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Saving the World for Democracy

An Historical Analysis of America’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century

by

J. A. Bassani Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel (P) United States Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: _________________________________

13 May 2005
“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”  -Sir Winston Churchill in a speech before the House of Commons on 11 November 1947
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Abstract

This study examines America’s new grand strategy that has emerged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.

Grand strategy is an overarching concept that guides how nations employ all of the instruments of national power to shape world events and achieve specific national security objectives. Grand strategy provides the linkage between national goals and actions by establishing a deliberately ambiguous vision of the world as we would like it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources (means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision. Effective grand strategies provide a unifying purpose and direction to national leaders, public policy makers, allies and influential citizens in the furtherance of mutual interests.

This study looks at three separate and distinct historical examples of grand strategy: The post-Republican Era of the Roman Empire, the rise of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Kahn, and Great Britain after the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the wars of Spanish Succession. From these examples, we see the common threads that run through all grand strategies and the different approaches that nations take in pursuing their national interests.

Next, it examines the American experience with the emergence of the so-called Monroe Doctrine (America’s first grand strategy), the move toward multilateralism as a result of the Second World War, and America’s 21st Century grand strategy that emerged post-9/11.

Lastly, I discuss the conflict between America’s values and her national interests and the implications for America’s future at the end of the Century.
Few Americans will be surprised to discover in the decades to come that the United States went to war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 to secure strategic resources that are critical to our economic well-being. They will, however, be quite surprised to learn that we were successful in securing these resources – not for ourselves but for the People’s Republic of China.

Unfettered access to oil is critical to the economic well-being of our nation. According to the Committee on Resources for the US House of Representatives, “oil is essential to our economy, our national security and our way of life” (U.S. Congress, 2005). Oil is a key enabler of modern life: from the cars we drive, the goods we buy, the trucks, trains and airplanes that bring our goods to market, virtually every sector of our economy is dependent on oil in one form or another. Given the importance of oil as a strategic resource, one could easily assume that America’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil played a major role in the decision to invade Iraq (setting aside, of course, the debate over weapons of mass destruction).

The data, however, do not support that assumption. According to the US Department of Energy, the percentage of oil coming from the Persian Gulf as a share of total US oil imports was just 20% in 2003 (the latest year that data was available). As a percentage of total US consumption, Persian Gulf oil accounts for only 12% of America’s total annual oil consumption for 2003. Canada, it turns out, is the primary supplier of foreign oil to the United States, with Saudi Arabia ranking second and Venezuela third; curiously enough, Iraq produces less than 4% of US oil imports.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “the areas and countries the US imports from and the normal day-to-day destination of MENA [Middle East and North African] oil exports, is strategically irrelevant” (Cordesman, p.33). Conceding the point that the United States is not directly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, one must still acknowledge the enormous impact that MENA oil has on the world’s economy.

The United States, as part of the global economy of the 21st Century, must be concerned with economic health of the other industrialized nations of the world. Americans are voracious consumers of imported goods, and we export more than any other nation on earth. Trade is the engine of our prosperity, and all of our major trading partners (outside of North and South America) are heavily dependent on MENA oil. In 2002, MENA oil accounted for 42% of Europe’s imports, 72% of Japan’s, 76% of the Asian/Pacific Rim states (excluding China) and 39% (and growing steadily) of China’s oil imports.

Clearly the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003, in part, to secure the world’s access to oil – and we were absolutely right to do so. In today’s global economy, America’s economic well-being is inexorably linked to the fortunes of our Asian and European trading partners.

But access to oil is not the only reason the United States went to war in Iraq; were it so, we could have tolerated the status quo. The sanctions and no-fly zones, while not perfect, were sustainable. After all, the United States contained the Soviet Union for more than forty years; certainly we could have marshaled the political will to contain Saddam Hussein.
If oil was not the major reason that the United States chose to go to war, why, then, did the United States commit its blood, treasure and international reputation by invading Iraq? In a speech on the South Lawn of the White House, in October of 2004, President Bush defended the war as necessary to protect America and the world from the threat of terrorist use of WMD:

Based on the information we have today, I believe we were right to take action, and America is safer today with Saddam Hussein in prison. He retained the knowledge the materials, the means and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction. And he could have passed that knowledge on to our terrorist enemies, Saddam Hussein was a unique threat, a sworn enemy of our country, a state sponsor of terror, operating in the world’s most volatile region. In a world after September the 11th, he was a threat we had to confront. And America and the world are safer for our actions (Bush, 2004).

Five months later the President elaborated on the Iraqi situation in a speech on the War on Terror, delivered at the National Defense University. In that speech, the President stated that “[o]ur immediate strategy is to eliminate terrorist threats abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home…Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions
that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East” (Bush, 2005).

On several occasions the President has articulated his belief that the security of the United States is directly linked to political freedom and stability in the Middle East. If relieved from the oppression and tyranny of dictatorship, the logic suggests, the people of the Middle East will be free to pursue their own unique version of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This philosophy raises several interesting questions: How did the president come to his conclusion regarding the link between the spread of democracy and peace? How will his belief be translated into tangible US policy? Finally, are we willing to bet the future security of the United States on the President’s assumption?

The United States of America has one of the most sophisticated national security bureaucracies of any nation in history. The National Security Council, created in 1947 to coordinate foreign and defense policy, assists the President in the formulation and execution of America’s national security policy. The organization of the NSC has evolved over the course of the eleven administrations it has served, but its primary function remains unchanged: assist the President in formulating national security policy and help him coordinate the agencies of the Executive Branch that control some of the elements of America’s national power.

The Congress, like the President, has its own national security apparatus to assist lawmakers in executing their national security responsibilities. An informal survey of the House and Senate committee websites reveals at least a
dozen standing committees dedicated to oversight of national security issues. Our government is awash in directors, analysts, advisors and panels of experts who are dedicated to helping our elected officials craft and implement effective national security policies.

The National Security Act of 1947 mandates that the President transmit to Congress, annually, a report on the national security strategy of the United States. The Act stipulates that the annual report include “proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives” that are vital to our national security (SEC 108, 50 USC, 404a). This requirement was reiterated in 1986 as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (USC Public Law 99-433.Sec.104,b 3). The National Security Strategy attempts to codify what had previously been a fluid, undefined process that involved a wide variety of interested parties – formal and informal, foreign and domestic – working to build a long term strategy for enhancing the security of the nation. This strategy was (and still is in academic circles) regularly referred to as grand strategy.

Some of the most important and difficult decisions that our political and military leaders face involve grand strategy. These decisions are important because they very often have a profound impact on the long-term security and economic vitality of our nation. Moreover, they usually involve long-term investments of political and economic resources, as well as the support and commitment of the American people.
Grand-strategic decisions are difficult because they deal with intangibles; they require leaders to think conceptually and to visualize the effects of a series of seemingly unrelated actions. Crafting and implementing effective grand-strategic decisions requires vision, foresight, and the ability to read-between-the-lines to discern the intentions of foreign leaders – both friend and foe alike.

This is why political leaders routinely struggle with the question of motivations: Why do men do what they do, or perhaps more importantly, why do nations act as they do? Why does a nation pursue one particular course of action over another? Why, for example, did the Romans destroy Carthage in the spring of 146 BC? Why did Union forces fight a bloody war of attrition against the Confederates during the American Civil War, rather than accept secession? Why did America adopt a "Germany first" strategy during the Second World War, rather than make the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) the main effort from the outset? Or, more recently, why did the United States preemptively attack Iraq in 2003 while pursuing quite a different approach with Iran and North Korea? In the search for an answer to these questions, one must first come to grips with the concept of grand strategy – what it is and why we need one.

**Grand Strategy Defined**

Nailing down a commonly accepted definition of grand strategy can be difficult. Many respected pundits use the terms strategy and grand strategy interchangeably. Quite often, there is not even a common understanding among academics and defense analysts of what constitutes a grand strategy. In the following pages, I will review the work of selected authors regarding grand
strategy and offer my own, humble definition as a starting point toward a greater understanding of grand strategy, in general, and American grand strategy, in particular.

Early writings on military art, while dealing primarily with military tactics and strategy, make no distinction between strategy and grand strategy. Over twentyfive hundred years ago, Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War, as a treatise on military tactics and strategy. In it, he addresses the tactical application of military forces when, for example, when he advises the tactic of using “the extraordinary and the normal forces” (Griffith, p.91) and the strategy of combining tactics into offensive maneuvers like “the direct and the indirect” (Griffith, p. 102).

More than two thousand years later, one of the western world’s most famous and influential military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote that “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war” (Clausewitz, p. 146). Here, Clausewitz offers us a clear and succinct, albeit a bit sterile, description of strategy and its relationship to tactics. Clausewitz limits his discussion, however, to military forces and functions – a surprisingly narrow view from a man who asserted that “war is an act of policy [where] the political aim remains the first consideration” (Clausewitz, p. 98). Though narrow as his focus may be, Clausewitz opens the door to political and other non-military considerations in the study of strategy.

In his seminal work, Strategy, one of the Twentieth Century’s most gifted writers on the subject of strategic thought, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, amplified and extended the meaning of grand strategy. Hart contends that the roles of
grand strategy “is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war” (Hart, p.322).

Hart goes on to argue that the scope of grand strategy transcends the military plane and extends into the fabric of a nation’s social life:

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will. A good cause if a sword as well as armour. Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most effective weapon in weakening the opponent’s will to resist, as well as augmenting moral strength. (Hart, p.322)

According to Hart, grand strategy harnesses all of the elements of national power in the pursuit of wartime objectives. Hart’s description of grand strategy,
while more expansive than Clausewitz’s, is still rather limited in its application. Hart reveals a rather linear perspective on the relationship between war, peace, and grand strategy. He seems to view war and peace in a binary sense — as two separate and distinct states of being, rather than alternating conditions in a recurring cycle of international relations. Hart’s model depicts a world where nations are either at war or peace with each other.

Hart’s approach forces him to confine his discussion of grand strategy to its role in the conduct of war. He does, however, address the impact of wartime grand strategy on the ensuing peace. According to Hart, “while the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of the peace – for its security and prosperity” (Hart, p.322). Clearly Hart understands that the type of grand strategy a nation adopts will have significant consequences for securing the peace, but he describes grand strategy as the political object of war, rather than war as an element of a larger grand strategy.

In his excellent work, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, noted Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis provides a fascinating review of American grand strategy from the earliest days of the Republic through the Post-9/11 era. His view is broad and encompasses a variety of political, military, and economic considerations. Unfortunately, Gaddis limits his discussion to the evolution of American grand strategy; he does not attempt to provide a working definition of grand strategy itself.
Gaddis’s colleague Paul Kennedy, however, takes grand strategy head on. Kennedy makes, in my view, the best attempt to define grand strategy when he asserts that “the crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests” (Kennedy, p.5). Finally, it seems, we are addressing the essence of grand strategy – why it is important and what separates it from simple strategy. According to Kennedy, grand strategy has to do with somehow bringing together all the elements, in peace and war, in pursuit of the nation’s best interests. Now we’re getting somewhere.

When Kennedy refers to “all the elements”, one assumes he means all the elements of national power. So in Kennedy’s view, grand strategy is about directing the elements of national power, in both peacetime and wartime, to achieve national goals and objectives (interests) related to national security. So far, so good, but Kennedy seems to backtrack, later, when he makes a differentiation between a wartime and peacetime grand strategy:

This is not to say that grand strategy in peace is identical to grand strategy in war. Clearly, the latter condition calls for “blood, sweat, toil and tears” to a degree that simply does not exist in peacetime. Like the amateur athlete, the nation-state in times of peace (that is, while not engaged in outright physical competition) has to balance many desiderata – earning its keep, enjoying its pleasures, and keeping fit and
strong; but when the race (or a conflict) occurs, a far larger amount of energies and effort is given to winning and fighting, and the other elements are left to later. After the event, one can always return to “normal.” (Kennedy, p.169)

In my own view, a true grand strategy must transcend periods of armed conflict or war. If grand strategy truly does, as Kennedy suggests, “bring together all of the elements…”, then it must have an enduring quality that transcends (or perhaps even bridges) periods of relative peace and war. Kennedy’s definition, while certainly an improvement in terms of clarity, lacks the necessary descriptors which allow one to distinguish grand strategy from any other kind of strategy.

Finally, former Senator Gary Hart describes grand strategy as “the application of power and resources to achieve large national purposes” (Hart, p.3). Putting aside the imprecise nature of the phrase “large national purposes”, Senator Hart goes on to further explain that his idea of grand strategy “is meant to be a coherent framework of purpose and direction in which random, and not so random, events can be interpreted, given meaning, and then responded to as required” (Hart, p.33). Senator Hart’s definition, while succinct, is simply too vague to provide the necessary traction for the purpose of this project.

As these examples show, the accepted understanding of grand strategy has evolved over many centuries from a framework for the proper application of military force, in time of war, to achieve national objectives, to one that embraces all of the instruments of national power, in both war and peace, for the same
purpose. Still, the search for the elusive definition of grand strategy, its essential qualities if you will, is reminiscent of Socrates’ dialogue with Meno regarding the essence of virtue, or as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart noted about pornography: “I may not be able to define it, but I know it when I see it.”

In full recognition of the intellectual giants, heretofore mentioned, I offer my own definition of grand strategy as an overarching concept that guides how nations employ all of the instruments of national power to shape world events and achieve specific national security objectives. Grand strategy provides the linkage between national goals and actions by establishing a deliberately ambiguous vision of the world as we would like it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources (means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision.

Grand strategy, unlike a particular military strategy (The WWII Pacific island hopping strategy, for example) or economic strategy (e.g. the Marshall Plan) is both comprehensive and long term. It provides broad direction for all of the elements of national power toward achieving a more secure and prosperous future for the nation. It results in policies which are long-range – to be pursued over the course of decades, rather than years.

The particular grand strategy that a nation embraces will influence national decision making and will be reflected in how it answers the basic, 5-W questions: who, what, where, when and why.

Who (or whom for the grammatically doctrinaire) do we consider our adversaries or potential adversaries? Who will we ally ourselves with (or against)
in pursuit of our national interests? What specific actions will we take in pursuit of our national interests? What issues are we willing to go to war over (Vital versus important national interests)? Where will we focus our diplomatic, economic and military efforts in support of our national interests? When will we pursue rapprochement with one adversary or standoff with another? Finally, why does a nation take seemingly opposing positions on the same issue with different nations? These are but a few of the questions that can be answered by understanding grand strategy.

A coherent grand strategy is not, in itself, a prescription for national security and prosperity. Obviously, some grand strategies are more successful than others. A successful a grand strategy must meet the following criteria: First, it must be sufficiently ambiguous to allow for broad interpretation. Secondly, it must be resource informed. And finally, when implemented, it must ultimately leave the nation more rather than less secure.

Ambiguity is the oil that lubricates a successful grand strategy. It allows the nation’s political leaders the freedom of maneuver to build coalitions, promote domestic acceptance, or keep an adversary off-balance. Bumper sticker phrases like containment, Cold War, and Manifest Destiny often evoke understanding in one listener that is sufficiently different in another to allow for unified action in the face of conflicting interests. How else can one explain how a diverse organization like NATO, with its wide diversity in national interests and international perspectives, maintained such a cohesive stance during its first fifty years?
No grand strategy can reasonably expect to succeed if it ignores national limitations. Leaders of small nations (Great Britain being the notable exception) cannot reasonably expect to operate unilaterally for extended periods of time and still achieve their national objectives. Most nations employ grand strategies that rely on building coalitions and leveraging their own unique, national capabilities to achieve their ends. Very few nations in history possessed the resources to act alone, all the time. Leaders must continually take stock of their national assets and balance them against the grand strategy.

Lastly, and most importantly, a successful grand strategy must enhance the long-term well being of the nation it serves. For as Saint Matthew admonished in the Gospel, “For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” (Matthew, 16:26). National leaders must take care to ensure that operational victories do not result in strategic defeats. In other words, the price of victory should not be so dear as to bankrupt the physical and moral reserves of the nation.

**Determining Factors**

A successful grand strategy has, at its core, a set of basic principles which provide the intellectual framework for its development and implementation. These principles are nationally unique and derive from geography, natural resources, political institutions, demographics and historical precedent. It is within the unique context of particular circumstance that each nation derives its grand strategy. Great Britain provides an excellent example.
From the time of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, through the end of the Second World War, naval power was the centerpiece of British military power and a driving force behind her grand strategy. A casual observer might consider this development a “no brainer”. One could even reasonably argue that the rise of the British Navy as the dominant military arm and instrument in service of British Imperial power was preordained. One wonders, then, why Imperial Japan, also an island nation, saw her army as the decisive force around which she pursued the military objectives of her grand strategy.

The answer to that question has more to do with the motivations behind imperial aspirations –Great Britain being concerned primarily with economics while Imperial Japan sought to secure both strategic resources and international status. In any event, the evolution of grand strategy involves a complex set of relationships with factors that, at first look, may not seem to be directly related to national security.

Interestingly enough, while national values tend weigh heavily in the formulation of grand strategy, quite often they play a much smaller role in the execution of grand strategy than most politicians or policy makers would care to admit. During the Cold War, for example, a succession of US administrations, both Republican and Democrat, maintained close ties with un-democratic foreign leaders (Ferdinand Marcos and the Shaw of Iran are two that come immediately to mind) because it was in our national interest at the time.

With a better understanding of what grand strategy is, let us now look at how grand strategies evolve and come to gain popular acceptance.
So how does a nation actually decide upon a particular grand strategy? Do governments actually make a conscious effort to develop a grand strategy, or does it simply evolve over time? And if, in fact, grand strategies are arrived at in a logical and deliberate way, how do the processes that produce them differ in open, democratic societies vice closed, totalitarian ones?

To present a functioning grand strategy, the national political process must achieve consensus amongst the polity that will implement it. Of course polities differ greatly across the various forms of government, but still, those individuals, groups and institutions with equities at stake in the nation’s political life must buy in to the strategy, if it will have any real chance of success.

**Grand Strategy Through the Ages: The Roman Empire**

From the earliest days of the Republic, the citizens of Rome, as reflected in the actions of the Roman Senate, were obsessed with the security and defense of Rome. Enduring memories of the humiliation at the capture of Rome in 390 BC by northern barbarians fueled the Roman quest for security behind frontier lands and borders. In the first two centuries of the Republic, Roman Legions rebounded from a series of defeats as they subdued the Italian peninsula, conquered Sicily, and defeated their most potent regional rival, the Carthaginians.

The destruction of Carthage in 146 BC is illustrative of how the Romans used their scarce military resources to achieve lasting effect – especially in the eastern lands. The Roman Senate believed that Carthage, with her enormous wealth and history of military success, posed an unacceptable risk to Roman
security. For more than a century, Rome waged a series of costly wars against her North African rival for domination over the Mediterranean region. Finally, in 149 B.C., Rome issued an ultimatum to the citizens of Carthage: abandon the city or fight; to the delight of the Senate, the Carthaginians chose to fight.

After three years of savage combat, Carthage fell to the Roman legions. The men who refused to surrender were slaughtered, the women and children taken as slaves, and the city razed to the ground. So complete was the destruction of the city that it is still widely believed today that the Romans ploughed up the ground and sowed it with salt to prevent anything from ever growing there again. While there is no historical evidence to support the salting tactic, the durability of the story itself serves as a testament to the ruthlessness of the Roman legion and the willingness of Rome to use examples of the power of her military might for deterrent effect.

British historian Tom Holland describes the Roman use of armed force as a means of spreading fear and intimidation:

The legions’ combination of efficiency and ruthlessness was something for which few opponents found themselves prepared. When the Romans were compelled by defiance to take a city by storm, it was their practice to slaughter every living creature they found. Rubble left behind by the legionaries could always be distinguished by the way in which severed dog’s heads or the dismembered limbs of cattle would
lie strewn among the human corpses. The Romans killed to inspire terror, not in a savage frenzy but as the disciplined components of a fighting machine. (Holland, p.5)

In large measure, the Roman Republic was built on acquiescence rather than outright military domination. Rome tempered the threat of violence with liberal inducements aimed at creating client states that would accept long-distance rule from Rome. “To states that humbly acknowledged their superiority, the Romans would grant such favors as a patron condescends to grant his clients, but to those who defied them, only ceaseless combat. No Roman could tolerate the prospect of his city losing face. Rather than endure it, he would put up with any amount of suffering, go to any lengths” (Holland, p.6).

Eventually the imperial success of the Republic would lead to its downfall, as generals succumbed to the temptations of power, and the excess of newfound wealth corrupted the body politic. What began as a policy of national security through conquest, led to internal revolt and, ultimately, to dictatorship.

In *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, Edward Luttwak outlines the evolution of Roman grand strategy through three distinct systems of imperial rule over the course of more than three centuries. Luttwak describes these systems as the Julio-Claudian System of expanding client states, the Antonine system of stability and consolidation, and Defense-in-Depth. These examples offer an excellent opportunity to review the history of Roman grand strategy and will aid in deepening our own understanding of the application of grand strategy.
According to Luttwak, “[f]or the Romans, as for ourselves, the two essential requirements of an evolving civilization were a sound material base and adequate security. For the Romans, as for ourselves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order” (Luttwak, p.1).

If Luttwak’s assessment is correct –and I believe that it is– we can only regard the grand strategy of the Republic era as a failure. The outbreak of civil war and the eventual rise of Julius Caesar demonstrated that the power of an empire will not rest peacefully in the hands of a governing body of equals, committed to consensus rule. By pursuing a grand strategy that sought to expand the empire, the Roman Senate embarked on a course that created instability in the very political institutions they were trying to preserve. Thus, the well-being of the Republic was not enhanced by this strategy.

The Julio-Claudian grand strategy that evolved after the reign of Julius Caesar differed from its predecessor in the means it employed rather than the ends it hoped to achieve. For while both strategies sought to enhance Roman security and economic vitality, and both embraced the expansion of the Roman Empire, the new strategy actually succeeded in its goal of securing the wealth and stability of successive post-Republican governments.

From the time of Augustus, in 27 BC, through the reign of Nero, which ended with his death in 68 AD, the Roman’s pursued a grand strategy of global hegemony that leveraged client states and tribes to serve as the bulwark against
foreign invasion. All the elements of Roman power – the diplomatic, military, and economic – were employed with the goal of leveraging the power of others to secure Rome and her provinces.

Much is made – and rightfully so – of the military might of the Roman Empire. But military might alone stood little chance of dominating and subduing such a large and diverse empire. At its most powerful, Rome could field only twenty eight legions (approximately 175,000 men). Even counting the auxiliary forces provided by her client states, the number of men under arms for Rome totaled only about three hundred and fifty thousand. There is simply no way that a force that small could maintain a presence throughout an Empire that spanned from North Africa in the south, to Germany in the north, and from Spain in the west, to Syria in the east and beyond.

The strategy that the Romans employed, distributed Roman Legions to strategic locations across the empire that enabled them to reinforce trouble spots or to move quickly to check an invasion or quell an uprising.

Thus, in A.D. 6, out of a total of twenty-eight legions, four were in Spain, five on the Rhine or beyond, two in Raetia, five in Illyricum, three in Moesia, and nine in the whole of North Africa, Egypt, and Syria. After the ambush of Varus’s legion in A.D. 9, the Spanish garrison was reduced to three, the German increased to eight, the Raetian eliminated, and Illyricum left unchanged, and the Moeshian reduced to two. One
legion remained in North Africa, two in Egypt, and four in Syria. This distribution was maintained until the invasion of Britain in A.D. 43. (Luttwak, p. 47)

Given the uneven and selective distribution of Roman forces, how are we to account for the remarkable stability of the empire? To compensate for their relative paucity of military forces, the Romans employed a variety of diplomatic measures aimed at securing the support of their client states and tribes. Vassal kings and tribal chiefs were offered inducements to secure their loyalty to Rome. Everything was on the table: from subsidy payments to land grants — even offers of Roman citizenship. In fact, the most cherished honorific that a client head of state could hope to achieve was the title “amicus populi Romani” (friend of the Roman people). And should *promise* of treasure, land or title fail to secure the support of a reluctant king, the *threat* of Roman military action usually produced the intended effect.

It is the absence of a perimeter defense that is the key to the entire system of Roman imperial security of this period. There were neither border defenses nor local forces to guard the imperial territories against “low-intensity” threats of petty infiltration, transborder incursion, or localized attack…such protection was provided, but by indirect and nonmilitary means. By virtually eliminating the burden of maintaining continuous frontier defenses, the net, “disposable”
military power generated by the imperial forces was maximized. Hence, the total military power that others could perceive as being available to Rome for offensive use -- and that could therefore be put to political advantage by diplomatic means -- was also maximized. (Luttwak, p.19)

Economic power, the final element of the Julio-Claudian Strategy, provided a powerful tool that helped to bind the empire together. While many client states chaffed in their role as vassals of Rome, and open rebellion was certainly not unheard of, few were willing to foreswear the economic benefits of imperial trade. Even among the barbarian tribes of Germany, the lure of Roman wealth was strong.

The elegance of the Julio-Claudian grand strategy is evident, not in its application of raw power but, rather, in its economy of force. “[B]y virtue of their very existence, the client states absorbed the burden of providing peripheral security against border infiltration and other low-intensity threats”. (Luttwak, p.24)
Here we see the kind of synergy that military force, diplomacy and economic partnerships can achieve. By viewing the empire as a balanced system of alliance, conquest and economics, Rome secured a frontier that was largely self-sustaining.

The shift in grand strategy from which occurred with the passing of the Julio-Claudian system to the era of the Antonine system reflects the inevitable maturation of the empire. “Notwithstanding the endemic insecurity of its unguarded frontiers, the Julio-Claudian system was highly efficient—efficient, that is, in terms of the goals of the empire at that time. But by the second century the goals had changed”. (Luttwak, p. 75)

By about 69 A.D., the Roman appetite for large-scale conquest had been sated; this was a period of consolidation. Barbarian tribes were being assimilated. The newly fortified frontier was a place where lesser, unassimilated barbarian tribes were segregated from their more civilized (Romanized) kin. Moreover, the resources of Rome were stretched thin and continued expansion of the Empire was simply not practical. The time for governing rather than expanding the empire had arrived.

Under the Antonine system, Roman grand strategy no longer relied on client states and tribes to provide frontier security. During the Antonine period, Roman priorities shifted from expanding and exploiting frontier client states, to securing a tranquil peace throughout the empire in order to promote growth, commerce, trade and, above all, political stability (or what Luttwak calls “Romanization”). As the frontier regions become increasingly pacified and
prosperous, they also become more accepting of Roman rule, and much like the relationship of American Colonies to England, they begin to see themselves as Romans, with all the rights and privileges therein.

The decline of the client state system began around 70 A.D., when Vespasian assumed the throne after the civil war which followed Nero’s death. Vespasian saw the client state system as burdensome, derisively referring to the political maneuvering required to secure client state support as "the leisurely processes of diplomacy". Under the Julio-Claudian system, Rome had an interest in maintaining a balance of power amongst her client states – adjudicating disputes and punishing unsanctioned military actions, such as Herod’s move against neighboring Nabatean Arabia during the rule of Augustus Caesar. Under the Antonine system, Rome began to annex her client states and take on the responsibility for their border defense as provincial entities of the empire.
Why, one might ask, did Rome decide to change a grand strategy that had worked so well for so long? The answer, while paradoxical, is actually quite logical: Strong client states were useful to Rome, only so long as she herself could maintain overwhelming military (and ultimately political) power over them. Strong client states enjoyed a measure of autonomy within the empire, so long as they employed their own military forces in the defense of the frontier and, most importantly, did not challenge the authority of Rome.

From the founding of the Republic to the end of the Julio-Claudia era, Rome wielded unprecedented power. During this period of imperial expansion, Roman client states understood the power of the legions and the willingness of the emperor to use those legions to assert Roman authority. Usually Rome’s clients weighed their options and chose to accept their role as semi-autonomous clients. Any king who wished to keep his throne would have to lead his military forces in service to the empire.

By the time of Vespasian, however, Rome had neither the inclination nor the resources for continued conquest. The civil war that followed Nero’s death left the political will of the empire exhausted. Furthermore, Vespasian certainly understood the danger that a powerful military commander left to his own devices on the frontier, posed to the established order in Rome.

Under the Julio-Claudians, the stronger a client state was, the better it could fulfill its diverse security functions. An empire that was perceived as capable of further expansion was also an empire that could
keep its powerful clients in subjection. Not so under
the new system, in which the only satisfactory clients
were those weak enough to be kept in awe by the
forces deployed in direct proximity to them. In the
absence of the ultimate sanction of annexation, only
weak clients were safe clients. But their very
weakness rendered them unsatisfactory as providers
of free military services. Strong client states, on the
other hand, had now become dangerous, since the
bonds of dependence had been weakened. (Luttwak,
p.114)

The evolution in Roman grand strategy that occurred under the Antonine
system was the result of economic concerns, as well as military factors, and it
affected more than just the disposition of Roman military forces. Diminishing
economic opportunity, as well as the need for security, drove the abandonment
of expansion and establishment of rigid borders. By 70 A.D. the Empire had
enveloped nearly all of the economically developed regions within reach. At the
close of the 1st Century A.D., Rome held dominion over an empire that reached
the ocean in the west, the Parthian empire in the East, and barbarian tribes with
little to offer in the way of goods or valuable resources in the north. Since there
was no profit in extending the empire further, Rome turned inward.

The death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 AD marks the beginning of the end
for the Antonine period. With the murder if his son and heir to the throne,
Commodus, in 192 AD, a disgraceful period of internecine war, bribery, and treachery ensued. “Between the natural death of Septimus Severus in 211 and the accession of Diocletian in 284, there were twenty-four more-or-less legitimate emperors and many more usurpers”. (Luttwak, p.128) It was Diocletian, finally, who brought order to the chaos through political and military innovations that would preserve the Roman Empire for another century.

Diocletian’s political reforms centered on the introduction of the tetrarchy as the new form of imperial authority in Rome. By cleaving the empire in two and establishing an Augustus of the East and an Augustus of the West, he returned political stability to the body politic and ended the bloody wars of succession that had plagued the Empire for decades.

Militarily, Diocletian established the strategy of Defense-in-depth, based on a combination of static fortresses and mobile field armies. When frontier fortifications were overrun, the Legions would resort to an open, mobile form of warfare. The preferred method during this period, however, was to tie armies into existing, fortified positions along the frontier:

Meeting only static guard posts and weak patrol forces on the frontier, the enemy could frequently cross the line virtually unopposed, but in the context of defense-in-depth, this no longer meant that the defense system had been “turned” and overrun. Instead, the enemy would find itself in a peripheral combat zone of varying depth, within which
strongholds large and small as well as walled cities, fortified farmhouses, fortified granaries, and fortified refuges would remain, each capable of sustained resistance against enemies unequipped with siege-machines. Within and beyond this zone were the mobile forces of the defense, deployed to fight in the open but with the support of the fortified places.

(Luttwak, p.132)

From the earliest days of the Republic, to the eventual sack of Rome in 410 A.D. by the Goths, the Senate and emperors of Rome had a grand strategy for securing the physical and economic well-being of the empire. And as the geo-political situation evolved over decades of conquest and rule, so too, did Roman grand strategy.

**Genghis Kahn and the Mongol Empire**

For centuries the name Genghis Kahn has evoked images of unbridled barbarism and chaos. It’s probably a pretty safe bet to assume that very few people today would use words like diplomacy, commerce, international law, and grand strategy when discussing the ruler of the ancient Mongol nation. It is actually quite remarkable, really, that history should portray the man who built the largest empire in the history of the world as more warlord than geopolitical strategist.

While Genghis Kahn had none of the organs of a modern, sophisticated national security system at his disposal, he did, nonetheless, have a grand
strategy or vision for the Mongol nation. Although unwritten, Genghis Kahn’s grand strategy for the Mongol nation was remarkably successful in harnessing the military power of the Mongol tribe, integrating diplomatic efforts, and creating a system of economic relationships that joined the traders of the east with the markets of the west. For “[a]lthough he arose out of the ancient tribal past, Genghis Kahn shaped the modern world of commerce, communication, and large secular states more than any other individual. He was the thoroughly modern man in his mobilized and professional warfare and in his commitment to global commerce and the rule of international secular law”. (Weatherford, p.267)

Temujin, the boy who would one day be known as Genghis Kahn, was born in the spring of 1162 A.D., to the Black Bone or lower caste of the Asian Steppe people. By the accepted standard of the day, the boy was completely unremarkable: He was not particularly large or physically gifted, and his temperament suggested nothing especially useful to a warrior culture. Nonetheless, this young boy was destined to one day remake the world in his own image and forge the greatest empire in the history of the world.

As a member of the lower caste, Temujin was forced to defer to his betters – those White Bones who achieved their positions in the established order by right of birth. His personal frustrations forced him by 1181 A.D. to set out on his own and establish his own clan. Taking a novel approach to the task of building his court, Temujin appointed his followers to positions of responsibility based on merit, rather than caste or family connections. So effective was his system that he quickly established himself as a beloved leader amongst the Mongol people.
In fact, by “the age of nineteen, Temujin seems to have determined to become a warrior leader of his own, to attract his own followers and build a base of power, eventually aiming to become a khan, the leader and unifier of the unruly Mongol tribe”. (Weatherford, p,39)

As he continued to expand his influence over his own tribe, Temujin began to see himself as a unifying force for all of the Steppe people. Historically the balance of power in the region shifted from Kahn to Kahn in a series of continuous battles. But as he continued to consolidate his power, Temujin grew determined to bring all of the tribes under one rule. Once he consolidated rule over his own tribe, Temujin began his conquest over all of the Eurasian Steppe, and by 1206, he had united all of the nomadic tribes of Eurasia – the Tartars, the Keyrid, and the Naiman -- under his rule as Mongols.

With his power base secure, Genghis Kahn, the 44 year-old ruler of the Great Mongol Nation, turned his attention outward. While he commanded a great army of warriors, he ruled over an impoverished nation with no industry and little wealth. As he looked across the great Gobi desert to the south, The Great Kahn saw the flow of riches along the silk route. And while the chieftains of the various tribes he had defeated in battle were content to skirmish over women, horses or scraps of cloth, Genghis Kahn had a grander vision: the vision of an empire united in commerce under the stability and protection of Mongol rule.

Because he understood that military conquest alone would not achieve the kind of lasting results he sought, Genghis Khan pursued his vision of empire with a grand strategy that harnessed all of the instruments of Mongol power. Under
his rule, military victories were exploited by diplomatic and economic maneuvers and, often times, diplomacy and economic agreements actually preceded military operations.

By 1211 A.D. Genghis Kahn was ready to begin the expansion of his empire. With the experience he acquired from his victories over the Steppe tribes, he led his army south across the Gobi and began the conquest of the Jurched territory, in what today is modern China. Advancing against walled cities, usually fighting outnumbered and facing a technologically superior foe, Genghis Kahn employed a military strategy that featured a carrot and stick approach:

Genghis Kahn recognized that warfare was not a sporting contest or a mere match between rivals; it was a total commitment of one people against another. Victory did not come to the one who played by the rules; it came to the one who made the rules and imposed them on his enemy. Triumph could not be partial. It was complete, total, and undeniable – or it was nothing. In battle, this meant the unbridled use of terror and surprise. In peace, it meant the steadfast adherence to a few basic but unwavering principles that created loyalty among the common people. Resistance would be met with death, loyalty with security. (Weatherford, p.8)
The success of Temujin’s Mongol warriors is legendary. Not since the empire of Rome had the world witnessed such a display of military prowess. Leading a nation-tribe of less than one million souls, with an army of approximately one hundred thousand warriors, Genghis Khan conquered an area of approximately 12 million square miles. “In twenty five years, the Mongol army subjugated more lands and people than the Romans had conquered in four hundred years”. (Weatherford, p. xviii)

The strategy that the Mongol’s employed against an enemy involved a sophisticated combination of diplomacy backed by the force. As he consolidated his power amongst the tribes of the Asian Steppe, Genghis Kahn cultivated his reputation as a fierce warrior. His military strategy was remarkably fluid and asymmetric.

All Mongolian warriors were mounted, and without armor, they were fast and agile. If his opponent possessed a large infantry force, Genghis Kahn’s armies waged a mobile campaign that employed hit-and-run tactics designed to spread the opposing army out. If he defended behind great city walls, the Great Kahn’s warriors laid siege to them, employing their engineers to build siege engines to reduce their defenses. If the enemy possessed a large peasant population, the Mongol armies drove them like cattle ahead of their advance, straight into the defending enemy army:

“The Mongol army divided into small units that attacked undefended villages, set them afire, and chased out the residents. The frightened peasants
fled in all directions. They clogged the highways and made it difficult for the Jurchen supply convoys to move. In the Jurchen campaign, more than a million refugees fled the countryside in desperation and poured into the cities; they ate up huge stores of food, and caused chaos wherever they went”.

(Weatherford, p.92)

The Mongol’s brutal military tactics supported Genghis Kahn’s preferred diplomatic approach to conquest: as the Mongol armies approached the capitol city of a kingdom, the general in charge sent a messenger with a surrender demand. If the prince surrendered his city, offered tribute and pledged his loyalty to the Mongol empire, the city was spared and the monarch kept his throne as a vassal of Genghis Kahn; if not, the city was razed, the prince publicly beheaded, and his wives distributed to deserving Mongol generals.

This approach supported Genghis Khan’s grand strategy of expanding his empire to establish hegemony over large parts of Europe, China, the Middle East and India in order to connect them in trade and, ultimately, enrich his own people. Certainly the Mongols would take what they wanted by force, but if they could coerce a ruler to submit to Mongol rule through fear, enlightened self-interest, or a combination of both, so much the better. In the end, all that really mattered to Genghis Kahn was that Mongol rule remained secure and supreme.
Above all else, economic considerations drove Mongolian grand strategy. By 1260 A.D., the Mongol Empire stretched over two continents, connecting the major cites of Zhongdu (Beijing), Moscow, Kiev, and Baghdad. Mongolian officers engaged in lucrative trading with merchants as far away as Venice and Geona. More importantly, the Mongols controlled the trade routes that joined east with west. Understanding the value of trade and commerce to their empire, the Mongols introduced a sophisticated finance system to support their global trade:

Genghis Khan had authorized the use of paper money backed by precious metals and silk shortly before his death in 1227. The practice grew erratically in the coming years, but by the time of Mongke Khan's reign, it became necessary to limit the
paper money supply in ways that it was not necessary
to do with gold and silver coins. Mongke recognized
the dangers incurred by earlier administrations that
issued paper money and debt on an ad hoc basis,
and in 1253 he created a Department of Monetary
Affairs to control and standardize the issuance of
paper money. The superintendent of the agency
centralized control to prevent the overissue of paper
money and the erosion of its value through inflation.

(Weatherford, p.176)

Mongke Khan, like his grandfather before him, understood that the real
value of money resided in dependence. By creating a stable and effective
monetary system, Mongke deepened economic ties and tightened his grip on the
vassal states of the empire.

Like the Romans before them, the Mongols employed their own unique
grand strategy that leveraged their national strengths and provided direction to
their subordinate military, diplomatic and economic strategies.

Great Britain and the European Balance of Power

With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, England emerged as an
important world power. Her immediate reaction to this newfound status was to
take to the seas in pursuit of economic rewards. According to Winston Churchill,
in his acclaimed History of the English Speaking Peoples, “England had emerged
from the Armada year as a first-class power...The success of the seamen
pointed the way to wide opportunities of winning wealth and fame in daring expeditions” (Churchill, p.155). As she continued her global conflict with Spain, a British grand strategy began to emerge that blended the military instrument, provided by her naval power, with economic expansion. While British merchants struck out across the globe in search of wealth, the Royal Navy continued its harassment of the Spanish at every chance:

The coming years resound with attacks upon the forces and allies of Spain throughout the world—expeditions to Cadiz, to the Azores, into the Caribbean Sea, to the Low Countries, and, in support of the Huguenots, to the northern coasts of France. The story is one of confused fights, conducted with slender resources and culminating in a few great moments. The policy of the English government was to distract the enemy in every quarter of the world.

The island was at last secure. (Churchill, p.155)

Beginning in the Eighteenth Century, during the Wars of Spanish Succession, British grand strategy evolved to include a second enduring objective: the balance of power on the European Continent. According to John Hattendorf, Professor of maritime History at the Naval War College, “English statesmen believed that there must be a balance of power in Europe which would hinder anyone [sic] nation from interfering with the normal development of another nation” (Kennedy, p. 19).
To achieve a balance of power on the Continent, the British government engaged in a series of diplomatic maneuvers aimed at securing a Grand Alliance against France. Britain secured the active support of the Dutch and the Portuguese, as well as lesser support from the Austrians and the Germans, in a bid to encircle France and her allies with the goal of dividing and weakening her superior military strength. After more than a decade of global war, the treaty of Utrecht secured a favorable peace for the British – one that created a balance of power in Europe, split the Spanish throne between the Habsburgs and Bourbons, secured the Protestant succession and secured significant trade and territorial advantages.

The grand strategy that emerged during the Eighteenth Century capitalized on three British strengths-- naval dominance, grand alliances, and colonial interests – to achieve a balance of power in Europe, thereby securing Great Britain’s physical and economic well-being. Time and again, when Britain saw her security threatened, she turned to this strategy to secure her long-term interests.
In one form or another, this grand strategy demonstrated its utility throughout both the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. For it was Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar, even more than Wellington’s at Waterloo, that secured England from invasion and preserved the British Empire. Whenever Britain chose to ignore her successful naval strategy as economy of force in Europe (Waterloo being the notable exception) she paid dearly.

One could trace the decline of the Empire to the British entry into World War One and their refusal to embrace this time-tested grand strategy, resulting in four years of horrific carnage, the loss of an entire generation and the erosion of confidence for the mass of British in their national government. “Liddell Hart’s dislike of Britain’s overcommitment (as he viewed it) to the western front led him to put the case for “the British way of warfare”: that is to say, for the “historical
strategy” of an island-state chiefly reliant upon sea power, and contributing the instruments of the maritime blockade, financial subsidies, and peripheral operations – but not large scale continental army – to the coalition assembled to defeat any power which sought to dominate Europe by force” (Kennedy, p. 3).

The Evolution of American Grand strategy

National security is the 800 pound gorilla of American politics. Providing for the common defense is one of the fundamental justifications for our very form of government. The image of the citizen-soldier, the minuteman, ready to take up arms in defense of his community is seared into the American consciousness. As a nation of immigrants (excepting, of course, the American Indians), most Americans have a sense that securing the “American Dream” is an obligation that comes with their birthright as Americans.

Since the earliest days of the Republic, American statesmen have struggled to achieve a balance between national security and American values. During the debates over ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton addressed America’s security interests in The Federalist Papers. Prior to ratification of the federal Constitution, Pennsylvania and North Carolina adopted constitutions which declared, “[a]s standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up” (Hamilton, federalist No.24). Hamilton, however, advanced the argument for a standing federal army as essential to the security of the nation:

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that
warn us against an excess of confidence or security.

On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are
growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.

On the other side, and extending to meet the British
settlements, are the colonies and establishments
subject to dominion of Spain. This situation and the
vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these
two powers, create between them, in respect to their
American possessions and in relation to us, a
common interest. (Hamilton, Federalist no.24)

Hamilton further explained that the federal government, rather than the
individual states, had an obligation to provide for the defense of the nation. In an
early hint at preemption, Hamilton dismissed the argument against maintaining a
standing army in peacetime as an invitation to attack by a hostile foreign power.
Should those opposed to a peacetime standing army prevail, Hamilton reasoned,
"[w]e must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it. All that
kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering
storm, [italics added for emphasis] must be abstained from, as contrary to the
general maxims of a free government" (Hamilton, Federalist no.25).

This early argument over the need for a standing army is illustrative of the
struggle to decide just what kind of nation the people of the United States of
America wished to build. The election of George Washington as our first
president would establish precedent for American national security policy for over a century.

As a military commander, Washington understood that military power is an essential component of national security. As a pragmatist, however, he also understood that American military power was limited, and that America, as a second-rate power compared to Great Britain, France and Spain, could easily find herself in the position of a pawn in the European balance-of-power game. Neutrality, Washington reasoned, was the only way that America could protect her independence.

Throughout his presidency, George Washington spoke frequently and eloquently in favor of neutrality in European affairs, in particular, and detachment from foreign intrigue, in general. Washington’s numerous writings and speeches on the subject revealed a deeply-held sentiment that would resonate throughout our government for over a century. In his farewell address to Congress, Mr. Washington declared,

If we remain one People, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation;
when we may choose peace or war, as our interest
guided by our justice shall Counsel…Tis our true
policy to steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any
portion of the foreign world” (Washington, p.975).

Washington’s impact on future American policymakers cannot be
overstated. His isolationist sentiments served as the bedrock of an embryonic
American foreign policy that continued to evolve throughout the Nineteenth
Century. So strong is the isolationist strain in the American body politic that, even
today, in an America that is the most engaged and important nation in the world,
Americans are reminded of Washington’s famous admonishment to avoid foreign
entanglements.

**The Monroe Doctrine**

In the decade following the end of the Revolutionary War, however,
Americans enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity, especially when
compared to the people of Europe who continued to be plagued by tumult of war
and revolution. Eminent American statesman and future President, John Quincy
Adams noted upon his return from Europe in 1801 the contrast in the quality of
life between the common people of Europe and the United States. According to
his biographer, Samuel Bemis, Adams observes that “[t]he standard of living had
steadily improved for the average man. Luxurious new mansions or “palaces,”
had sprung up for the more wealthy. The general well-being was testimony to the
success of the foreign policy of George Washington and John Adams, which
Thomas Jefferson took over and continued in all essentials: ‘peace, commerce,
and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none’ " (Bemis, p111).

Adams’s observations are important because he, perhaps more than any other American statesman before or since, played a significant role in shaping the future of American foreign policy. For John Quincy Adams, “the most influential American grand strategist of the nineteenth century”, was the principal architect of America’s first and most enduring, national grand strategy (Gaddis, p.15).

John Quincy Adams was the most skilled and experienced diplomat of his day. He received his first exposure to the affairs of state at the age of ten when he accompanied his father during the elder Adams’s diplomatic mission to the courts of Europe in 1778. From his experiences as a teenager in the courts of Europe, to his one term as a Senator from Massachusetts, his assignment as Ambassador to Russia and as Secretary of State in the Monroe administration, Adams developed remarkable skill as a diplomat as well as a keen sense of American independence.

Adams believed strongly in Manifest Destiny -- though that term had yet to be coined. During his time as Ambassador to Russia, Adams explained his position in a letter to his father:

> The whole continent of North America, he told his father, appears to be destined by Devine Providence to be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and
political principles, and accustomed to one general
tenor of social usages and customs. For the common
happiness of them all, for their peace and prosperity, I
believe it is indispensable that they should be
associated in one federal union. (Remini, p.44)

During his one term as a United States Senator, Adams demonstrated his
understanding that American security depended on expansion across the North
American continent. At great risk to his future as a Federalist politician, Adams
publicly supported Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, even though he voted against
on legal-technical grounds:

John Quincy Adams believed with John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, as well as with the High
Federalists Rufus King and Alexander Hamilton, in
the annexation of Louisiana, if only as a means of
keeping Napoleon Bonaparte out of that region for the
peace and safety of the United States. He was
further convinced that the loss of power and influence
of his section would be more than compensated by
the extension of national power and security. (Bemis,
p.119)

As Secretary of State during the Monroe Administration, Adams
demonstrated his genius as a diplomat by turning a potentially embarrassing and
dangerous situation into a stunning victory for American interests in North
America. Moreover, his handling of the crisis brought on by the First Seminole War provided the intellectual framework for America’s first true grand strategy that would ultimately result in the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1818 President Monroe authorized General Andrew Jackson to conduct a punitive expedition into Florida to punish Seminole warriors for their raids into US territory and attacks on US citizens. Jackson’s mission, while certainly a military success, was a potential diplomatic disaster. In the process of punishing the Seminole warriors and destroying their villages, Jackson greatly exceeded his mandate by capturing the cities of Pensacola and St. Marks and executing two British nationals who he suspected of arming the Seminoles.

This incident, with its potential to become a diplomatic crisis for the United States, split the President’s Cabinet. Several members of the Administration called on the President to censure Jackson in order to avoid British and Spanish reprisal; only Adams rose to the General’s defense. He prevailed upon the President to provide post hoc sanction of Jackson’s actions in Florida. Adams argued “that everything he [Jackson] did was defensive; that as such it was neither war against Spain nor violation of the Constitution” (Remini, p. 55). Monroe sided with Adams, and he gave his Secretary of State the mandate to set in motion a brilliant series of diplomatic maneuvers that signaled the beginning of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

The settlement that Adams engineered with the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1821 was a landmark event that won for the United States more than just title to Florida. Ever the visionary, Adams worked a general settlement of disputes over
the southern border with Mexico that, combined with his earlier settlements with Great Britain over the northern border with Canada, opened the way to western expansion and established American claims on the Pacific coast.

Just as importantly, Adams’s defense of Jackson’s actions in Florida established the intellectual argument for preemption. By giving the Spanish the ultimatum to adequately garrison the territory or cede it to the United States, Adams signaled, not just the willingness, but the right of the United States to defend itself against imminent threats. His belief in America’s divine mission to establish dominion over North America (Manifest Destiny) would ultimately find its expression in the Monroe Doctrine.

Adams diplomatic coup in Florida inspired Monroe to publicly embrace his vision of American hegemony. In his annual message to Congress on 2 December 1823, Monroe formally put the European powers on notice that the United States (with the tacit approval of Great Britain) would not condone attempts to revive their colonial authority in the Americas:

> [t]he American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. (Monroe, 1823)

Thus, the so-called Monroe Doctrine became the unifying theme of John
Quincy Adams’s grand strategic vision for American security: Preemptive military
action, in the face of emerging threats; unilateralism, expressed by American
neutrality and isolationism; and hegemony, initially over North America but
eventually extending over the entire western hemisphere, as American power
allowed.

Like all successful grand strategies, the strategy that Adams crafted in the
early Nineteenth Century was neither codified in a document nor publicly debated
as such. It was, however, popularly understood by most Americans and
expressed in common references to the issues of the day, such as “54-40 or
fight” over Alaska; the battle cry of “remember the Alamo” during the war with
Mexico, Horace Greeley’s challenge to “go west young man” and complete the
American settlement of the continent. These phrases, along with “Manifest
Destiny”, “Remember the Maine”, and others, reflect a national consensus over
America’s role and mission in the world. In fact, Adams’s grand strategic vision
was so successful that it served twenty-seven presidential administrations
(excluding the first two terms of FDR) and prevailed as the philosophical
underpinning for American national security for nearly a century and a half.

**WW I and Wilsonian Democracy**

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the United States stood
unchallenged as the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere. The
annexation of Cuba and the Philippine Islands at the end of the Spanish American War, coupled with the development of a two-ocean navy enabled by the Panama Canal, solidified her status as an emerging world power and master of the Americas. Despite her growing international stature (it was Theodore Roosevelt, after all, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the end of the Russo-Japanese War) American policy makers were determined to protect America’s neutrality.

To characterize America’s entry into the First World War as reluctant is an understatement. From the very outset of the war, President Wilson went to great lengths to keep America out of the fight. In a message to the 63rd Congress, dated 19 August 1914, barely three weeks after the war began, Wilson declared America’s neutrality, “in fact, as well as in name” (Wilson, 1914). Even the German sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 did not break American neutrality. In fact, Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in protest over Wilson’s harsh rebuke of the Germans over the incident.

While he would go on to win reelection in 1916 under the slogan “he kept us out of the war”, Wilson could not keep America on the sidelines indefinitely. Ironically, it would take a German diplomatic initiative to ally herself with Mexico, against the United States, to push America into the war. Even as America joined the Allies to defeat the Germans in 1917, she balked at the prospect of full partnership in the Grand Alliance, preferring instead to retain a vestige of unilateralism as an associate member.
It is clear that America’s entry into World War One represented a detour, rather than a departure, from America’s grand strategy of neutrality, unilateralism, preemption and hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. It is interesting to note the conversion that Wilson appears to have undergone during the war: He stood for reelection on a platform of neutrality, yet in his Fourteen Points speech to Congress, he proposed “a general association of nations…affording mutual guarantees” (Wilson, 1918). Later in the speech, Wilson revealed his newfound internationalist sentiments when he explained, “we fell ourselves to be intimate partners of all governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end” (Wilson, 1918). Unfortunately for Wilson, the Congress did not share his new world view. Unwilling to involve the United States in future European wars, the Congress failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and America returned to her pre-war grand strategy and pursued disarmament with reckless abandon.

**WWII and the Rise of Multilateralism**

In 1945 America was on the verge of being overwhelmed by her own success. With the emergence of the United States as a global Superpower after the Second World War, American statesmen faced an entirely new set of challenges. What could or should the United States do to rebuild Europe, and what would become of her former colonies? Would the alliance with the Soviet Union remain intact, or would pre-war tensions prevail? What impact would atomic weapons and long-range aircraft have on American national security?
These issues reflected a new, post-war reality, forcing American policy makers to devise a new grand strategy that reflected America’s expanding range of interests and concerns.

In the age of the atom, American diplomats reasoned, the United States could no longer depend on “nature’s gift of three vast bodies of water” to provide the “free security” to which Americans had grown accustomed (Gaddis, p.8). Most American statesmen, in the late 1940s, believed that America’s atomic monopoly would not last forever, and with advances in technology coming at an unprecedented rate, the United States could no longer afford to follow Adams’s model of neutrality, preemption and unilateralism. Engagement in the world through *multilateral cooperation*, they reasoned, was the surest was to secure America’s future in a smaller, more dangerous world.

While Roosevelt rejected Adams’s neutrality, he embraced— even expanded— Adams’s hegemonic design as the second tier of his vision of America’s post-war grand strategy. Roosevelt envisioned a global America, engaged in the world and shaping events. He understood, as did many of our allies, that America must remain engaged if Europe and the United States were to have any chance at a free and prosperous future. Roosevelt also understood that America would emerge from the war stronger and in a better position to lead, and the allies knew that they would need a strong America to help them rebuild and secure the post-war world. Roosevelt’s vision of post-war America, therefore, was of *globally hegemonic* America, leading the world in a consensual arrangement (Gaddis, p.54).
The final tier of Roosevelt’s new American grand strategy was his rejection of unilateralism. Roosevelt understood that, as with democracy, the cost of multilateralism is consent. While the Soviet Union might use force to keep its “allies” in line, the United States would not. From a moral perspective, the United States was unwilling to use force to compel other free nations to accept her authority. As the world’s great liberal democracy, American values simply would not allow the kind of heavy-handedness that Stalin would employ. The philosophy of America’s intellectual founding fathers – men like Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson – still resonated with Americans in 1945. America could not (and would not) maintain a standing army of the size necessary to dominate Western Europe by force. Since demobilization was inevitable, American would have to rely on the rule of law and the consent of free nations to keep the peace. Thus the term “free world” would come into vogue.

The seeds of America’s new global security strategy were sewn on 14 August 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill aboard HMS Prince of Wales. The men who headed the Anglo-American Alliance proposed a set of principles for international collaboration in maintaining peace and security called the Atlantic Charter. Their meeting, the first in a series of conferences which later included Stalin in Moscow, Teheran and Yalta, would lead to the formation of the United Nations on 26 April 1945.

In retrospect, it seems almost inevitable that Roosevelt’s new grand strategy would lead to the Cold War.
Stalin had made it clear, by the time of FDR’s death in April of 1945, that he would not accept multilateralism: that he planned to impose a unilaterally controlled sphere of influence in eastern and central Europe, as he himself once put it, as far as his armies could reach” (Gaddis, p. 55).

Stalin, himself a visionary, albeit a dark one, could see the growing power and influence of the United States; he was determined that the Soviet Union would emerge from the war as the dominant power in Europe.

Certainly it was clear to American and British military and diplomatic leaders that the wartime alliance between the Grand Alliance between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union was beginning to unravel as early as 1945. Several American and British wartime leaders, to include Churchill himself, argued for an Allied push to take Berlin, despite an agreement with Stalin that the Red Army would take the German capitol. To his credit, Roosevelt, ever the pragmatist, held firm to his commitment to the Soviets. What tends to get lost in the discussion over this point is that, by 1945, the Soviets had the largest, most powerful army in the world. With interior lines and a battle-hardened population, they clearly had the advantage over the west. Moreover, western leaders had spent the past several years rehabilitating Stalin’s image as “Uncle Joe”. How could they now explain that our Russian friends, who were allies in our fight against fascism, were now the enemy?
Herein lies an example of the brilliance of Roosevelt as a grand strategist. Despite enormous political pressure to press the military advantage against the Soviets in the closing days of the war, Roosevelt understood that the United States was in a unique position at the end of the war—stronger, richer and more respected than any nation on earth. What advantage could be gained by protracting the conflict and wasting lives and treasure in direct combat against the Red Army? Roosevelt's refusal to take Berlin was, in my view, the single greatest grand strategic maneuver of his presidency.

Shortly after the war, however, Stalin's blatant power grabs began to alarm western leaders. At Yalta, the United States and the Soviet Union had presumably reached an understanding on how the power vacuum in Eastern Europe was to be filled. Roosevelt felt he had received Stalin's agreement to free elections in which all democratic parties could participate. The systematic exclusion of pro-Western parties from the electoral process in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe struck many in the West as a doublecross (Hastedt: 48). The failure to allow elections, coupled with a series of aggressive Soviet moves—pressure on Turkey over naval bases and access to the Mediterranean Sea, combined with Stalin's refusal to remove Red Army troops from Iran in accordance with the schedule agreed to at the Tehran Conference, and Soviet support of the communist insurgents in the Greek Civil War—pushed Truman to adopt a more aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union.

George Kennan's famous cable where he warned that the Soviets were "committed fanatically to the belief that there can be no permanent modus
vivendi—that our traditional way of life must be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken if Soviet power is to be secure” sent shock waves through the American government. In one of the most inspired periods in the history of American foreign policy, Truman saw Kennan’s later call for containment as an opportunity for America to halt the Soviet expansion at a cost that America could afford:

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies …it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. (Kennan, 1947)

Truman outlined his policy, the so-called Truman Doctrine, on March 12, 1947, in a speech before a Joint session of Congress requesting funding and material support of the Greek and Turkish governments:

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States…I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. (Truman, 1947)

In the face of a growing Soviet threat, Truman was able to adapt Roosevelt’s grand strategy of multilateralism to suit America’s post-war national security needs. In fact, the very existence of the Soviet threat to Western Europe gave multilateralism its power, for when forced to choose between American hegemony and Soviet domination, most western leaders quite reasonably lined up behind the Americans.

**The National Security Bureaucracy**

Another important foreign policy achievement of the Truman Administration was the creation of the America’s modern national security apparatus. During the war, American diplomats, military leaders and members of Congress began to realize that the responsibilities of 20th Century foreign and military policymaking were becoming too complex for one man alone. The United States, with its legal and cultural checks and balances designed to thwart
the designs of would-be tyrants, excels at crisis management, but is rather inept at deliberate planning. By 1945, however, it was generally recognized that the “competitive chaos” of FDR’s approach to foreign affairs was ill suited to the responsibilities of a first-rate world power (Inderfurth & Johnson, p.2).

In an attempt to bring order and cohesion to the process of crafting and implementing America’s grand strategy, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. The Act established the National Security Council as an advisory body to the President “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security” (NSA of 1947).

Over the course of its fifty-eight year history, presidents have used the NSC to help shape American foreign policy in different ways – each with a different view as to the role of the NSC as an advisory body: From the highly institutionalized and procedural models under Truman and Eisenhower, to the personal, ad hoc approach under Kennedy and Johnson, and in the extreme case under President Reagan, to the point where “the NSC staff ceased to function as either a policy-making or policy-coordinating body” (Hastedt, p.121). Certainly, the NSC has adapted to meet the unique needs of each of the eleven administrations which it has served, yet its essential responsibility remains to advise the President and to coordinate policy between the departments of State, Defense and other governmental agencies as required.
The NSC’s track record of helping the President shape and implement America’s grand strategy is mixed. On one hand, the National Security Act of 1947 established a permanent forum for dialogue between the America’s military and diplomatic communities; on the other hand, it has institutionalized departmental parochialism that is often reflected in a process that appears to value consensus above all else. Policy by consensus, while certainly concordant with our democratic values, does not always produce the most effective policy. According to former Carter Administration National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

In the making of national security policy, we have, in effect, a chaotic nonsystem. And that nonsystem, I think, reflects some of the persistent institutional problems that have eluded solution in recent years…In searching for a remedy to the problem in all its aspects, we must recognize that the elimination of conflict is an idle dream. Conflict is bound to exist whenever a number of individuals are engaged in a decision-making process, whenever a number of institutions project different institutional perspectives. So some conflict is unavoidable and is bound to be with us, enlivening and, one hopes, enlightening our lives. (Brzezinski, p. 328)
While imperfect, the National Security Council does provide a forum for studying issues and presenting expert advice to assist the President in formulating, integrating and executing America’s grand strategy for national security.

American Grand Strategy After 9/11

“From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and fraud” - Edward Gibbon from The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11th, 2001, American foreign policy makers experienced what can only be described as a collective cognitive dissonance. As the death toll from the attacks continued to rise, it became clear to many that the old paradigm had been broken. If, as Thomas Kuhn asserts, “[p]aradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (Kuhn, p. 23), one can imagine that the emotion that the members of the Bush cabinet experienced on that day was not unlike that which their predecessors experienced in the Madison or Roosevelt administrations in 1814 and 1941.

Former National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, expressed this sentiment in a speech at the Reagan Presidential Library on 26 February 2004:
The attacks of September 11th, 2001, were the greatest strategic shock that the United States has experienced since Pearl Harbor. These attacks crystallized our vulnerability to plots hatched in different lands, that come without warning, bringing tragedy to our shores. These attacks made clear that sweeping threats under the rug is simply not an option. President Bush saw the implications of that immediately. The very day of the attacks—as smoke still rose from the Pentagon, and the rubble of the Twin Towers, and that field in Pennsylvania—he told us, his advisors, that the United States faced a new kind of war and the strategy of our government would be to take the fight to the terrorists. (Rice, 2004)

It is clear that the attacks of September 11th had a profound and immediate impact on the President and his advisors. The level of carnage and destruction wrought by a shadowy and relatively unsophisticated enemy exposed the nation’s vulnerability and the failure of an outdated grand strategy.

In September of 2002, President Bush unveiled his post-September 11th grand strategy for the United States. Bush’s “new” grand strategy is, in reality, an extraordinary amalgam of earlier principles expressed by John Quincy Adams in the early Nineteenth Century and Woodrow Wilson in the early Twentieth. According to the “Bush Doctrine”, America will defeat gathering threats through
preemptive actions, undertaken unilaterally when necessary, while expanding her sphere of influence (hegemony) by promoting global economic interdependence and democratic reform.

**Preemption –Vs- Prevention**

Few Americans would argue that any President has the right, perhaps even a sworn duty, to take preemptive military action defend the people of the United States against an *minent* threat. Even Senator Ted Kennedy, one of President Bush’s harshest critics, conceded this point in a statement on the so-called “Bush Doctrine of Preemption” when he declared that “no nation should have to suffer a certain first strike before it has the legitimacy to respond” (Kennedy, 2002).

Indeed, in his National Security Strategy, the President clearly articulates his rationale for resuscitating the doctrine of preemption:

>The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (Bush, 2002)
The argument against the President’s interpretation of preemptive military action involves making the distinction between preemptive war and preventative war. According to Senator Kennedy, the President’s strategy is illegitimate because it not preemptive but, rather, preventative. In other words, the President’s strategy would employ “strikes that target a country before (emphasis added) it has developed a capability that could someday become threatening” (Kennedy, 2002). Kennedy argues that this approach has been rejected in the past because is violates, “basic international rules against aggression” (Kennedy, 2002).

In a 2004 speech in Roswell, New Mexico, the President alluded to this distinction as he addressed the new realities of the Post-September 11th world:

And then we got hit by the enemy. And make no mistake about it, the enemy attack affected America.

It affected the way I think about foreign policy because we can no longer take gathering (emphasis added) threats for granted. If we see a threat gathering overseas, the lesson of September 11th says, we must pay attention to it. We just can’t—and if it gets so bad, we’ve got to do something about it. We cannot assume that oceans protect us anymore. It affected our psychology in America. (Bush, 2005)

Here, the President acknowledges the changed nature of international affairs: The rise of the non-state actor and, consequently, the diminishing effect
of deterrence as a safeguard against attack. Bush’s reinterpretation of the doctrine of preemption is important because it reveals the unhappy truth that the “new world order” envisioned by his father after the fall of the Soviet Union, is neither new, nor particularly orderly. The convergence of ancient, irrational hatreds with 21st century technologies, minus the constraining influence of the Cold War, forces us to rethink our 19th Century rules of civil international behavior vis-à-vis emerging threats.

Unilateralism with a Twist

On July 4th, 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, speaking from the rostrum of the House of Representatives, declared that “the United States would always be ‘the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all’ nations but that it must not go ‘abroad in search of monsters to destroy’ by enlisting under banners other ‘than our own’” (Remini, p. 58). Later that year, while debating within the Monroe cabinet whether to accept a proposal by the British to form an alliance in the Americas against the Holy Alliance of Russia and France, Adams urged the President to reject the offer on the grounds that, “[i]t would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war” (Remini, p. 60). It is not too surprising that Adams’s argument prevailed. After all, he stood firmly on the principle that Washington had articulated with his warning against ‘entangling alliances”. Adams feared, rightly so, that the United States would be seduced by the power of the British Navy into a war that belonged to the people of Europe.
Ironically, after September 11th, the Bush Administration concluded that America must again be willing to act unilaterally in the defense of the nation – not, however, to avoid being dragged into someone else’s war, but rather, to prevent others from curtailing our own freedom of action. The President has argued that America still values her multi-lateral arrangements, and that while “the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively” (NSS, p.6). More to the point, the President states that, “[i]n exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require” (NSS, p. 31).

The President’s most telling comments on America’s return to unilateralism came during the Roswell Speech when he declared that, “[t]here is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of nations and shutting down efforts because a few object. It’s a big difference. It’s the difference between being willing to gather a group of like-minded nations and lead the world toward freedom and peace, or allowing some to object and, therefore, nothing happens. That’s not the way this administration functions. As I said the other night, we will never seek a permission slip to defend the American people” (Bush, 2005).

Since the end of the Second World War, generations of Americans and Europeans have lived under the protection of international organizations and multilateral defense agreements, with their meticulous attention to legal justifications and consensus agreement in support of military action. Today, most
citizens have never known any other arrangement. Bush’s twist on unilateralism reflects America’s unique role in world affairs and the President’s determination to restore some measure of America’s freedom of action. By acknowledging the need to “enlist the support of the international community”, however, it appears as if the President is attempting to loosen, rather than break, the velvet ropes of cooperative security.

Global Economic Interdependence

(Free Markets + Free Trade = Democracy)

While much of the focus in the discussions over America’s new grand strategy has been on the President’s prescription for the use of military force and the relative merits of, and justifications for, preemption and unilateralism, in my view, the most radical aspect of the President’s grand strategy involves his vision for the use of so-called “soft power”. The President reveals his philosophical approach to foreign policy in the opening line of the National Security Strategy: “The great struggle of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” This political philosophy is grounded on an intriguing syllogism: Open, vibrant, free-market, capitalist economies provide the fuel for the engine of democracy, and affluent, liberal democracies do not make war upon each other. In other words, economic well being leads to political liberalization and respect for the rule of law.

Granting, for the sake of argument, that democratic governments, indeed, do not make war upon each other, what are we to make of the assertion that
economic prosperity, enabled by a free market, capitalist economy, drives
democratic reform. According to the President,

[a] strong world economy enhances our national
security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the
rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free
trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher
incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of
poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the
fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of
liberty. (NSS, p17)

The President seems to be betting the farm on the belief that economic
freedom inevitably leads to political freedom. One could argue that Nazi
Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan provide excellent examples of robust,
capitalist economies that did not embrace peaceful democratic reform.

And what are we to make of Russia and China? Certainly, the demise the
Soviet Union and the opening of China to western investment present
tremendous potential for future development and economic growth. Yet, here
again, the President appears to be ignoring the harsh reality of history when he
asserts that, “[w]e are also increasingly united by common values. Russia is in
the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner
in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is
the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political
freedom is the only source of national greatness” To which set of “common
values” is the President referring? Russia has experienced a significant backslide in democratic reform under Vladimir Putin, as he has presided over the systematic dismantling of Russia’s nascent democratic institutions. Under Putin’s rule, Russia has experienced renewed suppression of free speech, intimidation of the free press, and gerrymandering of local governments—actions not seen on this scale since the Soviet era.

Russian foreign affairs rhetoric has, likewise, taken a turn for the worse. In a recent radio interview, Putin defended the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939, which divided Poland and placed the Baltic States under Soviet domination, as a legitimate exercise of Russia’s prerogative to defend her western borders. Putin has also recently described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th Century. I am sure there are millions of Eastern Europeans who would agree that this is hardly the rhetoric of a man who shares a set of “common values” with the United States.

China’s recent record of democratic reform is equally as bleak. According to the Department of State’s 2004 country report on human rights, China’s “human rights record remained poor, and the Government continued to commit numerous and serious abuses” (DOS, 2005). Despite increased American economic and political engagement, China continues to conduct open and deliberate programs of repression against peaceful groups like the Falun Gong, Uighur separatists, and independent Muslim religious leaders. China, it seems, is as committed as ever to maintaining her one-party rule indefinitely. Simply put,
there is nothing in the history of either Russia or China to suggest that either nation will embrace democracy anytime soon.

Finally, the push for economic interdependence will, inevitably, force American policy makers to use America's military might in support of foreign economic interests. The war in Iraq is certainly the result of America’s dependence on a robust global economy and the need for a secure global oil market. In this 21st century global economy, where business is truly multinational and economic uncertainty has a ripple effect that extends across national boundaries, the United States cannot allow instability to affect the economies of nations or regions that comprise our largest trading partners. The President makes this point himself in the National Security Strategy: “A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security” (NSS, p.18).

Making the World Safe for Democracy

There is, in my view, a dangerous strain of idealism that runs through President Bush’s grand strategy at the beginning of this century which is eerily reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson, at the beginning of the last. In the opening of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the President boldly proclaims that “[t]he aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better” (NSS, p.1). Later, the President goes on to state that, “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right
and true for all people everywhere” (NSS, p.3) The reader can almost hear the echoes of Woodrow Wilson:

   There is one thing that the American people always rise to and extend their hand to, and that is the truth of justice and liberty and of peace. We have accepted that truth, and we are going to be led by it, and it is going to lead us, and through us, the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace such as the world never dreamed of before (Wilson, 1919).

One must ask whether it is the proper and legitimate role of the United States to “make the world not just safer but better”. The President asserts that the United States has a “responsibility to lead in this great mission” (Bush, 2002). I suspect Woodrow Wilson recognized this same responsibility when he declared during his first presidential campaign that America is chosen by divine destiny “to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty” (Wilson, 1912).

There is no doubt in my mind that President Bush has a clear vision for America in the 21st Century. He has surrounded himself with a cadre of exceptionally gifted men and women who have helped him craft a remarkable grand strategy—one that addresses the significant challenges posed by a globally linked, technologically enabled, transnational threat, while remaining grounded in the uniquely American values of our Founding Fathers. It is also clear that the President regards the events of September 11th as a wake up call
to the west that the rules for the use of national power must change if we are to successfully defend the ideals of an enlightened, liberal democracy in this new age.

What is not clear, however, is whether American national interests will take a back seat to American idealism. Nearly everyone, I suppose, can agree that economic development, individual liberty and democracy are good. Like puppies, apple pie and baseball, these concepts are nearly universal in their appeal. The challenge for policymakers is to avoid “mirror imaging”; in other words, projecting our own values on the rest of the world.

In the coming decades, American policymakers will put the Capitalism-Democracy-Peace syllogism to the test; we must be careful not to be blinded by our own logic:

Western policymakers, according to their public statements, believe that ethnic and religious unrest is caused by political oppression, even though it is political freedom itself that has often unleashed the violence that liberal societies abhor. There is nothing more volatile and more in need of disciplined, enlightened direction than vast populations of underpaid, underemployed, and badly educated workers divided by ethnicity and beliefs. (Kaplan, p.6)

Somewhere between theory and practice, American policymakers seem to have allowed their idealism to cloud their judgment. For when viewed in an
historical context, America’s current grand strategy looks like a non-sequitur:
Like the Romans, America has deployed Legions around the world, yet our
European allies or “client states” are unwilling to aggressively defend the frontier
because they no longer feel threatened by the “barbarians”. And like the great
Mongol leader, Genghis Kahn, President Bush seeks to enhance America’s
influence and economic well-being through an interconnected system of global
trade, but the trade routes of the 21st Century do not necessarily cross through
America, and no one is required to pay tribute to avoid reprisal. Finally, like the
British after Trafalgar, President Bush seeks to build alliances and achieve a
global balance of power (one that naturally favors American interests), only he
can’t seem to convince our European partners that such a “balance” is in their
interest.

In the final analysis, the American people will judge the validity of
President Bush’s grand strategy, not by how many elections are held in the
Middle East, but rather, by the physical, political and economic well-being of the
United States at the end of the 21st Century.
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