

Building Leaders and Staffs: Ensuring Mastery of the Non-Major Combat aspects of War

**A Monograph
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Abstract

BUILDING LEADERS AND STAFFS: ENSURING MASTERY OF THE NON-MAJOR COMBAT ASPECTS OF WAR by LCDR John-Michael Jones, U.S. Navy, 44 pages.

“Combat is about breaking things and killing people . . . war is about much more.”¹

Fred Kagan

The leadership development and professional education system since the end of the Cold War has been a key factor in many U.S. battlefield victories. Operation Just Cause, Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom were all decisive victories. With that said, like many things related to warfare, the term decisive must be examined within the proper context. Were these operations decisive because the U.S. and coalition drove enemy forces from the battlefield and eliminated their ability to resist the U.S. imposing its will? Did these combat actions directly lead to attainment of national objectives? If they did, how quickly were the objectives met? How long were they expected to take?

In answering these questions against a backdrop of these and many other operations two observations come to mind. The first is that the U.S. is extremely effective at major combat operations. The United States Military is capable of engaging and defeating any military foe. Joint doctrine, infrastructure, superior weapons and communications technology, and extensive training capabilities combine to make this happen.

The second observation however is a bit more sobering. The ability to bring about decisive results in the non-major combat portions within the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO) has not been as successful. The ROMO is the continuum of Theater Security Cooperation operations at the low intensity end to Thermal Nuclear War (TNW) on the far end. Discounting TNW for the scope of this monograph, the U.S. has achieved a mixed record in operations commonly referred to as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

The decisive actions are not always those involving major combat operations in terms of ultimately achieving national objectives. The current system is very adept at producing leaders and organizations capable of major combat but less effective in the other areas. The complexity of the current operating environment requires a military leadership that is developed and educated throughout the ranks that can plan, coordinate and execute effectively in MOOTW. The military will be called upon more and more in the future to engage in a wide spectrum of operations. The military’s ability to shape the “battle space” in an increasingly complex, interconnected operating environment pre and

¹ Frederick W. Kagan, *War and Aftermath* (Washington DC: Policy Review, No.120, 2003).

post combat in conjunction with other federal agencies and allies will often be the decisive operation leading to success.

This monograph is an exploration of why changes in leadership development and education are essential as well as recommendations to meet these goals

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. led invasion of Iraq was among the greatest military victories of modern times. The United States with aid from its allies started off the 21st century secure in its military's ability to effectively wage war on distant enemy territory in defense of national interests. The main battle phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in terms of distance covered by maneuver forces and speed of advance outshines any other major U.S. battle in the 20th century. The coordination of all branches of the U.S. military and its coalition partners resulted in the invasion, isolation and collapse of a hostile regime. The distances covered, the precision and lethality of fires, the leveraging of Special Forces and the minimal loss of life for friendly forces when compared to other major combat operations are clearly examples of military war-fighting prowess and effectiveness.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as of the writing of this monograph is still ongoing. It is expected to continue as a major focus and user of U.S. military resources for some time to come. The final history of OIF obviously is still to be written. OIF and the continuing difficulties experienced by U.S. and coalition forces after the completion of what is considered Major Combat Operations (MCO) thus serve as impetus for this monograph.

The unparalleled success of major combat operations in OIF and the subsequent difficulties encountered highlight the U.S. military's weakness in portions of the Range of Military Operations that are not considered major combat. Since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Operation Just Cause in Panama, Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom all have proven that Joint and

Coalition combat is a core competency of the U.S. military. These very same operations also show that the military is not as well suited for the post-conflict environment or what has been traditionally labeled as “Phase IV” operations. In the current operating environment it is during the non-major combat “phases” that long-term attainment of strategic goals will truly be realized and it is also where the U.S. as a nation is deficient.

Thesis

The dynamics of the 20th century and the age of industrial warfare have focused military leaders on the combat phase of war. In the 21st century adaptability in planning and operations across the entire spectrum of war must be a core competency as well. The military is without a peer competitor in terms of the quality and quantity of manpower, technology, breadth and depth of firepower, and global reach. The U.S. can almost assuredly assume that its battles can be won decisively. At issue in the complex battle space is whether the total war can be won as decisively. The majority of U.S. military operations, guided by policies aimed at global pre-emptive intervention, will lead to continuous operations which will be characterized as other than major combat, but no less important to achieving national security goals.² Jointness, globalization, and the pursuant complexity of international relations will be enduring aspects of future military operations. The military officers’ leadership development and education systems must change to meet the needs of the future.

This monograph will examine deficiencies in officer leadership development and professional education against the backdrop of the constantly changing and adaptive

² The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).

Operating Environment. The intention is not to assert that since the military is very adept at major combat operations that it can rest on its laurels and concentrate on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) to the detriment of Major Combat Operations (MCO). The legacy leadership development and education system is ill suited for the complex military, political, and economic world of today. While every crisis does not require a “military” solution, it is usually the military that is called upon to act.³ Military officers must move far beyond the technical and tactical modes of thinking and they must do so much earlier in their careers.

First the many facets of the Current Operating Environment (COE) will be discussed. Next, the shortfalls of the current leader development and education models will be presented as they relate to the COE. Specifically three areas will be covered-- officer ascension programs, junior officer development, and the role of joint and inter-agency operations.

The analysis model and methods used will be presented followed by initiatives and policies that are currently in the force. Finally recommendations will be presented that will meet the requirements of broad and continuous leader development and education with a goal of producing leaders throughout the officer rank structure that are not just technical experts but joint generalists that are comfortable supporting and commanding across the entire range of military operations.

³ The term “Military Solution” is becoming broader in scope, as the military increasingly engages in international affairs outside the realm of combat operations. In the purest sense “military solution” involved the use of force by a military against an adversary offensively or defensively when other, usually diplomatic or economic means have failed to achieve the policy aims of the government. Globalization has played a role in normalizing the expectations of both policy makers and the public at large that the military and its comparatively vast resources be used for missions ranging from natural disaster relieve to restoration of humanitarian assistance in poor countries. Still due to the complex geo-political environment there are situations that will not be helped by the presence of U.S. military forces, even in totally non-combat humanitarian roles.

War is an immensely complicated activity. The belligerent with the better technology does not always win. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the U.S. experience in Viet Nam proved that technically superior forces could win battle after battle and still lose wars. The ability for strategic, operational, and tactical leaders to fully understand the nature of conflicts is an essential factor in ultimate victory. The doctrinal, educational, and training components of the military require individuals at all levels that understand not just what to think but how to think. When any of these aspects are lacking, the chance for failure increases. Both the Soviets and the U.S. enjoyed comparative military advantage in their respective conflicts, but in the end the mismatch of policy, doctrine, strategy, and to a smaller extent operational art lead to neither nation achieving its national policy objectives. The military leader, especially today, needs not just finely honed combat skills but the ability to synthesize the complex inter-relationships between diplomacy, information, military and economics in order to successfully wage war.⁴ The military's primary role is to "fight and win the nation's wars." But author Fred Kagan makes a distinction between combat and war by saying the former is about "breaking things and killing people" while the latter is "about much more."⁵ The U.S. military has established and refined its training and resourcing system that since the invasion of Panama in 1989 has delivered clear-cut battlefield victories executed by fully integrated joint forces. During that same period however, the military and the nation have had significant setbacks, as illustrated by inconclusive and embarrassing operations

⁴ The methods and tools used by nations to exercise power or influence are commonly referred to as "instruments of national power". They are a nation's diplomatic, informational military and economic influences over other nations. This instrument of power construct is called "The DIME" in short form vernacular.

⁵ Frederick W. Kagan, *War and Aftermath* (Washington DC: Policy Review, No.120, 2003).

in Haiti and Somalia. Combat operations are and should be a core competency for the military. But many of the wars the military will be called to fight, including the current and poorly named Global War On Terror (GWOT)⁶ will be “about much more” than decisive combat operations. The U.S. military training system is the finest in the world and is a significant factor in the sustained record of decisively winning battles. The leadership development and professional military educational systems need to be restructured so that more officers will be capable and experienced in the other aspects of war that bring true victory and attainment of national goals.

Current Operating Environment

War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyze.⁷

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

Guerrilla warfare is what regular armies always have most to dread.⁸

C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars*

War and conflict according to Clausewitz are always politically based. An understanding of the political landscape therefore is essential for the study of war. The increasingly complex political, economic and informational landscape makes the current military leader development and educational systems obsolete. Secondly, as in the past, guerrilla war is something that regular forces prefer not to fight. The added difficulty of

⁶ Christopher Bassford, “We’re at War and It’s World War IV,” *Newsday*. (Combined editions). 14 Jan 2003, p. A.29.

⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 67.

⁸ C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Wakefield, UK: EP Publishing, 1976 [original 1906]), 126.

having to simultaneously assuage populations and decisively engage enemy forces is a tightrope walk the military has difficulty, thus making momentum difficult to maintain.

Definition of Key COE Terms

JP 1-02 defines the Operating Environment as the composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. FM 7-100 describes the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) as the operating environ that exists in the world today and is expected to exist in the clearly foreseeable future.

The definitions of several key and related terms that describe the operational environment will be covered. A relatively new series of documents the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) is an overarching description of how the joint force will operate ten-to-twenty years in the future. The JOpsC is further broken down into four approved Joint Operating Concepts (JOC) that cover the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). See Figure 1 below. They are Stability Operations, Major Combat Operations, Home Land Security, and Strategic Deterrence. A JOC is an operational-level description of how Joint Force Commander ten-to-twenty years in the future will accomplish a strategic objective through the conduct of operations within a military campaign. This campaign links end state, objectives, and desired effects necessary for success. These concepts identify broad principles and essential capabilities and provide operational contexts for

Joint Functional Concepts (JFC) and Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC) development and experimentation.⁹




Figure 1. Range of Military Operations

Source: Adapted from JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 Sep 2001. p I-2 fig I-1
Post-Conflict Operations

In this monograph the term post-conflict operations is used. Other synonymous terms are post-combat operations as used in Stability Joint Operating Concepts (Stability JOC) publication. In a broad sense Post-Conflict Operations (PCO) is a subset of operations within Stability Operations. For purposes of this monograph PCO is defined as multi-agency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community during

⁹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2004), 5.

and immediately after major conventional combat operations. The primary goals of PCO are to establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance.¹⁰

Major Combat Operations

Major combat operations, per the Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC), are large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s) that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. National Security.¹¹

Joint/Coalition, Interagency and Multi-National Environment (JIM)

This describes military operations conducted by one or more of the military services in conjunction with other agencies of the federal government or forces and agencies of other nations. Coalition warfare is not new. There have been alliances between like interested nation-states against single powers or coalitions of enemy forces since the Peloponnesian Wars. Jointness in its current form in the U.S. military has matured steadily since the passage of the Gold-Water Nichols Act in 1986. There has

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept* (Suffolk, VA: Government Printing Office, September 2004).

The definition of Post-Conflict operations due to the focus of this monograph is being derived from the overarching concept of Stability Operations. Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept actually defined the much broader “stability operations” of which PCO is a sub-set. Stability Operations include activities such as Combatant Commander’s theater engagement programs and public diplomacy efforts by the Dept of State that take place prior to hostilities breaking out.

¹¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept* (Suffolk, VA: Government Printing Office 2004), 1

always been some form of “multi-service” or “combined” military operations. The services, while maintaining completely separate chains of command have cooperated when the operation required it. Naval cooperation with Army amphibious operations in the Pacific and the early “joint” operations on the Mississippi River leading to the capture of Vicksburg by federal troops are examples of cooperation due to necessity. Now operations are conducted, planned, and staffed joint by default. This maximizes synergies but still maintains unique service characteristics.

Media, Information Environment

The media is and will be an integral part of the battlefield. Information from the media; media scrutiny and perceptions of media coverage all have great influence over the conduct of military operations. A holistic approach by military leaders at all levels must be taken regarding the media. This requires education and training about how the media operates and how information can be used to either hinder or help military operations.

COE

The current operating environment or COE is vastly more complicated than that of the Cold War Era. The bi-polar nature of international tensions provided some degree of predictability regarding national policies. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the rule is that there will be “no hard rules” governing international discourse. One consistent factor since the attacks of 11 September is the U.S. commitment to proactive and if necessary unilateral involvement in the world. More than ever the U.S. is actively engaged across the entire spectrum of the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The goals that underlie all U.S. policies are

security and closely related and essential to security, stability. Within this context, the current administration has also taken a longer-term view by accepting instability in the short term for long-term gains, illustrated by operations in Iraq.¹²

In further describing the COE, there are many forecasts of the future and varying interpretations of the present. The COE provides a shared view or common frame of reference for the multitude of departments and agencies engaged in forming and executing national security strategy. With that shared vision policy matters, organizational structures, and goals can be formulated. Also as the U.S. moves from a threat based approach to security analysis to a capabilities based approach, the common understanding of the COE supports development of concepts, capabilities, conduct of experiments, building of training products, and education of leaders.¹³

The U.S. military is already in the midst of significant transformation and reorganization. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent major combat operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), Homeland Defense (Operation Noble Eagle) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) have forced the U.S. to closely examine the structure and capabilities of the military and all other agencies that support national defense. Major assumptions that frame the COE are listed below:

1. U.S. maintains qualitative edge in conventional military capability
2. U.S. will not face a full spectrum military competitor until 2025
3. Globalization will continue

¹² The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).15.

¹³ United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operational Environment Draft* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command 2004), 3.

4. Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare will continue to be used by adversaries of the U.S.

5. Regional forces will deploy more often within their respective regions as a counter to U.S. involvement and influence.

The first assumption is that the U.S. will maintain its quantitative and qualitative edge in conventional military capability. With a defense budget equal to the sum of the next ten nations combined, a command and control system capable of coordinating global operations, and a robust defense and technology industry the U.S. will continue to lead the world in military capability.

Potential rivals such as China, Russia, and India, will not be full spectrum military peers within the next twenty-five years. As the economies of India and China expand so will their military capabilities. Both nations will be major influences in energy markets due to their expanding economies. The increased demand for resources has the potential of putting one or both nations in direct competition and conflict with the U.S. However, in the near term, even with large conventional forces, they still lack the global maneuver capability of the U.S. The robust capabilities of global reach of set U.S. armed forces apart from regional powers such as Russia, India, and China. Until these nations have the ability to command, control, deploy, and sustain operational combat formations effectively outside their immediate territories or pose a threat to the United States' ability to do the same, the U.S. will continue as the sole super power.¹⁴

¹⁴ A superpower is a “state powerful enough to influence events throughout the world”. The American Heritage dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition further defines a superpower as “a powerful and influential nation, especially a nuclear power, that dominates its allies or client states in an international power bloc”. A discussion of U.S. nuclear strike capability is outside the scope of this monograph. However it is also assumed that the U.S. will maintain its lead in nuclear capability both in

Next, the globalization of the world economy and the U.S.'s leadership role make it unlikely that U.S. policies or actions will exist in a vacuum. When the U.S. goes to war the world is affected. Any actions taken by the U.S. must be well integrated and thoroughly planned in order to minimize unintended second and third order consequences. Globalization can also have negative effects in the developing world. Nations that are unable to reap the benefits of globalization will fall even further behind and may eventually collapse. This of course will lead to greater instability in poorer regions of the world and provide potential safe haven for criminals and terrorists.¹⁵ These same groups will continue to reap the benefits of globalization (transportation, communications technology) in order to continue their activities.

Terrorism will continue to be the tactic of choice and necessity for adversaries that are not able to confront the U.S. conventionally. Terror tactics in an age of global instant media can have dramatic effects. The Madrid Train Bombings and the influence they had in Spain's decision to remove its contingent from Iraq in 2004 is a prime example. Terror groups realize the dramatic affect their often-low tech and small-scale actions can have on American leaders and the American public. Under certain circumstances, usually on the terrorists' timetable, an asymmetric attack can have as much impact as a successful conventional victory on the battlefield in a force on force engagement used to.

Lastly, along with the enduring threat of terrorism there will be an increase in local deployments of regional forces to counter U.S. influence. Ethnic and religious

strike (land-based, air and sub-surface) and defense (ongoing R & D and deployment of Missile Defense Systems).

¹⁵ United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operational Environment* Draft (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command 2004), 44.

tensions, once suppressed by cold war politics, will continue to flare up often leading to conflict. These conflicts will also most likely cross numerous borders due to the practice during European colonial rule of establishing borders that divided ethnic and tribal groups. There will be increased aversion to U.S. intervention in regional affairs. Regional power brokers, and those vying for regional clout, will act when they can to supplant U.S. influence. Increased regional intervention, while in the context of Iraq or Afghanistan may initially seem conducive to U.S. goals, will tend to further complicate an already complex operating environment elsewhere. A desire to limit U.S. “hegemony”¹⁶ will lead to unpredictable tactical alignments between regional states in possible cooperation with more traditional threats such as Russia or China as they take any opportunity to gain greater influence in international political and economic institutions.¹⁷

These assumptions about the future operating environment lead to the conclusion that the security environment in the next 25 years will require different military and other national capabilities. The essence of war however will remain the same.¹⁸ The U.S. will always have to maintain the ability to locate, engage with and destroy enemies. What changes is how the added capability to meet the complex environment can best be achieved.

¹⁶ Hegemony as defined by the Oxford Dictionary is leadership, especially by one nation over another. While the United States has often been referred to as “the Leader of the Free World”, this was a particularly Cold War Term. Now that the bi-polar competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is over power broker nations are looking to strengthen their influence and firmly establish hegemony in their respective regions. Examples are: China-East Asia, India-Asian Sub Continent, Venezuela-South America, Nigeria-Sub Saharan West Africa.

¹⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Non government Experts*, Available from http://www.odci.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html, Internet, Last accessed on 29 April 2005

¹⁸ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Major Themes and Implications, September 15, 1999. pp 4-7.*

Analysis of Threats

Transformation of the U.S. armed forces and various other federal agencies involved in national security is already in progress. Particular attention needs to be focused on post-conflict capabilities due to the central role this “phase” of warfare plays in the lasting attainment of national goals. The lead military agency for transformation is the Joint Forces Command, headquartered in Norfolk, VA. The 2001/2002 update to the Unified Command Plan gave USJFCOM the primary mission to become the incubator for new transformational concepts for the military of the 21st century. The new missions of USJFCOM are to operate as a Joint Force Provider, Integrator, Trainer, and primary for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation.¹⁹

Next the nature of the threats facing the U.S. currently and in the future will be discussed. Shifting away from the Cold War paradigm of threat-based analysis to capability-based approach was necessary. The number of potential adversaries, their nature and the myriad of tools available to wage war with make the former approach obsolete. At issue of course is the fact that the leadership development and education systems were designed for the Cold War.

The United States, the European Union (EU), China Japan and Russia are all key players regionally or global. On a regional level the nations that have the potential for causing global consequences are Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, North Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. These regional players do not have the capability to engage the U.S. military directly but due to their size, economy or influence over neighbors they can easily impact U.S. operations by a variety of methods.

¹⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command Website, Available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html>, Internet, Last accessed on 29 April 2005.

Aside from traditional nation-state adversaries there exist various non-state players. Because they are non-state oriented they pose a particularly dangerous problem. They are not bound by the same rules and are willing to employ weapons of mass destruction or effect. Drug Cartels, Terrorists, Criminal Organizations and Islamic Fascists are examples. Identifying the enemy is only partially useful. Understanding their capabilities and methods of attack and formulating counters to such acts. According to the USJFCOM Joint Operational Environment-Into the Future opponents will base their operations upon one or several operational designs:²⁰

- Strategic Preclusion
- Operational Exclusion
- Access Limitation
- Operational Shielding
- Adaptive Operations and Transitions
- Systems Warfare
- Strike
- Strategic Attack

The COE provides the context in which national security issues are debated and decided. It provides a methodology with which to analyze the appropriateness of weapon system procurements, training priorities and missions for military forces. The biggest challenge in developing a broadly accepted COE is that things continually change and there is a danger that as, international, religious, ethnic, and economic relations shift

²⁰ United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operational Environment* Draft (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 2004), 103

organizations like the military may be caught off guard or unprepared for the new realities. The fall of the Berlin Wall and eventually the Soviet-Warsaw Pact system was a welcome victory. It still took over twelve years and the 11 September attacks to fully get the military on a new vector to deal with the new realities.

Obviously the goal now is for the military and the government to become adaptive entities that are not locked into any one way of operating. There are many initiatives under way to reduce procurement cycles but needless to say they will remain a driving factor in the amount of time it takes for the military to transform.

What other aspects play a role in the military's ability to adapt to changing conditions? Leadership and Education are two and will be discussed in detail.

Strategically

The convergence of inefficiencies of reserve component integration for operations short of full mobilization; increased globalization; the rise in influence and lethality of non-state actors; unleashed ethnic and religious rivalries have made the shaping of the battle space before and especially after combat ends essential to success. Major combat is important. In fact the entire higher end thought process and conceptual theories of war, politics, and people are moot if one is defeated on the battlefield.

Operationally

The primary COE factor that impacts U.S. operational execution is the requirement for simultaneous types of operations within an AOR. Despite these requirements the tendency has been for operational commanders and staffs to fall into their "comfort" zone--combat operations, to the detriment of non-major combat

operations. Iraq and OIF are examples. Almost every commander up to the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) kept both their personal and staff focus on major combat while devoting limited resources (planning and manpower) to post-conflict operations. Many assumptions made regarding the post-conflict phase were overly optimistic.

That does not however excuse the fact that commanders never asked:

-What if the assumptions regarding PCO prove false?

-What are the Branch Plans?

-Are there appropriate forces, policy and support applied to those plans?

These are just three simple questions and an example of mismatches in reading of the COE and operational planning and execution.

Tactically

The tactical implications of the COE can be summarized in one term: “The Strategic Corporal.” The proliferation of media outlets and wireless communications worldwide mean that an act by a unit of any size or even an individual can have strategic and grand-political implications. The ramifications are often felt before the military or government has time to either digest the situation or get out the appropriate counter message. It is during this phase of officer career development that the current Leadership Development and Education System (LDE) system falls woefully short due to its primary focus of producing technical experts.

Analysis of Shortfalls of Legacy LDE

Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment. A culture of change, flexibility, and adaptability is more important to transforming the military than simply having new hardware.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

The Current Operating Environment will provide a continually changing backdrop over which the military must adapt and transform. Jointness as the principle mode of conducting operations throughout the ROMO is unlikely to change in the future. The current leadership development and educational system for officers is based on the Cold War-Industrial Age model and does not produce, across the board, the type of adaptive leaders required for the new operating environment. Transforming how leaders are developed and educated will be an essential task. Otherwise, the U.S. runs the risk of being able to win any and all battles yet lose the “wars” as our enemies adapt and take better advantage of the operating environment.

Cold War Operating Environment vs. the COE

Defense against Soviet aggression and containment of communism worldwide shaped U.S. national and military strategy for close to half a century. A degree of “bi-polar stability” was established which was broken by numerous conflicts. Those conflicts, the “hot” wars during the cold war, fortunately never put the two super powers into sustained direct combat. The relative certainty that nation states would fall on either

the U.S. side or the Soviet side of an issue or at least stay out of the way has given way to a multi-polar dynamic which is even more difficult to predict. This not to say the strategic backdrop of the Cold War was simple, but that the current international environment is truly multi-polar and as such much more complex.

Comparisons and contrasts to the Cold War-Industrial Age and the Post Cold War-Information Age are useful because of the fundamental differences in paradigms required to operate effectively in each. As stated earlier a primary factor in the time required to transform is the procurement cycle. During the Cold War and the Threat-based system things changed at the speed of weapons development and technology. New methods of operation, altered individual skill sets, leadership adjustments, changed tasks, facilities, or even doctrine were not primarily addressed.²¹ Today of course with the combination of terrorism, globalization, proliferation of information and non-aligned multiple threat organizations and nations, all aspects of the military organization must be addressed. Being confined to mode of operation without the ability to adapt quickly can be just as dangerous today as allowing the Soviet sub quieting program of the 1960's to go unchecked during the Cold War.

The highly joint and interagency environment has become a natural by-product of a COE that makes it almost impossible for the military to “wage war” by itself. The current system of leader development worked better under the old operating environment when the handoff between policy makers and the military was more defined. Officers were allowed to “grow” up to the rank of Lt Col/CDR without having to be more than technical and tactical experts by and large. Most officers were not exposed to advanced

²¹ United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operational Environment* Draft (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command 2004), 4.

strategic curriculums until their attendance at one of the Service War Colleges. By this time most were post O-5 level commanders. This worked well because the threat cooperated and remained static. In today's environment can an Army Battalion Commander afford to, on average, have no more formal professional military education than time spent at CGSC [Command and General Staff College]?²²

According to Dr Williamson Murray the professional military education system has been marginalized by lack of clear vision. Since World War II, the importance of military education has been reduced by a combination of shifts in military culture and outdated personnel systems designed for a completely different era.²³ He went on to note that the perceived importance of military education has changed significantly since the Inter-war period. Most of the general officers in World War II were Army War college graduates and or faculty and every Admiral of note was a Naval War College graduate. Admiral William S. Sims turned down a fleet command to become president of the Naval War College after World War I, as did as Admiral Spruance after World War II.

There has clearly been a shift over the years in the priority placed upon professional Military Education (PME). As asserted by the thesis of this writing, the COE has a tremendous influence upon where PME lies in the priorities of the various services. For example Dr Murray also noted that as late as 2001 fifty percent of active duty Admirals were not graduates of the Naval War College. In order to understand why

²² Steps have been already taken to expand the throughput of Army Student Officers into CGSC and a significant curriculum shift in the form of ILE has been instituted. With that said key aspects of the curriculum still remained focused on "training" students for follow on assignments as S-3/XO.

²³ Dr Williamson Murray, Transformation And Professional Military Education: Past As Prologue To The Future. National Security Challenges For The 21st Century Williamson Murray, Ed. The Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October, 2003), 11.

this cyclical emphasis regarding PME has come about the various operating environments must be considered.

During the Cold War personnel systems, especially in the Navy, stressed operational time or time at sea as the primary factor for promotion. A stable enemy and a promotion system that provided disincentives to do any job that was not operational are more than enough to remove the luster of War College attendance. Contrast the Cold War period with the Inter-war period and the opposite held true. Under intense pressure to downsize post World War I, the Navy was keen to foster new and innovative ways to be of use to the nation. The advent of the aircraft carrier provided the perfect springboard for exploration. The enemies were not as clear as they were during the Cold War. The U.S. correctly assumed that there would be increased contact and potential conflict with naval powers in the Pacific. The Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 and America's intentions to expand its influence in the Pacific made Britain a potential adversary as well as the Japanese. Uncertainty, new revolutionary weapons systems such as carriers and a desire to prove relevance all aided in making the PME offered at Naval War College (NWC) a coveted goal and a de facto right of passage for a successful career and personal development. Coming back to the present, the only difference between interwar period views on PME and present day is that the relevance of PME is not an issue. The landscape is uncertain. Today the primary threats are Al Qaeda and Islamic Fascist devotees. The time, location, and type of attacks against America are varied and may come from forces not even affiliated with Al Qaeda, but simply emboldened by Al Qaeda's previous operations. Also today there are many new transformative weapons systems and C2 structures for PME students to explore. Another distinction between

today and the interwar period is that U.S. will not have the option to withdraw from the world stage and the geopolitical landscape will continue to be extremely complex.

Junior Officer Development

The obvious emphasis towards Junior Officer Leadership Development and education is on ground forces. However the Navy and Air Force operating as part of the joint team have several thousand troops and officers running convoys and securing both bases and oil terminals in Kuwait and Iraq. The role of naval reservists is also being explored as a reserve unit last year cycled in to replace an Air Force Reserve unit as customs inspectors. Many sailors and airman have complained about similar issues as the mobilized Army Guard and Reserve units: Not enough weapons training, inferior equipment. Over thirty-seven sailors and thirty-one Airmen have died in the line of duty, including of course navy hospital corpsman assigned to Marine units. Three thousand of the total 150,000 troops actually stationed in Iraq are Air Force and Navy²⁴. There is a need for such replacements; it is the right and just thing to do as a joint force. The Army and Marine Corps, by design of course, have borne the brunt of assignments into the land combat area. What is glaringly missing for the Navy and Air Force is the same type of pre-commissioning educational and conceptual thinking Program of Instruction (POI) that this author advocates for land combat forces. These same petty officers and airman and especially officers will be key supporting members of Joint Task Forces in the future and must be prepared for those roles.

²⁴ Bryan Bender, Globe Staff, "Unready for Combat," *Boston Globe* 26 April 2005, 1.

But since these are precisely the roles the Army will most likely be called upon to perform in the global war on terrorism (counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, post conflict stabilization, and nation-building), it becomes the task of Army leaders to shape a force that can win the peace as well as win the war, and to do both willingly.²⁵

Jointness and Interagency

The proliferation of “Jointness” and Joint Task Forces is good for the military. Jointness has proven to be the most effective way of coordinating the relatively limited resources of the military for a multitude of global operations. The U.S. will fight or more appropriately operate as a joint force from now on. The one drawback to jointness is that the majority of service members and leaders are from leadership, development and education systems that produce technical experts. On the surface this is not bad since the strength of jointness comes from bringing together the core strengths of each service into a coherent team. The down side is the team is optimally designed for combat and not for operations further to the left on the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). The shaping of the battle space before and after the onset of hostilities holds the key to long-term attainment of U.S. national interests. Yet the operational and training experiences of most of the leaders and staffs have yet to promote the type of conceptual thinking, problem-solving and experience base required to effectively operate in these complex environments.

²⁵Dr. Conrad Crane . Panel Iv: Peacekeeping, Nation-Building, And Stabilization. Conference report “Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference April 13-15, 2004), 29.

Another requirement to push interagency experience and education as early in officers' career paths as possible is the human dynamic that often takes over the interagency process.

“The interagency process is not allowed to work. It is captured by small groups of key individuals who truncate the process, exclude experts (especially those with contrary views), and attempt to gain the President's ear to push their agenda.”²⁶ In effect interagency operations works best below the equivalent O-6 level, which requires officers at all pay grades to be fully educated earlier in their careers.

The application of the instruments of national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic) has never been successful when used individually. Even the expansive Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe, the most far-reaching economic assistance plan to date, was backed up by the presence of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops assigned to occupation duty in Germany. Likewise, the credible force of the U.S. military always backs up diplomacy. Prior to the advent of 24 hour global information, tight inter-dependence of world economies, and the emergence of violent trans-national terrorists and criminal entities military leaders could focus on a threat based enemy and not have to deal extensively with how diplomacy, economics and information impacted military operations and vice versa.

Now and into the future military leaders must be acutely aware of not just military operations but also the other three instruments of national power. Lack of knowledge and experience in diplomacy, economics and information will lead to execution of military operations that may meet military objectives. However those military operations if

²⁶ William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 95-112.

executed without tight integration of all aspects of national power will have limited success in meeting national security objectives. Much effort has gone into improving the breadth and depth of interagency cooperation. In theory, once a certain level of interagency coordination has been attained then the players can again focus almost exclusively upon their core competencies. For the military that would be fighting and winning wars. When the use of military force is required the interagency liaison and coordination system falls in place and military operations, closely nested with national security strategy, can be executed. The conclusion of military operations then gives way to a smooth transition to a civilian government agency or coalition control. In reality as discussed previously the military will continue to provide the bulk of the manpower for operations and contingencies whether the mission is traditionally military or not. Humanitarian Assistance and disaster relieve are examples. The perceived flexibility and availability of military forces make them the force of choice for intervention and assistance worldwide. But is the military working as a joint force always prepared to plan and execute the full spectrum of missions within the ROMO? The assertion is that it is not, but that is where interagency coordination comes into play. Optimally systems and relationships are in place that can tap into the vast expertise of supporting and supported agencies. However the other government agencies will not grow to a point where they can routinely replace military forces in the field. The pressure is therefore on the military to ensure that it possesses to the greatest extent possible the leadership, skills and education in its officer corps required to operate across the full ROMO.

In a complex and interrelated environment it will be a requirement for military officers to have a firm grasp of not just the military instrument of national power but also

diplomatic, economic and informational instruments as well. Therefore, the deficiencies of military leadership development and education will be analyzed within the construct of the 4 instruments of national power, commonly referred to as the DIME.

Diplomatic

“No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of the political factors.”²⁷

Clausewitz, On War

The Department of State has the primary role in:²⁸

- Promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest
- Creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad
- Assisting developing nations establish stable economic environments that in turn provide investment and export opportunities
- Bringing nations together to address global problems such as terrorism, cross-border pollution and humanitarian crises

The Department of State maintains diplomatic relations with 180 nations and over 70 international organizations. DOS also provides a myriad of services and protection for U.S. citizens living abroad. They accomplish these tasks with a total workforce of only 30,000 and a budget of just \$30 Billion for FY 2005. Understanding the physical limitations of the Department of State and the propensity for the military to be tapped for an ever wider range of missions it is clear that military officers must have a firm understanding of diplomacy and strategic policy. This ensures that military operations do not inadvertently impact ongoing initiatives by the State Department. Combatant

²⁷ Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²⁸ Department of State, “*State Department Organization*” [website]; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm> (1 of 16); Internet; accessed 15 December 2004.

Commanders do have a Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to their staffs, but these individuals are there in an advisory capacity only. Also their accessibility to a broad number of staffers is limited. So it is feasible to require a formalized system in which military officers are educated in the fundamentals of DOS operations and decision-making processes. It is no longer enough that simple understanding of the mission assigned and the intent of the higher command be sufficient. Officers including junior officers need to also have knowledge and understanding of national interests and how this specific mission supports those interests. Establishing a formal educational relationship with DOS will aid in accomplishing this goal. The educational flow of course works both ways. While the DOS may not have the manpower to assign liaison officers to each military JTF or Major HQ a system can be established to provide feedback to DOS regarding military problem solving and planning processes.

The limited number of State Department personnel compared to military is not new and despite a plan to hire over 1,000 more foreign service officers over the next two years the lack of dedicated liaison and planning staff is an issue that will continue to hamper interagency effectiveness. The military can help by providing under the centralized control of DOS Keystone-like courses to familiarize officers with diplomatic essentials. This type of across the force education will accomplish two goals. The first is that it provides the military with an understanding of how DOS frames problems. Armed with this knowledge military planners and operators have an understanding how best to “nest” their actions with DOS.

Recommendations

“ . . . the military still has not realized institutionally that the problems of war and peace are too complicated for either the military or civilian agencies of the U.S. government to address without the participation of the others as a full partner.”²⁹

The key to successfully meeting the challenges of the 21st century is leadership. It is assumed as stated earlier that the U.S. will maintain a qualitative advantage in technology. But trans national non-state threats don't need to be high tech in order to strike. September 11th proved that statement. Our current LDE system is quite good at producing technical and tactical leaders, which works well with the technical advantage. Where the U.S. is falling short is in the capability of leaders, especially in the military, to think on the conceptual level. The focus is not there and by the time the emphasis within the current system does take center stage (the services Senior War Colleges) it is too late. In fact a 1992 study showed that only 17% of students at the Army War College possessed the potential for cognitive complexity required to deal with 2-star or higher levels³⁰ This is problematic because for the most part formal educational opportunities stop at the Senior War College/O-5 to O-6 level. Yet it is from this pool of officers that flag and general officers are selected. Also up to this point in an individual's career there usually is no incentive to develop conceptual level skills.

²⁹ Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The challenges of peace and stability operations. Max G. Manwaring & Anthony James Joes, editors. Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 2000. 130.

³⁰ Emil Kluever, Lynch, W, Matthies, M, Owens, T, Spears, J, " *Striking A Balance In Leader Development A Case For Conceptual Competence* " *Monograph (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University,1992)* 9.

Listed below are several recommendations that address the problem of leadership mismatches with the COE. The ability to have more flexibility in assignments and a continuous and rigorous educational opportunities underpin most of them.

- Fully deploy and expand Standing Joint Force Headquarters construct
- Assignment of Transition Co-Commander to JTF
- Increase opportunities for officers in joint/interagency assignments
- Eliminate disincentives for experience outside of community/branch
- Provide educational opportunities earlier in officer career path
- Expand Options past 20-year career

Assignment of Transition Co-Commander

One weakness of full spectrum military operations including major combat and post-conflict operations is the transition phase between the two. As discussed earlier, OIF serves as an impetus for this monograph and from that conflict one lesson learned is clear—the military failed to anticipate correctly and manage the post-conflict phase on the ground. Commanders focused on major combat operations and their staffs reacted accordingly to their commander’s lead. This left the post-conflict portion of OIF without the benefit of commander focus or staff intellect. The assumption regarding how coalition forces would be met after hostilities ceased was in hindsight time sensitive. Yes, there was jubilation and happy faces that greeted troops in the immediate weeks following the fall of Baghdad. The troops and commanders understandably had a

difficult time shifting mindsets for close quarter combat in many instances to being benevolent liberators.

This again is not to disparage the troops. Shortcomings in Post-Conflict Operations have roots across the military and civilian chain of command. The proposal is to assign a Co-Commander for post-conflict planning/operations. This over the course of LDE reforms will serve several purposes.

1. A command qualified Flag Officer will at the JTF level be directly responsible to the Geographic Combatant Commander for planning, coordinating and once major combat operations are “phasing” over to PCO take command of all assigned personnel.
2. Provide further command opportunities for flag officers that may have more than the typical education/experience billets in low intensity and post combat.
3. Provide a dedicated staffing structure for personnel to gain experience at various level of their career

The intention is not to create dual career tracks for officers and staffs. Instead it is simply to provide fully qualified and dedicated leadership to the non-major combat portions of the ROMO (see figure 1). This construct in effect then frees up the primary CJTF to focus his staff on major combat operations while at the same time ensuring the other aspects of war planning and execution are fully staffed. The rationale for a Co-CDR of equal rank to the commander is to ensure that both pre and post hostility factors are addressed and most importantly listened to. This concept is not without precedence. World War II was the last major conflict in which the military and civilian establishments focused on and provided resources in order to implement coherent post-conflict plans. The enlightened leadership of leaders like General Marshall and General Eisenhower

were essential in making such planning a reality. They along with from the Departments of State, Treasury and War realized the magnitude of the rebuilding effort and thankfully took action. Knowing that a Germany wallowing in defeat as they did after the First World War would only lead to further misery and sow the seeds for future conflict.

In the midst of some of the heaviest fighting during World War II, several organizations and commands were formed to coordinate and lead the effort. They were in order: the Cabinet Committee on Germany (Secretaries and staff of War, State and Treasury) later replaced by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). This organization was the communications conduit to The European Advisory Committee based in London. Within Eisenhower's staff the G-3/5 sections formed the Post-Conflict Subsection (PPS). Finally the Deputy Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander, General Morgan was designated the Post-Conflict Coordinator for the staff.³¹

OPERATION ECLIPSE was the operation for the reconstruction of Europe. This is where without any other precedence to go by General Eisenhower appointed General Clay as the Deputy Commander for Military Government. Members of the SHAEF staff protested believing that General Clay was not to have his own staff and work directly for the COS as the G-5.³² This arrangement actually allowed three extremely important things to occur as both OVERLORD and ECLIPSE were executed. As mentioned earlier in the rationale for such a position, General Clay brought with him the experience of working post-conflict issues for several years from Washington. He understood the scale of the task and had both enduring relationships with civilian players as well as a

³¹ Maj Keith McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Command and General Staff College, 1995) 36.

³² William Flavin, Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success, Parameters (Autumn 2003).

dedicated staff. It also allowed Eisenhower and his staff to concentrate on offensive operations. The war was still raging and there was no guaranty that it would be over soon. Thankfully military and civilian leaders understood the magnitude of the post-conflict operations and provided the resources and manpower required for planning. The SHAEF G-5 section still coordinated with General Clay. Finally, the transition phase was much smoother than if Eisenhower's staff had to shift focus from offensive combat operations to occupation and civil-military affairs. In fact in Jean Edward Smith's biography of General Clay he was quoted to say: "[The] military government would have fallen apart if it was responsible to the tactical military command structure. I could never have gotten the type and kind of civilians I had if we had been down there reporting to the General Staff. And more important, I wanted to get military government out of the hands of the Army and into the hands of the State Department as quickly as we possibly could."³³

Lessons learned from OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama in 1989, also show that the assignment of staff officers under the combat operational commander if not fully integrated and empowered, will leave gaps in the post-conflict planning and execution. In the case of OJC, according to author William Flavin, even though it was assumed that the J-5 would command the Civil-Military Task Force, as a staff section they do not have the connectivity, structure or clout to effectively do a task as important as PCO.³⁴

³³ Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay, An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 225.

³⁴ Flavin, 109.

General Clay's appointment by General Eisenhower to the position is an example of how the Co-CDR construct can work. He was a capable commander that was given the resources required to accomplish the assignment while simultaneously leaving the "combat operations" staff and commander to run the combat portion of the war. The fact that he was also the first 4-star General never to have served in combat is not part of the intent for such billets in the future. The requirement stated earlier was that a command-qualified flag officer should be assigned. The upcoming recommendations along with a shift in military culture (a key aspect that is always required for true transformation to take place) will help broaden the pool of qualified individuals in the services that can be highly effective across the full ROMO. Also it is not recommended that such a position automatically be assigned for every JTF. It will always be in the nation's best interest however that the appropriate resources and manpower be assigned to deal specifically with post-conflict planning and execution. In the future any campaign plan that seems to "abruptly" end with the cessation of decisive combat operations should be viewed with great skepticism.

Current collaborative tools such as Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and the existence of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) if leveraged properly can enhance the span of command and control as well as provide JTF Commanders the Effects-Based Planning tools and Knowledge Base required for operations across the entire ROMO. The key of course is realizing the limitations of staffs and commanders to successfully engage in both the major combat fight and the adaptive coordination and planning required to gain full victory after hostilities cease.

Joint/Inter Agency Tour Incentives

The surest way to improve upon the experience level beyond the tactical and technical is to remove the disincentives officers are under when choosing diversified career assignments. The limited timeframe afforded officers in the current “move up or out” personnel system is one such disincentive. An increase in interagency billets for military personnel will achieve two things. One by cycling military personnel through various agencies on a regular basis the military can assist them with their planning capabilities. Most federal agencies are hard pressed to identify someone as the key planner point of contact. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Centers for Disease Control are just two federal agencies that have the training, experience, resources and cultures for effective long-range contingency planning. All other agencies fall woefully short of the mark.³⁵ As operations become more and more interagency the lack of planners or at least a planning culture may become a hindrance. Secondly, increasing military billets at selected agencies will broaden the professional experience of military officers. By making such tours mandatory early and often, officers are afforded concrete experience with the very agencies that will play a vital role in achieving future victories.

Expanded Educational Opportunities

PME is vital. However, few officers can afford to widen their careers at present by following such a path because of the myriad of jobs specified by each rung of the personnel systems ladder that each officer must hold in order to climb to higher ranks.

³⁵ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security –Volume 1 Key Observations and Overarching Processes (Washington DC: Hart-Rudman Commission, April 15, 2001). p 4.

High operational tempo has always been justified by claiming it was the surest way to maintain an individual's war-fighting edge. Over time the personnel system started to reward those that had successive operational tours. Naval aviation selection boards for example showed consistent preference towards records with above average operational flying time. In general the boards viewed time spent "out of the cockpit" at best neutrally and at worst negatively. This dynamic came about for two reasons. One, board members tended to promote records that looked like theirs. The Cold War struggle against a static enemy evolved into a contest of "Operational Tempo" (Op Tempo). It became an issue of the navy that deployed the most maintained the initiative. Reason two, was that the personnel system in general provided both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives for maximizing operational sea duty.

In practical terms this will require a sea change in culture throughout the services. Time spent in educational duty assignments must not be viewed as neutral or wasted time. It is an investment in the future. One reason that 17% of students at the Army War College were deemed capable of performing conceptually at the 2 star and above level was simply that the usual officer is afforded no time to improve educationally. Even the time spent at War College is viewed by some as a quick pit stop before heading back out to the real world. Almost an entire 20-year career by this point has been spent developing technical and inter-personal leadership skills. Once in War College it will take some time to work up to mastering conceptual level leadership skills and by then it is often time to rotate.

³⁶ Williamson Murray, National Security Challenges for the 21st Century (Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003) 13.

The bottom line is that the conduct of war has become so intertwined with politics and the global information net it behooves all officers to take time to think. Officers need to understand how their war-fighting skills can better integrate into the campaigns (not just battles) that the U.S. will be called upon to fight.

CONCLUSION

The object of war is to attain a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire...If you concentrate exclusively on military victory, with no thought for the after-effect, it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

B.H. Liddell Hart - Strategy³⁷

The biggest difference between the COE and the Cold War is adaptability. The term adaptive has been used in the past but usually in a technical and tactical sense within narrow confines. Now adaptability relates to the ability to adjust not only to actions but modes of thinking in response to situations that are constantly shifting. The Navy in the Cold War adapted to an enemy that slowly shifted from direct blue water engagement capability to one of ‘sea denial’ as the Soviets gradually lost their ability to keep large fleets deployed. The danger became over-the-horizon targeting links between aircraft and long-range surface-to-surface cruise missile shooters such as the Oscar class submarine. As stated above, there was adaptation but the context of the battlefield remained constant. It was acceptable for a naval officer to rise through the rank of O-8 and still never have left the comfortable realm of tactics. The motivation and general tactics of the enemy were never in question and as such did not require thought on the

³⁷ Manwaring and Joes 2000, 39.

intricacies of second order effects. The Air Force during the Cold War had a similar enemy to focus upon. In general, they guarded against U.S. first strike capability and the U.S. guarded against their first strike capability. Again, the lack of truly adaptive leadership development would not be a hindrance throughout an officer's career at least through the rank of Major General.

“Born Joint,” “Joint Focused,” and “Fighting Joint” are all common phrases of today's military. It is fully understood and has been shown in practice the synergies of bringing the core competencies of the various services into focus for successful operations. However the services, individually and collectively, can no longer afford to grow officers that are only educated and experienced in narrow technical & tactical fields. To do this, in the Current Operational Environment, is to lose the leverage that can be attained by having leaders capable of adaptive thought and action at all levels. It is assumed that Jointness is here to stay. JTF commanders may come from any service and their staff in accordance with “jointness” will be comprised of personnel from all services. Therefore it is important that the staff not be comprised of service-focused experts, but of individuals throughout the chain of command that are capable of operating and supporting conceptual level operations as service generalists.

To move towards the concept of service generalists without loss of specific expertise requires a fundamental shift away from the more static, Cold War, industrial age career development to one that front loads and continually enhances adaptive conceptual thought and experience.

Considering that most newly minted O-1's have not known the world of the Cold War and its relatively static strategic and operational constructs there is no need to break

them of a Cold War mode of thinking. In fact the military is seeing in Iraq that younger officers are welcoming of the challenges they are confronting. They are doing a good job, but many may vote with their feet if they are required to return to a system that once back from the battlefield operates in an Industrial Aged fashion and stifles creativity and opportunities to learn.

Unfortunately the current leadership system continues the practice of producing technical/tactical experts that are offered no incentives for thought or experiences outside the relatively narrow confines of branch or community norms regarding career progression.

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