



CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
*Strategy Essay
Competition*

Essays
2004

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
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Foreword

Professional military education is vital to creating effective strategies and carrying out missions in challenging times. It fosters freedom of thought and encourages diverse perspectives essential to the long-term success of the Armed Forces. Toward that end, this volume presents the winning essays in the 23^d Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

This annual event concluded in a tie for first place. One of the two first-place essays assesses the role of combatant commanders in shaping national security policy, and the other considers the importance of intelligence to planning and executing post-combat operations. Second place went to an essay that examines intellectual processes in military transformation. The third-place essay evaluates the benefits of an indirect, information-based campaign in combating international extremists.

Challenges to the status quo are essential in a rapidly changing security environment, and they are crucial to successful military transformation. This annual competition provides an opportunity for students at our war and staff colleges to share ideas. The vigorous debate that emerges from airing these ideas will lead to well-constructed, coherent, and winning strategies.

I want to thank the faculty, staff, and leaders of our professional military education institutions who offer the best programs in the world by encouraging innovative thinking. It is important to test our assumptions because the stakes are high. Ultimately, the security of the United States and friendly and allied nations lies in the strength of our ideas and our commitment to a shared objective: the defense of liberty.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders

Howard D. Belote

[Regional commanders] command so much respect in their theaters and in Washington that they often shape foreign relations strategy. But their philosophies on building alliances abroad, developed over long military careers, sometimes clash with civilian views.

—Dana Priest

In September 2000, Dana Priest opened a new chapter in popular coverage of the U.S. military role in international politics. After traveling extensively with the four regional combatant commanders, Priest highlighted their activities and influence in a three-article series in the *Washington Post*. She argued that the commanders she profiled “exerted more political influence abroad over the past 3 years than most civilian diplomats,” and saw the roots of that influence in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986. “Since then,” wrote Priest, the regional commanders “have evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy.”¹ Priest fleshed out her arguments in the Pulitzer Prize–nominated *The Mission*:

Colonel Howard D. Belote, USAF, shared first place with this essay, written while attending the National War College. His previous assignment was commander of the 32^d Air Operations Squadron at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Currently, he is commander of the 3^d Air Support Operations Group at Fort Hood.

Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military, which described an “incremental, little noticed, de facto” shift toward military prominence in international affairs whereby four-star commanders “simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress.”² Blessed with abundant resources and faced with nonmilitary problems, these commanders began to drive—not merely execute—U.S. foreign policy.³

Although some commentators have cited Priest's research to decry imperial American policies and military encroachment on civilian roles, her work appears to be the only serious exploration of the international role of regional commanders.⁴ *The Mission* only tells part of the story, however. While faulting elected leaders for “failing to ask probing questions or push hard enough for reform” and recounting incidents of friction between commanders and ambassadors, Priest does not delve deeply into the civilian side of these particular civil-military relationships—even though her criticisms echo those by Eliot Cohen in his recent book *Supreme Command*.⁵ At the same time, little of the scholarship on civil-military relations examines the diplomatic roles of four-star officers; most describes wartime dissent or inside-the-Beltway bureaucratic battling. No one has adequately addressed the civil-military implications of the modern-day military diplomat.

Perhaps the best way to fill this gap in the literature is to engage the civilians who work national security issues alongside the combatant commanders. Assistant secretaries of state and ambassadors normally direct the Nation's diplomacy and should be positioned to judge the effectiveness and appropriateness of military involvement therein. Therefore, this essay focuses on the international role—as policy executor and policy shaper—of the regional commanders vis-à-vis their Department of State counterparts. Why do these military officers enjoy such prominence on the world stage? Are they filling a post-Cold War vacuum, or does history suggest other reasons? Most importantly, is their prominent role proper? Do the combatant commanders somehow usurp civilian control, or do they fill a vital role that no one else can fill?

To answer these questions, this essay relies on both Priest's reporting and additional interviews of senior military officers who have served as regional commanders and national security advisers. To explore the civilian side of the civil-military relationship, it canvasses current and former under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and ambassadors. To discuss the implications for national security policymaking, it surveys

recent literature on civil-military relations. Finally, it synthesizes the experience of the aforementioned policymakers and explores ways to improve the civil-military relationships at the core of the national security policy process. Even in a resource-constrained world, the major actors—the Departments of State and Defense—might be able to effect some incremental change and ensure that America gets the most possible bang for its foreign policy buck.

Commanders Present and Past

Priest's writings emphasize the political role of the combatant commanders. She describes the commanders of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) as globe-trotting emissaries of the world's sole superpower—for much of the world, the most visible face of American engagement. Citing interviews with 20 ambassadors, Priest notes that “no other U.S. official in the region spent more time trying to build relationships with nations where virtually none existed” than did General Anthony Zinni, USMC, CENTCOM commander in the late 1990s.⁶ In Europe, the reporter highlights similar situations: “At every stop, [EUCOM commander General Wesley Clark, USA] sat with prime ministers and foreign ministers and spent as much time with civilian officials and diplomats as with military officers.”⁷ And while her personal observations of commanders in PACOM and SOUTHCOM deal more with military-to-military meetings, the foreign policy implications of such meetings are clear. In many of those nations, the indigenous military wields disproportionate political influence.

Regarding the nature of the job, recent commanders agree with Priest's assertions that the role is largely political. General Joseph Ralston, USAF, Clark's successor as EUCOM commander and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military chief—estimates that he spent about 70 percent of his time on political-military issues, despite having ongoing combat operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia and maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean. Believing his greatest impact was with decisionmakers throughout Europe, Ralston devoted up to 80 percent of his political-military time with various national ambassadors to NATO, heads of state, members of parliament, ministers of defense, and military chiefs of defense. Aware of his role as an international spokesman and mindful of press attention, Ralston worked hard to understand the needs of politicians,

governments, and populations: “For example, when I went to Finland, I had to know the Finnish prime minister had a different position on NATO membership [than other Finnish ministers]. I had to know what the Minister of Foreign Affairs thought, what the Minister of Defense thought. . . . I didn’t want to embarrass the government, but could be candid privately.”⁸ Analyzing PACOM and the pre-*Iraqi Freedom* CENTCOM, Ralston argued the political-military percentages of the commander’s roles were about the same. In a presentation at the National War College, Zinni concurred. He described three components to the job—the warfighting function, day-to-day engagement, and development—and suggested that he spent a lot more time on the latter two:

You have to know what you want the region to look like down the road, and try to build programs toward that. Take Yemen in the aftermath of its civil war. . . . [Americans] wanted to write it off, but it was a major security problem. The Yemeni president complained he couldn’t control his borders; I wanted to help shore up his coast guard, etc. Plus, I wanted to “get them pregnant”—get all the Gulf countries to participate in security issues like basing and overflight.⁹

Zinni focused his energies on strengthening regional cooperation, noting that the Gulf region functioned not as an alliance or coalition, but through a loose series of bilateral agreements. Zinni stated, “Area leaders wanted something more formal, but sensed no guarantees from the United States. . . . I used missile defense as a hook to start discussions on shared defense; Secretary [William] Cohen allowed Shared Early Warning. That became the first step in regional military cooperation.”¹⁰

Zinni’s efforts toward regional cooperation parallel Ralston’s leadership as SACEUR. The SACEUR history, in turn, suggests the deeper roots of the commander’s political influence. Priest admits that its hand has always “contained politics and policy along with military matters,” but fails to ask why; she relies on the Goldwater-Nichols Act and reduced Department of State budgets to explain the commander’s prominence.¹¹ However, the NATO supreme commander has for 55 years conducted diplomacy and shaped policy on both sides of the Atlantic. The first SACEUR, General Dwight Eisenhower, had an

intimate knowledge of politico-military problems on the highest level and a breadth of outlook unusual in a regular soldier. . . . Nobody else revealed Eisenhower’s remarkable capacity for integrating the efforts of different allies and rival services and for creating harmony between individuals with varied backgrounds and temperaments.¹²

Eisenhower's protégé and fourth SACEUR (1956–1963), General Lauris Norstad, USAF, led NATO through the Cuban missile crisis—important to Europe because of American missiles in Turkey—as well as crises in Hungary, the Suez Canal, Algeria, the Congo, and Berlin.¹³ Norstad repeatedly defused intra-alliance tensions, building up

a tremendously loyal following. . . . The French respect his behind-the-scenes efforts to encourage a better understanding of French problems in North Africa. Turks, Britons, and Greeks, for example, function smoothly at [NATO headquarters]. Most of all, the NATO nations implicitly trust the skill and judgment of Norstad and his staff.¹⁴

The general built that trust through brilliant diplomacy. As he told Edgar Puryear, Jr.:

I studied the countries . . . I knew the governments, but I also knew the opposition people and I spent almost as much time with the opposition people as I did with the government. . . . I felt that was my *forté*. . . . I'd become an expert in . . . the field of relationships between countries as well and I knew I had their support.¹⁵

While some inhabitants of the NATO and EUCOM command position have been more accomplished diplomats than others, they have all played significant international roles. Clearly, military officers have shaped and implemented foreign policy not only to fill a vacuum or as an unintended consequence of DOD reorganization, but also to develop and maintain alliance cohesion because they were best positioned to do so. The history of CENTCOM suggests a similar explanation. Indeed, the command was formed from U.S. Readiness Command about the same time as Goldwater-Nichols, but the CENTCOM commander has had to focus from the start on building and maintaining coalitions. Norman Schwarzkopf complemented Secretary of State James Baker's diplomacy and deftly held together a coalition for the Persian Gulf War; his successors maintained a presence in the heart of the Arab world, enforcing United Nations sanctions and ultimately ejecting Saddam Hussein from Iraq.

All the CENTCOM commanders—like their EUCOM counterparts—have from the beginning been on the front lines of American military and diplomatic engagement. America has long vested considerable power in the hands of its most senior military officers, often to great effect. In the words of two noted historians:

The military high command is the point of contact between political and military aspirations and activities; because of this, the coalition commanders must function as superb artists. . . . The coalition

soldier . . . who can do so successfully is one who has indeed proved his versatility. Defeating one's enemies while placating one's allies calls for the remarkable characteristics of the soldier-statesman.¹⁶

Whatever their historical roots, Priest is clearly ill at ease with the commanders' political-military interactions. She deplores the symbolism of their security entourages, arguing that "their travels, mechanically elegant and ceremonial, are unmatched in grandeur by those of any other U.S. Government official and a few cabinet secretaries."¹⁷ More importantly, she fears that the generals and admirals cast too long a shadow over American policy. First, their budgets outweigh civilian agency budgets: "With a combined budget of \$380 million a year, their resources were lavish compared to the civilian agencies that by law and tradition were supposed to manage U.S. foreign relations."¹⁸ Second, she worries that their

leadership skills, honed over years of military service, ensured [they] dominated, particularly in the near absence of strong, countervailing civilian figures. That their overbearing influence might actually distort American foreign policy goals was not a problem they thought much about.¹⁹

In fact, she has focused on that potential distortion, describing the friction between the PACOM commander and the Ambassador to Indonesia and how the commander's position prevailed in the National Security Council.²⁰

Predictably, the commanders downplay those concerns. In his NATO role, Ralston highlighted the role of civilian leaders, insisting that Washington had "to work through the Ambassador to NATO" and allow SACEUR to represent all member nations. As commander, Ralston was careful to use the channels mandated by Goldwater-Nichols, pointing out that "the vast majority of my phone calls were to the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the Secretary [of Defense]; I probably averaged two trips a month to Washington." He testified before Congress and ensured that every representative or senator who visited the region had complete visibility into EUCOM programs:

For every Congressional delegation that visited, I wrote a letter. I spent a lot of time on it—no boilerplate—outlining issues, what we were trying to accomplish. I talked to all of them, hosted Q&A [question and answer] sessions. It was a good dialogue; I'd taken an oath that if Congress asked my opinion, I'd give it to them, even if I disagreed with the administration. But I don't recall ever being out of step with

U.S. policy—so I think Dana’s wrong. There’s no overbearing influence on policy.²¹

Likewise, Zinni emphasized that “strategy and policy” should come from civilians, but lamented that “people read the Priest books and articles and believe we’re crazy proconsuls, then pull back power from those on the scene who can enact policy away from the politics of [Washington] DC.” He tried to pull direction from his superiors, seeking a coordinated national strategy: “I never got any policy direction. I read the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy; they’re Pollyannaish—something for everyone. I couldn’t discern priorities.” The general believed that he and his counterpart commanders made a vital contribution to the political debate because “the interagency process is ‘ad-hocery’ at its best, as decisionmakers try to figure out where on a map an issue is. There’s no depth of understanding like those out living the issues.”²²

The Civilian View

One would expect professionals such as Ralston and Zinni to defend the system that produced them and to justify their conduct as American public servants. Their comments, however, lead to important questions: What do their civilian counterparts think? Does *The Mission* exaggerate the problem? Do the officials charged with developing and executing foreign policy in the United States and abroad see teamwork and deference to civilian authority from the regional commanders, or do they sense an improper loss of power to the military? Does the current system work properly?

For a number of senior State Department officials—both political appointees and career Foreign Service officers—the answer is an unqualified *yes*. The system works to America’s benefit. Lincoln Bloomfield, who as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs must coordinate State-Defense interaction around the world, “could probably give 100 cases where the combatant commander has accomplished something we needed to get done. One, he’s on the scene. Two, the power to get something done may have been in a foreign military rather than a foreign ministry.” Bloomfield describes a “flow of information from State to embassies to commanders that is not as isolated as it once was . . . it’s more likely civilians will know the [commanders’] needs and vice versa,” and concludes that the regional commanders “are terrific. . . . It’s hard work, running all day long, bouncing things off of everyone, accumulating ideas of just what our policy is.”²³

Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, reports outstanding teamwork with Ralston and his successor, James Jones: “I’m always on the phone with the EUCOM commander, coordinating our approach to the region.”²⁴ Likewise, Marc Grossman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, confesses to being

a huge fan of the [regional commanders]. I was the ambassador to Turkey; in EUCOM, when the deputy [commander, the commander], and I were on the same page—there was nothing we couldn’t achieve. In 6 years in Turkey as [deputy chief of mission] and ambassador, there was never a single conflict. Now, I’m dealing with Colombia; I’ve made five of my six visits with SOUTHCOM’s commander. We do everything together.

Yes, someone could goof. But the system works wonderfully—the [regional commanders] are some of the finest America has to offer. When the [commander] and ambassador are on the same page, it’s a very powerful combination. I’m a complete believer.²⁵

Such positive impressions about regional commanders extend from Washington to the field. Robert Hunter, NATO Ambassador during the Clinton administration, is “a big believer in a SACEUR who plays a diplomatic role. . . . I used to say SACEUR was worth two deployed divisions in terms of presence, in what we’re trying to achieve.” Hunter believes the role is more important now than during the Cold War because with multinational missions around the world, European nations ask, “Can we trust him with our kids? It’s a diplomatic role of a radically different nature. . . . Fortunately, we have a very good track record in picking SACEURs. . . . Effective people in the job can play an integrating role.”²⁶ Finally, Ambassador Robert Gelbard—who, for Priest and others, was involved in the most significant case of regional commanders circumventing ambassadorial leadership—echoes the foregoing praise. Prior to his conflict with PACOM commander Admiral Dennis Blair, USN, over relations with Indonesia, Gelbard had

extremely positive experiences in SOUTHCOM with Generals [John] Galvin, [Fred] Woerner, [James] Thurman, and [Barry] McCaffrey, and in EUCOM with [George] Joulwan and Clark. It was crystal clear, their willingness to work with me. General Thurman said he worked for me; we’d talk several times a week, or he’d come to visit.

The Ambassador highlights an “extremely important example . . . the process of completely changing Chile policy to be pro-democracy and anti-Pinochet. I got the fullest cooperation from Galvin—

no mixed signals whatsoever.” Gelbard acknowledges the problem with Admiral Blair but lays the blame on a lack of policy coordination in Washington rather than personality conflicts or power vacuums. In any case, the Indonesian example failed to shake his confidence in regional commanders: “I can’t say if it’s the exception that proves the rule, but the rules of engagement and the system between the [commander] and the ambassador are about right. I wouldn’t change it.”²⁷

The Issue of Civilian Control

The foregoing discussion suggests that regional commanders do play a significant role in international affairs—a role welcomed and celebrated by the civilians who “by law and tradition” (to use Priest’s phrase) direct American foreign policy. Without a doubt, because their role is so prominent, these military officers greatly influence the policy that they execute. To demonstrate effective policy coordination within DOD, Ralston emphasizes “good support from Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld. I came back 19 times to tell the secretary he was making a mistake—all 19 times, the secretary did what I asked.”²⁸ Priest recounts an incident where Zinni resisted pressure from the White House to use American pilots to provoke Iraqi responses in the no-fly zone because he believed the idea to be militarily and politically unsound. Zinni insisted he would comply only with a direct order; no such order came—so the general, in essence, shaped the American posture.²⁹ Scholarly observers of civil-military relations might question such a level of military influence in the civilian realm, however. How does civil-military relations theory apply to this situation? Has military influence gotten out of control? Should the Nation disqualify or demand the active engagement of commanders in policy debate?

One long-time observer of the civil-military relationship, Richard Kohn, resents that “the American military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions.”³⁰ Kohn briefly mentions the regional commanders, if only to lament “that they have effectively displaced American ambassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign policy.”³¹ He then categorically discounts any role in policymaking for senior military officers because “advocacy politicizes the chairman, a chief, or a regional commander and inflates their influence in discussions of policy.”³² In calling for public military participation in national security debates, argues Kohn, commentators such as Sam Sarkesian and James Webb are off the mark—because officers cannot “subscribe to policy and

debate it honestly at the same time.”³³ While admitting that the “American military has never preyed on this society,” Kohn implores officers to accept “the right of civilians to be wrong, to make mistakes” and to “encourage civilians to exercise their authority and perform their legal and constitutional duty to make policy and decisions.”³⁴

Some commentators, on the other hand, do see a legitimate role for the military in the policy debate. Rebecca Schiff proposes what she calls *concordance theory*: the idea that “three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship.”³⁵ Although “specific conflicts may exist between certain civilian and military elites . . . there remains an overwhelming concordance between the political establishment, the armed forces, and society over the role and mission of the American armed forces.”³⁶ Eliot Cohen does not accept Schiff’s reasoning—he calls concordance theory “a mirage” and dislikes the current state of the civil-military dialogue, which since the Gulf War “has not really been ‘advice’ at all, but something different: a preparation of options, and sometimes a single option, for the civilian leadership.” For this, however, Cohen blames not military malfeasance but “abdication of authority by the civilian leadership”³⁷ and advocates a vigorous civil-military debate to remedy the situation. Challenging what he calls the “normal” theory of civil-military relations and forcing civilian leaders to engage deeply in the full range of political-military security issues, Cohen says political leaders

must demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not usually dictate, it must dominate, and that that conversation will cover not only ends and policies, but ways and means.³⁸

To illustrate, Cohen cites the examples of the central characters of his study—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—none of whom “dictated to their subordinates. . . . Each tolerated, indeed promoted men who disagreed with them, forcefully.”³⁹ Such tolerance contradicts Kohn’s assertion that officers cannot honestly debate, be overruled, then faithfully execute a policy with which they disagree. On the contrary, Priest notes that the regional commanders “have helped shift America’s strategic thinking [but privately] hold strong opinions that sometimes differ sharply with the policies they are asked to carry out.”⁴⁰ Admiral Blair pushed for more engagement with China, General Clark argued for adequate funding to

support Balkans operations, and General Zinni opposed covert funding to overthrow Saddam Hussein. While in uniform, Colin Powell used the *New York Times* to urge more time for sanctions to work against Hussein in 1990—then faithfully represented the administration during combat. Did such participation help or hinder American policymaking?

If some of history's most effective statesmen benefited from free-flowing debate, it follows that current leaders would benefit as well. The American system is built on open discussion—and open debate must be more acceptable and beneficial than the “relentless, ruthless bureaucratic struggle” Kohn deplors.⁴¹ Why does a uniform require muzzling? The Nation deserves the best quality policy debate possible—the type of debate Cohen celebrates. Regional commanders bring a wealth of experience and a lifetime of public service to the table. National security should demand that they share that experience publicly.

On balance, then, civil-military relations theory can, if reluctantly, accept an open debate among military and civilian security professionals. Speaking of the combatant commanders' role in that debate, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft states bluntly, “It's not a usurpation of civilian authority, not at all. The solution is certainly not to diminish the scope of the commanders' reach.”⁴² Instead, military and civilian alike should promote what Cohen calls “the unequal dialogue”: a freewheeling, honest discussion wherein civilians have the final say. According to the generals and civilian officials cited above, America's combatant commanders have prepared for and understand their place in that debate.

The Unequal Dialogue in Practice

Debate is, of course, two-sided; if the Nation is to enjoy the fullest benefit from an “unequal dialogue,” it must prepare all the potential participants in the national security arena to contribute. Diplomats, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines would clearly benefit from more meaningful exposure to one another throughout their careers. Recounting her travels with regional commander entourages, Priest jokes about foreign service officers who do not know the difference between corporals and colonels: “You have to teach State about the military; there's a total lack of knowledge. I'd ride with State Department guys who knew nothing.”⁴³ On the other side of the coin, James Locher—a former Senate staffer who helped draft Goldwater-Nichols—argues, “The Pentagon must strengthen its ability to work with other government departments and agencies.

Contemporary crises are complex. They have military, diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, technological, and information dimensions.”⁴⁴ Most importantly, as Anthony Cordesman insists, cross-functional knowledge and close teamwork between diplomats and military officers at all levels is critical to the Nation:

the United States cannot tolerate an executive branch that allows major divisions to grow between key departments like the Department of State and Department of Defense. . . . “Jointness” must go far beyond the military; it must apply to all national security operations.⁴⁵

A key question follows: How does one facilitate this teamwork and informed debate?

Some observers would prefer a complete restructuring of the national security apparatus. Four years ago, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (or Hart-Rudman Commission, after its principal members) proposed a major reorganization of the executive branch “to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era.”⁴⁶ Many senior speakers at the National War College during academic year 2003–2004 advocated a kind of Goldwater-Nichols II for the interagency process. Priest would prefer an empowered and resourced State Department with “some kind of cross between soldier and foreign service officer to wrestle with the chaos of civil society and nation building”; she highlights proposed legislation from Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) as a possible step toward a solution—but admits to huge “money, legislative, and [Defense Department]” obstacles to such a move. “There’s some acceptance from the executive branch, but no endorsement yet.”⁴⁷

The example of Goldwater-Nichols, which took 5 years to pass, and the languishing of the Hart-Rudman proposals suggest a less-than-bright future for institutional redesign. Short of radical reform, there may be ways to improve the current system. State and Defense can institutionalize closer, more effective coordination. Within resource and legislative constraints, though, where can diplomats and officers focus their efforts? Where are the critical seams in the State-Defense relationship?

Echoing the Hart-Rudman report, almost all the practitioners consulted for this study emphasize a lack of adequate policy coordination and interagency focus on security issues. As described earlier, Ambassador Gelbard faults poor policy direction, not bureaucratic friction, for his conflict with Admiral Blair: “The fundamental issue is policy. There has to be policy engagement in [Washington] DC; in this case,

there wasn't. I'd have happily taken instructions from DC to back off my hard-line policy—but I got none."⁴⁸ Under Secretary Grossman concurs with the observation, but sees few opportunities for change:

Why do we have confusion between State and Defense responsibilities? We're Americans—the whole system is designed for tension, for checks and balances. Is it fun for those who attend 16 deputies' meetings a week? No—but policy grows from that clash. We don't have a Politburo.⁴⁹

Regarding that tension, General Zinni laments a short attention span inside the Beltway, exacerbated by “the resonance of interagency rivalry.” He complains that the

[combatant commanders] and State regional bureau chiefs had a great deal of difficulty getting issues on the table. . . . No one's answering back here, and it's hard to explain in DC why we need regional strategies. Every [regional commander] submitted a strategy—but they weren't coordinated back here. We came together on our own to try to work things out.⁵⁰

Zinni's comments underscore a significant facet of the lack of coordination: a different focus between Washington and the field—and a lack of clear coordination within the State Department's regional bureaus and its embassies. The Hart-Rudman report notes that every regional commander

does have a Political Adviser from the State Department, but there is no systematic civilian foreign policy input into military planning. When a crisis occurs, coordinating the various civilian activities (humanitarian assistance and police forces) with military activities (transport or peacekeeping operations) remains very uneven. More fundamentally, a gap exists between the [commander], who operates on a regional basis, and the Ambassador, who is responsible for activities within only one country.⁵¹

General Scowcroft sees the problem in the role and responsibilities of the regional assistant secretary, who “is DC-, not field-oriented. . . . The problem is that State has no one in the field who has a regional perspective. The issue is in the field, not Washington.”⁵² Assistant Secretary Bloomfield underscores that a “good regional assistant secretary. . . spends a lot of time pounding the pavement” in the region but admits “at State, embassies have a country focus; the regional bureaus are thinking trade, economics, democracy, women's rights, and other policy priorities. The unified command does have the best 20/20 focus on regional security and its implications.”⁵³ Finally, Ambassador Hunter

agrees, highlighting an exception to Scowcroft's observation to show the value of close regional coordination. He calls the U.S. mission to NATO "the only fully integrated mission abroad; State and Defense, region and country. We never lost a battle in DC."⁵⁴

The former NATO Ambassador makes an additional observation that hints at another critical seam in State-Defense cooperation. Responding to Priest's disappointment in the regional commands' large budgets, Hunter admits:

I don't really know the money issue. Thank goodness the commander in Europe has money to throw around—there's an awful lot we should be doing. Taking away the recruiting pool for terrorists and their support, that's Poli-Sci 101. Yes, [commanders] have a lot more money. The system's not perfect—but if it were, it would probably be a day late and a dollar short.⁵⁵

The ambassador is by no means alone in "not really knowing the money issue." There are so many programs to invest in international engagement—through defense, diplomacy, or development—that no agency, leader, or analyst can track them. Policy analyst Jennifer Moroney has "for 5 years looked at security cooperation as a whole, from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, mil[itary]-mil[itary], civil-mil[itary], and civil-civil assistance"; she has found authorizations for "hundreds of huge programs to engage with countries. There's some train-and-equip programs, some non-lethal training, some familiarization." Interestingly, no one can assess the overall value of these programs, or determine if they complement or contradict one another, because

different agencies track programs differently. There's no system in place to evaluate these activities, no grand sharing of information, no overall transparency. . . . I've looked from the DOD level, the unified command level, the component level—anyone who works these issues knows there's a huge problem. It's not malicious; if you're required to report to only one agency, you do, and the report doesn't go anywhere.⁵⁶

Along the same lines, Corbin Lyday, an analyst who spent 9 years with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "couldn't think of a single meeting in 9 years" between principal actors in State, USAID, and Defense to coordinate regional or country programs. He notes that "no one crosses bureaucratic lines; we spend in isolation," and believes that military assistance money, critical to gain basing access in Central Asia, can nonetheless undermine years of work toward anticorruption and good governance programs. In any case, he advises to "zero

in on the money. That's most important—there's an enormous amount of money here. If we don't know where it is, we can't even ask if we're helping."⁵⁷ General Zinni provides the example for these analysts: counterdrug programs in Uzbekistan. "CENTCOM ran a program, CIA ran one, [former Secretary of State Madeleine] Albright drops \$2 million—why not coordinate resources and efforts?"⁵⁸

Any one or all of these problem areas—these seams in State-Defense interaction—provide a starting point for the Nation's "unequal dialogue." Senior officers and diplomats should engage publicly to improve security policy coordination, regionally focused security strategies, and coordinated defense-diplomatic-developmental budgets. To prepare themselves for high-quality debate, those officials should interact early and often throughout their careers of public service. How, then, can State and Defense improve their interdepartmental teamwork?

Recommendations

Most commentators see the best solution as either a reordering of missions or creation of cross-functional groups to enhance policy and strategy coordination. Priest wants to see a State Department staffed for full direction of foreign policy and educated to integrate military engagement properly; she thinks the current secretary of defense

wants to bring the military back to its core mission. In an ideal world, I would too. However, if you can't, do you train the military better to do those civilian things? If the choice is between a narrow-minded military being pushed into these roles or a broadly educated one, integrated with civilian oversight—I'd pick that one.⁵⁹

Zinni agrees that State needs more money, calling it "a whipping boy second only to the United Nations in [Washington] DC. Change its structure to support regional bureaus; align it with the [commanders] to coordinate policy, strategy, and planning with a regional focus." He calls for joint interagency working groups within the regional commands and a "standing joint/interagency group in DC. The NSC [National Security Council] doesn't fill the role—you need a true, fully manned, not ad-hoc group to focus on crises and work on complementary planning."⁶⁰ Assistant Secretary Bloomfield agrees, although on a smaller scale, calling for "an interagency, mid-senior level—deputy assistant secretaries—contact group in DC." This group would stay abreast of regional issues and "get the call, any time of night, whenever a sensitive issue comes in."⁶¹ For the Commission on National Security/21st Century, neither recommendation

goes far enough; instead, it would raise each regional bureau chief to under secretary level, and “establish NSC interagency working groups for each major region, chaired by the respective regional under secretary of state, to develop regional strategies and coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation.”⁶² Arguably, all these ideas about re-focused missions, extra funding, or new structures overreach. All would require congressional involvement—and no one knows if the political will exists to restructure the executive branch.

There may be a simpler solution: a single, existing, cross-functional position that could integrate regional planning, consolidate budgets, and track most of the military assistance and development money flowing into a region. The Hart-Rudman report would “require the regional [commanders] to strengthen the process through which their political advisers [POLADs] involve ambassadors in planning”⁶³—but that would be too small a step. The commanders should go even further, empowering and resourcing their POLADs to act as a clearinghouse and communication center between the command, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and deputy assistant secretaries in the regional bureaus. They could become a single point of contact for regional strategy and budget integration, smoothing a seam that Bloomfield identified:

I’ve tried to make the State and Pentagon budget-building calendars fit, so that every conference for a regional commander’s security plan is iterative—but State and DOD have been in different cocoons. I’d do a zero-based calendar—completely synchronize budgets so embassy and commander recommendations build on each other.⁶⁴

While building budgets, POLADs—who would need military and civilian support—should try to rationalize the scattershot process of distributing development money into their regions. To ensure that the best foreign service officers aspire to these more responsible positions, POLADs would have to come from and stay on the State Department career fast track.

To be effective, POLADs need support—and that support could simultaneously increase interdepartmental familiarity and understanding. In the field, POLADs should have a small military and civilian staff. In Washington, they need someone to represent the regional security perspective in mid-level interagency meetings. To facilitate the crossflow of information, a Washington point of contact should be provided for POLADs, and in order to ensure visible State-Defense coordination in

Foggy Bottom, DOD could provide one-star deputy assistant secretaries to each of the regional bureaus.

Can this work? Bloomfield thinks so. He reports that “Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage have clearly expressed their interest in POLADs. . . . I’ve tried to put as much energy into the position as possible, to make the POLAD a true pipeline.”⁶⁵ It may be more difficult to convince DOD to provide general officers to the regional bureaus; Priest and others report bureaucratic turf battles that work against such cooperation.⁶⁶ There is precedent, however: Bloomfield’s job was held by three-star officers in the mid-1980s. Perhaps that history points the way to improved civil-military security coordination.

Conclusion

The regional combatant commanders undoubtedly cast a large shadow over American foreign policy—a shadow that some commentators fear or resent. However, their political role goes back far longer than many observers realize; commanders have been influencing policy significantly since the National Security Act created unified commands in 1947. According to a host of policy developers and practitioners, that influence has been overwhelmingly positive. By nature of their position, their access to international leaders both civilian and military, their resources, and the quality of the individuals who accede to the job, regional commanders fill a vital role for the Nation.

Does such prominence somehow skew the civil-military relationship? Some observers fear so and appear to prefer a situation wherein all military advice is given behind closed doors, away from public scrutiny.⁶⁷ A more balanced assessment calls for an “unequal dialogue” wherein civilian influence does “not usually dictate, [but] must dominate.” A number of senior military and civilian security professionals—generals, ambassadors, assistant and under secretaries—suggest that regional commanders accept their subordinate role in that dialogue and are well positioned to represent the military in that policy debate.

Of course, the nature of the national security bureaucracy leaves a lot of room for improvement—as one regional commander said, “we are just not set up right for engagement in the world.”⁶⁸ The current system fails to coordinate policy adequately, lacks a regional focus, and allows millions of dollars to flow without understanding or coordinating their impact. While many observers call for radical restructuring of the national security apparatus, this essay calls for two smaller steps:

strengthening the regional commanders' political advisers and adding general- and flag-officer representation to the State Department regional bureaus. These moves could improve coordination among State, Defense, and Embassies; synchronize the security budgeting and strategymaking process; better track flows of development money; and institutionalize State-Defense cooperation.

In any case, all those involved in national security policy should accept, without undue concern, the important role of the four-star regional commanders. Indeed, because the stakes are so high, and the commanders' experience is almost unmatched anywhere in the bureaucracy, the Nation should demand their visible, public participation in the policy debate. To paraphrase Madeleine Albright, what is the point of having this military if one cannot fully use its experience, energy, and brainpower?

Notes

¹ Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 2000, A1. See also Priest, "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones; Zinni Crosses Central Asia, Holding Hands, Building Trust," *The Washington Post*, September 29, 2000, A1; and "Standing Up to State and Congress," *The Washington Post*, September 30, 2000, A1.

² Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004), 14.

³ Dana Priest, interview with author, April 16, 2004.

⁴ See Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 123–126. In a "useful if overheated and historically muddled book" (Andrew J. Bacevich, *Washington Post Book World*, February 29, 2004, 4), Johnson claims the regional commanders "avoid the normal chain of command" and have ambassadors working under them. For a historical look at regional commanders, see Howard D. Belote, *Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command. Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and Their Relevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, July 2000).

⁵ Priest, *The Mission*, 14, 218–243; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

⁶ Priest, "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones," 2.

⁷ Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?" 5.

⁸ Joseph Ralston, interview with author, December 2, 2003.

⁹ Anthony C. Zinni, remarks at the National War College, December 17, 2003. Guests at National Defense University speak under a policy of nonattribution; Zinni explicitly waived nonattribution when the author approached him for an interview.

¹⁰ Zinni remarks.

¹¹ Priest, *The Mission*, 93.

¹² Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, *Masters of the Art of Command* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 302.

¹³ Belote, 25.

¹⁴ "The Partners," *Newsweek* (December 17, 1958), 30.

¹⁵ Lauris Norstad, transcript of oral history interview by Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., August 22, 1977, file K239.0512-1473, tape 3-1, 8 and tape 4, 19, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

¹⁶ Blumenson and Stokesbury, 243–245. While the author cites historical evidence to discount the argument that regional commanders' influence is an unintended consequence of Goldwater-Nichols, it is clear that the legislation's framers hardly considered an international political role for unified commanders—they were focused on joint reform. See James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

¹⁷ Priest, *The Mission*, 17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 218–243; Priest, “Standing Up to State and Congress.”

²¹ Ralston interview, December 2, 2003. Ralston's predecessor, Wesley K. Clark, also reports making “it a practice to try to see every visiting congressional delegation.” See Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 168.

²² Zinni remarks.

²³ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., interview with author, March 19, 2004.

²⁴ A. Elizabeth Jones, remarks to visiting National War College students, April 9, 2004. Jones waived nonattribution.

²⁵ Marc Grossman, remarks at National Defense University, March 25, 2004. Grossman waived nonattribution. The author has substituted “commander” where he used the now-obsolete acronym “CINC” (commander in chief).

²⁶ Robert E. Hunter, interview with author, March 22, 2004.

²⁷ Robert Gelbard, interview with author, April 16, 2004.

²⁸ Ralston interview, December 2, 2003.

²⁹ Priest, *The Mission*, 81.

³⁰ Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2002), 9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³² *Ibid.*, 18.

³³ *Ibid.*, 30. Kohn cites Sam C. Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,” *Orbis* (Summer 1998), 423–437; and James H. Webb, Jr., “The Silence of the Admirals,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (January 1999), 29–34.

³⁴ Kohn, 35.

³⁵ Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995), 7.

³⁶ Schiff, 2, and “Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 277.

³⁷ Cohen, 204, 200.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 198, 206. For a complete discussion of the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, see the appendix, 241–264.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁴⁰ Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?” 5.

⁴¹ Kohn, 20.

⁴² Brent Scowcroft, interview with author, January 29, 2004.

⁴³ Priest interview, April 16, 2004.

⁴⁴ Locher, 449.

⁴⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting . . . The Need for a New Approach to Strategy and Force Planning” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 27, 2003), 6.

⁴⁶ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change” (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001), 47. Emphasis in original.

⁴⁷ Priest interview, April 16, 2004.

⁴⁸ Gelbard interview, April 16, 2004.

⁴⁹ Grossman remarks, March 25, 2004.

⁵⁰ Zinni remarks.

⁵¹ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 63.

⁵² Scowcroft interview, January 29, 2004. General Scowcroft qualified his remarks with a single exception, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

⁵³ Bloomfield interview, March 19, 2004.

⁵⁴ Hunter interview, March 22, 2004. See note 52 above.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Jennifer Moroney, RAND Corporation, interview with author, March 22, 2004.

⁵⁷ Corbin B. Lyday, senior integrity and governance adviser, PADCO, Inc., interview with author, April 23, 2004.

⁵⁸ Zinni remarks.

⁵⁹ Priest interview, April 16, 2004.

⁶⁰ Zinni remarks.

⁶¹ Bloomfield interview, March 19, 2004.

⁶² U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 63.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Bloomfield interview, March 19, 2004.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Priest, *The Mission*, 90.

⁶⁷ Cohen, 206.

⁶⁸ Priest, *The Mission*, 90.

Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)

George W. Smith, Jr.

Not a Frenchman then doubted that such rapid victories must have decided the fate of the Spaniards. We believed, and Europe believed it too, that we had only to march to Madrid to complete the subjection of Spain and to organize the country in the French manner, that is to say, to increase our means of conquest by all the resources of our vanquished enemies. The wars we had hitherto carried on had accustomed us to see in a nation only its military forces and to count for nothing the spirit which animates its citizens.¹

—Swiss soldier serving in Napoleon's army, 1808

Nearly two centuries ago, Napoleon Bonaparte preemptively occupied Portugal and Spain and ousted the Spanish royal family for being less than cooperative in supporting his Continental System. As Napoleon proclaimed, “Spaniards, your nation is perishing after a long agony; I have seen your ills, I am about to bring you the remedy for them.” Never did he imagine that that conflict would continue in an altogether different form.²

Lieutenant Colonel George W. Smith, Jr., USMC, shared first place with this essay, written while attending the Marine Corps War College. He served previously as plans officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and is currently commanding officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, Camp Pendleton, California.

The introduction of what was for the first time classified as *guerrilla war* (or *little war*, as the Spanish called it) was incomprehensible in Napoleon's conventional military mindset. The resulting resistance, as described by Martin van Creveld, "made do without 'armies,' campaigns, battles, bases, objectives, external and internal lines, *points d'appui*, or even territorial units clearly separated by a line on a map."³ Napoleon's "Spanish ulcer," as he described the Spanish response to his occupation, provides a myriad of timeless lessons for strategic and operational planners. The strategic gap that developed between Napoleon's rapid conventional military victory and the immediate requirement to influence positively the population as part of post-hostilities stabilization operations highlights the limits of conventional military power in post-conflict operations and the perils of forgetting "the people" in the initial and ongoing strategic calculus. Unfortunately, nations and militaries around the globe have been forced to relearn that lesson many times in the ensuing 200 years.

The parallels of Napoleon's challenges in Spain with the challenges of contemporary coalition forces in Iraq are striking. While there is a danger in attempting to take historical parallels too far, some similarities are too close to ignore. Moreover, such similarities may reflect the failure to understand the local populace within campaign planning. That understanding forms the bedrock for any successful post-hostility occupation phase.

Thus, cultural intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) with a focus on the post-hostilities landscape is perhaps more important than traditional intelligence preparation of the battlespace, which typically has monopolized the intelligence effort. Countless lessons from history resemble Napoleon's experiences with popular Spanish resistance and provide insight as to what should comprise the proper balance of effort within intelligence preparation for armed intervention. These lessons demonstrate that an inordinate focus on armies at the expense of a focus on the people has and will continue to make winning the peace more difficult than winning the war. Closing the cultural intelligence gap by striking an IPB balance within campaign planning may reduce surprises for an occupying force that historically have impeded the accomplishment of the campaign's stated political or grand strategic objectives.

The Spanish Resistance: A Historical Example

*I thought the system easier to change than it has proved in that country, with its corrupt minister, its feeble king, and its shameless, dissolute queen.*⁴

—Napoleon, on the occupation of Spain

Napoleon gave little thought to the potential challenges of occupying Spain in 1808 once his army had completed what he believed would be little more than a “military promenade.”⁵ Conditioned by the results and effects of his decisive military victories at Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806), Napoleon envisioned that the occupation of major Spanish cities and the awarding of the Spanish throne to his older brother, Joseph, would close the Iberian chapter in his quest for continental domination.

The “ulcer of resistance,” which flared up in varying degrees of intensity throughout the country, was most powerful in the territory of Navarre and surrounding northern provinces.⁶ That diamond-shaped area, which stretched just under 100 miles from north to south and about 75 miles from east to west, proved to be the hub of Spanish resistance.⁷ A closer examination of the inhabitants of that region uncovers numerous clues why resistance to a foreign occupier was so ferocious and weighed heavily in the defeat of Napoleon in Spain. More importantly, it highlights the importance of analysis of the Spanish people, their history, culture, motivations, and potential to support or hinder efforts at achieving French political objectives.

John Tone, in *The Fatal Knot*, succinctly describes the macro-conditions for guerrilla resistance in northern Spain:

The English blockade of Spain and Spanish America after 1796 had curtailed the option of emigrating to America, and the economic contraction caused by the blockade made work in Madrid and Ribera more difficult to find as well. What the French found in the Montaña in 1808, therefore, was densely populated, rugged country full of young men with no prospects. Thus, the availability of guerrillas was the result, in part, of a particular economic and demographic conjuncture in the Montaña.⁸

As a whole, the Spanish and Portuguese “were inured to hardship, suspicious of foreigners and well versed in the ways of life—above all, banditry and smuggling—that were characterized by violence and involved constant skirmishes with the security forces.”⁹ Unknown to Napoleon and his marshals on the heels of another military rout, there bubbled under the surface a “popular patriotism, religious fanaticism, and an almost hysterical hatred for the French.”¹⁰

The lack of influence of Spanish central authority over its citizenry proved surprising to Napoleon and his marshals, as their point of reference was the occupation of northern European countries. There they found the “Germans and Austrians, conditioned by militarism and centralization, unable or unwilling to act without the permission of their superiors.”¹¹ A common complaint emanating from the French as they grappled with occupying such an independent and spirited Spanish citizenry was that “Spain was at least a century behind the other nations of the continent. The insular situation of the country and the severity of its religious institutions had prevented the Spaniards from taking part in the disputes and controversies which had agitated and enlightened Europe.”¹²

Cultural mirror imaging blinded the French to the fact that many Spanish provinces had never been accountable to the royal edicts emanating from Madrid; many Spaniards commonly displayed open contempt for policy disbursed from their national government. Given such an environment of regional independence and domestic political tension, Spaniards even more virulently “disdained anything done for them by a foreigner.”¹³

This was especially true in Navarre, where its citizens, imbued with an allegiance to local government and long appeased by national officials in Madrid in an effort to retain a modicum of control, enjoyed perquisites not common in the rest of the country. As Tone wrote:

One of Navarre’s most valuable privileges was its separate customs border. In the rest of Spain, the Bourbons had created a single, national market, and they had restricted the importation of finished manufactured goods and the exportation of raw materials in an attempt to encourage industrial development. Navarre, however, controlled its own borders and was exempt from these restrictions.¹⁴

French preparation of a modicum of cultural intelligence prior to their occupation of Spain might have indicated that the Navarrese stood apart from their countrymen in their relative freedom and therefore would have the most to lose under French occupation. Succinctly, the Navarrese owed much of their existence to the smuggling of French goods into Spain, avoiding any central government.¹⁵ Cultural analysis might have revealed that assuming new fiscal duties toward an occupying power could be economically ruinous and psychologically offensive to the Navarrese.

The economic factor within the Spanish resistance assumed added significance due to the scattering of Spanish soldiers in the wake of

Napoleon's military juggernaut. Dispersed soldiers, no longer sustained by even their paltry military income, were left to roam the countryside focusing simply on survival. According to Charles Esdaile in *The Peninsular War: A New History*: "With the French imposing strict limits on movement and clamping down on many traditional aspects of street life, opportunities to find alternative sources of income were limited, and all the more so as industry was at a standstill and many señores [were] unable to pay their existing retainers and domestic servants, let alone take on fresh hands. In short, hunger and despair reigned on all sides."¹⁶

In such a desperate environment, many young men, former soldiers and civilians alike, were driven into the guerrilla fold out of economic necessity, thus exacerbating the patriotic fervor emanating from northern Spain and further fueled by French occupation.

Napoleon also underestimated the influence of the Catholic Church on the Spanish people. The Church served to energize the notion of an ideological struggle. Ecclesiastical leaders of guerrilla bands were expert at intertwining a host of reasons to continue the struggle against the French. Sébastian Blaze, an officer in Napoleon's army, described the power of the Church:

The monks skillfully employed the influence which they still enjoyed over Spanish credulity . . . to inflame the populace and exacerbate the implacable hatred with which they already regarded us. . . . In this fashion they encouraged a naturally cruel and barbarous people to commit the most revolting crimes with a clear conscience. They accused us of being Jews, heretics, sorcerers. . . . As a result, just to be a Frenchman became a crime in the eyes of the country.¹⁷

In the final analysis, "The Spaniards might not have liked their rulers, but they regarded them as preferable to some imposed, foreign dictator. Napoleon could establish Joseph on the throne, but he could not give him popular support."¹⁸

Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted struggle of occupation that lasted nearly 6 years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the Empire's total armed strength, almost 4 times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally had designated for this duty.¹⁹ The sapping of the Empire's resources and energy in countering the Spanish resistance had far-reaching implications and proved to be the beginning of the end for Napoleon. He was unfamiliar with this new type of warfare, which was rooted in the people and drove a wedge between conventional military victory and the achievement of his strategic design.

As David Chandler wrote in *The Campaigns of Napoleon*:

Napoleon the statesman had set Napoleon the soldier an impossible task. Consequently, although the immediate military aims were more or less achieved, the long-term requirement of winning popular support for the new regime was hopelessly compromised. The lesson was there for the world to read: military conquest in itself cannot bring about political victory.²⁰

French grand strategic victory required an understanding as to what winning popular support of the Spanish people actually entailed—a requirement of which Napoleon demonstrated almost complete ignorance. The realities of his tragic oversight were not fully understood until long after conventional combat operations had ceased and various elements of the Spanish population had seized the initiative.

A Preventable “Iraqi Ulcer”?

There is nothing new about the failure to give conflict termination the proper priority. The history of warfare is generally one where the immediate needs of warfighting, tactics, and strategy are given priority over grand strategy. Conflict termination has generally been treated as a secondary priority, and the end of war has often been assumed to lead to a smooth transition to peace or been dealt with in terms of vague plans and ideological hopes.

—Anthony Cordesman²¹

The aftermath of U.S.-led decisive combat operations in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* has presented challenges to coalition forces similar to those experienced by the Napoleonic army in Spain almost two centuries ago. Because the harsh treatment of the Spanish citizenry by the French was much different than coalition treatment of the Iraqi people, a parallel cannot be drawn. However, the shared failure to understand the respective peoples and cultures stands in bold relief. The French experience in Spain in 1808, as well as the experiences of many other nations in the intervening 200 years, should drive us to examine why we are prone to making centuries-old mistakes in our campaign planning.

Anthony Zinni, former commander of U.S. Central Command, remarked on the formulation of a coherent campaign design: “We need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you have to look at this thing from start to finish. It is not a phased conflict; there is not a fighting part and then another part. It is a nine-inning game.”²²

In planning for Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the coalition was unable to focus its intelligence efforts toward the strategically critical period between the end of large-scale combat and the wholesale transition to stability and support operations until those efforts were too late to be decisive. Planning for post-hostility operations was conducted almost blindly at the tactical and operational levels, with only scattered intelligence on the Iraqi people, what their likely reception of an occupying force might be, and where the coalition might continue to face resistance.

Planners did possess the macro-level detail of the ethnic and religious divisions and the historical tensions between those groups, specifically the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. But that cultural understanding did not have the fidelity to highlight, for example, that “more than 75 percent of Iraqis belong to one of 150 tribes, and that significant numbers of Iraqis subscribe to many of the medieval conventions of Islamic law, from unquestioning obedience to tribal elders to polygamy, revenge-killings, and blood money paid to the relatives of persons killed in feuds.”²³ Nor did the coalition understand the true depth of influence of the leading Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, or the young firebrand, Muqtada al-Sadr.

Furthermore, little analysis was conducted on which segment of the Iraqi population was likely to experience the highest degree of disenfranchisement. Intelligence analysis oriented on the stabilization phase failed to account for the prospect of large segments of the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard and remnants of the Ba’athist security apparatus scattered throughout the middle part of the country with no employment and a perceived dim future within an occupied Iraq. In other words, insufficient intelligence focused on the people versus fielded forces and the regime’s security apparatus in a post-hostilities scenario.

A broad cultural intelligence analysis, for example, could have drawn out the historical parallel between the Iraqi Sunni Triangle and the Spanish Navarrese Diamond—assuming, of course, that the analysis team was familiar with the cultural factors that contributed to Napoleon’s Spanish Ulcer. With that parallel in mind and despite the full benefit of hindsight, few would argue with Anthony Cordesman’s assessment in *The Lessons of the Iraq War*:

The Intelligence Community exaggerated the risk of a cohesive Ba’ath resistance in Baghdad, the Sunni Triangle, and Tikrit during the war, and was not prepared to deal with the rise of a much more scattered and marginal resistance by Ba’ath loyalists after the war. The intelligence

effort was not capable of distinguishing which towns and areas were likely to be a source of continuing Ba'athist resistance and support.²⁴

The U.S.-led planning effort spent more than 16 months determining how best to “break Humpty-Dumpty” with little thought that the coalition might be charged with “putting him back together again.” The latter task—infinately more difficult and foreign to the joint force than tasks associated with conventional combat operations and with the Iraqi people squarely at the center of such a planning challenge—was given short shrift in the intelligence preparation effort. Ironically, tremendous consideration was given to minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage to critical Iraqi infrastructure needed for follow-on stabilization efforts. However, such analysis and consideration was done largely under the umbrella of “intelligence preparation for combat operations.” Moreover, that incomplete analysis failed to recognize the historical truth that the people and the infrastructure bear the brunt of post-combat resistance.

There remained a gap in campaign planning for the period between cessation of major combat operations and wholesale stabilization of the country, a gap that had strategic implications. That historical pitfall is at the root of the following passage from Joint Publication (JP) 5–00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*:

Not only must intelligence analysts and planners develop an understanding of the adversary's capabilities and vulnerabilities, they must take into account the way that friendly forces and actions appear from the adversary's viewpoint. Otherwise, *planners may fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, and reactions that “mirror image” U.S. actions in the same situation, or by assuming that the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner* [emphasis added].²⁵

Much as the French viewed the Spaniards two centuries earlier, U.S. planners were left to peer through an almost exclusively Western lens in their hopeful analysis of how segments of this 25-million-person country might respond to coalition stabilization and support efforts. Succinctly, little professional analysis was conducted to answer the tough questions: “What is it about their society that is so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my distinctly American way?”²⁶

That intelligence gap left too much to wishful thinking and was the context for several broad assumptions that proved to be invalid. Whereas planners left no stone unturned in the intelligence preparation of the battlespace as it related to the defeat of Iraqi forces and ultimate

removal of Saddam Hussein, there was little corresponding depth to the analysis of the next target audience within the campaign design, the Iraqi people. Policymakers, commanders, and planners alike were content to lean on the assumption that Iraqis throughout the country would accept the coalition with open arms.

Bridging the Gap

*We must be cognizant of the changing roles and missions facing the Armed Forces of the United States and ensure that intelligence planning keeps pace with the full range of military operations.*²⁷


—Hugh Shelton

The U.S. military must accept the fact that the post-hostilities environment is central to campaign design if political objectives are to be achieved. Properly estimating the magnitude of stability and support operations that will be necessary after decisive combat operations end is the only way to prevent the emergence of a strategic gap. It is the military that will have to grapple with the immediate and diverse challenges that accompany the cessation of large-scale combat operations. More specifically, the military will have to deal with the indigenous population until the arrival of more support-focused and better resourced U.S. agencies and organizations, international aid organizations, and reconstruction specialists.

General Zinni described just such a chaotic environment in an address to the Armed Forces Staff College a decade ago:

The situations you're going to be faced with go far beyond what you're trained for in a very narrow military sense. They become cultural issues; issues of traumatized populations' welfare, food, shelter; issues of government; issues of cultural, ethnic, religious problems; historical issues; economic issues that you have to deal with, that aren't part of the METT-T [mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, time available] process, necessarily. And the rigid military thinking can get you in trouble. What you need to know isn't what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you.²⁸

While current joint intelligence doctrine that is focused on the people is not barren, the anemic level of detail dedicated to intelligence requirements focused on a people's history and culture is a reflection of the imbalance of the current IPB process. The omission in figure 1 sums up best the mindset of the joint community regarding where "the people" fit within the intelligence requirements for the development of a coherent campaign design.

Figure 1. Dimensions of the Battlespace

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 9, 2000), 1-2.

If properly balanced, a black arrow entitled “People” would be in the center of this diagram opposite the existing black arrow entitled “Forces.” This would draw attention to the reality that the civilian population will be the centerpiece of the post-hostilities environment. As currently depicted, this view of the battlespace does little to reinforce the requirements within JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, which states that “campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves” and that “emphasizing backward planning, decision-makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.”²⁹

Furthermore, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, states, “U.S. forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.”³⁰ Such leverage toward a lasting solution (grand strategic endstate) can be achieved only if the requisite historical and cultural understanding has been incorporated

into the overall planning effort. Currently, joint doctrine for intelligence does not lay the foundation for achieving such leverage. Just as a scan of joint publications suggests that “military professionals embrace the idea of a termination strategy, but doctrine offers little practical help,”³¹ a review of doctrine for intelligence preparation of the battlespace reveals only short, topical passages on “The Human Dimension,” “The Populace,” and the “Effects of the Human Dimension on Military Operations,” and only after the various elements of the battlespace contained in figure 1 have been elaborated upon.

Striking a Balance

*Our intelligence system is designed to support a Cold War kind of operation. We are “Order of Battle” oriented. We are there to IPB the battlefield.*³²

—Anthony Zinni

*The U.S. armed forces must change with that world [a terribly changed and rapidly changing world] and must change in ways that are fundamental—a new human understanding of our environment would be of far more use than any number of brilliant machines. We have fallen in love with the wrong revolution.*³³

—Ralph Peters

With such references to “backward campaign planning” and “achieving leverage,” why then do we maintain such an imbalance in our intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the crafting of a holistic campaign design? Or to paraphrase General Zinni, “Why are we only planning for a three-inning ballgame?” One part of the answer may be that

Western military forces are not political forces, and professional warfighters like the U.S. and British military tend to see peacemaking and nation building as a diversion from their main mission. It also seems fair to argue that conflict termination and the role of force in ensuring stable peacetime outcomes has always been a weakness in modern military thinking. Tactics and strategy, and military victory, have always had priority over grand strategy and winning the peace.³⁴

The gravitational pull of ever-improving technology coupled with the drive toward transformation has compounded the problem by producing a mindset that more can be done with less to achieve the decisive effects in recent and future campaigns. In certain aspects of campaign planning, increased efficiency and effectiveness resulting from technological breakthroughs lend credence to this line of thinking.

However, policymakers, commanders, and planners alike must be ever mindful that “efficiency should not be held up as the overarching goal at the expense of better understanding.”³⁵

Unfortunately, intelligence preparation of the battlespace, the driver of campaign planning, has been co-opted by the same fascination with efficiency. With a heavier focus on the employment of technologically advanced collection systems, the delta between collection efforts focused on enemy forces and those intelligence efforts focused on the people, “the last six innings of the ballgame” if you will, has actually widened. As Ralph Peters wrote in *Fighting for the Future*, “We need to struggle against our American tendency to focus on hardware and bean counting to attack the more difficult and subtle problems posed by human behavior and regional history.”³⁶

In the dozen years between Operations *Desert Storm* and *Iraqi Freedom*, the U.S. military made tremendous technological strides in its efforts to increase all aspects of its joint warfighting capability, specifically the overall lethality of the force, joint information management, and situational awareness driven by enhanced collection capabilities. But it is clear that the joint force did not place the same premium on gaining an adequate understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture. In analyzing the current situation in Iraq, an astute citizen wrote to the *New York Times*, “There is a crucial need for cultural anthropologists in Iraq even more than capable Arabic speakers. Linguistic knowledge is one thing, but understanding the conventions, subtleties, and nuances of a language and culture is something different.”³⁷

Three immediate steps should be taken to bridge future cultural intelligence gaps. The first step must be the acceptance that history is important, and while it may not repeat itself as some might argue, it surely holds the clues that will shed light on current and future cultural intelligence requirements. Robert Steele, in *The New Craft of Intelligence*, reinforces the importance of historical analysis: “The first quadrant [requirement], the most fundamental, the most neglected, is that of the lessons of history. When entire volumes are written on anticipating ethnic conflict and history is not mentioned at all, America has indeed become ignorant.”³⁸ Such ignorance would never be tolerated by commanders at any level in preparations for combat operations. That same intolerance must be maintained in planning for missions across the operational spectrum within a comprehensive campaign design.

Yet solving the “puzzle of the people” cannot be the sole domain of military intelligence officials, the small group of foreign or regional area officers, or even the competent but clearly undermanned and over-tasked Special Forces, civil affairs, and translator units and detachments sprinkled throughout a large-scale campaign’s area of operations. Rather, just as the U.S. defense establishment has increased overall efficiency and effectiveness by looking to all corners of the civilian business world within the military hardware acquisition process, so too must the joint force expand its horizons in the development of new intelligence doctrine. Since doctrine is a guide, the force must be guided in its intelligence activities by those who can shine the strongest beacon on historical and cultural issues. In looking “toward motivational and value similarities, the military should be looking for a few good anthropologists”³⁹ as well as historians, economists, criminologists, and a host of other experts who can provide the depth of understanding that will lay the foundation for success in post-hostilities operations.

The second step should be a culturally oriented addition to the intelligence series within joint doctrine. The scant references to post-conflict intelligence focused on an indigenous population that are currently embedded within several joint publications, namely JP 2–01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, and JP 3–07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, do not adequately address the myriad of unconventional intelligence challenges that are inevitable in the chaos of modern post-hostilities environments. Peters, a career Army intelligence officer, admonishes us:

Military intelligence is perhaps more a prisoner of inherited Cold War structures than is any other branch. . . . Our intelligence networks need to regain a tactile human sense and to exploit information technologies without becoming enslaved by them. In most of our recent deployments, no one weapon system, no matter how expensive and technologically mature, has been as valuable as a single culturally competent foreign area officer.⁴⁰

An addition to the intelligence series could take a page or two from the Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*, which discusses at length the psychology of a country’s population. Specifically, it states, “Human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science, but there are certain principles that should guide our conduct.”⁴¹ Furthermore, “These principles are deduced only by studying the history of the people,” and “a study of the

racial and social characteristics of the people is made to determine whether to approach them directly or indirectly, or employ both means simultaneously.”⁴² Finally, the manual warns that “Psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of a country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect, and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, respect, and order.”⁴³

The third step builds on the previous two and bridges the cultural gap through holistic backward planning that achieves intelligence leverage. William Flavin argues for just such a paradigm shift in intelligence preparation of the battlespace in *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success*:

The IPB should address political, economic, linguistic, religious, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and legal factors. . . . The intelligence operation needs to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions that must exist for the conflict to terminate and the post-conflict efforts to succeed.⁴⁴

The U.S. Joint Forces Command, tasked with the lead for transformation within the Department of Defense, has taken a first step in placing more emphasis on cultural intelligence and the imperative to understand a country’s or region’s dynamics well beyond fielded forces or other potential combatants. The draft “Stability Operation Joint Operating Concept” focuses on the vital period within a campaign that follows large-scale combat operations. As importantly, this concept stresses the requirement for a different focus of intelligence:

Situational understanding requires thorough familiarity with all of the dynamics at work within the joint area of operations: political, economic, social, cultural, religious. The joint stability force commander must have an understanding of who will oppose stabilization efforts and what motivates them to do so.⁴⁵

In reinforcing the fact that the joint force will remain the lead agent for an unspecified period of time upon cessation of hostilities, this concept further highlights the imperative for detailed planning and involvement for a post-hostilities phase across all of the warfighting specialties, specifically intelligence, from the outset of campaign planning. Furthermore, by articulating the critical nature of the period within a campaign when “the joint stability force begins imposing stability throughout the countryside to shape favorable conditions in the security environment so that civilian-led activities can begin quickly,”⁴⁶

this concept links theater strategic means to grand strategic political endstates. It levies the requirement that intelligence analysis reach depths rarely explored within our current conventional intelligence mindset:

On-going human intelligence efforts identify potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the post-hostility stability operation. The intelligence capabilities begin to focus on the unconventional threat posed by total spoilers. Human intelligence also focuses on the identity, motivation, and intentions of limited and greedy spoilers.⁴⁷

These different categories of spoilers will not be uncovered by conventional intelligence preparation and will remain undetected by our most technologically advanced collection assets. Spoilers will “swim in the sea of the people” and will require a sophisticated and precise intelligence mindset to separate them from the masses and ultimately extinguish the threat they pose to the achievement of the strategic endstate. Such sophistication recognizes that the intelligence focus of the battlespace in post-hostilities must shift from the physical to the cognitive domain, with the paramount concern being the “minds” of those who might oppose stability.⁴⁸

Conclusion and Future Implications

What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It's an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks.⁴⁹

—John Abizaid

Proper intelligence preparation of the battlespace focused on the people and the unique challenges of a post-combat operational environment will continue to challenge the joint force in the 21st century, just as it proved to be the Achilles' heel for Napoleon two centuries ago. If we are to apply Napoleon's maxim that “the moral is to the physical as three to one” within a truly holistic campaign design, then perhaps such a ratio should be applied in balancing the collective intelligence effort, with a focus on the people assuming paramount importance. That will require addressing intelligence challenges that are unconventional and uncomfortable for planners and commanders at all levels. Comprehensive backward planning with a balanced intelligence effort throughout the breadth and depth of the envisioned campaign will ensure that “forces and assets arrive at the right

times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later stages of the campaign.”⁵⁰

Just as it proved to be the beginning of the end for Napoleon’s dominant influence in Europe, giving the importance of “the people” short shrift within the strategic calculus may be the prescription for failure within future military campaigns. Technology is not a panacea within our joint warfighting construct, especially across the spectrum of intelligence requirements. As the world becomes even more complex, it is critical to understand root causes and effects of the histories and cultures of the peoples with whom the joint force will interact. Relying less on high-tech hardware, such a mental shift may be the most transformational step the military can take in preparing for the challenges of the 21st century. These requirements cannot be met with a narrowly focused approach toward intelligence preparation of the battlespace. As Ralph Peters stated at the end of the 20th century:

We will face a dangerous temptation to seek purely technological responses to behavioral challenges—especially given the expense of standing forces. Our cultural strong suit is the ability to balance and integrate the technological with the human, and we must continue to stress getting the balance right.⁵¹

Sophisticated cultural intelligence preparation of the battlespace may not pinpoint exactly where opposition flashpoints may occur within a post-combat operational environment. However, by achieving appropriate IPB balance, beginning with a bolstered joint intelligence doctrine, the joint force will reduce the potential for strategic gaps by helping to prepare for the Sunni Triangles or Navarrese Diamonds of the future.

If the current *modus operandi* of insurgents in Iraq is an indicator of the total disregard that future adversaries will have toward global societal norms, the joint force will, in many respects, be operating with one hand tied behind its back. The U.S. military can ill afford to have the other hand bound through the development of comprehensive campaign plans not grounded in solid cultural understanding of countries and regions within which it will likely operate. To do so risks adding yet another footnote to history highlighting an intelligence gap between combat and stability and support operations.

Notes

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“Knowledge Must Become Capability”: Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation

Steven W. Knott

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen [in war], two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.¹

—Carl von Clausewitz

While academics and military professionals have debated the value of intellectual pursuits to the profession of arms in recent years, that dialogue has failed to address the salient issue: the concept of institutional intellectualism and its catalytic role as an agent for transformation. Leading advocates of the military as an intellectual profession have attempted—with varying success—to convince their community that there exists a historic bias against intellectuals (thinkers) in favor of individuals of action (doers). The commonly held opinion that intellectuals provide little of practical value and fail to function effectively as combat leaders serves as the origin of that bias.² These proponents further argue that despite examples to the contrary—including Joshua Chamberlain and George Patton—such individuals succeed “in spite of and not because of official encouragement,” their intellectual talent largely ignored and veiled in the shadow of their battlefield achievements.³ The opinion of Dwight

Commander Steven W. Knott, USN, won second place with this essay, written while attending the U.S. Army War College. His most recent assignment was commanding officer of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 8.

Eisenhower, who disdainfully characterized an intellectual as one “who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows,” best represents the traditional military view of intellectualism.⁴

This typical and pervasive bias has compelled current advocates of military intellectualism to caution the uniformed services against rejecting or marginalizing individual thinkers, thereby depriving themselves of “precious intellectual capital” and the innovative capacity required to adapt successfully to the evolutionary character of war.⁵ One cannot dispute the merit of this conclusion; the warning is germane. Nevertheless, the prevailing debate over whether intellectual bias exists remains largely superficial and serves only to obscure the far more important issue of institutional intellectualism.

It is irrelevant that Chamberlain and Patton were gifted intellectuals; as military professionals, their intellect had no influence on doctrine or in catalyzing change, transformation, or a revolution in military affairs. While it is possible for exceptional combat leaders such as Chamberlain and Patton to employ their intellect in solving battlefield challenges, this is far different from the individual who uses his intellect to drive institutional change that results in transformation throughout the organization as a whole. Herein resides the point: only institutionalized military intellectualism can achieve successful transformation or, on rare occasion, revolutionize warfare; conversely, individual intellectualism that remains outside of an institutional context is largely impotent.

One can best define *institutional intellectualism* as system-sponsored critical thinking that focuses intellectual capital to effect transformational change and continual renewal within an organization. First, and of paramount significance, it operates within and as a function of the military system, meaning that institutional intellectualism resides (formally or informally) within the organization’s official structure and that it is capable of influencing mainstream thought and processes. Yet thinkers working within the system will always encounter opposition to change from entrenched elements. This phenomenon offers an interesting paradox: the nature of the military system ideally produces and empowers the traditionalists, while simultaneously affording legitimacy and sanctuary to the intellectual progressives—in turn preventing their marginalization. Second, institutional intellectualism can only exist—and succeed—in an organizational climate that promotes free thinking and a critical exchange of ideas. Not only is such an environment a prerequisite for creating institutional intellectualism, but it is also indis-

pensible for catalyzing change within a system and in overcoming inevitable resistance from ensconced traditionalists.

Third, institutional intellectualism achieves a synergistic effect that focuses intellectual energy in a highly disciplined, organized, and coordinated fashion. As a result, collective ideas are more effectively transformed into reality—and military capability. Moreover, individual efforts within an institutional context contribute to this intellectual synergy rather than remaining disconnected from the process. Lastly, institutional intellectualism is not military orthodoxy. For focused intellectual energy to push the envelope of convention, it must remain dynamic and be periodically infused with fresh perspective. This is best achieved by ensuring the system embraces new intellectual capital, while simultaneously replacing those veteran thinkers whose former ideas or theories now constitute established operating doctrine—or orthodoxy.

Man is a problem-solver. By nature, he applies intellectual energy to overcome current and anticipated challenges. The complex, fluid environment of war demands the institutionalization of this intellectual energy to effect the necessary organizational and doctrinal changes required to influence the nature and alter the character of armed combat. Simply illustrated, institutional intellectualism gives birth to theory and corresponding organizational-doctrinal change. New systems and doctrine in turn act as the primary determinant for successful transformation, and transformation will historically constitute one of two forms: it will be in response to a revolution in military affairs, or it will prove the catalyst for such a revolution itself. Moreover, in contrast to prevailing military beliefs, transformation remains primarily the product of intellectual energy and is rarely born of technology.⁶ Technology is a powerful military tool, but it traditionally remains ineffective until wedded to a doctrinal system on the battlefield. The English longbow⁷ and the tank, for example, failed to catalyze transformational change in the military art simply as a result of their invention; rather, it required the innovative and systematic application of these weapons to realize their full potential.⁸

Two historic case studies illuminate more clearly the role of institutional intellectualism in successful transformation. The first provides an example of a specially constituted team of intellectuals responsible for transforming an entire military organization in response to an adversary's military revolution: the Prussian reforms following catastrophic defeat by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806. The second example demonstrates how individual intellectuals can collectively propel transformation within

an institutional context—and, in this case, also initiate a revolution in military affairs with the creation of the German armor force (*Panzerwaffe*) during the interwar period. Examples from Prussia/Germany are especially relevant given the traditional success that nation's military has enjoyed in fostering a culture embracing intellectualism (thinkers) and tactical-operational excellence (doers) within the same institutional framework.⁹

Prussian Military Reorganization

Following the destruction of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806, Carl von Clausewitz sardonically observed that “It was not just a case of a style [of warfare] that had outlived its usefulness but the most extreme poverty of imagination to which routine has ever led.”¹⁰ Indeed, the Prussian army had arrived on the field ill prepared for battle against Napoleon. Yet few in the ranks or among the senior leaders realized that the character of war had fundamentally changed until they were overwhelmed by Napoleon's Grand Army. Despite a self-confidence rooted in the military achievements of Frederick the Great, the Prussian army of 1806 was institutionally flawed. The officers, more concerned with status and social affairs than professional matters, were of inconsistent talent and inadequately schooled.

A considerable percentage of soldiers were poorly trained, and many were well over the age of 40, as the Prussian state required up to 30 years of service before granting military exemption. More significantly, the soldiers lacked patriotic and military spirit because their interests were not one with those of the king; the fate of the nation in war had little influence on their day-to-day lives as disenfranchised subjects of the crown. Compounding these moral deficiencies, the Prussian army also suffered from poor administration and equipment; specifically, the troops lacked proper uniforms, and the weapons, field gear, and rations were the worst in Europe. Moreover, the military organization and tactical doctrine employed by the Prussians were obsolete as well.¹¹ In retrospect, given the atrophied state of Prussian arms and the transformational nature of the French military revolution, the decision at Jena-Auerstädt was inevitable.

Acknowledging the need for change, Prussian King Frederick William III convened a military commission in 1807 to investigate the debacle at Jena-Auerstädt and propose reforms to the existing military structure. The king failed to recognize that Prussia's defeat lay beyond the

sole realm of military concerns, but the individuals he appointed to the commission possessed far greater intellectual vision.¹² The principal members were Prime Minister Baron Karl vom Stein, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Colonel August von Gneisenau, Major Carl von Grolman, and Major Hermann von Boyen; Clausewitz, as a young captain and administrative assistant to Scharnhorst, also became a de facto participant of some influence.¹³ Stein and Scharnhorst were selected to lead the commission because the prime minister was one of the king's most trusted political advisers, and the general proved one of few senior military leaders who had performed well on the field against Napoleon. Moreover, Scharnhorst had gained universal respect as a military scholar and thinker while serving as director of the highly regarded *Militärische Gesellschaft* (Military Society), the first institution of its kind devoted exclusively to the academic study of war.

Significantly, Scharnhorst chose the remaining members of the commission based on their intellectual contributions to the *Militärische Gesellschaft* and their recent performance in combat; in short, they were the best and brightest the Prussian army had to offer.¹⁴ Despite a diverse range of experience and political influence among the reformers, they shared a common belief that the nature of the problem transcended military organizational deficiencies. Each possessed a keen intellect and a progressive worldview that enabled the commission to discern the need for institutional transformation across a broad societal, political, and military spectrum.¹⁵ Consequently, the reformers recognized the significance of the fundamental shift in relations among government, the people, and military power that had occurred in France. Similar reforms—short of revolution—would have to occur in Prussia to reverse the results of 1806.

The Military Reorganization Commission began by correcting straightforward organizational discrepancies. The army received improved uniforms and equipment, state-of-the-art weapons, and new tactical procedures (authored in part by Clausewitz).¹⁶ Once the means were in place to correct these deficiencies, the commission turned its attention to more difficult challenges. In addressing the pervasive socio-political faults within the army, the commission embarked on a more radical path that led to the creation of a new officer corps, the citizen-soldier, and a revolutionary general staff system. The reformers' guiding objective in pursuing these initiatives was to imbue the Prussian army with "institutionalized military excellence," specifically, "organizational genius . . . led in battle by operational genius."¹⁷ Scharnhorst and his associates believed that to achieve this

transformational goal was to provide the nation with its best insurance against revisiting Jena-Auerstädt.

Prior to overhaul by the reorganization commission, the state had reserved admission to the Prussian officer corps almost exclusively to members of the aristocratic landed gentry, or Junker class. Commissions rested on the basis of political influence and patronage rather than actual merit or military potential. As a result, inconsistent talent, insularism, and professional stagnation had characterized the Prussian officer corps before 1807. Moreover, the Junkers discounted the value of formal education (believing that it made one “soft”—a thinker rather than a doer); as a result, the intellectual capacity of the officer corps remained limited as well.

The reformers transformed the officer corps first by persuading the king to grant eligibility to all elements of society. New officers, whether Junker or commoner, would receive appointment through a universal examination process blind to station or influence. This measure alone served to expand the talent pool from which candidates came, and it proved to be the principal foundation upon which the new Prussian officer corps would rest. Secondly, Scharnhorst, recognizing the value of education, supervised the creation of three military schools to provide basic instruction to all newly commissioned officers prior to assignment with the active force. Compulsory military education was also unprecedented in Prussian military tradition, yet it proved equally successful and ensured standardization of quality while promoting intellectual growth among the new officer corps.¹⁸

In tandem with reforms to the officer corps, the commission also pursued significant transformational objectives in recasting the Prussian soldier. At Jena-Auerstädt, the men in the ranks did not constitute a people's army whose interests were at one with those of the state; in fact, most viewed the war as solely the concern of King Frederick William (and the Junker class), thereby resulting in an alarming popular indifference to the French invasion. Consequently, the average soldier was bereft of esprit de corps or patriotic spirit, and, equating service in the king's army with unjust coercion, he was likely to desert at the first opportunity.¹⁹ The reformers pursued a twofold scheme to transform the Prussian commoner-in-arms into a citizen-soldier. The first part was a system of egalitarian universal conscription that denied exemption to any element of society and mandated a shorter period of obligation. The goal of universal conscription was to ensure that the military “burden . . . was carried on all shoulders” and that service in the Prussian army became “a proud civic

duty . . . that turned the cause of the state into the cause of every man." An additional advantage would be in promoting a new nationalistic spirit in which fealty to the king also encompassed a growing loyalty to the state, or Fatherland.²⁰

Second, and primarily through the work of Stein, the reformers wished to expand markedly the powers of the constitutional element of the government vis-à-vis the king. They hoped this would encourage a feeling of general enfranchisement among the people to combat the pervasive sense of alienation from government resident throughout Prussia. Moreover, included in this initiative was an attempt to transfer control of the army from the king to constitutional civilian authorities.¹¹ While the reorganization commission was extremely successful in implementing universal conscription in 1808, the king rejected initiatives to expand constitutional powers or surrender control of his army.¹² Nevertheless, sufficient measures were in place to transform the existing system and produce Prussia's first citizen-soldiers as the reformers envisioned.

Having successfully addressed basic organizational deficiencies as well as implemented initiatives to transform the officer corps and the Prussian soldier, the commission members created the means to administer, train, and lead this new army with "institutionalized genius"—the general staff system. This measure proved the most unprecedented and intellectually revolutionary of all the reforms in the commission's efforts to counterbalance the French military revolution (as well as Napoleon's genius). Best described as "the intellectual center of the army,"¹³ this new general staff concept transcended traditional European staff organizations responsible primarily for executive clerical and courier functions. The Prussian army meticulously selected, organized, and empowered the best officers—intellectually and professionally—to function collectively "as a single . . . brain" responsible for strategic and operational planning, as well as for the direction of operations once hostilities commenced.²⁴ General staff officers routinely transferred between assignments with field units (where they assisted the unit commander and facilitated coordination with higher echelons) and the Great General Staff (at the War Ministry) to broaden their experience and perspective.

Selection to the general staff was competitive and entailed high standards. A system of examination selected only 150 candidates per year to attend the *Kriegsakademie* (war academy) founded by Scharnhorst in 1810. On graduation, each officer served with the general staff for a 2-year trial period; at the conclusion of this probationary assessment, only three

or four officers received permanent assignment to the general staff.²⁵ In its unprecedented ability to create and promote institutionalized military excellence, this unique general staff system remains the most significant initiative born of the reorganization commission—and its success underlies the fact that every major European army would eventually attempt to emulate it in some form.

The achievements of the reorganization commission provide a convincing example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military transformation. Working under a mandate from the army commander-in-chief (King Frederick William III), the reformers operated within and as a function of the military system. Moreover, they enjoyed a degree of intellectual freedom and engaged in a critical exchange of ideas that were remarkable for the time. This climate in turn allowed for the synergistic union of Prussia's leading military thinkers; their focused intellectual energy achieved a level of societal, political, and military reform that was truly transformational.

Concerted elements of the Junker class—both civil and military—remained convinced that organizational military reforms alone were sufficient to cure the ills of Jena-Auerstädt and opposed the commission's initiatives.²⁶ These traditionalists attempted at every turn to counter the reformers' efforts at sociopolitical change. Significantly, only within the system can intellectual energy achieve the necessary cohesion and influence to overcome this traditional opposition. Even the extraordinary intellect and vigor of Scharnhorst would have failed had he waged a crusade alone, disconnected from the political and military institutional framework. Furthermore, the commission's work did not constitute military orthodoxy; one of the functions that it envisioned for the general staff system was to prevent organizational stagnation and promote fresh perspectives that would challenge convention well into the future.

One final observation is useful: the factor of time. Even institutional intellectualism takes years and possibly decades to reap the fruit of its transformational seeds. The Prussian reformers put sweeping socio-political-military changes in place between 1807 and 1812. As a result, the Prussian army performed significantly better in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 against Napoleon. Yet the full return on their intellectual labor was not fully realized until the wars of 1866 and 1870, in which the Prussian army defeated Austria and France respectively and established the Prusso-German nation as the greatest power in Europe.

Developing *Panzerwaffe*

In 1933, Adolf Hitler witnessed a rather modest military demonstration that proved to be the harbinger of profound transformation within the German army and that eventually would usher in a revolution in military affairs. This exhibition introduced the militarily ambitious German Chancellor to the basic components of the newly created mechanized arm and included coordinated maneuvers by motorcycle, anti-tank, and armored reconnaissance units in cooperation with a platoon of light tanks. Hitler was so impressed by the demonstration that he announced enthusiastically to the assembled officers and political leaders: "That is what I need! That is what I want to have!" While it is doubtful that Hitler recognized the true military potential of this infant force, he did provide an important institutional impetus to its further development and incorporation in the operational doctrine of the German army.²⁷ It is this doctrinal change that transformed the character of war in 1939.

Unlike the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission, the thinkers most responsible for the creation of the German armor force (*Panzerwaffe*) and its revolutionary application to blitzkrieg had no formal organization. Instead, they achieved transformation through the collective effect of their individual actions, albeit working in an institutional context and within a system that encouraged innovation. The first of these individuals whose achievements warrant discussion is General Hans von Seeckt.

Seeckt, as head of the Army Command Troop Office, served as a clandestine chief of the general staff and led the German army between 1919 and 1926. A progressive thinker who recognized the need for military reform, Seeckt's first initiatives involved purging many traditionalist elements from the officer corps and undertaking a comprehensive analysis of lessons learned from World War I. Not only was he successful in creating "a very different officer corps from that which had existed before World War I, one whose cultural ethos emphasized intellectual as well as tactical and operational excellence," but also his investigation into the causes of Germany's defeat (conducted by over 500 officers working in specialized committees) yielded tangible results and provided the genesis for a new doctrine.²⁸ Army Regulation 487, entitled *Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen*²⁹ (Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms) and published in 1921/1923, first articulated this doctrine.

Written under Seeckt's supervision, this regulation described in great detail combined arms operations emphasizing offensive action,

speed of maneuver, penetration and exploitation, and decentralized command and control.³⁰ Moreover, Army Regulation 487 devoted an entire section to the use of tanks and other armored vehicles and recognized their potential for massed operations and deep penetration.³¹ While Seeckt initiated several other measures aimed at cultivating the fledgling panzer force, his primary contribution was in creating an intellectual environment that encouraged free thinking and the critical exchange of ideas. Significantly, he enabled key armor theorists and advocates to work within a system that provided institutional legitimacy to their continuing efforts at doctrinal reform.

The leading German armor theorist during the formative years of *Panzerwaffe* was Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim. A tanker during World War I, Volckheim had the opportunity to observe firsthand the success of Allied armor in reversing 4 years of stalemate on the Western Front in 1918. Consequently, following the war, he began a concerted study of mechanized warfare, becoming Germany's leading authority during the 1920s. Volckheim was a prolific writer, authoring over two dozen articles on armored warfare between 1923 and 1927, as well as publishing an autobiographical account of the German tank corps during World War I and a theoretical work on armor technology, tactics, and doctrine that became a standard army text.

Convinced that future operations would entail armored spearheads to effect penetration (with the requirement to destroy enemy armor), Volckheim was the first theorist to discount the value of light tanks in favor of more heavily armored and gunned medium battle tanks. He also stressed the need to maintain a mobile armor reserve, believing this to be the best doctrinal solution for defeating an enemy tank penetration through friendly defenses. Additionally, Volckheim was the first German to advocate equipping all armored vehicles and supporting arms with radio gear, recognizing that wireless communications would enhance command and control functions and greatly increase the tempo of operations.³² The young theorist devoted his considerable intellectual energies to the pursuit of these concepts—all of which were included in subsequent German armored doctrine.

Following World War I, two schools of thought emerged governing the employment of armor in battle. The majority view, advocated by the traditional officer corps of every major military power, recognized the tank as simply another supporting arm for the infantry; the minority school, championed by a small number of independent thinkers, envisioned the

tank as the principal combat arm to be supported instead by the infantry (as well as the other traditional supporting arms).³³ In Germany, the leading intellectual champions for independent armored units were Colonels Werner von Fritsch, Werner von Blomberg, and Ludwig Beck (all destined to be senior leaders in the German army).

During the mid-1920s, these officers advocated the creation of independent mechanized units inherently capable of breaching or enveloping an enemy position and then achieving rapid penetration in depth. In this manner, with armored forces ranging throughout the enemy's vulnerable rear areas, victory would be inevitable, providing the mechanized formations maintained a rapid tempo of operations and retained the initiative. Moreover, they envisioned a totally mechanized force in which the supporting infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and staff units would be motorized and capable of keeping pace with the tank formations. As Army Command Troop Office operations chief, Fritsch wrote in 1927 that "armored, quickly moving tanks most probably will become the operationally decisive offensive weapon. From an operational perspective this weapon will be most effective if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades."³⁴ While the Germans possessed no tanks during the 1920s, these officers validated their views concerning the potential for combined arms armor operations by closely observing British maneuvers during this period and reaching their own conclusions:

One can now clarify what will happen with tanks behind the enemy's main line of resistance after a successful breakthrough. Tanks can be used for attacks on the enemy's rear positions, against advancing reserves, as well as against command posts and artillery emplacements. For such tasks, present-day tanks are far more capable than older models.³⁵

Fritsch, Blomberg, and Beck's vision began to be realized in 1928 with the creation of the first independent mechanized battalion with permanently assigned armored car, motorcycle, and mock tank units (actual tanks would be added in 1933). This was accomplished under the direction of two influential armor pioneers in the Inspectorate of Motor Troops: Colonels Oswald Lutz and Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg. These two officers were also responsible for the design of Germany's first generation of light and medium tanks, as well as for expanding the technical curriculum at the Panzer Troops School to include formalizing training in mechanized warfare doctrine and combined arms tactics.³⁶ Given the conviction and vigor of all these officers in pursuing transformation, it will come as no surprise that Fritsch and Lutz later supervised the creation of the first three

panzer divisions in 1935 as the army's commander-in-chief and commander of panzer troops respectively.³⁷

An observation concerning the contributions of General Heinz Guderian is necessary at this point. While active in the development and expansion of the mature *Panzerwaffe* in the late 1930s as commander of panzer troops, Guderian played little intellectual role in the creation of the armored force and associated doctrine despite subsequent assertions to the contrary (he later claimed authorship for virtually all of the innovations and achievements described in the preceding paragraphs).³⁸ Nevertheless, in 1937, Guderian published a credible overview of German armored warfare doctrine, *Achtung-Panzer!*³⁹ This book reiterated the conviction that "Tanks would only be able to play their full part within the framework of a modern army when they were treated as that army's principal weapon and were supplied with fully motorized supporting arms."⁴⁰ Moreover, Guderian emphasized the need to concentrate the panzer divisions at the "decisive point of action" to maximize their advantage in mobility, firepower, and shock value; conversely, operational dispersion of *Panzerwaffe* would undermine its inherent strengths and negate its decisiveness.⁴¹ As Guderian concluded, "In an attack that is based on a successful tank action the 'architect of victory' is not the infantry but the tanks themselves, for if the tank attack fails then the whole operation is a failure, whereas if the tanks succeed, then victory follows."⁴² The concept of the independent panzer division as described by Guderian in *Achtung-Panzer!*—with its potential for massed action against the enemy's front or flank followed by relentless exploitation in the rear—made the transformation of German operational doctrine possible.

In the wake of the creation of the first three panzer divisions in 1935, Beck (by then a general and Fritsch's chief of staff) initiated a study to determine the feasibility of panzer corps and panzer armies. Subsequent field exercises and operational experience in the occupation of Austria in 1938 prompted the general staff to make ongoing improvements to the organization, training, and tactical procedures of the panzer divisions:

The result was a process of steady incremental improvement and innovation that amounted over the long term to systematic change, but without the risk of following false paths due to the misplaced enthusiasms of reformers or the troglodytic opposition of conservatives.⁴³

During the operation in Austria, the panzer divisions were employed piecemeal with subordinate units attached to infantry corps; the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1939, however, witnessed the panzer

divisions operating independently, though still under the control of an infantry corps commander. In short order, with procedures and doctrine further refined, the panzer divisions were organized in dedicated armor corps and teamed exclusively with motorized infantry divisions for combat operations against Poland.⁴⁴ As such, by the outbreak of war in September 1939, the intellectual vision begun by Seeckt and Volckheim had been successfully institutionalized within the organizational and operational framework of the army. Transformation was a reality. In a devastating endorsement of the validity of German armored doctrine, the *Panzerwaffe* proved a revolution in military affairs and made possible in 4 weeks in May–June 1940 what had eluded German arms for 4 long years during World War I: the total defeat of France.

The creation of *Panzerwaffe* offers another persuasive example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military transformation. The collective efforts of several individuals—Seeckt, Volckheim, Fritsch, Blomberg, Beck, Lutz, and Vollard-Bockelberg—achieved organizational and doctrinal change within the system solely as a result of synergistic, focused intellectual energy. Seeckt set the conditions for transformation and sponsored progressive intellectual activity within an environment that encouraged a critical exchange of ideas; moreover, his endorsement assured that contemporary and follow-on reformers remained shielded within the system and never forfeited their institutional legitimacy. Of course they faced inevitable opposition from old school advocates; General Gerd von Rundstedt clearly expressed the opinion of the traditionalists when, at an exercise involving the new tank units, he declared, "All nonsense, all nonsense, my dear Guderian."⁴⁵ Yet the conservative element never seriously impeded the development of *Panzerwaffe* or associated organizational/doctrinal reform because debate remained protected within the system where it could influence mainstream thought and processes. Additionally, the march of intellectual progress never stagnated into premature orthodoxy; the vision was continually renewed by succeeding generations of progressive thinkers who refused to stop short of real transformational success. Consequently, orthodoxy emerged only over time, when blitzkrieg became relegated to the realm of convention.

Two final observations are worth reemphasizing: While the German achievements in France included a significant technological dimension, the revolution in military affairs was not born simply of new tank designs and ubiquitous radios; instead, it resulted from the correct (and decisive) application of technology through a transformational doctrine.

The doctrine was revolutionary, not the tank.⁴⁶ Second, the factor of time is again apparent; it took nearly two decades for the collective intellectual vision of Seeckt, Volckheim, and the other progressive thinkers to mature into actual operational capability—illustrating well that military transformation by its nature is never a timely or efficient process.

Knowledge as a Capability

The catalytic role of the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission and the architects of German armored doctrine in promoting transformation within their respective military organizations is apparent. One can garner several themes from these case studies that are relevant and applicable to current and future efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to embrace transformation.

Intellectualism must work within an institutional context to succeed. Transformation is born of intellectual energy, but as demonstrated here, it can only thrive within an institutional framework and when wedded to the system. Organizational endorsement—as witnessed by King Frederick William III and Seeckt—provides legitimacy and intellectual freedom. The recent creation of the Office of Force Transformation under the direct purview of the Secretary of Defense offers a potential institutional framework for intellectualism to flourish and exercise influence within DOD. Similarly, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, coupled with U.S. Joint Forces Command responsibility for the creation of joint doctrine, afford additional opportunities for institutional intellectualism to work within and for the system. Unfortunately, these organizations to date have been largely incapable of catalyzing significant and enduring institutional change because they remain culturally divorced from the mainstream of events within the Armed Forces. While the structure is in place, the intellectual capital that it houses is not integrated within the system in the manner achieved by Scharnhorst or Seeckt. Moreover, this structure fails to promote effective innovation, free thought, or a critical exchange of ideas within and throughout the organization as a whole; instead, these endeavors are confined to think tanks within the walls of academia—well outside the organizational and professional mainstream. The Office of Force Transformation eventually may correct these deficiencies; if not, substantive transformation will prove impossible until intellectual endeavor is institutionalized in a way Scharnhorst and Seeckt would recognize.

The best intellectual capital must be assigned to transformation duties. Furthermore, these individuals should be primarily military profes-

sionals with operational experience. Successful transformation requires critical thinkers demonstrating “agility of the mind.”⁴⁷ At present, it remains highly questionable whether those organizations responsible for transformation are staffed with the proper intellectual capital. Are the contemporary intellectual peers of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Seeckt in residence at the Office of Force Transformation or elsewhere? They are not. The system resists assigning them to duties presently considered “non-career-enhancing.” Additionally, an effort is required to identify and employ young, talented officers as demonstrated by the personnel selections of Scharnhorst and Seeckt; intellectual renewal and avoidance of orthodoxy are only possible when the system empowers critical thinkers such as Clausewitz, Grolman, Boyen, and Volckheim to temper the experience of senior officers and push the envelope of convention. In the absence of our best intellectual capital (of all ranks), transformation will prove a fantasy.

Technological achievement does not constitute transformation. As illustrated in both case studies, transformation is born almost exclusively of organizational, systemic, and/or doctrinal innovation; therefore, while there is frequently a technological component to transformation, technology is incapable of catalyzing transformational change or a revolution in military affairs until it is subordinated to effective ideas. Consequently, there is an intellectual danger in staffing the Office of Force Transformation, U.S. Joint Forces Command, or the training and doctrine community with technocrats rather than critical thinkers. Given the current euphoria surrounding modern military technology, it is logical to assume that technocrats hold great influence within these organizations—and that transformation efforts dominated by technocrats will not succeed regardless of how revolutionary their technological achievements may be.

Transformation takes time. Presently, a misconception pervades all levels of the American military establishment that transformation can be accomplished in short order. The Prussian Military Reorganization Commission required decades for its goals to be realized, while the creation of the *Panzerwaffe* and associated doctrine consumed nearly 20 years in catalyzing less ambitious transformation. The complexity and scope of the transformation process will dictate the time required to achieve the desired end state—but the duration is likely to be measured in years. Therefore, since experience dictates that military reform is a laborious, time-consuming process, it would be logical to conclude that transformation efforts within DOD will not reach maturation in less than several years.

Traditionalists will always oppose transformation because it “requires changing culture and attitude.”⁴⁸ It is human nature to resist change; as such, intellectual efforts to drive transformation will always have to contend with traditional conservative elements supporting the status quo. Nevertheless, this opposition can be overwhelmed by ensuring that the intellectual impetus for transformation remains institutionalized and resides within the system. Therefore, opposition to present efforts at transformation does not pose any real challenge as long as the effort is driven by institutional intellectualism, continues to work within the organization, and retains administration and Secretary of Defense patronage.

Transformation turns intellectual vision into a military capability. Whether current efforts to transform constitute a response to a revolution in military affairs or a revolution itself, the driving force will—and must—remain institutional intellectualism; professional debate on intellectualism in the military must be focused on this salient issue. To do otherwise will lose sight of the most important aspect of intellectualism and its exclusive role as an agent for military transformation. Clausewitz reminds us in *On War* that “knowledge must become capability.”⁴⁹ We must never forget that without institutional intellectualism, this is impossible, and professional stagnation and atrophy will eventually result.

Notes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 102.

² Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms, Part I,” *Army Magazine* 52, no. 7 (July 2002), 18–20.

³ *Ibid.*, 20–23.

⁴ Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 10.

⁵ Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms, Part II,” *Army Magazine* 52, no. 8 (August 2002), 40.

⁶ Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175–180.

⁷ Clifford J. Rogers, “‘As If a New Sun Had Risen’: England’s Fourteenth-Century RMA,” in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*, 18–22.

⁸ Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*, 172–174.

⁹ David E. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 8–15.

¹⁰ Jehuda L. Wallach, *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 5.

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 39–42.

¹² Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 38–39.

- ¹³ Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1977), 20–24.
- ¹⁴ Charles E. White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805* (New York: Praeger, 1989), xiii, 128–131.
- ¹⁵ Peter Paret, *Understanding War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 78–80.
- ¹⁶ Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 192–193.
- ¹⁷ Dupuy, 24.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27–29.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.
- ²⁰ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 138.
- ²¹ Dupuy, 27, 29.
- ²² Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 138–139.
- ²³ Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff 1657–1945* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995), 35.
- ²⁴ Dupuy, 28.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 30, 46–48.
- ²⁶ Craig, 39.
- ²⁷ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 210–211.
- ²⁸ Johnson, 8–9.
- ²⁹ James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 254.
- ³⁰ Johnson, 9.
- ³¹ Corum, 125.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 126–130.
- ³³ Charles Messenger, *The Blitzkrieg Story* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 64–65.
- ³⁴ Corum, 130–131.
- ³⁵ Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39–40.
- ³⁶ Corum, 134–136.
- ³⁷ Larry A. Addington, *The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1941* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 34–35.
- ³⁸ Corum, 136–143.
- ³⁹ Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in *Hitler's Generals*, ed. Correlli Barnett (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 445.
- ⁴⁰ Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1952), 31.
- ⁴¹ Kenneth Macksey, *Guderian: Panzer General* (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 59.
- ⁴² Guderian, 43.
- ⁴³ Murray, "May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA," 161–162.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 162.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 161.
- ⁴⁶ Posen, 218–219.
- ⁴⁷ Arthur K. Cebrowski, dialogue with Advanced Strategic Art Program students, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, October 29, 2003.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 147.

War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World

Ling Wee Lee

The United States has reached a critical juncture similar to the end of World War II, when the strategy of containment was developed to counter the rising tide of communism. Had the United States adopted a different strategy, such as a preventive war, the outcome would have been different. Emerging from the Cold War with a healthy economy, and as the only superpower with overwhelming military and technological advantages, America faces a very different threat—global terrorism waged by radical Islam against Western democracy, an open economy, and modernization. As before, the United States has strategic options to deal with the new challenge symbolized by the September 11 tragedy. What type of strategic approach will effectively neutralize this threat?

This essay argues that the backbone of any strategic approach to this threat should be winning the hearts, minds, and souls¹ of the international Muslim community through the promotion of a progressive Islamic culture and teaching. This strategy must include an information campaign waged in ways and at levels unprecedented in U.S. history.

In “New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror,” Grant Highland rightfully cautions against casting the problem too narrowly as a fringe or radical

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movement that can be discredited among the greater Muslim population.² Citing Sun Tzu, Highland proposes that the United States must strive to reach a better understanding of the enemy.³ Indeed, the problem could be framed in medical terms, as a cancerous growth, feeding on and drawing strength from the mainstream Islamic body, and the treatment of which itself has nefarious effects on the healthy body. In such a case, a doctor needs to perform a thorough examination of the cancer patient and understand his medical history and background before prescribing a course of action. Likewise, it is necessary to understand Islam from its many perspectives, such as from al Qaeda, history, and the millions of Muslims around the globe, including those living in the United States.

Characteristics of Islam

As a religion that spans 14 centuries and binds more than a billion people together with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds in a common faith, Islam has four key characteristics, the understanding of which will be important in the subsequent discussion.

First, in the history of Islam, religion and politics have been closely related. In *The Crisis of Islam*, Bernard Lewis notes that, unlike early Christians who were persecuted and suffered under Roman rule until their religion was adopted after the conversion of the emperor Constantine, the first few generations of Muslims became at once a political and a religious community, with the Prophet as head of state.⁴ Lewis further observes that, as the community expanded within less than a century into a vast empire, these early Muslims viewed religious truth and political power as indissolubly associated. As such, the notion of secularism is alien to fundamental Islamic thought and practice, even though it has been possible to label governments of Muslim countries as being on a secular continuum. The *shariah*, or Holy Law, has provisions that parallel the Western constructs of constitutional law and political philosophy, such as the acquisition and exercise of power, the nature of legitimacy and authority, and the duties of ruler and subject.⁵

Given that the religion and politics of Islam are inextricably linked and that, according to Clausewitz, “war is . . . a continuation of political commerce,” the planners of the global war against Islamic terrorists should consider politics from within Islam itself. As such, any attempt to de-link the September 11 attacks from Islam is only *politically correct* and misrepresents the nature of the issues at hand. Likewise, efforts for

political reform within Muslim countries would have to begin with religious reforms to ensure that there is no conflict between Islam and the associated underlying principles such as liberty, democracy, modernity, and progressive thinking.

Second, besides the strong link between religion and politics, there are themes in Islam predisposing Muslims to identify themselves as belonging to a single community. In *Islam—Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, John Voll identifies these themes as the belief that “there is no god but the one God”; the common experience of Quran recitations; and the collective recognition of the Quran’s authenticity and Muhammad’s integrity as the Prophet. As such, there is a strong sense of unity within a community where moral and ethical values are guided by a common religion.⁶

This sense of identity has its origin in historical Islam. To many Muslims, Islam is “not just a matter of faith and practice; it is also an identity and loyalty . . . that transcend all others,” including national boundaries.⁷ In the Middle East, Islamic society was a single state under one ruler in the early centuries of the Muslim era. The Westphalian notion of national sovereignty might have ignited a sense of patriotism and nationalism in Muslims under colonial rule, resulting in the creation of modern nation-states, the boundaries being arbitrarily drawn up by colonial powers.⁸ But, with a keen awareness of history, Muslims there still see themselves as “a religion subdivided into nations” rather than “a nation subdivided into religious groups.”⁹

Although such a notion of religious identity is strongest in the Middle East, a sense of solidarity permeates the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia. Jihad, or Holy War, is viewed as a common religious obligation that is conducted offensively or defensively, in spiritual, moral, or military terms, with the ultimate aim of bringing the entire world under Muslim influence.¹⁰ The annual pilgrimage to Mecca that every Muslim seeks to fulfill at least once in a lifetime is another religious act of obligation that unites Muslims in a common faith. Perceived injustice to fellow Muslims in another country (for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or a foreign non-Muslim military intervention in a Muslim state) often results in public outbursts and frustrations against the inaction of political leaders.

This sense of common identity among Muslims worldwide suggests the strategic importance of an information campaign as the backbone to support the war against radical Islamic groups such as al Qaeda, and this

campaign should be conducted in parallel with direct kinetic attacks on these groups. Its objective would be to convince Muslims worldwide that these fringe elements are the true enemies of Islam and that the United States and its allies, in its confrontation against them, are sincere in bringing about a brighter future for Islam.

Third, according to Voll, despite the common themes existing within the global community, Islam, like many other world religions, is not monolithic. There is great diversity in the interpretation and application of the common themes cited above. Within the Sunnis and Shi'ites, there are different approaches and schools of thought. One example is the interpretation of law based on the Quran. Even within the Sunnis alone, Voll describes four main schools of thought, all accepting Islam as the legal basis in a society. The spectrum ranges from the Hanafi school, which "gives emphasis to personal reasoning and free judgment in legal interpretation," to the Hanbali school, which "allows very little scope for individual reasoning or analogy."¹¹

Furthermore, outside the Middle East, the strict interpretation and application of the common themes often cede to strong local customs and traditions. Village spiritual leaders or local holy men play an important role in shaping the Islamic experience, sometimes "diluted" by non-Islamic practices that traditional *ulama* condemn as magical practices and superstitions.¹²

The nonmonolithic nature in the interpretation and application of Islam means that a one-size-fits-all approach to the overall strategy of an information campaign would be counterproductive. In "Rolling Back Radical Islam," Ralph Peters rightly points out that "in terms of both population density and potential productivity, wealth, and power, Islam's center of gravity lies to the east of Afghanistan, not to the west," with India and Indonesia being the two countries with the largest Muslim populations. However, given the U.S. perception of Middle East oil as its vital interest, it has "come to see Islam largely through an Arab prism."¹³ In fact, following the proposal advocated by Peters, non-Middle East Muslim countries may be the source of Islamic religious reformists who are receptive to Western progressive thinking and values. These religious reformists, who will probably be nonstate actors, would benefit from the support of United States and its allies, in this spiritual struggle to "roll back radical Islam."

Fourth, historical evidence shows that Islam is not incompatible with the thinking associated with intellectual and scientific knowledge that

advances human civilization. In the wake of radical and militant Islamic attacks on the West culminating in the September 11 tragedy, most Western analysts of international security affairs focus on the failure of modernity within the Islamic world and seem to ignore the glorious golden age of Islamic civilization between the 8th and 13th centuries. Contemporary lack of awareness about this period, even on the part of some Muslims, prompted Iftekhar Mahmood, a Muslim pharmaceutical scientist, to write *Islam—Beyond Terrorists and Terrorism*, listing the most influential Muslims who had contributed significantly in the areas of medicine, science, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, history, and political science. These Muslims had “preserved the Greek, Persian, and Indian heritage and introduced new dimensions to the knowledge of Aristotle and Plato,” during a time Europe was groping through the Dark Ages.¹⁴

Moreover, despite a desire for global influence, history has shown Islam as a religion of tolerance and respect for other religions. In return for certain disabilities or penalties such as a poll tax on every adult male, non-Muslims in Muslim states were “tolerated and enjoyed a very large scale of autonomy in the conduct of their internal communal affairs, including education, taxation, and the enforcement of their own laws of personal status, notably marriage, divorce, and inheritance.”¹⁵ This contrasts greatly with the intolerance of current radical groups, which advocate strict and universal adherence to *shariah* laws. Just as the Muslim scholars and intellectuals of the past had served as a bridge between the earlier European Greek-Roman civilizations and the European Renaissance, modern Western civilization of the 21st century has a moral calling to help moderate and enlightened reformists within the Islamic community to revive the progressive thinking facet of the religion. More importantly, forging alliances with Muslim reformists would greatly facilitate the task of reversing the current trend of radical Islamic thinking with its associated terror unleashed on the West.

Beliefs define behavior, actions, and reactions. For as long as the prevailing wisdom holds that Islam and progressive thinking are incompatible, the strategies and methods that can be found for working with progressive Islamic elements to fight against radical elements will be limited and weak. However, if prevailing wisdom were to accept and embrace the possibilities inherent in believing that Islam and progressive thinking can be compatible, whole new vistas of opportunities to collaborate and fight terrorism open up.

The four characteristics of Islam underscore a need for a new approach in countering terrorism. This new approach should have the following ingredients: religious reform, which must accompany, if not precede, political reform for the latter to be successful; an information campaign that must be coordinated with direct kinetic attacks on radical Islamic groups to convince Muslims worldwide of the vision of a brighter and more desirable future end-state for Islam; and the presence of religious reformists who may or may not be state actors outside the Middle East. Finally, implicit in this new approach is the need for conviction on the part of U.S. policymakers that such a religious reform to instill progressive thinking and modernity in Islam is achievable.

The Crisis of Islam

To describe the current malaise within the Muslim community, Lewis alludes to “a failure of modernity,” citing the poor economic performances in terms of gross domestic products, industrial output, productivity, and job creation. For example, in 1999 the combined gross domestic product of all Arab countries was less than that of Spain alone. Other areas of underdevelopment include technology, education, and human development.¹⁶ Three issues are key to understanding how the Muslim community has arrived at this state of affairs.

First, Islam has stagnated as the rest of the world has evolved and been transformed. This stagnation can be measured by its receptivity to new ideas. Annual translation of books within the Arab world is about one-fifth that of Greece, and the accumulative total number of books translated since the 9th century is almost the average that Spain translates in a year.¹⁷ What is the cause of this stagnation?

Globalization has often been blamed as a relatively new phenomenon that causes many Muslims to retreat to the comfort of traditional Islamic practice and beliefs. However, it can also be seen from a wider timeline as just a geographical extension of the industrial revolution and the information revolution from the West. Economically, globalization takes advantage of cheap production and requires free trade and flow of products across national boundaries, hence creating supply at lower cost. Culturally, globalization exports foreign ideas with consumer goods to indigenous societies, thereby creating further demands for industry to sustain and grow.

Industrialization has been a painful experience for the Western world. In “9/11’ and After: A British View,” Michael Howard contends

that Western turmoil with modernity traces two centuries back to the Enlightenment period in Europe with “protest against the erosion of traditional values and authorities by the rationalism, the secularism, and the free-thinking that both underlay and were empowered by the American and French revolutions . . . creating general disorientation and alienation that was to be exploited by extreme forces on both the Left and Right.”¹⁸ Despite the discovery of the New World that absorbed discontented and dissenting European immigrants, industrialization and modernization with their initial extremes and excesses laid down the necessary conditions for two world wars with millions of lost lives, not to mention the downfall of several European empires.

So the issue is not whether Islam is compatible with modernity. Instead, just as one’s immune system is weaker as he undergoes a stressful experience and is therefore more susceptible to illness, it is about how the Muslim community can transit through this critical phase of inevitable social changes with an outcome that is less traumatic and explosive than the experience of the two world wars in the 20th century. This is even more challenging if one considers that, given a late start, this tumultuous process has been time compressed in the case of newly independent Muslim-dominated nations in the third world.

This leads to issue two: for most Muslim nations, initial attempts to modernize and industrialize have been negative experiences. The first trial with industrial age modernity coincided with the Cold War period as developing nations gained independence from their past colonial masters. While there have been isolated cases of successes such as the flourishing economies of the four Tigers in East Asia, many new governments that embarked on modernization and industrialization programs soon faltered due to a number of reasons, such as corruption and lack of governance. Many Muslims soon became disillusioned and impatient with the process. Open American support of Israel as well as oppressive and corrupt regimes in the great power politics of the Cold War further fueled the anger against imported Western values and systems that were associated with modernization.

Because the Western model of modernization is secular in nature, the resurgence of Islamic fundamental values becomes an expression for the rejection of Western and irreligious ideas. Economic and political reforms have therefore failed in the absence of religious reform. According to Lewis, the ensuing Islamic revolutionary movement in Muslim countries, such as Iran, has several components: a sense of humiliation

and frustration at the widening gap between the Muslim world and the rest; a sense of confidence and power made possible by the oil crisis of 1973; and a contempt for perceived Western decadence as Muslim visitors to Europe and United States “began to observe and describe what they saw as the moral degeneracy and consequent weakness of Western Civilization.”¹⁹ Even in countries such as Malaysia, where there are a majority of moderate Muslims, the misguided perception of Western decadence has entered mainstream politics. Indeed, there is now an increasing tendency and need for both the ruling and the opposition parties in these countries to compete among one another and proclaim their political legitimacy to their electorate by demonstrating the adherence of a more authentic form of Islam.

This reorientation, in our medical analogy, is similar to a patient’s rejection of medical treatment due to some negative experiences, even as she undergoes a stressful, high-risk, but necessary phase of treatment. The result of treatment rejection is the eventual flourishing of a cancerous growth that threatens the patient’s life.

The third issue deals directly with the nature of this cancerous growth: too weak to counter the perceived threat of Western global dominance in military, economic, and cultural arenas, radical Islamic elements employ terrorism to make their voices heard. Lewis observes that in the eyes of radical Muslims, the Islamic world has taken a wrong turn as its rulers adopt infidel laws and customs. Thus, “the only solution is a return to the authentic Muslim way of life.” While they “regard the West as the source of evil that is corroding Muslim society . . . their primary attack is directed against their own rulers and leaders.” The Shah of Iran and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt were “both seen as symptoms of a deeper evil to be remedied by an inner cleansing.”²⁰

Such radical Islamic movements have their origins in the 1970s and 1980s. However, since the end of the Cold War, the confluence of globalization and exponential Internet growth have produced compounding effects on the means and ends of terrorism. In “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” Audrey Cronin argues that in terms of means, globalization has extended the reach of terrorist groups in operational efficiency through the use of the Internet, mobile phones, and instant messaging; in physical cross-border movement to conduct terrorist acts; and in sourcing of funds through illegal activities such as money laundering, drug and arms trafficking, alien smuggling, and violations of intellectual property rights. In terms of ends, the growing awareness of

their global reach through tools made available by globalization has provided radical groups with the ability to strike at the perceived source of their problems instead of just attacking their government and leaders. Cronin concludes that while globalization is not the cause of the current crisis in Islam, it has certainly enhanced both the means and ends of terrorism that can be waged directly at the United States and its allies.²¹

In short, the failure in and the rejection of modernity led to the rise of Islamic radicalism. The latter found expression in the use of terror as a primary instrument to protest against the onslaught of modernity. While this phenomenon has developed over the past century, the September 11 tragedy brought it to the forefront of U.S. politics. It is therefore more appropriate to term the current global war on terrorism as *a global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements*.

Global War on Terrorism

So how can one characterize the nature of the global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements? Highland urges policymakers to view this conflict as an insurgency problem as both the radical Islamic terrorists and the insurgency fighters share four similar key characteristics.

First, all insurgency fighters have the political goal of overturning the status quo. By capitalizing on the current crisis in Islam, groups seek to establish political legitimacy by advocating an alternative *shariah* rule. Grasping at the inextricable linkage between politics and Islam, they “struck a nerve within the Middle Eastern psyche and tapped into a deep reserve of antipathy and despair that has served to heighten [their] standing within the Muslim community.”²²

Second, psychological operations form the core of the strategy of insurgency fighters. Groups such as al Qaeda effectively wage an information campaign to win the hearts and minds of Muslims.²³ Lewis notes that in ancient Islam the *madrasa* was a center of higher education, scholarship, and research, very much akin to the great medieval European universities where academic learning in various fields such as science, mathematics, and literature were brought to greater heights. Today, radical Islamic groups have subverted many *madrasas*. In many countries where the teaching of Islam in *madrasas* is not well regulated, these schools have become centers for indoctrination and incitement of violence and hatred against local governments and Western civilization.²⁴ Such indoctrination of militant Islamic teachings continues in terrorist training camps around the world.

Third, insurgency fighters have the luxury of time on their side to wage a protracted conflict. Indeed, groups such as al Qaeda have been proven to be resilient and resistant to U.S.-led efforts to curb their ambitions.²⁵ Information technology and funding through clandestine operations made possible by globalization have allowed them to operate on a low budget and set up sleeper cells that can remain dormant for long periods.

Fourth, most insurgency fighters rely on unconventional forces, tactics, and strategies. With complex organizational structures and the use of low-cost information technology, terrorist groups are nonstate actors who have the potential of unleashing devastating destruction using weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, with the possibility of striking anywhere and anytime, they are difficult to detect, deter, and predict.²⁶ The case put forth by Highland on the “nature of the illness” is convincing as it is consistent with the “medical history and background” of Islam. If Highland is right in characterizing the global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements as counterinsurgency warfare, what remedies and strategies should the United States and its allies adopt?

Winning Hearts, Minds, and Souls

While short-term use of intelligence and military power to eliminate terrorist cells and rogue states that support these cells is an essential component of the overall strategy, the United States needs to expand and deepen other instruments of policy. For example, diplomacy plays an important role in the establishment of international legal frameworks and multilateral agreements on financial controls to limit the sources of terrorist funding as well as on cross-border law enforcement and sharing of intelligence to limit movements and deny safe havens. Close international cooperation with allies also can help to restore good governance in failed states through political reforms and economic assistance.

However, given the nature of insurgency warfare under discussion, these efforts would not be effective if they are not backed by an information campaign with an overarching objective of winning the hearts, minds, and souls of an international Muslim community through the promotion of a progressive Islamic culture and teaching. Current thinking in information warfare focuses on how best to exploit mass media and communication. For example, the “Radio Sawa” (Radio Together) has replaced the Voice of America’s Arabic service with themes that appeal to Arab youths, and there are plans to launch a 24-hour

Arabic satellite news channel that will compete with al Jazeera.²⁷ While this shift from a hard-sell propaganda approach to a more subtle communication strategy is necessary given the rise of global communication in an Internet age, it lacks a central message in the form of a sincere and deep commitment to the future of the target audience.

This central message should be the promotion of a moderate interpretation of the Quran in order to bring Islam out of the current crisis and restore its prominence in the world. As Howard points out, “if there is indeed ‘a war against terrorism,’ it has to be fought and won within the Islamic world. The role of the West must be to support and encourage those who are fighting that war, and we must take care that we do nothing to make their task more difficult.”²⁸ In order to prevent relapse and side effects, rather than just targeting the malignant cells, one should focus on strengthening the body’s immune system.

During the Cold War, the United States acted as a counterbalancing force in the European and Asia-Pacific theaters, supporting the weaker allies against the stronger adversary that sought world dominance. The same logic can be applied here in a broader sense, the weaker allies being moderate reformists in the Muslim world who may be nonstate actors and are too weak to speak up against their more radical counterparts. To convince these moderate reformists of American sincerity and commitment to this cause, this struggle should be waged as an information campaign with two thrusts: reforming Islamic education and establishing Iraq and Afghanistan as positive models of Islamic states.

The centerpiece of this information campaign should be to promote the idea that Islam can coexist in harmony with progressive thinking and modernization. Unlike Christianity, Islam did not undergo the equivalent of the Protestant Reformation, which resulted in the separation of church and state and also secured the continued flourishing of Renaissance art and science by freeing Western civilization from the shackles of Roman Catholicism. A similar Islamic Renaissance is long overdue. Besides financial assistance to moderate Islamic groups, this Renaissance can be initiated by supporting the establishment of centers of excellence for the study of Islam and the promotion of moderate interpretations of the Quran in the United States and other parts of the world. Prominent moderate Islamic scholars should be mobilized to denounce the militant teachings of radical Islamic elements and to develop accreditation standards for the *madrasas*. Accredited *madrasas* should incorporate syllabi and curriculum that provide adequate coverage on secular subjects such as science and mathematics

while retaining emphasis on positive Islamic values such as integrity, honesty, tolerance of other faiths, and respect for human dignity.

Such reforms in Islamic education will lift the Muslim community from a vicious downward spiral in which Muslim parents seek refuge from the onslaught of globalization on their religious and cultural heritage by sending their children to *madrasas* that provide little skills and knowledge relevant in a modern economy. The combination of militant indoctrination and poor job prospects provides fertile ground for radical Islamic groups such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah to recruit terrorists from a growing disenchanting youth. If the United States continues to respond to terrorist acts by relying on hard-kill military actions alone, such actions will further reinforce the Muslim perception of self-vulnerability and Western dominance, in turn increasing the popularity of *madrasas* among Muslim parents.

Besides undertaking reforms in Islamic education as part of the information campaign, the United States should leverage the opportunities presented by the nation-building process in Iraq and Afghanistan to address the issue of Islam's role in state politics. Since the establishment of modern statehood in Muslim countries after World War II and the demise of colonial power, there has been a wide spectrum of attempts to position Islam and politics with varying degree of success. John Esposito chronicles this trend in *The Oxford History of Islam*. On one end of the spectrum, Muslim secularists such as the Shah of Iran, who advocated the Western norm of separation of religion from politics, failed to achieve legitimacy due to poor support from the masses. The difficulty in transplanting a Western political system to a Muslim society was to be expected given the symbiotic relationship between the political and religious aspects of Islam. On the other end of the spectrum, Muslim governments such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that embrace strict adherence to *shariah* and denounce democracy as incompatible with Islam also do not offer a satisfactory political solution, as they are unable to compete in the global economy.²⁹

Somewhere between these two extremes are a great diversity of Islamic reformers who seek to re-interpret the religion to accommodate modern liberalist and pluralist forms of government. Esposito traces the works of some early scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), who argued for the compatibility of religion with reason and science. The former believed in science and technology not only as integral to Islam but also as a source

of strength that had helped to spawn Islamic civilization. The latter argued that “although the religious observances of Islam were immutable, the social aspects of Islamic law could be reformed in such areas as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.” For example, he proposed that the Quranic ideal was monogamy and not polygamy.³⁰

However, with perhaps the sole exception of the Ataturk who was relatively successful in redefining Turkey as a secular state, the agendas of many post-World War II reformists were brushed aside in the capitalist-communist ideological struggle of the Cold War. What eventually emerged in most Middle East Muslim countries were repressive regimes supported by the United States and its allies in the name of containment against Soviet expansion. Given the greater awareness made possible by global travel and the information revolution of mass media and Internet communication in the last two decades, Lewis suggests that citizens in these countries increasingly resent what they perceive as a double standard in the application of human rights norms by the United States and its allies. While Western leaders preach these norms and apply them in their own countries, they generally tolerate the Middle Eastern leaders’ violation of civil rights and political freedom as long as the regional stability is maintained and the vital interests of oil and trade are secured.³¹

Recognizing that such resentment is easily exploited by radical Islamic elements to achieve their political goals, current nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan focus on the establishment of democratic governments that would set positive examples for neighboring Muslim countries. The soundness of this approach is questionable for two reasons. First, there is a risk that radical Islamic elements could seize power through the democratic process and proceed to change the constitutions and impose strict interpretation of *shariah* rules, thereby reversing the efforts to encourage mass political participation. Second, the United States has a poor past record of attempts to establish and sustain democracy. Moreover, the long-term sustainability of American domestic support for newly established democratic regimes in these two countries is questionable.

Democracy should not and cannot be a cure-all solution in the global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements. Instead, it is more important to derive a better understanding of the compatibility between democracy and Islam, which requires broad base participation and debate among eminent scholars and leaders within the world Muslim community to come to a consensus. The ultimate solution may not be a democratic government as perceived by the West but a more sustainable

form of governance that tolerates collective participation of the masses. The U.S.-led nation-building team should devote much time, effort, and resources to this end because the development of a positive model of Islamic states that embraces values consistent with collective political participation would have long-lasting positive effects on the sustainability of democracy in Muslim countries. As a key component of an American information campaign against radical Islamic terrorist elements, it would send a strong message to Muslims worldwide that this war is targeted specifically against extreme terrorist groups and does not seek to impose secular democratic regimes on Muslim countries. Actions will speak louder than words alone.

Conclusion

This argument references Highland's essay, which characterizes the global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements as counterinsurgency warfare. Therefore, in the final analysis, it would be appropriate to draw a parallel between the Cold War and the current global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements, with relevant lessons learned from the Vietnam War.

One significant lesson learned during the Cold War was the need to recognize the importance of local circumstances and craft out appropriate strategies to deal with the threat accordingly. Applying this lesson to the current global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements, there is a need to recognize the different shades of Islam practiced throughout the world—from moderate to radical. While Muslims see one another as part of the same community and may be sympathetic to the plight of fellow Muslims, they may not agree on the interpretations and practices of Islam. The American obsession with the Middle East ignores the larger Muslim community in other parts of the world, where a more moderate interpretation of the Quran is practiced. Even within radical Islamic elements, not all agree with the tactics and methods used by al Qaeda to stop the encroachment of Western culture on Muslim communities.

Given the sense of identity within the global Muslim community, direct attack on Muslim countries risks alienating the moderate Muslims from supporting the United States and denouncing the terrorist tactics used by certain groups. This is analogous to medical treatments that have negative side effects and adversely affect benign cells that the body depends upon to combat viruses. While such treatments may sometimes be necessary, complementary therapies that minimize resulting adverse

effects should be administered. Invasion and occupation of Iraq, for example, places governments of friendly democratic nations with large Muslim populations, such as those in Southeast Asia, in a difficult position with respect to their electorates. As such, there is a need to complement military actions with the promotion of progressive Islamic teaching to demonstrate that U.S. action is not targeting Islam and to allow moderate Islamic governments to garner internal support in terms of intelligence gathering to root out terrorist cells within their countries.

Another lesson learned during the Cold War is the importance of understanding the enemy and the nature of warfare that it wages. An effective medical intervention requires a good understanding of the health issues that we are dealing with (for example, identifying the virus strains and how they could mutate over time). Without a good appreciation of the Vietnamese heritage and determination during the Vietnam War, the United States failed to take into account their historical struggle against foreign occupation. It was a limited war to the Americans but a total war to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. The American military efforts focused on destroying the communist insurgency forces without recognizing the will of the American people as its Achilles' heel. Even though the United States won all the major battles in the Vietnam War, including the famous Tet Offensive, it could not prevent the eventual communist takeover of South Vietnam.

Recent propaganda campaigns and hard kill attacks to eliminate Muslim terrorists do not address the two root causes of the problem: a perceived threat against Islam posed by the global export of Western culture and values; and a perceived unjustness in the subjugation of the Muslim world by the overbearing world dominance of Western powers. Osama bin Laden has been able to capitalize on these root causes by making references to the "humiliation and disgrace" that Islam has suffered for "more than 80 years" since the fall of the last great Muslim empire, the Ottoman sultanate. His call for jihad resonates among Muslims, whether they agree with his method or not, and allows terrorist groups and networks to recruit young and willing supporters from unregulated *madrasas* that preach and incite hatred against the West.

The use of direct hard-kill attacks alone to eliminate Muslim terrorists would have just the opposite effect of generating more of them. Even the removal of the entire al Qaeda organization might not be a permanent solution to the problem, since the existence of underlying conditions may spawn other terror organizations that are much worse. There are signs that

the Department of Defense has begun to recognize this quandary. In a memorandum dated October 16, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld poses the following questions:

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the *madrasas* and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?

Does the United States need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The United States is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions.³²

President George W. Bush's statement that "you are either with us or against us" can be easily misconstrued as a duel between the Western and Islamic worlds. If there is indeed a duel, it should be one that pitches those with a moderate and progressive outlook against those with an extremist and radical view of the world. Therefore, the problem should be framed as an inevitable internal struggle between moderate and radical elements within Islam in the face of globalization.

The United States is specifically targeted by radical Islamic elements because it is the symbol of Western world dominance. The September 11 tragedy resulted in the formulation of the new Bush Doctrine that advocates the necessity of preemptive war, even if it has to be fought unilaterally without authorization from the United Nations. The subsequent war on Iraq reinforced an image of the United States widely held among allies and adversaries of an arrogant superpower that is insensitive to the concerns of other countries in the world. This degrades U.S. soft power and its ability to lead the rest of the world in the global war against radical Islamic terrorist elements. In contrast, the information campaign proposed by this essay will demonstrate the American willingness and resolve to tackle the root causes of the problem, enhance its image, and revitalize its soft power within the international community. In so doing, the United States will be in a better position to garner material, financial, and moral support from its allies toward nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. By reducing its own cost of the war, domestic support for the war will in turn be more sustainable. Under such a scenario, the U.S. military, given limited resources and capabilities, will not overstretch and can better focus on deterrence and containment of other regional threats.

Notes

¹ Grant R. Highland, “New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror,” in *Essays 2003: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), 30. Highland coins the phrase *hearts, minds, and souls* to reflect the religious dimension of the issue.

² *Ibid.*, 18–21.

³ Quoted in Highland, 18.

⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam—Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7–12.

⁶ John Obert Voll, *Islam—Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 15–16.

⁷ Lewis, 17–18.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, xx.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 29–36.

¹¹ Voll, 17–18.

¹² *Ibid.*, 19–20.

¹³ Ralph Peters, “Rolling Back Radical Islam,” *Parameters* 32, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 6–9.

¹⁴ Iftekhhar Mahmood, *Islam—Beyond Terrorists and Terrorism* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), xiv.

¹⁵ Lewis, 45–46.

¹⁶ Lewis, 113–119.

¹⁷ Quoted in Lewis, 115–116.

¹⁸ Michael Howard, “‘9/11’ and After: A British View,” *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 17.

¹⁹ Lewis, 21–22.

²⁰ Lewis, 24.

²¹ Audrey J. Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 45–54.

²² Highland, 23.

²³ *Ibid.*, 23–24.

²⁴ Lewis, 128–129.

²⁵ Highland, 24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁷ Mark Leonard, “Diplomacy by Other Means,” *Foreign Policy* 132 (September/October 2002), 55–56.

²⁸ Howard, 19.

²⁹ John L. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam—Reformation or Revolution,” *The Oxford History of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 675–680.

³⁰ Esposito, 647–649.

³¹ Lewis, 103–112.

³² Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum, October 16, 2003, to Paul D. Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, Richard B. Myers, and Peter Pace.

The 23^d Annual Competition

On May 20 and 21, 2004, the National Defense University convened a panel of judges at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC, to evaluate the entries in the 23^d annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition. The 2004 judges were:

John R. Ballard, *Naval War College*

Charles C. Chadbourn III, *Naval War College*

John W. Gordon, *Marine Corps Command and Staff College*

Colonel Penny Koerner, USAF, *Industrial College of the Armed Forces*

Lieutenant Colonel Marsha Kwolek, USAF, *Air War College*

Richard A. Melanson, *National War College*

Barton Michelson, *Industrial College of the Armed Forces*

James A. Mowbray, *Air War College*

Patricia S. Pond, *U.S. Army War College*

Joseph L. Strange, *Marine Corps War College*

Ray Takeyh, *National War College*

Robert H. Taylor, *U.S. Army War College*

The four winning essays are published in this volume, *Essays 2004*. The winning authors were presented with certificates signed by the Chairman, as well as gift certificates for books of their choice, provided through the generosity of the National Defense University Foundation.

The 2004 competition was administered by Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications and Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*, in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of George C. Maerz, Jeffrey D. Smotherman, and Lisa M. Yambrick, members of the editorial staff of NDU Press.

A complete list of the entries by college in the 2004 competition follows:

Air War College

Lieutenant Colonel Steven B. Harrison, USAF, *Toward a More Perfect Union: Matching Strategy and Structure in the Post–Cold War World*

Lieutenant Colonel Daryl J. Hauck, USAF, *Pandora’s Box Opened Wide: Micro Unmanned Air Vehicles Carrying Genetic Weapons*

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Hood, USAF, *Strategic Disconnect: Preemption and Cold War Basing*

Lieutenant Colonel Marilyn H. Howe, USAF, *Joint Specialty Officer: The Unintended Consequences of an Unrealistic Requirement*

Lieutenant Colonel Ling Wee Lee, Republic of Singapore Air Force, *War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World*

Commander Hans P. Liske, USN, *War, End States, and Nation Building: Fundamental Transformation or External Coups?*

Lieutenant Colonel Bryan T. Newkirk, USA, *Global Combat Support System: An Absolute Must for the Joint Warfighting Commander*

Marine Corps War College

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Harkin, USMC, *Achieving Political Legitimacy in the Iraq Insurgency*

Colonel Jon S. Lehr, USA, *Posse Comitatus: A Relevant Check and Balance, Not an Impediment to National Security*

Commander David J. Sampson, USN, *Intelligence and the Practical Application of Preemption*

Lieutenant Colonel George W. Smith, Jr., USMC, *Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)*

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

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