

Redefining the Global War on Terrorism: Developing a Clear Picture of a Fuzzy Objective

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

Redefining the Global War on Terrorism: Developing a Clear Picture of a Fuzzy Objective, by Major Brian A. Payne, 57 pages.

This paper argues that the development and implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power is critical to success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The paper discusses the flaws in declaring war on the method of terrorism rather than focusing on the actors or insurgents that use these methods. The paper analyzes Al-Qaida using the characteristics of successful insurgencies posed by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen in "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." The analysis of the underlying social, economic and political conditions that support an insurgency, Al-Qaida's ideology, leadership and strategy, and the sources of support that enable an insurgency provide valuable insights in developing a strategy to defeat it. A review of the National Strategy for Countering Terrorism demonstrates an incongruence that limits its effectiveness as a blueprint for counterinsurgency. Recommendations include: the formation of a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee to develop, implement and assess a counterinsurgency strategy integrating all aspects of national power; the reformation and revitalization of the executive branch, specifically the Department of State; and the development of military leaders with critical thinking skills and breadth of knowledge.

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INTRODUCTION

"Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?"

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, October 16, 2003¹

One expects to hear such a legitimate question from a newsprint journalist, but to have the Secretary of Defense pose the question raises considerable concern. This question drives to the heart of a problem facing the military today. The Army has trained to fight the "big one" on the desert floors of National Training Center, the digital simulations of the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, and to a lesser degree the woodlands of the Joint Readiness Training Center. Battle damage assessments (BDA), casualties, and occupation of terrain are solid metrics for judging success in these environments. In reality, however, the Army faces a more complex fighting environment in which the enemy refuses to engage in decisive battle despite our inherent desire to do so. Success in this new environment is not, however, measured in BDA or body counts. This is seen most readily in Iraq, where the military delivered a shocking victory over Saddam Hussein's forces only to become subsequently embroiled in insurgency warfare afterwards. America's dominance on the conventional battlefield ensures that our adversaries will continue to adopt insurgent methods in future conflicts. This paper argues that victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) can only be achieved through the implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates all aspects of national power, and recommends a methodology for doing so.

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen "propose that successful insurgencies exhibit a set of commonalties in their recently published, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st*

¹ Donald Rumsfeld, Internal Defense Department Memo to Gen. Dick Meyers, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Pete Pace, and Doug Feith, October 16, 2003, available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/rumsfeld-memo.htm>

Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response."² They state that social conditions producing a degree of frustration and lack of fair representation must exist within a society for insurgent movements to take root. This frustration is harnessed through the adoption or development of an effective ideology, strategy and leadership. Additionally, the availability of resources and the organization's means to procure them impacts the insurgent's success. The evaluation of Al-Qaida as an insurgent movement using social conditions, ideology, leadership, strategy and means of support as a model can provide valuable insight to developing a comprehensive strategy that incorporates all aspects of national power to ensure victory.

Chapter one clarifies the insurgent nature of the GWOT using a comparative analysis of recognized terror and insurgency definitions. Chapter two identifies the sources of frustration and resentment in the Muslim world that have given rise to a militant Islamic insurgency. The militant Islamic ideology, leadership and strategy that motivate and direct the insurgent movement and serves to redress the frustration of the people are discussed in the third chapter. Al-Qaida's sources of support are analyzed in chapter four. Chapter five proposes the need to integrate all aspects of national power in a strategy that reduces the conditions that lead to insurgency, discredits the ideology and leadership, and disables the organizations support mechanisms. Chapter six recommends a methodology for developing and implementing an integrated counterinsurgency strategy.

REDEFINING THE NATURE OF THE GWOT

***"Let's stop calling the enemy 'terrorism' which is like saying we're fighting bombings.'
Terrorism is only a method; the enemy is an extremist Islamic insurgency."***

Barbara Ehrenreich, 29 July, 2004³

² Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, November, 2004 (Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004)

³ Barbara Ehrenreich, "The New Macho: Feminism," *New York Times*, 29 July, 2004

What's in a name?

Words have meaning that, in large part, depends on the context in which they are used and the audience that hears them. Word selection or the lack thereof, sets the tone and impact of a message. Secretary Rumsfeld's concern over adequate metrics to assess success or failure is emphasized in the question "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists everyday than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?"⁴ This is the essence of the struggle in waging a GWOT. Does killing terrorists end terrorism? If not, can the military alone achieve victory in the GWOT? How do we measure effectiveness in a war on terrorism? The seeming concern over the current strategy to confront terrorism stems from the failure to adequately address the insurgent nature of the conflict.

Understanding the nature of this war requires an understanding of the terminology that has been used to describe it. Accurate wording is important. Word selection defines one's position or bias on an issue. Words also shape the development of solution sets to a given problem. Incorrectly defining a problem, through accident or political expediency, produces solution sets that do not accurately address the true nature of the problem. The Global War on Terrorism is just such an example. The use of the term "terrorist" does not necessarily allow planners to address the true nature of the problem. Terrorism is a method. It is a method often used by political and social organizations attempting to change the status quo of a system. Insurgency is a form of warfare that attempts to undermine the established state in order to replace it with a desired counter-state. Understanding terrorism, insurgency and the relationship

⁴ Donald Rumsfeld, Internal Defense Department Memo to Gen. Dick Meyers, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Pete Pace, and Doug Feith, October 16, 2003, available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/rumsfeld-memo.htm>

between the two provides a lens to view the true nature of the problem facing America in the GWOT.

Global War on *Terrorism*?

The prolonged and ambiguous nature of the GWOT has created a sense of angst among many despite the President's stirring rhetoric to rally the public. After all, how does one win a global war on terrorism? Mark Jurgensmeyer addresses the fallacy of using "terrorist" as a descriptive reference in singling out a particular class of people committed to violent acts.⁵ Defining the enemy in this manner enables the messenger to speak from moral high ground and requires those that oppose him to justify the terrorist act. Unfortunately, defining a terrorist in this manner leads to the simplistic logic that eliminating terrorists will end terrorism, a primarily militaristic approach. Jurgensmeyer, however, argues that different social, political, cultural and religious contexts shape the views of what constitutes terrorism and terrorists. The frequently quoted cliché, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," is often used to highlight this point. Focusing on the act of "terrorism" distracts from the more important aspect of who the "freedom fighter" is and what he hopes to achieve. Reviewing accepted definitions of terrorism provides clarity to deriving the insurgent nature of the current conflict.

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are primarily political, religious, or ideological."⁶ Another slightly different definition comes from the FBI which states that terrorism is the "the unlawful

⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*," (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 8.

⁶ FM 100-2000, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 5 December, 1990; and Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 19 April 2001, as amended through 09 January 2003.

use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives.⁷ Meanwhile, the Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."⁸ Bard O'Neill defines terrorism as "a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against non-combatants (usually unarmed civilians), rather than operational military and police forces or economic assets (public or private)."⁹ Distilling the similarities among these definitions produces an understanding that terrorism is the threat or use of violence in pursuit of political, ideological, religious or social objectives in opposition to existing social, state and/or international order. Efforts should be directed at those who employ terrorism rather than focusing on the method itself.

If Not Terrorism?

Terrorism as a form of warfare has been closely associated with insurgent movements since before the days of the Roman Legions.¹⁰ Pursuing the tie between terrorism and insurgency provides additional insight as to the true nature of the conflict and enemy in the GWOT. Frank Kitson classifies subversion and insurgency as integral components of revolutionary warfare, in which the former contained all aspects within the political, economic and informational realm while the latter dealt with the use of force to achieve political

⁷ Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 0.85, Judicial Administration, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2001)

⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), vi.

⁹ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1990), 24.

¹⁰ Ibid.

objectives.¹¹ Bard O'Neill combines Kitson's classifications in his definition of insurgency. He defines insurgency as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the "nonruling group consciously uses *political resources* (i.e., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."¹² Both of these definitions identify an actor or sub-group that attempts to achieve its political objectives through violence, often in the form of terrorism. This review and comparison of definitions indicates that the nature of the GWOT is one of insurgency.

Metz and Millen further classify insurgent movements as being either nationalistic, liberational, or in some cases a combination of both. Nationalistic insurgencies are fought between insurgent movements and the legitimate national government. Liberation insurgencies are fought to liberate a nation from an outside ruling class. Liberation insurgencies are harder to overcome as a result of the ruling classes' outsider status.¹³ The GWOT appears to be a manifestation of both of these types of insurgencies, as Al-Qaida seeks to drive Western influence out of the Middle East in order to instigate socio-political reforms among the Muslim population. Al-Qaida and those like them are attempting to harness the frustration of the Muslim people in support of their insurgent movement against the West and apostate Muslim leaders.

PRECONDITIONED FOR INSURGENCY

Escaping Colonialism

Combating an insurgency requires an analysis of the factors that enable a movement to gather support. The success of insurgent movements is predicated on the existence of frustration

¹¹ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, (Harrisburg, PA, Stackpole Books, 1971), 3.

¹² O'Neill, 13.

¹³ Metz and Millen, 2.

with the current system and a feeling of helplessness in addressing the issues. A conspiratorial history also provides an advantage to the insurgent movement. Insurgent movements can harness this frustration and gain support by employing effective ideology, leadership, strategy and organization.¹⁴ Eric Hoffer states that "an intense dissatisfaction with things as they are" is critical to the rise of a mass movement.¹⁵ Kshitij Prabha opines that while insurgent movements target changes in the political system, they find their roots in social and economic disparity.¹⁶ Likewise, the idea of collective violence as a result of perceived deprivation is a theme in Ted Gurr's "Why Men Rebel." The Muslim community, particularly in the Middle East, is rife with frustration at the West's political meddling, military dominance, and cultural incursion. This frustration is exacerbated by the inability to affect a solution due to the corruption or national leadership and the lack of economic opportunity. This frustration has been brewing for some time.

The history of the Muslim people is one of tremendous pride and frustration. Bernard Lewis describes the rise of the Muslim Empire under the Caliphs in the 7th century as attaining a level of sophistication and power rivaled only by the Chinese in the Far East.¹⁷ The subsequent ebb and flow of the Christian and Muslim expansions have given way to a relatively recent period of Western superiority. The recent period of domination and the subjugation has created tremendous frustration. This frustration stems from the perception of Western political meddling in order to reshape the Middle East. The inability to compete with Western military power has prevented any means of recourse to counter outside interference. The West's policies are often

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: HarperCollins, 1951), 111.

¹⁶ Kshitij Prabha, *Terrorism: An Instrument of Foreign Policy* (Colorado Springs, CO: International Academic Publishers Ltd., 2001), 28.

¹⁷ Bernard Lewis, *What went wrong?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 7-11.

perceived to support Israel and Arab leaders that provide access to the regions vital oil interests at minimal cost. These dictatorial regimes have benefited financially and done little to establish policies for internal economic development or address growing social pressures. The feeling of helplessness in securing a legitimate voice in local government or affecting Western policies exacerbates these frustrations.

The long history of interaction between Western and Islamic culture is laced with periods of expansion and dominance for each. Recent history, post World War I, has seen the demise of the Islamic Caliphate, the death of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent colonization of the Middle East. The developing industrialized economies of Europe and Russia sought inroads to the rich oil reserves in the region following World War I.¹⁸ Political treaties among the great powers divided up the region's resource areas without regard for or consent of the inhabitants. Iran is one such example in which both Russia and Britain partitioned the country for their own needs. The British received the oil fields and ports that secured passage to India and the Russians utilized the Northern partition as a buffer zone to its own empire.¹⁹ Iranian attempts to nationalize the oil resources contracted to Britain led to a coup instigated and financed by Kermit Roosevelt, an operative of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.²⁰ The backlash to U.S. involvement in the overthrow was felt in 1979 when Islamic fundamentalist Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini became the leader of Iran and began an aggressive anti-Western policy.²¹

As the Western nations continued to carve up the Middle East, little attention was paid to the cultural make-up of populations living within the arbitrary boundaries, often forcing ethnically and tribally fractious groups to cohabitate. The French creation of Lebanon out of

¹⁸ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003) 204.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 204.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 197.

Syrian territory, the British gerrymandering of India, Pakistan, Kuwait and Iraq has all led to bitter strife and continuous conflict in the region. The Lebanese civil war; the Pakistani civil war leading to the creation of Bangladesh; the continued fighting over the Kashmir province between India and Pakistan; and even the more recent Iraq invasion of Kuwait all have their roots in the artificial borders created by the European colonial powers.²² The United States emergence as the world's sole superpower forces it to accept responsibility for maintaining peace in the region. The United States involvement in the creation of the Jewish State of Israel has made brokering peace in the region an infinitely more difficult task.

Before the 9/11 attacks, sixty percent of the Arab population considered the U.S. foreign policy toward Israel as the "the single most important issue" in the Middle East.²³ A more recent Zogby International Poll, indicates an overwhelming belief among Arabs that American foreign policy is biased toward Israel thus preventing a resolution to the Palestinian and Iraqi situations.²⁴ The fact that the United States has stood beside Israel in every conflict with the Palestinians and Arabs over the last fifty years contributes heavily to this attitude.²⁵ The United States expended considerable political influence to affect Britain's plan for the Palestinian Protectorate after WWII. President Truman, sympathetic to the plight of Jews during holocaust and concerned with domestic politics, pushed for the resettlement of 100,000 displaced Jews from Europe to

²² John Esposito, *Unholy War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 79-80.

²³ Joseph Farah, "Just What is Arab PR?" *Jerusalem Post*, 10 August 2001, 14.

²⁴ John Zogby, *Impressions of America 2004*, Zogby International, June 2004, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/Impressions_of_America04.pdf

²⁵ Abdel Mahdi Abdalah, "Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol 7. No 4 (December 2003) : 63.

Palestine.²⁶ A resettlement of Jews in the region, however, would upset Britain's control in the region and jeopardize the Empire's economic and communications lifeline to India.

American involvement stemmed from a strong Zionist lobby in America. The lobby succeeded in securing support in the U.N. for the bipartition of Palestine for the Jews and Arabs. The Arabs refused any settlement that provided Jewish autonomy on Palestinian soil while the Jews would only accept two autonomous partitions despite numerous attempts to broker a settlement.

Negotiations gave way to armed conflict between the opposing groups. The Jews, following a more organized strategy, gained control of a segment of territory, secured a cease-fire and appealed for recognition as a state. Rivaling for supremacy in what was to become the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States recognized Israel as a nation on 18 May, 1948. The United States involvement undermined Britain's mandate for administering the Palestinian Territory. The British influence and control of oil reserves diminished in the region and the Palestinians still do not have a homeland as a result. The United States involvement in the Middle East partitioning signified the beginning of the new pax americana and the end of the old pax britanica.²⁷ The region would become a Cold War battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union for the next 45 years.

The United States, following a period of relative neutrality in Middle Eastern affairs, advocated a pro-Israeli policy in response to Soviet expansion and arms sales in the region. Israel became the beneficiary of the U.S. containment policy in the Middle East. Weapons technology and training assistance flowed relatively freely. Weapons included Patton tanks and HAWK

²⁶ Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-51* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1992) 12.

²⁷ Ritchie Owendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli War* (New York: Longman Inc, 1992) 140.

missiles from the United States and Mirage jets from France.²⁸ Israel had the best trained and maintained military in the Middle East as a result. This preparation led to a crushing defeat of the Pan-Arab coalition in the Six Days War of 1967.

The Arab's, still stinging from their defeat in 1967, attempted a surprise attack on the Yom Kippur holiday in 1973. The Israelis, initially fighting for their survival, were only able to turn the tide due to a massive U.S. airlift of arms, ammunition and repair parts.²⁹ American Air Force units stripped their own aircraft for critical parts and transferred them to Israel. The U.S. injection of logistical support and rapid fielding of Tactical Optical-Guided Weapons (TOW Missiles) was critical to repelling onslaught of Arab armor formations in the Golan Heights and Sinai.³⁰

Today, while Israeli troops in American attack helicopters and fighter jets patrol the occupied territories, the question of Palestinian independence remains unanswered. Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid since 1949, receiving \$85 billion in economic aid annually.³¹ Many Arabs feel that American economic and military support has denied Arab victory in the conflict with Israel. The Arab inability to eliminate Israel as a result of the United States interference is a source of tremendous embarrassment and humiliation. The United States military superiority displayed during Desert Storm further demonstrated the Arab inability to compete on the battlefield with the West.

The introduction of American military forces in the Middle East has been a source of frustration among many Islamic religious leaders. United States military forces were staged in Saudi Arabia and other nations as part of the U.N. supported coalition to liberate Kuwait from

²⁸ Ibid. 200.

²⁹ Frank Aker, *October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War* (Hamden, CN: The Shoe String Press Inc., 1985) 34.

³⁰ Ibid., 57.

³¹ Abdalah, 64.

Saddam Hussein. The dramatic collapse of Iraq, the most powerful Arab military in the region, demonstrated the absolute superiority of Western military technology, training and organization. Afterwards, United States maintained a military contingent in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in order to enforce the no-fly zones over southern Iraq to deter further aggression. Operation Iraqi Freedom is seen by many in the Middle East as an American attempt to control oil through the use of force. This "Shock and Awe" campaign demonstrated the ability of U.S. forces to operate militarily with relative impunity in the region. The United States military presence in Saudi Arabia and occupation of Iraq has created animosity among many Muslims in the region, who resented the need to rely on infidels for security and the introduction of polytheists on Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden has continually emphasized the U.S. presence as an attack on Islam with the complicity of the regions apostate leaders.

Globalization

The same technological developments in computers, communications and satellite technology that enable the might of the United States military has created a revolution around the world. The Internet, a recent development, provides near instantaneous connection among individuals regardless of the distance between their locations. The Internet and satellite communications make for a small world, just as the development of sailing ships enabled early traders to interact with other cultures and expand the variety of goods available. The rapid transfer of information, ever increasing processing speeds, and advancing digital communications have enabled business to increase responsiveness, decentralize operations, and cut overhead costs. This competitive advantage has created a greater impetus for nations to pursue open free trade economies to bolster consumer confidence and outside investment. The economic policies and

corruption in many Muslim nations has precluded their inclusion into the "electronic herd" of the global economy.³² Plugging into the global economy requires relinquishing a degree of control, something many of the autocratic leaders of Muslim nations are unwilling to do.

The globalization of information has provided a means for comparative analysis between the Muslim condition and the rest of the world. The relative deprivation in the living standard among Muslims compared with other developing regions serves as a major source of frustration.³³

Standards of living in most Muslim countries are among the lowest in the world with per capita income having fallen 50% in many of the Gulf states in the last decade.³⁴ Despite the reliance of the global economy on oil, the region has posted the second weakest economic development in the world over the last two decades,³⁵ Ironically, the vast oil reserves in the Middle East are contributing to the corruption of leadership and the lack of needed economic reform.

Oil is the life blood of many Muslim nations. The mismanagement of the revenues that fills the coffers of the regions governments has created systemic problems. The world's dependence on oil guarantees revenues to petroleum exporting nations freeing them from the need for taxation. Governments with consistent oil revenues in the region have not had the need to develop and evolve their economies in order to maintain solvency as a result. The flow of cash directly into the government enables the ruling class to accumulate great wealth through corruption. In order to maintain control of the governing apparatus, many regimes have adopted

³² Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 9.

³³ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) 37.

³⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Demographics and the Coming Youth Explosion in the Gulf* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January, 1998), 27.

³⁵ Carl Bildt, "Europe and the Third Wave of Globalization," *The Globalist*, October 8, 2003, accessed at <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWe/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=3093> on 20 November, 2004

policies of guaranteed government labor for students that complete their studies.³⁶ Using the government as a jobs surrogate has further negated the development of industries and infrastructure. As a result, individuals outside the ruling class have little opportunity for economic advancement and very little to offer in global economy. This tension will only increase as the region faces an unprecedented increase in population growth.

The Muslim population is the fastest growing segment in the world. The region has the greatest proportion of young people in the world with 38% of the population under the age of 14. This trend is predicted to continue with populations in the region growing twice as fast as East Asian nations and four times that of the world's developed nations³⁷ Without drastic changes, these youths will enter a society incapable of absorbing them regardless of their talents and education levels. The existing youth population provides no revenue for the state but requires massive expenditures for education, healthcare, and government jobs. As the population increases, the government will not be able to rely on oil revenues alone to remain solvent. This looming socio-economic crisis presents a serious risk to foreign investors further impeding the regions ability to participate in a global economy. Those that have marketable skills and the opportunity to emigrate to greener pastures will do so but many will remain with little hope for the future and plenty of frustration.

The increase in global communications technology has led to a greater self-awareness among the Muslims.³⁸ The advent of satellite television brings images from around the globe to the Middle East. Globalization has made culture one of the West's prime exports. This has met

³⁶ Alan Richards, *Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), 13.

³⁷ Cordesman, 5.

³⁸ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 158.

with considerable backlash in the Muslim world.³⁹ Daily bombardments of Western culture in the form of movies, television, music and advertisements are seen as a corrosive agent within the Muslim population. The role of women and the secularization of society are two concepts conveyed in the media that are in direct opposition to the traditional Islamic way of life.⁴⁰ The seductive enticements of materialism, immorality and decadence are a corrupting and unwelcome influence that leads believers away from the true Islamic path.

The perception of a Western campaign against Islam, the lack of economic opportunity in a globalizing world, widespread corruption among the nations leadership and degradation of the Muslim culture has contributed to the resurgence of the Islamic religion. As Muslims search for alternatives to their present condition, religious leaders lay the blame for the umma's ills on the lack of adherence to the principles of Islam. There are many leaders that advocate a return to the true path of Islam as integral to reestablishing the Muslim world's preeminence. The current Muslim condition is a tinderbox waiting to explode. The Salafist *Jihadist* ideology seeks to ignite the region in flames.

IDEOLOGY, LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY

"We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be called the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies and who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world."

George W. Bush, August 6, 2004⁴¹

³⁹ Friedman, 340.

⁴⁰ Lewis, 82-116.

⁴¹ George W. Bush, "President's Remarks to the Unity Journalists of Color Convention", August 6, 2004 available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040806-1.html>

The Emergence of Militant Islam

Webster's defines ideology as the "body of doctrine or thought that guides an individual, social movement, institution, or group."⁴² Ideology serves to develop solidarity and group identity empowering it to pursue political or social change.⁴³ Effective insurgent ideology provides a remedy for existing frustration, explains the reasons for the injustices, assigns responsibility for the injustices and justifies the use of violence in resolving the conflict.⁴⁴ The Salafist ideology provides a vision for the future, denigrates any opposition to the vision, and justifies violence to overcome opposition.

Many respected experts and authors assert that Al-Qaida and the militant Islamic ideology they represent is the preeminent threat to United States' security.⁴⁵ The President's speech following the 9/11 attack captures this sentiment stating that "the terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teaching of Islam," specifically mentioning Al-Qaida.⁴⁶ The recently released 9/11 Commission Report echoes the clear threat militant Islamist groups and their ideology pose to the United States.⁴⁷ These statements beg the question; what is their ideology?

Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida represent a militant version of the Islamic sect known as Salafism. Salafism draws its name from its adherence to the ways of the Al-Salaf' al-Salih, the

⁴² *Random House Webster's Dictionary*, 4th ed., 2001, s.v. "Ideology"
⁴³ David E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 18-20.
⁴⁴ Metz and Millen, 7.
⁴⁵ Ralph Peters, "Rolling Back Radical Islam" *Parameters*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3
⁴⁶ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001 available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html>
⁴⁷ The 9/11 Commission Report, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004) 363.

first generation of Muslims under Mohammed.⁴⁸ Salafists maintain a traditionalist utopian view of the future, seeking to return to the days of Islamic greatness attained under the Caliphate in the 7th Century. Society would be based on the principles of the Quran and governed by the Sharia, or holy Islamic law. The Caliphate would provide benevolent leadership in advisement of the ulema, the religious scholars. Living in this manner will bring the blessings of Allah upon the umma and enable them to rise to preeminence in the world. This blessing, they believe, has been denied due to the corrupt nature of the leadership and corrupting influences of globalization.

Salafists believe that the source of the problems in the Muslim community today stem from a turning away from the true Islamic path. They claim that the region's leadership has come under the influence of Western power and has become corrupted by oil wealth. These leaders are declared apostate for their desire to remain in power and continue to plunder the resources of the umma. The introduction of secular law and oppressive tactics to control discontented elements further demonstrate their denial of Islam. Salafist clerics emphasize a return to the literal interpretation of the Quran, Sunna and Hadith to rejuvenate the umma.⁴⁹ The umma is then required to participate in *jihad* to rid the world of apostate rulers and unbelievers that threaten the Islamic way of life.

The concept of *jihad*, or struggle has many meanings depending on one's view and belief in Islam. The Muslim faith divides the world in to the house of Islam, or Dar-al-Islam, and the house of war, or Dar-al-Harb. The Dar-al-Islam contains those believers living under Muslim government in accordance with the Sharia law while the Dar-al-Harb is the non-believing world

⁴⁸ Reuven Paz, "Islamists and Anti-Americanism," *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol 7, No. 4. (Dec 2003), 4.

⁴⁹ Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islam and the Theology of Power", *Middle East* 221, (Winter 2001) 2.

ruled by infidels.⁵⁰ *Jihad* is the efforts taken to defend or advance the house of Islam against the house of war. These acts are manifest in a wide range of practices. Some as innocuous as opposing spiritual corruption by adhering to the principles of Islam in personal matters as an example to non-believers, while others have adopted a more militaristic interpretation.⁵¹ The militaristic view has both a defensive and offensive nature. Offensive *jihad* is waged using a selected or volunteer army to advance the borders of Islam. When invaders occupy Islamic lands, all able bodied Muslims are called to defend the faith and repel them.⁵² The latter form has been radically interpreted by militant Islamic clerics throughout history to respond to threats to the Islamic faith. Several Islamic authorities have helped shape the ideology over the years, each in reaction to a perceived attack on the Islamic faith. The writings of ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and Sayyid Qutb have formed the foundation for the current Salafist ideology that fuels organizations such as Al-Qaida today.⁵³

An overview of these Islamic thinkers presents a series of reoccurring themes. First, each used political activism in order to further the Salafist dream of an Islamic society and the return to Sharia law. Each used their religious position and interpretations to discredit the ruling class through claims of apostasy in order to mobilize the umma to action. Each provided religious justification for jihad to achieve their goals. All were imprisoned or banished for their extremist views at one point or another in their lifetimes. Finally, none of them achieved the Salafist dream although they were relatively successful in achieving their short-term political goals.

⁵⁰ Michael G. Knapp, The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam, Parameters Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 Report, (Spring 2003), 83.

⁵¹ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 53.

⁵² Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, *The Aged of Sacred Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2002) 49.

⁵³ Ibid.

Taqi al Din Amhed ibn Tamiyya (1263-1328), a firebrand Sunni cleric, was one of the first Islamic leaders to justify the use of jihad against professing Muslim. His strict adherence to the principles of Islam and outspoken nature often brought him into conflict with the tribal leaders of his day and he was jailed several times for his criticisms. His ability to speak with the religious authority, however, made him invaluable to the defense of Egypt against the Mongols. The Mamluk fighters of Egypt moved to blunt the Mongolian advance into Syria and Palestine in order to save Cairo in 1260.⁵⁴ The Mamluk fighters, citing the Quranic restriction against Muslim on Muslim violence, refused to fight when they found that the Mongols had taken on the customs and beliefs of the Islamic faith in their conquests. The Mamluk leader came to Ibn Taymiyya for assistance. Ibn Taymiyya, driven from his home in Damascus as a boy by the Mongols, developed an argument to justify the Mamluk attack.⁵⁵ The Mongols, despite taking on some of the Muslim beliefs still ruled under the Mongol law of Yasa. Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa, or religious edict that pronounced the Mongols apostates for believing in a system of law other than the Sharia.⁵⁶ Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa justified the use of jihad inside the Muslim population and in so doing "planted the seed of revolutionary violence in the heart of Islam."⁵⁷

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a spiritual descendant of Ibn Taymiyya in the 18th century, was a devout and strict student of the Quran. He was thrown out of seminary in Basra for accusing the citizens there of apostasy and driven into the interior of Arabia after demanding the death of apostates in the village and vandalizing popular shrines.⁵⁸ He believed that indulging in any moral thought not grounded completely in the Quran was a form of self-idolatry and that

54 John Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 59.

55 Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1985) 100.

56 Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1990) 31.

57 Benjamin Simon, 50.

58 Ibid., 53.

philosophy was the science of the devil.⁵⁹ He advocated a return to the basic beliefs of Islam and the need to live under the Islamic law, Sharia.⁶⁰

Ibn Abd al-Wahabb became Muhammad ibn Saud's guest during his wanderings on the Arabian interior. Ibn Saud, recognizing his guest's ability to motivate the masses, sought his help in advancing his goal to acquire political power and territorial wealth.⁶¹ In return, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought Ibn Saud's assistance in religious reform. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab used his position to declare those that opposed Ibn Saud as apostate, providing religious cover for the expansion of power and wealth against the Ottoman Empire. Ibn Saud provided political and financial support for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious programs. This alliance led to the formation of the Saudi Arabian kingdom and enabled the small Wahhabi sect to espouse its puritanical message and religious influence. His teaching inspired one of the first revivalist movements in Arabia.⁶²

The teaching of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab continued after his death and led to the development of the Wahhabi school of thought. Wahhabi clerics reject the label of Wahhabism however, preferring instead to consider themselves representative of Islamic orthodoxy. These clerics believe that Wahhabism is not a school of thought within Islam, but is Islam.⁶³ This supremacist thought, also advanced as Salafism, is advanced world-wide through the financial support of the Saud family today. The Wahhabi history of political activism under the banner of religious edict is another stone in the ideological foundation of today's Salafist *Jihadist* groups.

Sayid Qutb, an Egyptian scholar and early member of the Muslim Brotherhood, advanced a religious social theory that, once again, justified Muslim on Muslim violence. He classified the

⁵⁹ Khaled Abou El Fadl, 6.

⁶⁰ Benjamin Simon, 52.

⁶¹ Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002) 20.

⁶² Choueiri, 21.

⁶³ Khaled Abou El Fadl, 7.

non-Muslim world as Jahilliyan, a pagan state of mind that reigned before the enlightenment brought by the Prophet Muhammed. Islamic societies that have openly declared secular practices and those that proclaim religious beliefs but demonstrate secular tendencies are included as Jahilliyan. These societies are considered contaminated with corruption and heresy since they have turned their back on the known truth.⁶⁴ Qutb saw Egypt, under socialist President Nasser, as being in this jahilliyan state and assisted in the plot to assassinate him. True Muslims, he believed, were called to fight for the removal of its leaders and restoration of the Sharia law. Qutb called for an "advance guard" to lead the fight for Islam in Egypt using any means, including violence, to achieve victory.⁶⁵ Sayid Qutb is recognized by many in the Islamic world as an authoritative source in redefining the Muslim responsibility with regard to *Jihad*. His writings and teachings helped shape the thinking Abdullah Azzam, ideological founder of the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK) and Al-Qaida. Abdullah Azzam, a student of Qutb's, and his protégé' Osama bin Laden furthered the concept of the "advance guard" in developing Al-Qaida after the Afghan War.

Leadership Network

Abdullah Azzam, a Salafist Islamic scholar, dedicated himself to the to defeating the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. He operated out of the Peshwar region of Pakistan, using the sanctuary to recruit, organize and train freedom fighters from the Middle East before sending them in to Afghanistan.⁶⁶ Salafist madrasas and training camps were established using the

⁶⁴ John Esposito, *Unholy War*, 60.

⁶⁵ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003) 17.

⁶⁶ Jonathan Randall, *Osama: The Making of a Terrorist* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2004) 87.

financial support secured through his ties to the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments.⁶⁷

Approximately 16,000 to 20,000 Islamic militants from twenty countries arrived in Pakistan during this time. Most of these fighters, committed to liberation in their own countries came for training and experience.⁶⁸ Azzam inspired them with his revived concept of jihad in establishing the Islamic State, often quoted as saying, "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues."

Azzam defined two kinds of jihad based on his interpretations of the works of ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhabi movement. These definitions were further supported by Cairo's Al Azhar University, the most respected Sunni Islamic Center. *Fard kifaya* is an offensive method of jihad undertaken in an adversary's own territory, similar to a spoiling attack. This attack would be conducted using specially selected Muslim volunteers. The second form, *fard ayn*, contains defensive methods to defeat an attack on Muslim soil. This form is obligatory for all Muslims, equal in importance to observing the five pillars of Islam.⁶⁹ This lesson was passed on to Azzam's apprentice, Osama bin Laden, and became an integral part of Al-Qaida's strategy.

Osama bin Laden, son of a wealthy construction engineer, became involved in the fight to defend Afghanistan as a young man. Working closely with Abdullah Azzam, Osama used his ties to wealthy families to secure funding and support for the efforts to defeat the Soviets and establish an Islamic State. He was able to secure engineering and technical support for building tunnel complexes, underground hospitals, arms depots and fortifications on the Afghan-Pakistani

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁶⁸ Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America* (Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 1999) 24.

⁶⁹ Randall, Osama, 87.

border from his father's construction firm.⁷⁰ His family influence and ability to talk with the elite members of Saudi society made him an invaluable asset to the movement in Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden has taken on an almost mythical leadership status. His actions to provide comfort for injured Muslim warriors and renunciation of family wealth and social position endeared him to many. His credibility was further enhanced by his bravery displayed on the battlefield in Jiji, Afghanistan, where his element was cut off from support for 10 days following a Russian offensive. His well spoken mannerisms and intriguing tales made him a favorite on the lecture circuit in Saudi Arabia, increasing his ability to garner funds and support. His carefully constructed image has enabled him to become one of the most elusive and notorious men in history as the leader of Al-Qaida.

Osama bin Laden, assisted by Abdullah Azzam, developed the concept for the Al-Qaida organization during the war against Russia in Afghanistan. Cofounders of the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK), they raised funds, recruited, and trained volunteers from 35 countries around the world to defeat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁷¹ The subsequent victory in Afghanistan allowed these fighters to return to their respective countries and contribute to the internal political discourse. These fighters soon found themselves outside the graces of the more secular autocratic regimes in the Middle East. Without legal recourse, these individuals developed insurgent movements to resist their oppressive leadership, drawing on the lessons learned in Afghanistan.⁷² Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida has unified these separate local insurgent movements using the common experience of Afghanistan and the militant Islamic ideology into a

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁷¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaida* (New York: Berkley Books, 2002) 5.

⁷² Schweitzer, 58.

global insurgent movement.⁷³ This loose affiliation of networks, also known as the "International Front for *Jihad* Against Jews and Crusaders", provides tremendous flexibility and resilience in pursuing its militant Islamic goals.⁷⁴

The development of the jihadist network brought Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri into a close personal relationship. Ayman al-Zawahiri served as leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a salafist terror group, and agreed to merge with Al-Qaida in forming the larger international front. Ayman al-Zawahiri became the religious mentor to Osama bin Laden after Azzam's assassination.⁷⁵ Many believe that Zawahiri, possessing a deeper theological background and international perspective, is the real leader in the organization. He defers to bin Laden's organizational skills and ability to garner resources. The numerous appearances of both men together in video clips demonstrate the closeness of the relationship. This relationship is further solidified by Zawahiri's selection as Osama's personal physician since 1996.⁷⁶ Zawahiri wields considerable influence with Osama in pursuing the goals of the organization.

The shura majlis, a close group of advisors to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, assist in developing the organization's strategy and operational focus. The shura is composed of several trusted members of affiliated organizations that alongside Al-Qaida form the coalition against the Jews and Crusaders. The membership to the board of advisors is constantly adjusted as the organization grows or members are captured or killed. Key decisions are brought before the shura majlis for discussion before implementation. The plot to assassinate Hosni Mubarak,

⁷³ Gunaratna, 75.

⁷⁴ Schweitzer, 56.

⁷⁵ Azzam was killed along with his two sons by a remote controlled bomb. The perpetrators were never caught, but some have speculated Osama's involvement as either implicit or complicit. This action placed Osama firmly in control of Al-Qaida.

⁷⁶ Gunaratna, 35.

president of Egypt and the decision to relocate from Sudan to Afghanistan are examples of two decisions brought before the shura majlis.⁷⁷

The network nature of the organization's leadership decreases the chances of detection, broadens support for action among the coalition, increases redundancy in command and maintains the ability to reconstitute in the event of an attack.⁷⁸ The network consists of over 35 known terrorist and insurgent movements world-wide, including the Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, the Islamic Group of Egypt, *Jihad* Movement of Bangladesh, Moro Islamic Liberation Front among others.⁷⁹ Each providing their own command and control, organizational and recruitment structures representing a "family" within the Al-Qaida network.⁸⁰ Individuals from these "families" are further networked through the contacts developed during training in the Al-Qaida camps. They are then assigned regions based on their nationality and ethnic background and are responsible for recruiting from among their family, friends and countrymen.

Coordination and cooperation is achieved through a common purpose and shared vision. The religious indoctrination conducted in Al-Qaida training camps facilitates a common purpose among all the groups that participate. Osama bin Laden provides a guiding vision through his religious fatwas and public statements. He has unambiguously directed the killing of all Americans wherever they are using any means available.⁸¹ The common purpose and common vision enable the component movements of Al-Qaida to operate autonomously to achieve their objectives.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 131

⁷⁹ Schweitzer and Shay, 57.

⁸⁰ Gunaratna, 130.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

Al-Qaida, organized to fight a global insurgency, operates as a venture capital organization providing funds, technical and training assistance to facilitate cooperation and coordination among militant Islamic groups world-wide.⁸² Its routine activities are coordinated through four committees; the military, fatwa and religious teachings, business and finance, and media and information committees. The committees initiate the policy decisions agreed upon by the shura members. The military committee conducts operations to undermine Western influence and build support among disenfranchised Muslims. The fatwa and religious teaching committees ensure theological legitimacy and provides religious indoctrination for potential members and affiliates. The business and finance committee funds the operation and also provides community assistance to needy areas to garner support and aid in recruitment. The information and media committee is charged with the task of propaganda and recruitment. This organization depicts a movement that seeks to capitalize on the frustrations of the masses and direct their actions in support of its goals in opposition to the established governments in the region.

Al-Qaida's America First Strategy

Metz and Millen believe that a successful insurgent strategy is founded on three interlinked components; force protection, actions intended to erode the will, strength, and legitimacy of the opponents; and augmentation of support and resources.⁸³ Osama bin Laden has developed a strategy that incorporates these three components with the goal to defeat the West and establish the unified Islamic State. Fourth generation warfare, as described by Thomas Hammes, uses political, economic, social and military means to convince decision makers that

⁸² Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al-Qaida," *Foreign Policy*, (May/June 2004): 1-6 accessed at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2536&print=1

⁸³ Metz and Millen, 6.

their strategic goals are unachievable or too costly.⁸⁴ This is the strategy of bin Laden's Al-Qaida. The power of Osama bin Laden's strategy thus far has been the coherent and consistent use of a central theme for his message to Islamic believers.⁸⁵ Al-Qaida is waging a war of ideas, using military actions to reinforce the message of hope and call to action.

Al-Qaida (AQ) in Arabic means "the base" or "foundation" indicating its importance to the development of the Islamic State.⁸⁶ This describes Al-Qaida as more than just a terrorist organization, it is a "vanguard" for creating a larger movement of militant Islam.⁸⁷ It is a utopian traditionalist movement that seeks to return to the "perfect" Muslim society of the 8th century, the zenith of the Muslim Empire. It is dedicated to the renewal and reunification of the Muslim community or umma, in accordance with Sharia law under a reestablished Caliphate.⁸⁸ As the vanguard, it illuminates the path toward this goal and serves as a model for those that follow. It serves as the catalyst for a greater movement to unify the Islamic world.

Osama bin Laden, in consultation with the shura, believe that the path to the Islamic state is blocked by Western influence in the region, specifically the United States. Previous attempts to overthrow apostate leaders have been thwarted due to the West's political meddling in order to maintain their influence on the region's oil wealth.⁸⁹ They believe that the United States must be driven from the region in order to create the reforms necessary to achieve the Islamic State.

Tasks critical to success are:

- 1) Diminish Western influence over Middle Eastern governments

⁸⁴ Thomas X. Hammes, "4th Generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths," *Armed Forces Journal* (Nov 2004), 40.

⁸⁵ Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, 177.

⁸⁶ Brian Jenkins, "The Organization Men", *How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 13.

⁸⁷ Abdullah Azzam, "Al-Qa'idah al-Sulbah," *Al-Jihad*, 41, April 1988, 46.

⁸⁸ Gunaratna, 74.

⁸⁹ Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, 203.

- 2) Remove Western forces from the holy land of Saudi Arabia⁹⁰
- 3) Reform a core state, possibly Egypt or Saudi Arabia into an Islamic State⁹¹
- 4) Destroy Israel⁹²

Unable to accomplish their objectives from a purely military perspective, Al-Qaida has adapted to engage the Muslim masses to achieve these goals.

Al-Qaida and others see globalization and its effects as destructive to their narrow view of Islam. Fearing that the status quo would eventually destroy the ability of the Islamic culture to resist, Al-Qaida has undertaken a strategy to sever the bonds between the West and the region's regimes. Al-Qaida seeks to gather support by initially framing the conflict as an insurgency of liberation from the West, and then redirecting that effort against the apostate rulers in the region. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama's deputy, claims that highly visible attacks against the external enemies of Israel and America will rally Muslims to Al-Qaida's cause, thereby strengthening the effort against the main enemy, the apostate governments in the region.⁹³ This strategy draws on the existing anti-Americanism to mobilize the population in the region against the United States, forcing the rulers in the region to choose sides between the body of Islam or the United States. Those that fail to reform are named as apostates and targets of jihad. In doing so, the organization has employed significant information operations augmented through military objectives to reach the Muslim population.

⁹⁰ F. Gregory Gause III, *The Kingdom in the Middle, How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 118

⁹¹ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*. Serialized in *Al-Sharq al Awsat* (London) 2-10 December, 2001. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document number FBIS-NES-2001-1202

⁹² F. Gregory Gause III, *The Kingdom in the Middle, How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 118

⁹³ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*. Serialized in *Al-Sharq al Awsat* (London) 2-10 December, 2001. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document number FBIS-NES-2001-1202 pg 75-78

The Muslim population is Osama bin Laden's center of gravity. Without support from the body of believers, Osama can never be more than a terrorist. Described as a man in search of a constituency, Osama has consistently portrayed the efforts of Al-Qaida as a religious duty to liberate the umma from the oppression of the West and its puppet regimes in the region.⁹⁴ His eloquent speeches in Arabic seek to harness the frustration that exists among Muslims and direct it against Americans and the regimes that support them. He uses historical parallels to frame the nature of the conflict with America comparing today's struggle to that of the crusades and Mohammed's fight against polytheists.⁹⁵ Osama bin Laden draws upon continuing sources of frustration, such as the lack of a Palestinian homeland, the sanctions levied on Iraq and the continued deployment of United States military forces on the Arabian Peninsula as evidence of America's desire to destroy Islam. He has addressed the role of the United States in disrupting a peaceful settlement in Palestine and the killing of innocent children in Iraq through sanctions and missile strikes as evidence of America's war on Islam.⁹⁶ Portraying American interests as imperial enables him to describe his actions as necessary to defend Islam through jihad.

The failure of regional governments to meet the needs of its citizenry is another theme in Osama's messages. The reliance on the United States military to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi forces is seen as a condemnation of the regime's ability to develop adequate defensive forces. Rather than looking over the defense of the nation, the regime focuses attention to internal security and the suppression of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Failures to provide social, health and educational services further depict the lack of concern for the citizens of Muslim

⁹⁴ Brian Jenkins, *The Organization Men, How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 13

⁹⁵ Michael Scott Doran, *Somebody Else's Civil War, How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 33

⁹⁶ Yonah Alexander and Michael Swetman, *Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network*, (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001) Appendix One.

countries. The introduction of secular law and governmental organizations is further evidence of a leadership that is no longer concerned for the well-being of its people.

The call to jihad is also a consistent theme in Osama's messages. He advocates that jihad is a personal responsibility given the attack on Islam by the West. His message for all Muslims is to fight wherever, whenever, with whatever means are available, to kill Americans and their allies, take their money and let them know what it is like to live under their rule.⁹⁷ Jihad, according to bin Laden, is second only to faith as the duty of the believer in Islam and is to be pursued relentlessly until the evil has been eradicated from Islamic territory.⁹⁸ Only through jihad can the Muslim people be free of oppression and return to the true path of Islam. Osama's message receives credible reinforcement from Al-Qaida's military operations.

Al-Qaida, seeks to use its limited force for maximum effect to create conditions that will strengthen support and weaken the United States both politically and economically in the region. Osama bin Laden selects targets for their ability to produce multiple effects to multiple audiences. The advancement of propaganda is one of the most critical aspects of military or terrorist operations. The attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were gestures that symbolized Al-Qaida's dedication to the jihad against Jews and Crusaders.⁹⁹ These spectacular attacks on United States diplomatic and military resources received tremendous media attention and brought recognition to Al-Qaida and the growing admiration among many in the region. These attacks, while damaging to the United States, paid huge dividends in recruitment and support throughout the Muslim world. These attacks were small in comparison with what took place on September 11, 2001.

⁹⁷ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 22.

⁹⁸ Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, 388.

⁹⁹ Schweitzer and Shay, 131.

The attacks on 9/11 brought unprecedented destruction to the shores of "fortress America." Osama bin Laden's emphasis on quality over quantity is evident in preparing these attacks. The attacks, once again, served to produce multiple effects to multiple audiences. These attacks created a period of economic instability in the United States, rallied the Arab street, demonstrated the U.S. public's vulnerability to attack, attempted to decapitate the United States government, and served as a recruitment tool throughout the Islamic world.¹⁰⁰ This message, delivered to the Muslim people through images of the crumbling World Trade Center on 9/11, signified hope and power. If the symbol of Western economic power was destroyed by the actions of a handful of the faithful, the vanguard, how much more could be accomplished with a rejuvenated umma? This attack had another motive, perhaps even more significant.

The 9/11 attacks also served as a strategic provocation to the United States.¹⁰¹ Osama created a confrontation that sought to draw the United States into a prolonged and indiscriminate war against Islam. The anticipated reaction of declaring war on the Muslim world corroborated Osama's message of a struggle between the evil West and the Muslim world.¹⁰² Osama hoped to produce his own version of the "your either with us or you're against us" posture with the anticipated declaration of war. This argument is echoed by Brian Jenkins statement "... bin Laden and his lieutenants knew that the September 11 attacks would bring a ferocious reply. Their strategy depended on provoking the United States into what would be seen in the Muslim world as an assault on Islam, and we may reasonably guess they prepared for it."¹⁰³ The anticipation of drawing U.S. military forces into confrontation on Muslim soil reinforced the crusader message,

¹⁰⁰ Schweitzer and Shay, 139.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁰³ Brian Jenkins, *The Organization Men, How Did This Happen*, ed. James F. Hoge & Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 14.

increased the justification for jihad among the believers and allowed Osama to fight wars as he knew best.

The anticipation of the United States invasion of Iraq prompted Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri to announce support for jihadists to resist the Americans to defend Baghdad as the seat of the caliphate prior to the Mongol conquest in 1298.¹⁰⁴ Operatives inside Iraq, such as Abu Musab Zarqawi have been using Al-Qaida messengers to communicate with Osama bin Laden. A seventeen page letter and compact disc were taken from Mohammed Ghul indicate that some of the insurgents in Iraq are working in conjunction with Al-Qaida.¹⁰⁵ The continued presence of U.S. troops engaged in military operations against Islamic fighters in the region continues to be a rallying cry for Osama bin Laden. The invasion has strained diplomatic ties with regimes in the region friendly to the West including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Insurgent elements are increasing their activities in these countries capitalizing on the frustration created by their compliance with the United States.¹⁰⁶ Osama bin Laden is now in a position to fight America just as he fought the Russians in Afghanistan. The prolonged and ambiguous nature of the fight in Iraq erodes the will of the American people and denies swift, decisive military victory. Osama seems to have employed Hammes' fourth generation warfare successfully thus far.

Whether Al-Qaida is able to create the conditions for the overthrow of one of the core states in Islam is unknown. The potential exists for a country like Saudi Arabia withdraw its tacit support of American intervention in Iraq in order to quell internal dissent or its leadership be overthrown and replaced with a more militant Islamic government. Al-Qaida would gain a significant supporter and ally in the movement toward a unified Islamic state should this take

¹⁰⁴ Randall, 297.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 298.

¹⁰⁶ Yossef Bodansky, *The Secret War in Iraq* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004) 305.

place. With the ability to control the world's oil market, Saudi Arabia could wield significant clout with U.N. Security Council nations to pressure a United States withdraw from the region and limit intervention in pursuing the greater Islamic State. Regardless, Al-Qaida's proven ability to motivate portions of the Muslim population continues to be a source of support for its operations in the region. Speculation in this regard may be found to be inaccurate with the passing of time but failure to account for this potentiality, should it prove correct, will be disastrous.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen highlight several broad logistical elements required to establish and maintain an effective insurgency. The degree of support in each of these areas directly impacts the effectiveness of the insurgency.¹⁰⁷ Al-Qaida has developed significant sources of funding, manpower, sanctuary, and intelligence in this regard. Funding supports the operational costs of training, preparation, intelligence gathering and mission execution. Manpower is derived from the means of recruitment, training and employment. Sanctuary is provided through transparency for operational cells and the use of remote geographic locations for training bases. Intelligence gathering enables effective planning and execution of attacks and prevents unexpected attacks. A strategy designed to defeat Al-Qaida needs to address each of these areas.

Funding

Al-Qaida's financial support network is structurally diverse as well. Osama bin Laden, purportedly worth approximately \$20-30 million, serves as the head of the Al-Qaida financial and

¹⁰⁷ Metz and Millen, 8.

business committee as well as the overall organization. This committee is comprised of accomplished bankers and financiers and is responsible for the collection, movement, investment and distribution of assets throughout the organization worldwide. The committee, which constantly seeks to increase its means of financial stability, operates on an estimated annual budget of \$50 million dollars.¹⁰⁸ The organization draws these funds from legitimate or front businesses established by Al-Qaida, charities and non-governmental agencies (NGO), and credit card fraud.

Al-Qaida has established numerous front companies and organizations around the world. Many of these companies are completely legitimate attempts to aid the population with jobs and economic growth. These companies run the gamut from furniture manufactures to genetic development laboratories for cattle to fruit export companies. Others provide cover for movement of personnel and shipping of goods. Wealthy businessmen in Saudi Arabia and the UAE are able to provide funding through these organizations while maintaining the air of legitimacy. This engenders sympathy and support within the community for the organization and serves as an evaluation system for recruits. The diversity of these businesses creates a complex network with which to move and hide large quantities of money. Recent efforts to freeze assets after 9/11 have had some success but much of Al-Qaida's money is moved through the Islamic Hawala, or informal banking system requiring no governmental scrutiny or accountability.¹⁰⁹ NGOs play a critical role in augmenting funding as well.

Al-Qaida has infiltrated several Islamic NGOs and charities in response to the attempts to freeze assets. A common ideology has enabled Al-Qaida to place individuals in prominent positions in some of the larger Islamic charitable organizations. These individuals are able to

¹⁰⁸ Gunaratna, 81.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 84.

redirect money and oversee projects that provide propaganda and recruitment opportunities, such as building schools, hospitals, and mosques. In one instance, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law became the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) branch chief in the Philippines and used his position to support two local terrorist groups.¹¹⁰ The infiltration of charitable organizations produces significant amounts of money and provides substantial influence in advancing the militant ideology.

In Western nations, which have more stringent banking laws, credit card fraud has become a significant means of funding. These networks operating in many European countries are estimated to be producing nearly one million dollars a month. A special camp in Afghanistan taught members how to commit credit card fraud, counterfeiting credit cards, and how to access and copy the encrypted information from magnetic strips. Equipment for reproducing credit cards has been captured during raids on terror cell safe houses in Europe.¹¹¹ This relatively easy method is often hard to detect as anything more than petty crime and enables the organization to maintain a low profile while generating large sums of cash from sources that would not contribute under other circumstances.

These vast sums of money are collected regionally and dispersed to the operational cells through a series of feeder accounts. The feeder accounts are established through Al-Qaida front organizations and charities while the operational accounts are established through unknown operatives using alias and false documentation that are also produced by the financial

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 91.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 87.

committee.¹¹² These accounts are numerous and widespread with many well known banking establishments world-wide providing an unwitting conduit to support terrorist activities.¹¹³

Manpower

Al-Qaida, by some estimates, has a support base of 6-7 million radical Muslims around the globe with as many as 120,000 willing to take up arms.¹¹⁴ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay have developed a succinct description of Al-Qaida's recruitment, training and employment system that provides a continuous flow of manpower in their ranks. Al-Qaida recruiters use mosques, Islamic cultural centers and prisons as a means to identify individuals with the potential for service.¹¹⁵ These recruiters have usually infiltrated these organizations and use their positions to agitate and indoctrinate individuals towards the more militant version of Salafist Islam.¹¹⁶ The recruiter can then direct these individuals in support of local organizations or recommend those with exceptional talent for further training within the Al-Qaida organization. This highly selective process is based on the individuals' desire to volunteer for service with Al-Qaida as well as the recruiters' assessment of their potential. After an extensive security check, recommended individuals are transported to Al-Qaida training camps for further indoctrination and education.¹¹⁷

Al-Qaida training is conducted in several remote locations around the world. The need to maintain secrecy and survivability requires a movement of these bases periodically. The training is echeloned with a basic, advanced and specialized skills curriculum. Basic courses are designed to familiarize individuals with firearms, first aid, explosives, and many other skills necessary for

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 84.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹¹⁵ Schweitzer and Shay, 144.

¹¹⁶ John Esposito, *Unholy War*, 110.

¹¹⁷ Schweitzer and Shay, 145

operating in a guerrilla force. Advanced courses deal with heavy weapons, assassination, and boobytrap explosives. Specialized courses develop surveillance and counter-surveillance skills, forging and adapting identity documents. Each operative is heavily inculcated with the ideological and theological teachings under Al-Qaida's religious and fatwa committee headed by al-Zawahiri.¹¹⁸ The development of personal and professional relationships among the trainees is heavily encouraged to increase the connectivity within the organizational network. Individual performance and commitment determines the level of training offered. Upon completion of training, individuals may return to their country of origin to assist in establishing or supporting an effective insurgency movement and to recruit others to the cause. Some are selected to serve in operational cells or assigned special missions to gather intelligence in foreign countries.¹¹⁹

Intelligence

Detailed planning based on accurate and actionable intelligence are characteristic of Al-Qaida operations. The transparent nature of Western society and the development of globalized information systems provide Al-Qaida a tremendous advantage in gathering actionable intelligence. This transparency enables terrorists to travel freely enabling them to gather intelligence through surveillance of targets and security protocols.¹²⁰ This is clearly evident in the ability of several of the 9/11 suicide high-jackers to travel, obtain pilot training, drivers licenses, banking accounts and credit cards within the United States.¹²¹ Human intelligence provided through sleeper agents is also augmented through the globalization of information networks.

¹¹⁸ Gunaratna, 95.

¹¹⁹ Schweitzer and Shay, 144

¹²⁰ Ibid., 134.

¹²¹ 9/11 Commission Report, 237-239.

The development of the World Wide Web has also been a boon to would be terrorists. The availability of information contributing to an attack is incredible. One only needs to check Globalsecurity.com to receive the latest locations of the United States Army's major commands, the Navy's fleets, and the Air Forces air wings.¹²² The ability to communicate and share this information via encrypted messaging has facilitated the planning and execution of several Al-Qaida attacks.¹²³ Al-Qaida's e-mail encryption programs, purchased off the shelf, remain unbroken by National Security Agency specialists.¹²⁴ The relative anonymity of global information systems enables Al-Qaida to gather critical information and communicate clandestinely with sleeper agents when developing plans of attack. The transparency inherent in an open democratic society has been co-opted to facilitate Al-Qaida's terrorist operations.

Sanctuary

Al-Qaida's diverse and decentralized organization requires minimal infrastructure. The ability to blend into the population allows cell members to operate with virtual impunity. Cell members live a parasitic existence using developed housing, travel and communications infrastructure often posing as foreign students to gain access and avoid attention. Extensive investigations have uncovered a cell responsible for destroying the World Trade Center operating in this manner in Frankfurt, Germany.¹²⁵ The transparency and mobility of the decentralized cell structure is key to their success in planning and executing operations.

One of the few infrastructure points of leverage is the Al-Qaida training bases. These camps are one of the few places in which relatively large numbers of trainees, operatives and

¹²² www.globalsecurity.org

¹²³ 9/11 Commission Report, 88.

¹²⁴ Gunaratna, 103.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 140

cadre are located together. In order to protect these assets, Osama bin Laden has used remote locations in relatively unstable regions such as Afghanistan, Northern Pakistan, Sudan, and more recently in Southeast Asia.¹²⁶ Local officials and warlords are often bribed to provide security and stability in these areas, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and governmental forces in Sudan.¹²⁷ These nodes are critical to maintain the flow of trained operatives and require a good deal of intelligence to locate.

ARE WE WINNING?

"It's quite clear to me that we do not have a coherent approach to this {war on terrorism}..terrorism is simply a technique being used by extremists. It is not the problem in and of itself, it's a weapon that's being used.

Donald Rumsfeld, June 5, 2004¹²⁸

Without a good plan for the whole campaign, it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat. ...Hence, before the first battle one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final battle will be fought...It is absolutely essential to have a long-term plan.

Mao Tse-tung¹²⁹

The military is very good at killing and capturing terrorists and plays a critical role in pursuing the war on terrorism. It has engaged terrorists worldwide and deposed dictatorial regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan since embarking on the GWOT. Many, however, argue that our hasty actions belie a strategic misunderstanding of Islamic religion and culture and have been counterproductive to victory in the GWOT. Additionally, these actions may have produced greater animus toward the United States and spawned greater support for Al-Qaida and other Islamist insurgencies worldwide. If the above statements of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Mao Tse-tung are correct, the United States' stunning military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq

¹²⁶ Paul J. Smith, "Transnational Terrorism and al Qaida: Confronting the New Realities," *Parameters*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, (Summer 2002) 37.

¹²⁷ Gunaratna, 82.

¹²⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, "Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies," Singapore, June 5, 2004

¹²⁹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972) 130-131.

may have valiantly paved the road to future failure in the GWOT. Victory in the GWOT requires the United States to develop and implement a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power in order to defeat Al-Qaida and others of their ilk.

Looking at the GWOT through the lens of insurgency demonstrates the complexity of the conflict facing America today and exposes a broader spectrum of opportunities to pursue. The analysis of the GWOT using Metz' and Millen's insurgency model identifies areas that must be addressed to prevent a successful insurgency. These areas provide both direct and indirect means of attacking an insurgency. The analysis demonstrates the need to address and resolve existing political and social conflicts to reduce the collective frustration that insurgent movements seek to exploit to garner support. The further need to confront and discredit the ideology that insurgent groups use to motivate and engender support is also demonstrated through this analysis.

Successfully addressing these areas of concern reduces the ability of insurgent organizations to expand. The identification, apprehension or destruction of critical leadership nodes and the reduction of existing sources of support are two other areas that directly combat an insurgent movement. An effective strategy, however, seeks to reduce support for an insurgency while simultaneously attempting to destroy the movement. Extreme caution must be taken to ensure that efforts to destroy the movement do not work against the efforts to reduce support and vice versa.

The Current Strategy

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism attempts to present a concept for incorporating all elements of national power to defeat terrorism. The strategy's release in February, 2003, nearly seventeen months after beginning the GWOT and the Secretary of Defense's statement above highlight the difficulty in resolving an ill defined problem. The strategy depicts the "structure of terror" as a hierarchical triangle with "underlying conditions" as the foundation, upon which is further laid the international environment, states, organization and

finally leadership.¹³⁰ This structure depicts the scope of the problem that the strategy attempts to address.

THE STRUCTURE OF TERROR



Figure 1

The strategy outlines four goals and their supporting objectives that attack the structure of terror. The strategy's stated goals are:

- 1) Defeat terrorists and their organizations
- 2) Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists
- 3) Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit
- 4) Defend the U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad

Three of these four stated goals are geared to directly or indirectly confront the terrorist movement. Eleven of the thirteen pages dedicated to outlining the objectives that support these goals are used to explain these three goals. The use of decisive military force is implicitly or explicitly described as a viable means of accomplishing two of these goals. Only the third goal,

¹³⁰ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 6.

"Diminish the underlying conditions" targets the foundation of terrorism as depicted in the "structure of terror" expressed earlier in the strategy.

The NSCT makes only a cursory stab at addressing the core issue in the GWOT. The goal of "diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit" is addressed by two stated objectives; "Partnering with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the (re)emergence of terrorism" and "Win the war of Ideas." This goal however comes with the caveat that, "The September 11 terrorists, for instance, came predominately from the ranks of the educated and middle-class and served in an organization led by a millionaire."¹³¹ This statement is in direct contradiction with the 9/11 Commission report that indicates that thirteen of the nineteen hijackers were "muscle hijackers," unmarried, from poor regions of Saudi Arabia and Yemen with no more than a high school degree.¹³² The leaders of the attack met the description contained in the NSCT, but the bulk of the foot soldiers came from the poor masses that this goal targets. The need to resolve the Palestinian and Israeli crisis is highlighted as a critical component in winning the "War of Ideas." The strategy takes a passive approach to this requirement stating, "The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when the Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them."¹³³ The minimal concentration on diminishing conditions of combating terrorism, coupled with the passivity in pursuing them indicate that this is not the central focus in the GWOT. Using "terrorism" to define the nature of the conflict has produced a strategy that fails to integrate the elements of national power to address the true center of gravity in fighting an insurgency; the people.

¹³¹ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February, 2003) 23.

¹³² The 9/11 Commission Report, 231-232.

¹³³ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 24.

Draining the Swamp

Central to Al-Qaida's success is the ability to control the Muslim population. Al-Qaida's strategy is dependent on the ability to motivate the population to take up arms against the West and the established governments in the region. The reduction of the conditions that enable Al-Qaida to gain and maintain support is therefore decisive to the success of this strategy.

Contributing to the success of the strategy is the ability to discredit the militant Islamic ideology and to present viable alternatives. This, in effect, serves to drain the swamp that incubates insurgency. While decisive in long-term strategy, success in these efforts will be measured slowly by degrees.

Al-Qaida and others seek to harness the frustration and hopelessness of the Arab-Muslim people in waging its insurgency against the West and the region's governments. The United States must actively participate in relieving the sources of this frustration in order to starve Al-Qaida of support. Diplomacy, supported by military action, economic policy and a coherent and realistic information campaign is key to success in this area. Critical diplomatic aspects of this strategy must include the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli, Iraq and Pakistani-India conflicts, the reformation of governmental and economic systems in the region, and the engagement in Southeast Asia to limit the potential expansion of the Islamist movement.

The Palestinian and Iraqi dilemma, and to a lesser degree, the India-Pakistani dispute, must be amicably resolved in order to reduce the tension within the Islamic community. This may require the United States to work in conjunction with Britain, the European Union or other regional powers, as an arbitration committee in order to resolve the long lasting conflicts and offset the perception of favoritism. Significant economic leverage can be applied using foreign aid and trade agreements to cajole cooperation from Israel and other Middle Eastern nations in negotiating a peaceful settlement. This settlement may require peacekeeping and/or security assistance missions until each nation is capable of providing for its own defense. An information

campaign emphasizing the significance of these reforms, expressed in tangible benefits for the population, must also be developed in support of these efforts. Resolving these long standing conflicts removes a significant catalyst for frustration among the Muslim population, but it must be accompanied with economic and governmental reforms as well.

Assistance must be extended to support regional government and economic systems as they evolve to meet the challenges of globalization in the 21st century. Enabling the Muslim population to raise their quality of life will reduce their willingness to support insurgent movements such as Al-Qaida. The United States and the world cannot allow energy policy and the desire for cheap petroleum to embolden corrupt autocratic leaders in the region. Investing in alternative fuel sources and efficiency systems may provide leverage in convincing national leaders to broaden economic and educational development within their countries. Funding educational panels and academic chairs at reputable Islamic universities and education centers in the region may empower the development of culturally unique solutions to economic, societal and governmental issues facing Arab-Islamic nations today. Information campaigns that emphasize the ability to maintain cultural identity while competing in a globalized world are necessary to assuage the fears of many Muslims. Assisting regional governments in making reforms in their economic and governmental systems without sacrificing cultural and religious identity would contribute significantly to reducing the cumulative frustration that fuels support for Al-Qaida.

The United States must also take action to support and assist governments in Southeast Asia to contain Islamic terrorist networks in the region. Over half of the world's Muslim population lives in Southeast Asia and Al-Qaida has established ties with several insurgent movements in the region to include the Jama'a al Islamiya and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

in an attempt to broaden their support base.¹³⁴ Military support in the form of security assistance, training and equipment, and intelligence sharing should be offered to those governments that seek to reduce this threat. Diplomatically, security coalitions involving regional powers such as India and China should be pursued to reduce this threat and limit the direct involvement of U.S. personnel whenever possible. Continued industrial and technological developments are already positively impacting the region's ability to compete in the global economy. Continued success in this area may enable moderate Muslim governments in this region to assist in leveraging reforms in the more autocratic regimes in the Middle East.

The success in reducing the existing conditions that give rise to an insurgency is assisted through the engagement in the war of ideas. The militant Islamic ideology must be confronted and discredited to disrupt Al-Qaida and other insurgent groups ability to motivate the population. The United States and its allies must not allow this insurgency to be characterized as one of liberation, rather this war should be framed as a civil war within Islam. Engaging moderate Islamic clerics is key to success in this area. These clerics have been allowed to remain on the sidelines for too long. Funding moderate Islamic academic chairs at leading universities in the region may provide a means to engage this critical resource. Academic grants should focus on exploring the viability of an Islamic democracy, developing apologetics for *jihad*, and exploring the evolving roles of government and religion within Arab culture. This empowers the internal development of viable alternatives to Islamic *jihadism*. Additionally, the Muslim population as a whole must be engaged. The globalized media can provide a conduit for this to take place.

The Zogby *Impressions of America 2004* Poll indicates that Muslims have an overwhelmingly unfavorable perception of United States policies but very mixed feelings about

¹³⁴ Schweitzer and Shay, 195.

Americans and American lifestyles in general. Those polled individuals that have met and know an American had significantly higher favorability ratings of the United States. American technology, education, freedoms, products and entertainment are categories that consistently receive the highest favorability ratings. Additionally, the younger respondents favored American values and products more than any other group.¹³⁵ This bodes well until one looks at where the respondents receive their information. The greatest source of information for the respondents is from Arab commentaries in Arab media. These findings provide valuable insight to leverage points that the United States can use to reach and influence Muslim Arabs. United States officials should actively seek opportunities to engage the population through any media available. Enabling reputable news carriers through the rapid dissemination of information will eventually reduce the short-term propaganda efforts undertaken by less honorable outlets. Finally, the information campaign must coherently support and describe the national strategy and objectives in the GWOT. Engaging the media to reach and influence the Muslims in the region is critical countering the Islamist Jihadist insurgency ideology.

Swatting Mosquitoes

Secondary to the success of a counter-insurgency strategy, but of more immediate priority, are the efforts to reduce the existing sources of support for insurgent movements and the apprehension or destruction of the insurgent forces and leadership. These actions are more readily observed and measured and, as a result, can be mistakenly used to determine the success or failure of the long-term strategy. Additionally, the havoc, fear, and potential for mass destruction caused by insurgents require political leaders and strategy makers to place heavy

¹³⁵ John Zogby, *Impressions of America 2004*, Zogby International, June 2004, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/Impressions_of_America04.pdf

emphasis on this aspect of a counter-insurgency campaign. Policy makers can not, however, allow the immediacy of this threat to distract them from the overall goal of reducing the long-term viability of the insurgency. The more direct and observable nature of these operations requires judicious application of force to prevent damage to the more subtle diplomatic, economic and informational overtures. Leading agents in this arena are intelligence, law enforcement, and the military. The current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) appears to concentrate America's efforts on swatting mosquitoes in the GWOT.

Moving Forward

Frank Kitson, in his book *Low Intensity Conflict*, expounded on the need to integrate all agencies of government under a centralized command structure to ensure unity of effort.¹³⁶ John McCuen echoes this sentiment when he says, "Unified planning, centralized control and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort, which will offer success against a unified revolutionary movement. All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be marshaled as weapons under centralized coordination and direction."¹³⁷ These quotes are decades old and yet could have easily been taken from current headlines. The NSCT directs specific tasks to different agencies within the government but does not, however, direct responsibility for supervising the overall efforts in pursuing the GWOT. The strategy further clouds the unity of effort at one point stating, "To synchronize this effort, the Department of State will take the lead in developing specific regional strategies for defeating terrorism. We will further leverage regional relationships, by ensuring appropriate allied participation with the

¹³⁶ Kitson, 53.

¹³⁷ John McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1967) 72-93.

regional Combatant Commanders as they prosecute the war on terrorism."¹³⁸ Who is in charge, the Department of State or Combatant Commanders and what is the relationship between the two? These are important issues that must be addressed in order to implement a counter-insurgency strategy and fully integrate all aspects of national power. Winning the GWOT requires the development of a long-term counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power under the direction of a central authority. Both immediate and long-term governmental reforms must be undertaken to ensure the United States ability to confront insurgent movements in the future.

National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC) are currently charged with managing the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States according to the National Security Presidential Directive-1.¹³⁹ The President should establish a new NSC/PCC to develop, implement and assess a new national counter-insurgency strategy and place those with the necessary expertise on the staff. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should chair the NSC/PCC comprised of representatives from each government agency. Agency and department heads should appoint representatives with resident expertise and requisite authority to ensure that the strategy is rapidly developed and implemented. This committee should assist the President in conducting a top down strategic planning process to develop a coherent and comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy. This immediate action is a short-term solution that provides a centralized authority to develop and implement a national counter-insurgency strategy until more permanent governmental reforms can be introduced.

¹³⁸ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 17.

¹³⁹ George W. Bush, "National Security Presidential Directive #1," February 13, 2001 accessed at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>, 4.

This NSC/PCC must develop a comprehensive global counter-insurgency strategy that empowers and synchronizes subordinate government agencies efforts in addressing the insurgency. The strategy should make the long-term goal of "diminishing the underlying conditions" that enable insurgencies the central focus while integrating the need to aggressively pursue existing insurgent organizations. This strategy must clearly delineate responsibility for accomplishing the stated goals and objectives and the requisite command and support relationships among government agencies. Refocusing efforts on diminishing the underlying conditions of insurgency will require the Department of Defense to begin ceding its leadership in the GWOT and assume a supporting role to the State Department as attempts to engage the world using the other elements of national power. Implementing this requires significant restructuring within the executive branch of government.

Long-term success in fighting counter-insurgency requires the restructure and revitalization of the State Department. The United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century recommends critical reforms that the State Department must undertake to be more responsive in negating emerging threats diplomatically. These reforms emphasize the need to develop a strategic planning capability and the consolidation of foreign aid programs, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the State Department. This would strengthen the department's ability to develop and implement foreign policy initiatives that reduce the conditions that lead to insurgency.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the State Department should create undersecretaries for directing the foreign services that mirror the Department of Defense's combatant command areas of responsibility. The combatant commanders and undersecretaries could then develop comprehensive theater engagement plans that incorporate and synchronize

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Washington D.C.: Governmental Printing Office, February 15, 2001) 47-49.

diplomatic, economic, informational and military efforts to counter insurgencies at a national, regional or global level.

The development of a comprehensive global counter-insurgency strategy and revitalizing the State Department's strategic planning and execution capability enables Combatant Commanders to develop more effective Theater Engagement Plans (TEP). Each Combatant Commander, armed with the strategy developed through the NSC/PCC and advised of State Department initiatives through the corresponding Undersecretary can develop a strategy for their respective Areas or Responsibility (AOR). Theater engagement plans direct the use of military forces for intelligence sharing, security assistance, foreign internal defense, training, as well as, ongoing combat operations in order to create conditions favorable to the United States within the AOR. These efforts should be designed to support the national counter-insurgency strategy, State Department initiatives, and create further opportunities for the use of the other elements of national power. This approach requires military leaders to assume a broader perspective than previously expected in developing these plans.

Senior strategic and operational commanders and planners to must think in broader terms than in the past. Senior and intermediate professional officers must be familiar with the strategic guidance issued in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), as well as strategic documents of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice. This understanding is required to develop effective plans to support and integrate the capabilities of the other elements of national power. These officers must understand the other elements of national power and be capable of expressing the potential implications of using force in diplomatic, informational, and economic and military terms when advising the National Command Authority (NCA). The “big one” mentality that has guided military education and training in recent decades must give way to the reality of the nature of conflict the United States will be engaged in for the near future. This transformation of mind enables the necessary development of a national counter-insurgency strategy that incorporates all aspects of national power.

CONCLUSION

The United States conventional military dominance has forced competitors and adversaries to pursue other means of conflict to achieve their goals. Terrorism is one method that has produced horrific results in recent years. The events of 9/11, coupled with the potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has necessitated a vigorous national response to the current threat. Unfortunately, this response has been a primarily military approach to fighting the Global War on Terrorism producing limited success thus far. Focusing efforts on terrorism, while politically expedient, distracts planners from the true nature of the conflict. The failure to properly define the nature of the conflict as a counterinsurgency has prevented the development of a strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power to defeat it.

Analyzing the GWOT using Metz and Millen's characteristics of successful insurgencies demonstrated the complexity of the fight, the inability of the military to produce victory alone and the requirement to leverage all elements of national power. The existence of underlying social, economic and political preconditions that produce collective frustration must be addressed to achieve long term success in a counter-insurgency effort. Insurgent movements seek to harness and direct this frustration through the implementation of an effective ideology, leadership and strategy. Finally, successful insurgent movements are able to secure and sustain sources of support in the form of manpower, intelligence, sanctuary and financing. A successful counter-insurgency, therefore, will use all elements of national power to mitigate and eliminate each of these areas.

The current strategy for terrorism does not adequately address the full scope of the conflict. The strategy continues to use "terrorism" to define the nature of the conflict and takes a direct approach to defeating this threat. The strategy seeks to decisively engage terrorist organizations, reduce their sources of support and protect the United States against further attack. Reducing the preconditions that give rise to an insurgency receives only minimal discussion in this strategy. The National Strategy for Countering Terrorism has focused on swatting

mosquitoes rather than draining the swamp that produces them. This prioritization belies a misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict and may actually lead to failure in the long term. The United States must develop and implement a counter-insurgency strategy that integrates all elements of national power to achieve success in the GWOT.

A special National Security Council / Policy Coordination Committee should be convened to develop and implement a counter-insurgency strategy. This PCC would advise the President and provide a centralized structure to develop, direct and assess the strategy's implementation. The expectation that insurgency will remain a viable method to defeat the United States conventional military power requires governmental reforms, especially within the State Department. These reforms would strengthen the State Department's ability to advise and direct diplomatic, informational, economic and military efforts to defeat insurgencies. Finally, the creation of an effective national counter-insurgency strategy and the revitalization of the State Department provide guidance to Combatant Commanders for developing Theater Engagement Plans that combat and restrict insurgency within their designated Areas of Responsibility. This requires the cultivation of leaders that understand the complexity of the nature of the conflict and the nations means for pursuing it. These efforts will enable the United States to develop a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power and win the Global War on Terrorism.

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