



State Homeland Security Program and Capability Review Guidebook Volume 1

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**Homeland
Security**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 31, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Interim National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) and accompanying National Preparedness Guidance (NPG). The Goal represents a significant evolution in the way we approach preparedness and homeland security. The Goal presents a collective vision for national preparedness and establishes National Priorities that will help guide the realization of that vision. The vision set forth by the Goal encompasses the full spectrum of activities necessary to address a broad range of threats and hazards, including terrorism.

The Program and Capability Review is intended to help States align their homeland security programs with the Goal, seven National Priorities, and eight priority target capabilities, and to ensure that their programs are effectively organized and managed in support of the Goal. Further, this review enables States to identify their current program and capability strengths and weaknesses across their entire homeland security program through a qualitative analytical process. The Program and Capability Review does not require States to submit to DHS an exhaustive list of State-wide capabilities, nor does it force a quantitative assessment process. Instead, States should complete a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan, which will be submitted as part of their FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) application. The Enhancement Plan does not replace the State Homeland Security Strategy. It is meant to complement the strategy and support decisions surrounding FY 2006 HSGP funding.

The purpose of the *State Homeland Security Program and Capability Review Guidebook Volume I* is to serve as a reference tool to aid States in conducting a review of their statewide homeland security program and level of capabilities, as identified in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). This review will assist States in identifying and prioritizing their homeland security needs from a program and capability standpoint. The Program and Capability Review process builds upon the State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy update process currently underway and supports existing State efforts to strengthen homeland security programs.

Capability Review

The objective of the Capability Review is to aid States in evaluating strengths and weaknesses relative to the eight priority capabilities, listed in the TCL, that link directly to the four capability-specific National Priorities introduced in the Goal. Section I of this Guidebook addresses the eight priority capabilities that each State must assess. Section II of this Guidebook discusses the remaining 28 capabilities in the TCL. Also, States should evaluate the three to five State-priority capabilities, as identified in their homeland security strategies, in addition to evaluating the eight priority capabilities in Section I.

This Guidebook provides the definition, outcomes, and high-level discussion points for each capability listed in version 2.0 of the TCL. The State can use this information while conducting the Capability Review to evaluate and identify current State levels of capability. States can also use this analysis as a means to prioritize State capability strengths and weaknesses. The outcome (identified capability strengths and weaknesses) of the Capability Review will lead into the development of a State Enhancement Plan.

Program Review

In the Program Review, States are essentially being asked to consider two high-level questions: 1) *Is the State program executing the appropriate activities to operate and manage the homeland security program?* and 2) *Has the State organized itself and established governance structures to effectively manage those activities?* To answer these questions, States will evaluate current homeland security program management capacity, baseline operations, and future program needs. An effective homeland security program requires sound program management structures that help ensure the program is capable of conducting business across departments, agencies, and disciplines at all levels of government. Successful efforts to build capabilities hinge on effective homeland security program management and operations. Understanding program management challenges can help address homeland security needs that support statewide efforts to enhance and sustain capabilities.

From a governance standpoint, a homeland security program involves the full lifecycle of program management including key components of processes, people, and tools with the cross-cutting foundation of planning. These program management elements contribute to a framework for States to evaluate their program in a multi-dimensional fashion. As part of this process, States will analyze their homeland security programs to identify strengths and weaknesses and produce a comprehensive evaluation of program needs. The intended outcome of the Program Review is the development of corrective actions to enhance program management and strengthen operation areas that are most relevant to the State's homeland security program.

Program and Capability Enhancement Plan

The analytical output of the Program and Capability Review will be captured in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan. The Enhancement Plan is a comprehensive program management plan that looks at homeland security irrespective of preparedness funding streams. An Enhancement Plan Template, including instructions, is provided separately as Volume II of this Guidebook. The Enhancement Plan template will help States consolidate the analysis, strengths, and weaknesses that are generated from the Program and Capability Review. The Enhancement Plan will work in tandem with the State Homeland Security Strategy and will help the State direct its homeland security activities toward a holistic, interagency, interdisciplinary approach for their homeland security program. Furthermore, the Enhancement Plan will assist States in prioritizing initiatives they wish to implement using preparedness program funding. As such, the Enhancement Plan must be submitted with the FY 2006 Investment Justification for HSGP funding. States will receive the FY 2006 HSGP Program Guidance and Application Kit on December 2, 2005. Applications, including the FY 2005 Investment Justification, are to be submitted to DHS within 90 days of Guidance release.

To further support the State's understanding of the connection between the Program and Capability Review process and the criticality of developing an enterprise-wide Enhancement Plan, DHS is offering Program and Capability Review Technical Assistance (TA) to facilitate the review process amongst key stakeholders in a personalized setting. The TA will include a thorough step-by-step tool to walk States through the review process, as well as onsite workshops beginning in the fall of 2005. These workshops will frame the overall process in conducting the Program and Capability Review and completing a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan that identifies State priority capabilities. The TA service will also underscore

the importance of developing a homeland security program management plan to oversee and implement the initiatives identified in the Enhancement Plan.

OVERVIEW

Purpose

On March 31, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Interim National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) and accompanying National Preparedness Guidance (NPG). The Goal establishes a vision for a preparedness system that is based largely on a capabilities-based planning process. Key building blocks for that system include the National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List (UTL), Target Capabilities List (TCL), and seven National Priorities. Accompanying the key building blocks is a series of reviews and assessments of the State and Urban Areas preparedness activities conducted this year. The reviews and assessments are a part of the overall process of implementing the Goal; this process begins with the State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy Update, and continues with a State Homeland Security Program and Capability Review.

The purpose of the Program and Capability Review is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the State homeland security program relative to the Goal, NPG, target capabilities, and program enhancement actions. As the TCL continues to evolve, the Program and Capability Review should be used as a tool for States in developing a comprehensive, enterprise-wide program management plan for homeland security, namely a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan. The Enhancement Plan, which will be submitted as part of the FY 2006 HSGP application package, will guide the implementation of States preparedness initiatives funding through the FY 2006 HSGP.

This year marks a significant change in how HSGP funds are allocated. The State and Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETTP) Grant programs will be allocated in-part based on risk and need. For each of these programs, there will be: 1) a baseline allocation component and 2) a risk- and need-based component. The need-based grant funding allocations will be determined through a competitive award process. Through this process, States will apply for supplemental funding based on critical need for capability improvements, enhancements, or sustainment to the State homeland security program. The Program and Capability Review will provide the foundation for States' applications for needs-based funding.

Stakeholders in the Program and Capability Review

Each State should engage a diverse group of stakeholders in the Program and Capability Review to ensure the analysis and resulting Enhancement Plan represents a collaborative, multi-disciplinary, and multi-jurisdictional approach to State-wide program and capability planning. An example of a multi-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional group of stakeholders is the State Senior Advisory Committee, which has been required as part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Cooperative Agreement Guidance since FY 2003, and as part of the FY 2005 DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). The Senior Advisory Committee provides an example forum through which Program and Capability Review discussions and analyses can occur.

Stakeholders involved in the Program and Capability Review should consist of multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional homeland security representatives who have an operational role relative to the State homeland security program and represent a wide range of functional area expertise. Recommended participants include senior agency officials who manage the State's homeland security programs, such as: representatives from the SAA, the State HAS office, the State EMA; personnel from law enforcement, fire, public health, public works, agriculture, information technology; and other pertinent disciplines. The purpose of this regionally comprehensive group is to identify State capability needs, evaluate the State homeland security program management, and develop an Enhancement Plan.

The Interim National Preparedness Goal and the Program and Capability Review

The Goal represents a significant evolution in the way we approach preparedness and homeland security. The Goal presents a collective vision for national preparedness and establishes National Priorities that will help guide the realization of that vision. The vision set forth by the Goal encompasses the full spectrum of activities necessary to address a broad range of threats and hazards, including terrorism.

The Goal also provides a common framework for a systems-based approach to build, sustain, and improve national preparedness. The Goal and other source documents—such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)—define the mission areas of this framework as: prevent, protect, respond, and recover.

The vision of the National Preparedness Goal is:

To engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.

At the core of this framework, success depends upon robust and adaptive collaboration—between the public and private sector, among different levels of government, throughout multiple jurisdictions, and amid departments and agencies within a single jurisdiction. Collaboration encompasses a wide range of planning, training, and operational activities aimed at coordinating the capabilities and resources of various agencies, organizations, and individuals. The common purpose of these activities is preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from intentional as well as natural threats to people or property. As such, collaboration can be viewed as a critical element of success in all four mission areas.

Throughout FY 2006, States should focus on significantly enhancing capabilities that most closely relate to the seven National Priorities outlined in the Goal. While the TCL is a guide for States to meet target capabilities, the seven National Priorities listed in the Goal are intended to guide the Nation's preparedness efforts to meet its most urgent needs and capabilities, and fall into two categories: (A) three overarching priorities that contribute to the development of

multiple capabilities, and (B) four capability-specific priorities that focus on building selected capabilities for which the Nation has the greatest need. These four capability-specific priorities closely align to eight of the target capabilities in the TCL as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1– National Priorities and Priority Target Capabilities



The Capability Review will address the capability-specific priorities through targeted analyses of the related eight priority capabilities. The Program Review will help States analyze their progress toward addressing the three overarching National Priorities and integrating them into the State homeland security program.

The Program and Capability Review in Context


Many processes, programs, and capabilities are already in place within the State homeland security programs that support the Goal. The State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy review and update is the first step that States are taking toward integrating these processes, programs, and capabilities into their preparedness goals and objectives. The purposes of a Homeland Security Strategy are: 1) to provide a blueprint for comprehensive, enterprise-wide planning for homeland security efforts and 2) to provide a strategic plan for the use of related Federal, State, local, and private resources within the State and/or Urban Area before, during, and after threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. States and Urban Areas are required to submit their strategy updates to DHS by October 31, 2005 for verification and approval.

The Program and Capability Review and Enhancement Plan development are the next key steps for States in aligning their homeland security activities with the Goal. The Program and Capability Review and resulting Enhancement Plan will help States in answering three fundamental questions: “How prepared are we?”, “How prepared do we need to be?”, and “How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?” As part of the FY 2006 HSGP process, States will be required to assess their capability strengths and needs and use the Program and Capability

Enhancement Plan to develop a formal investment justification outlining major sub-State, Statewide, or interstate initiatives when they seek DHS grant funding. The lessons learned through the Program and Capability Review can guide the State’s future efforts to improve their homeland security program and enhance capabilities. In future years, States will participate in a capabilities assessment based on the TCL that will gauge their level of preparedness and identify statewide needs.

Figure 2 provides an overview of this year’s State activities supporting the National Preparedness System for the first year of implementation. It illustrates the overall process beginning with the State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy Update and continuing with the Program and Capability Review.

Figure 2– One-Year Process Overview



Developing a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan

A separate Program and Capability Enhancement Plan Template has been created to capture summary analysis of the Program and Capability Review discussions, and structure that analysis into an actionable plan. The Program and Capability Enhancement Plan will also serve as the foundation for completing a strong investment justification to request needs-based funding through the FY 2006 HSGP.

Completing the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan is the first step in assessing needs for FY 2006 and developing an investment justification that outlines a plan for addressing that need. The FY 2006 HSGP Program Guidance and Application Kit, which States will receive on December 2, 2005, will include an investment justification template for States to complete – using the findings of their Program and Capability Review and Enhancement Plan – and submit to DHS within 90 days of Guidance release.

Guidance and Instructions for the Program and Capability Review

This Guidebook provides a framework to strategically evaluate State homeland security programs and capability levels, with a focus on program management structure and the seven National Priorities. States are encouraged to go above and beyond these requirements and address additional capabilities that are a priority for them based on their unique strategic goals and objectives as identified in their State Homeland Security Strategy.

Sections I and II of the Guidebook together constitute the full Capability Review, which addresses all 36 capabilities from the TCL. Section I addresses the eight Priority Capabilities from the TCL that link directly to the four capability-specific National Priorities in the Goal. Section II reviews the additional 28 capabilities from the TCL. Definitions, outcomes, and a series of high-level discussion points are provided for each priority capability. States can use these tools in their evaluation. These capability discussion points are based on the critical tasks and associated performance measures included in the TCL version 2.0.

Section III of the Guidebook, the Program Review, addresses program management from a governance standpoint. The Program Review involves the full lifecycle of program management, including key components of processes, people, and tools on top of the cross-cutting foundation of planning. These program management elements contribute to a multi-dimensional framework for States to evaluate their homeland security program. The Program Review also addresses the three overarching national priorities that address regional collaboration, NIMS/NRP implementation, and Interim NIPP implementation.

This exercise is intended to be qualitative, not quantitative, in nature. The evaluation process will not produce a score or grade. The purpose of the Program and Capability Review is to foster a multi-disciplinary discussion within the State on both priority capabilities and the overall effectiveness of the homeland security program. The outcome of these discussions will support the creation of a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan, as well as support the completion of an Investment Justification for FY 2006 HSGP funding.

Customized State Assessment, Grants, and Program Data Reports

DHS recognizes that States have already provided substantial data on both capabilities and expenditures that are relevant to the Program and Capability Review and Enhancement Plan process. Although this data pre-dates the release of the Goal, DHS is providing a State-specific report to help launch analysis of need based on capabilities and State homeland security efforts. This report, found in Appendix A, is based on three pillars of data that can further support the Program and Capability Review efforts: 1) homeland security program narratives submitted with the FY 2005 HSGP applications; 2) expenditure data from the December 2004 grants reporting submission; and 3) capabilities assessment data from the 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Process.

The program narratives submitted by States with their FY 2005 HSGP applications have been compiled and analyzed to highlight general trends both statewide and nationally that may be of

interest to States as they review the structures and effectiveness of their homeland security programs.

The 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy process includes tasks that various emergency response disciplines would be expected to complete following a Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) terrorism incident. DHS has mapped these tasks by discipline to one or more of the 36 capabilities and created a report that frames the State responses in the new context of the target capabilities.

Similarly, each of the project types included in a recent grant reporting submission has been mapped to one or more of the 36 capabilities. Because of the timing of the fiscal year spending, the FY 2005 grants reporting submission provides a rough estimate of FY 2004 grant dollars that have been spent in support of building or sustaining a particular capability.

SECTION I: PRIORITY CAPABILITY REVIEW

Capabilities are a combination of resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome. States must evaluate their current capacities against the eight priority capabilities. The links between the capability-specific National Priorities and eight Priority Capabilities are shown below:

Capability-Specific National Priorities	Priority Target Capabilities
Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination (<i>Prevent Mission Area</i>) Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations (<i>Prevent Mission Area</i>)
Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities	Interoperable Communications (<i>Common Target Capability</i>)
Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities	CBRNE Detection (<i>Prevent Mission Area</i>) Explosive Device Response Operations (<i>Respond Mission Area</i>) WMD/Hazardous Materials Response & Decontamination (<i>Respond Mission Area</i>)
Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities	Medical Surge (<i>Respond Mission Area</i>) Mass Prophylaxis (<i>Respond Mission Area</i>)

Separate discussions are presented for each priority capability. Each discussion includes a capability definition, expected capability outcomes, and a series of high-level discussion points about the capability to assist States in conducting their Capability Review. The capability definition is a statement of the principle action or capability activity that a State must perform to be deemed capable in the specific preparedness area. The expected outcomes of each capability result from performance of one or more tasks, under specified conditions, and link to national standards. The high-level discussion points can be used while State working groups are evaluating the State’s capability strengths and weaknesses.

The discussion points are based on critical tasks and performance measures included in TCL version 2.0. These points will serve as the basis for current capability level evaluation. This evaluation will then serve as a founding step in the Enhancement Plan development process.

PRIORITY TARGET CAPABILITIES**Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination (Prevent Mission Area)****Capability Definition**

Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination capabilities are necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities. Intelligence /Information Sharing and Dissemination is the multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local and Tribal layers of government, the private sector, and citizens. The goals of sharing and dissemination are to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and preferably declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers that need it. More simply, the goal is to get the right information, to the right people, at the right time.

An effective intelligence / information sharing and dissemination system will provide durable, reliable and effective information exchanges (both horizontally and vertically) between those responsible for gathering information, analysts, and consumers of the threat-related information. It will also allow for feedback and other necessary communications in addition to the regular flow of information and intelligence.

Capability Outcome

Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, Tribal, regional, and private sector entities to achieve coordinated awareness, preparedness, protection, prevention of, and response to terrorist activities. To meet the desired outcome the following objectives must be achieved: (1) All pertinent stakeholders across all disciplines are identified and incorporated into the information flow through a clearly defined information sharing system; (2) Information flows vertically (from the Federal level through regions, States, locals and Tribes and back) within Law Enforcement and other appropriate agencies in a timely and effective manner; (3) Information flows across disciplines (among fire departments, EMS (Emergency Management System) units, public works, the private sector, etc.) at all levels and across jurisdictions in a timely and efficient manner.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The way in which the current technical infrastructure in your State supports the receipt and dissemination of relevant homeland security information (and classified information if necessary).
- The training and skills of personnel that support Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination including whether or not they maintain the appropriate clearances to handle classified information if necessary.

- Federal, State, local, tribal, regional, and private sector efforts to help establish or adopt national, standardized plans, protocols, and procedures for Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination.
- The systems and information that are provided for all affected State agencies that gather data on potential or current terrorist activities and all-hazards incidents.
- The way in which training and exercises have been developed and executed for meeting the standards, protocols, and procedures, of the Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination priority.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations (Prevent Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate and conduct operations related to potential terrorist activities. Current and emerging investigative techniques are used, with emphasis on training, legal frameworks, recognition of indications and warning, source development, interdiction, and related issues special to antiterrorism activities.

Capability Outcome

Successful deterrence, detection, disruption, investigation, and apprehension of suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security. To meet the desired outcome the following objectives must be achieved: (1) Law enforcement personnel are able to carry out effective investigations of criminal/suspicious activities potentially related to terrorism; (2) Law enforcement and other appropriate personnel effectively receive, develop, and share information to aid in the conduct of an investigation; (3) Law enforcement coordinate effectively with CI/KR and private sector officials to facilitate an investigation; (4) Law enforcement and related personnel develop and maintain incident response plans; (5) Specialized units/ personnel are utilized for search, seizure and/or intervention/interdiction operations; and (6) Appropriate investigative units and/or personnel are capable of functioning in potentially hazardous and CBRNE environments and situations.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The current State structure to conduct investigations related to potential terrorist activities and how this structure is coordinated across the State and local jurisdictions.
- The State's processes and procedures for identifying and reporting suspicious activities and persons – related to suspected terrorist activity – to appropriate authorities using appropriate channels.
- The information sharing channels established with key federal, State, and local entities for investigative efforts.
- The State's plans and procedures in place for securing and preserving an incident scene (i.e., consider the processes in place for gathering, cataloging, and preserving evidence, including laboratory analysis).
- The ways in which law enforcement investigation and operations processes and procedures are exercised.
- The State's process for obtaining security clearances and if a lack of security clearances adversely affects the State's ability to investigate and intervene in potential terrorist activity.

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Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Interoperable Communications (Common Target Capability)

Capability Definition

Communications interoperability is the ability of public safety and service agencies to talk within and across entities and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems, exchanging voice, data and/or video with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, when authorized.

Capability Outcome

A continuous flow of critical information is maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS). To accomplish this, the jurisdiction has a continuity of operations plan for public safety communications to include the consideration of critical components, networks, support systems, personnel, and an appropriate level of redundant communications systems in the event of emergency.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The emergency response communication plans that are in place which incorporate management structures following NIMS and NRP guidance (i.e., discuss how these plans ensure uninterrupted flow of critical communication).
- Communications systems that exist and how they operate reliably throughout the jurisdiction's response area (for example, how communications identify "dead spots" and how alternate strategies are in place to maintain effective communications in "dead spot" areas).
- Efforts to train personnel to use communications systems and equipment.
- Communications systems in terms of a) Interoperability across jurisdictions b) Security c) Redundancy d) Fault tolerance
- The ways in which existing State plans and systems developed are being tested in exercises.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

CBRNE Detection (Prevent Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The capability to protect against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through deployment of systems that ensure early detection of the import, transport, manufacture or release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. The CBRNE Detection target capability is not just about technology, but rather the ability to recognize and resolve potential CBRNE threats through equipment, education, and effective protocols. The importance of training, communication, and close coordination with the intelligence community (with special attention to fusion centers and processes) was recognized as critical enabling elements of the two performance objectives. However, only the CBRNE detection specific tasks to these cross-cutting elements have been identified in this capability. The CBRNE Detection target capability does not include actions taken to mitigate the consequences of a CBR (Chemical, Biological, Radiological) release or activities to render any CBRNE device safe. The needs of these important functions are identified in other target capabilities.

Capability Outcome

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly detected, identified and safely managed at borders, critical locations, events and incidents. To meet the desired outcome the following objectives must be achieved: (1) CBRNE detection at key interdiction points. This objective has a primary focus on fixed locations where federal, tribal, state, or local entities have authority to inspect people and/or goods for safety or security reasons. Examples include customs inspections at points of entry and weigh stations or agricultural inspection points within the U.S. (2) CBRNE surveillance. This objective refers to general area monitoring, ad hoc inspection points, or targeted area search. Examples include community, venue, or mass transit system monitoring for CBR release, explosives screening of vehicles and personnel entering an event, and searches to locate unauthorized radioactive material in a venue or community.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of plans, policies, and procedures for CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities.
- Mutual aid agreements, both intra-State and inter-State for CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities.
- Procurement plans in place that ensure response communities are properly equipped with detection, response, and decontamination equipment.
- Whether or not appropriate disciplines are being trained at suitable levels in a regional approach across disciplines and jurisdictions.
- The ways in which training plans are improving CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities within the State.

- How the CBRNE plans, policies, and procedures address potential public disorder, isolated/widespread violence, and other security issues.
- How the plans, policies, and procedures address the integration of public health surveillance activities with/for CBRNE detection and response

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Explosive Device Response Operations (Respond Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct IED (Improvised Explosive Device) and/or explosive device response operations after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate Render Safe Procedures (RSP). Conduct searches for additional devices and coordinate overall efforts to mitigate CBRNE threat to the incident site.

Capability Outcome

Conduct threat assessments and Render Safe Procedures.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of plans, policies, and procedures for explosives detection and response as well as the ability to render safe and disposal (for example, is the State capable of addressing simultaneous incidents?).
- The number of personnel trained and equipped for explosive detection and response adequate for the jurisdiction (i.e., if personnel are not trained and equipped, what are State plans to address this deficiency?).
- The number of personnel trained and equipped for trauma management, specifically as related to explosions and mass casualties (for example: personnel are not trained and equipped, what are State plans to address this deficiency?).
- Regional collaboration or mutual aid assets that could assist in explosive device response operations.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

WMD/Hazardous Materials Response & Decontamination (Respond Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The capability to assess the incident, including: test and identify all likely hazardous substances on-site; provide protective clothing and equipment to responders; conduct rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conduct geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establish isolation perimeters; contain and fully decontaminate the incident site, victims, responders and equipment; manage site restoration operations, including collection of all hazardous substances; and implement standard evidence collection procedures.

Capability Outcome

Rapidly identify, contain, and mitigate a hazardous materials (HAZMAT) release; rescue, decontaminate and treat victims exposed to the hazard; limit and restore the affected area; and effectively protect responders and at-risk populations.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The status of HAZMAT plans and procedures in your State.
- Response times for: dispatch to first HAZMAT capable unit's arrival on scene; dispatch to full initial alarm assignment of HAZMAT capable teams; and, time to detect HAZMAT type and source.
- The ways in which the State has reduced its time in containing and controlling solids, liquids, vapors, and gases. If times have not been decreased, consider why and what future plans are in place to address, maintain, and/or improve HAZMAT response times.
- The status of the purchase and/or distribution of protective clothing and equipment. The determination of which first responders should receive WMD/HAZMAT equipment and training.
- The status of training and exercising WMD/HAZMAT response personnel.
- Plans in place to communicate information and conditions to appropriate authorities – including hospitals and other medical care facilities.
- The regional response plan/mutual aid agreements that have been established. If none have been established, explore plans to enter into these agreements.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Medical Surge (Respond Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The capability to provide triage and then to provide medical care. This includes providing definitive care to individuals at the appropriate clinical level of care, within sufficient time to achieve recovery and minimize medical complications. The capability applies to an event resulting in a number or type of patients that overwhelm the day-today acute-care medical capacity. Medical Surge is defined as the increased need of personnel (clinical and non-clinical), support functions (laboratories and radiological), physical space (beds, alternate care facilities) and logistical support (clinical and non-clinical supplies) in a coordinated fashion.

Capability Outcome

After the first event, minimize new cases due to preventable exposure to disease, contamination or injury. This will include exposure from communicable diseases and/or injuries which are secondary to the primary event. The at-risk population receives the appropriate protection (countermeasures) and treatment in a timely manner.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of current medical surge plans.
- Whether adequate personnel and resources are in place to include triage, treatment, transportation, communications, and security.
- Medical surge plans which include patient tracking from event site, through treatment and post treatment.
- The ways in which medical surge plans identify current and future State resource requirements appropriately.
- The organizational structure and personnel roles and responsibilities to ensure adequate Medical Surge capability.
- The types and frequencies of exercises used to gauge and improve Medical Surge capability.
- The way in which the State identifies the adequate amount of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to protect current and additional healthcare workers.
- The broader issue of responder safety and health of family members with respect to PPE, prophylaxis for caregivers and family members, decontamination of victims before they enter the facility, and security surrounding the treatment facility.
- The way in which medical surge plans address the interface between hospitals, Emergency Medical Service, public health, and private physicians.
- The legal and credentialing issues surrounding the use of out-of-state medical and allied-health personnel.

PROGRAM AND CAPABILITY REVIEW GUIDEBOOK

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Mass Prophylaxis (Respond Mission Area)

Capability Definition

The capability to protect the health of the population through administration of critical interventions in response to a public health emergency to prevent the development of disease among those who are exposed or are potentially exposed to public health threats.

This capability includes the provision of appropriate follow-up and monitoring of adverse events medical care, as well as risk communication messages to address the concerns of the public.

Capability Outcome

Appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner upon the onset of an event, to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies include recommendations about specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends and themselves.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of mass prophylaxis and vaccination plans, with consideration to rate of set up and throughput.
- Whether or not these plans identify current and future resource requirements appropriately – such as the number, skill level, and availability of medical personnel, the impact of a nearby, secondary CBRNE/natural disaster, and the expiration of prophylactic supplies.
- The way in which public information messages are prepared and disseminated, how they provide information regarding how to protect oneself and how they should receive prophylaxis or vaccination (discuss how special emphasis is placed on reaching disenfranchised populations).
- Plans to enlist supplemental providers and volunteers. If no plans exist, consider how the State will enlist supplemental providers, security, and volunteers.
- Any legal issues that may arise with regard to standards of care in a mass prophylaxis campaign versus standards of care in a “normal” environment – i.e., immediate (licensing and credentialing), long-term (patients/public rights to recourse to adverse medical outcome), and occupational (needle stick injury to provider) legal issues should be addressed.
- The means/timing/technological requirements/technological barriers related to the delivery of public information messages.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

SECTION II: ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES

The following section addresses the remaining 28 capabilities in the TCL version 2.0. In the TCL, capabilities are assigned to five target preparedness areas: Common Target Capabilities, Prevent Mission Area, Protect Mission Area, Respond Mission Area, and Recover Mission Area. The first four capabilities listed are the Common Target Capabilities. The remaining capabilities fall into the four Mission Areas – Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover, as follows:

COMMON TARGET CAPABILITIES

- Planning
- Interoperable Communications (*priority capability*)
- Citizen Preparedness and Participation
- Risk Management

PREVENT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

- Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings
- Intelligence Analysis and Production
- Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination (*priority capability*)
- Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations (*priority capability*)
- CBRNE Detection (*priority capability*)

PROTECT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

- Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
- Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
- Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing

RESPOND MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

- Onsite Incident Management
- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Volunteer Management and Donations
- Responder Safety and Health
- Public Safety and Security Response
- Animal Health Emergency Support
- Environmental Health and Vector Control
- Explosive Device Response Operations (*priority capability*)
- Firefighting Operations/Support
- WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination(*priority capability*)
- Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection
- Isolation and Quarantine
- Urban Search & Rescue
- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
- Medical Surge (*priority capability*)

- Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
- Mass Prophylaxis(*priority capability*)
- Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services)
- Fatality Management

RECOVER MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

- Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment
- Restoration of Lifelines
- Economic & Community Recovery

As discussed previously, each capability discussion includes a capability definition, expected outcomes, and a series of high-level discussion points to assist States with their capability reviews. The capability definition is a statement of the principle action or capability activity that a State must perform. The expected outcomes result from performance of one or more tasks, under specified conditions, and link to national standards. The high-level discussion points are provided for use while evaluating capability strengths and weaknesses.

The discussion points are based on the critical tasks and associated performance measures included in the TCL version 2.0. These points will serve as the basis for current capability level evaluation. This evaluation will then serve as a founding step in the Enhancement Plan development process.

COMMON TARGET CAPABILITIES

Planning

Capability Definition

This capability is the foundation on which all other capabilities are developed and enhanced. Specifically, all hazards planning is a mechanism to develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies and procedures describing how the federal, state, local and tribal governments will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment and resources to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from incidents such as those described in the National Planning Scenarios.

Capability Outcome

The planning capability ensures the ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The planning process and the resultant plans incorporate an accurate hazard analysis and risk assessment.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of the planning process for statewide homeland security programs and processes.
- The sufficiency of staff to manage planning efforts.
- Updates of all hazards plans, policies, and procedures, as well as frequency of the review of documentation and whether these updates and reviews are consistent with recommendations to update – at least annually.
- Mutual aid agreements and regional collaboration efforts in place to coordinate planning effectively across jurisdictions and/or regions.
- Additional planning needed to achieve goals identified in the State/UASI strategy.
- The sufficiency or insufficiency of the current planning staff. Consider reasons why or why not to hire additional full time or part time planners.
- Plans in place to ensure connectivity with other efforts, such as hazard mitigation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Resources and Services Administration etc.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Citizen Preparedness and Participation

Capability Definition

The American public has the capability (i.e., the necessary information, knowledge, skills, and abilities) to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all threats and hazards. Requirements to achieve this capability include collaboration among all levels of government, emergency responders, the private sector, civic organizations, faith-based groups, schools, and the public; public education in preparedness, prevention, and mitigation; training for citizens in life saving first aid, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), response skills, and surge capacity roles; and citizen participation in exercises, volunteer programs, and surge capacity support.

Citizen preparedness and participation is segmented into appropriate levels of engagement, but all employ some degree of planning, organizations, equipment, training, and exercises.

There are “Universal (U)” capabilities that everyone in America should have for the four mission areas of all-hazards preparedness: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. There are also “Specialized (Sp),” or advanced skills, knowledge, and abilities needed for those that live in high-threat areas (the terrorism threat in urban areas, natural hazard areas); for those whose personal circumstances require additional preparedness requirements (those with disabilities, those with language barriers, those with low income); and for those who volunteer year round to support local emergency responders and community safety efforts. Finally there are citizens who have a response or “Surge (Su)” capacity role, who will have the highest level of training and equipment.

Capability Outcome

Everyone in America is credibly educated about threats to their safety and property, is prepared for all-hazards, takes relevant mitigation measures, practices evacuation drills, employs prevention and deterrence tactics, is trained in first aid and emergency response skills, practices shared responsibility for neighborhood and community disaster planning, and responds to an incident with appropriate and practical steps to safeguard their own health and property while helping others.

Citizens who live in a high-threat area or who have personal circumstances that require additional needs (such as cognitive or physical disabilities, language barriers, low income, live or work in high rise buildings, take public transportation frequently) have an appropriately higher level of preparedness, training, approaches to prevention, participation in exercises, and first aid and response skills.

An adequate number of citizens also provide year round volunteer support to augment public education, training, local emergency responder efforts and community safety initiatives, and contribute to community emergency planning and exercises. An adequate number of citizens also have training in surge capacity roles, are an integral component of incident response and recovery, and perform appropriately when deployed. Private sector resources are an integral part of the response and recovery plan and execution.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plans and support structure in place to ensure citizen preparedness and participation and the inclusion of any established programs such as Citizen Corps.
- The roles that have been recognized for citizens in exercises, volunteer programs and surge capacity response.
- The types of training programs developed to educate the public about threats, preparedness, prevention, first aid, and emergency response and how this training is communicated to solicit involvement.
- The types of communication vehicles that are being utilized to raise public awareness for citizens regarding preparedness and response measures.
- The ways in which standards and measures are being developed to ensure appropriate education - related to preparedness and response - has occurred for citizens.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Risk Management

Capability Definition

The capability to identify and measure risk prior to an event, based on threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and to manage the exposure to that risk through the prioritization of risk-reduction strategies.

Capability Outcome

Federal, state, local, tribal and private sector entities have the ability to (1) identify and assess risks, (2) prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on reduction of risk, and (3) monitor the outcomes of allocation decision and undertake corrective actions.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The State hazard analysis/risk assessment process, how that process encompasses all hazards, and how the process is maintained and updated.
- The State's definition of risk.
- The leveraging of threat and vulnerability assessments in the identification and prioritization of risks and how these results are incorporated into response plans and procedures.
- The ways in which results from threat and vulnerability assessments are used to guide funding priorities.
- The State process for establishing risk profiles for critical assets and key resources and how the State engages infrastructure sectors in the development of these profiles.
- The mitigation strategies in place, how those strategies were developed and how they are updated.
- The mitigation strategies in place for all hazards, how those strategies were developed and how they are updated.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

PREVENT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings

Capability Definition

Information Gathering entails the gathering, consolidation, and retention of raw data from sources including human-source, observation, and open-source. Unlike intelligence collection, Information Gathering is the continual gathering of only pure, unexamined data, not the targeted collection traditionally conducted by the intelligence community or targeted investigations. Recognition of Indicators and Warnings is the ability to see in this gathered data the potential indications and/or warnings of terrorist activities or planning against U.S. citizens, land, infrastructure, and/or allies.

Capability Outcome

Locally generated threat and other terrorism-related information is gathered, identified, provided to appropriate analysis centers. To meet the desired outcome the following objectives must be achieved: (1) Information needs are clearly established and communicated to and from all levels of government; (2) Gather information that could be used to identify terrorist operations (in addition to “all-hazards”/”all crimes”) from all sources (i.e. Law Enforcement, public health, public works, transportation, fire, emergency medical entities, etc.) through routine activities; (3) Law Enforcement, public safety, the general public, and/or private sector personnel recognize and identify suspicious circumstances or indicators and warnings associated with planning, support, and operations related to potential terrorism; and (4) Information is received, authenticated and screened for relevance at the supervisory level in a timely manner.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The types of personnel positions and organizations utilized to perform Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings and their roles and responsibilities.
- The types and levels of training offered and training requirements to ensure personnel are following procedures.
- The ways information collection and dissemination procedures are evaluated and validated for accuracy, efficiency, and appropriate distribution.
- The utilization of information systems to collect and store information securely.
- The updating of information regarding threats to ensure timely data.
- The integration of various disciplines (including local law enforcement), agencies, and organizations into the Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings process.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Intelligence Analysis and Production

Capability Definition

Intelligence Analysis and Production is the merging of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture. This process focuses on the consolidation of analytical products among the intelligence analysis units at the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal levels for tactical, operational, and strategic use. This capability also includes the examination of raw data to identify threat pictures, recognize potentially harmful patterns, or connect suspicious links to discern potential indications or warnings.

Capability Outcome

Produce timely, accurate and actionable intelligence/information products in support of prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations. To meet the desired outcome the following objectives must be achieved: (1) Each Region must establish a multi-disciplinary, all-source information/intelligence fusion enter/process which undertakes an “all-hazards” and “all crimes” approach; (2) Fusion center/processes and capabilities are staffed with individuals with the appropriate training and expertise during all operational hours to handle the receipt, analysis and dissemination of intelligence; (3) Intelligence analysts at Fusion center/process have access to and receive collected information; (4) Fusion center/process integrates and analyzes relevant information/intelligence; and (5) Analytic products developed by Fusion center/processes are consumer-tailored, clear, objective and support the development of performance-driven, risk-based prevention, protection, and response programs at all levels.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The staffing levels, types of personnel positions, and organizations (with their associated roles and responsibilities) to ensure Intelligence Analysis and Production is performed adequately.
- The collaboration process among information sources into the Intelligence Analysis and Production process.
- The types and levels of training and training requirements offered to ensure personnel are following procedures and able to perform analysis.
- The ways in which intelligence analysis and production procedures are evaluated and validated for accuracy, efficiency, and appropriate distribution.
- The ways in which information systems are utilized to collect, analyze, report, and store information securely.
- The gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

PROTECT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

Capability Definition

The capability of public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and engage in protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in order to detect, prevent, deter, degrade, and mitigate deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit the critical infrastructure and key resources.

Capability Outcome

Critical infrastructure is identified; risk assessments are conducted, documented, and standardized; assets are prioritized; decisions are made regarding protective and preventative programs; protective and preventative plans are implemented; and the risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure is reduced.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The decision making process utilized to identify critical infrastructure, including collaboration with federal agency, public sector, State and other personnel.
- The training and exercises developed for various types of critical infrastructure.
- The way in which vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure are standardized to ensure that a consistent methodology is applied.
- The risk management approach for measuring high risk targets and reducing threats and vulnerabilities.
- The organizational structure in place to support critical infrastructure protection and the plan for sustaining and evolving processes.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense

Capability Definition

The capability to prevent, protect, respond, and recover against pathogens, chemical, biological and radiological contaminants, and other hazards that affect the safety of food and agricultural products. This includes the timely eradication of outbreaks of crop diseases/pests, assessments of the integrity of the food producing industry, the removal and disposal of potentially compromised materials from the U.S. food supply, and decontamination of affected food manufacturing facilities or retail points of purchase or service. This also includes appropriate laboratory surveillance to detect human illness or food product contamination. It is accomplished concurrent to protecting public health and maintaining domestic and international confidence in the U.S. commercial food supply. Additionally, the public is provided with accurate and timely notification and instructions related to the event and appropriate steps to follow with regard to disposal of affected food products and appropriate decontamination procedures.

Capability Outcome

Prevent, mitigate and eradicate threats to food and agriculture safety, strive to restore trade in agriculture products, dispose of affected products, decontaminate affected facilities, maintain confidence in the U.S. food supply, and protect public and animal health, and effectively communicate with all stakeholders.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plans that are in place to support the identification and elimination of threats to food and agriculture safety.
- The integration of personnel and various disciplines that are designed to maintain food and agriculture safety support capabilities and their responsibilities.
- The ways the State supports developing standards and protocols to ensure protection of food and agriculture safety and responding to potential events.
- The ways training and exercises have been developed and executed for meeting necessary standards related to food and agriculture safety.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing

Capability Definition

This capability comprises three distinct elements:

1. *Public Health Laboratory Testing (Chem Lab)*: The capability to conduct public health laboratory testing. It includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, reporting, and laboratory confirmation.
2. *Public Health Epidemiological Investigation*: The capability to rapidly conduct epidemiological investigations and public health laboratory testing. It includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, rapid implementation of active surveillance, maintenance of ongoing surveillance activities, epidemiologic investigation, and recommendations for the implementation of control measures.
3. *Laboratory Focused: Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing*: The capability to conduct public health laboratory testing. It includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, reporting, and laboratory confirmation.

Capability Outcome

For a chemical incident, potential exposure and disease will be identified rapidly, reported to multiple locations immediately, investigated promptly, and accurately confirmed to ensure appropriate preventive or curative countermeasures are implemented. Additionally, public health laboratory testing and epidemiological investigation is coordinated with law enforcement and other appropriate agencies.

For the Public Health Epidemiological Investigation, potential exposure and disease will be identified rapidly (determine exposure, mode of transmission and agent, and interrupt transmission to contain the spread of the event and reduce number of cases). Confirmed cases will be reported immediately to all relevant Public Health, Food Regulatory and Law Enforcement agencies. Suspected cases will be investigated promptly, reported to relevant Public Health authorities, and accurately confirmed to ensure appropriate preventive or curative countermeasures are implemented. The Public Health investigation will involve defining and characterizing the outbreak, determining the number of new cases on an ongoing basis, tracking the sources of exposure, identifying the methods of transmission, and recommending effective mitigation measures. Laboratories will identify the causative agent. Additionally, public health laboratory testing and epidemiological investigation will be coordinated with law enforcement and other appropriate agencies.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- Plans in place to support epidemiological investigation, laboratory response, and disease surveillance and reporting.

- The integration of personnel and various disciplines that are designed to ensure adequate epidemiological investigation and laboratory testing capabilities.
- The way training and exercises have been developed and executed for meeting necessary standards related to epidemiological investigation and laboratory testing.
- Plans to ensure proper coordination between law enforcement and HAZMAT.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

RESPOND MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

On-Site Incident Management

Capability Definition

The On-Site Incident Management capability to effectively direct and control the incident management activities through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

Capability Outcome

Achieve effective and efficient incident management, integrating the facilities, resources (personnel, equipment, supplies, and communications) and procedures using a common organizational structure which is ICS.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The staffing levels, types of personnel positions, and organizations (with their associated roles and responsibilities) to ensure on-site incident management is performed adequately.
- The adequacy of incident action plans and whether these plans incorporate management structure in accordance with NIMS/NRP.
- The types and levels of training offered and training requirements to ensure personnel are following procedures and able to perform on-site incident management.
- Mutual aid agreements and other plans in place to coordinate on-site incident management effectively across jurisdictions and/or regions.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Emergency Operations Center Management

Capability Definition

The capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management through the activation and operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), consistent with the requirements of the NIMS for Multi-Agency Coordination Systems, including EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; providing public information and warning; and maintaining information and communication necessary for response and recovery activities.

Capability Outcome

The EOC is activated, staffed, and managed for a pre-planned or no-notice event; multi/interagency activities, such as communications (including direct and indirect voice and data interoperability), resource management, and mutual aid, are coordinated; incident action planning activities within the EOC are conducted at regular periodic intervals. Situation reports are produced at regular periodic intervals. The EOC could be deactivated as the emergency transitions into the recovery phase.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plan for integration/collaboration of disciplines and organizations to activate an Emergency Operations Center.
- The ways in which individuals are trained to ensure personnel capable of making and implementing decisions from all appropriate functions
- The communications plan used to ensure that the Emergency Operations Center is activated in a timely manner and information reaches the target audience and is understood and acted upon appropriately.
- The standards used to direct and evaluate Emergency Operations Center Management.
- The location and linkages to the Joint Information Center (JIC) (if not integral to the EOC) to ensure provision of accurate and timely information to the Joint Information System (JIS).

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Capability Definition

The capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize and demobilize, and accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary for preservation of life, safety, and security.

Capability Outcome

Critical resources are a) inventoried and tracked, b) available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution and necessary response efforts to aid disaster victims in a cost effective and timely manner, and c) demobilized as necessary.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The State plans that are in place to ensure critical supplies, equipment, and personnel are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request.
- Any support agreements in place for receiving shared resources and if these agreements are formal or informal.
- The organizational structure, including position descriptions, responsibilities, and personnel assignments (temporary or permanent) in place to manage identification, dispatch, mobilization and demobilization resources throughout all emergency management phases of an incident.
- The types of training provided to personnel to support identification, dispatch, mobilization and demobilization of available resources throughout all emergency management phases of an incident.
- The ways in which availability of resources, including critical supplies, equipment, and personnel are determined and ensured for emergency responders across various types of incidents.
- The types of inventory management processes that are in place to ensure proper availability of supplies and equipment to emergency responders.
- Any exercises conducted to ensure protocols are followed and compliance to procedures are anticipated.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Volunteer Management and Donations

Capability Definition

The capability to effectively manage unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations in support of domestic incident management, including identifying and determining uses for effectively managing and deploying volunteer support and donations before, during and after an incident. This capability is consistent with and supports the existing volunteer/donations Management Annex to the National Response Plan.

Capability Outcome

The value of volunteers and charitable donations is maximized and does not hinder the response and recovery activities.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The protocols in place to manage and deploy volunteer support and donations.
- The communication planning efforts to ensure volunteers are available and mobilized adequately.
- Training types and levels provided to volunteers to ensure their incident-specific roles can be executed successfully.
- The way in which information and information systems support the effort to maintain volunteer data, incident affected worker data, and relevant historical records.
- The coordination of volunteer efforts among entities, including relief organizations.
- The ways volunteers can be effectively tracked, directed, and managed using available volunteer centers and managers
- The management process for volunteer donations to ensure appropriate collection, prioritization, and dissemination.
- The use of exercises to gauge and improve volunteer management operations.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Responder Safety and Health

Capability Definition

Responder safety and health is a critical component of overall emergency management. The response to the scenarios provides a multitude of highly technical hazards. The definition of “First Responder” includes police, fire, emergency personnel, as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators). This extended definition includes a very broad set of workers and a wide range of likely response activities that may be performed by “first responders,” resulting in an increased number of potential hazards and exposures. The ability to protect all of the responders from all of the hazards is a substantial undertaking involving prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. This capability supports both the Safety Officer position identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) and the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP). The Type 1 Safety Officer described in this capability has yet to be fully defined (to include managing all of the hazards likely to be faced by all first responders); rather the concept used is the same as the “Disaster Safety Manager” described in Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response (NIOSH, 2004). In addition, the list of services critical for this capability is consistent with the actions specified under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex and in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Guidelines for HazMat/WMD Response, Planning and Prevention Training (FEMA, 2003).

During the response to any incident, employers are primarily responsible for the safety and health of their employees. However, the ICS creates a unified safety and health organization under the Safety Officer. In large-scale incidents, because of the number and varieties of hazards and workers, the safety officer would be utilized more as a “safety manager.” This technical capability therefore does not prescribe a certain level of preparedness for any particular organization, rather it specifies the need for personal protective equipment (PPE), Safety Officers, etc. and allows the local entity to determine the best way to obtain the needed resource (e.g. through mutual aid, state resources, federal resources, etc.) for the first 72 hours of the response operations. This capability ensures that adequate personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on-scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel (first receivers), skilled support personnel and, if necessary, their families through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program. This program needs to be integrated into the incident command system and include training, personal protective equipment, health and safety planning, risk management practices, medical care, decontamination, infection control, vaccinations for preventable diseases, adequate work schedule relief, psychological support, and follow-up assessments.

This capability identifies the critical personnel, equipment, training, and other resources needed to ensure the protection of all workers from “All Hazards” including fire (heat), chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, electrical, collapsed structures, debris management, and others.

Capability Outcome

No additional illnesses in or injury to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel resulting from a preventable exposure to secondary trauma, chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical and emotional stress after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The incident management procedures that are planned that coordinate among disciplines to protect any first responder, first receiver, hospital staff member, etc. from exposure to secondary trauma, chemical release, infectious disease, or stress after the initial event and respond to any experienced physical and emotional stress.
- The types of equipment that are planned for use to ensure the safety of first responders from secondary trauma, chemical release, and infectious disease after the initial event. Consider how this capacity is planned to ensure adequate supply and timely availability.
- The ways in which exercises are used to gauge the effectiveness of planned protocols and equipment to protect first responders after the initial event.
- The types of training opportunities and requirements that exist to promote health and safety planning for first responders. Consider the personnel positions, disciplines that provide and receive training.
- The follow-up process in place to review events with exposed first responders to a) ensure their continued recovery and b) make improvements to protective processes.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Public Safety and Security Response

Capability Definition

The capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area (in coordination among law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services [EMS]), safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operation, and sustaining operations from response through recovery.

Capability Outcome

Successful assessment of the incident and coordination of public safety resources needed to secure the incident scene, manage access control, provide security support to other response operations (and related critical locations, facilities and resources), and aid in emergency public information while continuing to protect first responders and mitigating any further effect to the public at risk.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The policies, plans, or procedures in place to manage public safety incident response.
- The ways in which HAZMAT, fire/rescue, and law enforcement personnel have been included in the development of the public safety response plan.
- The way these policies, plans, and procedures have been exercised.
- The number of sites the State is prepared to secure at any given time based upon trained personnel and equipment.
- The State's on-scene management and personnel accountability system.
- The response plan's consistency with NIMS.
- ICS implementation at the scene.
- Cross discipline communications and consider any weaknesses.
- The way an incident perimeter and security zone would be identified and secured.
- The way force protection would be accomplished.
- Contingency plans for a situation where all existing resources are maximized.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Animal Health Emergency Support

Capability Definition

The capability to protect, prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from threats and incidents that would result in the disruption of U.S. livestock, other domestic animals, including companion animals, wildlife and related industries, endanger the food supply, public health, and domestic and international trade. It includes the capability for responding to large-scale national and regional emergencies as well as to smaller-scale incidents through rapid determination of the nature of the event, initiation of the appropriate response, containment of the disrupting effects, and facilitation of recovery. These capabilities are for a wide range of incidents and emergencies including: accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, nuclear and conventional events; as well as other biological, chemical, or radiological agents.

Capability Outcome

Prevent foreign animal disease from entering the United States by protecting our critical infrastructure and key assets. In the event of an incident, to detect animal disease as early as possible, implement immediate and humane actions to eradicate the outbreak, maintain continuity of agriculture and related business, limit economic damage, and protect public and animal health and the environment. Develop, coordinate, and execute plans to maintain and/or restore trade in agriculture products, domestic and international confidence in the US food supply, and agricultural industries to their prior productivity, including replenishing the domestic livestock and other domesticated animals.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plans that are in place to support the identification and elimination of outbreak of diseases in animals.
- The integration of personnel and various disciplines that are designed to maintain animal emergency health support capabilities and their responsibilities.
- The way in which the State is developing standards and protocols to ensure protection of outbreaks from animal diseases and containing and responding to potential incidents.
- The way in which training and exercises have been developed and executed for meeting necessary standards related to animal health emergency support.
- Plans, policies, and procedures associated with collaboration, pre-event education, and stakeholder buy-in with national associations to maintain confidence in the U.S. food supply both at home and abroad.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Environmental Health and Vector Control

Capability Definition

The capability to provide ground and aerial vector control and environmental health services in support of public health protection. Vector control includes elimination of organisms, such as fleas, mosquitoes, and rodents that can spread disease to humans. Provide subject matter experts to: advise, provide rapid needs assessment, identify health capabilities, deploy/institute a victim exposure registry, disseminate physician education for treatment of victims, coordinate specialized medical care, provide liaison and communications support to regional ESF8 groups, appropriate sample collection, advise on protective action guidelines, analyze and communicate results, and provide occupational safety and health.

Capability Outcome

Improvised Nuclear Device:

Classical environmental health services (safe water, sewage disposal, and vector control) will be gravely disrupted in an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) scenario therefore a spike in new cases of communicable diseases can be anticipated within the initial weeks following the event. Cases of radiation sickness will increase for the first 30 days as cases of Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) are recognized by the public health reporting system. Additional cases will continue to occur due to added radiation exposure to external radiation and internalized fallout.

- Minimizing new cases due to preventable exposure to disease and contamination will pose significant challenges in the post disaster environment.
- Victim registries will need to be started immediately and linked to centralized coordination of limited clinical (radiation injury management) expertise to direct local health care providers.
- Minimizing exposures experienced by at risk population and emergency responders will require coordinated efforts to provide clean water, sewage disposal, and guidance to minimize radiation exposures.

Nerve Agent:

Local Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) teams rapidly identify the class of chemical agent in use, and immediately inform receiving hospitals and local incident command, ensuring that appropriate medical countermeasures are employed without delay. Survivors are triaged and decontaminated in the field before transport to hospitals. There is no loss of life to field responders or people receiving casualties for decontamination, transport, emergency stabilization, and definitive medical care. Epidemiologists are brought in to establish an emergency registry of victims and other exposed/ potentially exposed persons such as decontamination and sampling teams, and medical “first receivers”.

Food Contamination:

After the first event, a marked reduction in new cases due to preventable exposure to disease or contamination will occur. The at-risk population receives the appropriate protection in a timely manner.

New cases are prevented through intervention methods listed below:

- Public Health Education – Fact Sheets, Guidelines, Public Service Announcements (PSA)
- Contaminated Product Removal
- Contaminated Facilities and Equipment Cleaned or Removed
- Proper Disposal of Contaminated Items
- Eliminating spread of disease by vectors
- Coordinated effort with public health, law enforcement at local, state and federal levels

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The organizational structure – including integration of disciplines, organizations, and agencies – to protect public health and ensure vector control.
- The plan for determining the appropriate action to protect the public and evaluating the effectiveness of those actions to minimize further threats to public health.
- The way in which exercises support the evaluation to determine if facilities, equipment, and personnel are able to operate accordingly.
- The communication plan to ensure the public is adequately informed of the threat and educated on necessary actions.
- The need for inter and intra state agreements related to environmental health and vector control.
- The need for possible mass evacuation related to insurmountable environmental conditions.
- The need for, use of, and collaboration with, possible outside resources, such as the use of US military equipment for spraying.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Firefighting Operations/Support

Capability Definition

The capability to coordinate and conduct fire suppression operations; including, scene size up, resource assignment, establishing an incident command system consistent with National Incident Management System (NIMS), communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, and conducting fire cause determination. This capability further includes support necessary to prepare the community and reduce vulnerabilities in the event of an incident of national significance.

Capability Outcome

Dispatch of the initial alarm assignment occurs within the response time objectives designed by the authority having jurisdiction. Initial arriving unit initiates the Incident Command System, conducts assessment of the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources. Firefighting activities are conducted safely and the fire(s) is/are contained, controlled, and managed in accordance with emergency response plans and procedures.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plans and policies in place for firefighting operations and how they are maintained and updated.
- The establishment of an incident command system consistent with NIMS.
- The ways in which integration activities with multiple areas and resource sources are incorporated into the planning and execution processes (including mutual aid agreements).
- The way firefighting operations outcomes are evaluated for effectiveness.
- The standards employed to guide firefighting operations/support.
- The ability of firefighters to talk to other units and disciplines
- What is being done or could be done to improve interoperable communications between fire and police.
- The use of exercises to gauge and improve firefighting operations/support.
- The training program used to support personnel in firefighting operations/support.
- The procedures in place to ensure personnel have the appropriate resources and equipment necessary to perform firefighting operations/support

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection

Capability Definition

The capability to plan for and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population; or an organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population to areas of safe refuge in response to a potential or actual dangerous environment, and the safe and organized re-entry of the population.

Capability Outcome

Affected and at-risk populations are safely sheltered-in-place and/or relocated to safe refuge areas, provided sheltering and essential services and effectively and safely reentered into the impacted area (if appropriate).

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plans in place for citizen relocation, the criteria and other processes utilized for the development of the plan.
- The types of training and exercises developed to support planning protocols for successful relocation.
- The assignment and acceptance of roles and responsibilities of transportation and other related industry members and disciplines involved to ensure successful coordination for citizen evacuation and relocation processes.
- The organizational structure in place to support citizen relocation.
- The ways in which developed plans will ensure citizen awareness and coordination during evacuation and relocation procedures.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Isolation and Quarantine

Capability Definition

The capability to protect the health of the population through the use of isolation and/or quarantine measures in order to contain the spread of disease to themselves or others. Isolation of ill individuals may occur in homes, hospitals, designated health care facilities, or alternate facilities. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and may become infectious. Successful implementation will require that sufficient legal, logistical, and informational support exists to maintain these measures.

Capability Outcome

Separation, restriction of movement, assurance that basic necessities of life are available, and health monitoring of individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed, in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (pandemic influenza). Legal authority for these measures is clearly defined and communicated to the public. Logistical support is provided to maintain measures until danger of contagion has elapsed. Most experts feel that isolation and quarantine will not stop the outbreak and that if used, the focus will be on cases that might introduce the disease into the state or other geographic area.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- Staffing levels, types of personnel positions, and organizations (with their associated roles and responsibilities) that exist to ensure isolation and quarantine is performed adequately.
- The established isolation and quarantine plans.
- The way legal authority is defined within State statutes and regulations and integrated into local, regional and State response plans.
- The types and levels of training and training requirements offered to ensure personnel are following procedures and able to perform isolation and quarantine capability.
- The establishment of shelter-in-place plans, arrangements for additional isolation and quarantine housing, and public information messages. Consider the adequacy of these plans, procedures and processes.
- The need for order and security, commutation and supply with a quarantined or isolated area and sanitation or isolated areas.
- The legal issues related to isolation and quarantine at the state and local level.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Urban Search and Rescue

Capability Definition

The capability to coordinate and conduct search and rescue (US&R) response efforts for all hazards including locating, accessing, extricating and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in damaged or collapsed structures, or other national significant events

Capability Outcome

US&R activities are conducted as safely and efficiently as possible, with the greatest numbers of victims rescued in the shortest amount of time while maintaining rescuer safety at all times.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- Plans, policies, and procedures in place for urban search and rescue operations and support, including local dispatch and operating procedures, memoranda of agreement (MOAs), and procedures for activating and coordinating with national US&R task force(s).
- The integration of personnel and various disciplines that are designed to ensure adequate search and rescue capabilities.
- The ways in which training and exercises have been developed and executed for meeting necessary standards related to urban search and rescue operations.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Emergency Public Information and Warning

Capability Definition

The capability to develop and coordinate the release of accurate alerts, warnings and other emergency information to the public prior to an impending emergency. To contribute to the well being of the community during and after an emergency by disseminating accurate, consistent, timely and easy-to-understand information about emergency response and recovery processes.

Capability Outcome

Members of the public receive prompt, accurate and useful information regarding threats to their health, safety and property. Additionally, the public receives clear, consistent information and periodic updates outlining protective measures that can be taken by individuals and their communities.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State’s homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plan for integration/collaboration of disciplines and organizations to qualify, issue, and communicate alerts.
- The management plan used to analyze data to ensure alerts are accurate and timely.
- The ways in which personnel are trained to ensure alerts are accurate and timely and communication is relayed throughout the life cycle of the event as needed.
- The communications plan that is used to ensure the alert message reaches the target audience and is understood and acted upon appropriately.
- The standards used to direct and evaluate the Emergency Public Information and Warning operation.
- The way exercises are performed to gauge performance of the Emergency Public Information and Warning operation and make improvements.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

Capability Definition

The capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility.

Capability Outcome

Emergency medical service resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched, and are able to provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the emergency medical services system for continued operations.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The personnel and disciplines involved and the communications plan to ensure information is available to rapidly triage, diagnose and transport casualty victims.
- The types of exercises that are performed to ensure protocols for triage, stabilization, and safe transportation of casualty victims are in place and effective.
- The type of training that is required for disciplines involved in casualty triage and pre-hospital training, and identify if there is a required frequency for refresher training.
- The type of equipment that is inventoried and maintained to support triage and pre-hospital treatment of casualty victims.
- The type of organizational structure that exists to ensure equipment is distributed effectively during an incident.
- Mutual aid agreements that exist to support triage and pre-hospital treatment of casualty victims.
- Coordination efforts with mortuary services.
- The plans for conducting decontamination as needed, the levels of equipment to support decontamination, and the types of personnel and training to ensure effective decontamination.
- The way in which transportation is managed during a casualty to ensure victims are reached quickly and can be moved rapidly to treatment facilities.

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Medical Supplies Management and Distribution

Capability Definition

The capabilities to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute, and track these materials during an incident.

Capability Outcome

Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately secured, managed, distributed and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The staffing levels, types of personnel positions, and organizations (with their associated roles and responsibilities) to ensure medical supplies management and distribution is performed adequately.
- The adequacy of emergency public health and medical distribution and hazard-specific response plans. Explain how these plans appropriately identify and prioritize resource needs.
- The adequacy of plans for special needs populations to receive medical supplies in an emergency.
- The types and levels of training offered and training requirements to ensure personnel are following procedures and able to perform Medical Supplies Management and Distribution.
- Mutual aid agreements and other plans in place to coordinate Medical Supplies Management and Distribution effectively across jurisdictions and/or regions.
- The logistical process used to pre-identify and plan for projected medical supply needs.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services)

Capability Definition

The capability to provide mass care services, to include immediate shelter, feeding, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items and other related services to persons affected by the incident, including special needs populations. People with special needs include individuals who need medical attention/personal care beyond basic first aid due to physical or mental impairment. Other populations may require special planning for certain needs, such as non-English speaking populations. The capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, while special needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community for alternate care facilities.

Capability Outcome

Rapid provision of mass care services for the affected general population, services for special needs populations, and services for animals within the affected area.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The staffing levels, types of personnel positions, and organizations (with their associated roles and responsibilities) to ensure Mass Care is performed adequately.
- The collaboration process among information sources into local government evacuation plans and shelter agreements.
- The types and levels of training offered and training requirements to ensure personnel are following procedures and able to perform analysis?
- The adequacy of shelter both in the affected area and within the relocation area.
- The adequacy of transportation. What other means of transportation may be available? (i.e. Amtrak, Ferries, etc)
- Accommodations in place for people with special needs and the adequacy of plans to address this population.
- Collaboration efforts with NGOs to ensure Mass Care could be provided efficiently and effectively.
- Plans or programs that are in place to ensure regional interface in a situation where mass care capabilities from one region are needed to provide mass care services for a incident that occurs in another region.
- The security of those being provided Mass Care.
- The need for a liaison role among NGOs and to and from multiple levels of government (e.g. a feedback loop from NGO's and all levels of government involved).

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Fatality Management

Capability Definition

The capability to effectively perform scene documentation; the complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim's personal effects, and items of evidence; decontamination of remains and personal effects (if required); transportation, storage, documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence; determination of the nature and extent of injury; identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the of cause and manner of death; processing and returning of human remains and personal effects of the victims' to the legally authorized person(s), (if possible); and interaction with and provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and culturally competent required services to the families of deceased within the context of the family assistance center. All activities should be sufficiently documented for admissibility in criminal and/or civil courts. To be incorporated in the surveillance and intelligence sharing networks to identify sentinel cases of bioterrorism and other public health threats. Complete daily non-event demands of the community.

Capability Outcome

Fatality management operations are conducted through a unified command structure as safely, timely, and efficiently as possible. Complete documentation and recovery of human remains, personal effects, and items of evidence will be done (except in cases where the health risk posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains and personal effects). Remains receive surface decontamination (if indicated) and, unless catastrophic circumstances dictate otherwise, are examined and identified, and released to the next-of-kin's funeral home with a complete certified death certificate. Reports of missing persons and ante mortem data are efficiently collected. Victims' family members will receive updated information prior to the media release. All hazardous material regulations are reviewed and any restriction on the transportation and disposition of remains are made clear by those with the authority and responsibility to establish the standards. All personal effects are made safe to return to next-of-kin unless contraindicated by catastrophic circumstances. Law Enforcement agencies will be given all the information needed to investigate and prosecute the case successfully. Families will be provided incident specific support services.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The ways in which procedures for mass fatalities and personal property processing are included appropriately in an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).
- The organizational structure developed to coordinate fatalities management – including integration and collaboration among personnel, disciplines and organizations.
- The way physical facility capacity availability is ensured to conduct fatality management operations (laboratory services, storage, etc).
- The way training efforts support forensic collection and analysis.

- The ways in which communications are planned and executed to ensure information is provided to survivors appropriately.
- The use and frequency of exercises to gauge fatality management.
- The evaluation of fatality management operations.
- The ways in which resources are provided to ensure personnel can effectively perform fatality management tasks, including the provision of protective equipment to minimize the occurrence of additional fatalities.
- The use of mutual aid to prepare for and execute fatality management tasks.
- Determination of responsibility for Family Assistance Center(s) (FAC) (particularly, who is in charge of the overall FAC operations) and various representatives who will staff it.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

RECOVER MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES

Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment

Capability Definition

The capability to conduct damage and safety assessment of civil, commercial and residential infrastructure, and to perform structural inspections, debris removal, and mitigation activities. The capability includes being able to provide contractor management, construction management, cost estimating, technical assistance and other engineering services to support and manage response and recovery operations.

Capability Outcome

Accurate situation needs and damage assessments occur. Mitigation projects to lessen the impacts of similar future events are identified, prioritized, and conducted. The full-range of engineering, building inspection, and enforcement services are implemented, managed, and coordinated in a way that maximizes the use of resources and aids emergency response and recovery operations.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The adequacy of structural damage and mitigation assessment plans.
- The procedures utilized to ensure that a jurisdiction maintains situation and damage assessment plans in Recovery Annex and that a jurisdiction conducts code enforcement, permitting, and inspection activities.
- The organizational structure and personnel roles and responsibilities to ensure adequate structural damage and mitigation assessment analysis.
- The ways structural damage and mitigation assessment procedures are evaluated for effectiveness.
- Zoning regulations which may impact recovery/restoration.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Restoration of Lifelines

Capability Definition

The capability to manage clearing and restoration activities (e.g. demolition, repairing reconstruction, etc.). This includes the restoration of essential gas, electric, oil, communications, water, wastewater and sewer, transportation and transportation infrastructure, and other utilities. This also includes clearing debris from lifelines.

Capability Outcome

Restoration of lifelines (e.g. transportation, communications, and public/private utilities) to facilitate emergency response and recovery activities, and to re-establish essential lifeline services for the impacted population.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The plan for identifying critical sites and resources. Consider how or if those sites are already identified. If those sites are not identified, further explore what plans are in place to move forward with that identification.
- The prioritization of assets for restoration and reconstitution efforts.
- The State restoration plan, and steps which were taken to engage the private sector, volunteer groups, and other stakeholders in the development of this plan.
- Efforts to establish mutual aid agreements to assist in restoration and reconstitution efforts.
- The State's emergency contracting capabilities for bringing in aid to support critical activities on a rapid basis.
- Contingency plans for a situation where all existing resources are maximized.
- The depth of Continuity of Government (COG) statues, as well as Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

Economic and Community Recovery

Capability Definition

The capability to implement short-term and long-term recovery processes after an incident. This will include identifying the extent of damage caused by an incident, through post-event assessments, and by determining and providing the support needed for recovery and restoration activities.

Capability Outcome

Recovery and relief plans are implemented and coordinated with all levels of government, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. Economic impact is estimated. Priorities are set for recovery activities. Business disruption is minimized. Individuals and families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.

Capability Discussion Points

When discussing and analyzing the State's homeland security preparedness capabilities, stakeholder participants should consider the following:

- The way in which economic and community recovery plans ensure coordination across government agencies and relief organizations.
- The procedures utilized to prioritize the recovery of business and economic assets.
- The organizational structure, personnel roles, and responsibilities used to ensure adequate economic and community analysis and post-events response.
- The types and frequencies of exercises used to support gauging and improving recovery activities.
- The way in which economic and community recovery procedures are evaluated for effectiveness.

Please note that these are discussion points. States are not expected to answer each question or write a lengthy narrative about each point. These discussion points are provided as a tool to help identify capability strengths and weaknesses and inform the analysis included in the Program and Capability Enhancement Plan.

SECTION III: PROGRAM REVIEW

Overview

The homeland security Program Review is a mechanism for strengthening State homeland security program management. The Program Review should involve a working group of homeland security program managers who will use the provided National Priority and program management discussion points to capture program strengths and weaknesses. Once strengths and weaknesses are identified, they will be used to complete an effective homeland security Enhancement Plan.

The intent of the Program Review is to encourage States to self-assess and gauge current program capacity, baseline operations, and future program needs. Successful efforts to build capabilities hinge on effective homeland security program operations. Understanding program management challenges can help address needs that support statewide efforts to enhance and sustain capabilities. As part of the Program Review process, States are essentially considering two high-level questions: 1) *Is the State program executing the appropriate activities to operate and manage the homeland security program?* and 2) *Has the State organized itself and established governance structures to effectively manage those activities?*

The guidelines and discussion points contained in this section of the Guidebook are not a mandated management approach intended to supplant existing and effective systems and processes. Instead, the Program Review is intended to be used as a mechanism for identifying program management strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, sound program management will help States develop, coordinate, and maintain the capabilities that will make the Nation better prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Discussion topics are provided in the following pages stimulate thought and identify strengths, weaknesses, improvement opportunities, and corrective actions in the areas that are most relevant to a State's ability to operate and manage an effective homeland security program. State multi-disciplinary working groups do not have to submit answers to the discussion points but should use them as a starting point to complete this exercise with an eye toward identifying management strengths and weaknesses within their organizational structures.

Defining a Homeland Security Program

In general, a program is defined as a collection of organizational resources including processes, people, and tools, which are geared to accomplish one overarching goal or set of mutually supporting goals, and may be an organization as well as a system. The State homeland security program should support and seek to achieve the overarching goal of preparedness: “to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect

The homeland security program management objective is:

To strategically manage and effectively coordinate major initiatives in support of State homeland security preparedness.

against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.”¹ The State homeland security program should support the four homeland security mission areas outlined in the Goal: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. From a governance standpoint, a homeland security program should involve the full lifecycle of key program management dimensions of processes, people, and tools. These elements contribute to a framework for States to assess their program in a multi-dimensional fashion and identify the program’s strengths and weaknesses.

An effective homeland security program hinges on sound program governance structures that help ensure the program is capable of conducting business across departments, agencies, and disciplines at all levels of government. Homeland security is a particularly challenging issue from a governance standpoint because such a wide spectrum of stakeholders are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events. Although a lead State agency is required from a functional standpoint to manage the overall homeland security program, the scope of the program transcends agencies and demands collaboration among all key constituencies in order to achieve success.

Incorporating the Overarching National Priorities

The Program Review provides States with the opportunity to gauge progress toward the three overarching National Priorities included in the Goal and identify gaps to address and efforts to sustain. The three overarching National Priorities are: Expanded Regional Collaboration, Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) & National Response Plan (NRP), and Implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). These priorities are cross-cutting in nature, involving multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, and agencies at the State and local levels. The achievement of the homeland security program goals requires an integrated, strategic, enterprise-wide approach undertaken by an efficiently managed homeland security program. Specific analytical discussion points relevant to each of the three overarching National Priorities are included in the following section.

Program Review and Overarching National Priorities Discussion Points

State working groups are encouraged to consider the following discussion points and priority discussions as part of the Program Review in exploring how the overarching National Priorities are incorporated in the State homeland security program, identifying the level of involvement of multiple disciplines and agencies at all levels of government with the State, and gauging the State homeland security program’s progress toward fully implementing the three overarching National Priorities.

Expanded Regional Collaboration

Major events will invariably have cross-geographic consequences and impact. The expanded regional collaboration priority highlights the need for embracing partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration allows for a multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary approach to building capabilities for all four mission areas, spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas. This approach increases opportunities to create efficiency and leverage capabilities across the country. Regional collaboration focuses on expanding mutual aid and assistance compacts

¹ National Preparedness Goal.

among contiguous State, local, and tribal entities, and their private and non-governmental partners, and extending the scope of those compacts to include pre-incident preparedness activities (i.e., planning, training, exercising). The intent is to locate capabilities strategically to maximize coverage of the U.S. population and the Nation’s high priority critical infrastructure and key resources. The Goal does not mandate that State and local governments adopt a regional governmental structure, but it does require that all levels of government embrace a *regional approach to building capabilities*.

Consider the following discussion points when assessing the current state of the Expanded Regional Collaboration efforts:

Expanded Regional Collaboration discussion points:

- Satisfaction with existing statewide collaboration efforts.
- The State concept for regionalization and its methodology for addressing unique needs of tribes and major metropolitan areas.
- The State plan for integrating operational systems from multiple disciplines and jurisdictions for all homeland security mission areas as part of the State’s strategic vision for enhanced regional collaboration.
- The criteria for determining regional, State, or jurisdiction needs and for approving those needs at the State level.
- The extent to which contiguous State, local, and tribal entities are working together to share funding for a specific purpose that affects all the entities.
- The extent to which border security issues are addressed in the State’s regionalization concept.

Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) & National Response Plan (NRP)

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), “*Management of Domestic Incidents*,” mandated the creation of the NIMS and NRP. The NIMS provides a consistent framework for entities at all jurisdictional levels to work together to manage domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To promote interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, local, and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of guidelines, standards, and protocols for command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and management and maintenance of NIMS. The NRP, using the template established by the NIMS, is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms to coordinate operations for evolving or potential Incidents of National Significance. Incidents of National Significance are major events that “*require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities*.”

Consider the following discussion points when assessing the current state of the NIMS/NRP efforts:

Implement NIMS/NRP discussion points:

- Incorporation of the NIMS into emergency operations, plans, policies, procedures, incident and resource management, training, and exercises.

- The statewide implementation strategy for ensuring NIMS compliance at the State, local, and tribal levels by established deadlines (acknowledging that different Federal funding streams – i.e., DHS, HHS, etc. – have differing deadlines).
- Promotion of intrastate and interagency mutual aid agreements, including private sector and non-governmental organization agreements.
- Incorporate a thorough understanding of, and necessary linkages to functions and organizations of, the NRP into emergency plans, policies, procedures, incident and resource management, trainings, programs, and exercises.
- Integrated regional operational systems based on NIMS concepts and principles.
- Integrated regional operational systems based on NRP support.

Implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)

The Interim NIPP outlines how DHS will exercise leadership and work with State, Tribal, and local governments, and the private sector to implement HSPD-7 “*Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*,” to produce a risk management framework that fosters a more secure environment for our nation’s citizens and infrastructure. With the inclusion of the Interim NIPP implementation as a National Priority, efforts to develop and implement a critical infrastructure protection program are a required component of both States and Urban Areas strategy updates and State Program and Capability Reviews. Thus, NIPP forms a key pillar of the overarching homeland security program.

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR) sites are potential terrorist targets deemed most crucial in terms of national-level public health and safety, governance, economic and national security, and public confidence consequences. Protecting CI/KR sites is a shared responsibility requiring cooperation among all levels of government – Federal, State, local, and tribal – and the involvement of the private sector. Effective security involves plans that define, identify, and set priorities for the most critical structures and assets that are potential targets for terrorist attacks. From a functional standpoint, the responsibility for creating and managing a critical infrastructure protection program entails building a program that can implement the risk management framework outlined in the Interim NIPP, to include: identifying critical assets; assessing risks; normalizing and prioritizing across infrastructure sectors; implementing protective programs; and measuring effectiveness of risk reduction measures. In the aggregate, these functions form the basis of an infrastructure protection program and are elements that support the implementation of relevant infrastructure protection-related goals and objectives.

Consider the following discussion points when assessing the current state of the NIPP efforts:

Implement the Interim NIPP discussion points:

- Steps taken to build a statewide critical infrastructure protection program that implements the risk management framework outlined in the Interim NIPP: identifying critical assets; assessing risks; normalizing and prioritizing across infrastructure sectors; implementing protective programs; and measuring effectiveness of risk reduction measures.
- State efforts to engage all relevant intergovernmental coordination points to ensure a comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure protection across all appropriate levels of government and across both public and private sectors.
- Steps that are being taken to identify, prioritize, and assess CI/KA.
- Efforts to incorporate cyber security protection efforts across all sectors of CI/KA.

Program Review Components and Outputs

To complete a Program Review, the State should focus on assessing homeland security program management activities and resources using a combination of targeted discussion points, or topics, about the three main components of program management that cross all dimensions of an effective homeland security program: processes, people, and tools. The results of the Program Review will provide the State with strategic perspective, maintainable strengths, and identified weaknesses of the State's management of its homeland security program.

Components to Consider in the Program Review

In the context of effective program management, processes, people, and tools are defined below.

Process – Activities and component steps that need to occur to achieve the mission.

People – Organizational entities, staff, working groups, and committees that are accountable for and participate in carrying out processes.

Tools – Resources other than people that are used in carrying out processes. Tools can be information technology, related components, and policies.

When discussing and analyzing effective State homeland security program management activities in regard to process, people, and tools, State working groups should consider the following:

Process Discussion Points:

- The current State evaluation process to evaluate program management activities.
- The way in which the State prioritizes funding for initiatives.
- The process to facilitate the disbursement of funds, once grants are awarded.
- States efforts underway to mitigate potential delays in the disbursement of funds.
- The State's efforts in identifying non-monetary resources and promising practices to support management activities.
- How the State incorporates legal and programmatic policies, requirements, standards, and regulations that impact program management.
- Whether plans and/or work breakdown structures have been developed for program management, in terms of cost and schedules, and whether these plans have been communicated, implemented and/or managed.
- Existence of statewide collaboration processes and how they are managed
- Whether or not specific program managers have been assigned to manage initiatives within the homeland security program and other managers in the State are aware of who is responsible for managing the initiatives.

People Discussion Points:

- Organizational entities, working groups, or committees accountable for implementing, conducting, and planning preparedness initiatives, grants allocation, and program assessments.

- The role of the Senior Advisory Committee, or similar statewide coordination body, with regard to planning, allocating, monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of the homeland security program.
- The degree to which appropriate human resources are available to the State to conduct preparedness activities, allocation and management of funds, and assessing and managing homeland security programs.
- Types of training that homeland security staff have undergone to support the program initiatives, allocation and grants management, and monitoring and assessment efforts.
- Internal initiative management training for staff

Tools Discussion Points:

- Whether or not initiative management lessons learned are documented and incorporated in initiative management guides, policies, and procedures.
- The State’s tracking data for performance evaluation and reporting and the sources of data that are used to drive the assessment process.
- Any oversight policies that have been established for the management of funding plans, expenditures, funding transfers, etc.
- Whether or not quality control plans have been established which include a system of policies, guidelines, and processes that ensure initiatives will meet all cost schedule, technical and usability requirements.
- State policies, information technology, regional collaboration, and other such resources that are in place to support the grant allocation process.
- The tools that are used and the way in which the State is promoting information sharing through integrated systems and how data quality is ensured.
- State efforts to ensure infrastructure protection, to include the security, availability, and reliability of systems and networks supporting preparedness.
- The level of satisfaction with the State’s information technology and the infrastructure resources to monitor, assess, and manage preparedness initiatives.

While processes, people, and tools are essential components of a program, using a strong management plan that incorporates the goals and objectives of the State Homeland Security Strategy is a good foundation for effective program management. The components of processes, people, and tools should be used in conjunction with the foundation of planning to analyze the management of State programs. For example, when discussing and analyzing State planning efforts, it is important to understand planning procedures, who is responsible for those planning efforts, and what tools are used in the process. In the context of effective program management, planning is defined below:

Planning – Analyzing program data, making decisions, and formulating plans for action in the future, aimed at achieving the program objective and the goal of State homeland security preparedness. Planning involves the process of anticipating future occurrences and problems, exploring their probable impact, and detailing policies, goals, objectives, strategies, and resources to solve the problems.

When discussion and analyzing the State’s homeland security program management activities in regard to planning, State working groups should consider the following:

Planning Discussion Points:

- The identified State planning stakeholders.
- How the State planning working group is assembled.
- The communication efforts between planning stakeholders.
- How often the State conducts an assessment to develop planning priorities.
- When the State develops a planning approach for new initiatives.
- The effectiveness of the planning budget and how it affects overall program management

APPENDIX A: CUSTOMIZED STATE PROGRAM, EXPENDITURE, AND CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT DATA REPORTS

Overview

Appendix A provides customized reports that contain State-specific data, which is based on existing assessment and grant data. The reports, which include caveats and assumptions, were designed to aid States with the Program and Capability Review. The reports convey existing State data in the context of the Target Capability List and demonstrate how DHS utilizes the information that States submit.

State Program Narratives

This section includes State-specific homeland security program narratives, which were submitted with the 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program applications. These narratives outline support systems and processes (planned or in place) to administer State homeland security programs. By drawing attention to statewide and national trends, the narratives can assist States in reviewing the structures and effectiveness of their homeland security programs.

Expenditure Data

This section includes expenditure data from the December 2004 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) submission. The BSIR is due at six month intervals over the period of performance for each grant award. The report is used as an effort to outline how State, urban area, local, and other Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) grant funding is being used to meet the strategic goals and objectives outlined in the State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies and related strategies. For this assessment, BSIR grant dollars are broken down by target capability, project type, and associated funding. State users must select one of several pre-defined project types that best relates to the project that they created and allocated funding towards in their BSIR. Project types from the BSIR are mapped to one or more of the 36 target capabilities in order to estimate the quantity of FY 2004 grant dollars that have been spent to build a particular capability.

Capabilities Assessment Data

This section includes capabilities assessment data from the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Tasks by Discipline section of the 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Process, which enabled jurisdictions and states to indicate the ability of their first responders to perform approximately 200 WMD-related tasks across the five solution areas (planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises) for each of the five hazards (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has mapped the tasks by discipline from the 2003 assessment to one or more of the 36 capabilities and has created charts that report the responses as provided by the entities within each state or territory that completed the 2003 assessment for the tasks that align to the target capabilities.

APPENDIX B: CAPABILITY-BASED PLANNING PROCESS AND TOOLS

At the national level, the challenge is to not only identify the components of the capability planning process but also define how all the components will work together to set measurable readiness priorities and targets across the nation. The challenge for the States then becomes understanding how they are meeting those priorities and targets. The Capability-Based Planning process, and its components, are defined further in the sections below.

Capabilities-Based Planning

In the Interim National Preparedness Goal, Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) is defined as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.” The CBP process allows for the comparison of current levels of capability to established performance targets by involving stakeholders in a continuous cycle of risk analysis and risk management. This process helps inform and optimize decision making at all levels of government by linking resource allocation to capabilities that must perform a wide range of assigned missions and tasks. The planning tools being developed to facilitate the Capabilities-Based Planning process include: National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities List.

National Scenarios

While much preparedness applies across the all-hazards spectrum, the National Strategy attaches special emphasis to preparing for catastrophic threats with “*the greatest risk of mass casualties, massive property loss, and immense social disruption.*” To address this requirement, a Federal interagency working group developed fifteen National Planning Scenarios to illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of a plausible range of major events, including terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive or predictive; rather, they are meant to illustrate a broad range of potential terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies and their related impacts. Scenarios provide the foundation for a risk-based approach to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. These scenarios should guide CBP State efforts and will be referenced in the State Program and Capability Review.

Target Capabilities List

At the heart of the Goal is the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The TCL identifies 36 national preparedness capabilities, provides a description of each capability, and presents guidance on the levels of capability that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain. Each level of government or geographical area will not be expected to develop and maintain all 36 capabilities at the same level. The expectation will vary based upon the risk and needs of different levels of government and geographic area. For example, basic capability levels may be expected of a rural, low-population jurisdiction, while more advanced levels of capability may be expected of a group of jurisdictions, an entire State, or the Federal

government. These levels should be identified through capability-based planning and during the Program and Capability Review.

Universal Task List

The Universal Task List (UTL) provides a menu of tasks that may be performed in major events such as those illustrated by the fifteen National Planning Scenarios. Identifying a menu of tasks is a step toward identifying dependencies and critical tasks among disciplines, entities, and levels of government. Critical tasks are defined as those prevention, protection, response, and recovery tasks that require coordination among an appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental entities during a major event to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. Critical tasks, with associated conditions and performance standards, provide the foundation for developing target levels of capability. Most importantly, they serve as the source for learning objectives used in the design, development, conduct and evaluation of training and exercise events. Over time, the UTL will include a list of conditions derived from the National Planning Scenarios and other sources that affect the way to perform the tasks. The UTL will also include performance measures and criteria associated with each task. The measures and criteria can be used to help define performance standards. Performance standards, when linked to conditions, provide a basis for evaluating how well tasks are performed in operations, training, and exercises. As part of capability-base planning, the UTL can help a State to further understand the basic steps or tasks to complete on the road to preparedness.

APPENDIX C: NATIONAL PRIORITIES IN THE INTERIM NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

Expanded Regional Collaboration

Major events, especially terrorism, will invariably have cross-geographic consequences and impact. The expanded regional collaboration priority highlights the need for embracing partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration allows for a multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary approach to building capabilities for all four mission areas, spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas. This approach increases opportunities to create efficiency and leverage capabilities across the country. Regional collaboration focuses on expanding mutual aid and assistance compacts among contiguous State, local, and tribal entities, and their private and non-governmental partners, and extending the scope of those compacts to include pre-incident preparedness activities (i.e., planning, training, exercising). The intent is to locate capabilities strategically to maximize coverage of the U.S. population and the Nation's high priority critical infrastructure and key resources. The Goal does not mandate that State and local governments adopt a regional governmental structure, but it does require that all levels of government embrace a *regional approach to building capabilities*.

Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) & National Response Plan (NRP)

HSPD-5, "*Management of Domestic Incidents*," mandated the creation of the NIMS and NRP. The NIMS provides a consistent framework for entities at all jurisdictional levels to work together to manage domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To promote interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, local, and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of guidelines, standards, and protocols for command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and management and maintenance of NIMS. The NRP, using the template established by the NIMS, is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms to coordinate operations for evolving or potential Incidents of National Significance. Incidents of National Significance are major events that "*require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities.*"

Implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)

The Interim NIPP outlines how DHS will exercise leadership and work with State, Tribal, and local governments, and the private sector to implement HSPD-7 "*Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*," to produce a risk management framework that fosters a more secure environment for our nation's citizens and infrastructure. With the inclusion of the Interim NIPP implementation as a National Priority, efforts to develop and implement a critical infrastructure protection program are a required component of both States and Urban Areas strategy updates and State Program and Capability Reviews. Thus, NIPP forms a key pillar of the overarching homeland security program.

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From a functional standpoint, the responsibility for creating and managing a critical infrastructure protection program entails building a program that can implement the risk management framework outlined in the Interim NIPP, to include: identifying critical assets; assessing risks; normalizing and prioritizing across infrastructure sectors; implementing protective programs; and measuring effectiveness of risk reduction measures. In the aggregate, these functions form the basis of an infrastructure protection program and are elements that support the implementation of relevant infrastructure protection-related goals and objectives.

Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities

The NIMS identifies establishing an effective process for gathering, sharing and managing information and intelligence as a key characteristic of effective incident management. Likewise, the NRP identifies collection, analysis and application of intelligence and other information as a key component of mission performance. The Goal reflects the consensus of the homeland security community regarding how to achieve appropriate levels of proficiency and the required supply of capabilities for these missions and processes through the Information Sharing and Collaboration National Priority.

Effective “information sharing and collaboration” efforts depend on the ability of State, local, and tribal governments to collect, analyze, disseminate, and use homeland security-related intelligence, a capacity that has come to be known as “intelligence/information fusion.” Accordingly, the establishment of this fusion capacity is one of the top components of the Information Sharing and Collaboration Priority for State, local, and tribal governments.

Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities

The lack of interoperable wireless communication systems is an issue that continues to affect public safety agencies in communities across the country. In many cases, agencies are unable to communicate or share critical voice and data information with other jurisdictions or disciplines during major events or even day-to-day operations. Interoperable Communications, the ability to provide an uninterrupted flow of critical information among responding multi-disciplinary and multi jurisdictional agencies at all levels of government before, during, and after an event, is a capability-specific priority. Communications interoperability underpins the ability of Federal, State, local, and tribal entities to work together effectively to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities

As noted in the National Preparedness Guidance, this National Priority “leverages efforts throughout the government to develop robust capabilities to detect, neutralize, contain, dismantle, and dispose of CBRNE materials, and decontaminate exposed personnel and

property.” This National Priority links with the several other priorities, including Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities, Expanded Regional Collaboration, and Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities. Establishing effective detection, response, and decontamination capabilities will require a regional approach; successful detection, response, and decontamination operations will necessitate operational integrated regional systems.

Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

Establishing an effective medical surge and mass prophylaxis capability requires embracing a multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional collaborative approach. These capabilities should be supportive of integrated regional operational systems being established in support of the expanded regional collaboration priority, and demonstrate effective integration among public health, healthcare services, and other appropriate disciplines (e.g., emergency management, emergency medical services, etc.). Much work in these areas has already been accomplished through programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These accomplishments and ongoing efforts should be leveraged in further strengthening and broadening medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities.

As noted in the National Preparedness Guidance, the Nation’s healthcare system, particularly hospitals, must be able to handle large numbers of patients requiring immediate care following a major incident. Emergency-ready hospitals, working collectively, must be able to handle different types of injuries, including trauma and burns, infections, or chemical- or radiation-induced injury. The medical provider community must have the capability to rapidly accommodate an influx of supplemental healthcare assets from mutual-aid partners, as well as the State and Federal government. Additionally, local public health and public safety agencies must develop capabilities and coordination capacity throughout the local and regional health and medical community. Because most of the Nation’s medical assets are privately owned, capability-building must close the public-private gaps, as well as integrate multiple disciplines and levels of government.

Also noted in the National Preparedness Guidance, public health threats and emergencies can ensue from a myriad of infectious agents, some of which can be mitigated by administration of immunizations and/or antibiotics and antiviral drugs. Although a wide variation exists among the disease and prophylaxis protocols, they all share a need for rapid deployment, distribution, and administration of the countermeasures. Local public health departments have the responsibility to develop and maintain (through exercises and drills) the capability to carry out first response and ongoing (Federally-assisted) mass antibiotic dispensing and vaccination campaigns tailored to the local population. States are responsible for providing support and assuring coordinated multi-jurisdictional responses. Federal assets and resources are intended to augment local and regional first response capability.