necessary to respond initially to an event or problem while at the same time ensuring proper scanning analyses to facilitate a long-term response and ultimate resolution. The most valuable step in the SARA model may be the “assessment” step. Traditionally, law enforcement has been less than willing to conduct proper assessments of programs or projects. It is quite possible that systematic and scientific assessments of law enforcement actions may uncover failures. Unfortunately, many law enforcement organizations, even the most professional, do not see failure as an option; so they respond to it in a negative manner, instead of embracing it as a learning opportunity.

To ensure future success, law enforcement organizations must thoroughly and properly evaluate all of their respective programs, including those related to homeland security. This aspect will be discussed in detail later in the “accountability” section of this thesis. Proper analyses ensure accountability and transparency in law enforcement operations. The requirement for assessment allows organizations to learn from mistakes as well as successes while developing a compilation of best practices and lessons learned. These best practices and lessons learned can then be applied across a broad spectrum of issues, including the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks and other homeland security-related issues.




Figure 2. The S.A.R.A. Problem-Solving Model

D. ACCOUNTABILITY

A great deal of money, time, and effort has and will continue to go into homeland security. Organizations must proactively ensure accountability, transparency, and conformity with community mandates. Successful homeland security also involves

prevention, but measuring prevention is problematic. How can an organization measure something that has not occurred? “The ability to measure the prevention of terrorist attacks is vitally important for a number of reasons. First, there is the accountability issue. The nation, at all levels of government and the private sector, is investing vast amounts of funds and effort to ‘prevent the next attack.’”⁵⁸

Community policing efforts are often measured at the process level rather than at the final outcome level since final outcomes such as prevention are often immeasurable. The measure of a homeland security process and distinct pieces of programs and strategies likely provides acceptable data for a policy or practice analysis and assessment. For example, if an organization wishes to determine the effectiveness of its critical infrastructure protection efforts, it could document and measure the steps it takes to reach the desired goal. It could set benchmarks for and measure its progress in assessing the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure within its sphere of influence. Also, the quality and number of its business and private sector partnerships may prove an appropriate process measurement. In addition, the organization’s participation in information and intelligence-sharing efforts related to critical infrastructure protection is measurable and appropriate for determining its progress and success in the protection of critical infrastructure.

Individual organizational members, especially supervisors and command staff, should also be evaluated for their efforts related to homeland security. And organizations should develop appropriate evaluative criteria (process and outcome) for the efforts of their respective commands. All efforts related to homeland security should be reported and reviewed in the same way that criminal activity is.

E. CHANGE

The law enforcement organizations that will ultimately be successful in the war on terrorism are those that facilitate and embrace change today. The victors in this endeavor will be those that are adaptable, flexible, and resilient. “The process of

⁵⁸ Glen Woodbury, “Measuring Prevention,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 1:1 (summer 2005), 1.

implementing substantive change in the field of law enforcement requires political maneuvering, negotiating positions, bartering political influence, sharing information, assessing new directions, and responding to the diverse needs of citizens, elected officials, and employees.”⁵⁹ Resistance to change may be one of the determining reasons for adopting a smaller "project-oriented" approach to addressing homeland security issues. Homeland security is not a project, it is a philosophy. Law enforcement organizations must integrate their homeland security efforts into their overall policing philosophy. To effect this change in the most efficient and effective manner possible law enforcement organizations must:

- **Involve all stakeholders.** Community policing is a valid approach to addressing homeland security issues. All personnel should participate. A community policing approach to homeland security is not something special that only a select few can do. Change means enhancement.
- Be **patient.** Worthwhile and effective processes are not implemented overnight in a haphazard manner. However, organizations should not settle for traditional incrementalism.
- Be **consistent** in the application of policies and practices to ensure understanding, adherence, and buy-in by all stakeholders.
- **Expect and address resistance.** It is normal that change brings resistance. The key is to expect and prepare for resistance. Resistance may prompt overall improvement in the change process and end results.

F. TRUST

1. Racial Profiling (Racially Biased Policing)

Commitment to professionalism and the public trust is the hallmark of any professional law enforcement organization. Law enforcement organizations are accountable to the community they serve, to other stakeholders in the fight against terrorism, to policy makers, and to their individual members. Each organization’s actions

⁵⁹ David L. Carter, “Community Policing and Politics,” (Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice, 2006). <www.cj.msu.edu/~people/cp/cppolit.html> (accessed February 27, 2006).

related to homeland security should always be in compliance with the United States Constitution, the state constitution, and federal, state, tribal, and local law. The rule of law should never be compromised.

The law enforcement community has enjoyed historic reductions in crime by identifying and addressing specific acts of criminal behavior, *not* by targeting individuals. American law enforcement will be successful in detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorist attacks by continuing successful partnerships and commitment to the rule of law and the fair and ethical treatment of all persons. One of the most controversial issues associated with homeland security–related enforcement is racial profiling or racially biased policing. “Racially biased policing occurs when law enforcement inappropriately considers race or ethnicity in deciding with whom and how to intervene in an enforcement capacity.”⁶⁰ Racially biased policing erodes trust and confidence and puts law enforcement officers at odds with the very communities they serve and should partner with to fight crime and effectively address homeland security. In his February 27, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush declared that racial profiling is “wrong and we will end it in America.” Organizations should ensure that policies are codified to unequivocally forbid racially biased policing. In addition, law enforcement organizations should address this issue in a proactive manner through proper recruitment, training, and supervision of personnel.

2. Criminal/Behavioral Profiling

Although the word “profiling” has many negative connotations, criminal or behavioral profiling is an effective and lawful law enforcement tool and technique. “Profiling is generally condemned as a very bad thing. In fact [criminal profiling] is the basis of all good law enforcement.”⁶¹ Criminal profiling is a bona fide activity that helps in focusing attention on persons likely to engage in specific crimes based on behaviors,

⁶⁰ Lorie Fridell et al., *Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2001), 4.

⁶¹ Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, 129.

not race.⁶² Law enforcement personnel should use every lawful investigative tool available to identify potential suspects, to find and arrest those responsible for crimes, and to prevent them from committing more criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Law enforcement personnel should ensure that all enforcement-related contacts are based upon legitimate investigative leads. To qualify as a legitimate investigative lead, the following must be true:⁶³

- The information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the criminal activity.
- The information must be trustworthy.
- The information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied to a particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a particular criminal organization.

Effective homeland security requires mutual trust and respect. Law enforcement must operate with unquestionable integrity and transparency. Responsible law enforcement organizations expect their partners, all of them, in the global war on terrorism to do the same. Law enforcement organizations must engage in an effective fight against terrorism while ensuring that the rights of all people are upheld. No one at any level should tolerate discrimination or illegal profiling, or racially biased policing in any form or fashion, by any person or organization.

G. VISION

Experts within the homeland security community say that two of the things that allowed the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon to happen were a “failure of imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.⁶⁴ Law enforcement

⁶² William D. Flores, *Position Paper: Non-Biased Policing* (San Diego, CA: National Latino Police Officers Association), 4.

⁶³ U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, *Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies*, June, 2003 <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.htm> (accessed March 10, 2006).

⁶⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States of America, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States of America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 336.

organizations must not allow such failures to occur in their jurisdictions. First responders/preventers must learn from the past while keeping an open mind and a constant eye on the future. The future must find law enforcement willing and well prepared to deal with whatever changes, crises, and challenges it may hold. Organizations must be flexible and responsive to the ever-changing challenges of post-9/11 policing. New policing strategies such as intelligence-led policing should be examined, instituted, and institutionalized when appropriate.

1. Intelligence-Led Policing

One of the most beneficial strategies that a law enforcement organization can engage in is intelligence-led policing (ILP). Intelligence-led policing is the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and the strategic level.⁶⁵ For intelligence-led policing to be effective, it must become an integral part of an agency's philosophy. It is critical that, once integrated, ILP is a management orientation in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. Ultimately, ILP is based on a common understanding of intelligence and its usefulness in addressing crime, disorder, and the fear of crime and disorder, including terrorism. By necessity, law enforcement organizations must address terrorism-related issues as criminal acts; therefore, ILP is also a strategy that assists with an organization's homeland security efforts. An effective implementation and ongoing engagement in ILP requires seamless integration into an organization's overall community-policing efforts. In addition, it is absolutely essential that ethical and civil rights issues are properly addressed. Finally, an organization that wishes to effectively implement and engage in ILP must ensure that mechanisms and practices are in place to ensure the proper sharing of intelligence data.

Intelligence-led policing is a systematic enhancement of proactive problem-solving strategies which are integral to community policing. Proactive problem-solving

⁶⁵ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Intelligence-led Policing: A Definition, RCMP Criminal Intelligence Program*, January 27, 2005 <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/crimint/intelligence_e.htm> (accessed July 8, 2005).

strategies require an organization to develop an analytic capacity necessary for both intelligence collection and intelligence analysis. The bedrock of police problem-solving is the SARA model (scanning for, analyzing, responding to, and assessing problems). The SARA model dovetails nicely with the intelligence-led policing crime reduction process.⁶⁶ The similarities and consistencies are highlighted in the diagrams below:




Figure 3. S.A.R.A. Problem Solving Model




Figure 4. The Intelligence Cycle

⁶⁶ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, "Intelligence-led Policing," *Australian Institute of Criminology-Trends & Issues* 28 (April 2003), 3.

An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction process




Figure 5. An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction process

An effective ILP program is built from the bottom up and begins with street-level officers. To collect quality intelligence data, street officers must receive quality training in the collection and analysis of intelligence data. Although the primary responsibility for data analysis rest with an organization’s intelligence analysts, analysis training of line officers enhances their understanding of the data needed and how the data and information applies to the overall intelligence cycle. This can greatly enhance organizational members’ collection efforts.

a. Ethical and Civil Rights Issues

Any organization that engages in ILP must understand the significant ethical and civil rights issues associated with the intelligence cycle. Numerous citizens’ groups have expressed concern at the national level about the USA PATRIOT Act and at the local level about the types of personal information that are collected and retained in files at local law enforcement organizations. As part of a public education effort, organizations must assure the community that it will maintain the highest level of legal and ethical standards in the collection of intelligence data and the storing and dissemination of intelligence. The development and publication of specific and

transparent policies prior to the implementation of ILP is absolutely essential. The policies and procedures should specifically address civil rights issues and an agency's responses to those issues.

b. Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence sharing is an essential aspect of ILP. Adjacent communities as well as state and federal members of the law enforcement community are an individual agency's most obvious and likely most valuable intelligence partners. However, the organization must not limit itself to proximate partners. Full participation in an appropriate intelligence fusion center and the exploitation of other intelligence-sharing opportunities are essential.

A genuine organization-wide commitment to complete intelligence-led policing may initially cause significant organizational stress. However, the recognition that ILP is simply an extension and enhancement of the organization's ongoing community-policing philosophy should alleviate some of the apprehension.

Line officers and other organizational members who are already tasked to their reasonable limits will be assigned additional training tasks and responsibilities. However, the benefits of intelligence-led policing are beyond measure. The importance and value of timely, accurate intelligence cannot be overstated. The capability to effectively share intelligence with the law enforcement community as well as the intelligence community as a whole will position the organization to properly address the community's homeland security needs. In addition, ILP will assist in the overall reduction of crime and disorder and the public's fear of crime and disorder.

Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations must recognize the importance of intelligence. A firm commitment to the lawful and ethical gathering of intelligence data, the proper processing and exploitation of the gathered data, the expert analysis and production of the processed data, and the lawful and ethical dissemination of the intelligence product is critical. Crime, including acts of terrorism, does not respect organizational boundaries; cooperation and collaboration with other members of the law-

enforcement and intelligence communities is vital. To provide the best possible service to its citizens, an organization must become a contributing member of the intelligence community. The immediate and complete implementation of an intelligence-led policing model will greatly assist organizations in meeting the law enforcement and homeland security challenges of the twenty-first century.

H. EMPOWERMENT

Law enforcement organizations must develop organizational structures and environments that reflect their community's values and that facilitate joint citizen, employee, business group, and industry empowerment in homeland security-related issues. The entire law enforcement community should understand the need to focus on solving homeland security issues in creative ways. Law enforcement organizations must grant greater autonomy to all members of their organizations, especially line officers. "Empowering officers at lower levels with decision-making authority and familiarizing them with making (and taking responsibility for) important decisions could be of value in a crisis"⁶⁷ Greater autonomy implies enhanced trust and respect for their organizational members' professionalism judgment as law enforcement professionals. Community members and business partners must share in the rights and responsibilities implicit in identifying, prioritizing, and solving homeland security-related problems, recognizing that they are full-fledged partners with the law enforcement community.

I. LEADERSHIP

Leaders in law enforcement organizations can provide leadership in the homeland security realm by appropriately and skillfully influencing their members, individual citizens, groups, and business partners. Law enforcement leaders must provide purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to prevent terrorist attacks in their respective communities and providing for an effective response to and recovery from a terrorist attack should one occur. Leaders at all levels should "prepare relentlessly" and

⁶⁷ Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, *Community Policing and Terrorism*, April 2003 <<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scheider-Chapman.html>> (accessed January 26, 2006).

understand that “everyone’s accountable, all of the time.”⁶⁸ Individuals and organizations should also exercise appropriate “followship” when necessary, recognizing that, at times, it will be more appropriate for other homeland security partners to take the lead.

1. Strategic Planning

The institutionalization of homeland security is of such vital importance that it cannot be left to chance or become an afterthought. The weaving of homeland security into the core fabric of law enforcement organizations is imperative. Therefore, organizations that wish to effectively institutionalize homeland security should include it in their strategic planning. Strategic planning is “a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or any other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it.”⁶⁹ Effective implementation of any strategic plans requires sound leadership throughout the entire strategic planning process. Developing effective programs, projects, action plans, budgets, and implementation processes will bring life to the strategies and create more tangible immediate and long-term value for the organization (or community) its stakeholders’ mandates are met and the mission fulfilled.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Rudolph W. Giuliani, *Leadership* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

⁶⁹ John M. Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3rd edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 6.

⁷⁰ Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, 238.




Figure 6. Strategic Planning Model⁷¹

Characteristics of an effective strategy to institutionalize homeland security in a local law enforcement organization include:

- Technically feasible
- Politically acceptable
- Fits organization's philosophy and values
- Ethical, moral and legal
- Deals with the issue that it is supposed to address

⁷¹ J. M. Bryson and F. Alston, *Creating and Implementing Your Strategic Plan*. 2nd edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005); quoted in Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, 3rd edition, 7.

Technical feasibility is not limited to equipment. Numerous industries have cropped up to address the nation's homeland security needs, and new technology is developed daily. Often the most overlooked aspect of the introduction of new technology is the training of personnel to effectively use the new technology. This very necessary training is often time consuming and, at times, very costly. In addition, the ongoing maintenance and upkeep of technology is often overlooked, especially if additional personnel costs are associated with the maintenance and upkeep of new technology.

The importance of ensuring a strategies' political acceptability can not be overstated. Failure to recognize this fact can doom a strategy to failure. Buy-in from all stakeholders will help ensure the strategies success in both the implementation phase and the ongoing operation of the program. Elected officials, through proper channels, should be fully educated about strategies that have wide-ranging effect on the community. This is especially true for strategies that address such hot-button topic as homeland security.

Strategies that do not fit the organization's philosophy and values have little chance for success. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the strategy is linked at every step to the organizations vision, values and mission. In addition, organizations must naturally discard any strategy that is not ethical, moral and legal.

Often, at the end of a planning process, the strategy that is created does not actually address the specific issue for which it was created. Strategies and program can morph throughout the creation and implementation process, thus rendering them ineffective. However, it is very possible that the realized strategy (a blend of what is intended and what work in practice)⁷² actually may not resemble the strategy envisioned at the inception of the planning process, but if this strategy meets the aforementioned criteria pragmatism should prevail. Organizations should be especially aware on "mission

⁷² H. Mintzberg and F. Westley, "Cycles of Organizational Change," *Strategic Management Journal* 13 (1992), 39-59; quoted in Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, 3rd edition, 238.

creep” and attempting to do too much with a particular strategy, especially those actions which the strategy was not intended to address but were simply bootstrapped to the strategy for convenience.

a. Implementation Roles and Responsibilities

Effective strategy implementation requires appropriate leadership. Law enforcement organizations should ensure that highly qualified leaders with a good knowledge of the organization and its culture are tasked with strategy implementation. A leader which wishes to help his or her organization institutionalize homeland security must have demonstrated a firm commitment to and understanding of the organizations commitment to community policing and the need for homeland security institutionalization. These leaders should have the authority and the flexibility to institute change in innovative and pragmatic ways if necessary. In addition, homeland security leaders should understand the likelihood that they may face significant resistance from the community, other stake holders and the authorizing environment, which is politicians and governmental overseers at every levels. Leaders should understand that “the greater the legitimacy behind a decision, [the decision to institutionalize homeland security] the harder it is to ignore or reverse, and the stronger the mandate.”⁷³ In addition, competition for and the best use of scarce recourses (public budgets) is always a significant issue. This issue is exacerbated by public apathy in the absence of ongoing terrorist attacks in America, and an acceptance of a “new normalcy” in which the nation becomes callused to the possibility of terrorists attacks and resigns itself to the realization “that the threat of terrorism can never be completely eliminated and that no level of resources can prevent the United States from being attacked in the future.”⁷⁴

⁷³ Mark H. Moor, *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 126.

⁷⁴ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Forging America’s New Normalcy* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), 1.

J. FEAR REDUCTION

Most progressive law enforcement organizations have codified mission statements which not only address the organization's desire to reduce crime and disorder but also include some reference to the organization's desire to reduce fear of crime and disorder. Fear of crime is a serious issue which organizations must actively and aggressively address. While crime is a major problem in many cities, citizen fear of crime often exceeds the actual risk of being victimized. This phenomenon is also true for fear of terrorism, perhaps more so. Although terrorism is at its root a political act rather than a criminal act, the effects of terrorism, especially the fear of terrorism are no different and may be more severe than the effect of crime in a community. Therefore, since one of the primary goals of terrorist acts or threats is to instill fear, any strategy intended to effectively address terrorism must include fear reduction.

Law enforcement organizations, especially at the local level are usually the most capable of taking the lead in a multidisciplinary effort to reduce a community's fear of terrorism. Local law enforcement organizations are usually the largest, most professional and most recognizable segments of local government. In addition a sizeable segment of the population holds the law enforcement community in high esteem and trusts law enforcement organizations

The advent and success of community policing has equipped law enforcement organizations with community contacts, public support, and partnerships which are invaluable in addressing any issue in the community, more especially, the reduction of fear associated with terrorism.

Organizations which have embraced and institutionalized community policing have the professional "tools" and the organizational culture in-place to facilitate their success in terrorism fear reduction. Organizations must address fear reduction holistically, rather than incrementally. Addressing fear preemptively (before a terrorist event) will better position local law enforcement organizations to address fear during actual terrorist events and during the recovery from terrorist attacks. Organizations should understand the effects of terrorism, including fear, do are not limited to those

event which may or do occur within their respective corporate limits. Terrorist acts throughout the nation, and at times, the world can promote fear within a community. For example, an attack by a suicide terrorist in a shopping mall anywhere in the United States, would adversely affect all shopping malls throughout the United States. “The primary target [of a terrorist attack] is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but those made to witness it.”⁷⁵ The media’s focus on such events ensures the entire nation becomes a defacto witness to the terrorist act; likely resulting in widespread fear. To confirm this notion one need only recall the fear of those persons whom worked in high-rise buildings post 9/11 as they scrambled to procure emergency breathing apparatus and escape parachutes.⁷⁶

1. Personnel Training

Once an organization has come to the realization that it must reduce fear of terrorism in its community, and that it has the capabilities to do so, the organization should develop a plan to achieve this goal. The most beneficial first step a law enforcement organization can undertake is to educate its members about terrorism and train its members how to respond to various acts of terrorism. This will lead to the accomplishment of an all-important first goal- the reduction of fear of terrorism by the organization’s personnel. Although the community might expect that members of their local law enforcement organization understand terrorism, its causes, and all of the nuances associate with responding to terrorist acts, it is likely that many law enforcement officers and employees know little more than the average citizen about terrorism. Therefore, it is essential that an organization provide training to ensure their personnel understand terrorism and can engage in an intelligent informed conversation about terrorism when needed, and most importantly, can effectively respond to an act of terrorism if required. Education and training will form a strong foundation for the organization’s future prevention, response and recovery efforts. All members of the

⁷⁵ Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” *Science* 299 (7 March 2003), 1534.

⁷⁶ Warren E. Leary, “Devising 21st-Century Escape Routes for Creative Exits,” *New York Times*, October 9, 2001, F4 .

organization should receive training appropriate for their respective positions. Both commissioned and non-commissioned personnel should receive training.

Training should include classroom or on-line training which conveys an understanding of terrorism including its history, causes, organization and tactics. In addition, training in equipment usage such as how to dawn, wear and operate in any protective equipment. Employee confidence is boosted and fear reduced by participation and success in disaster drills designed to test all phases of prevention of, the response to and recovery from terrorist incidents.

Next, organizations which have developed effective partnerships can leverage those partnerships to help ensure a better informed community. People fear the unknown; therefore, a better informed and educated community will greatly reduce the fear associated with terrorism. Collaboration with community groups, business groups and civic organizations can greatly enhance a law enforcement organization's community education efforts. These are the organizations most likely to embrace the law enforcement message and can become informed ambassadors to the rest of the community.

2. The Media

As previously mentioned, the media plays a significant roll in the community's fear of terrorism. Working with the media can pay significant dividends in fear reduction. "The media have the opportunity to play a significant positive role in the community. The media have an implicit responsibility to keep the public informed about current events and can help relay messages in the most efficient and effective way. They can also serve the role of reassurance and comfort to people in time of confusion and uncertainty."⁷⁷

A relationship or partnership with the media may not always be pleasant for a law enforcement organization. At times the media will report incidents or subjects that may

⁷⁷ Adrienne S. Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, Chapter. 2: Developing Strategies for Minimizing the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism Through Prevention, Intervention, and Health Promotion, in *Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003), 58.

not shed a favorable light on a law enforcement organization; however, transparency and honesty with the media will payoff in the long run. Organizations must constantly remember that they are doing the people's business and they should not fear the reporting of their efforts and actions.

American law enforcement organizations must develop strategies to effectively prevent, respond to and respond to acts of terrorism. Any terrorism strategy must include fear reduction. Law enforcement organizations can reduce the fear of terrorism in their communities through education and training. Eliminating the unknown through training and educating their personnel and educating the public through community partnerships and symbiotic relationships with the media can and will reduce public fear of terrorism. When fear is eliminated, terrorist loose a significant portion of their power and effectiveness thus achieving a victory or victories in the global war on terrorism.

V. CONCLUSION

A. TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY POLICING

Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations face a new and significant challenge — homeland security. On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States were thrust into the “war on terrorism.” Since then, most law enforcement organizations have responded to the terrorist threat as best they can, given limited resources, an unclear mission in homeland security, unclear policies for dealing with political and civil liberties issues, the demands of their ongoing day-to-day law enforcement jobs, and an uncertain commitment to what is often perceived as a federal responsibility. The current law enforcement business-as-usual attitude and incremental programmatic responses to homeland security issues is no longer acceptable. Terrorist attacks or a natural disaster is at first a local issue which will be responded to by local first responders. Local law enforcement organizations must recognize and embrace the critical and essential role they have to play in maintaining security in their communities and in addressing key issues pertinent to the war on terrorism and natural disasters. Preparedness for attacks on their communities or for terrorists’ potential use of their communities to plan and launch an attack is key to the success as both first responders and first preventers.

In that context, community policing is one of the most successful strategies that law enforcement organizations can continue to develop and use as a tool to assist in homeland security institutionalization. Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law enforcement, prevention, problem solving, community engagement, and partnerships. Community policing has had a dramatic, positive effect in America’s communities: over a sustained period of time, it has helped law enforcement organizations substantially to reduce crime rates and the fear of crime in their communities.

Although many organizations have experienced some success from applying community policing principles on a limited or a programmatic basis, it is clear that those

organizations that have *institutionalized* community policing, that is, adopting it as a core philosophy or philosophical underpinning, have experienced the greatest successes. Organizations that desire long-term success in their critical homeland security efforts can take a positive step toward this goal by using community policing principles as a template combined with other progressive policing practices to institutionalize homeland security. To achieve the greatest effectiveness, homeland security, like community policing, must be adopted throughout the organization, integrating the homeland security responsibility into the agency's mission statement, values, goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other systems and activities that define an organizational culture.

The institutionalization of homeland security will not only make America's communities safer, but also may reduce crime and disorder and the public's fear of crime and disorder. This process will in turn enable local law enforcement organizations to address their homeland security mandate while fulfilling their primary function. At some point in time, the line between homeland security and everyday policing will be indistinguishable. At that point, homeland security institutionalization will have been achieved. Failing to accomplish this could prove very costly, in both monetary and human terms.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis argues that local law enforcement organizations have an important role to play in homeland security and, to most effectively fulfill that role; they must institutionalize homeland security concepts, principles, and practices. Furthermore, the thesis suggests that institutionalization can best be achieved through the application of community policing principles to homeland security.

To begin the institutionalization process, each organization must first officially integrate homeland security by codifying, the homeland security responsibility into the agency's mission statement, goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other systems and activities that define the overall organizational culture. In doing so, each

organization must identify the change processes that will be most effective in their individual organizations and then aggressively pursue the needed changes.

These processes of institutionalization and change should not be limited to law enforcement organizations, however, because terrorism and homeland security are not simply law enforcement problems. The twenty-first-century challenge of terrorism will be met most efficiently by resilient communities that have institutionalized homeland security on a community-wide basis. The law enforcement community can act perhaps as a catalyst for this institutionalization in concert with other first responders/preventers such as the fire service, the emergency management community and the medical community. But true community-wide homeland security institutionalization will only be achieved if and when every member of the community, especially public servants, understands and is able and willing to fulfill a vital role in the prevention of, the response to, and the recovery from terrorist attacks.

Absent a clear and present threat, it is likely that one significant challenge will be to maintain the momentum of homeland security institutionalization. Thus organizations must resist the tendency to become complacent. Although some equipment and training are applicable only to law enforcement's homeland security responsibilities, whenever possible, they should strive for dual functionality. This combined effort will better ensure the most efficient and effective use of precious law enforcement time and talent and scarce public resources, while making America's communities safer places to live, work, and play.

C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The local law enforcement establishment's movement to homeland security institutionalize is in its infancy. And any reliable and valid academic research that highlights effective and generally applicable homeland security practices and strategies for law enforcement organizations would be very beneficial. In addition, research that highlights the effect that homeland security has had on community policing and the

policing profession as a whole could assist in developing the strategies that will be needed to address the next rendition of terrorist threats and natural disasters.

Research that leads to policy and training recommendations to assist the nation's law enforcement organizations in specific prevention, response, and recovery activities would be extremely valuable. For example, though suicide bombers have become effective weapons for terrorist organizations, very few American law enforcement organizations are trained and equipped to respond to this looming threat. In addition, other forms of terrorist attacks and natural disasters, such as hurricanes or a pandemic flu catastrophe, which would affect a large region of the country, would pose a significant challenge for the entire homeland security community. Aggressive affirmative steps are needed to overcome these shortcomings. In sum, the concept of "resilient communities" and the development of a holistic community approach to homeland security that includes all factions of government — local, regional, state, federal, and private sector — benefits all aspects of our national homeland security mission and responsibility.

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