Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?

Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Naval Postgraduate School

Monterey, California, July 14–July 15, 2005

Conference Sponsored by Navy International Programs Office and the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

by Jessica Piombo, Karen Guttieri, and Barry Zellen

For a printable version of this report, please click here.

Introduction

This conference report presents an overview of the proceedings of a two-day workshop on Interim Governance that took place at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA on July 14-15, 2005. The conference was organized by two professors in the National Security Affairs department of the Naval Postgraduate School, Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, with the support of the Navy International Programs Office and the Department of National Security Affairs. The workshop brought together academics and policy experts who have been involved with researching and working in the field of transitional governance and interim regimes, with the goal of examining the innovations in interim governance that had occurred since the end of the Cold War. Designed to be a small gathering so as to encourage active discussion and debate, the proceedings were intended to initiate a dialog between the academic and policy world. Two of the main goals were to trace the evolution of transitional governance in the past decade and to analyze the increased international involvement in transitional regimes, with particular attention to the longer term consequences of heavy international involvement on domestic legitimacy, stability, and governance. Participants were asked to prepare case studies and theoretical works that examined a number of critical cases in international governance, and which probed various themes.

The report that follows is meant to provide a window into the two-day workshop. The goal of this conference report is to summarize the proceedings, maintaining the flavor of the actual conference. Thus, the various sections of the report summarize the presentations of the participants, with little editorializing and analysis by the conference organizers. This report is an initial product from the workshop and in no means is meant to be the final presentation of the papers, as those will come out in a forthcoming edited volume. This volume will represent the first product from this conference, and will have an academic orientation, isolating a model of internationally managed interim governance that stands apart from previous interim regimes, which were primarily domestic affairs. We anticipate this volume to be the first in a series of works on this subject, and sincerely hope that the discussions and debates contained in this report and the edited volume represent just a first stage of this project. Future outputs and activities in this project will assume a more policy-focused orientation, seeking to isolate best practices and to bring together the insights of practitioners more directly.
The conference organizers would like to thank all the workshop attendees for their active participation in a lively and vibrant conference. Paper presenters were given a rigorous set of guidelines to follow as they prepared their case studies and theoretical works, and in the wake of the proceedings, were asked to stick to a strict timeline by which to edit their presentations. We appreciate their cooperation and investment in the process. The final volume, currently being edited before submission to a publisher in February 2006, has benefited greatly from the sage insights of the workshop’s discussants and audience members. The conference would not have been possible without the hard work of our administrative assistant, Jennifer Hambleton, and the organizers are extremely thankful to her for her expertise. Izumi Wakugawa, also in the NSA department at NPS, contributed greatly to the organization and functioning of the workshop. Finally, the conference would not have been possible without the financial support of the Navy IPO and the NSA department at the Naval Postgraduate School.

The views expressed in these pages are those of each of the participants, and do not necessarily reflect the position of their organizations.

Introductory Remarks

LTG Bob Ord, USA (ret.), dean of the School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, opened the conference on Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, welcoming attendees, and introducing the conference organizers—professors Jessica Piombo and Karen Guttieri. Dean Ord discussed his role at NPS, the programs offered by the Department of National Security Affairs, and the mission of the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction. This set the stage for the two-days of panels to follow—during which both academic experts as well as practitioners of transitional governance would discuss their ideas and insights, blending theory and practice. Dean Ord noted that conference participants reflected a diverse group of teachers, practitioners, students, and policy experts.

After Dean Ord’s introduction, Nick Tomb, from the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS), presented an overview of the Center, and its Master’s degree program.

Tomb’s remarks were followed by welcoming comments from conference co-organizers and NSA professors Jessica Piombo and Karen Guttieri—faculty members in the Department of National Security Affairs. Guttieri reflected on where the conference organizers were coming from. She described her theoretical interest in a practical problem of interest to the new Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: how does authority move in the wake of war? In particular, how do interim governments form the basis for stable governance after war? Pedagogical demand also motivated the project, in particular, the need for scholarly works for the classroom. Guttieri noted that the groundbreaking work in the 1995 volume Between States edited by Yossi Shain and Juan Linz needed a follow-on study since the wave of internationally administered interim governments had taken place. “What is the nature of governance in this transitional zone in this seeming nether world when you have a transitory rule?”

Co-organizer Piombo presented a look at where they were going over the next two days. Piombo shared her hope that the program would lead to a coming together of theory and practice with detailed case studies reflecting the insights of both academics and practitioners. Her vision for the conference includes the development of teaching materials, course development, as well as the publication of a book on international transitional governments—all of with the goal of advising decision-making in real-world situations. The conference in Monterey aimed to provide an analysis of the theoretical implications of the innovations in the nature of transitional governance that had taken place since the early 1990s, and follow-on projects would emphasize more of a lessons learned or best practices analysis. Piombo also emphasized the fact that international transitional governments lie at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations—and that it is the union of these two disciplines that may best inform related endeavors.
Piombo and Guttieri engaged the multiple challenges of interim governments from a variety of perspectives. Beyond their roles as professors, they brought their real-world experience training peacekeeping forces deployed abroad. With some final acknowledgements of all those who worked so hard to make this conference possible, the conference broke for coffee and then resumed with the first panel.

---

Conference coordinator Jen Hambleton assists with registration on day one of the conference.

**Panel One: Theme One**

After the coffee break, the conference resumed with panel one, chaired by Karen Guttieri. This first segment of the conference featured three papers—1) *Issues and Debates in Transitional Governments and Interim Regimes* by Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, 2) *Temporary Remedy? Domestic Political Challenge in Externally Imposed Polities, 1816-1994* by Andrew Enterline and Michael Grieg, and 3) *Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Meeting Social Expectations in Post-Conflict Transitions* by Antonio Donini—and a discussion led by Fen Hampson of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

Piombo and Guttieri presented the first substantive paper of the conference, their co-authored working paper, *Issues and Debates in Transitional Governments and Interim Regimes*. Piombo opened the panel by introducing the paper as the theoretical introduction to conference and eventual book, posing an overview of the problems and challenges of interim governments. The paper was broken down into three sections: first, an overview of why the topic of interim governments is of academic/theoretical interest; second, an examination of the different forms taken by interim governments today; and finally, some queries into the nature of interim governance in general.
Piombo described herself as the “comparativist” and Guttieri as the “international relations (IR) scholar,” and noted that in an interesting twist, each would actually be presenting in the other’s area of expertise.

Several changes accompanied the overall transition from domestic interim governments to international ones. The first was a shift in the nature of war: in the last decade, civil wars as a percentage of all wars has increased. Piombo noted the recent increase in the percentage of intrastate (as opposed to interstate) wars, overall, most wars now take place to win over a domestic arena and if they involve a cross-border element, it usually does not involve combatants entering neighboring territories for the purpose of gaining control over those areas. She contrasted these with the wars of state creation that took place in the formative centuries of European state creation, and with the wars of territory and conquest that dominated the 20th century, where the intent was to expand territorial control and increase the size of the state. Both of these types of wars tended to strengthen the governing apparatus of the winners who survived the process. She noted that the intrastate wars of our own era, on the other hand, are in part resulting from, and in part creating, a syndrome of “state failure…with a frequency that we had not seen previously.” Symptoms include the delegitimization of the state, often a product of the state’s having committed crimes against its own people. Piombo cited the situation in Afghanistan as an example of this phenomenon, where the lack of a centralized power essentially precludes domestic efforts at stabilization.

Piombo went on to characterize another set of changes relevant to the challenges of interim governments: namely the evolution of “peacekeepers” into “peacemakers.” According to Piombo, there are many more peace enforcement missions in the past decade, and these forces themselves have sometimes inadvertently become combatants themselves. She attributed this to the “different type of intervention that has to come in” during cases of civil wars as opposed to interstate wars. She remarked, “We all hear the stories of the peacekeepers that were told they were not allowed to fire except in self-defense. Then the world said, ‘How could they let genocides happen?’ Well that is what they were told to do.” She concluded, “This has led to an evolution of what they are allowed to do.”

The discussion of the transition from peacekeeping to peacemaking was a good segue into the gist of Piombo’s argument that now “when the international community goes in, we think it’s doing something substantially different than it had in the past.” It is the examination and characterization of this “new interventionism” that Piombo said was the very heart of the conference. When the international community goes in and sets up judicial systems, health care and education systems, and actively writes a constitution—that is a much different type of influence than when it simply goes in to enforce and monitor a peace process.

Guttieri continued the presentation by moving the discussion to the topic of the varying forms of interim governments by posing the question: “What exactly is it about this variance that may help us to explain in which cases we see success and in others dismal failure?” In addressing this question, Guttieri introduced the concept of “popular sovereignty,” which she described—using Charles Taylor’s definition—as “a combination of moral obligation with individual consent as a basis of political authority.” According to Guttieri, popular sovereignty is both the means and the end of intervention; though it is “in question in transition itself.”

Guttieri also distinguished between interim government as the bridge to peace and the bridge to democracy. The issues she touched on here include the quality of elections, the extension of state authority, and establishing the legitimacy of the state. She raised the dilemma of outside intervention itself and the consequences for peace and democracy when external civilian and military agendas collide. With respect to the depth of external authority, Guttieri and Piombo ask whether rule is direct or indirect. She cited Larry Diamond’s position that “it’s the international legitimacy that leads to the domestic legitimacy,” and asked the audience: “Do we want to accept
that, or do we want to challenge that assertion?” With these final words, Guttieri turned the floor over to Andrew Enterline.

Andrew Enterline and Michael Grieg’s paper Temporary Remedy? Domestic Political Challenge in Externally Imposed Polities, 1816-1994 was described as the first in a multi-paper project inspired by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enterline presented the paper. He began with a discussion of the Bush Administration’s involvement in the Middle East, specifically in reference to the proposed strategy of imposing democracy as a means of generating peace, both “within states and between states.” Enterline characterized the intended outcome as a “beacon of hope, of democracy, prosperity, and peace in the Middle East.” He cited the Bush Administration’s frequent mention of Germany and Japan as examples of such success, but then went on to distinguish between so-called “strong” beacons of democracy, like Germany and Japan, and “weak” beacons, where democratic institutions continue to struggle, noting that both successes and failures must be taken into account in any thorough analysis.

According to Enterline, the distinction between a strong beacon of democracy and a weak one is important. He argued, “Strong democracies can actually increase regional peace... But if you impose a weak democracy, it tends to collapse and it undermines peace; you get wars and civil wars in a region.” The same relationship holds true for regional democracy, Enterline claimed. With respect to the situation in the Middle East, “If Iraq breaks down and becomes a weak democracy... it just spells disaster for the region; it’s even worse than it was before.”

Enterline went on to discuss the role of political challenge in the context of imposed democracies, examining the factors that influence political insurgencies and how long these insurgencies last. Enterline works with a broad definition of political challenge: “Bombings, rebellions, civil wars, assassinations—all sorts of things that are associated with political challenge and imposed political systems.” He presented a number of arguments on the theme of imposing democracy that tied in with potential factors of political challenge, such as militarization and ethnic cleavage. He also emphasized “the behavior of the imposing parties” as a key factor influencing the smoothness of the transition. Enterline explained that “the more threatening the international environment is, the more they have to use resources they could use elsewhere.”

The study is based on a data set of 60 imposed polities over the past two centuries, 28 democratic and 32 autocratic or authoritarian—ranging from the strong “Japans and Germanys” to the very weak imposed polities that last for only a few years. Enterline explained that the unit of analysis in the paper is the imposed polity year, and that one of the paper’s main goals is to determine the chances and probability in the given imposed polity year that the imposed polity will receive a political challenge domestically.

After some final words on the methodology, Enterline fielded a couple of questions from the audience. In his responses, he explained that democracy actually has a significantly negative effect on political challenge: it actually reduces the probability of political challenge by 70% in our data set. Meanwhile, if democracy is paired with large or high frequency of ethnic groups, where there are a lot of ethnic cleavages in a state, the probability of political challenge goes up 76%. Enterline went on to enumerate some other factors influencing political challenge, supporting his arguments with quantitative findings from his data set. Returning to the Middle East, he concluded, “in Iraq, the United States needs to stay there for about a decade before it will actually reduce political challenge to below average in the data set... that’s a little worrisome.”

Following applause from the audience, Guttieri introduced the next speaker in the panel, Antonio Donini, a man with 26 years’ experience in the United Nations. His paper, titled Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Meeting Social Expectations in Post-Conflict Transitions, came in two parts. The first part he described as “a reflection on whether or not democracy is kind of the right vessel in which to conceptualize successful transition operations.” The second, based on what Donini referred to as “evidence-based research, was an empirical study on post-crisis Afghanistan,
Kosovo, and Cambodia. Together, the paper explored the experiences of local populations in countries recovering from crisis.

Donini focused on the sensitive role of international activists in the fostering of “durable sustainable peace” in post-crisis countries. He brought up the point that there is an inherent rift between what he called “the fundamental right to participate” in the reconstruction of one’s own country’s political institutions and the presence of international involvement in the establishment of interim governments. According to Donini, “often this dichotomy results in a very uneasy balance, if not open tension.” Local and international visions are partly a question of how the international community intervenes. The “light footprint” in Afghanistan led to a divergence between de jure legitimacy at the international level and contested de facto legitimacy at the local level. The legitimacy of the state remains contested primarily because the transition process “was conceived… as a sort of top-down process built around the capital, where the desires and expectations of the local population were there mostly as an afterthought, rather than the focus of what the transition was all about.” Successful national elections must be weighed against continued control of villages by local commanders. Furthermore, “unless the more fundamental issues of rights are addressed, the process can be internally flawed and lead to very unsatisfactory results.”

Donini posed a fundamental question, “Is democracy the right vessel for promoting sustained world peace” or is it instead “a case of ‘the West knows best’?” He adapted a quote from Peter Burger in the context of transitional governments, saying, “These processes will fail unless they are illuminated from within.” In other words, imposing democracy in an interim government can only succeed if it is done from the inside out. “If you don’t have transparent and accountable systems of power relationships on a local level, in my view it’s very difficult for a formal democratic process to be imposed there and work.”

Donini emphasized this point by returning to his example of Afghanistan, where he explained, there have been a number of studies that demonstrate the incredible expectations of local populations in terms of justice and accountability in addressing the abuses of the past. Such expectations must be met in order for an imposed interim government to be successful. Otherwise, the people see that the international community may be supporting a grand plan, but it is not supporting the issues that affect them in their daily lives, and this can lead to a critical problem for the internationally organized transitional government.

For example, in Afghanistan, the people expected injustices to be addressed, but warlords have enjoyed impunity with the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan for two years. He quoted from an interview with an illiterate shopkeeper in Western Kosovo who said, “peace is jobs and electricity.” Donini embraced the shopkeeper’s perspective: “I think the point he made was, once peace was there in terms of there is no active fighting around us, the only way to put our lives together is through the provision of social services and finding a job; that human security is really what all this is about.” The basic point is, peace and security mean different things to different people, be it the militaries, the aid agencies, or the local communities.

Donini concluded his presentation with a short anecdote of a successful effort at bottom-up reform in Afghanistan. He told of a small local NGO that succeeded in getting “tribal leaders to understand that it was in their interest for the women folks to vote in the presidential elections.” By appealing to the traditional leaders, the NGO respected local customs, yet it was able to get its message across and implement a change, so that women were indeed allowed to vote. This approach worked more effectively than a Western-oriented mass media campaign that women should have the right to vote: pleasing to the international community, but often rejected locally. Donini suggested that this NGO’s approach could represent a viable alternative to the “top-down heavy Western value-driven approach to social transformation” and as a positive avenue of political transition, even though it may fail to challenge the basic social custom that women cannot be directly approached with such an appeal.
Guttieri thanked Donini for his fine work and then turned it over to Fen Hampson, who introduced the first discussion of the conference. Hampson was able to extract two underlying questions as common denominators of the three papers: first, “What lessons, if any, are relevant from state-building and democratization interventions in the past, and are these lessons applicable to the recent U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan?” and second, “Can we in any sense be optimistic or hopeful about the outcome in long-term of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the prospects of achieving stability and democracy in these two countries, as we look backwards through the rearview mirror at past experience?”

Starting with the Guttieri and Piombo paper, Hampson echoed the authors’ sentiment that we know very little about the factors that contribute to stable democratic transitions, especially when external actors are involved. He also added, “there are no real pure cases in recent history, other than perhaps the World War II cases, where external actors have been responsible for both deposing an authoritarian regime by military force and replacing it with an international administration or transitional authority which is ultimately intended to give way for democracy.” These two ideas led him to the conclusion that “we are in a new world,” where the challenges we face are new and different and the “lessons of the past are in some ways limited.”

Drawing upon the papers by Donini and Enterline and Grieg, Hampson raised the question of “the role of civil society, including transnational civil society and social and economic reconstruction, and the role of economics—including the development of social and capital infrastructure, and how that impacts ultimately on state-building and democratization process.” He remarked that a number of the papers’ findings on the matter were interesting because they were counter-intuitive. For example, the authors “argued that you can have a successful political transition if institutions are able to weather out the storm in the short-run.” Also, “external actors... are going to have a lot of resistance in the short-run, but that short-run challenge to their authority may be outweighed by the long-term political stability gains that they are likely to reap if they stay around.” Hampson concludes, “There’s a very instructive message there for U.S. policy.”

Hampson characterized Donini’s paper as arguing for “a more people-centered approach to governance and state-building tasks—the need to focus not just on physical security, but opportunities for social and economic advancement.” Hampson remarked that “the refrain about the need for local ownership” has been heard for a long time now, but that this paper “does underscore a bigger message here, and that is the challenge in this exercise is obviously not to just bring together comparative politics and international relations, but also, doubly so, triply so, the development perspective.”

After Hampson’s introductory remarks, the floor was opened up for discussion. The first comment from the audience came on the issue of “catering to local concerns.” Donini was asked how he built culture into his model of transition. He replied, “Anthropologists have been studying these issues for generations and generations” and that the solution was no easy one. But he gave a real-world example of the importance of cultural awareness in the case of post-crisis situations. He reminded us of Afghanistan, where “aid workers and NGO’s were welcome everywhere” before 9/11. According to Donini, “it was taboo to attack aid workers before 9/11, and it’s no longer taboo. So there is something in the relationship that has gone awry.”

There was a general discussion with the audience on the roles of quantitative analysis and case study, in which Susan Woodward raised the question of case studies learning from one another over time. She emphasized the strategic interest of outside powers as a factor in the changes Piombo and Guttieri cited. Sarah Farnsworth likewise noted the evolving role of the international community. As the European Union gains influence, the US must adjust. Farnsworth called for a definition of interim government, stating that “part of it is an international presence, but part of it is also our need to elect a local domestic representative body, that we end up disempowering sometimes through our own transitional interim governments we put in place.” She also spoke about differing timelines for local and state development, and the dangers of continuing
identifications of a community that work against state building. She noted, “Sometimes our
democracy works extraordinarily well in places like Kosovo, where you have a definition of who
they are, and they know where they are going.” On the other hand, “in Bosnia the democracy is
floundering and perhaps failing,” due in part to the “ethnic community that is divisive [and] works
against the building-up and the definition and identity of the state.”

Aurel Croissant then spoke on the subject of taking the expectations of local communities into
consideration in the process of setting up interim governments. He noted that not all of the local
groups are included in the negotiations over basic tenets like the constitution, which makes some
of what the international community suggests not always effective. He shared an anecdote from
Iraq about a meeting for minorities to which the Bahais and the Jews were not invited. “Did we
really do all this for Iraq to start excluding minority religions from their constitution?”

With some final remarks from Piombo and Guttieri, the assembly broke for lunch, and then
reconvened for the second panel of the conference.

Panel Two: Region One: Southeast Asia

Panel two was chaired by Leslie Lebl of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Two papers
were presented—1) Post-Conflict Peace-Building: Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor by
Aurel Croissant and 2) Indonesia by Michael Malley. The discussant for this panel was Chris
Twomey.

Southeast Asia experts Aurel Croissant, Michael Malley present papers during panel two, with
Leslie Lebl serving as chair and Chris Twomey as discussant.

Croissant’s presentation concerned the issue of “to what extent... interim government has
contributed to the democratization and post-conflict peace-building in Cambodia and East Timor.”
He started off with a brief outline of how his paper tackled that issue, and then identified the questions he sought to address in his presentation.

Croissant’s first remark was that legitimacy is the Achilles’ heel of all forms of interim government. He went on to describe a number of other common challenges of international interim governments, including “double accountability” (international and domestic), “obstructive political, social, and economic circumstances,” and the frequent presence of “warring parties” or a “hostile political elite.” Furthermore, Croissant noted that because parties “may have agreed on a cease fire or peace, but not on who will govern the peace… founding elections of the new democracy in post-conflict societies are a most dramatic event.”

Moving on to the cases of Cambodia and East Timor, Croissant explained, “in both countries interim government was established with consent, or in Cambodia even by invitation, by all involved domestic parties.” However, “the depth and the pact of the legal authority and de facto control varied considerably.” The main difference was that in East Timor “there were, except for the international law, of course, no restrictions on decision-making by the UN transitional authority,” while in Cambodia the “UN transitional authority… was restricted to administrative authority;” legislative authority remained with the four warring parties. Croissant also distinguished between initial conditions: in Cambodia, the interim government was created in response to civil war, while in East Timor, the international administration was responding to a crisis of governance in the wake of a war for independence.

The next step was to compare and contrast the organization and functioning of the interim governments in Cambodia and East Timor. In doing so, Croissant noted, “Both interim governments achieved their short-term goals of peacekeeping and stabilization. The question is, what did they achieve in terms of long-term peace-building and durable democratization?”

Croissant suggested that the situation in Cambodia was less than optimal. “In a nutshell my paper argues that the process of selecting the interim government and the longer-term government, and the fact that there were no constraints placed on the behavior of domestic elites after the interim regime had ceased, negatively affected the prospect of democracy in Cambodia.” Croissant cited improvements in other areas such as human security and economic well-being, but noted that in the case of democratization “the international community had only weak instruments to enforce the Cambodian parties to accept the outcome of democratic process.” This resulted in a standstill when the losing party refused to accept the outcome” of the 1993 elections.

Croissant hopes that Cambodia’s example will inform the more recent case of East Timor. “The transition to independence and democracy was surprisingly smooth. In East Timor, however, effective governance has not yet completely transferred to domestic institutions, and Croissant argued that it is as yet unclear if and when the young nation’s economy and public administration will stand on its own feet. Croissant concluded that external actors can bring peace, but democracy needs more enforcement, and the creation of sustainable indigenous government is even harder to achieve. Moreover, international interim government is successful only when there is a hurting balance of power. He handed the floor over to Michael Malley.

Malley’s Indonesia concerned a situation that was quite different from the preceding ones. According to Malley, in the case of Indonesia “the transition to democracy or at least to a more democratic way of government did not occur as a result of civil war. There was no externally imposed solution… If anything the Indonesian case resembles the caretaker model rather than any other readily recognizable model of interim government.” In this respect, the Indonesia case provides an example of continuity from the old; a case where the transition was more domestically oriented and thus fits better with the older than the emerging model of transitional governance.
The interim regime in Indonesia, Malley argued, resulted from a decade of turmoil of the 1990s, when “events were spiraling out of control.” Labor strikes, disorganization, widespread violence, and the president’s resignation in 1998 marked a government in distress, leading to intervention to set up a temporary regime designed to return the country to a stable democratic order. Malley explained how the revolution of 1998 led to an interim government that in the eyes of its leader “bridged an authoritarian past and a democratic future.”

In this temporary regime, the international community took a facilitative role, contrasted against the more direct role assumed in many of the other cases in the workshop. The United Nations assisted running elections but not in writing legislation. Elections and constitutional reform marked progress toward democratization. “After decades of a strong executive-dominated regime, we’ve had several years in which a legislature has asserted its authority.” However, the military in Indonesia continues to operate with few civilian curbs, as it is largely self-funded.

Discussant Chris Twomey first addressed Malley’s paper, encouraging the author to further develop such themes as the presence of “international pressures, norms, threats, perceptions of anticipated American response” and the role that “external actors... play in assuring transitions that are relatively peaceful.” He then turned to Croissant with a few suggestions, including a greater emphasis on “the evaporation of external support for rule or conflict or for intervention” and the role of “civil society” in the cases Croissant treats.

After Twomey’s opening remarks, the floor was opened for discussion. The cases sparked discussion of state, as opposed to regime, collapse. When Cambodia melted down, the United Nations came in with administrative capacity. Indonesia’s regime collapse was not accompanied by collapse of its state. These cases then suggest room to investigate the problem of sustaining as opposed to reassembling sovereignty. Susan Woodward commended Croissant’s conception of interim governments, saying, “I don’t want us to think of interim as something that’s there because there isn’t anything else; but it’s more to the point that you’re making about inability to agree on who should rule and how.”

Meanwhile, Croissant returned to Twomey’s earlier comments on external support and civil society and responded, “There wasn’t much of civil society in Cambodia or East Timor before the UN came in; so what we face today as civil society... is to a large extent the result of interim government.” Also, there is an important distinction between civil society and social capital that is often missed by the rosy advocates of civil society, argued Croissant. He reminded the audience of how the Nazi party in Germany created a lot of social capital, but with markedly anti-democratic effects, and concluded that “Social capital is not necessarily something that supports peace-building and democracy... so there is a difference between social capital and civil society.”

Lebl concluded the discussion and announced a break before the final panel of conference day one.

Panel Three: Region Two: The Balkans

Anne Clunan of the Naval Postgraduate School chaired the final panel of day one. The subject was the Balkans, and two papers were presented, 1) Bosnia by Mark Baskin and 2) State Building Before Statehood: Kosovo’s Evolution from an Interim Polity to ‘Conditional Independence’ by Lenard Cohen. Susan Woodward of the City University of New York led the discussion.

Baskin started off by saying that Bosnia was “one of the first of the new internationally-driven post-conflict state-building projects,” and it came about to some extent as a result of “the failure of the international community to help prevent the war in the first place.” He also identified the “four major players” in the formation of the Bosnian state: the international community, Bosnia, the
Serbs, and the Croats. He argued, “The conflict itself strengthened, but it already existed before the war—that is, in the mid-eighties—in informal economies, networks of authority that we call crime and corruption. This is transnational; it’s cross-border.”

Ethnic awareness was of primary concern in Baskin’s analysis. According to Baskin, “the war has decreased what had really existed before, which is a genuine empathy among groups. It has increased the saliency of boundaries.” Baskin’s interest lay in “the notions of statehood strategy,” particularly in their application to “establishing a viable Bosnian state that is multi-ethnic.” But he took care to note that there is a big difference between the goals of the international community and the goals of all three Bosnian parties.

Baskin focused on the American initiative that led to the Dayton agreement, which he claimed “was intended to be a short-term restoration project—a quick transition to a stable ruling power sharing in a non-ethnic state—sort of a return to the status quo.” He pointed out a number of pitfalls in the stabilization process and highlighted the incongruity of the Western political mentality within Bosnian political culture. Baskin remarked, “The West’s most significant lesson for Bosnia was that for Balkan leaders it was to demonstrate the necessity to accumulate absolute state power over territories with clear ethnic majorities … or as Mel Brooks put it, ‘It’s good to be king’.”

Balkan experts Mark Baskin and Lenard Cohen join Panel Three chair Anne Clunan and discussant Susan Woodward.

Baskin went on to argue, “With Dayton, wartime goals had not changed much; in fact, what had changed is that there were new meanings in trying to achieve these old goals.” He elaborated on the specific interests and expectations of each of the four major players, noting the differences among the three Bosnian factions. According to Baskin, “the Bosniacs… had a much more centralized vision of the state, in which all people could return home in principle, if not in fact.”
Meanwhile, both the Serbs and the Croats... want ethnic predominance—that is, they want a state where they are clearly in charge.

Baskin next addressed the tactics applied to the situation in Bosnia. He identified three, namely 1) expanding the authority of the Office of the High Representative; 2) big investments in small deeds; and 3) limiting assistance to non-cooperative folk. Baskin cited both positive and negative outcomes of international involvement. Among the latter, he noted: “We weakened the state, in fact... by fostering dependence upon the international community. They don’t have to make a decision, because in the end, we’ll make a decision.”

Finally, Baskin spoke of the experience of building the Bosnian state. He first reminded the audience, “There really is no self-regulating Bosnian state today... we continue to be there, we have to be there—and there is tremendous resentment of the international community.” He then remarked on successes and failures, and concluded with some words of advice. “There needs to be good macro-economic policy that sets up good financing of things—that creates economic activity... There needs to be an intelligent international framework that enhances all of this—that gives good aid packages, that supports realistic performances—that itself displays realistic tolerance, that we want them to display towards each other.”

After Baskin’s closing statement, Clunan introduced the next speaker in the panel, Lenard Cohen, who presented his paper State Building Before Statehood: Kosovo’s Evolution from an Interim Polity to ‘Conditional Independence.’

Cohen first identified the factors that made the situation in Kosovo unique. First, “By the time the international community dealt with the Kosovo question... questions about the use of force and intervention had already been much discussed with respect to Bosnia.” The war in Kosovo had a twofold aspect: it was a war for state creation on one level, as well as an interstate war. The effect was to simultaneously create authority and obstruct sovereignty.

Cohen informed the audience that “there seems to be a consensus that has emerged in the international community...that there will be some kind of enhanced sovereignty—which people have called limited or conditional independence, or substantial independence—but that enhanced sovereignty will still involve another interim phase.” In other words, Kosovo is seen as moving out of one interim phase and into another. The prospective transition to a permanent domestic government is still not yet in sight.

This seemingly endless transitional government raised the issue of status ambiguity. “Status ambiguity” refers to the problem of “who is doing what.” He explained, “It created a tremendous dichotomy between the different actors... mostly between the Albanians, most of whom were dead set on yearning for independence, and the Serbs that were wanting to stay in this ambiguous status and not go back under the control of Belgrade.” Meanwhile, there are rivalries within the United Nations mission, also related to the who should to what dilemma. Kosovo’s ambiguous status (which could also be posed as that of independent country or section of greater Serbia) creates problems and limits democracy-building, economic investment, and social transformation, and should be considered a failure in state-building.

Cohen characterized the progress that has been made in Kosovo thus far, focusing in particular on what he viewed as a fundamental shortcoming in changing basic political values. “I would say that some progress has been made—there has been success in peace-building and stabilization, and peacekeeping to some extent—but in transformation of political values there is a long way to go—a very long way to go, no matter how we conceptualize democracy.” Referring back to the earlier presentation by Antonio Donini, Cohen reiterated “the importance of being sensitive to local notions of democracy.”
Cohen’s presentation concluded with the remark, “An independent or substantially independent Kosovo is pregnant with the consolidation of democracy.” That said, Clunan turned the floor over to Susan Woodward, the panel’s discussant.

Woodward noted that both cases are excellent examples the pitfalls of interim government. Bosnia’s transition has been going on for ten years without an end in sight. The shifting external weight from the United Nations to the Office of the High Representative to the European Union constitutes a shift from international to joint international and local. In the case of Kosovo there have been five stages: 1) in the 1990s there was an interim government of Kosovo with the subsequent effects of intervention and war; 2) a KLA-run Kosovo; 3) a new interim government with suspended sovereignty; 4) a mix—partly UNMIK and partly PISG; 5) debate about the next phase. This case demonstrates, she argues (citing Edward Lutwak), the “curse of inconclusive intervention”: “if a military solution is it—we won’t get a durable outcome.” Following Woodward’s introduction, questions and comments were taken from the audience. First, discussion focused on empirical measures of success in terms of legitimacy, durability, and quality of governments. If the international community is willing to pay for the institutional change, is that success in terms of commitment? Next, the discussion of the lessons of the Balkans included the need to avoid creating a rump state and to address human suffering. It’s a mistake, argued one participant, to move from light to heavy forces. A light touch causes warring parties to retrench in four to six months. It’s vital to immediately assume the levers of power: violence, justice and money.

Day one of the Interim Governments Conference concluded.

Anne Clunan confers with conference co-organizers Jessica Piombo and Karen Guttieri.

Panel Four: Theme Two

The first panel of day two was chaired by Philip Morgan of the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Three papers were presented in this panel—1) Interim Governments and the
Carrie Manning started the day off using the previous day’s closing discussion on international peace operations as a preface to her presentation on the impact of interim governments on the construction of political elites. Have new institutions altered the security dilemma? Manning cited Mozambique, as one of the earliest cases in which international peace operations were guided by the notion that democratization is an essential part of building the peace. Mozambique is a case of both war termination and state building via democratization.

Manning’s paper began with the idea that “the establishment of interim governments is in part a process of constructing political elites.” She soon abandoned this idea, however, stating, that these are the “effects that we might say we would see in theory. In practice, I’m not sure that interim government makes that much of an impact, because what I see is that the underlying relations of power tend to remain unchanged,” as interim governments tend to empower those who had power at the end of the war. Her paper sought to address two main questions. First, “how do interim governments contribute to the construction of political elites?” And second, “how important is this process of elite construction in terms of lasting impact on the durability of the regime and on good governance?”

Manning’s first step in responding to these questions was to identify a subset of interim regimes to use as her data for analysis. She explained, “For my purposes the cases that were most interesting to me were those cases in which a transitional authority was created to oversee the peace process.” These included Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, DRC, East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo, and Liberia.

Her next step was to identify the key dimensions for understanding how interim governments might affect elite formation or elite construction. She noted three, namely 1) the nature of the selection process, 2) the mechanisms for determining the distribution of authority within the government, and 3) the distribution of power between local and international authorities.

According to Manning, the most common scenario includes “selection processes that are mediated by elites,” as “distribution of authority within government tends to be power-sharing arrangements reached on the basis of inter-elite negotiations,” and “interim governments tend to fall in the middle in terms of having somewhat limited sovereignty.” These conditions, Manning suggested, “have a tendency to strengthen those who are already strong.” She added, “The key question here is, how do you create interim governments that will both respond to these short-term imperatives but also not block the prospect for change down the road?”

Manning concluded her presentation with a few words on the policy implications of her work in particular, that electoral politics are unlikely to alter the balance of power among parties. In order to change the underlying power structure, economic development must alter the link between military and political power. Manning then turned the floor over to the next speaker of the day, Jessica Piombo. Piombo presented the paper Executive Power Sharing Systems in Africa: Conflict Management or Conflict Escalation? on behalf of the author, Donald Rothchild, who was unable to make it to the conference.

Rothchild’s paper began with the idea that “power-sharing agreements are good to end civil wars, but not necessarily for creating a lasting peace.” Piombo notes, “What Donald’s saying is, we can resolve the security dilemma issue on the short-term with power-sharing, but only as long as an external actor is there to guarantee it.”
However, in the absence of external actors, or “if they’re biased or when they withdraw, some of these short-term power-sharing agreements may break down... and we may see a return to a war situation.” The paper argues that the reason for this lies in the fact that “the power-sharing in and of itself isn’t necessarily enough to change those underlying issues that have created the sort of security dilemma situation.”

Rothchild identified three different types of power-sharing in his paper: 1) inclusive decision-making, in which there is shared participation in the branches of government; 2) partitioned decision-making, which grants limited autonomy at the regional level; and 3) predetermined decision-making, or preset formulas, such as constitutions and electoral systems. Rothchild’s focus was on the first of the three, inclusive decision-making, and in particular, on executive power-sharing: formal rules for the inclusion of all major groups in key government positions. Piombo summarized that Rothchild’s basic argument was that executive power-sharing “promotes confidence about future roles in government, and so you’ll get smaller groups participating.”

As Piombo explained, “The idea is getting parties to the table by guaranteeing some form of participation in post-conflict governance at the highest level.” She went on to remark that this situation is especially important in cases where we need to resolve situations in which military victory by either side is unlikely and where though all sides know that none can win, yet none are willing to accept compromise. Put simply, “the idea is buy-in.”

The next section deals with the long-term. Rothchild argued in his paper that power-sharing agreements are “more durable when a third party acts as a guarantor, or as the mediator, to create a compromise... third parties can enforce the agreements.” However, once the third-party guarantor or external actor leaves the conflict, the mediating effects of the power-sharing will persist only under two conditions. First, the rules must be “both formal and informal”—that is, they must be able to respond to changes in society. Piombo noted, “One of the most often cited problems with power-sharing arrangements is that if the demographics of society change and the institutions of power-sharing can’t change with them, then you’ve got a built-in recipe for conflict.” The second condition is that the power-sharing agreements must be “able to meet the essential needs of both stronger and weaker parties for security, participation, and effective governance.”

The paper then examines specific patterns in Africa, identifying three in particular: 1) when there is an agreement on power-sharing arrangements but the implementation is difficult or incomplete, as in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, and Liberia; 2) when negotiations lead to an agreement in principal but are not fully implemented in practice—as in Sudan; and 3) partial or full breakdown, as in Rwanda. Rothchild argued, “If an agreement is worked out through careful negotiations over time, the possibility of a stable transition seems more likely,” or in other words, “if we come in and very quickly try to slap on a power-sharing agreement and we’re not, as an international community, careful to make sure that all the critical parties are participating in the decisions... there’s going to be greater breakdown.”

Piombo compared Rothchild’s paper to Manning’s, noting that Manning’s paper argued that interim governments would not be able to really change the composition of the elites if they did not also change the balance of forces, while Rothchild was arguing that power-sharing only works if the balance of forces remains the same. The two analyses work at cross purposes, it would seem. Piombo then elaborated three factors proposed by Rothchild that particularly complicate the implementation of power-sharing agreements, namely 1) uncertain information, 2) a lack of credible commitments, and 3) inappropriate external protection. On this last factor, Piombo distinguished between two forms of inappropriate external protection: “inadequate” protection and “biased” protection. The paper gave Lebanon as an example of the latter, where, according to Rothchild, “the French were partial to the Maronites” while “the Syrians were partial to the Muslims.”
After offering some final insights from Rothchild’s paper, Piombo stepped down to make way for the panel’s third speaker, Yossi Shain. Shain presented his paper *Reflections: Interim Governments 10 Years after Between States*, which he prefaced with a brief commentary on the concept of “regime change.” Shain began by questioning whether or not the workshop and his earlier project were actually debating the same phenomenon. When you bring... international bodies into the game [of regime change], it’s a totally different game, and the subject matter is different.” He went on to engage the concepts of interim vs. permanent, arguing that “only democracy” can “lead [an interim government] to permanence.” He further remarked, “There is no alternative to democracy today.”

Now on the topic of interim government, Shain argued that the whole idea of an interim regime is premised on the notion of arriving at a certain semblance of stability. And what is stability? Stability, Shain argued, connotes the very idea that there is monopoly over the means of violence, and those who govern have this legitimate monopoly. He explained that this legitimate monopoly eventually may shift to a democratically legitimate monopoly, but that this transition is not guaranteed. Shain offered Cuba as an example of a country in which this secondary shift has not taken place: Castro is a provisional government because he declared himself to be a provisional government.

Shain argued that the basic concern needed to be with statehood and effective sovereignty, returning to Max Weber’s original conception of the state. “No democracy, no interim government, nothing can be run without the very idea that sovereignty is assured—sovereignty in the sense of monopoly over the means of violence.” Otherwise, there will be a confusion of authority and the “state” that exists will be a government in name only. Second, he noted the temporary nature of interim government, “The clock is ticking in an interim government. It's ticking for a very good reason, because you make a declaration that you are transitional.” The clock is ticking not only on a domestic level, but also for the international community involved—“the outsiders really do have to go.” Shain concluded his presentation with some final considerations of Max Weber’s emphasis—not upon democracy—but upon legality as a basis of legitimacy, or “the legalization of power.” He then turned the floor over to Tom Bruneau, the panel’s discussant.

Bruneau made a few remarks on “location and timing.” He explained, “As I’m listening to this and reading what I’m reading, it has so much to do with the set of cases that you’re looking at.” On location he argued, “What was possible in Portugal or Spain... is not what’s possible in Africa and not what’s possible in Latin America in the same way.” And on timing, “Doing the kind of work that we’re doing now in this global terrorist world... focuses one’s attention.”

Bruneau first commented on Shain’s work, beginning with the idea of establishing democracy by regime change. Bruneau noted the paradoxical nature of installing democracy by non-democratic means, or “democracy by invasion.” He continued with a brief discussion of sovereignty in the context of regime change, using Panama as an example of, in his opinion, a positive outcome of regime change by invasion.

Moving on to Manning’s presentation, Bruneau offered his remarks on the extent to which established power arrangements allow for change. He gave Southern Europe as a counter example, because arrangements made did not cement things in place forever. Bruneau cited the neo-institutionalist argument that rules matter, in order to cite Brazil as an example of understanding that its constitution should be ignored. Portugal in 1982 likewise put in mechanisms for change.

With a few words on the roles of formal rules and institutions, Bruneau next addressed the points brought up in Rothchild’s paper, applying his own experience with the situation in Portugal to Rothchild’s remarks on power-sharing. Again he returned to location and timing, arguing that what is possible in some parts of the world is less possible in other parts of the world, and that dynamics are much different before and after September the 11th. That is, what the constraints or
what the possibilities were in one context change very, very rapidly. He urged study participants to frame issues in terms of what is possible where and when in history, and also in relation to conceptions of sovereignty.

Bruneau concluded, “Foreigners are much more involved now, to the point of taking over a country with regime change and trying to impose something… it’s a matter of what kind of lessons—academic, intellectual lessons, and then policy lessons—that we’re going to draw from these different cases of interim governments.” In the question period, the question of managing spoilers, within and without, arose. What are the strategies? Are they political—to co-opt, marginalize or suppress? Are they military-security—to buildup forces, disarm and demobilize, or reintegrate? Another issue that arose was the question of sequencing elections and priorities of implementation. The conference broke for coffee before the next panel of the day.

Panel Five: Region Three: Africa and Latin America

Retired U.S. Army General Thomas Montgomery chaired panel five, which featured three papers—1) Liberia and the Fate of Interim Governments in the Vortex of West Africa by Philip Morgan, 2) Transitional Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi by Devon Curtis, and 3) Interim Governance in Partial Democracies: El Salvador and Guatemala by Bill Stanley—and a discussion led by Jan Black of the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

Morgan started off by stating that the goal of his presentation was to demonstrate how looking at Liberia would be useful and illuminating to policy analysts concerned with interim governments. He described Liberia as an interesting case because it is the prototypical weak state that was eroded first by privilege and secondly by a changing world environment which allowed the internal forces reacting to privilege to openly bring down the state.
Morgan explained this privilege as deriving from the fact that the Republic of Liberia had its origins in the “settler culture of returned African-American former slaves,” who were returned to the continent in 1847. According to Morgan, over the course of the 100 years following the initial resettlement, this settler culture emerged as a quite self-contained class arrangement of about 300 families who were quite distinguishable from the rest of the country, who were always called “the country people.” Morgan went on to explain that this privileged class of families “essentially formed and controlled the government up through 1971... [and they] prospered by virtue of their control over commodities.”

But the times did change, and Morgan explained how. With a brief overview of the more recent events in Liberian political history, Morgan provided the background against which the country’s political turmoil arose. The climax of the story, “the drama that brings the country into complete disintegration over the next ten years,” came when Charles Taylor, former director of Liberian general services, “shows up on New Year’s Eve in 1989 with a militia made up of a combination of indigenous people [and] external mercenaries and tries to take over the country.”

Morgan went on to represent Taylor as a “warlord,” a term he used with just as much caution as intent. He described him as “absolutely diabolically clever... [he] not only did a lot without the instruments of sovereignty or the state, but in 1997 he got himself elected president—so for the next six years, things completely implode with his own warlord politics.” Morgan told how Taylor’s ambition aligned with the fact that the Liberians have always seen themselves as being the lead country in West Africa, and that Taylor’s quest for power therefore became a matter of international concern. Taylor sent rebel leader Fodeh Sankoh into Sierra Leone, where children were made into soldiers and the “bracelet” practice was employed. The Liberian story is thus a very regional story. During the upheaval in Liberia, Nigeria sent soldiers to be peacekeepers, but these went unpaid and then “became part of the problem.”

Finally, international intervention led to the signing of a peace agreement in August 2003. Morgan suggested that considerable progress has since been made, especially in the areas of disarmament and disengagement.

The lesson to be learned from the situation in Liberia, Morgan explained, was that “if [we] look at what really happened in August of ’03, this [peace] agreement is a snapshot of all the stakeholders at that time... essentially [all it did] was freeze [the situation] in time and place.” The problems are becoming more and more salient—especially with elections coming up. According to Morgan, “despite the three years of peace, the actual management of resources is still too much in the hands of former interested parties and stakeholders.” He added, “Taylor in his splendid exile in Nigeria continues to manage this somewhat remotely, or at least remotely—or at least this is one of the worries.”

Morgan concluded, that based on Liberia, the international players are saying that if this is going to be different, then next time we’re going to have to do something differently. There are many reports about resource management still in the hands of interested parties. There is concern that the economic governance action plan amounts to a “trusteeship.” With these closing words, Morgan was followed by Devon Curtis, who presented her paper Transitional Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

Curtis prefaced her presentation with a dash of current events, informing the audience of the recent legislative elections in Burundi held on July 4th. She noted that there was a lot of praise for these elections, but that if we look back to the elections that were last held in Burundi, which were in 1993, they were also praised by the international community, and yet three months later, the president was assassinated, and the country plunged into civil war.
Moving on to her paper, Curtis’ first step was to specify the category of cases she was dealing with. She identified five main factors that applied to both Burundi and the DRC: 1) a very difficult conflict environment; 2) limited international interest for taking over governance functions; 3) local power-sharing transitional governments set up alongside plans to create a new national army; 4) a process to set up these transitional governments that attempted to be inclusive; and 5) external guarantees and external involvement in the form of committees. She also noted some differences between the two countries, one of the most significant of which was size: Congo is 84 times as big as Burundi.

Curtis next presented the main argument of her paper, which was that although international actors do play a role, in countries like Burundi and the Congo, there are limited choices there, a limited space from which the international community can maneuver. One of the main problems in dealing with these two countries is the fact that “leaders do not necessarily represent cohesive groups, and so there are a large number of incoherent factions and personal ties that impede coherent governance. Curtis’ self-described negative assessment of the particular transitional structures set up in the two countries was that “it is not clear that there was really any other realistic choice.” Despite the less than positive outcomes, “I can’t point to an alternative that would have worked better.”

Curtis spent the next few minutes updating the audience on the recent political history of first Burundi and then the DRC. She explained, “There are two notable features about Burundi: the first is the fact that it is African-led; the second is sequencing: the agreements and the transitional institutions were set up before there was a cease-fire, and that led to obvious problems and continued negotiations.” The war continued despite transitional structures. As for the Congo, she remarked, “What’s interesting about the Congo is that it is both an international and an internal conflict... there have been eight different African countries involved... and there’s an internal component to the fighting as well.”

Finally, Curtis offered her conclusions: 1) there are not necessarily many options for countries like Burundi and the DRC; 2) because of the diffuse nature of the conflicts and combatants, coordinated international action is very important; 3) the large number of incoherent factions also means that power-sharing arrangements cannot bring in everybody; and 4) this disconnect with the population may have an impact later on. On this last point she noted was that in Burundi the election results show that there was some kind of an impact; in the DRC it is yet to be seen.”

Bill Stanley came next on the agenda with his Interim Governance in Partial Democracies: El Salvador and Guatemala. He began, “I have an interesting challenge in that I have to speak about the role of interim government in two countries that didn’t really have interim governments... instead, they had governments that had been elected under partially democratic frameworks.”

Stanley continued, “These cases could look uninteresting in the context of international peacekeeping in that they are both very successful... but what makes this interesting is [that] there are some pretty significant contrasts between the two cases in how much of the peace accords are implemented.” He went on to explain that in El Salvador almost all of the requirements of the peace accords were implemented, while in Guatemala virtually nothing that has been agreed to has been carried out, and yet both are considered to be successfully transitioned.

One obvious reason for this contradiction, Stanley argued, is that the peace accords were much more vague in Guatemala. Stanley attributed this in large part as a result of the very different negotiating contexts in which these agreements were reached. The guerrilla threat in El Salvador was more imminent, he claimed, “which forced the government to actually make concrete decisions.” In contrast, the Guatemalan government had much less governance capacity, and therefore could not implement difficult decisions. In El Salvador, the factions were few, reconciled and coherent. In Guatemala, they were also few and reconciled, but incoherent. Therefore,
Guatemala depended entirely on the international community for verification. El Salvador depended upon UNOSAL for voter registration. There were peace commissions, but these were not useful. The explanation for Guatemala’s success, Stanley argued, seemed to be a tale of incumbent effectiveness as key to allowing space for effective interim governance.

It was now time for discussion, and discussant Jan Black took the floor. She began with democracy, saying, “I think that term is overused and misused so much as to cast more fog than light.” She argued that we instead might evaluate events “along some other lines... perhaps along a spectrum from anarchy to pacification, and then to some kind of self-sufficiency.”

Black addressed the panel’s presenters, offering her own perspectives on the individual cases discussed. In the cases of Burundi and the DRC she emphasized the fact that the UN troops are finally able to actually protect civilians and to try and disarm or control the flow of arms and so forth. She argued that if the UN had that kind of mandate in many other situations, including Bosnia, “we would have been so much better off.” Regarding the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, she made the point that when it comes to negotiations, individuals matter a lot, and the particular chemistry between them is extremely important. She noted that the negotiating parties in El Salvador were extraordinarily accommodating in comparison to those in Guatemala. She also noted, however, that this was not the only difference between the two countries that played an important role in the implementation of their peace agreements. “The social distance in Guatemala was much greater than that in El Salvador—the distance between elites and the majority of the people... and that did make a great big difference.”

Black concluded her introductory comments with some final words on the pros and cons of inclusiveness, after which Tom Bruneau opened the floor to the audience. One question came on the issues of legitimacy and popular participation and how international involvement can address these issues when we spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with factions that... dictate the terms of peace, as seen in the cases in Africa. Another question dealt with the fact that most of the cases that were looked at by this panel involved interim authorities that were set up after what might be called a “negotiative peace process,” even while the parties continued to believe that they could pursue their political objectives through violent means. The panelists were asked, “Is the overall dynamic of the conflict ripe for a settlement?”

Morgan, Curtis, and Stanley each responded to these questions relying on examples from their own areas of expertise. Curtis gave a word of warning about civil society not always being wholly representative, and Stanley warned that the international community does not always pay sufficient attention to public safety during transition. The morning session concluded, and the conference broke for lunch.

Panel Six: Region Four: Southwest Asia and the Middle East

Panel six was chaired by James Russell, who also led the discussion. The final two papers of the conference were presented here—1) Afghanistan by Tom Johnson and 2) Is This Any Way to Run an Occupation? An Investigation into the Development of Governance in Post-Conflict Iraq by Daniel Serwer.

Tom Johnson began, “What I’m trying to do here is to deal with some of the structural limitations and structural concerns in Afghanistan relative not only [to] the development of democracy but also... transitional government policy.” He described Afghanistan as a society where you’ve had a complete destruction of the infrastructure—not only the physical infrastructure, but in many respects the intellectual infrastructure. He continued, “We’ve got a total lack of government structure and institutions, and there’s an inertia there that I think is very important.”
Johnson spoke briefly on the past three or four decades of Afghan political and social history, emphasizing the great importance of ethnicity. Johnson argued that tribal networks and ethnicity are very important, “much more so than I believe is being played out by policy-makers in the international press.”

Johnson then proceeded to the focus of his presentation: the stipulations, consequences, and context of the Bonn Agreement. He first identified the four primary groups represented in the Agreement: 1) the Northern Alliance, 2) the Rome Group, 3) the Cyprus Group, and 4) the Peshawar Group. He then elaborated on and evaluated “the actual Bonn process,” the calendar and execution of the decisions made in the Agreement, sharing his particular satisfaction with the presidential elections. He remarked that the presidential elections were a basic breaking-point in the history of Afghanistan, saying, “it was a wonderful, wonderful process.”

Johnson resumed his overview of the Agreement. He noted that after Karzai was made the interim president, “if you look at his cabinet, you'll see that it did not reflect the demographics of Afghanistan... this extremely upset many Pashtuns, who wanted a greater percentage [of representation].” Karzai has attempted to incorporate the warlords into government, appointing Ismail Khan as minister of mines, and Dostum as national security advisor. The immediate challenges for Bonn are “guns and drugs.” He tied these problems in with the struggles of the Afghan military force—suffering a 30% desertion rate—and emphasizing the importance of its role in establishing stability in Afghanistan.

Finally, Johnson returned to the issue of elections. He explained, “The elections are actually a paramount event in Afghan history, but they're reflecting the same type of ethnic cleavages that have driven this country for a hundred and fifty years.”

Johnson concluded his presentation by offering what he described as “his best and worst case scenarios for Afghanistan.” He argued, “The best case scenario is that [Kazrai] continues to make great strides toward democracy and national control.” And then, “Worst case scenario: one bullet. Karzai assassinated. That's the worst case scenario right now.”

Daniel Serwer presented the last paper of the conference, titled *Is This Any Way to Run an Occupation? An Investigation into the Development of Governance in Post-Conflict Iraq*. He began, “Maybe I can just summarize my paper by just saying that no one on Earth can show you that slide of the plan for transitional governments [the one used in Johnson’s presentation] for Iraq, because that’s the main point—it didn’t exist.” He continued, “There never was a clear concept, either at the national level or the international level, for exactly what was going to happen—and the lack of that planning is a good part of why we are where we are.”

Serwer described his interpretation of the goal of the overall process in Iraq as “going from a situation where power grows from the barrel of a gun to power growing from democratic posts”—or, more succinctly, “going from bullets to ballots. It is not post-conflict reconstruction or stabilization that we’re talking about here.” He explained, “It’s not post-conflict because the conflicts continue,” and “it’s not stabilization, because I don’t think we would have been satisfied with an Iraq stabilized under a new Saddam.” He continued, “We're not trying to reconstruct what was there before—we're trying to construct a new Iraq.”

Serwer remarked that Iraq was not a total failure. “Step by step, little by little... it’s there.” According to Serwer, insurgency in Iraq is “not an insurgency against the occupation... it’s always been, in first, an insurgency against the transition to democracy”—a resistance against the intent of the government to stop the violence and thereby remove the political power of people with ammunition.
Serwer argued that the failure in Iraq was a “failure of planning.” He cited insufficient provision for “public security in the immediate post-conflict period” as an example of this failure. “Initial planning failures [caused] problems all along.”

The success, he claimed, lay primarily in the “increasing acceptance by an Iraqi population of a government that, more and more, they feel is responsive to them. You have politics—real politics—occurring on the ground.” Serwer concluded, “What was wrong in Iraq doesn’t have to do with the occupation model per se, which we know can work in other places... It’s a test of planning and implementation, which were lacking.”

James Russell commenced his discussion of this panel’s papers with the question, “Why are these two case studies important?” He remarked, “We have a whole plethora of strategy...released by the Bush administration...where there is a clear intent, at least right now, to use force as a transformative or revolutionary instrument to further U.S. objectives and interests around the world.”

Russell identified the goal of international involvement as “fundamentally altering a country’s internal political dynamics.” He spoke first on Serwer’s paper on Iraq, expressing the point of view that, “if anything, I think Daniel has understated some of the contrasts [in the situation].” Russell considers it “incredible that we had a chance at all for a success in Iraq, given the ineptness of the planning at both the civilian and military levels for the immediate aftermath of the end of hostilities.” Russell joined Serwer’s paper together with Johnson’s, noting, “If there was a theme that was consistently threaded in their presentations, it’s the underlying structural dynamics of each of the particular cases, which has to be taken into account by whatever kind of reconstruction model that you seek to implement on the ground.”

On the process of planning and execution Russell concluded, “The undeniable and unfortunate fact of the matter is that the military remains the institution that is best equipped for us to do this, and it remains the institution which is least interested in doing it.” That said, Russell took his leave, and the floor was opened for questions.

In the discussion, Antonio Donini noted that Afghanistan’s agreement was “among victors.” The warlords had bankrolled the October 2002 agreement, so that justice and accountability were not on the agenda. He also noted that what is happening in Iraq is affecting the program in Afghanistan. The group discussed the suspicion that “these insurgencies and the forces that motivate them are not going to go away,” leading to debate about whether “the international community is prepared to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for the long haul”? The alternative was presented as “forms of interim governments, or even stable governments, that will coexist with an ongoing insurgency that will be like in Colombia.” Johnson had mixed feelings on the situation in Iraq, but he replied, “I know that it’s going to be a disaster in the case of Afghanistan if we don’t stick it out.” Meanwhile, Serwer argued, “There’s much more sense that we’ll stick it out in Iraq than stick it out in Afghanistan.”

Serwer emphasized the importance of establishing working institutions of justice in the process of transition. “If nobody can be convicted and sent to prison for murder after one of these [international] interventions, you’ve got a big problem on your hands, and you’ve got to go in with the capability to do those things. I think we’re making a big mistake not to do that.”

With some final remarks from Johnson on the issue of lingering rivalries in Afghanistan, panel six was brought to a close.
Panel Seven: The Experts React

The last panel of the conference took a different format from the preceding ones. Jessica Piombo returned as chair, and the panel became an open forum for discussion among and with the experts. The panelists were Leslie Lebl, Hamid Abdel Jaber, Andy Morrison, Sarah Farnsworth, and Judy Van Rest. Each was given the opportunity to react to the conference proceedings and offer their words of wisdom for the project.

Leslie Lebl was first at bat. Her first point to take home was that “the first report is always wrong.” After some laughter from the audience, Lebl gave her second bit of advice. In light of the fact that everyone seemed to agree that the economic component was vital to the processes of reconstruction and stabilization, Lebl remarked, “You’ve got a team here with no economists on it.” She encouraged the audience of political scientists to more actively recruit an “economic perspective” in their work. Lebl’s final remarks built off her experience of being “shocked by the degree to which personalities are key. Person goes, function ceases.” She concluded, “When you’re talking about international community and structures and institutions, don’t kid yourselves—it’s skin-deep, and it’s so personality-driven, and so personal and independent, that that’s a real challenge to getting stuff done.”

Hamid Abdel Jaber came next. He reminded fellow participants that he spoke in his personal capacity and his views do not necessarily reflect the position of the United Nations. His substantive presentation began by distinguishing among four different models of UN involvement in the interim stage: 1) when the UN is in charge of the whole operation, 2) when there are partners and the UN works with them in partnership, 3) when the UN is only a passenger somewhere there, but is not the decision-maker; and 4) when the UN is left out. He stated that if
we analyze these four models, we find a lot of success when the UN is in charge such as in the cases of Namibia, Cambodia and East Timor.

When the UN is a real partner, tangible success can be traced in the post-conflict peace-building efforts. Afghanistan and Kosovo cases come to mind as real examples of this model. Abdel Jaber elaborated on the UN’s role in Iraq, which he described using his third and fourth models. “First the UN was left out and then it was invited to be a passenger in this vehicle.” With UN assistance, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the first Iraqi partner, was established to assist the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Abdel Jaber identified some of the primary shortcomings of the Iraqi Governing Council, noting, “From the very beginning, there were... symptoms of failure due to the ethnic and religious composition of the Council.” The two models developed after the IGC had also their problems. The legitimacy of the Interim Government of Ayad Allawi and the Transitional Government of Ibrahim Jaafari remains a dilemma for many Iraqis in light of the two compelling facts: the uncontained violent insurgency and the shortcomings of the daily basic needs of the Iraqi ordinary people such as water, electricity, schooling, medical needs and the sort.

The terrorist attack on the UN Headquarters on August 19, 2003, which left 22 UN staff dead, including chief of mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, dealt a big blow to the even limited role the UN was playing in the humanitarian, reconstruction and political fields. However, the Security Council reauthorized UN personnel to go back to Iraq to help assist Iraqis in a multifaceted ways such as elections, writing the constitutions, conducting referendum and others tasks.

Abdel Jaber concluded by suggesting a model similar to Afghanistan where there will be three partners working hand in hand for restoring Iraq’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity: the UN, a multinational formidable security assistance force and an elected Iraqi government. The first and the second will help the government in stabilizing the country, engage in a major rehabilitation and construction programs and secure an environment conducive to bringing on board all segments of Iraqi mosaic. The new Iraqi government should be a widely representative and democratically-elected one, acceptable to the vast majority of the Iraqi people, supported by the neighboring countries and welcomed by the international community.

Andy Morrison, who had worked in Iraq as a leading member of the State Department, was the third expert to react. He drew not only the familiar parallels between the situation in Iraq and the successes of comparable endeavors in Germany and Japan, but also an analogy to the process of reconstruction after the American Civil War. He reminded the audience, “We [are] dealing with communities that have been severely repressed for a long time, [that] had not been able to participate politically, and after had been at risk of life.” Referring back to Hamid’s earlier remark, Morrison commented, “It’s true, no one presented us with flowers—but that’s because they didn’t have flowers—the agricultural sector in Iraq had been devastated.” He continued, “I think there was a real feeling of liberation at the beginning, and”—building off Daniel Serwer’s paper—“the thing that derailed what could have... led to a lot of progress on democratization and nation-building was the growth of insurgency operating underneath the surface, where a lot of our public efforts towards democratization really couldn’t have had much of an impact.” He further remarked that events in Iraq are made incredibly difficult in large measure because when you have a success, the “bad guys” will find out about that and realize that’s happening in their community, and those success stories become targets. Morrison commented on several of the papers presented over the course of conference, but only after again reminding the audience to bear in mind that an analogy cannot so easily be made between the post-conflict cases they examined and the situation in Iraq, primarily because in the case of Iraq, “the conflict is by no means over.”

Fourth in line was Sarah Farnsworth, who had worked in the Balkans while employed by USAID. She emphasized the problem of stove-piping. In the Balkans, for example the US government appeared as a “hydra-head”—the Special Representative of the President, the Ambassador, and
the Secretary of State all weighed in. US AID seconded to several expressions of the international community including the Office of the High Representative, the OSCE, the Peace Implementation Council. The international community must also have transparency and accountability. Farnsworth’s overall point was that “you can’t have a successful governance without economic development, and you can’t have a successful governance without security.” She remarked, “the fact of the matter is, it all interconnects, and [you have] to have all three components moving forward.” Farnsworth spoke primarily on one of her own main areas of expertise, the Balkans, identifying some of the pros and cons of international involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo and noting the lessons to be learned from it. She commented in particular on the issue of international intervention in domestic elections and the role it can play in determining or detracting from their legitimacy. She also condemned the philosophy of “do as we say, not as we do” in the context of international involvement, pointing again to the sensitive skin of political legitimacy. Farnsworth concluded by pointing out that all players are on different clocks: the US is always running late; the EU sees the Balkans in 20 year terms; the people of the Balkans themselves see no end. When we as the international community enter a country with the goal of establishing a transitional government, “their timeline is much longer than our ability to stay... [and] that should help us to prioritize the sort of structures that we want to put in place that will help them to be able to survive the shocks that will occur... after we have gone.” According to Farnsworth, these structures should be “a justice system, a security system, and a civil society that is able to absorb these shocks.”

The final expert to speak was Judy Van Rest, a vice-president of the International Republican Institute. Judy gave a concise overview of the history and goals of the Institute, especially as they applied to the issues brought up over the course of the conference. She spoke primarily on the role of the Institute in training politicians and political party leaders unaccustomed to participating effectively in democratic governance.

Piombo opened the floor for the final question and answer period of the conference. The audience took advantage of this final opportunity to consult with the experts, and numerous questions were asked. The first question came on the issue of the difficulty the international community faces in being effective when confronted by impediments such as safety concerns and unforeseen natural phenomena, the recent incident of a sandstorm in Baghdad that set back plans being cited as an example.

Another question asked the experts to give advice on how to most effectively incorporate the lessons of the past into present and future efforts at policy- and decision-making in the context of international intervention in transitional governments. Susan Woodward asked, “How does your organization learn?” Judy Van Rest answered, “By experience.” Sarah Farnsworth offered mentoring. The lesson of political consequences of victory was introduced, in the example of the four month window in Iraq in which the Arab world did not rise up. The United Nations provides best practices and reports, such as the Brahimi Report, on peacekeeping. However, the problem with lessons, Alberto Donini noted (citing Lewis Carroll) is “they lessen and lessen.” General Montgomery noted that the US experience in Somalia inspired, in part, the Brahimi Report. Although the US military is an exemplary learning organization, lessons are recorded but not heeded. Some lessons, such as the lessons of Vietnam, instead become institutional biases that do stick.

With much food for thought, the Interim Governments Conference came to a close.
Conference coordinator Jen Hambleton, conference co-organizer Jessica Piombo, and Interim Governance book project coordinator Jeff Larsen talk shop during a coffee break.

Appendix One:

List of Papers and Presenters (in alphabetical order):

- Mark Baskin, Center for International Development: Bosnia
- Christina Caan, Beth de Grasse, Paul Hughes, and Daniel Serwer, Peace and Stability Operations and Balkans Initiative, USIP: Is this Any Way to Run an Occupation? An Investigation into the Development of Governance in Post-Conflict Iraq
- Leonard Cohen, Simon Fraser University: State Building Before Statehood: Kosovo’s Evolution from an Interim Polity to ‘Conditional Independence’
- Aurel Croissant, Naval Postgraduate School: International Interim Governments, Democratization and Post-Conflict Peace-Building: Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor
- Devon Curtis, Columbia University: Transitional Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi
- Antonio Donini, Humanitarianism and War Project, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University: Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Meeting Social Expectations in Post-Conflict Transitions
- Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, Naval Postgraduate School: Issues and Debates in Transitional Governments and Interim Regimes
- Tom Johnson, Naval Postgraduate School: Afghanistan
- Michael Malley, Naval Postgraduate School: Indonesia
- Carrie Manning, Georgia State University: Interim Governments and the Construction of Political Elites
• Philip Morgan, Monterey Institute for International Studies: Liberia and the Fate of Interim Governments in the Vortex of West Africa
• Donald Rothchild, UC Davis: Executive Power Sharing Systems in Africa: Conflict Management or Conflict Escalation?
• Yossi Shain, Georgetown University: Reflections: Interim Governments 10 Years after Between States
• Bill Stanley, University of New Mexico: Interim Governance in Partial Democracies: El Salvador and Guatemala