



# National Institute of Justice

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

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## Issues and Findings

**Discussed in this Brief:** An NIJ-sponsored evaluation of Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) programs, which were established with Bureau of Justice Assistance support in eight urban and suburban sites in 1990. Distinguished by their focus on neighborhood drug problems, the programs used community policing techniques, particularly police-community partnerships, to attempt to lower the demand for illegal drugs.

**Key issues:** Implementation issues received special emphasis in the study: the extent to which police officers understood and supported the projects and the degree to which other public agencies and the community were involved. The study also examined police and residents' perceptions of INOP's impact. Because the evaluation was conducted relatively soon after the programs were adopted, it could not assess long-term effects.

**Key findings:** Evaluation of INOP programs revealed:

- The major implementation challenges were resistance by police officers to community policing and the difficulty of involving other public agencies and of organizing the community.
- With the exception of one site, the involvement of other public agencies was limited.

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## Implementation Challenges in Community Policing Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Eight Cities

by Susan Sadd and Randolph M. Grinc

Community policing could arguably be called the new orthodoxy of law enforcement in the United States. It has become an increasingly popular alternative to what many police administrators perceive as the failure of traditional policing to deal effectively with street crime, especially crimes of violence and drug trafficking. Although the concept is defined in varying ways and its ability to meet its goals remains largely untested, community policing has gained widespread acceptance. According to one source, about 40 percent of the Nation's larger police departments have adopted it.<sup>1</sup>

### Community-centered drug demand reduction

If community policing has been a central aspect of emerging police agendas in many jurisdictions throughout the country, so has drug demand reduction. Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) is unique in drawing on the principles of community policing and applying them to drug demand reduction. One of these principles—a major component

of community policing—is that partnerships between the police and the community can be effective in reducing crime and fear. In focusing on a particular issue, INOP also draws on the principles of problem-solving policing.

Demand reduction can involve intensive local street-level enforcement, which makes it more difficult for buyers and sellers to link up with each other and may dissuade new users from becoming addicted. Beyond intensive enforcement, which is the more common focus of police initiatives directed at illegal drug use, demand reduction can also include prevention and treatment. What is unique about INOP is its attempt to supplement traditional enforcement with long-term community-based prevention, education, and treatment referral. Combining all these components, INOP projects approximate a comprehensive approach to demand reduction. Ideally, all components are represented in a given project. In the INOP projects analyzed in this Research in Brief, each contained some but not all the components.

## Issues and Findings

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- Police officers generally did not understand community policing; saw INOP assignments as conferring an elite status; perceived INOP as less productive, more time-consuming, and more resource-intensive than traditional policing; and felt their powers, particularly to enforce the law, were restrained.
- Average citizens had less knowledge than community leaders about INOP and were reluctant to participate; their reasons included fear of drug dealers' retaliation and cynicism about the perceived short duration of the project.
- The perceived effects of INOP on drug trafficking were mixed; they resulted in geographic and temporal displacement of markets. In the sites where people thought INOP had reduced crime, fear of crime declined.
- Most site residents believed their relationship with the police had improved, even where the effect on drugs, crime, and fear was believed to be minimal.
- INOP's limited success in reducing drug crime and fear may be related to the obstacles generally encountered in transforming program ideas into action—especially within the short timeframe of this evaluation.

**Target audience:** Law enforcement officials and administrators; city and county officials, managers, and administrators; community organizations; and researchers.

## The INOP program

INOP was designed in 1990 by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice, as a demonstration program to further the National Drug Control Strategy by focusing on and broadening the scope of community-based approaches to drug demand reduction. INOP projects are based on the notion that crime and drug problems must be addressed by the entire community, not just by the police department. Because of the nature and extent of the drug problem, traditional police tactics are limited in their ability to control it. Proactive and interactive approaches by communities and the police have thus become essential to accomplish both law enforcement and community objectives. INOP's goal is to develop strategies for demand reduction that are centered in the community and anchored in the police-community partnership. Police departments are to act as catalysts for developing and sustaining a coordinated network of neighborhood services.<sup>2</sup>

Eight jurisdictions were selected by BJA as the sites of initial INOP demonstration projects. (See exhibit 1.) Each site was awarded between \$100,000 and \$200,000 for the first year of its program.<sup>3</sup> The sites differed greatly in population size and consequently in the

size of the police agency that served them. They also differed in their relationships to other neighborhood-oriented policing initiatives within the jurisdiction. In several, for example, the INOP project was the police department's first effort at implementing a neighborhood-oriented style of policing. In others, it was a relatively small component of a larger, citywide neighborhood-oriented policing initiative that was either new or well established.

In general, the projects shared a police enforcement component (except in New York), a focus on target neighborhoods, community involvement, and inter-agency planning and partnerships. Drug demand reduction was the goal shared by all, but the approaches differed substantially. Some sites featured components that met particular community needs, such as an extensive public advertising campaign or reliance on volunteers.

## Evaluation issues and methods

The INOP projects were evaluated by the Vera Institute of Justice under National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsorship, about 1 year after each had been launched. The process evaluation presented indepth descriptions of the sites and cross-site comparisons of program

**Exhibit 1: Size of INOP Jurisdictions and Police Departments**

Jurisdiction	Population	Police Department Size (Sworn Staff)
Hayward, California	120,000	156
Houston, Texas	1,700,000	3,950
Louisville, Kentucky	300,000	671
New York, New York	8,000,000	25,869
Norfolk, Virginia	261,000	684
Portland, Oregon	418,000	850
Prince George's County, Maryland	700,000	1,230
Tempe, Arizona	145,000	234

Note: The figures reflect the information available at the time of the study.

structure and operations and expectations of the various groups—police personnel, municipal and community leaders, and others—who had roles in the projects.

**Measuring effects on crime.** The impact evaluation, which is discussed in this document, examined the effects of the INOP projects on drug demand, public safety, and the quality of life of the communities and identified the characteristics of the projects that contributed to (or tended to detract from) program effectiveness.

The effects were measured in terms of the perceptions of the people involved in the projects—police officers and administrators, other police agency personnel, residents, and business people. Effects were measured both within each site and across the sites. Specifically, the individuals interviewed (a total of 552 in the eight sites) were asked for their views of the effects on drug use and drug trafficking, drug-related crime and other crime, fear, quality of life in the area, police-community relations, and level of community organization and involvement.

**Implementation issues.** Another part of the evaluation analyzed project implementation based on comparisons among all sites. The research conducted for this analysis employed a variety of methods: interviews, focus groups, field observations by the researchers, and review of evaluations conducted locally when these were available. The implementation issues included police acceptance of/resistance to INOP, extent of community organization and involvement, and extent of involvement of public agencies other than the police.

One of the most significant findings—but one that may come as no surprise—was that early stages of implementing community policing are not easy. This was the experience in all eight jurisdictions. For one thing, it was difficult to convince police officers to accept the new roles and behaviors required for community policing. Citizen involvement—the linchpin of community policing—was particularly challenging. Despite acknowledgment by some residents (largely community leaders) of community policing as valuable, activism was generally confined to a small group of dedicated individuals. The comprehensive approach that is another hallmark of community policing was not

carried out to the extent it might have been because the involvement of agencies other than the police was, at best, limited at most sites.

**Evaluation timing.** The timing of the evaluation goes a long way to explain the findings regarding implementation difficulties. The evaluation began in mid-1991, with data collection ending about a year later. (The timing of the evaluation was determined by receipt of funding from NIJ.) Most of the projects were launched in mid-1990—only a year before the start of the evaluation. These dates are important to keep in mind because they indicate that the INOP projects were at varying stages of implementation, most of them

## T Recent Developments in Tempe, Arizona

Tempe began its INOP project in November 1990 as a pilot program in a single police ministration, designated as Beat 16. Since then the police department has used its experiences in Beat 16 to expand community policing.

### Expansion of community policing.

The department expanded community policing citywide in mid-1993 and continues to be committed to the approach. One reflection of this commitment is the streamlining of command: The number of ranks has been reduced from eight to five, and the rank of detective has been eliminated.

### Continued community organizing.

The citizens' Coordinating Committee turned over its responsibilities to the parent organization, the Escalante Neighborhood Association (ENA). Since then the Beat 16 officers and ENA have held discussions concerning police activity and problem solving. The department

also has a citizen volunteer program that has grown from three members in 1988 to more than 200. Its motto, created by a volunteer, is "We are not an arm of the police; we are the heart of the community."

The department also continues to operate a Citizens Police Academy, begun during the Beat 16 project, that offers citizens an opportunity to learn about the department and its responsibilities. Many citizens who attend the 6-week evening course become volunteers with the department.

The department recently initiated a citywide multi-unit housing program that had been in the planning stages for more than a year. It aims to alleviate drugs and crime in apartments and other multi-unit dwellings, and it includes landlord and tenant education supported by community policing activities.

up and running only a short time before they were subjected to evaluation. In other words, they did not have much time to become fully operational.

The project in Hayward, California, is one example. It began fairly late—in 1991—and its central component, a mobile van, was not put into operation until the researchers' final site visit. The projects continued to progress after the evaluations were completed. In Tempe, Arizona, followup through mid-1993 revealed the extent of progress achieved. (See "Recent Developments in Tempe, Arizona.")

Because the INOP projects had little time to establish a "track record," it is not possible to come to any definitive conclusions regarding long-term outcomes. Many of the difficulties the projects encountered need to be considered in light of this timeframe. For this reason, the evaluation is best interpreted as an assessment of the INOP projects at a very early stage of their development and over a brief period of time. Nevertheless, the findings also make clear that much remains to be learned about the optimal approach to structuring the various components of this type of program.

**Applying the lessons.** In addition, it is important to note the small scale of many of these INOP projects, which often constituted only a single component of a police department's operations. For this reason it would be difficult to apply the lessons of their experiences to those of police departments generally. Moreover, because the evaluation was not national in scope, the same reasoning would apply.

The challenges in implementing INOP led to the conclusion that the evalua-

tion findings would be particularly useful for jurisdictions that have community policing initiatives in the planning stages. The experiences of the eight INOP demonstration sites could help these jurisdictions avoid some of the difficulties they might otherwise encounter and influence them not to abandon their plans but to improve the likelihood of their success. In this way, implementation of community policing at the neighborhood level could be accomplished more smoothly and productively.

### Eight distinctive jurisdictions and programs

#### Hayward, California—Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS)

Hayward is a relatively low-income community in which a majority of the population is white, but there is also a great deal of ethnic diversity. The entire city was targeted for INOP, although one area with a pervasive drug problem received more attention than others.

Community policing was a fairly recent development, introduced in 1991. The department reorganized to accommodate the new approach by decentralizing patrol, and all officers became community policing officers. The cornerstone of INOP was a large van, the Neighborhood Access Vehicle, intended for use as a mobile office and community meeting place. It was to serve as a source of referral information and to make the police more accessible and more visible in neighborhoods where it was deployed. INOP was also to include drug enforcement in the schools that would involve cooperation between the police and school principals. Enforcement through a

Tactical Narcotics Team took place on a parallel track.

COPPS training was held for all police personnel. The volunteers of Neighborhood Alert, a block watch group active in the city for 20 years, were also trained in a range of topics, and training for rental unit managers in recognizing drug abuse was planned. Plans were also made to increase the number of Neighborhood Alert groups.

INOP helped solidify the interagency cooperation that had existed for several years in the "Beat Health Team," which addressed issues of public health and disorder. INOP developed an information and referral resource guide to facilitate citizen access to other agencies' services and a guide to alcoholism, drug abuse, and family support services.

#### Houston, Texas—Operation Siege

There were two INOP target areas in Houston. In one, which experienced the city's most serious crime, the major problems were prostitution, crack cocaine, and abandoned buildings used by crack dealers. The other contained many "cantinas" (bars) that residents associated with criminal activity.

Houston's experience with neighborhood-oriented, problem-solving policing dated to 1982, and 5 years later plans were made (but then abandoned) to adopt community policing departmentwide. INOP emphasized enforcement through a strategy of high-visibility patrol aimed at open-air drug activity, monitoring of the cantinas, and covert operations and intelligence gathering targeted to drug sellers and suspects.

The emphasis on enforcement did not preclude community involvement. Operation Siege opened with a series of meetings with community groups to identify problems and plan strategy. The police enhanced their relationship with Neighborhood Watch, which monitored the cantinas; in this target area citizens formed a patrol and were given CB radios to contact the police. In the other target area the police helped revitalize a community organization, which in turn helped supply information and aided the police in other ways. The police also helped elderly homeowners in “target hardening,” providing locks and doors free of charge to a number of them. No formal partnerships were established with other city agencies, but some informal links were made with individuals within these agencies.

**Louisville, Kentucky—Community-Oriented Policing (COP)**

INOP was adopted in one (and subsequently a second) of the six police districts in Louisville. The initial district was selected because it had the highest level of violent crime in the city and had been the center of heroin trafficking. It was also plagued by high unemployment, and a substantial number of liquor stores and bars had been identified as drug-trafficking locations. INOP had two phases, planning and problem identification, followed by strategy development and implementation. Phase two focused on problem solving, primarily in a park identified as a site of drug activity.

Since the police were involved district-wide, there was no recruitment, and all officers were expected ultimately to participate. The enforcement strategy used almost exclusively was a task force of officers who employed a variety

of techniques (surveillance, for example) for a few weeks to a few months, depending on the problem. Prevention/education was also part of the strategy, with some community members trained in drug abuse prevention, and an education campaign to create awareness of drug issues was planned.

A project committee and a strategy committee, consisting of police officers and community members, were formed and later consolidated into one. Among other activities, the committee conducted an “advertising” campaign and held community forums to define priority issues. Community involvement was built on the foundation of a number of active, organized block associations that predated INOP. Several block association leaders became active members of the project committee.

In enforcement, the police department received cooperation and assistance from the city-county narcotics unit whose director pledged support. INOP created 12 partnerships with city agencies, including those responsible for job training, housing, health, and parks and recreation. The mayor formally endorsed “COP” (as INOP was called) and mandated cooperation by all supporting agencies. COP also became a member of the city-county drug rehabilitation, education, and enforcement program, which linked the project to a consortium of treatment and prevention initiatives.

**New York City—Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP)**

By 1988 community policing in New York had been instituted citywide, although the approach has since evolved. The INOP project targeted

three precincts: in East Harlem, the Bronx, and Brooklyn. Each had a substantial drug problem, a large proportion of low-income residents, and a large proportion of minority residents.

The INOP precincts each had a van (a converted motor home) parked outside an elementary or junior high school in areas of active drug markets. Services (such as youth counseling) were provided in them and the adjacent schools. Information on drug prevention was also available. The vans were not used for citizen reporting of crime or providing other information about crime. Rather, citizens who had this type of information were instructed to go to the precinct or to call in reports. The presence of the vans was expected to encourage school attendance. Because the vans were to be seen as a community—not a police—resource, they were not to be staffed by police. However, lack of volunteers led to assignment of a police coordinator.

The Tactical Narcotics Teams, a street-level, buy-and-bust enforcement program, conducted drug sweeps at the time the vans were set up. Otherwise, the enforcement component was not large. Community Patrol Officers, who were assigned walking beats, provided drug prevention activities and referrals to treatment, and they patrolled the area around the vans to take information about drug use in the area and to ensure the safety of people using them.

Community volunteers were recruited through the Parent-Teacher Associations and received training, and the Manhattan District Attorney’s office also trained volunteers. Outreach also included introduction of the Neighborhood Resource Centers (the vans) to residents, with requests for volunteers to staff them.

Several public and private agencies were involved: the Board of Education; Victim Services Agency; the Department of Health; the Department of Youth Services; the nonprofit Citizens Committee for New York City; MOSAIC, a Bronx community center; and the District Attorney's Office. The Department of Health, for example, provided an injury-prevention component, and Youth Services provided a counselor.

**Norfolk, Virginia—Police-Assisted Community Enforcement (PACE)**

Although concentrated in and around public housing, the INOP project in Norfolk was part of a citywide program called PACE, which involved all city agencies. By the end of the evaluation research, PACE had been established in 10 areas, with plans for 2 more.

Crime and calls for service were to be reduced in a 3-stage process of sweeps, stepped-up patrols, and community partnerships. PACE included all officers, although some were involved more than others. All officers, including the chief, received introductory training, followed by ongoing inservice training.

Stage 1 was an assault on street drug activity through intelligence gathering, undercover operations, and saturation patrols. The major component of drug prevention was an athletic league for young people. Other features included working with the D.A.R.E.<sup>®</sup> (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) program in the schools, demolition of abandoned buildings, attention to physical disorder, evictions of drug dealers, and screening of rental applicants.

Police outreach began in Stage 2, with introduction of the program to the community. Police met with commu-

nity leaders to organize Neighborhood Watch and Operation Identification. PACE representatives attended community meetings and other functions. "Community Service Days," featuring representatives of city agencies, were organized. Stage 3, whose goal was full community partnership and a reduced burden on the police, was not fully implemented.

Interagency coordination was extensive and mandated, and all city agencies had a role. The Support Services Committee, which coordinated the services of police and other city agencies, addressed specific issues like family services and signs of physical disorder.

**Portland, Oregon—Iris Court Community Policing Demonstration Project**

Portland INOP was a demonstration project, one of three established in each of the city's three police precincts as part of community policing, which began in 1989. The focus was a public-housing complex where most of the units were occupied by low-income residents. Evidence suggested that many of them were drug-dependent. This site and three adjacent housing projects were selected primarily because of high levels of open-air drug dealing, calls for service to the police, and gang violence. The project served the 159 residents of the housing complexes.

The projects had several related components: enforcement/high-visibility patrol, a "Neighborhood Response Team" of two uniformed patrol officers, a civilian project coordinator, a community health nurse, a community policing contact office, partnerships between residents and social service

providers, use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, and resident organizing and empowerment. The emphasis on human services partnerships with other agencies made this project unique among the INOP sites.

The primary method of drug demand reduction was coordination and provision of social services. The contact office provided referral to services rather than functioning as a police ministration. The project coordinator, a civilian employee of the police department, worked full time in the contact office linking residents with service providers, making referrals, and coordinating outreach. Training landlords in how to keep drug activity out of their properties was another INOP component (though not in Iris Court).

Service provision aimed at improving the quality of life of the Iris Court residents to make drug use less attractive to at-risk youths. The enforcement/high-visibility patrol component was begun, however, just before INOP was launched and was intended to convince residents the neighborhood was safe to some degree. The rationale was that before Iris Court residents would take advantage of the social services based in their neighborhood, they needed to feel safe. The means to that end were eviction of suspected drug traffickers and people engaged in other illegal activities, enforcement of the trespass ordinance, and street-level drug enforcement.

Community outreach responsibility lay primarily with the Neighborhood Response Team; its two members attended resident association meetings, and they worked with the residents' council and in the contact office. Through the city housing authority and

the project coordinator's outreach efforts, the residents' council and a tenants' association were organized.

**Prince George's County, Maryland—Community-Oriented Policing Squad (COPS)**

The INOP project was located in a single patrol sector of one police district of this bedroom suburb of Washington, D.C. The area is a "line" district, so-called because it shares some of the problems of crime and poverty that characterize the adjacent areas of its urban neighbor.

Problem-solving policing was not unknown, but the project was part of an expansion of the police force. The aim of the expansion was to devote staff for the first time to continuous neighborhood-oriented problem solving in a department long known for its sometimes strained relations with the community. COPS officers were selected after a call for volunteers.

Satellite offices established in problem-ridden apartment complexes offered information about community services. The COPS officers' presence several hours a week was designed to reduce fear and increase police visibility. The officers patrolled (sometimes on foot), conducted community outreach, provided service referrals, and identified and addressed neighborhood problems. Information about prevention was available at the offices, and COPS officers were involved in drug prevention and treatment activities.

Enforcement included police use of information from community sources to identify narcotics locations. The COPS officers also conducted traffic checks at entrances of apartment complexes known for drug activity and explored avenues of civil enforcement.

Community members were represented on the planning committee, the project's advisory group, which consisted also of representatives of several county agencies. COPS officers established small planning committees on their beats and worked with church groups, Neighborhood Watch and Business Watch, tenant organizations, and municipal officials.

**Tempe, Arizona—Beat 16**

Beat 16, an economically disadvantaged but stable area of Tempe, had a long-standing heroin trafficking problem and a large number of calls for service. INOP, Tempe's introduction to community policing, was centered in a police ministration created as a modular unit in a park. It was established as a pilot project in a single beat, with assignment to a single squad of officers on a long-term basis.

The approach differed more philosophically than operationally from traditional policing. The responsibilities of Beat 16 were like those of routine operations except that its officers were not responsible for calls outside their beat and could set priorities and delay response to calls. The project focused primarily on education and prevention, and the ministration was the site of a drug information hotline. Ties were established with several prevention programs for youths. There was also an enforcement component that began with a drug sweep of the area.

The officers recruited for the project received intensive training and were encouraged to become familiar with problems of the beat and to interact with residents. Several members of the citizens' Coordinating Committee were also trained at the department's Citizen Police Academy.

Each officer on the Beat 16 squad attended meetings of a specific homeowners' association or other neighborhood group. The Coordinating Committee—consisting of representatives of community groups, business leaders, service providers, and city officials—was a central feature. It created links with other agencies, and it was to have had an active role in defining problems and identifying resources but was disbanded because of lack of interest on the part of community residents and difficulties in defining its role and that of its members. The activities of the committee were then taken over by another group.

**Evaluation findings**

**Police understanding and support.** Gaining police acceptance was one of the major implementation challenges of INOP. Like many other jurisdictions that have adopted community policing, the INOP sites experienced resistance from many patrol officers. Some resistance may have derived from labor-management problems and from problems at the institutional level. In this respect, the sites resembled other organizations in which management has had difficulty communicating its goals to employees. In other words, the resistance of patrol officers may not always have been to community policing itself; rather, it may have resulted from the low credibility accorded to any management-instituted change or reform. Because most of the projects had been in operation less than a year before the evaluation began, they had little time to overcome this obstacle.<sup>4</sup>

**Lack of knowledge.** The majority of the INOP projects consisted of pilot or experimental community policing units in target areas rather than

jurisdictionwide undertakings, and the officers not involved in them had little knowledge of them. This lack of knowledge, which may be traced to inadequate communication of project goals at the outset, was a major factor in the limited support for community policing among police officers.

Most INOP projects expended considerable effort in explaining project goals and operations as part of their training of INOP officers. However, the bulk of the training focused on these officers alone, and even the officers who were trained often displayed only a rudimentary understanding of community policing. (See “Preparatory Steps: Training and Technical Assistance.”)

In general, when officers (both those involved in the INOP projects and those not involved) were asked about the INOP project goals or for their definition of community policing, they would note its emphasis on community outreach and the new relationship envisioned between police and community residents. Only occasionally did officers mention problem-solving activities or interagency cooperation as elements of community policing or the INOP projects. Most police officers defined “real” police work as work involving crime-related tasks.

The lack of understanding is not unique to the INOP sites. Because community policing is still relatively new, inadequate definition and understanding of its goals and means have complicated implementation. The officers themselves did not have a single definition, although all their definitions shared some common elements (such as involvement of the community) that can be conveyed in training.

The ambitious nature of the community policing mission—calling for a new role for the patrol officer—also creates implementation difficulties. Community policing is a fight for the “hearts and minds” of patrol officers and the public. It may be that the INOP sites underestimated the difficulties of this challenge. Officers who eventually embraced the idea of community policing enough to volunteer for the INOP projects recognized the scope of this challenge when they noted that because of their nontraditional nature, the projects needed not just to be described by management but to be actively “sold” to patrol officers. Such an undertaking, involving a shift in the culture of policing, would no doubt take more time to produce results than was available to these projects—more time than the period of the evaluation. In New York and Houston, even after 10 years experience with community policing, many officers contended that there was little support among the rank and file. This suggests that acceptance by officers may take a very long time.

**Opposition to special-unit status.** Because for most of the police departments INOP was the first experience with community policing, the projects were usually established as distinct units within patrol, rather than departmentwide. The introduction of special units set apart from the rest of the department seemed to exacerbate the conflict between community policing’s reform agenda and the more traditional outlook and hierarchical structure of the departments.

The perception of elitism is ironic because community policing is meant to close the gap between patrol and special units and to empower and value

the rank-and-file patrol officer as the most important agent for police work. But INOP projects were themselves special units and as such created distrust between police management and rank-and-file patrol officers and between officers assigned to traditional policing and those assigned to community policing.

A certain amount of this intradepartment resentment can be attributed to the general antagonism that may exist to one degree or another between patrol and any special unit. Therefore, this problem in the INOP projects may have had little to do with community policing itself. Such rivalries are common in most police departments large enough to have special units, and evidence suggests that police departments in the INOP sites were no exception.

It was evident from the interviews that senior patrol officers seemed to make up the backbone of resistance to the INOP projects and the reforms they represented. This was largely because of long-standing working styles cultivated from performing years of traditional patrol work but also because they felt disenfranchised by a management system that takes the best and brightest out of patrol and that has left them behind.

The intrusion of the INOP projects and their community policing agenda into the long-standing promotional structure of departments that rely on the distinctions between patrol and specialized units caused many senior patrol officers in some INOP sites to become embittered and resistant to reforms. By contrast, it also inspired some officers to become involved in community policing. This was particu-

larly the case in departments that expressed intentions to expand their community policing initiatives. An officer in Prince George’s County (Maryland), for example, indicated that the department’s plans for expanding

INOP and adopting community policing as an important element of patrol deployment had led some officers to believe that the INOP projects were the new career path to promotion.

An administrator in Louisville saw community policing as the perfect solution to the problems he associated with a department structured around special units because of the value that the approach places on the individual

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Preparatory Steps: Training and Technical Assistance

o build knowledge and to develop skills in organizing, strategy development, leadership, and other areas, a systematic program of training and technical assistance was carried out as an integral part of INOP. The Police Executive Research Forum and the National Crime Prevention Council were awarded a grant, separate from that of the evaluation, to design and deliver training and technical assistance.

**Needs assessment.** The assistance, which was tailored to the specific needs of each of the eight sites, was preceded by assessments conducted to identify these needs. Input for the assessments came from individuals at each site—representatives of the community, the police, and other agencies and organizations. A range of needs was identified, but two appeared to dominate the agenda: strengthening collaboration among agencies and citizen mobilization/leadership development for both active and prospective community leaders. In Hayward, California, for example, the police expressed the desire that the current collaboration of the department with the building inspector’s agency, a community preservation group, and the city attorney be expanded to other groups, including schools and churches.

Leadership development might require training in such skills as chairing a meeting and in the roles and responsibilities of tenants’ organizations. Citizens were also interested in receiving training that was more directly related to crime reduction and control. They wanted to find out, for example, the effects of various illicit sub-

stances and how to locate prevention programs, geared to young people and to substance abuse, that could be replicated in their jurisdiction.

The police departments also identified training needs in the areas of crime control, management, and information systems support. For example, they wanted training in innovative narcotics abatement strategies and in CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), as well as in strategic planning, problem identification and analysis, and the development of computer-based information systems.

**Training/technical assistance received.** Assistance focused on the areas identified in the needs assessment: building and sustaining interagency collaboration and community partnerships, mobilizing citizens/developing citizen empowerment to address crime and crime-related problems and, for both the police and citizens, enhancing problem-solving capabilities. In Tempe, for example, citizens were taught how to implement drug abuse prevention strategies and how to build and maintain positive police-community relationships and relationships with public and private agencies. Hayward received training in team building and conflict resolution, problem solving, and resource allocation. In Louisville, training in cooperation between the police and other agencies focused on where to go for what type of assistance *outside* the police department and where to go for what type of assistance *inside* the police department.

Typically, participants included representatives of local governments and government agencies, business, representatives of religious organizations, and community residents, as well as sworn and civilian police personnel. In Hayward, for example, the mayor, the deputy police chief, leaders of the religious community, businesspeople, and community residents were among those taking part. In Louisville, staff from the city’s public housing authority, other community agencies, and the schools were trained, as were patrol officers, first-line supervisors, and two district commanders.

**“Cluster conferences.”** These meetings of INOP project participants were held to promote information sharing among the sites. A series of these conferences was held throughout the course of the projects and functioned as “peer technical assistance.” In addition to representatives of each site, participants included the evaluation researchers, representatives of the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice, and the technical assistance providers.

Spaced 6 to 9 months apart and beginning early in the life of the INOP projects (December 1990), the conferences were an opportunity to present project updates that covered successes achieved thus far, challenges faced, and steps to be taken next. Workshops were held on such topics as landlord training, an overview of drug supply and demand, effective drug demand reduction, and sustaining interagency collaboration.

patrol officer and the power and responsibility it assigns to each one.

Officers involved in the INOP projects often expressed their belief that acceptance would take a long time. Community policing would gain widespread acceptance in their department, they felt, only after a generation of younger officers, trained in community policing from the beginning of their careers, had filled the ranks.

**Productivity issues.** Some objections stemmed from officers' belief that community policing is a less productive form of policing than traditional patrol. (They perceived that fewer arrests are made, for example.) Because police departments face resource constraints, these supposedly less productive units come in for particular criticism.

Many non-INOP patrol officers felt that the community policing projects were safe havens for officers who did not want to work hard. This perception was particularly common in sites where community policing officers were not required to answer 911 calls. Patrol officers generally believed that community police officers should respond to calls in their beats, if only as backup for regular patrol.

**Concern for resources.** Related fiscal and human resources issues played an important part in the way police officers viewed INOP. Most police officers (and many community residents) felt their police departments were understaffed and overworked. At all eight sites, officers raised concerns about the effect of community policing on scarce departmental resources. In addition to believing that community policing was less productive than traditional policing, they also saw it as

more time consuming and requiring more police resources. Community outreach and problem solving were the two specific activities that officers identified as being the most labor intensive, as well as the most difficult to integrate with their more traditional duties.

In general, officers recognized that community policing activities necessarily would consume extra time, and there was a general consensus that they also required a different *kind* of time from that spent on traditional police functions. Just as an officer in Tempe said she needed large blocks of uncommitted time to develop a relationship with school children in her beat, so, too, officers in Norfolk felt that working with community residents demanded a new work flexibility.

Officers also indicated that the press of 911 calls made it difficult to meet the need for community outreach, problem solving, and networking with other agencies required of community policing. That perception may be based on the notion that the key to easing crime conditions is additional resources. Some officers did believe that community policing would in the long run reduce 911 calls and ease staffing constraints.

Officers were also concerned about the size of the area for which they were responsible. In contrast to conventional police work, which rotates officers in and out of districts according to a pre-arranged schedule, community policing builds the officer's relationship with and accountability to the community in which he or she works through relatively permanent assignment to a specific geographic area. These "beats" are typically smaller than those of radio motor patrols. Most of

the INOP projects, however, did not subdivide their pre-existing system of geographical deployment to accommodate the community policing agenda, and the officers viewed their beats as too large.

**Expectations too high.** Police managers in many of the INOP sites who were trying to sell resistant officers on the merits of the program may have described the potential benefits too broadly and optimistically. As a result, officers opposed to community policing had the opportunity to criticize the project if it failed to deliver. But in all the sites, INOP officers saw these criticisms as premature and recognized that community policing needed time if it was to demonstrate the effects and efficiencies it was trying to produce. They felt that critics of the projects were pointing prematurely to failures that had not had sufficient time to mature into successes.

**Reliance on individual officers.** INOP creates a new role for the police officer, one that requires a new outlook and a new set of skills. The scale of the change in the police officer's basic job description and therefore in his/her occupational identity also generated resistance to INOP among regular patrol officers.

Whether they were assigned to INOP projects or not, officers believed that certain individual "styles" of policing were more suitable than others to community policing. The importance of the characteristics of individual police officers in the success of the INOP projects was a theme in all sites, and it manifested itself in several ways. For example, in some sites, a few dedicated and knowledgeable police officers essentially carried the entire INOP effort. At the supervisory level, the newness

and complexity of community policing increased the latitude for individual interpretation of its goals.

If responsibility for success resides in a small, core group of officers, supervisors, and project administrators, this highlights the necessity of developing recruitment standards that will enable police departments to select officers who are most likely to embrace a community policing approach.

**Labor-management tension.** Most of the officers interviewed felt that community policing was happening *to* them rather than *with* them and that there was no attempt to involve the rank and file in decisionmaking. This perception was due in part to their skepticism about new programs in general and their strained relations with management. While officers throughout the sites expressed distaste for specific aspects of community policing, they were almost unanimous in criticizing what they saw as heavy-handed implementation by management. Community policing emphasizes community empowerment and involving citizens in decisionmaking. Rank-and-file patrol officers, however, generally argued that administrators had excluded them from decisionmaking.

Some police officers perceived that changes in their job descriptions are driven by political rather than law enforcement considerations. Some took comfort from the fact that a long list of new projects and restructurings had come and gone without significantly changing the way policing is performed. This rapid succession of “repackagings” in policing since the current round of reforms began in the 1970’s convinced many officers that all new projects are driven by political pressures on police and city managers and are thus inherently of dubious value.

**A “new old” idea.** In virtually every site, most of the officers who took part in focus groups described the kind of policing implemented by the INOP projects as nothing new but rather as just “good, old-fashioned policing.” This was the view of officers who were trying to make a case in favor of community policing, but it was expressed more often by officers who were skeptical about reform. By arguing that INOP essentially requires officers to engage in the same kind of sound policing that many of them have been practicing for years, the resistant officers made a case for continuing the status quo. This view, which focused largely on the community outreach component of community policing, was rooted mainly in the general lack of knowledge of community policing. But it may also have been an expression of a generic resistance to change of any sort rather than to INOP. Again, it reflects the distrust of management, which officers raised without prompting, and that underlies some of their resistance.

**Perceived loss of enforcement power.** The parallel with an idyllic period in the past when the “beat cop” and citizens enjoyed a more trusting relationship was contradicted by the officers’ perception that community policing placed too many restraints on police power. The officers were concerned their enforcement powers would be limited. In most sites, the lack of an aggressive enforcement component was consistently reported by officers not assigned to INOP as the biggest stumbling block to acceptance of it.

Some skeptical officers did express a willingness to change their minds if community policing could achieve traditional law enforcement goals. The key to community policing’s credibil-

ity, they claimed, was its ability to reduce 911 calls, reduce criminal activity, and produce arrests. At least in part, community policing’s perceived directives to “smile and wave” (rather than enforce) were disdained because they came from management.

### Involvement of other agencies

If community policing is to be successful, it must include problem solving, and this in turn requires the active involvement of other city agencies. Although most of the INOP sites made some attempts to involve city agencies, this is the area in which opportunities for better implementation were greatest. Interagency involvement was limited and informal. Many of the INOP projects were perceived to depend not on cooperative efforts among agencies but on the efforts of one or two individuals—a police administrator or a beat officer.

Norfolk was the sole exception; in fact, the active, mandated involvement of *all* city agencies was the component that made Norfolk’s program notable. The mayor made it clear to every department head that all city departments were part of the Police-Assisted Community Enforcement program. The program was promoted and training was provided to administrative staff from every city agency. Organizational structure was provided by the PACE Support Services Committee on which all city agencies were represented. The committee focused on team-centered assessment of family service needs and quality-of-life issues in the neighborhoods.

Traditional enforcement strategies—e.g., making arrests, filing reports, and issuing summonses—do not involve public agencies other than the police.

But many problems cannot be solved through traditional means alone and require input from other agencies and from community residents. This is especially true of quality-of-life problems (such as abandoned cars, noise, graffiti, and other signs of neighborhood disorder or decay).

**Reliance on personal networking**

Most police officers are not experienced in dealing with other public or private agencies, nor are there effective mechanisms to make such interactions work smoothly and predictably. If an officer at an INOP site believed that another public agency could be helpful in dealing with a particular problem, he or she most often relied on personal contact with someone at the agency. This was done because there was no structured relationship between the department and the agency and no formalized procedures to follow. If the contact person should leave the agency, the officer would have no quick, effective means of dealing with similar, subsequent problems. This business-as-usual approach was taken in most of the INOP sites during the period of the study.

In some sites there was little support for the program from even the city (or county) government. For such cities, community policing is *de facto* an isolated police department phenomenon.

**Community involvement**

Definitions of community policing may vary, but all share the idea that the police and the community must work together to identify problems affecting the community and to develop solutions. This is a radical departure from the era of “professionalism” in policing in which police claimed a monopoly of the responsibility for crime

control and actively discouraged citizen involvement in police business.

Despite the central role of the police-citizen partnership, many of the police departments paid little attention to the education and inclusion of the community. All the INOP sites experienced difficulty in establishing a solid community infrastructure upon which to build their programs. Although they did not have much time in which to organize the communities, their experience nonetheless suggests that the question of how to unleash the potential for effective organization may prove to be the greatest challenge for community policing.

**Familiarity with INOP and community policing**

Understanding precedes involvement. Respondents’ knowledge of a project—its existence, goals, and tactics—varied greatly at all the sites, and the interview data indicate that the level of understanding about INOP or community policing in general was closely linked to a person’s status in the community and to the frequency of his or her interaction with the police.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in Hayward and Houston, block watch leaders knew a great deal more about the INOP project than did either their members or average citizens, and the same was true of residents’ council members in Portland.

This phenomenon is hardly limited to INOP, however. Almost by definition, local leaders will make it their business to become familiar with issues affecting their community. This was the case in the INOP sites, where community leaders who interacted frequently with the police knew more about INOP than did residents who belonged to no community group. In all the INOP sites, however, even the most knowledgeable community leaders had only limited fa-

miliarity with project goals, tactics, and the role of the community.

Some residents, particularly older people, were unaware of the program. Community leaders and other residents tended to lay blame for lack of knowledge on the police, who they claimed did not adequately inform or educate the general population. Even assuming the best education campaign, however, it would have been difficult for the INOP projects to become a familiar community fixture in the short timespan they were in operation.

**Type of knowledge.** Residents of public housing or other disadvantaged neighborhoods that were INOP sites often defined community policing or a specific INOP project solely in terms of the picnics, block parties, and events for children that were so often used as methods of community outreach. They were familiar with little of the substance of community policing or the INOP projects. While social events like block parties do little to inform or educate community residents about community policing and their role in it, it is possible that they may create solidarity in the community and thus could be considered the beginnings of attempts to organize. In addition, these events allow residents to meet police officers in a nonthreatening situation.

**Perception of community organization.** Many residents at all eight sites believed the projects had positive effects on the level of community organization and involvement. In many instances, however, their responses indicated they equated community organization with large turnouts for social events, such as barbecues and picnics. Again, although larger turnouts for

community meetings or significant increases in the number of people volunteering to help with problem solving would be better indicators of community involvement, the rudiments of community organization might be detected in people's equating it with these social events.

### Issues in stimulating community involvement

Both practitioners and theorists of community policing often assume that because the approach offers such evident benefits to the community, once educated about these benefits, residents will actively aid in the effort. The evidence from these eight sites strongly suggests, however, that community residents generally may *not* want to become involved, and from their perspective, the reasons are sound.

**Fear of retaliation.** The reason most frequently cited in all eight communities for lack of involvement was residents' fear of retaliation from drug dealers. In several communities residents also specifically expressed fear of reprisals when they were identified as "snitches" as a result of their calls to the police. Responding police officers would come to their homes and thus they would be observed by the drug dealers.

In all theories of community policing, the perception of fear is a central concern. Implicitly or explicitly, most adherents of community policing incorporate the theory of "broken windows"<sup>6</sup> into their programs. This theory holds that the police need to emphasize their order-maintenance function; for example, attending to disorderly behaviors such as loitering or public drunkenness. Such behav-

ior, if neglected by the police, leads to increased incivilities, lower levels of informal social control, and greater fear among community residents. The resulting condition, left unattended, increases the level of community decay, both social and physical, and makes the area ripe for intrusion by outside criminal elements. This in turn generates even more fear.

The role of the community policing officer is to make residents feel safer because he or she will concentrate on the incivilities and order-maintenance problems that inspire fear in residents. It may be, however, that fear is too deeply ingrained among residents of some low-income urban areas. If so, community policing may be unable to reduce fear to the degree necessary to allow residents to feel safe enough to police themselves and take back the streets.

Community policing may find itself confronted by a major contradiction as a result. If community policing is to attain its goal of reducing fear, the streets must first be made safe from the perspective of community residents. According to the residents of these eight communities, for this to happen, the level of crime, not merely the perception of it, must fall. However, most theories of community policing seem to assert that without the active participation of the community, the police cannot reduce the incidence of crime and disorder and thus reduce fear.

**The transitory nature of projects to assist disadvantaged neighborhoods.** The designers of many of the INOP projects realized this and began or preceded their projects with intensive, traditional law enforcement efforts.<sup>7</sup> Such actions may produce unintended

effects, however. Residents almost unanimously applaud police attempts to increase enforcement in their neighborhoods, and during such crackdowns they report feeling safer. But many of these intensive enforcement initiatives are (intentionally) short-lived and therefore do not produce the desired effect of reducing fear in the long run. When this happens, residents begin to define community policing as "just another program" in which services are here today but gone tomorrow. Residents attributed lack of community involvement to the fleeting nature of the INOP projects. The perceived view of projects as transitory was most apparent where a strong enforcement effort—one of short duration—preceded an INOP project.

**Historically poor police-community relations.** One of the untested assumptions of community policing is that residents really want closer contact with the police and want to work with them to reduce crime. The assumption is itself based on the notion that people who do not routinely violate the law and who will eventually come to work cooperatively with the police are the logical audience for the community policing approach. Again, data collected in the interviews for this study cast doubt on these assumptions.

A large number of the community residents indicated that a major reason for lack of involvement or even outright hostility was the historically negative relationship between the police and residents of economically disadvantaged communities. Such relationships, most common in areas of the city usually chosen as the target sites for community policing demonstration projects, will not be easily changed. Police officers in many of the sites interpreted the refusal of residents to be-

come involved as apathy or lack of interest in bettering their own lives. The lack of involvement may, however, be due less to apathy than to this long-standing antagonism.

**Lack of outreach by the police.**

Nearly all the INOP sites were hampered in their attempts to generate community organization and involvement by lack of resources and experience. The exceptions were Hayward and Houston, which had strong block watch groups in the target areas.

While the police departments recognized the need to train officers in the strategy and tactics of community policing, they did not provide the same level of training to members of the community.

One evident need is for training in the fundamental principles of community policing and the role of the community. Confusion about the role of the community in “community policing” was common. As noted earlier, although community leaders had some notion of community policing, ordinary residents had very limited knowledge. Most of the INOP projects did, however, attempt to involve residents in some manner. In Tempe and New York, police recruited citizens as volunteers; in Portland, they helped residents form councils; and in Norfolk, they involved citizens in interagency problem solving.

**The nature of the target neighborhoods.** The economically disadvantaged urban areas that generally serve as testing grounds for community policing tend to be highly disorganized, characterized by poverty, unemployment, inadequate educational services, and high crime rates. In areas encumbered by such an array of problems it is often difficult to find well-organized

community groups that are attempting to address quality-of-life issues.

Most residents in the eight INOP sites reported that the level of community organization was only average or low and that this had been the case for some time. Most attributed this lack of community activism to fear. In several sites (particularly Tempe, Houston, and Hayward), the police were particularly feared by the illegal immigrants who lived there in large numbers.

The initial responsibility for generating community organization in troubled areas must fall to the police because it is they who are asking the public to assist them. This police effort is best undertaken in association with other city agencies. Thus, in Portland, where the Iris Court project serves people living in public housing, the police asked the city’s Housing Authority to assist the residents in forming a residents’ council; and in Hayward, the police built on the solid foundation provided by the citywide “Neighborhood Alert” groups.

**Intragroup conflict.** A common barrier to organizing, according to both residents and police officers, was conflict among community leaders and residents. In some sites this took the form of disagreement about what issues were to be addressed, how tasks were to be delegated, and similar strategic and tactical questions. In several sites, personality conflicts with community leaders were cited as a major reason residents refused to become involved with a block watch, residents’ council, or other civic association linked to INOP.

The intragroup conflicts suggest that references to an ideal “community” often fail to consider that in reality the

community is often an aggregate of competing groups. Simply because people live in the same geographic area and share the same racial and class backgrounds does not guarantee that they share all the same values or define problems the same way.

The Portland site took a step toward solving this problem by offering training for the Iris Court residents. The aim of the training, offered to residents’ council members, was broader participation in the project, and it also focused on resolving intragroup conflict.

**Finding out what the community wants.** One of the principles guiding community policing is recognition that the police must be guided by the values of the community. Identifying those values may not be easy, especially when neighborhoods are heterogeneous.

Residents of the INOP sites were asked how they would improve the project and how they would improve community policing or policing in general. A number of patterned responses emerged across the sites, among them the desire for continuity in assignment of beat officers. Residents wanted a beat officer assigned for an extended period of time. In Portland, for example, a Neighborhood Response Team, consisting of two officers, spent a great deal of time at the start of the INOP project in the public housing complex to which they were assigned and established rapport with a large number of residents. Residents reported that after a time, however, the presence of these officers declined dramatically.

It is clear from the INOP sites that residents took the problem of “revolv-

ing beat officers” very seriously. The beat officer is the most visible manifestation of the community policing approach, and, in fact, it was common for residents to *define* community policing in terms of the beat officer.

Another community expectation, as expressed by residents, was for police to be crime fighters above all else, and they defined the success of community policing in terms of reducing crime and fear. However, a great many residents also noted other, equally important criteria, one of which was better relationships among residents and the police, which often seemed to hinge on the idea of having long-term beat officers.

### The perceived impact of INOP on crime and quality of life

**Drug trafficking** All the projects had one goal in common: reducing drug demand. The purpose of INOP was to develop innovative approaches to that end. The general perception of residents and others who were interviewed was that drug trafficking had been displaced, either from one area to another, from street level to indoors, or to a different time of day.

Some differences in this overall impression were found in specific sites. In Hayward, Houston, and New York City, for example, some people interviewed believed the INOP project had

no effect on drug trafficking. In Portland and Tempe, by contrast (see “Attitudes Towards INOP”), the project was seen as extremely effective. In the other sites, the predominant view was that drug dealing had been displaced to an area receiving less attention from the project, to a few blocks away but within the same area, to locations indoors rather than on the street, or to another time during the day.

**Drug-related crime.** The people interviewed found it more difficult to assess the effects of the INOP projects on drug-related crime. Often they noted they were not really able to distinguish crimes that were drug related

## C Attitudes Towards INOP

**Citizens.** As part of the Beat 16 project in Tempe, citizens were asked how they felt about the project and its effects. This was done through surveys—conducted just after the project began and again a little over a year later—after INOP was in full operation. The initial survey was conducted to provide baseline data, the second to register any change over time.

The results were encouraging. For example, when residents were initially asked about the number of times they saw police officers patrolling their neighborhood, 38 percent answered more than 10 times per month, but in the survey conducted after the INOP project was in operation, the percentage rose to 65. In the baseline survey, 24 per-

cent of the respondents said they personally had seen drug activity in the neighborhood, but this number dropped by almost half (to 13 percent) in the second survey. Only 9 percent initially said they were active in the neighborhood association, and this number doubled when the second survey was taken.

**Officers.** The nine beat officers involved in the INOP project were also asked, about 2 years after Beat 16’s inception, how they felt about the project. All nine said it was working well. They especially liked the idea of staying in one beat and having time to get to know the area and the residents. One officer noted, “I now take ownership of problems instead of slapping a band aid on them.”

All nine officers thought the attitudes of residents toward the police had become more favorable, and they felt more empowered and free to pursue more independent avenues of policing and dealing with citizens. Several said they felt more effective now than before when they were limited to random patrol. The officers also believed they enjoyed a greater sense of responsibility for their work. Among the weaknesses they identified were reluctance of officers from other beats to help out, the feeling that not all officers were “pulling their own weight,” the need for more training, and the feeling that at times things were moving too fast.

from those that were not, but despite this difficulty they were able to make an assessment. Responses ranged from “no effect” to “very strong” impact, with a full range of responses in-between. New York City was the only site reporting “no effect” on drug-related crime, while Portland, Tempe, and Norfolk said the INOP project had a “very strong” impact. In fact, almost all respondents in Portland believed the INOP project had a very large impact on crime in Iris Court, with dramatic changes in gang activity, violent crime, robberies, and burglaries. In Prince George’s County, people believed that crime rates had declined, and the County Executive proclaimed the program a “true success.” In Hayward, Houston, and Louisville, respondents were divided in their assessments.

**Fear and drug-related crime.** Theories holding that social disorder and crime generate fear suggest that it will decline where drug trafficking and crime are perceived to have declined. Accordingly, respondents in Hayward, Houston, and New York City believed the INOP projects had little or no effect on drugs and crime (or only a temporary effect), and the levels of citizens’ fear in those cities changed little. By contrast, in Portland, where the project was viewed as effective in reducing drug trafficking, respondents were overwhelmingly positive about the project’s effect on fear, as were respondents from Tempe and Prince George’s County. Responses from Norfolk and Louisville were mixed.

**Police-community relations.** There appeared to be little relationship between perceptions of effects on drugs, crime, and fear and perceptions of how the projects affected police-com-

munity relations; it did not necessarily follow that respondents who saw INOP as having little effect on crime also saw it as having little effect on the relationship of the community to the police. Most respondents reported better relationships between the police and community residents. Even in sites where INOP’s effect on drugs, crime, and fear was perceived as minimal (Hayward, Houston, and New York City), respondents generally believed the relationship between the police and the community had improved.

**Community organization and involvement.** Respondents found it more difficult to assess INOP’s effect on community organization and involvement, but in most sites they indicated that levels of community organization and involvement had increased since the start of the INOP project. It was not clear, however, whether the increases were attributable to INOP or to other factors. Even in Hayward, where citizens’ groups were the most organized among the eight sites, it appeared that the increased organization was more likely the result of a grassroots effort by the community that predated the INOP program. Nevertheless, the police and residents all indicated that more Neighborhood Alert groups had been formed and attendance in existing groups had improved since community policing began.

The response of a police administrator from Louisville may help explain the general view of respondents that community organization had increased. The administrator indicated that the many interventions taking place, some not related to INOP, made residents feel “there is some interest in them.” Residents of many of the INOP neighborhoods to whom the police were pay-

ing attention for the first time may have felt that any intervention was better than no attention at all.

## Easing the transition to community policing

Community policing holds great promise for citizen participation, increased responsiveness on the part of the police to the concerns of residents, and greater police accountability. But if community policing is to be granted legitimacy by the public, its proponents need to demonstrate that it works. The INOP projects provided an opportunity to meet the need for information about the effectiveness of the approach and about the implementation challenges community policing faces.

In achieving the crime-reduction goals of community policing, the INOP projects had mixed success, but this conclusion needs to be seen in light of the limited amount of time the projects had been in operation before their results were assessed. Community policing represents major shifts, both for the police and community residents, and—particularly because of its emphasis on prevention—is likely to take a long time before it approaches institutionalization.

Aside from the effects of the projects in reducing crime and fear, the assessment brought to light a number of areas in which implementation could be improved. The experiences of the eight INOP sites clearly revealed that in the transition to community policing, jurisdictions need to pay particular attention to three issues: overcoming patrol officer resistance, generating interagency support, and building community involvement. The assessment findings suggest that helping to ensure

a better *product*—crime reduction—may require greater attention to *process*.

**Overcoming patrol officer resistance.** Resistance by police officers to community policing is due in part to inadequate understanding of the principles on which the approach is based, which in turn stems from insufficient training. Police officials who envision the transition of their own departments to community policing can learn from the experience of the INOP sites about the need for a commitment to training all officers.

Jurisdictions contemplating adopting community policing may also want to rethink the special-unit status accorded many of the INOP project officers because of its potential for generating intradepartmental rivalry and consequent resentment and resistance. Moreover, the view of community policing as a drain on resources, one in which not all officers are seen as pulling their own weight or performing traditional duties (such as responding to 911 calls), was also revealed in the INOP sites as a problem that needs to be overcome. For community policing to be successful in attracting the most talented personnel, police departments might want to make it a career path—an exception to the current rule that advancement does not run through patrol.

New recruitment strategies may also be needed. In some INOP sites, it appeared that the continued existence of the program rested on a single officer or administrator. The nature of community policing also makes it susceptible to variations in supervisory style, and because of the emphasis on interaction with the community, a single officer or supervisor can strongly

influence the public's perceptions of the program. Officers who are favorably disposed toward community policing may positively influence community residents, while officers who have not bought into the concept may cause residents to develop a negative impression. New recruitment strategies could help police departments select candidates committed to the ideals of working with and for the community.

**Becoming a city agencywide phenomenon.** At the INOP sites, the police tended to rely on personal contacts with other agencies to secure their involvement, and community policing was almost always an isolated police department phenomenon. This approach highlights the need for an organized, systematic involvement of agencies citywide. This need is particularly acute because community policing involves crime prevention and quality-of-life issues, not all of which fall within the purview of the police.

The experience of the INOP sites suggests that at the very least, employees of other agencies should understand how they can contribute to problem solving; in short, they need to be instructed in their role in community policing, which is no less important than that of beat officers or concerned community residents.

**Involving the community.** That the INOP sites in general had limited success in stimulating community organization is not surprising, given the brief time in which to involve the community and the limited experience of the police in this area. The evaluation findings indicate that neighborhood organizing is a skill the police will want to develop if they hope to involve the community. Other

city agencies can play a role in this process. If police departments involve them from the beginning of the implementation process, they could be useful in stimulating community involvement by educating the public.

By the same token, the experience of the INOP projects can be useful for police administrators in recognizing community education and training as equal in importance with police training and education (though far more difficult to accomplish). Existing community organizations and leaders are the logical first audience, but it should be kept in mind that neighborhoods that commonly serve as community policing pilot sites generally have few viable community groups. The police, in concert with other public and private agencies, should create organization where it does not exist, although it may be argued that a high level of community organization is *not* necessary for community policing to function effectively.

To address residents' concerns about the transitory nature of policing projects, departments considering adopting community policing will want to gauge as accurately as possible, before it is instituted, the resources required to practice it. Almost all the INOP sites promised communities regular beat officers who would be permanent fixtures of the neighborhood, but these officers were in fact rotated, preventing residents from getting to know them. If the police do not accurately estimate resources, the result may be broken promises to the community and a loss of police credibility.

## Conclusion

At least initially, community policing will require more resources. That

means jurisdictions will find themselves faced with committing to larger budgets in an increasingly harsh fiscal climate. This need highlights the importance of involving other agencies. Not only are they essential to the problem-solving approach to policing, but resource constraints on police departments make them even more valuable because their involvement provides the opportunity to leverage additional expertise and resources.

Given the monumental nature of the tasks, the transition to community policing will take a considerable amount of time—much more time than these eight sites had to “prove themselves.” It remains to be seen whether an already impatient public will accept this fact. In large cities with extremely diverse populations and large police bureaucracies, the process is likely to take far longer.

The transition may be faster and ultimately more productive if the jurisdiction itself makes a commitment to a transition that assigns equal value to training the police, the public, and the staffs of all public agencies. The training provided to the INOP sites introduced the key players to the concepts and principles of community policing and to related procedures and practices. It was intended *only* to set community policing in motion. However, the need for training persists throughout the life of a project, particularly because the new philosophy entails so many and such profound changes. The resistance of many officers at these sites to community policing is a strong argument for offering training on an ongoing basis. Ultimately, training may prove to be a key to long-term success.

## Notes

1. Wycoff, Mary Ann, “Community Policing Strategies,” draft final report, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, November 1994 (grant 91-IJ-CX-K0008):45. The data for this Police Foundation study are from a survey conducted in 1993. The figure is for municipal police departments with staffs of 100 or more. Figures for county police and sheriffs’ departments with staffs of this size are 23 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The community policing provisions of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 will undoubtedly cause these figures to rise. A two-page summary of the report is available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Call 800-851-3420. Ask for FS 000126.

2. This description of the INOP program was drawn from the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s initial solicitation for proposals to establish INOP programs.

3. The total amount awarded to the eight INOP sites was \$2.4 million. All but one received funding for 2 years.

4. The police reaction to INOP documented in this section was obtained from individual interviews and focus group sessions (comprising up to eight people) conducted at all the sites, which included the officers involved in INOP and those not involved. Supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants) were interviewed both individually and in groups.

5. The information regarding familiarity with INOP and community policing was obtained from focus groups and interviews with individuals—police officers and police management, representatives of other local government

agencies, and community leaders and other residents.

6. Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows,” *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982:29–38.

7. These law enforcement efforts were not specifically mandated by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, but they were part of the overall demand reduction strategy.

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The evaluation was conducted under NIJ grant 91-DD-CX-0012. The full reports of the impact evaluation, *Issues in Community Policing: Lessons Learned in the Implementation of Eight Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing Programs*, NCJ 157933, and of the process evaluation, *Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing: Descriptions of Programs in Eight Cities*, NCJ 157934, are available for a fee through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), by calling 800-851-3420; or by writing to NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20849-6000. They are also available over the Internet by telnetting to [ncjrsbbs.aspensys.com](http://ncjrsbbs.aspensys.com) or connecting to the NCJRS Justice Information Center World Wide Web site:

<http://ncjrs.aspensys.com:81/ncjrshome.html> or gophering to [ncjrs.aspensys.com](http://ncjrs.aspensys.com) 71. Those without Internet access can dial the NCJRS Bulletin Board System via modem: dial 301-738-8895, set modem at 9600 baud, 8-N-1.

Susan Sadd, Ph.D., was project director for the NIJ-sponsored evaluation conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice. She is currently director of planning and analysis for the Bronx District Attorney. Randolph M. Grinc, Ph.D., now an assistant professor at Caldwell College, was a research associate at the Vera Insti-

tute and deputy director of the evaluation project. The update on Tempe was written by Thomas J. McEwen, Ph.D., managing principal with the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ), and Edward F. Connors, president of ILJ, on the basis of their evaluation report.

*The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.*

NCJ 157932

## Selected NIJ Publications About Community Policing

Listed below are some NIJ publications related to the issues of community policing. These publications can be obtained free, except where indicated, from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS): telephone 800-851-3420, e-mail askncjrs@ncjrs.aspensys.com, or write to NCJRS PO Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000.

Please note that when free publications are out of stock, they are available as photocopies for a minimal fee or through interlibrary loan. They are also usually available on the NCJRS Bulletin Board System, the NCJRS Justice Information Center World Wide Web site, or the Department of Justice World Wide Web site. Call NCJRS for more information.

**Community Policing Strategies**, Research Preview, 1995, 2 pages, FS 000126.

Goldstein, Herman, Research in Brief, **The New Policing: Confronting Complexity**, 1993, 6 pages, NCJ 145157.

Kelling, George L., and William J. Bratton, **Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem**, 1993, 12 pages, NCJ 141236.

Kennedy, David M., **The Strategic Management of Police Resources**, Perspectives on Policing, 1993, 12 pages, NCJ 139565.

**Managing Innovation in Policing**, Research Preview, 1995, 2 pages, FS 000130.

Wycoff, Mary Ann and Skogan, Wesley K., Research Report, **Community Policing in Madison: Quality from the Inside Out**, 1993, 96 pages, NCJ 144390.

Wycoff, Mary Ann and Timothy N. Oettmeier, Research Report, **Evaluating Patrol Officer Performance Under Community Policing: The Houston Experience**, 1994, 30 pages, NCJ 142462, \$8 (U.S.), \$14.30 (Canada), \$13.75 (other countries).

Sherman, Lawrence W., Chief Criminologist, Indianapolis Police Department; Professor of Criminology, University of Maryland: **Reducing Gun Violence: Community Policing Against Gun Crime**, Research in Progress, VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153730, \$19 (U.S.), \$24 (Canada and other countries).

Skogan, Wesley, Professor, Political Science and Urban Affairs, Northwestern University: **Community Policing in Chicago: Fact or Fiction?** Research in Progress, VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153273, \$19 (U.S.), \$24 (Canada and other countries). A summary of the videotape is also available free: **Community Policing in Chicago: Year Two**, FS 000105.

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