TOWARDS A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS: THE TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING GROUP

by

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March 2006

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

The VI is under-prepared for major natural disasters and terrorism. Many emergency plans are incomplete, based on inaccurate information, wrongly optimistic and assume an infrastructure that does not exist. The VI is at risk to a direct terrorist attack and also subject to whatever secondary consequences result from a stateside attack, because virtually one hundred percent of food, fuel, medicine, and oil used to make electricity and potable water - and tourists, the economy’s lifeblood -- are imported. Also, (1) geographically, help is not readily available from any neighboring city or state; (2) the VI’s first responders are likely to be affected by the same disaster they are responding to and unable to assist; (3) the VI must assume more of the emergency preparedness functions that would typically be shared between neighboring communities; (4) the VI must have more funding than similar communities on the mainland; and (5) preparedness planning must include the importing of mainland resources.

The purpose of this thesis is to point out how the VI is different from the mainland U.S. This thesis documents vulnerabilities and shows how the Government’s existing infrastructure is inadequate. Included is discussion of how the police, social issues, and existing VI Government leadership affect the vulnerabilities. It examines existing preparedness plans. One chapter discusses how management can harm Homeland Security while another chapter deals with change and proposes a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. Lastly is an Action Plan listing things that can be done immediately.


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TOWARDS A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS: THE TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING GROUP

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ABSTRACT

The Virgin Islands (VI) is under-prepared for major natural disasters and terrorism. Many emergency plans are incomplete, based on inaccurate information, wrongly optimistic and assume an infrastructure that does not exist. The VI is at risk to a direct terrorist attack and also subject to whatever secondary consequences result from a stateside attack, because virtually one hundred percent of food, fuel, medicine, oil used to make electricity and potable water - and tourists, the economy’s lifeblood -- are imported. Also, (1) geographically, help is not readily available from any neighboring city or state; (2) the VI’s first responders are likely to be affected by the same disaster they are responding to and unable to assist; (3) the VI must assume more of the emergency preparedness functions that would typically be shared between neighboring communities; (4) the VI must have more funding than similar communities on the mainland; and (5) preparedness planning must include the importing of mainland resources.

The purpose of this thesis is to point out how the VI is different from the mainland U.S. This thesis documents vulnerabilities and shows how the Government’s existing infrastructure is inadequate. Included is discussion of how the police, social issues, and existing VI Government leadership affect the vulnerabilities. It examines existing preparedness plans. One chapter discusses how management can harm Homeland Security while another chapter deals with change and proposes a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. Lastly is an Action Plan listing things that can be done immediately.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>Automatic external defibrillator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Amateur Radio Club (St. John)</td>
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<td>ARES</td>
<td>Amateur Radio Emergency Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Patrol, U.S.</td>
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<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHDS</td>
<td>Center for Homeland Defense and Security <a href="http://www.chds.us">www.chds.us</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Cardio pulmonary resuscitation</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security, U.S.</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense, U.S.</td>
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<td>DOH</td>
<td>Department of Health, VI</td>
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<td>DOH BT</td>
<td>Department of Health Bioterrorism</td>
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<td>DPNR</td>
<td>Department of Planning and Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCP</td>
<td>Defense Supply Center Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Emergency Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EENW</td>
<td>East End Neighborhood Watch</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMT</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Technician</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERT-A</td>
<td>Emergency Response Team-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF #</td>
<td>Emergency Services Function ___</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Communications Commission</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>HAZMAT</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSPD #</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive number ___</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurgen</td>
<td>Police headquarters for the island of St. John Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKS</td>
<td>Myrah Keating Smith Clinic and Community Health Center</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Meals ready to eat</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTSA</td>
<td>Maritime Transportation Security Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>National Maritime Security Plan</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Park Service</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWB</td>
<td>National Weather Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td>St. John Rescue</td>
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<td>STJ</td>
<td>St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands</td>
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<td>STT</td>
<td>St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>STX</td>
<td>St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Territory Command Center</td>
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<td>TCL</td>
<td>Target Capabilities List</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Territory of the United States Virgin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>U//FOUO</td>
<td>Unclassified, For Official Use Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVI</td>
<td>University of the Virgin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle borne improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Virgin Islands (Territory of the United States Virgin Islands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIFS</td>
<td>Virgin Islands Fire Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIPA</td>
<td>Virgin Islands Port Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIPD</td>
<td>Virgin Island Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITEMA</td>
<td>Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-TEOP</td>
<td>Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoIP</td>
<td>Voice Over Internet Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAPA</td>
<td>Water and Power Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WICO</td>
<td>West Indies Company (operates cruise ship docks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Territory of the United States Virgin Islands (hereafter “VI” or “Territory”) must recognize that as a collection of small islands, it is uniquely vulnerable to the consequences of both major natural disasters and terrorism. The VI is under-prepared for both of these! A significant natural disaster such as a hurricane, earthquake, or tsunami in the VI would have a grave impact on human life and the Territory’s economy. Similarly, a terrorist attack in the mainland U.S. or in the VI would severely threaten the Territory’s economy and the health of its citizens. Because the VI has much room to improve in its ability to respond to both natural disasters and terrorism, the initial damage and injuries caused by such a disaster would paralyze the islands, leaving its citizens without basic services such as electric power, food distribution and public safety.

Compounding the VI’s lack of preparedness, (1) the VI is geographically isolated so help is not readily available from the usual sources such as neighboring communities. Also, (2) the VI’s first responders who often fill multiple emergency response roles simultaneously, might be personally affected by whatever disaster occurs and thus not able to respond. For example, after Hurricane Marilyn in 1995, “police were hampered … because the department lost 90 percent of its vehicles… [and] many officers and their families are sleeping in cars and don’t have a change of clothing.”1

Even though these are separate islands, St. Thomas is approximately six miles at its closest point away from St. John, and St. Croix is approximately forty miles away, these are close enough to each other that it is not certain one island’s rescuers could assist another’s – especially if there was a large and powerful hurricane that would affect all the islands. Plus, in any disaster, transportation between the islands is interrupted. Because neighboring islands

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1 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” Virgin Islands Daily News, September 23, 1995, 6.
will be unavailable and incapable of assisting each other, each island in the VI must (3) assume more of the emergency preparedness functions that would typically be shared among similar communities or regions on the mainland. This sharing, sometimes called “regionalization,” is where neighboring communities avoid duplication of emergency capabilities by sharing resources.

Without the benefit of regionalization, the VI (4) must have more emergency preparedness and Homeland Security funding than similar communities because it must train for, prepare and assume more responsibilities. In addition, (5) preparedness planning must include the importing of mainland resources because there are no neighboring cities and states where personnel from other places can easily drive or fly from to assist.

Fortunately, most planning for natural disasters will benefit planning for terrorism and vice versa. This is sometimes referred to as dual-use or multi-use. For example, improved communications will help in the everyday emergency such as a car accident or fire. It will also help in terrorism. Another example is in the field of public health and agriculture. The same monitoring of traditional communicable diseases or traditional plant and animal diseases will also help track a biological terrorist attack.

This thesis begins with documentation of the VI’s emergency preparedness vulnerabilities from several perspectives, including an analysis of how the existing inadequate infrastructure limits and creates special challenges for emergency response planning. There is discussion of how the police, social and cultural issues, and the existing VI Government leadership create further challenges to any meaningful preparedness and response planning. The Territory’s existing preparedness plans are reviewed and evaluated, followed by a discussion of management considerations and then a proposal and outline for a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. This thesis concludes with methods to foster change and an Action Plan.
When compared against what is widely considered to be standard government operating procedures, the VI is seriously deficient in its planning and actions to harden and create backups and redundancies for critical infrastructures and systems, including communications, power, food and water. A weak, inadequate and fragile infrastructure make the VI a soft target, unable to protect itself and similarly unable to respond to a major crisis. The VI imports virtually one hundred percent of its food, fuel, medicine and oil used to make electricity and potable water through under-secured maritime ports. There are no roads to bring supplies from the next city, state or neighboring country. A shutdown of the ports would result in severe economic and life-threatening consequences.

In part because it is so isolated (one thousand miles from the mainland U.S.), a terrorist attack directly on the VI would have an impact more devastating than a similar terrorist attack directly on the mainland. In addition, the secondary and tertiary consequences that would result from a stateside attack are unique to the islands. The slowdown in tourism would have tremendous repercussions throughout the local economy, which is almost exclusively dependent upon tourism. It would also affect the larger national economy because the local economy is inexorably intertwined with the mainland US economy. A VI slowdown will have national economic repercussions. For example, most of the hundreds of cruise ships that visit the VI are based in the mainland. Most of the thousands of commercial airline flights bringing tourists originate in the mainland. If either of these stop, other economies such as Florida’s cruise ship industry, the nation’s airlines and all of their suppliers and support industries will be harmed too.

The Water and Power Authority (WAPA) produces two of the three most important Level 1 infrastructures: water and electricity. Telecommunications, which is the third Level 1 sector, requires WAPA electricity to function. Although

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WAPA has a more-than-adequate generating capacity, it is a single-location generating facility on each island. (The generator on St. John is intended as emergency backup only and is too small to power the entire island. St. John, like Water Island, gets its electricity from St. Thomas through underwater cables.) A systems failure at the St. Thomas facility would completely eliminate the provision of water and electricity to St. Thomas, eliminate electricity to Water Island, severely reduce the amount of electricity available to St. John, and thus limit emergency response capabilities on all three islands. Essentially then, damage to the WAPA facility, its fuel storage tanks or distribution system would eliminate all public power in the Territory.3

Equally important, because of its relatively small size, WAPA’s distribution system doesn’t have the stability of the larger power grids in the mainland United States or elsewhere. And unlike on the mainland, there is no power grid to import electricity from the next town, city or state. An essential component of meaningful emergency and disaster planning must include the protection, hardening and building of more redundancy and robustness into the Territory’s power generation and power distribution systems.

The vast majority of the employees in the VI Police Department (VIPD) are intelligent, hardworking, dedicated and honest. Nonetheless, the quality and sophistication of law enforcement suffers because of the same general complacency and social dynamics that exist throughout the VI government generally. The failure of the VIPD to develop an effective rapport with the community prevents it from effectively enforcing the law, solving crimes or responding to Homeland Security issues. It is widely acknowledged that the VIPD is under-trained and under-equipped. Law enforcement is inconsistent and sporadic at best. There are definitely exceptions, but the VIPD in general has a poor reputation. Because law enforcement is an inseparable component of

3 For St. Thomas, St. John and Water Island. St. Croix has its own WAPA generating plant.
Homeland Security, it is essential to any effective Homeland Security plan that strategies are developed and implemented to improve trust in the VIPD.

A review of the VI’s emergency and disaster planning documents obtained indicate that the quality of these plans is mixed. Some plans are well-thought-out and meaningful, while others are incomplete, based on inaccurate information and unjustifiably optimistic. There are more hazards than listed in some of the planning documents and the hazards identified are far more severe than reported. Some of the plans are theoretically sound, but many of them presume the existence of an infrastructure and support staff that simply does not exist. By nature of being on an insulated island, many people perform multiple roles – for example one single person might be all of the following: a police officer, a National Guard member, a Red Cross shelter manager, and a part-time ferry captain.

The most fundamental challenges facing the VI’s efforts to improve Homeland Security and emergency response capabilities are political and social. It is generally believed there is widespread government mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and cronyism. These factors are compounded by racism, poverty, stark and increasing economic disparity and poor education. There is also a large unskilled labor pool, lack of employment opportunities, a serious hard-drug problem along with a culture that largely accepts and promotes substance abuse. Perhaps most important is the absence of a sense of community within and between government agencies and among citizens in the community. These are the major inhibitors to improved quality of life, improved law enforcement and improved Homeland Security in the VI.

From a social perspective, the population of the VI comes from all over the world. Most, however, are from other Caribbean islands and many have remained unassimilated and isolated; the VI is not a unified community. Of course each island has its own identity. St. Thomas is different from St. Croix which is different from St. John. Yet even within a single island, there is disunity.
Many of the groups have their own meeting places and social and ethnic circles. There is very little intermingling and currently no unifying force.

The Governor must develop a broad, unifying vision for the VI that includes honest and open government, economic recovery, social healing including recovery aimed at uniting the community, and dramatically improved law enforcement. This unifying vision must include a broad view of preparedness for both natural disasters and terrorism for the Virgin Islands. Collectively this is Homeland Security.

The Virgin Islands should establish a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group (Planning Group) to thoroughly investigate the VI’s vulnerabilities and recommend solutions or policy options to “prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from incidents of national significance,” including natural disasters, the consequences of either local or mainland terrorism and a WAPA shutdown.

An after-the-fact, crisis-driven response can and should be avoided. We have the opportunity to acknowledge and learn from our tremendous wealth of intellectual capital and to empower our citizens. Advanced planning based on the thorough, open and informed discussions of the Planning Group can help lessen harmful consequences of a natural or manmade disaster in a way that does not trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy.

The threat against America in general and the VI in particular is real, current and cannot be ignored. An attack will be life threatening and economically devastating. When there is something wrong or inadequate with a system, those with the ability to take action have the responsibility to take action. The 9/11 Commission Report criticized the U.S. government for a “failure of imagination” in anticipating the 9/11 attacks. Addressing and protecting the Territory’s vulnerabilities is thus limited only by our collective imagination.

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Homeland Security relates, in one way or another, to every aspect of our lives and every sector of our economy. The Territory needs a Planning Group because of such inter-dependency; because the topic of Homeland Security is simply too broad for any one person or one government department to comprehend and manage. Homeland Security requires interaction, interdependency and cooperation. Everyone has a role.

A Planning Group will bring together experts from many and varied disciplines throughout the Territory. It will take advantage of the vast knowledge and experience of VI employees and citizens.\(^5\) It would correct inaccuracies in existing planning, and, based on factual realities, explore long-range, long-term and broad policy-based planning. When formed, the Planning Group will provide well-thought-out recommendations to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of Homeland Security and other leaders to consider for the development of a truly meaningful and useful Homeland Security plan.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I invite anyone with comments or suggestions to contact me at malperen@chds-alumni.org. Thank you.

\(^5\) In one sense, what is needed for the VI is reminiscent of the business concept of reengineering and “one way to ensure that reengineering has a cross-functional perspective is to assemble a team that represents the functional units involved in the process being reengineered…” Michael Hammer, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harvard Business Review (July–August 1990), 108.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank Robert Bach, Ph.D., my Thesis Advisor and Ted Lewis, Ph.D. my Second Reader for their invaluable guidance and advice; the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, its outstanding professors, support staff, library and librarians, and my fellow students. Also, the members of St. John Rescue, Inc., the St. John Amateur Radio Club, and friends and family who reviewed, commented and provided invaluable ideas for this thesis. I would especially like to thank the following persons who gave their free time to assist (in alphabetical order). Several chose to remain anonymous.


Winston H. Chen, Esq. Attorney Chen was an Assistant Attorney General and Director of the White Collar Crimes Section with the Virgin Islands Department of Justice. He is now a Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Law Section of the California Department of Justice.

Stephen M. Clark, Chief Ranger, Virgin Islands National Park/Virgin Islands Coral Reef National Monument.

George Cline: St. John Emergency Communications Coordinator for ARES; State Communications Coordinator for the American Red Cross of the Virgin Islands.


Barry Devine, Ph.D., Chief Scientist, University of the Virgin Islands, Eastern Caribbean Center.

Peter Dreyfus; Fraser Drummond; James Livengood; Tyson Reed; Selma Rockett;

Guy Shoemaker; Darrell Tasman; Julie A. Wolfe, Esq.
Lastly, attending this outstanding program would not have been possible without the vision of former Attorney General Iver A. Stridiron and the then Deputy Attorney General Alva A. Swan, for their initial permission and support. They recognized the need for this type of knowledge within the VI Government. That support continued when Alva A. Swan was the Attorney General. He was particularly concerned about the VI’s level of preparedness. The current Attorney General Kerry E. Drue has also reaffirmed the value of this education.
I. UNDERLYING ISSUES

The United States Virgin Islands (hereafter VI or Territory) is under-prepared for any major natural disaster and is even more under-prepared for terrorism. The threat against America in general and the VI in particular is real and current. An attack against either entity will not only be economically devastating, it will be designed to be life threatening. The potential for attack cannot be ignored. If there is something wrong, those who have the ability to take action have the responsibility to take action. If VI emergency preparedness is inadequate, it must be addressed by the local government and citizens before the federal government is forced to intervene.

The Virgin Islands must recognize that because of the characteristics of small island states, the Territory is fragile in relation to the effects of natural disasters and terrorism. Its economy and the health of its citizens will be severely threatened if there is a terrorist attack in the mainland United States. Any slowdown in tourism will have repercussions in the local economy because the economy is almost exclusively dependent upon tourism.

A nationwide port shutdown will stop the flow of goods, including food, fuel, medicine and eventually electricity and water. Unlike the mainland, there is no power grid so the VI cannot import electricity from outside of its borders. There are no roads to bring supplies from the next city, town or state. In the Virgin Islands, an attack on a cruise ship, Water and Power Authority (hereafter WAPA) or a blockage of the port will have similarly devastating economic consequences.

An “after the fact” crisis-driven response can and should be avoided. We have the opportunity to acknowledge and learn from our tremendous wealth of intellectual capital. Planning based on the thorough and informed discussions of a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group (hereafter Planning Group)
can help lessen harmful consequences of a natural or man-made disaster in a way that does not trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy.

A. THESIS OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this thesis is to point out how the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands (and all islands) is different from the mainland United States in terms of disaster preparedness and the ability to prevent, respond and recover from natural disasters and terrorism.

Chapter I documents the problem. It describes vulnerabilities for the United States in general, then for seaports in general because the VI is vitally dependent on seaports, and finally, it documents vulnerabilities specifically for the Virgin Islands. It discusses vulnerable borders, weak infrastructure, geographic vulnerability, and what I have labeled “systemic vulnerability.” One section discusses various ways the VI may be attacked while another details some of WAPA’s vulnerabilities.

This thesis attempts to answer the question of where are we at risk. What parts of our society and infrastructure are vulnerable and how can we fix them? Because we are not privy to the terrorists’ intentions unless they choose to threaten or warn us, we must rely on information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies around the world -- and on our imaginations. Included are quotations from leading researchers, authors and intelligence and law enforcement leaders worldwide.

Next this thesis shows how portions of the VI’s existing infrastructure is inadequate by demonstrating how several private, non-profit organizations and individual citizens fill urgent needs that are traditionally the Government’s responsibilities. Included here is a forthright discussion of how the police, social issues, existing VI Government leadership and perceptions affect Homeland Security.
Chapter II provides an in-depth analysis of existing VI and federal government preparedness plans, and identifies their strengths and weaknesses. Chapter III discusses mismanagement and how mismanagement harms Homeland Security. Chapter IV deals with change and proposes to create a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. Change will require leadership and community involvement. Other required changes include increased federal level law enforcement intervention, improving the VIPD, fostering a sense of community and enacting The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. The Planning Group will correct the inaccuracies in existing preparedness plans and take advantage of the wealth of knowledge and experience in these islands. It proposes a wide range of contributors and will be completely open and participatory. The public will be welcome. The press will be invited. One goal is to empower our citizens to participate in their government and in fundamental decisions that will affect the Virgin Islands for the next century. Chapter V is an Action Plan that lists several things we can do immediately.

B. BACKGROUND

Three main islands comprise the U.S. Virgin Islands. St. Croix is physically the largest and has a population of approximately 45,000. St. John is the smallest with approximately 5,000 residents and St, Thomas has approximately 55,000 residents. All of these islands have a daily or weekly influx of tourists. Other inhabited islands include Water Island and Lovongo Cay.
Virtually all food, over-the-counter medicines and fuel are currently brought to the U.S. Virgin Islands via port-based shipping. If this stops, it is estimated that stored food supplies and over-the-counter medicines will be exhausted in four weeks, not considering hoarding. Prescription medication usually arrives by air and thus will not be affected the same way as port shipping, except to the extent that manufacturers and distributors themselves rely on containers. If air shipment is not an option, locally available prescription drug alternatives and substitutes will help keep the medicine supply viable for approximately two weeks, but because some pharmacy products are ordered or reordered on a daily basis, these might begin to diminish immediately.

According to the 2000 Census, the U.S. Virgin Islands has a population of 108,612. (July 2004 estimate is 108,775.) (This number is misleading and low because it counts residents, not the tourists.)

Of that number, only 274 people (0.6 percent of the population) are engaged in farming, fishing and forestry. Only 11.76% of the total land is arable and permanent crops use 2.94% of the total land. One percent of the gross domestic product can be traced to agriculture.

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6 Terry Buder (Owner, Quality Food Corp., St. Thomas, VI) and Chuck Gidley (Chief of Operations), interview, 1/5/05.
7 Heidi Coyle (Owner, Chelsea Drug Store, St. John, VI), interview, 1/6/05.
9 Buder and Gidley, Interview.
10 Coyle, Interview.
11 Coyle, Interview.
16 Ibid., 5.
There are 247 farms in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Most are small (fewer than three acres), individually owned and earn less than $1,199.00 a year.\textsuperscript{17} Electricity is produced solely by oil and although there is a refinery on St. Croix, crude oil is imported by ship. The 2001 estimate for oil consumption is 66,000 barrels a day.\textsuperscript{18} Lastly, “[t]he two drivers of the U.S. Virgin Islands economy are commodity exports and tourism.”\textsuperscript{19} Both of these are dependent upon ports.

C. DOCUMENTING THE PROBLEM – RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES

1. America is at Risk

We live in a dangerous world. Thousands of people all over the globe would like to bankrupt the United States, demolish our way of life, and kill us. Al Qaeda still exists but now more than ever it exists in theory rather than as an organized, hierarchical entity. It has changed into an ideology comprising many different groups and that increases the danger because there is no one center of activity, no focal point, no place for us to go and attack. A large part of American society does not believe these groups are dangerous or concern themselves with the problem. A large part of the VI does not either and based on what is discussed in this thesis, neither does the VI leadership.

Some may ask, why would someone attack the VI? We are so small. We have always recovered from natural disasters before.\textsuperscript{20} The threat is real! On

\textsuperscript{17} 1997 Virgin Islands Census of Agriculture, Tables 1, 2, 5, 6, 17 and 19, http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/index1997.htm, (accessed 3/16/06).


\textsuperscript{20} “The West Indian is not exactly hostile to change, but he is not much inclined to believe in it. This comes from a piece of wisdom that his climate of eternal summer teaches him. It is that, under all the parade of human effort and noise, today is like yesterday, and tomorrow is like today; that existence is a wheel of recurring patterns from which no one escapes; that all anybody does in this life is live for a while and then die for good, without finding out much; and that therefore the idea is to take things easy and enjoy the passing time under the sun.” Herman Wouk, Don’t Stop The Carnival (New York, Little & Brown, 1965), 4.
February 6, 2006, our own Virgin Islands National Guard Adjutant General Eddy L. Charles referred to "the inevitable threat of terrorism." 21

I quote extensively throughout this thesis from writers who are more expert than I am in their fields and because they express themselves eloquently and powerfully. It is my hope that if enough people say it in different ways, more of those reading this thesis will learn to appreciate the danger we face. The first sentence of the first quotation, below, is to me very powerful and that is why it is first. It is difficult to comprehend such powerful hatred. It is difficult to comprehend that there is such a thing as a god who could be so vengeful and it is difficult to believe that this god sends forth killers who believe killing leads to better things. But it is true.

[Our] opponents [are] suffused with a vision of a vengeful god whom they serve as executioners, men who regard death as a promotion and disdain the humane coexistence for which we stand…[Our] future will not be peaceful. We are in the early stages of a third world war. This conflict may occasionally involve standing armies on both sides, but, more often, it will be fought asymmetrically, as in Iraq or Manhattan, with our enemies seeking to avoid our military strengths while capitalizing on the vulnerabilities inherent in a free society… 22

After spending trillions of dollars on high-tech armaments, the United States finds itself confounded by a dirt-cheap weapon of genius: The suicide bomber. The ultimate precision weapon and genuine “smart bomb,” the suicide bomber is hard to deter and exasperatingly difficult to defeat….impassioned faith still trumps microchips. Armed with a fervent belief in his god's appetite for blood, the suicide bomber can dominate headlines around the world with a few pounds of explosives … Except for 9/11, suicide bombers have conducted their missions abroad. That's going to change, but it's a credit to the patriotism and decency of American Muslims that none of our fellow citizens has strapped on a bomb and walked into a Wal-Mart. Nonetheless, our enemies will find a

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way to bring their deadly campaign back to our doorsteps. The suicide bomber is so powerful a weapon that not even the terrorists have realized its full potential. We need to prepare for the suicide-bomber blitzkrieg, when murderous zealots come at us in waves.\textsuperscript{23}

...With Iran moving toward the development of nuclear weapons, we are getting dangerously close to that fatal point of no return on the world stage. Yet there are few signs of alarm in our public discourse, whether among politicians, the media or the intelligentsia. There is much more discussion of whether government anti-terrorism agents should be able to look at the records of books borrowed from public libraries. The Iranian government is giving us the clearest evidence of what a nuclear Iran would mean, with its fanatical hate-filled declarations about wanting to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. But send not to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee. Just last year, before the American election, Osama bin Laden warned that those places that voted for the re-election of the president would become targets of terrorist retribution. We could ignore him then. But neither we nor our children nor our children's children will ever be able to ignore him again if he gets nuclear weapons from a nuclear Iran. We will live at his mercy - of which he has none -...you cannot deter suicidal terrorists. You can only kill them or stop them from getting what they need to kill you. We are killing them in Iraq, though our media seem wholly uninterested in that part of the story, just as they seem uninterested in the fact that the fate of Western civilization may be at stake just across the border in Iran... The squeamishness, indecision and wishful thinking of the West are its greatest dangers, because the West has the power to destroy any other danger. But it does not have the will. ...People insulated from dangers for generations can indulge themselves in the illusion that there are no dangers....Debating abstract questions is much easier than confronting concrete and often brutal alternatives. The big question is whether we are serious or suicidal.\textsuperscript{24}

Claims that al Qaeda will again strike the United States come from the highest levels of government, leading researchers and writers. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss, addressing the U.S. Senate


Intelligence Committee on February 16, 2005, stated, “It may be only a matter of time before al Qaeda or other groups attempt to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons.”25 It is, thus, not if, but when. According to a March 2, 2005, statement by Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, al Qaeda has clearly stated its intention to use biological weapons, it has posted instructions on how to make these weapons on the Internet and Iraq has become the breeding ground for terrorist groups.26 South African Police Commissioner Jackie Seleb, speaking of biological weapons, said, “This is not science fiction, but a call for urgent prevention.”27

Even more recently, on January 20, 2006, the nation’s top law enforcement officials warned that al Qaeda may have plotters already inside the United States.28 Senior U.S. intelligence analyst and author of *Imperial Hubris*, Michael Scheuer, said

I write this book then, with a pressing certainty that al Qaeda will attack the Continental United States again, that its next strike will be more damaging than that of 11 September 2001, and could include use of weapons of mass destruction.29

Terrorists are seeking nuclear and biological weapons outside the United States, but they long to use them here.30

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Unfortunately, other suicide bombers are likely to follow those who struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, by attacking targets in the United States. Even before 9/11, suicide attacks had either been contemplated or planned but thwarted…. Four years before 9/11, two Palestinians plotted a suicide bombing of the New York City Subway. Their plan was foiled when an informant tipped off police…The spread of suicide terrorists worldwide suggests that the United States will not remain immune from this threat.31

Al Qaeda is likely to select its targets based on the following three criteria: Targets that are recognized symbols of U.S. life and power, targets that will result in mass casualties and thus spread fear and panic, and targets whose destruction will negatively impact the U.S. economy.

The threat is broad. “Terrorists can turn aircraft into cruise missiles (as in the 9/11 attacks) or boats into torpedoes (as in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole).”32 The threat includes more than bombs. Radio Frequency Weapons (RFWs) are a developing threat. An August 2005 report says,

RFWs have already been used to defeat security systems, commit robberies, disable police communications, induce fires, and disrupt banking computers. Improvised RFWs have been demonstrated to jam satellites, cause a catastrophic failure in a locomotive and damage automobiles. Devices that can be used as RFWs have unintentionally caused aircraft crashes and near crashes, pipeline explosions, large gas spills, computer damage, medical equipment malfunctions, vehicle malfunctions such as severe braking problems, [military] weapons pre-ignition and explosions, and public water system malfunctions…33


32 Hoffman et al., “Preparing for Suicide Terrorism,” 2.

On February 28, 2005, the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee wrote:

The IT infrastructure is highly vulnerable to premeditated attacks with potentially catastrophic effects. Thus it is a prime target for cyber terrorism as well as criminal acts. The IT infrastructure encompasses not only the best-known uses of the public Internet — e-commerce, communication, and Web services — but also the less visible systems and connections of the Nation’s critical infrastructure such as power grids, air traffic control systems, financial systems, and military and intelligence systems. …Beyond economic repercussions, the risks to our Nation’s security are clear.34

One of the inherent problems of dealing with terrorists is that they do not advertise their plans. Furthermore, because of poor intelligence in general, we do not even know for sure what we know. On March 31, 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction said, “…we still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries.”35

These threats will be with us for a long time. “Like the Cold War before it, the Global War on Terrorism will be the work of a generation.”36 “The terrorist threat has been and will likely remain one of the most pervasive challenges that [the Department of Defense] faces.”37 [Antiterrorism] must be taught as a way of life for every [Department of Defense] employee - whether military, civil service,
family members or contractor. “We may thus be on the cusp of an even bloodier and arguably more sustainable campaign of al Qaeda and al Qaeda – inspired violence in the years to come.”

As there is a possibility that multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially, organizations should always consider the need to respond to multiple incidents of the same type and multiple incidents of different types, at either the same or other geographic locations, in preparedness planning efforts. These incidents will invariably require the coordination and cooperation of Homeland Security response organizations across multiple regional, State, and local jurisdictions.

The Gilmore Commission concluded:

[Panel members all agreed at the outset that it could not postulate, as part of its vision, a return to a pre-September 11 'normal.' The threats from terrorism are now recognized to be a condition that we must face far into the future. It is our firm intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats from other sources that the American people face every day - from natural diseases and other illness to crime and traffic and other accidents, to mention a few. The panel firmly believes that terrorism must be put in context of the other risks we face, and that resources should be prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks in a logical fashion.]

The many quotations in this section have the sole purpose of convincing the reader of the great danger we face. No one quotation is more important than any other. They do, however, collectively represent the most knowledgeable people in the field and the goal is convince you, by saying this so many different ways and from so many different sources, of its truth.

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38 United States Northern Command Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, 8.

39 Bruce Hoffman, “Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” Testimony presented before the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on September 29, 2005 (RAND, CT-250-1), 10.

40 National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, iv.

41 Gilmore Commission, Annual Report Volume V, December 15, 2003, I,
2. Seaports at Risk

The seaports of the continental United States are highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Such an attack will either be focused directly on a port or the weapon will travel through a port to its final destination. It does not even have to be a detonated weapon. Merely leaving a container of nuclear material or a biohazard in a conspicuous place could cause ports to be shut down out of caution.

If this happens, ports will be shut down just as the U.S. civil aviation system was shut down on 9/11. A local port shutdown will be followed by a nationwide shutdown, with a cascading shutdown effect worldwide and resulting worldwide economic disruption. Port-based vulnerability is a major concern.

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43 Winston Chen, Esq., email Feb. 23, 2006. Attorney Chen was an Assistant Attorney General and Director of the White Collar Crimes Section with the Virgin Islands Department of Justice. He is now a Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Law Section of the California Department of Justice.

44 Think tank reports and news stories about the vulnerability of America’s ports, shipping in general and the likelihood of a port attack abound and precede 9/11. Stephen Flynn was writing about this subject in the fall of 2000. Here, he describes a chemical weapon hidden in a container arriving in Newark, New Jersey.


A well-documented academic study concludes that our ports are vulnerable.


[A] container-borne atomic bomb detonated in a U.S. port could wreak economic as well as physical havoc. Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection with the Department of Homeland Security, has argued that such an attack would lead to a halt to container traffic worldwide for some time, bringing the world economy to its knees.45

Some might challenge the notion that an attack is likely to come through a port.46 Although no one knows for certain exactly how an attack will manifest, there is near unanimous agreement that an attack is forthcoming. It is not if, but when.

A report released February 21, 2006, from the New York State Office of Homeland Security provides an exceptional analysis of the maritime risk. It is quoted at length here with its internal footnotes listed immediately following, because it is so thorough and compelling.47

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The maritime threat is not limited to large container ships. Magnus Ranstorp, Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, said passenger and car ferries could also be targeted because detained al-Qaeda have indicated this subject was discussed several years ago.


A container attack is not the only way to disrupt our ports. Bell Labs conducted a study of "cascading impacts under disruption scenarios" testing how other factors affect ports. For example, ports require electricity and therefore implicate the power grid system. If there is no electricity, there is no way to operate electric machinery and lighting. Communications is also vitally important. Drop-off and pick-up coordination happens via the telecommunications system. If that system does not work, the port will not function properly. Ports also require fuel, other modes of transportation (trucks and planes) and so on. Disrupting any one of these will also disrupt ports. Walter E. Beyeler, Stephen H. Conrad, Thomas F. Corbet, Gerard P. O'Reilly and David D. Picklesimer, “Inter-Infrastructure Modeling-Ports and Telecommunications,” *Bell Labs Technical Journal* 9:2 (2004), 91-105. Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).


As a result terrorists are seeking to exploit the largest area on the face of the earth, the sea, and has increasingly shifted their focus towards maritime operations. The maritime domain in particular presents not only a medium by which terrorists can move, but offers a broad array of potential targets that fit the terrorists' operational objectives of achieving mass casualties and inflicting catastrophic economic harm.  

The CIA warned as early as February 2003 that al Qaeda was developing and refining maritime attack capabilities. Recent indications point to al Qaeda's intention to intensify operations against maritime targets and increase strikes against shipping and port facilities as part of a strategy to strike economic targets.

British Royal Navy Admiral Sir Alan West, the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, has warned that we are entering "an era where the maritime terrorist threat is a clear and present danger."

Suicide attacks against the **USS Cole** in October 2000 and the French-owned oil tanker **MV Limbourg** in November 2002 are the most notable manifestations of al Qaeda's oceangoing threat. However, there is evidence pointing to al Qaeda's growing focus on waterborne attacks.

In May 2002, a joint Moroccan-CIA operation captured a four man al Qaeda cell planning to attack U.S. and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar using bomb-laden Zodiac speedboats. The operatives described to American intelligence officers their plan to acquire speedboats, load them with high explosives, and after a series of test runs, utilize the boats as "human torpedoes" against U.S. and British ships.

Furthermore, information gleaned as a result of the November 2002 capture of al Qaeda's nautical strategist, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, confirmed that the Moroccan cell was just the crest of a planned wave of nautical terrorism. Nashiri, an expert in naval demolition and sabotage, detailed to interrogators al Qaeda's strategy for attacking Western maritime targets. The strategy called for ramming underway vessels with explosive-laden speedboats, detonating vessel-borne improvised explosive devices in ports, attacking large cargo ships and supertankers from the air with explosive-laden small aircraft, and subsurface attacks by divers or suicide demolition teams, utilizing limpet mines (a magnetic explosive device used for disabling and destroying surface vessels) and other improvised explosive devices.
Along with Nashiri, coalition forces seized an al Qaeda maritime military manual detailing where to strike different classes of vessels and the quantity of explosives needed to cause critical damage.

Saud Hamid al-Utaibi, a senior al Qaeda lieutenant, integral in the attacks on the *USS Cole* and *MVLimburg*, is believed to have replaced Nashiri as the new al Qaeda strategist. Al-Utaibi’s promotion reinforces concerns by security agencies around the world that the maritime industry is a prime target for future al Qaeda attacks.5

On August 25, 2004, Stephen Flynn, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a retired Coast Guard commander, in congressional testimony before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation stated he had, “little doubt that al Qaeda possesses the means to identify those users of the maritime transportation system that US authorities currently view as low security risks and are fully capable of exploiting the many opportunities to intercept and compromise these legitimate shipments either at their point of origin or anywhere along the transportation route they travel.”6

The very factors that allow maritime transport to contribute to economic prosperity also leave it uniquely vulnerable to terrorism. As Flynn characterized, the maritime industry is “the soft underbelly of globalization.”7 Any number of major attack scenarios against the maritime transport system could result in massive casualties, cripple global trade and have immediate and significant economic impact.8

The security of our ports, sea lanes and maritime chokepoints is of vital importance to the United States. In today’s interdependent global economic environment, with more than 95 percent of the world’s commerce moved by sea, a catastrophic terrorist attack against the U.S. maritime industry would have a devastating impact on the global economy. Over 95 percent (by volume) of our non-North American foreign trade, including 100% of key foreign commodities (i.e., foreign oil), enter the country through maritime channels.9

Terrorists are believed to exploit this [registration] loophole to mask the ownership and identity of their vessels. The lack of transparency in ship ownership is a significant concern since most ships calling U.S. ports are foreign owned and foreign crewed. In August 2001, the Tonga-flagged *Sara*, which had changed names four times in two
years and flags twice during that span, was intercepted off the coast of Sicily with 15 al Qaeda operatives onboard all holding fraudulent Pakistani papers...

It is widely believed that Osama bin Laden has control of an estimated 20 merchant ships and crews.\(^{19}\)

It is believed that they play a vital clandestine role in the movement of operatives, funds, messages, explosives, arms, ammunitions and other terrorist-related material to al Qaeda cells strategically situated on key shipping lanes...

The maritime threat posed by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and sympathetic extremist groups is limited only by the imagination of terrorist planners.

Internal footnotes:


5 http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=532, [(accessed 3/16/06)].


3. Virgin Islands Risk Factors

The VI is at risk first and most simply because it is part of America. An attack in or through the VI is an easy way for bin Laden to attack America. Although the VI has just over 100,000 people, millions of tourists arrive every year. A slowdown or shutdown in tourism here would also result in mass layoffs. The vast majority of the cruise ships visiting the U.S. Virgin Islands are based on the mainland. The economies of the cruise ships and airplanes that bring tourists to the VI will be adversely affected, as well as each of these industries support systems for food, fuel, entertainment, etc.

The VI is at risk also because it is vitally dependent upon seaports. If mainland seaports shutdown, the Virgin Islands will be severely impacted and perhaps shut down with catastrophic and life-threatening consequences. For the VI, the consequences of a stateside port shutdown or interruption will be the loss of virtually 100% of all food, fuel and over-the-counter medicines because all of these items are imported through ports. For example, the VI “imports more than $9 million in fruits and vegetables compared to a local production of only $800,000…”\(^{48}\) It is thus *doubly vulnerable* because it will also suffer the consequences of mainland shutdowns or interruptions.

In addition, because help is not available from the next city, town or state, the VI must assume a larger percentage of the emergency preparedness functions that would otherwise be shared between communities and regions. Planning for outside resources should be the norm because the VI cannot take advantage of this Regionalization. The VI must lay the groundwork for, demand and accept immediate off-island assistance.

The Virgin Islands is an attractive terrorist target for four additional reasons. It has porous borders, weak infrastructure, it is isolated geographically, and it is an easy target. Osama bin Laden said his group’s goal is to bankrupt

America and economic recession in the VI following an attack would be one method for him to achieve his goal. Bin Laden said, "So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah." An attack on the VI is thus an easy way for bin Laden to attack America.

A vital point that distinguishes the Virgin Islands from the mainland is the reality that the Virgin Islands’ first responders will likely be personally impacted in some way by the same disaster they are supposed to respond to and may unable to help. These first responders have families and homes to take care of. After Hurricane Marilyn in 1995, “police were hampered … because the department lost 90 percent of its vehicles… [and] many officers and their families are sleeping in cars and don’t have a change of clothing.”

An excellent recent example of this problem was Hurricane Katrina where most of the first responders lived in New Orleans and “…were largely overwhelmed and unable to perform their duties…” In contrast, for 9/11 in New York, the vast majority of those first responders lived outside of the city and were not personally affected.

The VI will need off-island help because there is no town, city or state within driving distance! This requires planning beyond the typical staging of

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51 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” *Virgin Islands Daily News*, September 23, 1995, 6

additional resources/assistance because of the geographical complications of being islands with rugged terrain located more than 1,000 miles from the mainland US.

The next four sections elaborate on the VI’s vulnerabilities.

**a. Vulnerable Borders**

Illegal aliens land in the VI openly and regularly, yet they are rarely apprehended. The vast majority is not caught. “The Virgin Islands, and St. John in particular, are busy drop-off points for human smugglers…It’s not a big secret that there are organizations using the Virgin Islands to get people into the United States.”

The VI is thus at risk individually, and the mainland is at risk from terrorists whose physical entry point into the United States is the VI. The VI is “175 miles of unprotected shoreline” – it is a wide open back door! “The U.S. Virgin Islands are close to other islands, and are close to the U.S.;” ... “The

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54 Pancham, “Senate Studies VI Homeland Security Funds.”
geographic location [including close proximity to remote islands for other countries] is why many illegal immigrants choose to attempt to enter the U.S. through the Virgin Islands.55

After 9/11, it was apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of transportation are potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists and result in terrorist weapons illegally entering the United States.56

[T]he potential exists for a single individual or small group to cross the border undetected with biological or chemical weapons, weapons of mass effect, or other implements of terrorism.57

Indeed, a person could already be sick with a deadly contagion before ever crossing the border. The mainland or national counter-terrorism consequences of porous borders in the VI are twofold: (1) it is easy to enter the Territory, and (2) once in the VI, a terrorist has his or her proverbial foot in the door and may more easily infiltrate the U.S. mainland.

An ever-present threat exists from the potential for terrorists to employ the same smuggling and transportation networks, infrastructure, drop houses, and other support and then use these masses of illegal aliens as ‘cover’ for a successful cross-border penetration.58

b. Weak Infrastructure

Based on my personal observations, research, and having been a first responder in the VI for seven years, it is apparent the VI has weak and

inadequate infrastructure, including law enforcement and security, it is a soft
target, unable to protect itself and similarly unable to respond to a major crisis.

In the VI, even something as mundane as a multi-car accident
exhausts every aspect of emergency response capability, including police, fire,
emergency medical services and communications. On St. Thomas, there is
sometimes only one government ambulance on duty for the entire island of
55,000, not counting tourists. On St. John, there is always only one government
ambulance on duty. A direct attack causing more damage than a car accident
would have devastating economic consequences in the VI, ripple effects
nationwide and of course, nationwide symbolic consequences.

After Hurricane Marilyn (1995), there was widespread looting that
was only controlled by approximately 200 federal and state law enforcement
including FBI, U.S. Marshals, U.S. Customs Agents, Military Police and South
Carolina Police.59

In the VI,

[c]ivil disorder and widespread looting have occurred in past
disasters. VIPD has +/- 457 sworn officers, but may be
overwhelmed and need additional resources in a large event. VI
Port Authority has only 15 sworn officers to protect all key airport
and port facilities. Supplemental law enforcement resources must
be immediately available the first night post event. Abundant
portable lighting is critical to maintaining public security.60

Volunteers [with other jobs] perform nearly all Search and Rescue
work (marine/land) with very limited budgets and equipment. [VIFS
has no capabilities.]61

For firefighting and hazardous materials, there is no search and
rescue or EMS capability. VIFS does not have the capabilities or
resources for multiple fire responses; could be strained by a large
single fire; are under-equipped to deal with a high-rise fire, e.g.,

59 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” Virgin Islands
61 Ibid. (material in brackets [] is from page 17).
hotel or public-housing complex. There are no working fire hydrants outside WAPA-serviced areas. Tanker trucks are used… There are minimal HazMat capabilities Territory-wide.62

“The USVI does not have adequate equipment or trained staff to detect and decontaminate biological, chemical, radioactive or other HazMat victims.”63

VIPD’s radio system is likely to be disrupted in a severe event. The network relies entirely on Innovative Communications equipment, which is prone to damage. VIPA [Virgin Islands Port Authority) is severely understaffed for the large number of critical facilities it needs to support. VIPA supplements security during non-disaster periods with +/- 30 moonlighting USVI law enforcement officers that will not be available in disasters.64

“There are no USVI evacuation plans. The general perception is that the VI has survived major disasters without evacuations, so it is not a priority.”65

[The Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency, (hereafter VITEMA)] is responsible for all disaster preparations… Given staffing limitations, USVI capabilities would be overtaxed by a severe event and significant federal support will be required.66

ERT-A communications capability is very limited and contact with VITEMA, other territorial and federal agencies and responders will be difficult. VITEMA EOC’s on STT and STJ are vulnerable and communications may fail in a significant disaster. [The STT EOC is planning to move so this information relative to St. Thomas may eventually become inaccurate.] Extensive damage to air and sea ports could delay delivery of additional communications assets.67

The Territory Operations Plan (VITEOP) was last updated on 30 June 1999. Plans, training and exercises have been limited and new personnel will be challenged in a major disaster. 21 of 40 key

63 Ibid., 47.
64 Ibid., 17.
65 Every citizen must be comfortable telling a local officer the information they have who WILL pass the information up to the Intelligence or Homeland Security or Terrorism coordinator in the department, who WILL pass it up to the Territory-wide counterpart who WILL pass it up to the National level. Ibid., 18.
67 Ibid., 37.
staffing positions in VITEMA Territory ERT and ESF’s are vacant as of early 2004...STT/STJ EOC’s are highly vulnerable to strong hurricanes. None of the EOC’s is built to seismic standards. [St. Thomas is planning to move its EOC so this information may become inaccurate as to STT.] Territorial communications post-disaster will be inadequate and could impede response operations. The USVI Territory Emergency Management Council (EMC), headed by the Governor and supported by the primary VI government agencies to set disaster-related policies, has not been meeting regularly.68

There is no location on STT or STX that can be used as a Mobilization Center to support a large disaster relief effort. Smaller staging areas on STT and STX have been identified... VITEMA has no transportation plan to move, store or distribute requested items.69

c. Geographic Vulnerability

The VI, because it is comprised of small islands more than 1,000 miles from the continental United States, is vulnerable to terrorism in ways the continental United States is not. It is doubly vulnerable. It is vulnerable to a direct attack and it is also subject to whatever secondary or tertiary consequences flow from a stateside attack, what some refer to as "second and third order effects, such as the impact of a port attack on shipping commerce."70

For example, the VI economy is tourism-based, so a tourism slowdown would be devastating. The World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that 40.3% of all jobs in the VI are related to travel and tourism. This represents more than 18,000 jobs or one in every 2.5 jobs. By the year 2015, these numbers are estimated to increase to 46.2%, 24,000 jobs or one in every 2.2 jobs.71

69 Ibid., 56.
Also, nearly 100% of VI food, fuel, over-the-counter medicines and oil used to make electricity\textsuperscript{72} and potable water are imported through ports. A port shutdown would thus have life-threatening consequences.

Near total reliance on food import necessitates that ports must resume normalcy within 7 to 14 days after the disaster, before on-island food supplies are depleted... Loss of electricity and resultant loss in refrigeration and water would intensify the needs for food, so would the loss of gas and electricity for cooking.\textsuperscript{73}

Most of the marine piers are not designed to withstand seismic activity [, they] may be damaged by tsunamis, tidal surge and/or floating debris [and] piers may not be accessible due to harbor debris.\textsuperscript{74}

d. Systemic Vulnerability

The VI is vulnerable because much of the rest of the United States is better protected, with better infrastructure, a more connected and perhaps a more vigilant community and with help as near as the next town, city or state.

A draft version of the Virgin Islands Health Department’s \textit{Bioterrorism Response Plan} described the situation this way:

Vulnerability of the Population

Preparedness and sustainability in the event of an emergency due to a bioterrorist attack is crucial for any jurisdiction, but is even more so for the USVI for the following reasons:

- The USVI is located in the Caribbean’s hurricane belt which puts its population, buildings and other physical structures at high risk for catastrophic damage from tropical storm systems.


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 65.
• The Hovensa Oil Refinery, the largest oil refinery in the Western Hemisphere, is located on the island of St. Croix and offers another highly visible target for a terrorist attack.

• The vibrant tourist industry with airlines and cruise ships transporting passengers to and from the U.S. mainland and other neighboring Caribbean islands is a potential target for terrorism.

• In the event of a bioterrorist attack on the USVI, the nearest outside emergency response assistance is at least five hours away. In addition, 2.5 percent of the USVI population (about 4000 people), travel daily between the territory’s islands. This daily commuting can potentially foster the spread of a bioterrorism agent and challenge efforts to contain it.

• The USVI is a combination of islands with 40 miles of ocean separating the two main islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas. Inter-island coordination of emergency response activities will be severely challenged because of this fact.75

The final version of the *Bioterrorism Response Plan*, made the following “assumptions” for a hurricane:

1. Few deaths and critical injuries are expected, except if accompanied by flooding, in which case drowning may occur.

2. Damage to medical and health care facilities.

3. Closed ports of entry, preventing normal evacuation and transport of goods.

4. Possible epidemic following the event, due to the breakdown in general sanitation and infrastructure, to include potable water, sewage disposal and proper storage of food supplies.

5. All four islands could be isolated for a period ranging from few to many hours.

6. Tidal surge usually accompanies hurricanes; therefore, low lying and oceanfront areas and facilities need to be prepared for flooding — sandbagging, protecting equipment, etc. - and may need to be evacuated."76

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75 The document *Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan* may have been a draft version of the *Bioterrorism Response Plan* but I was not able to confirm that. The quoted section is from *Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan rev.doc*, “Section II: Situations and Assumptions,” unnumbered pages.

76 *Department of Public Health’s Bioterrorism Response Plan*, “Section II: Situations and Assumptions,” unnumbered pages.
4. Direct Attack against the Virgin Islands

a. Virgin Islands’ Targets and Methods of Attack

This section attempts to show how easy it would be to attack the Virgin Islands. Targets of a direct attack might include cruise ships. The St. Thomas-based May 5, 2005, Health Department Table Top Exercise, Module Two, envisioned a fishing vessel crashing into the side of a cruise ship. Modules One and Three involved a biological attack on a cruise ship. “A manual posted to a jihadist forum provides instructions for the cultivation and use of three strains of plague - bubonic, septicemic, and pneumatic - from the Yersinia pestis microbe, as a biological weapon…”77

Quoting again from the February 21, 2006, New York State Office of Homeland Security78 with internal footnotes at the end of the quotation,

A large ship could ram and thus knock out bridge abutments and block shipping channels, or intentionally be sunk outside a key harbor blocking civilian and military vessels in port.34 The lengthy closure of a military port could hamper the military’s ability to re-supply deployed forces. 35 …

As a targeting strategy, a successful attack on a cruise ship could produce high casualties; devastate that tourist industry and garner significant worldwide media attention for al Qaeda. Between 1992 and 1994 Ayman al Zawahiri and the Egyptian Islamic Group, now merged with al Qaeda, specifically targeted and attacked cruise ships along the Nile to damage Egypt’s tourist trade…

Ferries have been long viewed by terrorists as a target capable of yielding high casualties. Most notably, on February 27, 2004, a television set filled with 8lbs of TNT was detonated onboard the Philippines’ Superferry 14 by Islamic terrorists killing 116…

There is concern al Qaeda-linked terrorists will attempt to explode a ship laden with explosives or flammable material in a key port, canal or internal waterway, to cause maximum casualties, infrastructure damage and economic harm.

Internal footnotes:

34 Fay Bowers and Peter Grier, "How Al Qaeda Might Strike the U.S. by Sea", Christian Science Monitor, 5/14/03.


An attack on a ship does not have to use scuba divers, a bomb or a plane. "Any action affecting Virgin Islands tourists [who come from all over the world] would create worldwide headlines. Cruise ships could serve as incubators for any type of biological agent- i.e., a salad bar or buffet causing mass food poisoning or spreading contagious diseases that wouldn't be manifested until the passengers reached home, all over the world."79 In short time, the illness would be traced back to its VI origin. The economic consequences would be devastating to the VI and to the worldwide travel industry.

Scuba terror has already been tried in the Middle East.80 The Philippine military has captured a terrorist made submarine (see Figure 1 below) and a terrorist made suicide boat bomb (see Figure 2 below).

Al Qaeda has been training operatives in scuba diving techniques. Two of the most dangerous al-Qaeda-linked groups in Southeast Asia are working together to train militants in scuba diving for seaborne terror attacks, according to the interrogation of a recently captured guerrilla.81


Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the southern Philippines have trained as scuba divers in preparation for attacks on shipping outside the country, a Philippine military report says.82

Figure 1. Terrorist-made submarine. 83

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83 Peter Chalk, Ph.D., RAND Corporation, Sri Lanka, 2004. The sub was discovered in a shipyard in Phuket in southern Thailand in 2000. The yard was owned by a Tamil with Norwegian citizenship. It is the first case of an insurgent group (LTTE) demonstrating the capability to undertake underwater operations of this sort.
The training scenario used by the VI Department of Health during its March 10, 2005, Bioterrorism Conference was an anthrax attack during Carnival. A full copy of the scenario is attached. Other potential targets include

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84 Oak Ridge Associated Universities ORAU#12 Sri Lanka Suicide Boat, FINAL Version, PowerPoint slides received from Commander Michael Crockett, U.S. Navy, August 1, 2005.

85 VI Department of Health, bioterrorism training scenario, March 10, 2005. “The afternoon Adult Parade has an audience of 2,500. During the ceremony a truck driving along the Lionel Roberts Stadium and another along the waterfront a mile upwind of the stadium and the Governor’s stand release an aerosol of powdered anthrax. An invisible, odorless anthrax cloud is created, a third of a mile in breadth. The wind carries the cloud into the stadium, as well as to business and residential neighborhoods miles away. The truck is parked at UVI when the activities are over, and the drivers and their associates leave the country by aircraft. Nobody detects the anthrax release. About 5,700 persons working or living downwind of the area were infected. No one has detected or observed the Anthrax release on the waterfront, but nobody knows that yet [sic].

As the drivers and their associates are on the plane they call 911 and report an attack only at the stadium. After the call a bystander and police officer verifies that they saw a truck passing by releasing something, but did not have any suspensions [sic]. WHAT IS YOUR AGENCY ROLE HERE”
Hovensa Oil and WAPA. “Oil powered desalination plants provide 80% of the drinking water in both St. Thomas and St. Croix.”

Terrorists could easily use the St. Thomas/St. Croix seaplanes as a weapon because they land and take-off from Charlotte Amalie Harbor many times each day and there is no passenger screening. These planes fly so close to the cruise ships and ferry boats that a deviation from the flight path would crash the seaplane into a cruise ship or ferry in less than ten seconds, and the VI would not be able to effectively fight the resulting marine fire because “[t]he land-based firefighters of the VI Fire Service do not have the personnel, resources or equipment to combat a significant marine fire.”

The seaplane takes off and lands less than one minute’s flight time away from WAPA. Destroying WAPA’s single location generating capacity would eliminate all power to St. Thomas and Water Island and 90% to St. John. This damage would take years to repair. The United States Congress has recognized “a disruption of concentrated infrastructure could have greatly disproportionate –

86 For more information about HOVENSA, see http://www.epa.gov/region02/waste/fshoven.pdf. Also, HOVENSA, “1. Located on STX, third largest oil refinery in the Western Hemisphere with a maximum on-site storage capacity of 30 million barrels. 2. Largest single private employer in the U.S. VI, with 2000 direct/contract employees and 6000 indirect. 3. HOVENSA has a 45-60’ deep harbor, which can accommodate super tankers at two of the nine berths. 4. HOVENSA provides fuel directly to government agency and EMS vehicles during emergencies. … HOVENSA supplies all fuel to WAPA.” FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 11.


Another method of direct attack could be blockading VI ports by for example, sinking a ship in the harbor. The Territory relies on seaport-based shipping for nearly all of its food, fuel (including fuel that runs WAPA) and over-the-counter medicines. If the VI ports are blocked, we will quickly run out of food, fuel, medicine and power/water.

5. VI Water and Power Authority Vulnerabilities

The Water and Power Authority, called WAPA, produces electricity and water for St. Thomas and just electricity for St. John because St. John has its own water plant. Another WAPA plant produces water and electricity for St. Croix. Most areas of the islands, however, are not serviced by WAPA water, do not have fire hydrants and the homes do not have "city" water. The majority of all of the homes collect rain water in cisterns.

Virtually all of the electrical distribution system is an 'over-head' system with wooden poles...Over-head distribution [is] extremely vulnerable to wind/seismic activities. [WAPA's] electric generation plants have no seismic protection, and are located in coastal areas prone to flooding. [These] plants rely on #2 & #6 fuel oils currently provided exclusively by the Hovensa refinery.

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets identifies water, power and telecommunications as the three most important Level 1 infrastructures. WAPA produces two of these, water and

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electricity. The third Level 1 sector, telecommunications, requires WAPA electricity to function. Although WAPA has more than adequate generating capacity, because it is a single-location generating facility, damaging it or its fuel storage tanks, or its ability to get more fuel (the port), would eliminate all generating capacity.

If WAPA’s production capability is damaged or destroyed there will be no power, and power runs everything else in the Territory. WAPA is so important, so much the Territory’s most critical infrastructure, that without it life as it is known would cease to exist. Aside from the National Strategy indicating that water and power are two of the three most critical sectors, it is readily apparent that every aspect of life in the Virgin Islands relies upon water and power. In addition to the tourism industry (hotels, guest houses, restaurants and those industries that support them, such as food wholesalers, restaurant supply and taxis), other sectors (hospitals, telecommunications and education) also need water and power to exist. In the warm climate, food and some medicine will quickly spoil without electricity for refrigeration. WAPA electricity also runs the Territory’s sewage treatment plants.

WAPA gets all of its fuel from the Hovensa refinery on St. Croix. Hovensa is vulnerable from a direct attack, and also because it receives all of its crude oil from Venezuela, which has become increasingly anti-American. Further, the United States military is a major user of Hovensa-produced refined petroleum products and it is possible that in times of crisis, their needs will take precedence over the Virgin Islands’ needs.

WAPA’s distribution system is another aspect of the Territory’s vulnerability. Because of its relatively small size, WAPA’s distribution system

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94 The telecommunications industry in the VI, like many other sectors, does have an alternate energy sources in the form of small generators. Usually there is no more than two weeks’ worth of fuel and these generators are not intended for continuous and long term use.

95 For St. Thomas, St. John and Water Island. St. Croix has its own WAPA generating plant.

doesn’t have the stability of the larger power grids in the mainland United States or elsewhere. And unlike on the mainland, there is no power grid to import electricity from the next town, city or state. This has been noted by FEMA, above. It is also observable by the frequent power outages.

Yet WAPA is not crumbling. In fact, much of their wire and protective devices are less than fifteen years old. Approximately 80% is less than eight years old. Partly because of its relatively small size, WAPA has a higher ratio of ‘critical nodes’ to ‘non-critical nodes’ than in larger systems. This can and is being fixed by changing design parameters when installing new equipment and by remodeling the existing arrangements. Simply stated, the system reacts violently to even small problems because it is small and therefore can be dramatically affected by disturbances that would go unnoticed in larger systems.

And WAPA does have redundancy; it is just different from that in larger systems. Technically speaking, WAPA has a transmission "loop" rather than a radial feeder system. This means if something happens along the line, redundancy is accomplished by feeding the system from around the other way. Also, WAPA can feed all parts of the island from two or more possible feeders. This is in case a particular substation has to go offline. They simply tie the feeders end to end, so that the outaged ones would be fed from the butt-end of others that are still live (fed from an online substation).97

D. GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE IS INADEQUATE

The most basic role of any government is to protect its citizens. It is “the fundamental governmental responsibility to protect public health and safety.”98 This section demonstrates how the Government of the Virgin Islands is in very

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97 Much of the information for the section on distribution comes from a WAPA employee who wishes to remain anonymous.

important respects failing at that task because private, volunteer, non-governmental entities are doing what the government should be doing.

1. Private Non-Profit Organizations and Individual Citizens Fill Urgent Needs and Demonstrate Government Inadequacies

On the Island of St. John, two non-profit, non-government agencies, St. John Rescue (Rescue) and St. John Amateur Radio Club (ARC), fulfill vital 'normally-government-provided-services,' namely emergency medical/rescue services and emergency communications. These types of groups exist elsewhere in the United States, but the degree to which both Rescue and the ARC continue to be absolutely vital to the island’s public safety demonstrates the poor state of government preparedness and the weak condition of its infrastructure.

A third group, the East End Neighborhood Watch, provides critical border protection observations, information gathering and analysis. The East End Neighborhood Watch transmits this information to federal law enforcement. Similar groups exist on St. Thomas, St Croix and Water Island.

These activities not only document the inadequacy of the VI Government infrastructure, systems, planning, etc., but also represent the viability and importance of community involvement in public safety/Homeland Security. This section describes the activities of Rescue, ARC and the East End Neighborhood Watch.

a. St. John Rescue and the Amateur Radio Club

Despite full-time, paid, fire, police and Emergency Medical Services (EMS - the emergency medical technicians and paramedics) departments, St. John Rescue responds to almost as many calls as the paid responders. The VI Government does recognize Rescue’s value and provides financial operating budgets and occasionally major project allocations to Rescue in support of its goals. For example, the VI Government funded a $150,000 Rescue Truck and
$52,000 radio system for St. John Rescue. The VI Government supports all of the Territory’s Rescue Squads to varying degrees, but much more financial support is needed.

Rescue’s official mandate is to assist the Government’s paid EMS, police, fire, the National Park, VITEMA and the non-governmental American Red Cross. Despite its official support role, Rescue has become the island’s premier search and rescue agency. EMS is excellent but severely understaffed. There is only one two-person crew on duty at any time. The consequence of this understaffing can be life-threatening. Because of the hilly and windy roads, it takes an hour without traffic to travel from one end of St. John to the other. An accident at the far end of the Island thus occupies the only Government ambulance and its crew for at least two hours. If the injured person has to go to the clinic on St. John and/or to the hospital on St. Thomas, the ambulance is occupied for at least three hours.

To get to St. Thomas, the injured person is manually lifted over the transom of a boat and that boat then goes to St. Thomas where the patient is transferred to a St. Thomas ambulance for the trip to the hospital. On several occasions, persons injured on St. John in need of transport to the hospital on St. Thomas have not been able to go because there was no ambulance on St. Thomas to meet the emergency medical boat and take the injured to the hospital.

Rescue fills in when there are two (or more) accidents at the same time or if an accident overwhelms the two-person crew. Rescue is the only agency on the island trained and equipped for vehicle stabilization, vehicle extrication (Jaws of Life), low angle rescue and building collapse. They own a state-of-the-art rescue vehicle with state-of-the-art equipment. Furthermore, the full-time paid employees of the fire department and police department are not trained or equipped and do not provide these services.

Rescue responders are highly motivated and trained to at least the First Responder level, as well as AED, CPR and oxygen assist. Many are EMTs. In addition, most Rescue members, who live and work all over the island, now have “trauma kits” and oxygen in their personal vehicles and some have AEDs. Rescue initiated this decentralized approach to distributing rescue equipment to shorten the time for emergency equipment to arrive at a scene.

Rescue and the ARC have taken the lead in another traditionally government area, public safety communications. Public safety communications in the VI are unreliable, with many radio dead zones, caused in part by the mountainous terrain. Rescue is the only agency on St. John that can communicate by radio from one end of the island to the other. The police cannot communicate across this distance and EMS loses communications a few minutes’ drive from their base. There is also poor cell-phone communications on many parts of the island.

The line between Rescue and ARC is clear, but increased cooperation, the relationship between emergency services and emergency communication, and the fact that many Rescue members are now ARC members and vice versa, has blurred the distinction. Working in conjunction with the National Park Service radio communications director and ham radio operators both on-island and stateside, and drawing from existing systems already in use, St. John Rescue and the ARC have designed a radio system using “cross-band repeaters.” This system gives Rescue the first complete island-wide radio communications of any agency in the Territory.

b. The St. John Amateur Radio Club

The St. John Amateur Radio Club is an all-volunteer group of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensed amateur radio operators. Many members of the ARC also belong to the national group known as ARES (Amateur Radio Emergency Service), whose primary objective is to provide back-up radio communications when needed. Examples of ARES involvement in
national emergencies include activation after the September 11th terrorist attacks, during the 2003 East Coast power outage and during the 2003 forest fires in California and other western states.

In the Virgin Islands, ARES communication support has been provided to the Virgin Islands Government, VITEMA and the Red Cross, as well as for community activities such as the 8 Tuff Miles road race and the annual Love City Triathlon.

ARES members are FCC licensed to use a variety of radio frequencies for both short-range and long-range communications. ARES fills a vital need for communications following major disasters, and was the only radio service on St. John to work through and survive Hurricane Marilyn which devastated the region in 1995. ARES members provided critical government communications when the government’s systems failed. This included life-saving medical communications for the Myrah Keating Smith Clinic to arrange helicopter pickup for the injured, as well as priority and medical communications to Puerto Rico and the continental United States.

Other ARES activities include transmitting weather fax and slow scan TV weather pictures to boaters and transmitting weather data to the National Hurricane Center in Miami. ARES has proven that it provides an invaluable and life-saving function to the people of the Virgin Islands.

E. THE POLICE, SOCIAL ISSUES AND EXISTING TERRITORIAL LEADERSHIP

Half a century ago, Albert Einstein observed, ‘The world we have made as a result of the level of thinking we have done thus far creates problems we cannot solve at the same level of thinking at which we created them.’ When one considers the changes wrought by technology in the last century since Einstein’s work, and the
scale of change likely this century, it is obvious that new ‘levels of thinking’ are urgently required today.  

Truly successful decision making… demands more than just a picture of the world as it is. It demands in addition a picture of the world as it will (or at least may) be. 

If 9/11 was a failure of imagination, then [Hurricane] Katrina was a failure of initiative. It was a failure of leadership.

1. Existing Leadership

The most fundamental challenges facing the VI’s efforts to improve Homeland Security and emergency response capabilities are political and social. It is generally believed there is widespread government unresponsiveness, mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and cronyism. These factors are compounded by racism, poverty, stark and increasing economic disparity and poor education. There is also a large unskilled labor pool, limited employment opportunities, and a serious hard-drug problem along with a culture that


105 During the current Governor’s first term, all public Virgin Islands schools lost accreditation. This was allowed to happened despite the Governor once having been Commissioner of Education and having a Ph.D. in Education.

largely accepts and promotes substance abuse. Perhaps most important is the absence of a sense of community within and between government agencies and as among citizens in the community. These are the major inhibitors to improved quality of life, improved law enforcement and improved Homeland Security in the VI.

The Governor must develop a broad unifying vision for the Territory that includes efficient management, honest, open, participatory and transparent


“Editor’s Note: Dr. Cora Christian was the founder of the Virgin Islands Medical Institute and functions as the medical director as well as the chief medical consultant at Hovensa, LLC. She is on the boards of the National AARP; Interfaith Coalition, St. Croix; American Cancer Society and the Foundation of the University of the Virgin Islands.”

Senator Liston Davis, unedited e-mail dated January 17, 2006, St. Thomas Source, January 22, 2006.

“Senator Liston Davis, member of the Committee on Education, Culture and Youth said that the latest revelation that our local Education Department has returned an additional $2.1 million in unused federal funds is further indication that the department lacks competent leadership.

‘Especially in this meager guava crop when our Education Department has already had to forego tens of millions in badly needed funds, it is extremely disheartening to learn of another $2.1 million that must be placed in the category of unused and returned federal monies,’ said Senator Liston Davis. Just how our Department of Education measures up under the present Commissioner is evident by the fact that whilst on average the U.S. States and Territories returned $112.24 per pupil to the federal government, our local Education Department sent back sixty-five times as much to Washington, D.C.

‘We have the dubious distinction of being evaluated among U.S. States and Territories as the jurisdiction which has comparatively sent back the most education funds to Washington, D.C.,” said Senator Davis.”http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local+Government&p=1138079605#continue (accessed 1/22/06).

108 “The Virgin Islands has an extraordinarily diverse population and broad range of talent. It has become increasingly evident that government officials are either unable or unwilling to tap into these exceptional resources. More and more we find the same officials meeting and talking exclusively among themselves as they seek to develop policies and programs affecting our community.” John deJongh, “The Community Needs to Be Consulted in Problem Solving,” St. Thomas Source, 22 July 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Op-ed&p=1105686492 (accessed 12/13/05).

“Editor’s Note: John deJongh is a former Finance commissioner, was a special assistant to Gov. Alexander Farrelly and primary author of the Five Year Operating and Strategic Financial Plan written at the behest of Gov. Charles W. Turnbull.”
government, responsive government, economic recovery, social recovery, an integrated community and dramatically improved law enforcement.

2. Local Police - the Synaptic Disconnect

Law enforcement is a significant part of Homeland Security. The failure of the Virgin Islands Police Department to develop a rapport with the community at

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“The Virgin Islands government, alas, does not have a reputation for transparency. It, in fact, frequently treats information that is public as though it were personal information – nobody’s business but its own…..The VI operates under the VI Code, title, 1, section 254, also known as the Sunshine Law. It is called the sunshine law because its purpose is to allow light to shine on ‘all records and documents of or belonging to this territory… or any department, board, council or committee of any such branch of government.’” Health Commissioner Favors Darkness Over Sunshine,” St. John Source, December 20, 2004, http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Editorials&p=1105679992 (accessed 11/19/05).


“Editor’s note: John de Jongh, Jr., served as Commissioner of Finance and Executive Assistant to the Governor during the Administration of Alexander A. Farrelly and served as chairman of the Economic Recovery Task Force and co-Chairman of the Cruise Ship Task Force.”
large prevents it from being effective in both law enforcement and in turn, Homeland Security. The lack of rapport prevents it from learning essential information about criminal activity and terrorism.

The VIPD needs Community Oriented Policing programs, committed, new and vibrant leadership, and the power to hire and fire at all levels to make this happen. It is important to note that the police unions sometimes obstruct progress and make this process difficult. That is an issue that must be dealt with.

The federal government and the Department of Homeland Security must also dramatically increase the federal law enforcement presence, including Customs and Border Protection. More important, the VI Government and VIPD must dramatically improve their relations with the community in order to motivate a concerned citizenry to participate in crime prevention and terrorism prevention.

Once upon a time, VI residents and organizations routinely reported illegal activity to the police as one would expect. This included illegal entry (border security) and common crimes. Routine practice though has changed in the past decade. Most individuals no longer report anything but life threatening matters because the police or Immigration (Immigration and Customs Enforcement for illegal alien matters) will not respond in an acceptable manner.

While the vast majority of the men and women in the VIPD are intelligent, hardworking, dedicated and honest, law enforcement overall suffers from the same general complacency as the rest of the VI Government. Law enforcement is inconsistent and sporadic at best. The VIPD has a terrible reputation in every category. “[The] V.I Department of Justice says some cases not thoroughly investigated or have improperly handled physical and forensic evidence.”111 The police are often unfriendly, sometimes hostile, and are not trusted. “I think the confidence in the police is at a very low level. I don’t think too many people hold

too high a regard for police responses…” 112 Senate President Lorraine Berry, who has served “a record breaking 24 years - 12 consecutive terms” 113 says "The public does not trust the Police Department." 114 Police use of deadly force is rampant.115

“[T]he answer lies with more training for police and a change in attitude…They need to recognize that they are public servants that work with and for the people.”116 “VI Police Commissioner Elton Lewis said lack of staff and inadequate officer training are factors that pose a problem in tackling the crime rate.”117 “I really believe that we have to do something beyond talk about dealing with the criminal activities that are impacting the community. And when police are involved [in the criminal activity], we have to be even more concerned, because


who can you trust?"118 "...the perception from the community is that officers demonstrate 'selective enforcement,' where some people are punished and others are just let go."119

The police culture is not aggressive or proactive. "Based on the VIPD statistics, only 4.7 percent of reported crimes ended in arrest in 2005; however, this grim statistic is an improvement upon the three percent of arrests for crimes reported during 2004."120 "While law enforcement agencies nationwide reported a drop in the number of violent crimes reported in the first six months of 2005, the Virgin Islands has seen an increase in every category."121

Often, the police exhibit little motivation to excel. For example, I have seen the police go to a nighttime car accident on a dark, unlit and remote road without flashlights. Sometimes, and with increasing frequency, they do not go to crime or accident scenes at all. Armed-burglary victims have been told to come to the police station to file their report. The police almost never walk a beat. Police cars have dark tinted windows and the officers drive with the windows closed so sound and sight are cut off. Any prospect of interaction is avoided and minimized. In response to complaints from business owners that police never stop by their establishments, a group of officers visibly visited downtown businesses en mass a single time in the fall of 2005. The newest wrinkle starting in late 2005 is the police are doing driving patrols at night, mostly within a mile of the police station. The officers do the driving slowly with blue emergency lights flashing throughout


the entire patrol. They just drive around town like that. This provides a long and easy warning system to any criminals that the police will be arriving soon. The criminal element has quickly learned this routine, making the patrols virtually ineffective. Not a single officer I questioned about this was able to provide me with the reason for this new tactic other than that is what they were told to do.

In 2005, local residents on the East End of St. John called the police to complain about a group of illegal aliens hiding in the bushes. The police made the forty-five-minute drive to the area, and without getting out of the police car, the passenger officer opened his tinted-opaque window two inches to say to the concerned citizens that they would miss shift change if they were to apprehend the illegals and then the police just left without doing anything.

Thus, the VIPD is often acknowledged by VI residents to be unprofessional and ill-prepared to deal with criminals. This is harmful to any prospect of effective Homeland Security. In addition, just like the population in general, the police demonstrate a lack of appreciation and awareness of the terrorism threat. Because effective Homeland Security shares a foundation with effective law enforcement, the VIPD’s problems have Homeland Security consequences. “The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, confirmed that all Americans share responsibility for Homeland Security.”122 Homeland Security requires collaboration, information sharing, networking and integration among and between the entire community and its agencies. This is not the case in the VI, however, because just as the citizens do not report crimes or cooperate with criminal investigations because of their perceptions of the police force, they do not report border security and potential terrorism and Homeland Security concerns either.

The VIPD did hire a consultant to improve their reputation and performance. To this extent, the VI Government has tried, with the consultant and the attempts at meeting with community representatives they chose, to

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identify problems and promote improvement. This is true, despite the general opinion that it’s much too little, too late, ineffective and that wrong and inadequate solutions are being advanced.

The VIPD’s problems are complex and include, like the rest of the government, corruption, nepotism, cronyism and lack of openness. There is also the problem of lack of education and illiteracy. These problems are compounded by the small size of the community, where the majority of the population knows or is related to each other. These problems can only be solved by new, high-level management. They are long standing problems and may not have originated at the top, but they are ingrained and must be dealt with from the highest levels. The Governor and his politically appointed Police Commissioner and politically appointed Police Chief lack the political will or the ability or vision to solve and heal these problems, instill rapport, accessibility and trust with the community.

I refer to the problem with the police specifically and with the VI Government in general as a “Synaptic Disconnect.” Homeland security should take advantage of the wealth of potential information available from the local community. Virgin Islanders would love to tell someone in authority about the things they see. VI residents are of course worried about the common criminals who may come with the illegal aliens; they also worry that terrorists may arrive with the illegal aliens. Residents want to incorporate counterterrorism into policing, but very little policing actually occurs.

Information is coming into hundreds of local eyes and ears but there is no place for it to go. There is only the inability to talk to the police – the Synaptic Disconnect. This is an information collection problem. The information is available and waiting to be collected by someone who will listen and act. Citizen observations and information do not even have the opportunity to become an information analysis and dissemination problem. Tremendous advantage could be obtained if the VIPD improved its approachability, accessibility and rapport. An obvious solution to those familiar with law enforcement is to instill a
Community Oriented Policing philosophy. Unfortunately, this has not been done. Law enforcement is to instill a Community Oriented Policing philosophy. Unfortunately, this has not been done.

3. U.S. Department of Justice Critical of VI Police Department

“[T]he majority of the VIPD's policies and procedures remain outdated...[and are] inconsistent with generally accepted police practices...”¹²³ The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, began an investigation of the VIPD in March 2004. By letter dated October 5, 2005, addressed to the Attorney General, Commissioner of Police, and the Police attorney, the U.S. Department of Justice listed several major deficiencies, including the above quotation.

4. Federal Law Enforcement

The National Park Service (NPS) operates perhaps the most effective law enforcement agency in the Territory. Although small and charged with protecting the Virgin Islands National Park and its visitors on all the islands, rather than with policing the urban areas, the NPS does not suffer from the VIPD's ills. The NPS continuously shows what a responsive police force could do for the Territory and its residents. The NPS enjoys great community support and has fostered a private, not-for-profit organization entitled Friends of the Park. The NPS could be a model for law enforcement, management and Homeland Security in the Territory.

Aside from the NPS, there are no Customs and Border Protection or Border Patrol agents to look for, chase and capture illegal aliens or their smugglers. Other federal law enforcement, including the FBI, ATF, DEA and ICE, are overworked, understaffed and not eager to handle yet another task. Add to

this a local police department that does not view illegal entry as a priority, and it is easy to see why groups of thirty illegal aliens can land on St. John, walk down the isolated East End roads, and disappear into the bush unmolested. This happened almost daily for approximately one month, thirty at a time coming from the same catamaran. Once on-island it is easy to assimilate into the population. (A careful al Qaeda would use attackers who blend in too.)

Calls to the VIPD are usually ignored and ICE may send over an agent a few days later to investigate. Neither the illegal nor the smuggler is apprehended and this can result in easy entry into the United States for terrorists. Eventually, after a month of this and increasingly vocal complaints, there was the successful federal intervention discussed in the section on the East End Neighborhood Watch. The daily influx of illegals slowed for a while. Also, raids of businesses to check for illegal aliens are almost non-existent because of resource constraints a lack of the will the act.

5. **Sense of Community**

The most fundamental problems facing the VI are social and political. These problems include poverty, racism, stark and growing economic disparity, poor education, lack of job skills and employment opportunities and the absence of a sense of community. The lack of sense of community exists both among citizens and government agencies.

The population of the VI comes from all over the world. Most, however, are from other Caribbean islands and many have remained unassimilated and isolated; The VI is not a unified community. Of course each island has its own identity. St. Thomas is different from St. Croix, which is different from St. John. Yet even within a single island, there is disunity. There are West Indians, Stateside Blacks, Continentals, Caucasians, Down Islanders, Haitians, “Santos” (Santo Domingo), “Dominicanos” (Dominican Republic), Dominicans (Dominica) St. Lucians, “light skinned,” “clear skinned,” Frenchies (from French ancestors, usually white), etc. People are commonly described in this racial or ethnicity-
identifying way.\textsuperscript{124} There is much racial and ethnic division, distrust, isolation and discrimination. As this thesis is being written, St. John is suffering from serious racial discord, allegations of hate crimes, and three allegedly retaliatory arsons.\textsuperscript{125} Rather than a unified community, the VI is a collection of unassimilated and isolated groups. Each of these groups has its own meeting places and social circles. There is little intermingling and absolutely no unifying force.

The various racial, ethnic, and nationality groups have differing family, household, occupational, labor force, income, and educational characteristics, are often residentially segregated, and engage in widely disparate and exclusive recreational and associational activities. These groups, for all intents and purposes, constitute separate communities and the relationship between them is most often colored by mutual distrust, misunderstanding, and hostility…

All Eastern Caribbean immigrants [to the USVI] have been historically lumped together, and had associated with them, the

\textsuperscript{124} “The territory has tried to ignore multiple problems faced by its children. The nativism, prejudice, and exploitation experienced by Virgin Islanders whose parents hail from other eastern Caribbean islands, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is rampant in our society. We have all heard the words ‘Gasso’ and ‘Santo.’ We have heard people insult the speech patterns and culture of these groups.” Whitney A. McFarlane, “School Violence May Have its Roots in Social Injustice,” St. Thomas Source, 13 December 2005, \url{http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary%3AOped&p=1131772991} (accessed 12/13/05).

\textsuperscript{125} Whitman T. Browne, “Racism Seems to Be Alive in Parts of the Community,” St. Thomas Source, August 26, 2005, \url{http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary%3AOped&p=1105687564} (accessed 8/26/05).


“This Is a Time for Calm Heads,” Editorial, St. John Source, August 31, 2005, \url{http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary%3AEditorials&p=1105687734}.


derogatory term "garot," suggesting that they were poor, unwashed and uneducated, a common stereotype of immigrant groups…

The USVI remains, nevertheless, a largely segmented society. Since race, ethnicity and national origin are the major lines of cleavage, they tend to structure all social relationships, creating a fragile equilibrium that is sustained by the necessity of economic intercourse but continuously threatened below the surface by mutual suspicion, antagonism, prejudice and racism.

Such an uneasy social equilibrium, thinly held together by the impersonal bonds of the marketplace, has both short-run and long-run consequences. It was in part the frayed community fabric and the absence of a widely shared history and cultural tradition (in addition to the severity of the destruction) that resulted in the outbreak of looting and violence in the wake of hurricane Hugo in September of 1989. Such a disaster, laid bare some of the long-standing cleavages festering throughout USVI society. It is this same frayed fabric that may prevent the successful resolution of the most critical issues facing the Territory in the near future. These include the issue of a future local constitution, greater local participation in the tourist economy and the future direction of this economy, the control of the business sector by minority communities (whites, East Indians, and Arabs), and the persistence of an underclass of black and Hispanic youth with little chance for social mobility.126

This isolation is akin to the environmental anonymity discussed by Philip G. Zimbardo as a breeding ground for vandalism:127

It is possible for certain environments to convey a sense of anonymity… The people living in such environments do not have a sense of community…That is one definition of ‘community,’ where people care about what happens on their turf, even to the person or property of strangers, with the reciprocal assumption that they would also care about them.128

On a Territory-wide scale, “[t]he National Strategy for Homeland Security… states that the Nation must develop ‘interconnected and


complementary Homeland Security systems that are reinforcing’…” Yet the same absence of a sense of community that exists in the general population also exists in the VI Government. Each department is isolated, with little inter-departmental cooperation. For example, the VI Department of Justice does not communicate with the Department of Education. The Police Department does not accept Assistant Attorneys General assisting on major cases. VITEMA does not exchange ideas with the Rescue Squads. The VI Department of Homeland Security is not accessible to the population. The VI Government needs to be more networked, seamless and integrated.

Terrorism-related intelligence is derived by collecting, blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. Successful Homeland Security efforts require that Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector entities have an effective Information Sharing and Collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, analyze, disseminate and use information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response and continuity efforts.\(^\text{130}\)

We must draw on the strength of our considerable network of assets, functioning as seamlessly as possible with state and local leadership, law enforcement, emergency management personnel, firefighters, the private sector, our international partners, and most certainly, the general public. Building effective partnerships must be core to every mission of DHS.\(^\text{131}\)

An intelligence fusion capability, sometimes referred to as fusion center or a terrorism threat integration center, is where information from all sources is collected and reviewed with the goal of spotting patterns and identifying potential terrorist activity. The VI does not have a fusion center. However, if such a capability existed, the lack of rapport between the police and the community, the isolation, the number of unassimilated groups, and the same lack of networking


within the government would make intelligence in the VI a collection problem from the very beginning. Citizens are reluctant to report information to the police if they believe that no action will be taken. Potentially valuable information does not even get to law enforcement. This information does not have the opportunity to become actionable intelligence because it is never “blended, analyzed and evaluated.”  

6. Born Here

Related to the isolation and absence of a sense of community is, for lack of better words, the “Born Here” syndrome. This is not unique to the Virgin Islands. It does exist elsewhere. It manifests itself in the perception of some of those who were born in the Virgin Islands that they are entitled to things those who were not born here are not entitled to. (In the British Virgin Islands, “Belonger Status” entitles one to own real estate.) The importance of this point rests on an analogy of this attitude - ideas that were not born here will not be acted on or considered. Homeland Security is too important to the VI to fall victim to this.

The lack of community does not mean people are unapproachable. The local culture is strong. By far, the vast majority of those who live in the VI are wonderful, caring and big-hearted people. It is a place where people say good morning and really mean it. “Good Morning,” “Good Afternoon” and “Good Night” is said in greeting, to open a conversation or just in passing as a common courtesy. To say “Good Night” even a half hour early will likely bring a terse “Afternoon” in reply. It is expected that one will greet anyone they pass on the street. This is so ingrained, even a menacing group of men hanging on a dark street corner will bring a begrudging “Good Night” in reply to yours.

Sometimes it is impossible to walk in public without repeatedly being stopped and “chatted up” by those you know. Certainly it is impossible to have

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this walk without many people saying good morning or good afternoon. Nonetheless, the social ills that are stated here are common, known and palpable.
II. EXISTING PREPAREDNESS AND ASSESSMENTS: WHAT PLANS ALREADY EXIST AND HOW SHOULD THEY BE EVALUATED?

Much Virgin Islands planning has already been done and several of the planning documents are reviewed below. All of the plans, however, with the exception of the Economic Recovery Task Force’s Five Year Operating and Strategic Financial Plan\textsuperscript{133} and the Law Enforcement Planning Commission FY 2004 Strategy, reviewed below, are operational in nature. There is otherwise no formal Strategic Level planning, yet I suggest that the Department of Health’s ESF #8 and Bioterrorism Response Plan, both reviewed below, have much of what would be properly classified as Strategic Level planning.

A review of the planning documents available for academic review indicates planning in and for the Virgin Islands is mixed. Some are well-thought-out and meaningful. Good examples are the \textit{Lucinda Millin Home (for the aged) Emergency Evacuation Plan} and \textit{Property and Procurement’s Disaster/Emergency Preparedness Plan}. Other planning documents are incomplete, based on inaccurate information and wrongly optimistic; there are more hazards than listed and the hazards are more severe than reported. Some of the plans do make excellent points yet many assume an infrastructure that does not exist.

A. HOW TO JUDGE PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE?

The National Preparedness Goal (HSPD 8) teaches that effective planning must respond to the broadest range of likely scenarios. The most comprehensive list of these is found in HSPD 8, encompassing the National Planning Scenarios. These lead to development of the Universal Task List and that leads to the

Target Capabilities List. VI planning should be judged against the Target Capabilities List. (More information about the National Planning Scenarios can be found in Appendix A).

B. TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that federal, state, local and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain. The TCL currently identifies thirty-six capabilities.\footnote{Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness, 7. More information about some of these capabilities can be found in the section entitled “Overarching Priorities,” which begins on page 10.} It is important to note that no single jurisdiction is expected to meet all thirty-six and interagency cooperation as well as regionalization will suffice. This means, for example, that any one or a number of the thirty-six capabilities can be satisfied if the next city, town, county, state, etc., has that capability in sufficient capacity and readiness to assist.

The Virgin Islands, however, does not have a next city, town or state so in this respect, the Virgin Islands must be better prepared to handle, on its, own, a larger share of these capabilities than a stateside locale. We must also recognize that because the VI’s First Responders will suffer the same consequences as the population and facilities they are to protect, some, many, most or even all of them may be incapacitated and unable to help!

\footnote{Also, see May 31, 2005, Version 1.1 of the TCL at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06).}
C. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEFICIENCIES AS TO THE TCL

The Virgin Islands is deficient at best and completely incapable of many of the required Target Capabilities. For example, commenting on only the first twelve:

1. Animal Health Emergency Support. There is some capability but certainly not adequate for any large scale disaster.

2. Citizen Preparedness and Participation. Because of the hurricane threat, hurricane preparedness is generally good. However, because of the other social and political problems discussed above, participation is very limited.


4. Critical Infrastructure Protection. With few exceptions, the Virgin Islands infrastructure is in poor condition.

5. Emergency Public Information and Warning. Nothing other than private radio stations and ARES communications.
6. Firefighting Operations/Support. Found by FEMA to be inadequate.\textsuperscript{136}


10. Interoperable Communications. Found by FEMA to be inadequate.\textsuperscript{137}

11. Medical Surge. There are plainly not enough medical and support staff, facilities, supplies and equipment. There is no planning for Mass Care.

12. Search and Rescue. Completely volunteer, as found by FEMA.\textsuperscript{138}

Another useful method to explain the TCL is to use the National Planning Scenarios, organized according to Mission Areas. The ‘Respond Mission Area target capabilities of Public Safety,’ are illustrative and the VI does not meet the objectives. For example, the Capability Description is to “reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area in coordination with HAZMAT, fire/rescue and law enforcement disciplines.”\textsuperscript{139} As documented above, the VI is weak in all of these areas. A copy of the Respond Mission Area - Target Capabilities is reproduced in Appendix B.

Also, several of the TCL items that the VI is stated to have some capability to perform may be exaggerated, because the person filling the capability is likely to be fulfilling other TCL roles that would be impossible to fulfill simultaneously.


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 17, 37.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 15-17.

D. VIRGIN ISLANDS TERRITORIAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (VITEMA) PLANS

1. The Virgin Islands of the United States Territorial Emergency Operations Plan (VI-TEOP), June 1, 1999

Preliminary Note: Throughout this paper and especially in this section, references to St. John Rescue are included because, as past president, I have personal knowledge of the issues discussed. These references are merely to demonstrate VITEMA’s interaction with the population and should not be construed in any other way.

VI-TEOP could have been much more of a planning starting point than it was had there been proper promulgation of the document encouraging people to review and discuss the proposed plan. Unfortunately, this never happened. The VI-TEOP remains largely unknown and has not been discussed, trained with or adhered to since its creation, despite the clear mandate otherwise.\footnote{140} Contrary to VITEOP’s Governor’s Letter of Promulgation,\footnote{141} there was never a training...
session or meeting. I did not “assist in developing emergency plans, coordinate emergency preparedness efforts, response and recovery,” for example, during the years 1999 through 2005 when I was the Emergency Services Coordinator for St. John. In seven years as a VI Government employee, neither my agency nor any other agency that I am aware of did “disseminate to their employees detailed instructions and procedures…”

The Preface on page 14 says:

The primary goal of VITEMA is to involve the entire community (private and public sectors), in the coordinated effort to protect people and property from the effects of those hazards (manmade, natural and technological) to which the U.S. Virgin Islands is vulnerable.

Page 16 states:

It is important that every member of the community have a clear understanding of the types of hazard that threatens the Virgin Islands and fully understands the significance of warnings that public officials may issue.

This is grand sentiment, but very far from reality. VITEMA has a limited relationship with the citizenry and has involved very few citizens in limited activities (i.e., CERT Trainings), and only then with the concerted assistance, including financial assistance, of the Rescue Squads. VITEMA has repeatedly alienated the Rescue Squads (St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. John), and has made no effort since 1999 to ensure “that every member of the community have a clear understanding of the types of hazard that threatens the Virgin Islands.” This despite the fact that “In 2002 Department of Homeland Security (DHS/FEMA) awarded USVI $145,000 under the Citizen Corps program to enhance the preparedness and security on the islands, especially to train the first responders in the Incident Command System.”142 Only some first responders have received this training and most of those who received the training online received it with no contribution (or expense) from VITEMA.

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142 Marie E. González (Hurricane/Earthquake/Dam Safety Program Manager, Caribbean Division, Department of Homeland Security), email to the author, October 25, 2005.
VITEMA does have some interaction with the citizenry. They visit schools to teach about tsunamis and hurricanes, they have literature located in public places (the U.S. Post Office), they set up tables of information in the park during hurricane preparedness week, and they do an occasional seminar. VITEMA schedules other public awareness activities as well. For example, in 2005 on St. John, they bussed senior citizens to VITEMA Headquarters during one of the government sponsored ‘awareness’ weeks, and provided food, etc. while they assured them that during an emergency they would be taken care of. A particularly good part of this effort was that VITEMA invited Rescue members too so the seniors could know that they would also be helping in an emergency. There is also the occasional public TV advertisement on the fact that we live in a hurricane zone and we should be prepared.

Despite its shortcomings, the VI-TEOP presents an excellent list of important hazards for the Virgin Islands, identified on page 14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tropical storms</th>
<th>Hurricanes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>Hazardous materials incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil spills</td>
<td>Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild fire</td>
<td>Earthquakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landslides</td>
<td>Marine accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation accidents</td>
<td>Public health disasters (epidemics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil disorder (Riots)</td>
<td>Civil disturbance (strikes, industrial disputes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Hurricanes and Earthquake are the primary hazards and carry the highest level of risk for catastrophic impact on the Territory” (page 17). With the exception of tropical storms, hurricanes, and perhaps floods, the Virgin Islands is not prepared to meet any of the rest of these hazards. For example, only members of some Rescue Squads have training in building collapse and there is absolutely no public or first responder training for earthquakes. An aviation accident would be made more catastrophic by the lack of ambulances, trained EMTs, and physicians, not to mention there being only one hospital on each of the two islands that have airports. St. John Rescue and St. Thomas Rescue,
through their respective presidents, have independently and unknown to each other, twice each volunteered their agency to assist the Port Authority Fire Department in any way possible, should there be a plane crash. In addition to more personnel, both Rescue agencies have fire gear, extrication equipment and medical training. The Port Authority Fire Department has never responded to these offers.

2. Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan

This large and detailed document is thorough in what it does discuss, yet important material has not been explored and there are several serious inaccuracies. The consequence of the omissions and inaccuracies is that the Hazard Mitigation Plan portrays a seriously flawed assessment. It is overly optimistic; there are more hazards than listed and the hazards are more severe than reported.

According to Section 2 of VITEMA’ Hazard Mitigation Plan, “All of the agencies that participated in the Hazard Mitigation Committee meetings had a stake and a vote in identifying and prioritizing hazard mitigation actions at the Territorial-level as well as for each major Island.”143 This statement of inclusion is not correct. Pages 2-7 list all of the public sector, private sector and non-profit sector entities invited to participate. St. Croix Rescue was not invited, yet they are so qualified that the U.S. Department of Defense hires them to teach rescue-related courses to the military and law enforcement of other nations in the Caribbean. Neither St. Thomas Rescue nor St. John Rescue was invited, although St. John Rescue did learn of the meetings and three of its members attended. The consensus of those three attending members was that there was nothing notable, nothing to contribute, nothing to vote on and they were not tasked with anything.144 It was not participatory. Further, “the St. John Public

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143 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, April 2005, 2-17.
144 Martin Alperen and two other members of St. John Rescue each attended one meeting.
Information Workshop…was conducted at the Marriott Hotel [on St. Thomas].”145 By definition this workshop was not inclusive because to get from St. John to the Marriott Hotel on St. Thomas requires a ferry-boat ride from St. John to St. Thomas with car or taxis required at both ends of the trip. Because this was about St. John and because there are hotels and conference facilities on St. John, it should have been held on St. John. Having the St. John Public Information Workshop on St. Thomas was certainly not inclusive.

Chapter IV of the Hazard Mitigation Plan entitled “Risk Assessment,” states, “The following natural Hazards have been documented for the U.S. Virgin Islands and have been assessed as risks for the purpose of this study. They are not listed in any particular order: Hurricane Winds, Riverine Flooding, Earthquake, Coastal flooding, Tsunami, and Landslide.”146 Despite the listing of six vulnerabilities of concern in Chapter IV, the Capability Assessment in Chapter III is exclusively limited to the Comprehensive Land and Water Use Plan, Floodplain Management, Coastal Zone Management and Land Use (zoning). This is good information, yet there is no mention of the capabilities of the other areas of concern.

Further, even though there are six vulnerabilities of concern, the Risk Assessment was limited to earthquake and tsunami; what about hurricane wind hazard, riverine flood, coastal flooding and landslide?

More important, the document’s table 3.3, citing “Regulatory compliance with DMA 2000 [Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000],” regarding the Virgin Islands capabilities to address hazard mitigation lists twenty-one capabilities in three categories. Of the sixty-three entries, forty-seven of the capabilities listed received a rating of 1 (“Potential exists to support activity but is not fully developed”), fifteen were ratings of 0 (“No potential relationship”), and only one

145 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2-15.
146 Ibid., 4-2, 4-7.
received a rating of 2 ("Supports activity to full potential of the plan, program or policy"), which was for the Emergency Management Council’s capabilities related to Post Disaster Hazard Mitigation.\footnote{147 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 3-29.}

\textbf{a. St. John}

An example of flawed data is the Mitigation Plan’s Table 4.31, Coastal Flooding risk for St. John and also Appendix I. For the category Hospital/Medical Clinic, the Table and Appendix list two facilities at “Very Low” risk for coastal flooding. Only one, however, the Myra Keating Smith Clinic, which is one of the best constructed buildings on the Island and is at a high elevation, is accurately assessed as very low risk for coastal flooding. The other facility is the Morris DeCastro Clinic in Cruz Bay. Cruz Bay is the westernmost area of St. John and is closest to St. Thomas. It is where the passenger and car ferry boats from St. Thomas arrive and depart. It is the “downtown” of St. John.

The DeCastro Clinic is only seventy-five feet from Cruz Bay Harbor and is at sea level and is thus very vulnerable to a hurricane storm surge. It is listed as very low risk for tsunami but a tsunami wave will travel far inland over the flat Cruz Bay. The Morris DeCastro Clinic is also a few hundred feet from the piers, which, according to Appendix I, have a “Very High” vulnerability to Tsunami. The DeCastro Clinic is so open and unprotected that it received a “Very High” for Hurricane. Since it is not on stable ground, it also received a “Very High” for Earthquake. The indication in Table 4.31 and Appendix I of VITEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Plan that the De Castro Clinic is at “Very Low” risk for coastal flooding is plainly contradicted by other information. Further indication that the DeCastro Clinic is vulnerable to Coastal Flooding can be found in the Mitigation Plan’s Appendix J because many of the buildings near the DeCastro Clinic are listed in Appendix J as “High Risk” for Tsunami. They include the WAPA Power Station, the Julius Sprauve School, the National Park Service Building and the WAPA Desalinization Plant.
Table 4.45 also has significant errors. St. John does not have two police stations. The Sewage Treatment Plant is listed as “Very Low” risk for Tsunami, yet it is at sea level, adjacent to a port and according to Appendix I, at “High Risk” for Earthquake Damage, “High Risk” for River Flood and at “Very High Risk” for Coastal Flood. For these reasons, because it is next to a port and at “High Risk” for Flooding, it is also at “High Risk” from a Hurricane Storm Surge and contrary to the Table, the Sewage Treatment Plant is at “High Risk” for Tsunami.

For the category Hospital/Medical Clinic, the Table again lists two facilities at “Very Low” risk, the Myra Keating Smith Clinic and the Morris DeCastro Clinic. The DeCastro Clinic is at “High Risk” for Tsunami for the same reasons it is at “High Risk” for Coastal Flooding, as discussed above.

In fact, if the vulnerabilities in the Mitigation Plan’s Appendices I and J are correct, then much more of the information contained in Tables 4.31 and 4.45 is incorrect, and much more of St. John is vulnerable to Tsunami. The Tables are misleading. The Police Station in Cruz Bay is across the street from the Julius Sprauve School yet the police station is listed as very low risk for tsunami while the school across the street is at very high risk for tsunami. In fact, the area encompassed by the buildings listed in Appendices I and J indicates that all of Cruz Bay is at “Very High” risk from Tsunami and Flooding.

**b. St. Thomas**

For St. Thomas, Table 4.15, “Hurricane Exposure and Vulnerability,” says the airport is at low risk for hurricanes. Further, Appendix I says the airport is at low risk for hurricane and very low risk for coastal flood and tsunami. The airport, however, is at sea level, it borders the open ocean and the runway extends into the sea. Stating it is at low risk simply does not make sense.

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148 The Coral Bay Police Station opened in August 2005. It is not staffed regularly or consistently. It is incorrect to say there are two police stations. The Coral Bay Police Station is correctly listed as “Very High” risk for Tsunami in Table 4.45, but it is not even listed in Appendix I.
Section Five, “Mitigation Strategy,” deals mostly with Land Use and Coastal Zone Management and makes an important point about this focus on Land Use, Zoning and Coastal Zone issues:

The recovery ranking was presented in Section 4.7 on an island-by-island basis. The earthquake hazard is the best example of a hazard that ranks higher in the recovery time ranking than the dollar loss ranking. It is, in most cases, prohibitively expensive to retrofit critical facilities; however, it is very cost effective in the long term to improve the quality of disaster-resistant construction by improving building codes, development and site plan review, and comprehensive land use planning.149

**c. St. John Mitigation Actions**

Section 5.3.3 is a well-thought-out listing of the mitigation actions applicable to the Territory as a whole, and also “Prioritized mitigation actions for each of the islands.” The St. John Mitigation Actions are repeated in this paper because only one of them has been accomplished (STJ-4) and the other (STJ-6) is critical, potentially life-threatening, but has not been addressed.

5.3.3 St. John Mitigation Actions

**GOAL 1: REDUCE THE IMPACTS OF NATURAL HAZARDS ON RESIDENTS AND PROPERTY**

**Objective 1.1 Protect Existing Development from Future Disaster Events**

STJ-1 Pursue Public/Private Sector initiative to resolve localized flooding problem on Westin Hotel property and adjacent public road. Several new, properly-sized culverts are required.

STJ-2 Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized flooding at Voyagers Restaurant where natural storm flows in the catchment area have been altered by construction and improper siting of structures.

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149 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 5-7.
GOAL 3: RAPIDLY RESTORE ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, WITH UNINTERRUPTED OPERATION OF CRITICAL FACILITIES AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES FOLLOWING A NATURAL DISASTER

Objective 3.2 Reduce the vulnerability of essential infrastructure and critical facilities

STJ-3 Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized flooding along Emmaus Gut that causes localized flooding problems at the Fire Station and Guy Benjamin School; both designated critical facilities.

STJ-4 Provide Alternate Transmission Feeder to St. John Substation. Installation and termination of an underground transmission system with approximately three miles of duct banks and underground 35kV, 750 Kcmil underground power cables from the East End Substation to alternate submarine cable at Red Hook. Loop underground transmission feed for St. John. Benefits include the rapid restoration to normal services and economic recovery for all public services and critical facilities on St. John.

(This was completed in December 2004.150)

Resolve localized flooding at WAPA building and treatment plant, while addressing potential secondary impacts to wetlands.

This refers to the wastewater treatment area. WAPA has a small generator across the street. Flooding in this area has been bad, closing down all traffic going to and from South Shore road.

STJ-6 Pursue joint Federal Highways/DPW mitigation project to eliminate slope failures along Centerline Road that periodically close road during major storm events.

The importance of STJ-6 cannot be overstated because the failure to complete STJ-6 can have life-threatening consequences. Minor rockslides are common and substantial road closing slides are, as stated, periodic. It is important to note that depending on where the road is closed, the fastest growing area of St. John, Coral Bay, and its thousands of inhabitants and visitors could be completely cut-off from access to medical care, law enforcement, emergency

150 Telephone conversation with Mr. Glenn Rothgeb, WAPA, December 5, 2005.
evacuation, etc. For at least part of the way, there is only one road to Coral Bay. If Centerline Road is closed in other places it could be an hour-long drive around the obstruction (assuming the only alternative, North Shore Road, portions of which are along the shore, is also not flooded or obstructed.).

In the past two years, landslides caused by heavy rains have buried automobiles and much other personal property, closed roads, required the extraction of private individuals, collapsed retaining walls and undermined the safety of paved roadways. While these were considered 'isolated' incidents, they are clear indicators of potential disasters waiting to happen.

Private individuals and volunteer Rescue personnel both requested the Department of Public Works to position backhoes on the east side (far side) of the island during times of heavy /long duration rains in anticipate of landslides to more quickly open up the sole east/west roadway on St. John. That proved to be a good thing, because the next time landslides happened, the road was opened in record time.

STJ-7 Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized flooding along Route 107 southbound at Coral Bay. A hydrological study of the catchment area is necessary to determine technically feasible and cost effective structural solutions to the flooding problem.

E. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) PLANNING

FEMA publishes an indispensable resource for locals and non-locals alike who would respond to a disaster. It is a rich and detailed guide of who’s who, what is where and how to find it, all geared to disaster response and mitigation. The Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, by FEMA (“the Guide”) includes sections on the VI’s geography, demographics, political status and key players, major employers, public safety statistics and commentary, the available response capabilities, critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities, shelter and re-housing and media. (Abbreviations used in the guide are: STT (St. Thomas), WI (Water Island), STJ (St. John) and STX (St. Croix)).
Despite the tremendous amount of useful information, the Guide includes inaccurate information regarding several important areas. For example, the VI Department of Education (DOE) is said to have “187,500 lbs. of food, sufficient to feed 20,000 people for 3 days, stored in 3 sites: 1 each on STX, STT and STJ.”\(^{151}\) A more accurate description of the available DOE food supply would indicate that such stores of food are not always available because the supplies are rotated in and out of the school lunch program. The food is consumed and eventually replenished. As of November 15, 2005, it was estimated that although St. Croix had its full allotment, St. Thomas and St. John were at approximately one-half of the stated amount.\(^{152}\) This date was still within the confines of the 2005 hurricane season and hurricanes continued well past the ‘official’ end on November 30.\(^{153}\)

Although the VI DOE is still a resource for food, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken over this function.\(^{154}\) A major vulnerability is that all of the USDA food is stored in one warehouse on St. Thomas. If this one location is damaged or destroyed, then all the USDA food may be lost.

Further, the Guide states, “[t]he American Red Cross (Red Cross) will position food in 12 primary shelters: (5 STT, 3 STX, 4 STJ) 24 hours prior to a hurricane landfall. ARC aim[s] to have 2 days’ supply of food for approx. 2,400 people.”\(^{155}\) This is not entirely accurate for several reasons. As of November 15, 2005, one of St. Croix’s three shelters had not yet been approved as a shelter. In addition, the availability of food stocks can vary because the Red Cross will

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\(^{152}\) Telephone interview with School Lunch Program, November 15, 2005.
\(^{154}\) Telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Young, Director of Emergency Services for the ARC in St. Thomas, November 15, 2005.
purchase the food from local stores.\footnote{156} Logic suggests that the Red Cross will then be competing with the local population for this limited supply of food.

The Guide lists other pre-positioned resources as follows:\footnote{157}

- **STT:** (at FEMA bunker)  
  - Tarps: 759 rolls (20’x100’)  
  - Water: 2463 liters for responders  
  - MREs: 126 for responders
- **WI:** (in FEMA trailer mid-Island) - Tarps: 112 rolls (20’x100’)
- **STJ:** (in FEMA trailer at STJ EOC) - Tarps: 304 rolls (20’x100’)
- **STX:** (in FEMA trailer at STX EOC) - Tarps: 280 rolls (20’x100’)

Puerto Rico: Following is a partial listing of the resources stored at the CAO warehouse. In the event of a disaster in both Puerto Rico and the USVI, [FEMA] Region II will determine distribution priorities.

- Generators: 112 (5kw – 500 kw)
- Tarps: 5608 rolls (20’x100’)
- MREs: 807 for responders
- Water: 4590 liters for responders

Even a cursory review of this information indicates that FEMA does not have adequate pre-positioned supplies. There may be enough tarps, but only STT has water and MREs, and these are allocated to responders. Similarly, the material stored in Puerto Rico is woefully inadequate for both jurisdictions (the population of Puerto Rico on April 1, 2000, was 3,808,610\footnote{158}) and there are occasions when the same disaster strikes both the VI and Puerto Rico, as with

\footnote{156} Telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Young, Director of Emergency Services for the ARC in St. Thomas, November 15, 2005.


Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 and Hurricane Georges in 1998. FEMA miscalculates when it says that in Puerto Rico, they have, for BOTH the VI and Puerto Rico, “supplies/materials for at least five days, which is the timeframe for the arrangements and physical arrival of a barge from the mainland.” 159 “Barging to the U.S. Virgin Islands from Port Elizabeth, NJ will take five days; from Jacksonville, FL, will take four days.” 160 This is plainly not adequate if the sending or receiving port is closed for more than five days as discussed above and does not include the time to assemble the goods before shipping.

F. LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING COMMISSION (LEPC), FY 2004 STRATEGY

I was privileged to obtain a copy of this FY 2004 Strategy. The 2006 version is currently under development. 161 The Introduction states:

This document will serve as the continuing Territorial Homeland Security Strategy (THSS) for the Virgin Islands. The purpose of this strategy is to define the ongoing strategic direction for enhancing regional capability and capacity to prevent and reduce the vulnerability of the Virgin Islands from WMD/terrorism incidents. This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordination, cooperation and focused effort from the entire region – citizens, local, state, and federal government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors.

This is an excellent paragraph that discusses the complexity of the problems and the broad scope of the Homeland Security endeavor. It also represents long-range strategic planning. It is an excellent beginning, has excellent goals, yet like much of the Virgin Islands’ planning, it assumes a physical, equipment, personnel, and training infrastructure which does not exist. Further, paragraph two states, “All populated portions of the Territory and municipal agencies within each Territorial jurisdiction were given an opportunity

159 Marie Gonzalez (Puerto Rico FEMA/DHS), email to the author, November 16, 2005, (Marie.Gonzalez1@dhs.gov).
161 Mel D. Vanterpool (Director, VIOHS), email to the author, February 16, 2006.
to participate in the assessment process." This is simply not accurate and planning was not inclusive or representative.

On page 2, under the heading, “Territorial Vision,” it states,

The Virgin Islands goal is to be able to effectively work in a multi-disciplinary environment to detect, mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a WMD terrorism incident. As well as to enhance capabilities through planning, training, and exercises that will include all disciplines.

This too is excellent and up-to-the-minute theory for Homeland Security. To effectively prevent and respond to terrorism (or natural disasters) is without question a multidisciplinary activity. Further, it requires networking and cooperation on levels never before seen.

Unfortunately, not much has been accomplished towards reaching the excellent goals. For example, from page 2,

**GOAL 1: (Prevention/Planning)** Develop and institute an aggressive Infrastructure Protection Plan

1.1 Request Technical Assistance to provide support for an Infrastructure Physical Security Site Survey to be completed as part of the development of an overall Infrastructure Security Enhancement Planning effort.

1.2 Develop a perimeter and access control system to protect critical assets, such as, the Legislature Building, the Government House, Department of Finance, and Water and Power Authority (WAPA) on St. Thomas and those potentially identified through the Infrastructure Physical Security Site Survey.

1.3 Develop a perimeter and access control system to protect critical assets, such as, the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, VIPD and WAPA on St. Croix and those potentially identified through the Infrastructure Physical Security Site Survey.
Implementation Plan: Design, Develop and Institute a perimeter and access control security system for identified critical infrastructure. Milestone for completion to be June 2004. Funding for this process will be continued from FY 2003 and anticipated FY 2004 DHS funding.

As of the date of this thesis, well into FY 2006, none of these has been accomplished.

Another example is found on page 5:

GOAL 5. (Preparedness/Response) Continue to improve the interoperability of territorial communications functions for WMD response providing for interoperable capability among all first responder agencies in a multi-disciplinary environment and the enhancement of the Territories 911 system.

5.1 Continue acquisition of state of the art communication equipment that will ensure a reliable and interoperable primary communication system that is user friendly.

5.1a Re-establish territory-wide early warning systems by September 2004.

5.1b Establish a written policy (MOU) with privately owned communication providers (including HAM) to disseminate information by March 2004.

5.2 Complete the territorial emergency communication network.

5.2a Develop a mass communication plan to sufficiently inform the general populous in the event of a WMD incident by December 2004.

5.2b Evaluate the existing 911 system to determine necessary equipment and training needs to comply with current OSHA and Homeland Security standards by December 2004.

5.3 Continue development of and implementation of the Interoperable Communications Plan

5.4 Continue improving mass communication

5.4a private communication
5.4b off-island communication
5.4c early warning signs
Implementation Plan: Implementation of this Goal began during FY 2003, and will continue to progress during FY2004 as additional equipment and training are identified. VITEMA is continuing the development of the Island-wide communication plan and anticipates completion by December 2004. Technical Assistance is required and will be requested to meet that commitment.

Government communications remains abominable! Only St. John Rescue has the ability to communicate from one end of the island to the other with few radio dead zones.

There is no early warning system. There are no MOUs with HAM (FCC licensed radio operators such as those discussed above for the St. John Amateur Radio Club and ARES). There is no mass communication plan and this is particularly unfortunate because an informed, alert, responsive, non-panicked population is essential.

The 911 system is also terrible. The local press is full of complaints about the police sometimes hanging up on callers; there are very few streets that have names, fewer still that have signs designating those names, and the houses have no numbers. It is an everyday occurrence that emergency responders cannot find the emergency. This is why St. John Rescue and the ARC are working with the University of the Virgin Islands to develop a geographic information system (GIS). Most troubling, it was anticipated in this goal that these would be completed by December 2004! (More information about the GIS System is in Chapter IV.)

The Border Security discussed in Goal 7 remains, as described above, non-existent.

Goal 8 on page seven states in part, “The VIPD is in the process of developing an intelligence unit to establish the first local law enforcement intelligence capability in support of the VI Homeland Security Council.” This is an outstanding goal but as discussed above, is absolutely meaningless until the public trusts the police. With the current level of mistrust and suspicion, few people will tell the police anything. Also, Goal 8 should recognize that the police
are not the only receivers of intelligence. Clancy Richardson on St. John’s East End, founder of the East End Neighborhood Watch is a perfect example. Included in the list of information gatherers should be the fire department, EMS, teachers, public works, school and public bus drivers and the general population.

We are all in this together. This would begin to represent the “coordination, cooperation and focused effort from the entire region” discussed in the LEPC Introduction. All of this also needs to be integrated real time and networked between all agencies.

Networked means that when the fire department observes something, almost instantaneously the police know, the Intelligence Unit is evaluating it, and all necessary responders know all of the facts to enable them to safely and effectively respond. It would be improper for Central Dispatch to send all first responders to the scene of a bioterrorism attack, which is what happened in this exercise. The Anthrax tabletop exercise is described in endnote 90.

G. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (BIOTERRORISM)

I obtained several useful documents. The Territorial Emergency Services Function #8, Health and Medical Services Annex, the Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan and the Bioterrorism Response Plan. After receiving the plans, however, it was no longer possible to obtain responses to questions. There is no mental health or psychological first aid plan.

1. Territorial Emergency Service Function #8 Health and Medical Services Annex

The descriptions in “Section III, SITUATION, A. Disaster Condition and B. Planning Assumptions” are excellent because they are realistic and recognize that no one will know the extent of damage until after an event and that there are a myriad of events that can cause damage. A full copy is set forth in Appendix C.
Several of the most critical statements from the Annex are presented here because they support the conclusion that the VI is not capable of responding to a major event.

III. SITUATION

A. Disaster Condition

The sudden onset of such a large number of victims would stress the territory’s medical system necessitating time-critical assistance from the Federal government.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. The Health sector resources within the affected disaster area of the Territory will be inadequate to clear casualties from the scene or treat them in local hospitals.

2. Damage to chemical and industrial plants, sewer lines, and water distribution systems and secondary hazards such as fires will result in toxic environmental and public health hazards to the surviving population and response personnel including exposure to hazardous chemicals, and contaminated water supplies, crops, livestock, and food products.

3. The damage and destruction of a catastrophic natural disaster will produce urgent needs for mental health crisis counseling for disaster victims and response personnel.

4. Assistance in maintaining the continuity of health and medical services will be required.

5. Disruption of sanitation services and facilities, loss of power, and massing of people in shelters may increase the potential for disease and injuries.  

This is a good plan with some excellent goals, but other parts of the Plan were problematic, mostly because the VI does not have enough people with the training, skill, equipment, resources, motivation, etc., to successfully implement the Plan. In addition, the people and organizations affected must conduct a Plan

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162 Territorial Emergency Services Function #8, Health and Medical Services Annex, 3-4.
exercise and this has not been done. The Plan drifts from being operational to being “the way things should be.” Either the planning needs to be brought in line with the available resources, or more resources need to be brought to it.

a. Specific Comments about the Plan

The volunteer Rescue Squads are a vital and necessary part of the VI’s emergency response, yet they receive minimal mention in the Plan. In particular, the Island Response Structure on page five does not state that the Rescue Squads routinely assist EMS in all areas. St. John Rescue is often at a scene even before EMS.

The Health Surveillance objective listed on page six is an excellent goal, but the VI does not have the resources to do anything like what is proposed. There is no one to do this work.

Section IV (D)(1)(a)(2) Health Surveillance

ESF #8 will establish surveillance systems to monitor the general population and special high-risk population segments; carry out field studies and investigations; monitor injury and disease patterns and potential disease outbreaks; and provide technical assistance and consultations on disease and injury control measures and precautions.

Similarly, the Activation of Health/Medical Response Teams cited on page nine does not reflect the lack of resources. These teams do not exist! The VI has absolutely no “Medical Surge” capability.

Section IV (D)(2)(b) Activation of Health/Medical Response Teams

Under the direction of ESF #8, teams of health officials will be deployed as needed and appropriate medical and public health (including environmental health) assistance will be provided.

In Section V. RESPONSIBILITIES on page 11, Health is tasked at number 4 to “Provide leadership in directing, coordinating, and integrating the overall territorial response …..” The problem, however, is that this is a massive
undertaking and there is no one qualified to provide this service. Task 7 is to
“Coordinate the evacuation of patients…” There is no evacuation plan!

Regarding WMD cited on page 12:

The VI Department of Health (DOH) is hereby designated the
territorial response agency for all health issues related the
response to an act of terrorism employing WMD. DOH will activate
technical operations to support the territorial response to acts of
terrorism. DOH may coordinate with individual agencies identified
in the territorial plan and with federal agencies as deemed
necessary. DOH [is responsible for]

- Epidemiological Investigations
- Agent Identification
- Threat Assessment
- Consultation
- Decontamination
- Hazard Detection & Reduction
- Public Health/Medical Support
- Pharmaceutical Support Operations
- WMD Support and Consultation
- Write and annually maintain the WMD Appendix for Radiological
  and Biological Weapons in concert with VIFS and DPNR.

The VI Department of Health does not have the capability to do this.

On page 13, the Plan gives too much responsibility to the American
Red Cross (RC). The RC is vital but does not have the local resources needed to
do what is asked of them.

American Red Cross

1. Provide emergency first aid, supportive counseling, health care for
   minor illnesses and injuries to disaster victims in Mass Care
   shelters, recovery centers, distribution centers and other sites
deemed necessary by ESF #8.

2. Provide supportive counseling for the family members of the injured
   or dead.
3. Acquaint families with available health resources and services and make appropriate referrals.

4. At the request of ESF #8, provide blood and blood products through the Regional Blood Center in Puerto Rico.

5. Provide coordination for uploading of appropriate casualty/patient information from ESF #8 into the DWI system within ESF #6.

Section VI, RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS on page 15.

A. Assets Critical for Initial 12 hours

The most critical requirements during the initial 12 hours of a major disaster will be medical response personnel, necessary medical supplies and equipment, transportation, logistical and administrative support, and communications systems support. The principal requirements will be:

1. The alerting and deployment of emergency support coordinators, ESF #8 ERT, the Territorial ESF #8 emergency response structure, and other necessary ESF #8 personnel.

2. The alerting and deployment of medical units to assist in the delivery of patient care to victims of the disaster and the provision of mortuary services as required. Patient care will probably be rendered under austere field conditions for casualty clearing, casualty staging, and during transportation.

3. Medical supplies (including pharmaceutical and biologic products) and equipment necessary to replace those damaged or destroyed by the disaster.

4. Transportation support to include:
   a. Aircraft for transport of incoming medical response personnel, supplies, and equipment;
   b. Ground transportation for deployment of incoming assets within the disaster area;
   c. Ground transportation and rotary wing aircraft for movement of casualties within the affected area;
   d. Fixed wing short, medium, and long-range aircraft for patient evacuation from the disaster area;
   e. Ground transportation and air transportation for patient transport; and
   f. Transport of medical response personnel and equipment following deactivation.
5. Logistics and administrative support including:
   a. One or more representatives of each ESF #8 lead/support agency to be located at or to be immediately available via telecommunications.
   b. One or more representatives of the lead agency to be located at the TCC [Territory Command Center];
   c. One or more representatives of the lead agency to be located with FEMA;
   d. Qualified personnel to establish, maintain, and operate communications systems;
   e. Clerical support personnel at island EOC and territory--level TCC;
   f. Reference material including plans, directories, maps, etcetera, necessary for coordination of medical and public health response; and
   g. Accommodation adequate for the operation of ESF #8 on a 24-hour basis.


This list proposes a tremendous amount of work. This plan has not been practiced. All of these resources ("medical response personnel, necessary medical supplies and equipment, transportation, logistical and administrative support, and communications systems support") could not come together from the VI – they do not exist here! Further, in the event of a VI or stateside port shutdown, the DOH will have great difficulty in obtaining the fuel needed for all of this transportation. In 2005, a single barge that transports vehicle gasoline to St. John was forced out of service by the Coast Guard for several weeks. The result was the immediate closing of all but one gasoline station on St. John, which offered limited gas for limited hours for everyone, including government and emergency service personnel. People stayed home, work slowed down, the economy suffered. People paid $50.00 to take a barge ride to St. Thomas just to get gasoline.
2. **Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan**\(^{163}\)

Like the other documents, the Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan has many excellent parts. The “Situation and Assumptions” section at “Situations” states:

The USVI comprise 100 islands and cays, including the inhabited islands of St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas and Water Island. The islands are in close proximity to the British Virgin Islands as well as surrounding eastern Caribbean islands and therefore may be affected if an act of terrorism, whether biological, chemical or of other origin, results in a mass casualty incident or widespread disease. These populations are under different jurisdictions and government. Coordinated response plans with these jurisdictions will be needed.

This is the only discussion in any plan I have seen that mentions the risk from nearby islands and the need for coordination with these other islands. However, one must remember that these neighboring islands are either independent countries or possessions of other countries.

The section entitled “Vulnerability of the Population,” quoted earlier in this paper from the Virgin Islands Health Department’s *Bioterrorism Response Plan*, is excellent because it provides a realistic assessment of the situation.

3. **Bioterrorism Response Plan**

Section III. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT discusses Special Needs Shelters and Disaster First Aid Centers, yet in seven years of emergency response on the island of St. John, I have never heard of these centers. I am similarly unaware of a Communicable Disease Investigation Team.

Section VI. ACTIVATION states:

Only official alert by the National Weather Bureau out of Puerto Rico will result in activation of Emergency Operations by the

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\(^{163}\) The document *Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan* is presumed to have been a draft for the *Bioterrorism Response Plan*, but I was not able to confirm that.
Department of Health in conjunction with VITEMA. The chief source of information at that point in time will come from VITEMA through the Office of the Commissioner.

Hurricane Katrina teaches us that sometimes bureaucracies have to act on their own without “formal notice” being received. In response to the Hurricane Katrina emergency, U.S. Army General Honore ordered the First Army to activate as a “training exercise” because the Army can train as needed but is not allowed to self-deploy. Initially NORTHCOM criticized First Army, but after the scope of the disaster became clear and it became apparent that neither the city nor the state had made the correct requests, NORTHCOM approved further DOD activation. There may be a situation where Emergency Operations should be activated even though the NWB or VITEMA have not given the order.

The failure of initiative [exhibited by the local, state and federal governments in Katrina] was also a failure of agility. Response plans at all levels of government lacked flexibility and adaptability. Inflexible procedures often delayed the response...We again encountered the risk-averse culture …\(^{164}\)

The Department of Health should consider self-activation under certain circumstances. There may be a time when the Department of Health is not able to contact or be contacted by VITEMA. Just as General Honore took action on his own, there must be flexibility that allows the DOH to do the same.

The section entitled “STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)” at “2. Description,” states (emphasis added)

In the event of a major natural disaster, technological accident, or act of terrorism using a weapon of mass destruction, the protection of lives affected or potentially affected will depend largely upon the availability of, and ability to provide medical treatment (pharmaceutical supplies, prophylactic medicines, etc.), to all emergency responders, health care professionals, and the general

community in a timely manner. Accomplishing this task necessitates the establishment and coordination of strategically placed stockpiles of essential medication and medical supplies throughout the territory to be used preceding and in conjunction with the CDC’s National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program. This national program is comprised of highly skilled staff and large quantities of medical materiel and equipment, and is anticipated to arrive to the territory from the U.S. mainland within twelve hours or less of its activation. Coordination of the SNS program, both at the local and national level, requires the development of a comprehensive plan for receiving, storing, staging, distributing, dispensing, apportioning, replenishing, and recovering the stockpile.

This is an excellent idea but these stockpiles do not exist. Neither is there a “plan for receiving, storing, staging, distributing, dispensing, apportioning, replenishing, and recovering the stockpile.”

Section VI entitled “Notification” states:

Simultaneously to the notification of all DOH BT staff, the Bioterrorism staff will also notify Clinic Administrators, Hospital Administrators, EMS, RESCUE, Airport & Airline Administrators along with other agencies with whom mutual aid agreements have been established.

I was unable to obtain information about any such agreements. The Rescue Squads do have an agreement stating that they are primarily responsible for vehicle extrication. This was prepared so the Rescue Squads would qualify to receive U.S. Department of Transportation funds for vehicle related equipment.

H. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN

There is no such plan, yet there should be such planning for the entire population - children, adolescents and adults. Developing a Crisis Response Plan is a laudable goal because there is plenty of opportunity for crisis. The Territory, however, does not have sufficient trained personnel to implement any plan and is generally under-prepared for all of these disasters. This makes the
need for a Crisis Response Plan even more critical because the psychological situation will be made worse when basic safety and immediate needs cannot be met.

With the problems and limitations discussed throughout this thesis in mind, devising a plan that could not be put into practice because there are not enough resources is futile. The VI must negotiate agreements with the private practitioners in the territory to assist the Department of Health. It must also pre-arrange for off-island assistance to arrive as soon as it is safe. The VI cannot do it alone -- help is not simply the next city, town or state away. More detailed information can be found in Appendix E.

I. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The Director of the VI Department of Homeland Security initially declined, in November and December 2005, to provide any information for this thesis although on February 16, 2006, he did provide the Law Enforcement Planning Commission FY 2004 Strategy, which is reviewed above.

J. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY AND PROCUREMENT


The Disaster/Emergency Preparedness Plan for the Department of Property and Procurement is excellent. It clearly indicates responsibility for Transportation and Resource Management, ESF’s 1 and 7, respectively.

Its objective under ESF-1 is “To coordinate and provide instantaneous access to the government’s vehicular fleet in cases of emergency or any

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declared disaster; to provide fuel prior and after a declared emergency.” Among other things, this plan indicates that “All emergency vehicles have been identified and listed,” the “Transportation Emergency Plan has been updated,” it identifies specific fueling stations, whether they have gas and or diesel, and it names the fuel truckers. The only criticism of this plan is that it does not mention the island of St. John.

Its objective pursuant to ESF-7 is “To provide storage area for critical and expendable supplies for the Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital, the Roy L. Schneider Regional Medical Center, the Department of Health, and other government agencies.”

This section is also well presented but raises serious questions. It lists two warehouse locations, one on St. Thomas and one on St. Croix. The obvious limitation of only one on each island is that all the supplies will be in one place. The Hazard Mitigation Plan, Appendix I, For St. Thomas, Critical Facilities Summary – Vulnerability lists, under “Government Buildings,” “Property Procurement” a 25,200 square-foot facility that is presumably the warehouse (it is the only Property & Procurement in the list). It is listed at Very High Risk for Earthquake, Hurricane, River Flood and Tsunami. Is this a good place to store supplies for a disaster?

I was unable to determine from Appendix I for St. Croix whether the single Property & Procurement facility is vulnerable because some data were missing and because there is more than one Property & Procurement listing. St. John is not listed at all.

Good points in the Resource Management function are that “Warehouse emergency staffing plans are complete. Post storm drive-in/drive-out warehousing space has been identified,” and there are agreements with other agencies to use two additional facilities, but these are both on St. Croix. In addition, pre-approved contracts are in place for “Debris Site Management and
The Transportation Emergency Plan is thorough, detailed and well-thought-out. It includes plans to coordinate with other agencies if more help is needed, for example, the Department of Public Works, VITRAN (public busses) and the Virgin Islands Taxi Association. The plan also notes its limitations by stating they do not have the trained personnel to “drive or move any elderly, disabled or special needs persons.” Again, St. John is not listed at all.

K. VIRGIN ISLANDS HOUSING AUTHORITY

The Virgin Islands Housing Authority provided the Lucinda Millin Home Emergency Evacuation Plan Implementation. It is well-prepared, well-thought-out, thorough, provides for redundancy, is comprehensive and easily understandable. The VI Housing Authority calls it a “living” document and recognizes the need for revisions.

L. VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL GUARD (VING)

Requests for information from VING were referred to other agencies, though a newspaper reported that VING has received HAZMAT training from NORTHCOM.166

M. VIRGIN ISLANDS PORT AUTHORITY

The Port Authority, through its Executive Director, denied access to all requested planning documents on the basis that the Port Authority information was classified as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). However, the Port Authority did permit me to speak with the Federal Programs Coordinator, who answered questions as long as they did not breach the SSI rules.

N. UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL

The National Border Patrol Strategy\textsuperscript{167} has five overarching objectives. [The first three are]:

Objective 1. Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to illegally enter the United States between ports of entry …

Objective 2. Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement …

Objective 3. Apprehend and deter smugglers of humans, drugs and other contraband…\textsuperscript{168}

… The core concepts for the Coastal Border are [to] … gain, maintain, and expand shallow and deep-water control in the areas of responsibility; in support of the priority anti-terrorism mission. A key strategy to accomplishing this mission is partnership and integration with other law enforcement agency efforts… requires clear, coordinated, federal, state and local law enforcement activities.\textsuperscript{169}

Considering the activities of the East End Neighborhood Watch, and because of the woefully inadequate Customs and Border Protection and Border Patrol resources devoted to the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the limited abilities of the VIPD, the Border Patrol has failed in meeting its objectives.\textsuperscript{170}

O. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The USCG has an immense responsibility for Homeland Security as well as Homeland Defense and does an admirable job. However, some aspects of their work, in this case Homeland Security – port security Rules and Regulations, are less than effective. In the example that follows, the problem is partly the Rules’ “one-size-fits-all” solution.


\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 7-9.

\textsuperscript{169} National Border Patrol Strategy, 19.

The origin of this “one-size-fits-all” approach is the National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP) of September 1, 2004. Calling itself the “Capstone of the MTSA [Maritime Transportation Security Act] Planning System,” it lists three NMSP functions. Number three states, “The NMSP must also set a standard for consistency in security assessments and mitigation measures within the MTSA system of plans, from region to region.” In the case of the fence on St. John discussed below, this is an example that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” Aside from the fence simply being ineffective, it makes no sense whatsoever to mandate consistency, in other words to advertise our security precautions. Terrorists will take comfort in knowing what to expect, consistently, from one possible target to the next. This makes no more sense than any security or police patrol following an immutable schedule.

Unclassified CIA reports (and common sense) state that variable security measures are vital. Each port should not be the same as the next.

The sole reason for the fence is the Port Authority and the VI Government’s insistence on a fence when one is not required. There is no requirement for a security fence.

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172 Personal correspondence from F.J. Sturm (Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Port and Vessel Security), December 29, 2005.
1. The Fence

On July 1, 2004, and pursuant to the Maritime Security Act, the VI Government Port Authority installed a chain link and barbed wire fence approximately one-third of the way out the passenger ferry dock on St. John. The fence prevents people from walking from the land onto the ferry boats that take them to and from St. Thomas. (Locals refer to it as “The Fence” and it spawned

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173 Yahoo, Japan, www.geocities.jp
the bumper sticker, “St. John – A Gated Community.”) Before The Fence, free access to the boats and the ability to sit on the dock of the bay had been the tradition for generations.

Given the geography of the Virgin Islands and the current state of both federal and local law enforcement, any effort towards non-suspicion based, non-pinpoint inspection is useless. The Fence is completely ineffective, wasteful of resources and a public relations disaster. It should be removed.

a. Background

Since The Fence was installed, ferryboat tickets are taken at The Fence gate instead of further down the dock at the actual boats. New “Security Guards” have new jobs, but do not do anything except sometimes open and close the gate. The guards do not search anyone or anything. They do not look in bags, boxes or containers. They do, however, enforce the ferry boat regulations against eating on board.

Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations establishes their duties. At the lowest alert level, called MARSEC 1, they are supposed to “screen persons, baggage, personal effects and check identification or examine passenger tickets.”176 They do not. There is absolutely no meaningful scrutiny.

b. Why the Fence Does Not Work

The Fence is ineffective for many reasons. The 85-degree Caribbean water is less than two feet deep at this point, and one only has to walk through warm, clean water no more than four to five feet deep, and climb back on the pier on the other side of the fence. Islanders and visitors regularly wear only shorts and flip-flops and have sand on their feet, so one would not even look out of place after having done this. This can be done easily unseen by the security guards.

176 33 CFR 105.255(e).
Because The Fence was not well designed or implemented, another way around it is to climb out the unscreened window in the waiting-seating area and walk along the two-foot wide ledge to the other side of the fence and then back on the pier. Or, one could simply purchase a ticket ($5.00 or $11.50, depending on the destination).

Driving and taking the car ferry between St. Thomas and St. John can avoid The Fence entirely. Every day, several hundred vehicles come and go a block away at the car ferry dock without any inspection. No security is mandated at the car ferry because both the car ferry and the car ferry dock are exempt from the statute. They are not a “Passenger vessel certificated to carry more than 150 passengers,” (33 CFR 104.105(a)(6)) and the dock is not a “Facility that receives vessels certificated to carry more than 150 passengers…” (33 CFR 105.105(a)(2)).

Private boats (pleasure craft) are also uninspected. Perhaps one thousand private boats are anchored or moored around St. John on any given day and hundreds come and go daily, uninspected. There is a dinghy dock accessible from this same dock just a few yards before the Fence. This is used by almost anyone coming to Cruz Bay from a boat anchored in the bay or a nearby bay. So, it is not even necessary to get one’s feet wet to get around the Fence. The ferry boats are not under constant surveillance, and it would be an easy matter to access a boat from a dinghy.

Unofficial estimates indicate that of the legitimate, non-contraband, non-smuggling traffic, 70% of the people coming to St. John arrive by passenger ferry from St. Thomas. This includes the tourists and their baggage. Another 25% come with the cars and trucks on the uninspected car ferries, and the remaining 5% on the uninspected private boats. Approximately 95% of the goods and merchandise come to St. John on the uninspected car ferries with the remaining 5% coming on the uninspected private boats. The end result is that 70% of the legitimate people must pass through a meaningless inspection process, while 100% of the legitimate goods and merchandise and the remaining 30% of
legitimate people are uninspected. Given these numbers, spending government money on The Fence is useless because criminals and terrorists will utilize one of the unlimited numbers of uninspected or illegitimate entry points.

c. The Reality of the Situation

Passenger ferries are the island equivalent of a cross-town bus and holding them to the mandated level of security is purely cosmetic and a waste of resources. Every day, thousands of residents, day workers (many of them known illegal aliens), tourists, business owners, shop keepers, students of all ages, etc., come and go from the larger island of St. Thomas to St. John as if they were taking a city bus. It is a twenty- or forty-five-minute ride depending on which boat is taken. As a nation, we have not implemented security inspections on inter-city buses and subways. Also, the uninspected car ferries and private boats remain an issue.

If the purpose of the inspections is to prevent a terrorist from commandeering or blowing up a passenger ferry or using the passenger ferry as a weapon against a cruise ship, then the authorities must conduct more thorough inspections. Although an improved inspection process could have some effect, it ignores the seaplane that flies in and out of Charlotte Amalie Harbor many times a day, in close proximity to the cruise ships, passenger ferries and WAPA, without any passenger screening whatsoever. It ignores car barges, which can and do carry combustibles and pass closely and regularly to cruise ships just off shore. If the purpose is to prevent terrorists from smuggling themselves and or weapons onto the island, then the cursory 70% of the passenger-only inspections are useless.

Meaningful security is logical. However, anything approaching meaningful security on the level of inspecting baggage, parcels and identification, the requirements of MARSEC 1, is only possible on St. John if the car ferries are inspected too. If car ferries were included in inspections, then approximately 95% of people and goods departing St. John would be inspected. Inspections would
also have to occur at the Charlotte Amalie dock on St. Thomas and the Virgin Island National Park dock on St. Thomas, along with the already-fenced Red Hook St. Thomas dock to even approach the same statistic for arriving people on St. John. Anything or anyone else would enter or leave with the thousand or so boats coming and going to the thousand or so beaches, coves, bays, harbors, etc.

Searching the car ferry is plainly not practical because it would add hours to a forty-five-minute trip and would stifle inter-island commerce. It would be the equivalent of inspecting cars and trucks traveling between any two stateside towns or cities. Because St. John is an island, everything is brought there from St. Thomas by a truck on the car ferry or a container on a truck on the car ferry. Businesses on St. John would be crippled by this sort of inspection. (The VI could, at least in theory, implement the same sort of preferred shipper pre-approved security lists utilized by the USCG.)

d. Consequences

If implemented, meaningful inspection of the passenger and car ferries would logically steer illegal activity to the remaining 5% of private boats discussed above, or to uncounted criminals and terrorists. The thousand or so beaches, coves, bays, harbors, etc., are already used by drug, gun and people smugglers with impunity. “[The Caribbean is a] fertile breeding ground for growing involvement in drug abuse and in drug trafficking. The Caribbean has become a principal transshipment area in the South America-North America/Europe drug trade.”177 At least we would be fairly certain the bad guys would enter via the uninspected route and we could find the weak link. Only a

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177 Norman Girvan, “Societies at risk? the Caribbean and global change,” Revised version of a paper presented at the Caribbean Regional Consultation on the Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme of UNESCO, Kingston, Jamaica, February 1997, http://www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm#caribbean (accessed 02/19/06). Norman Girvan is a Professor of the Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica (email ngirvan@uwimona.edu.jm).
drastically increased federal border protection presence combined with a drastically improved local police department can adequately address this vulnerability. Neither of these is happening.

**e. Alternatives**

The solution is much easier to describe than to implement. It requires a dramatically increased federal border patrol presence (highly mobile teams on each island with land, near-shore and far-shore marine and helicopter and surveillance capability) combined with timely intelligence and dramatically improved local law enforcement. It would include:

THE NEW VIPD. Caring, involved and highly-motivated officers who have an excellent rapport with all segments of the community. And it would involve:

THE NEW VIPD TERRORISM FUSION CENTER. The Fusion Center would include intelligence officers who are proficient in the several languages representing the many groups who live in the Territory. These officers would work closely with all federal agencies and organized local groups, and would regularly relay information about real-time alien, potential terrorist, border and transportation security to the CBP Task Force Teams, who, with the willing and motivated assistance of the new VIPD, would intercept and arrest. In the alternative, the VI Government, Port Authority and VI Department of Homeland Security can recognize the fence as ‘unnecessary in light of the nature or operating conditions’ of the area and revise its security plan.

**f. Conclusion**

Given the futility of passenger ferry inspection alone, the impracticality of adding car ferry inspection and the complete lack of scrutiny of the remaining 5% of entrants it is wasteful and impractical to even conduct the passenger ferry inspections and to have The Fence. The VI Government should revise the security plan, remove The Fence and put the security guard money to better use.
NOTE: The information in this section about the Homeland Security fence was formally submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard and Virgin Islands authorities in October 2005. It received widespread media attention on St. John in November 2005. When asked about the situation by a news reporter, “[the Director of the VI] Homeland Security office said he would not comment on the matter. He also said he refused to provide information to Alperen for his thesis.” Subsequently, the screening of passengers coming and going to St. John was increased by random baggage inspection. Screening was increased yet again a few weeks later. “The random security screenings for ferry passenger will become more noticeable in the new year…”

Rather than address the uselessness of the entire security plan, the authorities have simply increased the level of absurdity. The seaplane still flies in and out of Charlotte Amalie Harbor many times a day, in close proximity to the cruise ships, passenger ferries and WAPA, without any passenger screening whatsoever.

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Also, The Fence has been “upgraded.” The chain link and barbed wire have been replaced with a more attractive fence consisting of vertical metal tubes in the shape of an inverted letter “J.” The problem with this upgrade is that the “J” is backwards, with the open side facing the pier, as if the objective was to keep people from climbing from the pier onto the shore when in fact the opposite is true.\textsuperscript{182} It is still possible to simply climb out the large opening in the seating area and bypass The Fence by walking along the two-foot wide ledge.

2. Other Coast Guard Planning

The Coast Guard’s Coastal Area Contingency Plan for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the companion document U.S. Virgin Islands Sensitive Areas and Protection Strategies represent thorough and detailed environmental response plans. The Hurricane Plan is a similarly detailed and thorough plan for hurricanes.\textsuperscript{183}

P. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND (NORTHCOM)

Because it is their official role, any military food and subsistence support will most likely be coordinated through the Defense Logistics Agency,\textsuperscript{184} in particular the Defense Supply Center Pennsylvania (DSCP), “which supplies subsistence items including food and clothing….DSCP also supports U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.”\textsuperscript{185} However, their August 14, 2005, response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request indicated no records regarding the following request:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{182} As of 27 February 2006 the wrong direction J Poles have been corrected but I am unable to determine when this was done.
  \item \textsuperscript{183} These documents are available at \url{http://www.uscg.mil/sectorsanjuan/root/planning.html}, accessed 3/16/06).
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Grass, “Department of Defense Food Procurement,” 2 and footnote 2.
\end{itemize}
Relating to natural disasters (hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, etc.) and for the U.S. Virgin Islands and or the Caribbean in general… information about risk assessments, contingency plans or any plans for responding to mass casualty and for delivering food, fuel, medicine, etc. to the population of the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Q. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
The Northcom request quoted immediately above was forwarded to the Defense Energy Support Center, which by letter dated September 8, 2005, responded that they too have no records responsive to the request. The request was forwarded again to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, on August 31, 2005. By letter dated December 23, 2005, they responded that there are no records. This makes no sense because such plans do in fact exist and have been reviewed in this paper. I have no explanation as to why DHS would deny the existence of these plans.

R. PLANS THAT AGENCIES REFUSED TO PRODUCE
The following plans exist but the agencies refused to produce them:

- The Virgin Islands Police Department’s Hurricane Plan, Standard Operating Procedures
- Virgin Islands Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures for Hurricane Deployment
- Virgin Islands Port Authority Plans and Risk Assessments (refusal based on Homeland Security secrecy rules)
- Tourism Department Airline Evacuation Contingency Plan
- The Education Department refused to provide any information

S. PLANS THAT CANNOT BE LOCATED
The following plans are referenced in other documents but could not be located:
• [Food] Distribution Plan for the U.S. Virgin Islands\textsuperscript{186}
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE): Hurricane Evacuation Study for the USVI (1994)\textsuperscript{187}
• USACE Transportation Analysis Hurricane Evacuation Studies for St. Thomas (1997)\textsuperscript{188}
• USACE St. Croix (1992) (Dealing mainly with intra-island traffic movement issues.)\textsuperscript{189}
• VITEMA’s Evacuation Plan\textsuperscript{190}

T. FEDERAL CAPABILITIES AND SIMULTANEOUS DISASTERS

Hurricane Katrina had potential consequences for the Virgin Islands if a major hurricane or other disaster had occurred at the same time. Any hope for a massive response, like that which occurred in Katrina, would not have been possible because most of the resources were being utilized for Katrina. It is clear from a review of the planning that the VI must have a major influx of resources from outside the Territory and those resources may not be available.

Don’t look to the federal government to send much help should the Virgin Islands get blasted with a hurricane, was the word from VI Territorial Emergency Management Agency officials … plans worked out with the federal agencies for this hurricane season are ‘out the door’ given the magnitude of the unprecedented disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Red Cross representative Carol McGuinness said that her agency wasn’t ‘looking at getting a lot of help from the states because of New Orleans.’ Additionally,

\textsuperscript{186} DHS, FEMA Region II, email sent October 25, 2005 stated “On June 7, 2005, the Department of Property and Procurement prepared a [food] Distribution Plan for the U.S. Virgin Islands. No such plan could be located.”


\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{190} DHS/FEMA Region II, email sent November 15, 2005.
[VITEMA Deputy Director Steve] Parris and others said St. John must stand on its own feet in the event a hurricane hits because of its location away from the St. Thomas hub.191

191 Lynda Lohr, "Don't Look North for Help if Disaster Strikes VI," St. John Source, September 2, 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1105687796 (accessed 9/2/05). Sept. 1, 2005 — Don't look to the federal government to send much help should the Virgin Islands get blasted with a hurricane, was the word from VI Territorial Emergency Management Agency officials as people from various St. John agencies met Thursday to fine tune the island's hurricane response plans. Steve Parris, VITEMA's deputy director on St. Thomas, said plans worked out with the federal agencies for this hurricane season are "out the door" given the magnitude of the unprecedented disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Red Cross representative Carol McGuinness said that her agency wasn't "looking at getting a lot of help from the states because of New Orleans."

Additionally, Parris and others said St. John must stand on its own feet in the event a hurricane hits because of its location away from the St. Thomas hub. "When it comes to a disaster, it's like every place else is a thousand miles away," St. John's deputy director, Alvis Christian, said.

He said that St. John's residents and emergency responders always step up to the plate when a disaster strikes. Ira Wade, deputy Public Works director, said the island must be prepared to stand alone for at least four or five days until relief comes across Pillsbury Sound from St. Thomas.

Many St. John agencies face the same hurdle — some, and in some cases, most of their staff lives on St. Thomas. This means it may be impossible for them to get to work. Deputy Fire Chief Brian Chapman said 66 percent of his staff calls St. Thomas home.

However, agency representatives said they are all prepared to work together to keep the island afloat.

Agencies also face difficulty getting fuel for their vehicles because the only fuel supplier with a government contract, the Texaco Station, hasn't been paid. "Sergeant Hendricks put gas in the car and paid for it himself," Police Officer Bridget Conow said. Wade said that Public Works faces the gas snafu every five or six weeks because the Property and Procurement Department submits the paperwork late. "Every five or six weeks we have to go through the misery of not knowing whether we'll have fuel, and I can't pick up garbage if I don't have fuel," he said.

Lt. Gov. Vargrave Richards, who attended the meeting, said he contacted the Finance Department to find out what's holding up the payment.

Christian said that VITEMA has pre-positioned supplies at Bordeaux, Fish Bay, Mandahl, and the East End so residents in those areas will get help should the roads be impassable when a storm hits.

"There will be too many people affected if something happens to Centerline Road," Christian said.

St. John has two main roads, Centerline Road and the North Shore Road. However, the North Shore Road intersects with Centerline Road near Coral Bay, leaving Centerline Road as the only main artery to the fast-growing eastern end of the island.

Wade said that access is available through Bordeaux Road, but the road remains unpaved for about a mile with some very bumpy sections.

The Red Cross has recently trained people to be shelter managers. Christian said that Emmaus Moravian Church, Bethany Moravian Church and the Methodist Church will serve as primary shelters. Should those structures experience damage, the John's Folly Learning Institute, the St. John School on Gifft Hill and the Clarice Thomas Annex of Julius E. Sprauve School will serve as back-up shelters.

Christian said that the Westin Resort and Villas is lined up to serve as an emergency medical center in case something happens to Myrah Keating Smith Community Health Center.

"And their large freezers could be used as morgues," he said of the Westin.

Starfish Market manager Lenyse Shomo said the store has stocked up on canned goods.

McGuinness said that St. John is sending one person at a time to volunteer at the Hurricane
The U.S. military stood up Joint Task Force Katrina on August 31, 2005, to provide support for FEMA and local authorities. NORTHCOM was already providing active duty personnel and military equipment, including helicopters and swift-water rescue teams. Disaster equipment was transported to the region by the Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group. A hospital ship, a Navy salvage vessel and many more military assets responded. 192

When First Army was activated as Joint Task Force Katrina, with General Honore as the Commander, he immediately formed a joint staff of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps planners (including Joint Task Force - Civil Support) and operators to begin further developing the DOD support for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. The first priority was to support life saving efforts for the victims of the storm who had essentially become refugees. Simultaneously, they moved forward with planning for life sustaining efforts.

There were no large-scale disaster relief plans in place before Hurricane Katrina, yet First Army is very experienced at making plans.

Since 9/11, on at least 20 occasions we've activated Defense Coordinating Officers/Elements (DCO/E) (teams of about 15 people), along with other types of DOD support - primarily

Katrina disaster. She said only one will be gone because they may be needed on St. John should a hurricane hit.

Parris said he attended the recent National Hurricane Conference held in New Orleans. "New Orleans got caught with its pants down," he said, implying that St. John doesn't want to find itself in the same position.


transportation, engineer, and medical - in support of other federal, state, and local agencies/communities for both manmade and natural disasters, as well as National Special Security Events. We've also activated Joint Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Teams (12-14 person teams) along with the other federal Emergency Support Functions (ESF) at the FEMA Regional Readiness Coordination Centers (RRCC), and Joint State EPLO Teams (6-8 personnel) at the state emergency operation centers or National Guard joint force headquarters.¹⁹³

All of this magnificent support would not be available to the VI in the event of more than one Incident of National Significance at the same time. This further supports the conclusion that the VI increase its preparedness.

¹⁹³ Donald Reed, student at CHDS, 0403, and director of a senior staff in the DOD Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities planning for the twenty-seven states and three territories that comprise FEMA Regions I-V (essentially all of the contiguous United States east of the Mississippi River, plus Minnesota, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), August 20, 2005.
III. MISMANAGEMENT

Mismanagement in its broadest sense includes poor judgment, ‘one size fits all’ based solutions, wasteful and unnecessary spending or spending just because you can, and of course corruption, cronyism, nepotism and simple incompetence. Mismanagement affects policy decision-making and policy implementation, fiscal matters and operations.

The VI is not alone with this problem. Mismanagement occurs everywhere. Most of the examples listed below are from the USVI simply because I am not privy to those from other places. I have tried to find verifiable examples from other jurisdictions but that is challenging because information is not readily available. Some of my classmates have provided me with suggestions from other places.194

A. EXAMPLES OF MISMANAGEMENT

The Cruz Bay Dock fence is an excellent example of poor management and wasted money. Although described in the section for the U.S. Coast Guard, the VI Port Authority had and has ultimate responsibility for the fence because, as explained earlier, a fence is not mandated.

B. FURNITURE FOR NON-EXISTENT BUILDING

It is not just planning and preparedness that can be mismanaged. I was informed that limited Homeland Security funding will be used for equipment and furnishings for a building the VI does not have the money to construct. At a meeting about designing and building an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)195 the plan was announced to use FEMA money currently available to purchase furniture and equipment for an EOC, even though there is no EOC and

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194 It is only fair to note that the Territory has experienced extremely rapid growth and expansion in a very short time. What used to be sleepy, slow-paced islands has in less than a generation been thrust into the internet age and the war on terror.

195 An EOC is a physically sound structure from which disaster response is coordinated.
no money to build one. The idea of contacting FEMA and telling them it would be a better use of limited financial resources to use this money to build the much-needed EOC rather than purchase furniture and equipment for a non-existent building was rejected.196

**C. 2.7 MILLION WORTH OF LARGELY UNUSABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT**

VITEMA now has nine new state-of-the-art $300,000 mobile communications vehicles. The total value is almost 3 million dollars. They are so complicated that they are of limited use, and for St. John, there are only two people qualified, partially trained and authorized to use them. Those two are not VI Government employees but are rather volunteer members of ARES and St. John Rescue. The vehicles are allocated four for St. Thomas, four for St. Croix and one for St. John. They were purchased with federal money. They can serve as an important command and control function and provide radio interoperability. However, a major problem is in getting individual vehicle systems up and running. They arrived from the vendor(s) late 2005 in a mostly un-useable condition and have not been fixed satisfactorily so that they could be put into service, if needed. Even after over a year of being handed over to St. John, that vehicle still has original vendor repair issues that never seem to get done.

This complex equipment includes different kinds of radios operating on different bands (frequencies) including the amateur bands, the business (commercial) band, a satellite phone, a satellite dish for digital satellite communications, a LAN and a WLAN for local networking, with the ability to send video images, charts and graphs to and from nearby laptops. All of this is integrated with a sizable computer and server.

The FEMA communications vehicle contains a phenomenal cross-band, mostly software-driven repeater system which permits interoperability between

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196 I heard this and I am the one who suggested FEMA be contacted about using the money for the building instead of the furniture. I do not know if this furniture has actually been purchased.
and among almost any type of radio from CB to satellite service. A large portion of training involves learning how to use it, particularly with integrating radio frequencies that are not already programmed into the computer system.

Therefore, a technically sophisticated and trained person is needed to operate it. One problem seems to be with non-trained users trying to self-teach and instead putting the computer/server system out of service. Since repair and maintenance of these valuable assets are being mostly ignored/postponed, the systems are not kept operational from day to day so that persons cannot even be trained on them let alone use the vehicles during an incident.

Also, until recently, every emergency service agency in the St. Thomas and St. John District of the US Virgin Islands used VHF radios. There was thus no interoperability problem that could not be remedied by simply programming every agency’s VHF frequency into every existing VHF radio, or to program in one mutual aid VHF channel into every radio.

It was recommended at the communication vehicle training that the vehicle be operated and all of its components be used at least once a week, and that the person doing the communicating have high-level Incident Command System training. The only ones trained on this vehicle for St. John are the two volunteers. They do not have ICS training. At least one Law Enforcement Ranger for the Virgin Islands National Park on St. John has the necessary ICS training but not the radio communication training or experience. In addition, the two volunteers are just that, volunteers for ARES and Rescue and cannot be expected to operate the vehicle weekly, test everything and maintain it.

Lastly, to put the purchase of the communications trucks into better perspective, not only can we not use them, we have too many. “[T]he Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department are currently contracting … to purchase two [of these communications vehicles]…. They plan
on purchasing three to five additional units....” 197 If Los Angeles thus purchases all of the units contemplated that would bring their total to seven. The Virgin Islands has nine!

D. ST. JOHN’S EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLE

There was no secure place to park St. John’s emergency communications vehicle on St. John and VITEMA chose to keep it in an abandoned and completely isolated unsecured building. This was an unlocked garage in a dilapidated structure that could not even be seen from the road. Police reported vandalism of Public Works vehicles at their locked and not isolated repair facility, next door. I personally complained to FEMA about this and the vehicle was eventually removed from the abandoned building.

Except for the two trained volunteers, there is no one on St. John qualified to operate this vehicle. In fact, reports are that there are fewer well trained persons in all of the VI than there are vehicles and I believe there is not a single person on any of the US Virgin Islands who is a paid member of a public service agency with the knowledge, experience and training to operate the remaining eight vehicles. Volunteers cannot be expected to help maintain the vehicle or equipment since their time is their own. An infrastructure with a maintenance schedule for "exercising" the communications/computer equipment must be established if any of these vehicles is ever to be used when needed.

If and when the St. John vehicle can be brought up to operational status, the two volunteers are willing to train other operators. The priority list should first be VITEMA personnel, then Rescue, National Park, Fire Service and Police. St. John needs at least 4 trained persons in each emergency service to cover issues of illness, vacation time, training time, etc. Right now there are none trained for any service.

On December 15, 2004, St John Rescue and ARES (the only ones trained to operate the vehicle) were told they were not permitted to be trained on or allowed to use any of FEMA/VITEMA communications vehicles. This decree has subsequently been rescinded so the two volunteers are now permitted to use and train others how to use the communication vehicles. It was demoralizing to those affected who wanted to learn and be useful in on- and off-Island communications during time of need. In addition, over a year's training time has been lost.

E. THE 800 MHZ RADIO FIASCO

The Department of Health/EMS just switched over to an 800 Mhz digital trunking system which effectively isolates them from every other emergency service. For at least the next several years, there are no plans for other emergency services to switch to the digital trunking system. Even though EMS retains the ability to "drop down" to their old analog VHF frequency and talk to other agencies, in practice, this is not happening so that valuable support services such as St. John Rescue are not getting alerted. The Island communications network thus now has a major hole in it.

Published information about an 800 system says to get the same geographical coverage as with a conventional VHF repeater system, you have to have more complex towers. These create additional expense, additional service requirements, more complexity of equipment, etc.

Presumably, the DOH is trying to respond to DHS directives to install a secure digital system that no one else can listen to. They have done it and now the EMS ambulance on St. John will not have, among other things, the support of St. John Rescue members on scene, no one to ride in the ambulance to help with CPR, etc.\(^{198}\) This is because no agency can monitor the frequency and Rescue has to call 911 when they hear a siren to find out what is going on (and

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\(^{198}\) The ambulance on St. John is frequently staffed by 2 female EMTs (or Paramedics). Their medical qualifications are superb yet in the past, they have benefited from the additional lifting capacity provided by St. John Rescue. The same is true even when the EMTs happen to be male.
911 often does not know and often will not tell them if they do know). When EMS travels without using its siren, Rescue knows nothing.

On February 19, 2006, there was an incident where EMS was on scene before anyone knew there was an incident. The Police knew nothing. Rescue followed the lights and got there to help. DOH with the only 800 MHz system in use and their refusal to use their existing analog radios to notify others for help is a very poor way to serve the community. Rescue has provided lifesaving assistance on hundreds of occasions but is now being hampered more than ever because they cannot monitor the DOH radio.

The individual who promoted this plan for the DOH again has been "released." In terms of radio capabilities, the DOH is now back to about what they had before Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 when that failing 800 MHz system was mercifully damaged and ARES took over handling DOH’s hospital-to-clinic communications on VHF. ARES can fill in again, but why it is that failed history is being repeated?

F. OTHER EXAMPLES

1. VITEMA Reimbursement

A slightly different kind of mismanagement involved reimbursement for personal expenses. VITEMA owned an amateur radio band repeater that was sometimes operated by the volunteer ham radio operators. When it needed repair, VITEMA asked the volunteers to see to that and promised reimbursement. Repairs cost $300 and for more than three years, the money was not repaid.

2. New Hampshire ATV

New Hampshire Governor Craig Benson complained about an All-Terrain Vehicle purchased with Homeland Security money by an urban city in his state. Presumably, a car or SUV would have served the law enforcement purpose just as well or even better, but that would not have been paid for with federal funds.
He courageously said his state will not accept any more homeland security money unless the funds are needed. Benson is not so much looking a gift horse in the mouth as telling the giver to deliver it to someone who needs it more. “If every governor in the country [and the Territory] did the same, imagine how much lower our taxes could be…Money flowing to New Hampshire from the Department of Homeland Security has not been put to the best use…I am not going to waste any more homeland security money…”

3. Federal Level

There is no Customs and Border Patrol presence to seek out illegal aliens in the U.S. Virgin Islands yet there is a serious and well-documented problem. The VI is a wide open back door to the U.S. mainland.

G. CONSEQUENCES OF MISMANAGEMENT

The FEMA Grant money for furniture for the non-existent building and the useless communication equipment are barren victories. “[N]othing is more common in war than strategically barren victory—meaning military achievements that, however impressive in their own terms, nevertheless fail to alter the political context in which they occur.” That is precisely what has happened here. The VI has state-of-the-art communications equipment and no one to operate it.


They are no better off than if they never had it in the first place. They spent money and are not any safer. The same is already or soon will be true of the furniture.

Mismanagement has both symbolic and concrete importance in Homeland Security. To both common citizens and Homeland Security practitioners alike, mismanagement is dispiriting, discouraging, depressing and disheartening. It leads to a sense of hopelessness and it inhibits and restrains progress. When citizens perceive mismanagement, they feel less secure. Mismanagement causes people to withdraw from participation. It is simply uninspiring and the community suffers from the lack of involvement. Because Homeland Security has a finite budget, fiscal mismanagement diverts limited resources from more necessary or useful places.

For example, the consequence of there not being any Border Patrol in the U.S. Virgin Islands (a federal issue) is not just that illegal aliens come here with impunity, but also that other critical resources are pulled away to meet the Border Patrol need. For example, when the east end of the St. John community became particularly concerned after a dramatic increase in the number of illegal alien arrivals and armed robberies, because there is no Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Inspectors went from St. Thomas to St. John to take reports of where the aliens have been coming ashore. This, however, is not ICE’s normal job. The ICE Investigators were pulled away from their regular duties to do what the Border Patrol should do. Two functions were thus poorly served. The regular ICE investigations were not attended to and the ICE agents, arriving days after the aliens came ashore, did not apprehend any illegal aliens or their smugglers.

Equally as important as the Fence’s ineffectiveness is that it and the potato-chip-confiscating201 security guards alienate people. Citizens see the

201 This happened to me. The security guard prohibited me from bringing a bag of potato chips on to the ferry from St. Thomas to St. John. A week later, a different security guard prohibited me from bringing a plastic bottle of water.
ineffective fence and believe their tax dollars are being wasted. They lose confidence. Whether the mere perception of security is a valid measure of success as opposed to actual security is an open question, but this fence does not even provide the mere perception of security.

The result of non-payment of the $300.00 to the amateur radio operator was that he refused to undertake another task requested by the agency. They asked for his help and he said no.

The consequence of DOH/EMS switching to an extremely complex trunking system that no other agency can listen to is severely diminished capacity for medical first response. People will either have more serious injuries than they would otherwise have if more help was available, or they will die.

H. HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS

The St. John Security Fence, furniture for a non-existent building, communications equipment that no one can use, and switching EMS to an 800 MHz radio system all represent wasted money or resources that would be better spent in another way. This mismanagement violates the National Strategy for Homeland Security Principles that “require responsibility and accountability…” mandate that we “allocate resources judiciously” and attempt to “constrain government spending.”

Why does the DOH/EMS have to have secret communication in the first place when the police do not? Even police in major metropolitan cities do not have secure communications. If security is needed, they use a land line telephone.


203 Conversation with this person November 27, 2004.

Why does mismanagement happen? One reason is lack of effective oversight. It cannot be simply lack of knowledge because most if not all of the examples here are unambiguous and one does not have to be an expert in any particular field to see the errors. Common sense tells us this. Another explanation is lack of courageous leaders. VITEMA could have simply not taken the communications vehicles or at least taken only three, one for each island rather than nine. The same reasoning applies to the furniture for the non-existent building. A courageous leader should have told FEMA that we don't care that communications vehicles and furniture are on the menu this year. We need an EOC.

Courageous leadership might have drawn on the ‘dual-use principle’ discussed in the Homeland Security literature and this paper. It is common knowledge that all of the emergency services in the U.S. Virgin Islands suffer poor radio communications with antiquated equipment and many radio dead zones. Using the money from the communications vehicles and 800 MHz system and spending it to improve police, fire and EMS radio communications would have the dual use of helping emergency response every single day and also for natural disasters and terrorism. What good is a $300,000 radio interoperability vehicle when the basic infrastructure is fragile and won’t operate? There will be nothing to interoperate!

A courageous leader would have told DHS that having the Department of Health and EMS as the only public safety agency on a secure radio would undermine public safety.

In addition to lack of courage, another explanation for mismanagement is failure to see the larger picture and lack of familiarity with the jurisdiction. The St. John fence and furniture for the non-existent building provide good examples. Even a meager understanding of life on St. John would indicate the fence is useless because it is so easily circumvented. An understanding of the sense of community on St. John and knowledge that many wealthy and philanthropic individuals have homes here suggests that furniture for the as yet unbuilt EOC
was not a concern because it would have been easily donated. St. John Rescue and ARES felt confident enough in this concept that it was incorporated in St. John Rescue and ARES’s design of the EOC. We need money for the building. The furniture will happen on its own.

Another example of not knowing the community comes from the local Office of Domestic Preparedness. ODP funds training but will not make training available to the local rescue squads. Do the individuals who make the decision not to train the rescue squads know that on all of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the volunteer rescue squads are the primary first responders? St. Croix Rescue is so well qualified that the DOD contracts with them to teach emergency services to other nations throughout the Caribbean. On St. John, whenever there is an island-wide drill, the scenario does not begin with “the police were notified of…” or “Fire was notified…” The scenarios always begin with “St. John Rescue is notified of.…”

I. LEADERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL

Homeland Security leaders must know and understand their jurisdiction and community. They also need a broad and thorough understanding of Homeland Security facts, and principles so they can see both a specific jurisdictional problem (treetop view) and also see this same problem as part of a larger effort (30,000 foot view). One solution to mismanagement is to develop and choose wise and well-educated Homeland Security leaders. They must have both the breadth and depth of understanding such as that provided by the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), sponsors of this program. Another option is credentialed Homeland Security practitioners, an idea spawned by the Strategy Paper topic of a fellow classmate.205

205 “My strategy memo proposes the development of a national Homeland Security accreditation or certification program. Its purpose is to establish an independent, peer-review process to assess national preparedness (including HSPD-8’s National Preparedness Goal capabilities) to improve risk- and needs-based Homeland Security funding allocation and preparedness efforts.” Darren Chen, CHDS website, NS3180, 01/03/05.”
The leader must have common sense and the courage to implement policy in the manner most effective for his or her jurisdiction without losing sight of that jurisdiction’s place in the national strategy.
IV. HOW TO FOSTER CHANGE

As leaders we are each faced with making changes in our behavior to be more effective at influencing others, leading teams and implementing change in our organization.\textsuperscript{206}

The classic hero myth begins with the kingdom in trouble. Crops are not growing. Babies are not being born. Sickness, alienation, and despair are rampant. Life is vanishing from the land. Some people claim that it is the fault of a sinful and despotic king. Others blame a dragon that roams the countryside destroying everything in its path. The elders meet to decide what to do, but their ideas have been heard before and no longer have any power. Hope is disappearing from the kingdom. Into this slough of despondency comes the hero, the man or woman who takes on the task of bringing new life to a dying land.\textsuperscript{207}

A. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO

From the Homeland Security perspective, doing nothing is a recipe for disaster, both locally and for the nation. The VI is an unprotected backdoor for terrorists to enter the United States and is thus a major weakness in our nation’s border security. On the local level, the VI Government lacks the resources, motivation, interest and political will to prevent illegal entry. The federal agencies in the VI are perhaps overextended, but plainly do not respond to real-time reports of groups of illegal aliens (as large as thirty) that have been seen coming ashore.

From the perspective of natural disasters, the Territory’s infrastructure and the other issues addressed in this thesis will only exacerbate whatever problems arise. Instead of no injuries or deaths, there will be more injuries or they will be more severe and there will be more deaths. Because of the concept of dual use,


\textsuperscript{207} Christopher Bellavita, “The Public Administrator as Hero,” \textit{Administration and Society 23}, no. 2 (August 1991), 155.
most of the solutions will help whether the disaster is natural or man-made. There is no excuse for maintaining the status quo.

B. PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CREATED POSITIVE CHANGE

1. University of the Virgin Islands Professor Establishes Geographic Information System

A significant public safety problem is that many streets in the VI have no names, and if they do have names, they are unlikely to have signs. Just finding the exact location of an emergency is a challenge. This should be a government concern, but it receives absolutely no attention.

Related to this, police and the ambulance EMTs from St. Thomas who are often assigned to St. John do not know where they are going. They do not know the island because it is not mandatory that they learn their way and the initiative to do so on their own often does not exist. (St. John Rescue has had to lead the way on several occasions.) St. John has hundreds of thousands of visitors a year. It is a disgrace that the streets are not named, the houses not numbered, and many of the government’s paid responders do not know how to find the location of emergencies. It is widely believed that the pizza delivery folks and private mail services (UPS, FedEx) can do a better job.

A University of the Virgin Islands professor, using what is called geographic information system (GIS) technology has initiated a program to identify every structure on St. John so that rescuers can find someone in an emergency. This GIS System will be similar to Enhanced 911 systems, except it will be sponsored by a private agency. Mapping has begun without any outside funding. St. John Rescue is assisting.

2. Designing Emergency Operations System

Rescue and the ARC are leading their largest joint effort to date - to design and construct a building on St. John to house VITEMA’s Emergency
Operations Center (EOC). They obtained consensus between VITEMA, the Federal Department of Homeland Security, the Red Cross, Rescue, ARES and the Virgin Islands Department of Property and Procurement regarding the plan. All of these groups and agencies are now working together toward this common goal.

3. **Private Citizen Creates East End Neighborhood Watch: A St. John Case Study**

Private citizen, homeowner and carpenter Clancy Richardson\textsuperscript{208} has become the leading Homeland Security organizer, detective and community voice on the East End of St. John, if not for the entire island. The information in this section is from numerous interviews with Mr. Richardson and the quotations are his. He has defined how community input can help with Homeland Security through his involvement with the East End Neighborhood Watch (EENW). Clancy moved to the then-desolate, sleepy East End two decades ago. Back then, he says, there were no illegal aliens. There was no crime. There were only four burglaries on the East End between 1989 and 2004. In the past year, there has been a dramatic increase in violent crime, including armed robberies and home invasions. “There are many reasons why this happens,” Clancy says.

Historically, this has been a hospitable area for smugglers and sea traders. The extraordinary building boom on St. John drives the need for cheap labor and there is thus an increase in people smuggling and illegal alien workers. Along with this development, come criminals. We are concerned that dangerous terrorists may come ashore along with the economically driven illegal aliens. All this is helped by the (at best) lackadaisical attitude by people who call themselves law enforcement professionals. The police are completely unresponsive. They simply do not show up when called.

For example, last November (2004), my neighborhood watch correctly determined that someone had broken into and was living in a guest house that had been closed for the season. The suspect was inside. St. John Rescue responded and after more than an hour waiting for the police, assisted the neighborhood watch in

\textsuperscript{208} This is a pseudonym.
making a citizen’s arrest. The police showed up two and one half hours later to collect the already cuffed suspect.

In April 2005 a similar situation happened again but the EENW did not go inside to make an arrest. Instead, “We waited two and one half hours for the police before giving up. They did not show up and we left.”

Clancy says that Federal law enforcement is equally poor in dealing with the illegal immigrant issue, but for very different reasons. “We have extremely porous borders, with no Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to apprehend the illegals. ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] which has a different role from CBP here is under-funded, under-staffed and under-equipped.” Clancy recounts that

last year, after a large group of illegal aliens were spotted running up from the beach, a concerned citizen gave me a still wet wallet and bank book from the Dominican Republic. What a treasure trove of information, I thought. ICE was, no pun intended, cool to the prospect of examining the wallet and bank book and would not be able to come from St. Thomas to St. John to collect it. So, I gave it to a friend who took it to St. Thomas and a few days later, they picked it up. Although I did not receive any feedback about the results of the bank book investigation, I did receive a very important thank you.

The largest problem is the lack of law enforcement on St. John. The VIPD is unresponsive to a myriad of issues, not just illegal aliens. The EENW efforts to involve federal law enforcement have had some good results but they are very short staffed. After repeatedly calling and complaining, ICE agents came over from St. Thomas a few times. Clancy took them on a tour of the area and showed them the drop-off points and smuggling routes.

This led to a federal law enforcement operation that included the Coast Guard. With ongoing information from the EENW, five large smuggling boats were intercepted. Smuggling, at least on the East End, stopped for a while but has since resumed.
Aside from that one-time operation, the EENW has not been able to get a full-time CBP presence in the Virgin Islands and smuggling has resumed. Recently, however, a new National Park Service Enforcement Ranger has taken an interest in the subject. Clancy has again provided a tour of the drop-off points and smuggling routes.

The obstacle is inadequate law enforcement at both the federal and local level. Some apprehensions are made and at least on St. John, those are done by the local VIPD, but it is sporadic and only a small percentage is caught. Clancy is powerless to directly effect change in this area, yet he continues to register complaints and voice his concerns. Recent, unrelated events may change this situation.

The federal intervention that netted five smuggling boats was an obvious success and demonstrated that local information from the EENW, combined with adequately supported law enforcement, can produce results. In addition, a recent alleged hate crime has resulted in an increased police presence on St. John in general and the East End in particular.

Clancy is quick to point out that he is “just” one member of the EENW and that without all the others, little would be accomplished. The only reason there is an EENW, however, is because organizers developed allies with other area residents. Their successes have also been noted in other parts of the island. There are now plans to implement the use of air-horn blasts to signal trouble, phone trees, watchful eyes and neighborhood back-up. For example, for the citizen’s arrest of the burglar in 2004, there were two other men from the neighborhood and two more from Rescue who came to assist. Clancy solicits help from his contacts within both the Territorial and federal government for procedural suggestions, contact names and numbers.
Clancy has expanded operations under the guise of a new hobby. The aliens leave discarded personal items and clothing at the landing points--Clancy now collects these. On August 14, 2005, he found a passport from Guyana. He says he

Googled the name and it came back as Indonesian meaning ‘He who gazes at the sea.’ The NPS Ranger I gave it to subsequently told me that the passport was fraudulent. So who is coming to St. John using a fraudulent Guyana passport? Could this be Al Qaeda?

There is still no one interested or able to follow-up on the immediate “aliens in progress” calls, or to investigate the origins of these illegal aliens. This may change with the new National Park Ranger interested in this and with the increased VIPD presence. Only time will tell. Clancy, however, is fast becoming an expert on illegal immigration on St. John.

C. FIRST STEPS TOWARD A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY: A TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING GROUP

In a time of drastic change, it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists.209

Truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error; and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate.210

The best collective decisions are the product of disagreement and contest, not consensus or compromise. 211

The growth of knowledge depends entirely on disagreement.212

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211 Surowiecki, Wisdom of Crowds, XIX.

212 Believed to be attributed to Karl Popper (1902–1944).
This thesis illustrates that much of the planning for the Virgin Islands is incomplete, inaccurate and wrongly optimistic. Some of the plans do make excellent points, yet there is much to be done. Many of the plans assume an infrastructure or access to resources and capabilities that do not exist.

The Virgin Islands should establish a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group composed of subject matter experts and intellectual capital from many disciplines throughout the Territory.

1. Planning Group Goals
The goal of the Planning Group is to thoroughly investigate the VI’s vulnerabilities and to recommend policy options to “prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of national significance,” including natural disasters, the consequences of either local or mainland terrorism or a WAPA shutdown.

Its goal will be to correct the factual mistakes included in the existing plans, and provide the Governor and other elected officials and leaders the facts, insights and options needed for them to better prepare for the challenges they must address.

2. Planning Group Charge
The 9/11 Commission Report criticized the U.S. Government for a “failure of imagination” in anticipating the 9/11 attacks. Protecting the Territory’s vulnerabilities is thus limited only by our collective will and imagination in identifying them.

The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group will be charged as follows.

Explore all possible permutations to the problems/vulnerabilities and solutions to those problems. After a plenary session, the Planning Group will break into functional units (for example, Energy or Agriculture) and search for,
propose, examine and vigorously challenge all possible risks and vulnerabilities that could arise following a port shutdown, WAPA shutdown, hurricane, earthquake, terrorism, etc. These functional units will prioritize the risks and vulnerabilities and propose, examine and vigorously challenge all possible solutions. Are the solutions practical? Can we do it? Is there another way? Finally, each functional unit will prepare a report describing its efforts, listing the problems and proposing solutions.

When completed, the end product of the Planning Group will be well-thought-out recommendations to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of Homeland Security and other leaders.\textsuperscript{213}

An important question to ask is why a Planning Group will do a better job than the agencies responsible for running the VI Government and those initially responsible for designing the flawed plans. If numerous government agencies (Virgin Islands Police Department, Fire Department, Port Authority and Tourism Department) refused to provide me with information for a U.S. Government Department of Homeland Security-sponsored Thesis, what reason do we have to believe a Planning Group will do a better job at obtaining this information? To some extent there is no reason to believe things will change, unless there is a change in leadership. Small mindedness, pettiness, turf battles, personal resentments and jealousies exist everywhere and hinder Homeland Security in many places, although not to the degree encountered in the Virgin Islands.

One answer lies in the design and formation of the Planning Group.

3. Planning Group Participants
Participants in the Planning Group should include subject matter experts from the Department of Agriculture; VI Farmers Cooperative, University of the

\textsuperscript{213} In one sense, what is needed for the VI is reminiscent of the business concept of reengineering and "one way to ensure that reengineering has a cross-functional perspective is to assemble a team that represents the functional units involved in the process being reengineered..." Michael Hammer, "Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate," \textit{Harvard Business Review} (July–August 1990), 108.
Virgin Islands (UVI) Agricultural Station, UVI economists, business professors, 
engineers, physicists, ecologists, political scientists and historians; the VI 
Government’s Economic Recovery Task Force; Hovensa Oil; WAPA; Licensing 
and Consumer Affairs (because of its familiarity with the petroleum distribution 
system); VITEMA; Virgin Islands Energy Office; VI Port Authority; Seaplane 
operators; VI Government executive, legislative and judicial branches; 
Department of Health; VIPD; VIFD; U.S. and VI Department of Homeland 
Security; FBI; WICO; United States Coast Guard; volunteer Rescue Squads; 
Amateur Radio Emergency Services; American Red Cross; National Park 
Service and the Department of the Interior; private business sector; cruise ship 
industry; interested residents; representatives from all the U.S. islands and the 
media. Also, because they are experienced and have prepared excellent and 
well-thought-out plans already, the Virgin Islands Housing Authority and 
Department of Property and Procurement should also be invited.

The Planning Group will be unprecedented in many ways. It will have a 
broad range of experts instead of just political appointees. It will be open and 
participatory while the VI Government has historically operated in secrecy and 
recycles its “leaders.” A person with no vision in one job will be unlikely to have 
vision in a new one. They also tend to be risk averse and unwilling to speak out, 
make waves, or challenge the status quo. The media will be present to inform the 
public about what transpires and historians will be invited to document the event. 
Such openness and participation has never happened before in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.

One example of the subject matter expertise would be the Department of 
Energy. A representative from this department along with scientists and 
economists will be the best equipped to answer questions about decreasing 
reliance on imported oil from an increasingly unfriendly country, that is used to 
produce electricity in a vulnerable single location generating facility, with 
vulnerable single-location fuel storage and a featherweight distribution system. 
WAPA should be invited, but they are part of the problem because they have
presided over this dilemma. It is against their interest to explore solar and wind energy for the sake of emergency preparedness and Homeland Security, although they have reluctantly made some progress in the sole interest of saving money.

Another example involves how to increase local food production. The existing powers have not made any effort to increase local agriculture. We do not have enough food stores for major disasters and the Department of Education food storage facility is in one warehouse. That is another vulnerability. Experts from the Department of Agriculture, the VI Farmers Cooperative and the University of the Virgin Islands Agricultural Station would be the proper folk to review and make recommendations in this area.

4. Planning Group Questions

In addition to questions Planning Group members develop on their own, they will examine the following questions to assist in developing sound policy recommendations.

1. How much food, fuel, water and other resources do we consume and thus need to stockpile and import? What is our “ecological footprint”?214

2. How long a reserve do we have from the usual, normal-course-of-business stockpiles, i.e., how much food is in the food store warehouse and how much fuel is in the WAPA fuel storage tanks? Should the VI Government stockpile food and supplies?

3. What happens if there is hoarding or price gouging?

4. Is a military airlift feasible? Will the U.S. Navy participate? Who will coordinate such an air or sea lift?

5. How will air or sea-lifted food and medicine be distributed when there is no fuel? How will we get uncontaminated drinking water without fuel for desalinization?

214 Barry Ray, Ph.D. (Professor, University of the Virgin Islands), conversations with the author in November and December 2004, January 14 and March 30, 2005.
6. Can we increase local food production?

7. Can we increase local energy production from such things as solar and wind power? Should the VI pursue and support joining the Caribbean Electric Power Network?\footnote{Ananta Panchan, "WAPA Considers 'Plugging In' to Florida Power Supply," \textit{St. Thomas Source}, December 16, 2005, \url{http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131773123} (accessed 12/17/05).}

8. Can we reduce electric power vulnerability by what is called a “distributed network,” i.e., decentralized energy production?

9. As a short term solution to fuel shortages, can Hovensa Oil products from St. Croix be shipped directly to St. Thomas and St. John, rather than through Puerto Rico middlemen?

10. Since the military is a major user of Hovensa-produced refined petroleum products, if there is another attack, will the U.S. military then take a larger percentage of that product to keep its forces operating?

11. Is the supply of crude oil to Hovensa from Venezuela secure, politically and otherwise? What alternatives have been examined?

12. Can we diversify the economy away from tourism, for example, along the lines of the technology park envisioned for St. Croix?

13. How will we harden and build redundancy into WAPA?

14. What resources, if any, will the resorts, as community members, be willing to provide? Food, lodging, refrigeration for food, refrigeration for morgues? Are there agreements in place for these?

15. Legal considerations: In the event of terrorism, who has Emergency Powers? What are they? What are the requirements before they can be implemented? What is their scope? What are their limitations? For example, who has authority to open or close local ports, the VI Port Authority, U.S. Coast Guard, police, fire, VI Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health? Who has authority to order quarantine and who would enforce it?
This question takes on special significance in the VI because if a sick person with a contagious, terrorist-related illness walks into the only hospital on St. Thomas, or the only hospital on St. Croix or the only clinic on St. John, that entire facility may be contaminated. Where then do the rest of the citizens go? Who can mandate that a local hotel accept overflow hospital patients? Who will pay for that?

Because we cannot protect everything, the VI must prioritize its vulnerabilities. The most efficient and accurate way to do this is a mathematical approach called “Scale Free Network Theory.”216 This theory emphasizes applying Critical Node/Critical Link analysis to Critical Infrastructure Protection. It will help to prioritize the most critical links and nodes, i.e., where money is best spent. It will work for WAPA’s distribution system once it is mapped and for highways and roads now because they are already mapped. It will also work for shipping and transportation and the Territory’s communications networks. Next, Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) should be used.

MBVA is a process that zeroes in on vulnerabilities of critical nodes [and links] for the purpose of quantitatively evaluating the vulnerability of a sector. MBVA combines network analysis with fault analysis tools used by reliability engineers to analyze faults in complex systems… [Following this would be] risk assessment and resource allocation. Taken together, these tools provide a complete process for identification of sector weaknesses, estimating vulnerabilities, computing risk, and then allocating funds to improve the security of the sector’s critical nodes.217

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5. Additional Benefits of a Planning Group

a. Hurricanes, Earthquakes, Tsunamis and Multi-Use

Some people fear that a hurricane, earthquake or tsunami\(^{218}\) is more likely than terrorism. Hurricane Hugo devastated St. Croix in 1989 and Hurricane Marilyn did the same to St. Thomas in 1995. Approximately 80 percent of all homes were damaged or destroyed by these hurricanes. Economically, 9/11 negatively affected all of the islands. There have been other natural disasters. Groundwater contamination lead to a Super Fund cleanup of the Tutu region of St. Thomas and in 2001 there was a “massive sulfuric acid spill at St. Croix Alumina” on St. Croix.\(^{219}\)

The USVI has experienced a series of hurricanes: Hugo (1989), Marilyn (1995), Bertha (1996), Georges (1998), and Lenny (1999), after nearly half a century of little activity…The USVI is also susceptible to earthquakes, tsunamis and other seismic hazards. It is located near the North American and Caribbean tectonic plates, and is classified as Zone 4 in terms of quake hazard (similar to California).\(^{220}\)

Due to the historical record of earthquakes in the region, it is considered reasonable to expect that tsunamis would be generated as well and the historic record bears this out…\(^{221}\)

It is impossible to know if a port attack is more likely than another kind of attack, and it is similarly impossible to predict that a hurricane, earthquake or tsunami strike is more likely than terrorism. Thus, the concept of “multi-use” is

\(^{218}\) According to Roy Watlington, Ph.D., a tsunami with the strength of the one that struck the VI in 1867 would destroy all infrastructure lower than 21 feet above sea level up to ¼ mile inland, http://faculty.uvi.edu/users/rwatlin, (accessed 3/16/06).


Also, the U.S. Virgin Islands is actually considered as earthquake-prone as many areas of California,” United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, April 2005, 4-10.

\(^{221}\) United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 4-14.
valuable in evaluating how to allocate limited resources. VI ports could be closed by a nationwide port shutdown, a VI port shutdown or a hurricane, earthquake or tsunami. “An earthquake generating a tsunami can impact vulnerable facilities, particularly the VIPA port facilities, St. John’s single lifeline to St. Thomas.”222

“Sunken vessels can block STT Harbor. Primary emphasis must be given to clearing the harbor, both for bringing in disaster relief supplies and restoration of the cruise industry.”223 Under each scenario, the result is the same, thus planning for a port shutdown will help in the case of terrorism or a natural disaster. WAPA could be damaged by terrorism or a natural disaster. Again, the end result is the same, so planning to develop alternatives, decentralize production and build redundancy will help no matter what the cause.

Because all of the Planning Group’s planning will address calamities regardless of cause, it is truly multi-use planning.

It is also expected that the Planning Group’s conclusions will apply to other island states, U.S. territories and freely associated states in the Pacific.224

6. EXPECTED CONCLUSIONS

a. Expected Planning Group Findings

Preliminary investigation suggests the following Planning Group findings. These are just ideas to initiate discussion. After the facts are identified the Planning Group will endeavor to find solutions.

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222 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2-16.
224 “The Pacific territories, possessions, and freely associated states that are included in the U.S. homeland are: Guam, American Samoa, and Jarvis Island; the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands; the Freely Associated States under the compacts of Free Association, which include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau; and the following U.S. possessions: Wake Island, Midway Islands, Johnston Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, Jarvis Island and Kingman Reef.” Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Department of Defense, June 2005, fn. #2, 8.
A military airlift and sealift will work and should be coordinated by a VI government agency, perhaps the VI Department of Homeland Security or VITEMA. The food and commodities should be distributed to the normal food and pharmacy wholesalers for distribution to the normal food and pharmacy retailers. This will disperse the product and prevent chaos, but might be problematic because there will be no fuel to transport citizens to markets to shop.

Since less than 3% of the land is cultivated yet almost 12% of the land is suitable for agriculture, there is the potential for increased local agricultural production. However, this increased production is unlikely to occur in sufficient capacity to feed the local population. It will at any rate require government funding and support.\textsuperscript{225} The concept of Victory Gardens could be explored. There are no statistics about the potential for increasing local fishing, and Fish and Wildlife regulations may have to be changed to allow for fishing in traditionally closed or off limits fishing areas during an emergency.

Although we can increase local energy production from such things as solar and wind power, and we can reduce electric power vulnerability by decentralized energy production, both of these will require significant investment in infrastructure.\textsuperscript{226}

Hovensa Oil products from St. Croix can be shipped directly to St. Thomas and St. John rather than through Puerto Rico middlemen, yet it is likely that supplies will be limited because the military is a major user of Hovensa-produced refined petroleum products and will take a larger percentage. Further, given political uncertainties, Hovensa’s supply of crude oil is not guaranteed because Venezuela has become openly hostile toward the United States and has started to sell large amounts of its crude to other countries, for example China.


\textsuperscript{226} WAPA finally received bids for alternative energy production such as waste to oil, wind power, etc. Dan Buchanan, “WAPA to Choose Between Wind, Waste, Coal or Oil,” \textit{St. John Source}, November 30, 2005, \url{http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131772490} (accessed 11/30/05).
The public sector must be an active participant in these initiatives because many of them will flourish only if there are tax incentives to provide the necessary impetus.

b. Expected Planning Group Structure

Love of country, community and humanity are the motivating factors for the Planning Group. Membership will be voluntary and it is anticipated that for members who have other jobs, the Planning Group will become an acknowledged part of that person’s official job responsibility. In this sense, the Planning Group will be funded by the members’ employers.

The Planning Group will need a secretary, basic office supplies and access to computers, phone, fax, copier, etc. At least two people will be needed to organize and run the Planning Group. One person will assume the duties of Director; the other will serve as Assistant Director. The Director will be responsible for all coordination and organization. There will be two Facilitators who could be the same Director and Assistant Director. Their task would be to assist the Planning Group members as needed. Funding will be required for conference room space and meals.

The Planning Group will not have subpoena, arrest or emergency powers. Whether it will follow the confidentiality provisions adopted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security227 will have to be determined. Whenever possible, it is the goal of the Planning Group to conduct all business in public and all meetings are open to the public. There will be an initial “meeting of the whole” and then meetings of the whole only as needed.

The Planning Group will break into Subcommittees, with each Subcommittee representing substantive areas of expertise. The Subcommittees will focus on their respective tasks, yet take advantage of other areas of knowledge as needed.

For example, the VI Energy Office will probably be assigned the question of whether it is wise to diversify and decentralize energy production, and if so, how to do that. These questions will require the expertise of other Planning Group members, such as WAPA, physicists, ecologists and economists. The Planning Group will complete its business within nine months to one year and will issue a final report three months later. The report will be a compilation and synthesis of the individual Subcommittee reports. After issuing a final report, the Planning Group will be disbanded.

Business will be conducted in a large conference room, possibly at a hotel. The Planning Group has no power to enforce adoption of any initiatives or to ensure compliance. The Director will coordinate with the State Department for communication and coordination with other countries, including the British Virgin Islands.

7. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The following questions need to be resolved:

- Who will design and staff the Planning Group?228
- The list of participants is large. Is it too large? Can some of the participants with similar perspectives be combined?
- Will Planning Group members from the private sector be compensated? If so, who will fund them?
- What are the Planning Group funding requirements? Prepare a budget.
- Where will the Planning Group conduct its business? Will there be a permanent office?
- How often will the Planning Group meet?
- Who or what agency will be ultimately responsible for the Planning Group and conducting meetings?
- Who will monitor compliance with any of the adopted initiatives?

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228 Invaluable help and ideas for this section came from John Bowman, Rescue Chief and Immediate Past Vice President, St. John Rescue, and Master Sergeant, United States Air Force Security Police, Retired.
- What duties and responsibilities will Planning Group members have toward official VI agencies and with other agencies outside of the VI?
- Who will coordinate with the State Department for communication and coordination with other countries?
- Since many agencies would not assist me in this thesis, how do we avoid creating another level of non-cooperation?
V. ACTION PLAN: WHAT WE CAN DO NOW

Several of these recommendations can be implemented with little or no cost to the VI Government.

A. THE GOVERNOR’S UNIFYING VISION

The task of initiating change rests with the Territory’s Chief Executive. The most important contribution to improving any and all aspects of life in the VI, law enforcement and Homeland Security, is for the Governor to develop a unifying vision. Not just a vision of economic recovery, but also of social recovery aimed at uniting the community and a New VIPD.

All levels of government and all levels of government employees will have a role in implementing this vision. The police, however, are paramount. The New VIPD will endeavor to foster not just appreciation of the individual cultures, but also a sense of belonging to a larger group. This will not happen by itself or in a vacuum. The Governor must appoint new police leadership and the Legislature must provide necessary funding to successfully create the New VIPD.

The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group and the critical changes needed will not happen on their own. It will require vigorous promotion by persistent and determined individuals because it challenges the status quo.

The problems that exist in 2006 were not all created during the current Governor’s two terms. Many of the problems predate him but they still exist, and that is a problem. If it remains clear that the Virgin Islands cannot reform itself, and this is a major unanswered question because such reform would alienate some people in power, then the Homeland Security imperative may cause the federal government to take over more local functions. A successful model for this federal supervision exists in the District of Columbia.

There are, however, many leaders in industry, the private sector and government who understand the complexities of the problems presented. These
people recognize that there are brilliant, dedicated and caring men and women living and working in the Territory who would love to contribute. Thus, these leaders must be enlisted as sponsors. At the same time, the many talented, motivated and caring citizens who share these same understandings must be involved in the process.

Who could lead this endeavor? The Champion must be the Chief Executive, the Governor. It will require vision and top-down leadership. The task must be embraced with open arms and an open mind. Drawing from the *Public Administrator as Hero*, quoted above, the Governor will have the incredible opportunity to foster meaningful change on an unprecedented level — “to bring new life to a dying land.”

### B. IMPROVE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT - THE NEW VIPD

Local law enforcement needs immediate overhaul. *Absent the Synaptic Disconnect, the VIPD could be an effective law enforcement agency and the premier intelligence fusion agency in the Caribbean.* It is important that the Virgin Islands welcome information from every level down through fire and police and local citizenry. Every citizen must be confident that information they relay to a local police officer, firefighter, teacher, WAPA employee, Public Works employee, etc., will be forwarded up the chain: from that person to that agency’s Intelligence Coordinator or Homeland Security Representative, then up to the *New VIPD* Homeland Security or Intelligence Division and the VI Department of Homeland Security and finally to the national level. Everybody has a role to play. The *New VIPD* will be networked with other agencies. There will be seamless information sharing and cooperation up and down the chains of command and from agency to agency.

The atmosphere in which this can occur requires *new leadership in the VIPD with the power and will to fire low-performing officers and command staff who will not progress, a Governor-inspired unifying vision, and funding.* A major federal intervention is needed to inspire the local government to pay more
attention to border issues, to provide the VIPD with modern police training and to promote the major change, which is community policing.

Although they are currently not capable, the ideal Homeland Security strategy for the VI would have the New VIPD at the center of information collection. Caring, involved and highly motivated Community Oriented Policing officers, who have an excellent rapport with all segments of the community, gladly refer all citizen information to the New VIPD Intelligence Division and Terrorism Fusion Center, where a team of analysts turn the raw data (information) into intelligence. In the New VIPD, intelligence travels in all directions to those who need it. They do not ask who needs to know, but who else needs to know.

The New VIPD Fusion Center has its own multi-lingual intelligence officers, who represent the many groups who live in the Territory. The Fusion Center thus incorporates human intelligence sources, as well as open sources and citizen input. Because of the VIPD’s successful interaction and involvement with the community, the local ham radio operators even provide signals intelligence.

The Fusion Center works closely with all the federal agencies, other Caribbean islands and organized private sector groups, including the volunteer Rescue Squads. It regularly relays information about real-time alien, potential terrorist, border and transportation security to the CBP Task Force Teams, who, with the willing and highly motivated assistance of the New VIPD, intercept and arrest.

Because “there is a lack of structured and formal oversight of VIPD officers by command staff”\textsuperscript{229} for both Homeland Security and regular old law enforcement, the New VIPD must represent a major reorganization, leadership and attitude change.

At all layers, police must be in a ‘hunter’ not a ‘fisherman’ mindset: They must actively seek out, observe, and track their ‘prey.’ They must not stand idly by or simply wait passively until something happens to attract their attention or until someone does something demonstrably threatening. The senior commanders overseeing and orchestrating the [officers’] deployment must closely supervise and control the environment, making adjustments and changes as necessary.230

C. INCREASE FEDERAL BORDER PATROL PRESENCE

Establishing a Border Patrol presence in the VI is an absolute imperative. Such a presence should utilize highly mobile teams on each island, with land, near-shore and far-shore marine and helicopter capability available to quickly track and intercept both the smugglers and the smuggled.

At the same time, the VI Government needs federal resources to increase the awareness of and response to border protection issues.

D. ENACT THE TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING GROUP

The existing plans must be corrected so the Governor and other elected officials and leaders have the facts, insights and options needed for them to better prepare for the challenges they must address. Homeland Security encompasses all aspects of society and it will take participation from all aspects of society to learn, grow and make the VI safer.

E. PROPERLY FUND THE VOLUNTEER RESCUE SQUADS

St. Thomas Rescue, St. Croix Rescue, St. John Rescue and Water Island Search and Rescue (Rescue Squads) collectively save the Government of the Virgin Islands millions of dollars per year because they do what is traditionally a Government function. The Rescue Squads are completely volunteer – 100 percent of all funding goes toward operations, equipment, training, supplies, etc.

Collectively throughout the Territory and individually on each island, there are more trained medical first responders in the Rescue Squads than there are in the police and fire departments. There are also more licensed EMTs on the Rescue Squads than are on the Government payroll. These men and women are on call any time of the day or night and in any weather. They do nothing but help people.

Yet the Rescue Squads are severely under-funded. They have bake sales, raffles and various fundraisers to raise money. They seek private donations and do receive some funding from the VI Government although it is inconsistent, and never to the proper level. Frequently members spend their personal money for supplies.

Each Rescue Squad has submitted budgets. Immediately, the Government should fund these requests in full for equipment, supplies and training and thereby increase the Territory’s life-saving capabilities.

F. PROPERLY FUND THE VOLUNTEER ARES

The same need for funding as for the Rescue Squads is true of the amateur radio operators. Keeping in mind that after Hurricane Marilyn, they were the only group with operational radio communications and they provided life-saving communications to the VI Government and its citizens. They have been using their own equipment forever. ARES has designed and given to VITEMA detailed plans for needed communications. This should be funded.

It has been a long time since ARES was the key player in Hurricane Marilyn so it is appropriate to remind our decision makers that ARES was very active in Florida and Alabama this past hurricane season. Any of those storms could have struck the VI. This footnote contains a statement from the ARRL, American Radio Relay League recognizing their contribution.231

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231: ARRL Web site <memberlist@www.arrl.org> wrote:

Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2006 03:34:22 -0500
Subject: ARES E-Letter for February 15, 2006
From: "ARRL Web site" <memberlist@www.arrl.org>
The ARES E-Letter
G. PROPERLY FUND A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM.

February 15, 2006

Rick Palm, K1CE, Editor

+ The View from Flagler County

Orlando, Florida, February 11, 2006 - In the past, the Orlando Hamcation was a national-scale event; not quite Dayton, but big. It still is, judging by Saturday's crowd. The ARES Forum was "Standing Room Only." A notable guest was John Fleming, WD4FFX, of the Florida Division of Emergency Management staff. Without his support, it is likely there would be little or no Amateur Radio involvement with the state's EOC and its operations.

It was Fleming, along with Northern Florida Section Manager Rudy Hubbard, WA4PUP, and former SEC George Thurston, W4MLE (SK), that set the stage for the modern relationship with the state. Before Hurricane Andrew in 1992, relations could be summed up by the state's "Don't call us, we'll call you" policy. But after Andrew, the Governor and FEMA patently needed new planning. Thurston called Hubbard about a meeting to be held at Tallahassee. FEMA reps, the Governor's staff, and several amateurs attended, including Thurston, Hubbard, and John Hills, KC4N, current State Government Liaison.

The Governor replaced the staff at the state EOC with professionals from South Carolina, veterans who had managed the Hurricane Hugo disaster there in 1989. Hubbard gave the new staffers a copy of the Northern Florida ARES Plan. They asked if ARES could provide the communication service depicted in the plan. They were assured ARES could, and the next meeting with ARES and the SEOC reflected a new relationship between the two entities, one that has worked exceptionally well since the mid-1990's. Fleming has been the point man.

Fleming lauded amateurs involved in last year's incredible hurricane season, passed out State Certificates of Recognition, a special achievement award for Hubbard, and emphasized the importance of the role of Amateur Radio and ARES at the state EOC. He noted the state's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program had resulted in the large Brevard County Amateur Radio Emergency Service van parked on display outside the building. Fleming emphasized training and preparation for the upcoming hurricane season, and informed the group of two conferences: the Governor's Hurricane Conference in Ft. Lauderdale in May, and the National Hurricane Conference in Orlando in April. Amateur Radio sessions will be held at each event.

DEC KO4TT--Steve Richbourg's, professional presentation of the Northern Florida ARES Plan was well received. Hubbard discussed the state's "tracker" system for matching emergency communication needs with assets, and emphasized that his ARES organization embraces all modes as tools for communication, including "two coffee cans and string, if necessary." The Northern Florida SEC Joe Bushel, W2DWR, emotionally expressed his appreciation for hurricane efforts. I said that the excellent response of the field organization was matched by ARRL HQ staff members who took unprecedented steps to support its field's efforts. Alabama Section Manager Greg Sarratt, W4OZK, spoke of his appreciation for the ARES effort as well.

"Orlando" was an opportunity to put faces to call signs, and I was especially pleased to meet Greg, Hillsborough County RACES Officer and EC Gary Sessums, KC5QCN, who was another key player in the Katrina response, and Harold Kramer, WJ1B, the League's Chief Operating Officer (a former Emergency Coordinator). Harold is a great guy and supporter of the ARES program. This ARES E-Letter was his idea originally.
This system, described above, works and it will save lives. It is relatively inexpensive. Almost the entire Coral Bay region of St. John has been mapped and all with volunteer effort. The current planning is for St. John Rescue to purchase small laptop computers to be mounted inside of its rescue vehicles. They will then be able to find a location by occupant or owner name, phone number, house name, etc.

The next step would be for these laptops to be added to the police cars, ambulances and fire trucks.

H. IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) are written procedures to follow in the case of a specific emergency. They are basic planning documents but do not exist in the VI public sector. Attached at Appendix D are several EAPs designed by St. John Rescue. They are included here as a starting point only. They should be evaluated and improved. Making them better will cost nothing. Then they should be given to the Police Department’s Central Dispatch so proper resources can be brought to the emergency. For example, if there is an earthquake, Central Dispatch would look to the EAP for Earthquakes and have a list of whom to contact and what resources should be deployed.

I. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR IMMEDIATE OFF-ISLAND ASSISTANCE

Because the VI’s first responders may be injured and unable to respond and because there is no help available from the next town, city or state, planning should begin immediately to automatically bring in outside rescue personnel. Planning without these provisions is simply inadequate. Designing these is essentially cost free.
J. EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS FOR IMMEDIATE OFF-ISLAND ASSISTANCE

Several of the British Virgin Islands are closer to St. Thomas and St. John than St. Croix, and VISAR (Virgin Island Search and Rescue, British based ocean rescue) is exemplary. The VI Government should immediately begin negotiation with the British Virgin Islands and with the help of the VI Department of Justice and perhaps the State Department, draft Mutual Aid agreements. Again, this is essentially cost-free.

To some extent, this type of cooperation has already begun. On February 24, 2006, it was reported that the FBI is scheduled to provide the British Virgin Islands with a weeklong training in Weapons of Mass Destruction.232

K. NEGOTIATE MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Planning for disasters must involve the private sector. For example, as demonstrated above, there is not enough VI Government-controlled food for a major disaster. Therefore, the VI Government must negotiate agreements with the food and beverage wholesalers to make their inventories available in an emergency.

At the same time, because of the potential for looting, discussed above, the police or the Virgin Islands National Guard must be in place to preserve order at all of these locations. This needs to be negotiated beforehand too.

These agreements do not guarantee there will be enough supplies and off-island help will still be needed. For example, if the disaster were to happen during hurricane season, which is typically the slowest tourist season, these suppliers will not have the same amount of supplies in their warehouses that they have during peak tourist season.

Another example is the Mental Health Crisis Intervention planning discussed above and also in Appendix E. Because there is insufficient staff in the Division of Mental Health to meet our needs, the Government must contract with private sector psychiatrists, psychologists and counselors before the crisis hits.

All of these can be accomplished at little or no cost.

L. THE VI DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CAN ANSWER THE LEGAL QUESTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE

These include, who has Emergency Powers? What are they? What are the requirements before they can be implemented? What is their scope? What are their limitations? Who has authority to open or close local ports? Who has authority to order quarantine and who would enforce it? There is no need to wait for a catastrophe. An after-the-fact, crisis-driven response can and should be avoided. We should endeavor to answer these questions in a way that does not trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy. This too is essentially cost free.

M. CONCLUSION: WHAT WOULD PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS?

Our government leaders and the population must first recognize the problem. In Al Qaeda, Islamic extremists and others, we are facing cunning and ruthless enemies. We must recognize America is at risk, seaports are risk and the VI is at risk from them.

We have other enemies too. Change and true preparedness can not take place until the social issues have also been addressed.

Poverty, unemployment and inequality undermine the kind of social cohesion needed to manage change effectively and this is especially so where the lines of exclusion coincide with deep rooted ethnic and social divisions. They occur in the context of the intense exposure of the region’s population, especially the youth, to affluent metropolitan life styles through the presence of a large tourist population and to a relentless diet of the cult of individualist consumerism, sex and violence, through satellite TV and other new
technologies. This may undermine disciplined attitudes to study and work and contribute to the legitimization of antisocial behaviour.\textsuperscript{233}

We must eliminate government unresponsiveness, mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and cronyism, and the social issues including racism, economic disparity, poor education, lack of job skills, limited employment opportunities, poor police relations and the absence of a sense of community. These are vital to growth, prosperity, Homeland Security and survival.

The federal government and the Department of Homeland Security must also dramatically increase the federal law enforcement presence, including Customs and Border Protection. Because community participation is essential to effective law enforcement and effective Homeland Security, the federal government should immediately take steps to support the development of Community Oriented Policing in the VI, and to grow the New VIPD. The Governor must develop a unifying vision. Not just a vision of economic recovery, but also of social recovery, an integrated community and a New VIPD.

The Virgin Islands must accept that it cannot reach the same level of preparedness as the mainland United States because we are isolated and cannot take advantage of Regionalization. Because of this, the Virgin Islands need a greater share of Homeland Security Funding so it can achieve more of the TCL capabilities. That money must be well spent and is meaningless unless there are adequate physical and personnel resources to operate or utilize those resources. Further, we must face the sober fact that our first responders may at the least be overwhelmed and perhaps not even able to respond. This means planning for the Virgin Islands, and perhaps all island states, must include off-

\textsuperscript{233} Girvan, “Societies at risk?”
island resources. We must find a way for “…federal assets to quickly supplement or, if necessary, supplant first responders.” 234

A Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group will help in this process by bringing together the Territory’s untapped talent. The end product of the Planning Group will be well thought out recommendations based on accurate information, to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of Homeland Security, VITEMA and other leaders.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I invite anyone with comments or suggestions to contact me at malperen@chds-alumni.org. Thank you.

The Federal interagency community has developed fifteen all-hazards planning scenarios (the National Planning Scenarios or Scenarios) for use in national, Federal, State, and local Homeland Security preparedness activities. The Scenarios are planning tools and are representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the related impacts that face our nation.235 * * * * “[T]he scenarios developed generally reflect possible terrorist capabilities and known tradecraft.... * * * As there is a possibility that multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially, organizations should always consider the need to respond to multiple incidents of the same type and multiple incidents of different types, at either the same or other geographic locations, in preparedness planning efforts. These incidents will invariably require the coordination and cooperation of Homeland Security response organizations across multiple regional, State, and local jurisdictions.236

The National Planning Scenarios ask:

1. What should we prepare for as a Nation? ... [and] illustrate the scope [sic] magnitude, and complexity of major events that we should prepare for as a Nation.

2. What Tasks need to be performed, under what conditions, and to what standards? The Universal Task List (UTL) provides a comprehensive menu of tasks that can be performed in major events outlined in the scenarios. Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, with private sector support as appropriate, select the tasks that apply to them.

3. Which tasks are critical? Critical tasks derived from the UTL, with associated conditions and performance standards, provide the foundation for developing measurable readiness targets.

4. What capabilities are needed to perform the critical tasks? The Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies the capabilities to perform the critical tasks. A capability provides a means to achieve a

236 Ibid., iv.
measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more critical task(s), under specified conditions and performance standards.\textsuperscript{237}

The National Planning Scenarios list ten broad Mission Areas.\textsuperscript{238}

\textit{Prevention/Deterrence} – The ability to detect, prevent, preempt, and deter terrorist attacks and other man-made emergencies.

\textit{Infrastructure Protection} – The ability to protect critical infrastructure from all threats and hazards.

\textit{Preparedness} – The ability to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise Homeland Security personnel to perform their assigned missions to nationally accepted standards – this mission area includes public education and awareness.

\textit{Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis} – The ability to achieve and maintain a common operating picture, including the ability to detect an incident, determine its impact, determine its likely evolution and course, classify the incident, and make government notifications.

\textit{Emergency Management/Response} – The ability to direct, control, and coordinate a response; manage resources; and provide emergency public information – this outcome includes direction and control through the Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination Systems, and Public Information Systems.

\textit{Hazard Mitigation} – The ability to control, collect, and contain a hazard, lessen its effects, and conduct environmental monitoring – mitigation efforts may be implemented before, during, or after an incident.

\textit{Evacuation/Shelter} – The ability to provide initial warnings to the population at large and at risk; notify people to shelter-in-place or evacuate; provide evacuation and shelter support; and manage traffic flow and ingress and egress to and from the affected area.

\textit{Victim Care} – The ability to treat victims at the scene; transport patients; treat patients at a medical treatment facility; track patients;

\textsuperscript{237} Capabilities Based Planning Overview 12-17, DHS/SLGCP/OPIA/Policy and Planning Branch, 5, \url{https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=11767} (accessed 11/25/05).

\textsuperscript{238} National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, April 2005, v.
handle, track, and secure human remains; provide tracking and security of patients’ possessions and evidence; and manage the worried well.

*Investigation/Apprehension* – The ability to investigate the cause and source of the incident and identify, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks and other manmade emergencies.

*Recovery/Remediation* – The ability to restore essential services, businesses, and commerce; cleanup the environment and render the affected area safe; compensate victims; provide long-term mental health and other services to victims and the public; and restore a sense of well-being in the community.

The Planning Scenarios are\(^\text{239}\)

2. Biological Attack – Aerosolized Anthrax.
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza.
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent.
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake.
10. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane.
15. Cyber Attack.

\(^\text{239}\) National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, 1-1 through 15-2.
APPENDIX B  UNIVERSAL TASK LIST, PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE

“The Universal Task List ... has been reorganized ... to provide a way of organizing the tasks required to achieve the four Homeland Security missions: Prevent, Protect against, Respond to, and Recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies.”

Public Safety and Security Response

CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION
The capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area in coordination with HAZMAT, fire/rescue, and law enforcement disciplines.

OUTCOME
Successfully secure the incident scene while protecting first responders and affected community from further harm.

ESF/ANNEX
ESF#13: Public Safety and Security

UTL TAXONOMY LOCATION
Respond, Minimize Impact, Manage Incident

ASSOCIATED CRITICAL TASKS
Identify and establish incident perimeter and zones
Identify force protection requirements
Establish force protection
Conduct public safety and security response
Conduct traffic control

MEASURES

Capability Measures
Yes/No  Public safety and security plans, policies, and procedures are in place
Yes/No  Of incident sites that can be secured
Number  Of trained personnel available and equipped to effectively control equipment
Yes/No  Traffic control plans, policies, and procedures are in place
Yes/No  Public safety and security plans have been exercised

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/getfile.cfm/Target%20Capabilities%20List%201%2E1%5FFINAL%2Epdf?id=13112 also http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06).

241 Ibid., 87-88.
**Performance Measures**

Yes/No  Safety and security plans and procedures were successfully implemented

Number  Of new or secondary injuries

Percent  Of incident site that was secured

Time  To communicate a site safety plan to all first responders at incident site

Time  To identify and segregate hot, warm, and cold zones for incident response

Time  To secure incident site

Yes/No  All traffic control and alternate ingress/egress routes were identified and staffed addressing damage/debris

Yes/No  All incident site control zones/points were clearly identified and staffed.

Yes/No  Damaged buildings and debris blocking emergency response ingress/egress were removed

Yes/No  Perimeter zones were coordinated jointly by HAZMAT, fire/rescue, and law enforcement

Yes/No  Personnel demonstrated the ability to establish NIMS/ICS command for response

Yes/No  On-scene personnel accountability system was established

**CAPABILITY ELEMENTS**

**Personnel**

Law enforcement and security personnel
National Guard
Traffic control personnel (including traffic engineers)
Building officials
Dam safety officials

**Planning**

Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) consistent with National Response Plan (NRP)
National Incident Management System (NIMS), and applicable laws and regulations
Traffic control plan

**Organization and Leadership**

National Incident Management System (NIMS)
National Response Plan (NRP)
Applicable legislation, plans, directives, policies, and procedures
Equipment and Systems
Barrier/perimeter equipment and supplies
Transportation/traffic control equipment
Personal protective equipment (PPE)
Interoperable communications systems

Training
Safety and security
Safety and security operations in a potential WMD/CBRNE environment
NIMS
PPE

Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions
System for incorporating lessons learned into plans and procedures
Emergency response exercises incorporating public safety and security components
APPENDIX C  TERRITORIAL EMERGENCY SERVICE FUNCTION #8

Territorial Emergency Service Function #8 Health and Medical Services Annex, Section III, SITUATION, A. “Disaster Condition and B. Planning Assumptions.”

III. SITUATION

A. Disaster Condition

A significant natural disaster or man-made event that overwhelms the Virgin Islands would necessitate both public health and medical care assistance. Casualty estimates for a major earthquake could be substantial, depending on population density, quality of building construction, and the location, time, magnitude and duration of the earthquake. The sudden onset of such a large number of victims would stress the territory’s medical system necessitating time-critical assistance from the Federal government. Such a natural disaster would also pose certain public health threats, including problems related to food, vectors, water, Wastewater, solid waste, and mental health effects.

Hospitals, nursing homes, pharmacies and other medical/health care facilities may receive severe structural damaged or may even be destroyed. Those facilities, which survive with little or no structural damage, may be rendered unusable or only partially usable because of a lack of utilities (power, water, sewer), because staff is unable to report for duty due to personal injuries, and/or because of damage/disruption of communication and transportation systems. Medical and health care facilities which remain in operation and have the necessary utilities and staff will probably be overwhelmed by the "walking wounded" and seriously injured victims who are transported there in the immediate aftermath of the occurrence. In the face of massive increases in demand and the damage sustained, medical supplies (including pharmaceutical) and equipment will probably be in short supply. Most health care facilities usually maintain only a small inventory stock to meet their short term normal patient load needs. Disruptions in local communications and transportation systems could prevent timely re-supply.
Uninjured persons who require daily medications such as insulin, anti-hypertensive drugs, and digitalis may have difficulty in obtaining these medications because of damage/destruction of normal supply locations and general shortages within the disaster area.

Although other disasters such as hurricanes, floods, etc., may not generate the casualty volume of a major earthquake, there will be a noticeable emphasis on relocation, shelters, vector control, Wastewater, and solid waste facilities.

A major emergency resulting from an explosion or toxic gas release could occur that might not damage the local medical system. However, such an event could produce a large concentration of specialized injuries that could overwhelm the territorial and island medical system.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. The Health sector resources within the affected disaster area of the Territory will be inadequate to clear casualties from the scene or treat them in local hospitals. Additional mobilized Federal capabilities will urgently be needed to supplement and assist the Territorial government to triage, and treat casualties in the disaster area and then transport them to the closest appropriate hospital or other health care facility. Additionally, medical re-supply will be needed throughout the disaster area. In a major disaster, operational necessity will probably require the further transportation of patients, probably by air, to the nearest area with sufficient concentrations of available hospital beds where patient needs can be matched with the necessary definitive medical care.

2. Damage to chemical and industrial plants, sewer lines, and water distribution systems and secondary hazards such as fires will result in toxic environmental and public health hazards to the surviving population and response personnel including exposure to hazardous chemicals, and contaminated water supplies, crops, livestock, and food products.

3. The damage and destruction of a catastrophic natural disaster will produce urgent needs for mental health crisis counseling for disaster victims and response personnel.

4. Assistance in maintaining the continuity of health and medical services will be required.
5. Disruption of sanitation services and facilities, loss of power, and massing of people in shelters may increase the potential for disease and injuries.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{242} Territorial Emergency Services Function #8, Health and Medical Services Annex, 3-4.
APPENDIX D  EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

1. RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE:

“WINDSHIELD ASSESSMENT” (what do you see from your vehicle) then order resources based on this assessment.

SCENE SIZE UP. Give on scene report answering questions:
What kind of situation do I have?
What action will I take?
What resources do I need?
Approximate number and condition of patients.

Survey scene and identify hazards or safety concerns, establish safe zone for further rescue operations.

For HAZMAT: identify the hazardous material

2. TIME, DISTANCE and SHIELDING

Civil Disturbance, Hazardous materials emergencies.

Spend as little TIME in the area as possible. Forgo treatment on behalf of your safety and get the patient out as quickly as possible.

Maintain as much DISTANCE as possible from the hot zone area.

Put as much SHIELDING (protection) between you and the violence/hazard as possible.

Establish Incident Command Posts UPWIND and UPHILL

3. TRIAGE:

Effective triage is vital to any multi casualty or mass casualty incident.

S.T.A.R.T. Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment.

Use “RPM” Respiration, Perfusion, and Mental Status.

Respiration: if none, reposition head and open airway, if no again tag DECEASED.
If after you open airway there are respirations, tag IMMEDIATE. If respirations more than 30 per min. tag IMMEDIATE.

Perfusion. Check capillary refill, if more than 2 seconds tag IMMEDIATE. Can also check radial pulse.

Mental Status: if altered (can't follow simple commands), tag IMMEDIATE.

Only treatment rendered by triage team is if not breathing, to open airway, or direct pressure to stop obvious bleed, or elevate extremities for shock.

IMMEDIATE: those whose RPM is altered.
DELAYED: unable to leave on their own but whose RPM is intact.
MINOR: able to leave on their own, “walking wounded”.

Use Triage Tags.
4. SAFARI BUS OFF ROAD or MULTI-PASSENGER VEHICLE ACCIDENT

RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE: Windshield Assessment - Scene Size Up.

NOTIFY:

Police, Fire, EMS & REQUEST BACKUP EMS FROM STT, NPS, Rescue, ARES, Public Works, VITEMA, MKS, Tow truck & heavy equipment notify through VIPD.

RESOURCES NEEDED:

Police: scene security, traffic, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed.
Fire: fire suppression, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed.
Rescue: vehicle stabilization + extrication, First Responder/EMS, lighting, assist as needed.
EMS: supervise all on-scene medical.
Tow truck: stabilize or move vehicles.

Maybe heavy equipment for vehicle stabilization, movement
Maybe taxicabs for people transport (rescue personnel, wounded to clinic)
Maybe food and water for rescuers (logistics)
Maybe ARES for off island or dead zone communications
Maybe WAPA for utility pole damage

OBJECTIVE: To rescue as many survivors as possible. Remove, triage and transport the injured. Establish a perimeter and secure the area

PLAN: stabilize scene (perimeter), stabilize vehicle(s), triage (walking wounded to Delayed Treatment area), extricate, triage, transport.

TRIAGE AREA: either at accident site or entry to Treatment Area.

TRIAGE: S.T.A.R.T. “RPM” Respiration, Perfusion, Mental Status.

TREATMENT AREA: upwind and uphill; sufficient space for all injured; unimpeded access for EMS; separate areas for patients classified as immediate, delayed, minor.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) ORGANIZATION:
SAFARI BUS OFF ROAD or MULTI-PASSENGER VEHICLE
Incident Command: __________________________

Planning: Chief ___________________

    Situation Unit, keep IC advised on status

Operations: Chief __________________________

    : staging area manager _________________

    : treatment area manager _________________

        : vehicle stabilization team(s) _________________

        : vehicle stabilization team(s) _________________

        : vehicle extrication team(s) _________________

        vehicle extrication team(s) _________________

    medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First Responders _________________,

    medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First Responders _________________,

    medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First Responders _________________,

    medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First Responders _________________

    (Medical Team work with extrication teams for patient care during extrication,
then move to Treatment Area)
5. LANDSLIDE – EARTHQUAKE

RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE: Windshield Assessment - Scene Size Up.

NOTIFY:

Police, Fire, EMS & REQUEST BACKUP EMS FROM STT, NPS, Rescue, ARES, Public Works, VITEMA, MKS, Tow truck & heavy equipment notify through VIPD,

RESOURCES NEEDED:

Maybe VITEMA EOC
Police: scene security, traffic, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed.
Fire: fire suppression, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed.
Rescue: vehicle stabilization + extrication, First Responder/EMS, lighting, assist as needed.
EMS: supervise all on-scene medical.
Tow truck: stabilize or move vehicles.
Heavy equipment for moving large rocks, removing obstacles
Maybe taxicabs for people transport (rescue personnel, wounded to clinic)
Maybe food and water for rescuers (logistics)
Maybe ARES for off island or dead zone communications
Maybe WAPA for utility poles.
Wood for building collapse (4X4X16, 4X6X16, 4X8X16) double headed nails, plywood
(Lumber Yard and Hardware Store)

UNOFFICIAL RESOURCES:

Carpenters & builders for building collapse & shoring of damaged structures
Search teams:

OBJECTIVE: Search all structures for casualties by ________ hours
Provide medical care as needed
Transport injured to clinic
Clear all roads by ________ hours

PLAN:
Organize search teams, determine scale of damage and injury
LIGHTLY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: search, triage, report, treatment, transport.

MODERATELY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: utilities, search, ABC’s, remove from structure, treatment, transport.

HEAVILY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: stay out, utilities, stabilize structures with potential or known occupants, search these now stabilized structures triage all injuries, transport, clear roads

ICS ORGANIZATION:
LANDSLIDE – EARTHQUAKE

Incident Command: VITEMA? __________________________

Information Officer: __________________________

Incident Command Post (ICP) VITEMA’s EOC?

Operations: Chief __________________________

Cruz Bay Division: ________________

staging area manager ______________________

Gift Hill Division: ________________

staging area manager ______________________

Westin Division: ________________

staging area manager ______________________

Coral Bay Division: ________________

staging area manager ______________________

East End Division: ________________

staging area manager ______________________

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Air Operations: _____________________

ARES: off island and dead zone communications

Strike Teams: semi-non-entry searches to prioritize search sites (e.g., this building was vacant, this one had several inhabitants), neighbors can do this.

Task Forces: Heavy equipment, EMS, Building Collapse Team

Planning: Chief _____________________
   Situation Unit
   Resources Unit

Logistics: Chief _____________________
   Food Unit
   Supply Unit
6. ST. JOHN CARNIVAL PARADE

POTENTIAL HAZARDS: usual medical problems – normal occurrences, public health (water and porta-potty), vehicle collision, crowd control, clean up, fight-riot, fire at location on parade route, amusement ride collapse, power failure, marine based threat, terrorism.

VULNERABILITIES: facilities: NPS, Post Office, EMS/DeCastro, Jurgen Command, Sprauve School, Texaco Station, MKS.

NOTIFIED - ON SCENE - AVAILABLE:

Police+Police boats, Fire, EMS, NPS, Public Works, VITEMA, MKS, Rescue, WAPA,

RESOURCES NEEDED:

Police+police boats, Fire, EMS, NPS, Public Works, MKS, Rescue, WAPA

ICS ORGANIZATION:

Incident Command Post: Jurgen? _______________________

Incident Commander: ____________________________

Operations: Chief ____________________________

Police-Fire-EMS-Rescue-NPS Branch ____________________________

  Police Group Leader __________________________
  Fire Group Leader __________________________
  EMS Group Leader __________________________
  Rescue Group Leader __________________________
  NPS Group Leader __________________________
  MKS Group Leader __________________________
  Facilities Branch __________________________
  Public Works Group Leader __________________________
  WAPA Group Leader __________________________

Planning: Chief __________________________

  Situation Unit
  Resources Unit
OBJECTIVE: To operate an organized and safe Carnival Parade

ST. JOHN CARNIVAL PARADE

PLAN:

POLICE: to be developed.
POLICE MARINE: to be developed.
FIRE: to be developed.
EMS: to be developed.
NPS: to be developed.
PUBLIC WORKS: to be developed.
MKS: to be developed.
WAPA: to be developed.

RESCUE PLAN: Preposition staff and vehicles and equipment

Rescue 1 positioned so it can move out of town, maybe at Dolphin Market

Private Rescue Member vehicles positioned similarly:
NPS Maintenance Area
Dolphin Market

Rescue Members prepositioned at strategic areas with oxygen and trauma kits
NPS Maintenance Area – Mongoose Junction
Natures Nook
Post Office – EMS
Foot of pier
First Bank – Connections
Sprauve School Annex - Texaco
The following are excerpts from a paper written for a course at the CHDS. I asked the Department of Health what I could do that would both satisfy my course requirements and help them. This was their suggestion. I quickly learned, however, that devising such a plan is a major task, on the level of writing a whole thesis, and time limitations did not permit my efforts to be more detailed. I will not repeat here what has been said elsewhere in this thesis. This information is included to point out the problem and as a starting point for further planning.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

"In general, an effective infrastructure should provide the following functions to adequately prepare for and respond to psychological consequences:

1. Basic resources including food, shelter, communication, transportation, information, guidance, and medical services
2. Interventions and programs to promote individual and community resilience and prevent adverse psychological effects
3. Surveillance for psychological consequences, including distress responses, behavior changes, and psychiatric illness, and markers of individual and community functioning before, during, and after a terrorism event
4. Screening of psychological symptoms at the individual level
5. Treatment for acute and long-term effects of trauma
6. Response for longer-term general human service needs that contribute to psychological functioning (e.g., housing, financial assistance when the event creates job loss)
7. Risk communication and dissemination of information to the public, media, political leaders, and service providers..." 243

Items 1 and 6 are not the province of the Department of Health but are necessary prerequisites to psychological well-being. Psychological intervention is

243 Butler et al. "Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism," 64..
meaningless if people are in crisis regarding the most basic necessities listed in number 1. Intervention is made that much more difficult and the numbers of those needing care will be greater if the longer-term needs listed in number 6 are not satisfied. The Department of Health will be hampered by the Territory’s complete lack of Risk Communication discussed in number 7.

The Department of Health, Division of Mental Health, is thus responsible for items 2, 3, 4 and 5. They have caring and dedicated employees but not enough of them. They have 1 full-time psychiatrist on St. Croix and 2 part-time on St. Thomas. There are 9 counselors in Mental Health territory-wide and more in different sections of the Department of Health. In the private sector, there are approximately 7 psychiatrists in the territory (4 on St. Croix & 3 on St. Thomas), approximately 11 psychologists in the territory, and approximately 100 counselors, territory-wide.244

A. POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The U.S. Virgin Islands has a population of approximately 108,000. There is thus insufficient staff in the Division of Mental Health to meet the need and private sector psychiatrists, psychologists and counselors must be enlisted for any intervention program. They should be contracted with before they are needed. Psychiatric First Aid and Crisis Intervention training should be provided. Lay people can receive this training as well.

A small start in this direction took place on St. Croix in December 2005 when 40 first responders on St. Croix received training on how to deal with the mentally ill and substance abusers. This was the first such training of its kind in the Virgin Islands.245

244 Denese Marshall, Ph.D., Director, Virgin Islands Department of Public Health, Division of Mental Health, Alcoholism and Drug Dependency Services, email to the author dated January 03, 2006.

B. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

In the space and time limitations of this paper, it was impossible to do more than clarify the need, identify the problems and obstacles, and propose the possible solution of enlisting private sector and off-island assistance.

Below is a list of resources. Although only preliminary, these are an excellent starting point. The plans are detailed and thorough, well documented and presented and readily available. Most of these can be downloaded free of charge and they are promulgated by respected institutions.

“Communicating in a Crisis: Risk Communications Guidelines for Public Officials” (1-800-789-2647 reference number SMA02-3641 http://riskcommunication.samhsa.gov). It is currently out of print with no information as to when it will be in print again. It is available as a pdf file that can be downloaded and printed, at http://www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/RiskComm.pdf (accessed 3/15/06).

Many other publications are also available and can be located at http://www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/index.htm (accessed 3/16/06).

The National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/) (accessed 3/16/06) has a fact sheet for Terrorist Attacks and Children with recommendations broken down according to age group. There are references, links to additional sources including a FEMA link designed for children. The National Center for PTSD Children’s Fact sheet can be found online at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/disasters/fs_children_disaster.html (accessed 3/16/06). Information about Disasters and Terrorism in general can be found at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/disasters/index.html, (accessed 3/16/06).


The Center for Cognitive Development and School Psychology Program, Department of Psychology, George Mason University in Fairfax Virginia has developed a “Psychological First Aid Kit for School Professionals.” John D. Wasserman, Jack A. Naglieri, and Scott P. Merydith, September 12, 2001. This 10 page paper has sections on Administrative Planning, Handouts for Crisis
Management and Follow-up, How to Talk to Children about Disasters, Handout for Leading Class Discussion and another handout for parents. It is available and may be reproduced without permission at: http://www.gmu.edu/departments/psychology/homepage/PsychFirstAidKit.doc, (accessed 3/16/06).

Information about EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing) is available from the EMDR Institute at http://www.emdr.com/ (accessed 3/16/06) and the EMDR International Association at http://www.emdria.org, (accessed 3/16/06).

Information about CBT (Cognitive Behavior Therapy) is available from http://www.cognitivetherapy.com/, (accessed 3/16/06).
APPENDIX F GOOGLE EARTHMAP, FLORIDA TO SOUTH AMERICA

From: http://earth.google.com/
APPENDIX G   GOOGLE EARTHMAP, VIRGIN ISLANDS

From: http://earth.google.com/
From: [http://earth.google.com/](http://earth.google.com/)
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_____“Al-Qa’ida: Railways a High Priority Target (U//FOUO).” CTC 2004-30035, April 7, 2004;

_____ “Al-Qa’ida: Looking to Infiltrate the United States through Mexico (U//FOUO).” CTC 2004-30085, July 22, 2004;

_____ “A Primer on Al-Qa’ida’s Modus Operandi and Possible Attack Signatures (U//FOUO).” CTC 2004-30086, July 28, 2004;


_____ “Al-Qa’ida Surveillance: Tradecraft, Tactics, and Indicators (U//FOUO).” CTC 2004-30108, August 27, 2004;

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Virgina EMS Task Forces (listing Virginia Department of Health EMS Disaster Task Forces), http://www.vdh.state.va.us/OEMS/Disaster/taskfrce.asp (accessed 6/26/05.)


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. President George Bush
   The White House
   Washington, D.C.

4. The Governor of the Virgin Islands
   Honorable Charles Turnbull, Ph.D.
   Government House
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

5. The Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands
   Honorable Vargrave Richards
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

6. Honorable Lorraine L. Berry
   President of the Senate
   Legislature of the Virgin Islands
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

7. Honorable Ronald E. Russell
   Vice-President of the Senate
   Legislature of the Virgin Islands
   Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

8. Honorable Juan Figueroa-Serville
   Secretary of the Senate
   Legislature of the Virgin Islands
   Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

9. Honorable Roosevelt St. C. David
   Majority Leader
   Legislature of the Virgin Islands
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands
10. Honorable Louis Patrick Hill  
Sec. of Intergovernmental & Territorial Affairs  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

11. Honorable Pedro Encarnacion  
Liaison to U.S. Congress  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

12. Honorable Craig W. Barshinger  
Senator At Large, Liaison to the White House  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

13. Honorable Neville A. James  
Liaison to the Department of the Interior  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
Frederiksted, St. Croïx, U.S. Virgin Islands

14. The Honorable Norman Jn Bapiste  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

15. Honorable Liston A. Davis  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

16. Honorable Celestino A. White, Sr.  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

17. Honorable Shawn-Michael Malone  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

18. Honorable Usie R. Richards  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
Frederiksted, St.Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands
20. Honorable Terrence Nelson  
Legislature of the Virgin Islands  
Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

21. Honorable Kerry Drue  
Attorney General of the United States Virgin Islands  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

22. Deputy Attorney General Corneilius Evans  
VI Department of Justice  
Design Center Building  
Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

23. Mr. Mel Vanterpool  
Director, VI Department of Homeland Security  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

Office of the Adjutant General  
Virgin Islands National Guard  
Christiansted, St. Croix U.S. Virgin Islands

25. Honorable Elton Lewis  
Commissioner of Police  
Virgin Islands Police Department  
Alexander Farrelly Justice Center  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

26. Mr. Harold Baker, State Director  
VITEMA  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

27. The Honorable Donna M. Christensen  
Delegate to Congress  
Washington, D.C.

28. The Honorable Donna M. Christensen  
Delegate to Congress  
Nisky Business Center  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands
29. Honorable Maria M. Cabret
   Presiding Judge, Superior Court
   Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

30. Honorable Daryl Dean Donohue
    Judge, Superior Court
    Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

31. Honorable Patricia Steele
    Judge, Superior Court
    Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

32. Honorable Edgar D. Ross
    Judge, Superior Court
    Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

33. Honorable Ive A. Swan
    Judge, Superior Court
    Alexander A. Farrelly Justice Center
    St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

34. Honorable Rhys S. Hodge
    Judge, Superior Court
    Alexander A. Farrelly Justice Center
    St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

35. Honorable Brenda Hollar
    Judge, Superior Court
    Alexander A. Farrelly Justice Center
    St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

36. Honorable Leon Kendall
    Judge, Superior Court
    Alexander A. Farrelly Justice Center
    St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

37. Honorable Audrey Thomas
    Judge, Superior Court
    Alexander A. Farrelly Justice Center
    St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands
38. Honorable Anthony Jenkins  
U.S. Attorney for the Virgin Islands  
Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

39. Honorable Andrew Rutnick  
Commissioner of Licensing and Consumer Affairs  
Property and Procurement Building  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

40. Honorable Michael Chertoff  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, D.C.

41. Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, D.C.

42. Capt. James E. Tunstall  
Sector Commander  
U.S. Coast Guard  
San Juan, PR

43. LCDR Jose Quinones, Esq.  
U.S. Coast Guard  
San Juan, PR

44. MST 1 Joel Reid  
U.S. Coast Guard  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

45. FBI Special Agent in Charge  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

46. Mr. Stephen Clark  
Chief Law Enforcement Ranger  
Virgin Islands National Park  
St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands

47. Mr. Gregory N. Richards, President  
St. Croix Rescue  
Kingshill, U.S. Virgin Islands
48. St. Croix Rescue  
   Kingshill, U.S. Virgin Islands

49. Mr. E.J. Feliciano, President,  
   St. Thomas Rescue  
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

50. St. Thomas Rescue  
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

51. St. John Rescue  
   St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands

52. Water Island Search and Rescue  
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

53. Secretary Gail Norton  
   Department of the Interior  
   Washington D.C.

54. Acting Commissionier Deborah Spero  
   Customs and Border Patrol Headquarters  
   Washington, D.C.

55. Joy Blackburn  
   J. Robins, Deputy Executive Editor  
   The Virgin Islands Daily News  
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

56. St. Croix Avis  
   Christiansted, St. Croix

57. St. Thomas Source  
   St. Croix Source  
   St. John source

58. St. John Tradewinds  
   St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands

59. TV 2/News2  
   St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands
60. Mr. Sam Top  
Mr. Jean Greaux  
Radio One  
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands