
A Monograph
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Abstract

AN AGENT OF CHANGE OR A COLONEL WHO JUST COMPLAINED: A CASE STUDY OF COLONEL DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR AND HIS BOOK, BREAKING THE PHALANX, A NEW DESIGN FOR LANDPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY. By MAJ Daniel S. Stempniak, USA, 49 pages.

The monograph proposes that Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor represents an Agent of Change for the United States Army. In 1997 Colonel Macgregor published the book, Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (BTP). This book questioned the Army’s continued adherence to a Cold War paradigm and proposed that a new operational concept supported by organization, doctrine and cultural changes could revolutionize the military’s capabilities. Colonel Macgregor proposed concepts for improving the Army’s integration into the joint community and modifying the Army’s organizational and cultural. Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor believed emerging information technologies combined with significant changes in the national security environment promised a revolutionary advancement of the Army’s capabilities if synchronized with corresponding changes in doctrine, organization, and culture.

The proposals in BTP remain controversial. As with the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” one man’s agent of change is often viewed by others as simply a disenfranchised complainer. Hence the monograph’s title “Douglas Macgregor an Agent of Change or a Colonel Who Just Complained?”

To prove that Douglas Macgregor served as a catalyst for change in the United States Army, the monograph begins by examining the life of Colonel Macgregor. This analysis demonstrates that Douglas Macgregor served as a respected officer, committed to the United States Army.

The monograph next provides an analysis of the environment confronting the United States Army during the time period of 1991-2003. This period represented an extraordinary period of change for both the world and the United States Army. In the first eight years of this period the Army quickly downsized. The Army reduced force structure by forty percent, operated under budgets reduced by forty-five percent, closed numerous facilities and reduced forward deployed forces in Europe by fifty percent. In the last two years of this period the Army performed its role in the War on Terrorism by conducting combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Three Chief of Staffs of the United States Army (CSA) led the Army through this period of enormous change. These men were Generals Gordon Russell Sullivan, Dennis J. Reimer and Eric K. Shinseki respectively. The monograph examines their contributions to the process of transforming the Army from a Cold War organization.

Six years into this period of intense change, Colonel Macgregor published BTP. In this book Macgregor demonstrated the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, the need for improved joint command, control and integration and Colonel Macgregor proposed Army tactical force structure and cultural modifications.

This study concludes by comparing Colonel Macgregor’s Group concept with General Shinseki’s Objective Force concept. The monograph advances recommendations in the areas of material, leadership and organizational development based on the criteria of Joint Vision 2020 and the operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection.
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INTRODUCTION

The biggest external challenge to the United States Army in 2003 is convincing the American public of the relevance of land combat forces. The biggest internal challenge for the United States Army in 2003 is changing a culture that resists significant change, fighting to maintain a status quo based on branch parochialism.

Mr. Clinton Ancker¹

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor addressed the comments of Mr. Clinton Ancker, the Director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Division at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, by proposing concepts for improvements in the Army’s integration into the joint community and Army organizational and cultural modifications. Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor believed emerging information technologies combined with significant changes in the national security environment promised a revolutionary advancement of the Army’s capabilities, if synchronized with corresponding changes in doctrine, organization, and culture². Colonel Macgregor proposed his concepts of change in a book titled, *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP).

An examination of Colonel Macgregor and BTP remains important because many of the Army’s current reshaping efforts resemble the concepts delineated in Douglas Macgregor’s book. Expanding the thesis of BTP, Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor covered a vast spectrum of landpower issues and offered concepts to leverage this potential RMA. The monograph classifies one of Macgregor’s ideas as fact and three of his concepts as meriting additional study. The idea classified as a fact concerns the relevance of landpower in the 21st century. The three Macgregor concepts worthy of additional study include improved integration of the Army into the joint community and Army organizational and cultural modifications.

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¹ Interview conducted with Mr. Clinton Ancker, Director Combined Arms Doctrine Division, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth 5 December 2002.
² Email from Colonel Macgregor to author on 13 December 2002.
These topics remain pertinent to the Army as demonstrated by the restructuring process introduced by the Chief of the Staff of the United States Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki.

Two years after the publication of *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st* (BTP) General Shinseki introduced a restructuring process named “Transformation”.

Transformation promises to profoundly change the Army’s culture, force structures and doctrine fueled by the emerging technologies of the Information Age. To date General Shinseki’s transformation efforts resulted in a significant redirection of research development and procurement, education and organization changes. The Objective Force represents a critical component of General Shinseki’s Army transformation.

A white paper released on December 8, 2002, describes the Objective Force as:

…organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the full spectrum of military operations. The Objective Force is comprised of modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations. It is able to transition quickly between changes in task, purpose, and direction, maneuvering into and out of contact without sapping operational momentum. Trained and equipped leaders and Soldiers at the lowest levels make decisions.

Many conceptual similarities exist between the tactical force structure introduced in BTP and General Shinseki’s Stryker brigades. These similar concepts include the goal of developing an information dominant organization, the migration of permanent combined arms formations to lower echelons, and the reduction of operational logistical support requirements while sustaining the lethality, survivability and tactical mobility of current armor formations. Colonel Macgregor and General Shinseki identify combined arms brigades as the Army’s primary Unit of Action (UA) and both gentlemen advocate a modification of the echeleonment and functionality of the Army’s command and control elements.

The concluding paragraph of the Objective Force in 2015 Concept Summary illustrates the magnitude of change envisioned for the United States Army by the Objective Force concept.

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The Transformed Army is not just new systems; it is the completed holistic revolution in doctrine, organizations, training, material, leader development, people, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The Objective Force represents not only a change in our operational Army, but also a change to our institutional Army. *It will be Soldiers, not technology, that realize the campaign qualities of America’s Army, the Objective Force.*

The italicized part of this excerpt speaks to the importance of Army culture. While Macgregor focused his thoughts on the acculturation and education of the field grade officer population of the United States Army, Shinseki initiated a much broader reexamination of the entire officer education system. These efforts continue to significantly change the basic and intermediate level programs of the Army’s officer education system. At the lieutenant’s rank changes include the requirement for newly commissioned Officer’s to attend a branch immaterial Basic Officer Leadership Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. At the captain’s rank the Infantry and Armor Schools research program of instruction (POI) consolidation for the Armor and Infantry Captains Advanced Course with a goal of developing a combat arms captains Advanced Course. The Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas finalizes a new POI designed to enhance the tactical and operational education of operation career field majors. Finally, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) expanded its student body by a third, significantly increasing the number of officers receiving advanced operational educations during the last two academic years.

Although, the years of 1991-2003 represent a period of exceptional change for the United States Army, the process of change is not unfamiliar to the United States Army. Since the end of World War II the United States Army introduced four new divisional force structures including the Pentomic Division (1956), the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD-1960), the Airmobile Division (1963) and the Light Infantry Division (1983). Furthermore, the Army dedicated sizable quantities of existing force structure to test new organizational studies since the end of World War II. Examples of these well-resourced tests include the Divisional Reorganization attempt (1947), the Triple Capability Division (TRICAP-1971) and the High

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*Ibid, ii*
Technology Motorized Division (HTMD-1980). Finally, since the end of World War II the Army commissioned three in-depth studies that culminated before the field test stage. These in-depth studies included the Modern Mobile Army (1965), Division Restructuring (1975) and Division 86 (1978).

Recent force structure initiatives focus on revolutionizing the warfighting capabilities of the Army by developing emerging information technologies. In 1994 the 32nd Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Gordon Sullivan introduced the Army After Next (AAN) Study. This study examined the potential of emerging information technologies for landpower application. The AAN study matured into the Force XXI experiments under the 33rd CSA General Dennis J. Reimer. The Force XXI experiment dedicated the 4th Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Hood, Texas as a test unit charged with creating the first fully digitalized division. General Shinseki’s Objective Force expands on the lessons learned from the Force XXI experiment to fundamentally change the warfighting concept of the Army. The magnitude of change envisioned under the Objective Force Concept represents the most significant peacetime Army restructuring initiative since the introduction of the Pentomic Divisions in 1956.

If history determines the 34th CSA, General Eric Shinseki initiated revolutionary change of the United States Army by starting the Army transformation process; examining the possible catalysts of this RMA constitutes a worthwhile project. This study begins by identifying Colonel Macgregor as a possible Agent of Change. The first chapter examines the life of Colonel Macgregor, attempting to provide insight into how his personal and professional life experiences molded his concepts. This chapter provides insight for the reader concerning how Colonel Macgregor viewed the world and his Army. The second chapter of the monograph analyses the environment confronting the United States Army between the years 1991-2003. This chapter seeks to explain the immense introspection occurring in the Army as the institution executed a significant force reduction, participated in world-wide combat, stability and support operations and managed scarce acquisition and research and development (A&RD) resources while
maintaining landpower dominance. Chapter three presents Macgregor’s concepts. Chapter four concludes by comparing and contrasting Colonel Macgregor’s Group concept with General Shinseki’s Objective Force concept utilizing the Joint Vision 2020 operational concepts as evaluation criteria and focuses on recommendations in the areas of material, leadership and organizational development.

CHAPTER ONE

COLONEL DOUGLAS A MACGREGOR

THE MAN AND HIS LENS

After twenty-seven years of service Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor currently works as a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense at the National Defense University. In 1997 LTC Macgregor earned name recognition among fellow combat arms officers after publication of *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP). In BTP, his graduation thesis at NDU, LTC Macgregor expressed ideas on a vast spectrum of landpower topics and issues. Many of LTC Macgregor’s proposals expressed in BTP remain controversial. To this day the mention of Macgregor’s name and BTP often evokes emotional responses from officers serving in the rank of colonel and higher. Often these criticisms begin with discrediting statements like; Douglas A. Macgregor is one of those “cavalry officers” who simply fails to understand the complexities of the Division organization and the larger institution Army. This chapter provides an accurate representation of Douglas Macgregor military career and provides the reader with insights concerning how he viewed his world and the United States Army. The chapter begins with Douglas Macgregor’s personal history as a company grade officer, transitions to the field grade years and concludes with analysis of Colonel Macgregor’s career.
The Company Grade Years

Douglas A. Macgregor graduated from the United States Military Academy (USMA) earning a commission as a Second Lieutenant (2LT) of Armor in the Regular Army in May 1976. Prior to attending the USMA, Macgregor attended the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) for one year before earning an appointment to USMA. After graduation 2LT Macgregor reported to Fort Knox for the Armor Officer Basic Course (AOBC) and while attending AOBC, 2LT Macgregor earned a slot to attend the United States Army Ranger School headquartered at Fort Benning, Georgia. 2LT Macgregor successfully completed Ranger School and reported for his first assignment as a Platoon Leader in 1st Squadron, 1st United States Cavalry, 1st Armored Division, Schwabach, Germany. After approximately eighteen months as a Cavalry Platoon leader, Macgregor served as the aide de camp for the Deputy Division Commander of the 1st Armored Division. 1LT Macgregor held the position of aide de camp for one year and returned to the 1st Squadron of the Division Cavalry Squadron where after promotion to Captain he served as an assistant operations and plans officer for the squadron.

In 1980 Captain Macgregor returned to Fort Knox for the Armor Officer Advanced Course. Upon successful completion of this course he reported to Fort Carson, Colorado. At Fort Carson Macgregor initially served as the Adjutant for 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). After one year CPT Macgregor became the Battalion Motor Officer (BMO). From the BMO position he assumed command of a 1/77 Armor Company. Captain Macgregor served as a company commander for nearly two years before selected for the position of Operations Officer, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (ID). The 4th ID assignment during the years 1980-1983, represents Macgregor’s only assignment in a twenty-seven year career with an armor tactical unit. In future tactical assignments, Colonel Macgregor served in either Division cavalry squadrons or with an armored cavalry regiment.5

5 Colonel Macgregor provided biographical data in an email to the author on 13 December 2002.
In 1983 the Department of Social Sciences selected Captain Macgregor to serve as an associate professor at USMA. This prestigious selection included a two year fully funded graduate degree program, which Captain Macgregor successful completed earning a master degree in political science from the University of Virginia. After graduate school, Captain Macgregor spent three years instructing in the Social Science Department of USMA. At the end of this period Captain Macgregor received a promotion to major and earned a seat for attendance at the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The Field Grade Years

After graduating from CGSC in 1989, Major Macgregor returned to Germany and reported to the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), initially serving as the Regimental Adjutant. Major Macgregor’s assignment in the 2nd ACR represents his only assignment with an ACR. In 1989, 2nd ACR served as the Armored Cavalry Regiment for VII Corps. In 1989 two Army Corps remained in Germany V and VII Corps. In 1990 Major Macgregor became the Operations Officer for 2nd Squadron, 2 ACR, a position he held during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Major Macgregor received the bronze star with “V” device for personal actions during 2nd ACR’s participation in the battle of 73 Easting. While serving as a Squadron S3, Major Macgregor received notification of selection for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Battalion command.

From June 1991-June 1992 Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor served as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine, and Developments at the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe Virginia. In June of 1992 Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor obtained his highest level of command in the United States Army assuming command of 1st Squadron, 4th United States Calvary (1/4 CAV), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas. In July 1994 LTC Macgregor relinquished command of 1/4 CAV and reported as the Forces Team Chief in the War Plans Division of the Operations Section.
of the Army Staff. In November of 1994, LTC Macgregor received notification of selection for attendance at a Senior Service College and reported as a fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) in April 1995.


**Conclusions**

Colonel Macgregor succeeded as an Officer in the United States Army. An analysis of his Army career reveals a balanced Armor officer, with a diversity of tactical and operational experience. Colonel Macgregor served in every force structure available to Armor Officers including a tour in an Armor Battalion, an Armor Cavalry Regiment and two tours in Division Cavalry Battalions. His successful completion of Ranger School as a second lieutenant exposed him to the Infantry Branch and strengthened his creditability within combat arms officer culture. The first sign of Colonel Macgregor’s tactical specialization as an Armor Officer occurred after seventeen years of service when he returned for a second assignment in Division Cavalry Squadron as the Squadron Commander.

The United States Army provided Colonel Macgregor with academic credentials complementing his tactical experience. His attendance at VMI and graduation from USMA
demonstrate academic prowess as a young man. Colonel Macgregor continued to build on his academic foundation by earning a Masters Degree from the University of Virginia and serving as a professor in Social Sciences at USMA. The capstone of his military education consisted of attendance at NDU an Army War College equivalent institution. The Army War College and equivalent institutions represent the highest level of professional military education (MEL 1) afforded to Army officers. LTC Macgregor wrote *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* as part of his graduation thesis at NDU. He currently serves at NDU as a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense. His joint experience includes an assignment with SHAPE.

An analysis of Colonel Macgregor’s career leads an observer to conclude that Colonel Macgregor served as a respected officer in the United States Army. No creditable evidence exists supporting a statement such as “Douglas A. Macgregor represents a ‘cavalry officers’ who simply fails to understand the complexities of the Division organization and the larger institution Army.” Potential critics may identify Colonel Macgregor’s election to pursue a masters degree and utilization tour as an associate professor at USMA versus a tour at the Army’s newly formed National Training Center, his decision not to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) after graduation from CGSC, or the lack of a senior division and Regional Combatant Command (RCC) staff assignment as potential flaws in an operations career path. However, while these assignments represent important billets for the current generation of operations career field officers, Colonel Macgregor served as a mid-grade officer in an Army with a vastly different personnel system than the system managing current operations career field officers. Attempts to discredit him as an anomaly with a non-standard career pattern appear unsupportable. In 1997 when LTC Macgregor authored *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP) he represented a successful armor officer, appropriately diversified and molded by the institution he served and respected as a combat arms officer in the United States Army.
CHAPTER TWO
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1991-2003:
THE ENVIRONMENT

When history is at a watershed, people, institutions, and nations have three choices. One choice is to live in the past; relishing triumphs, elaborating on myths, and eventually becoming a part of the past. The second choice is to fight change…the third alternative is for individuals, institutions and nations to embrace the future with all of its uncertainties. It is better to transform rather than to be transformed by the future.\(^6\)

This monograph focuses on the strategic environment confronting the United States Army from 1991-1999. The end of the Cold War significantly changed the strategic landscape of the world, resulting in a sense of inquiry as to the appropriateness of the United States military’s force structure for a new emerging strategic environment. In 1991 the United States of America lead a coalition that fought and won the Persian Gulf War. At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War the United States Army consisted of a force structure designed to prevail over the former Soviet Union in a high intensity conflict on the Western European plain. The swift coalition victory over the Iraqi Army in the Persian Gulf War validated the Army’s ability to accomplish the goals of its designers. The Iraqi military modeled, advised and equipped by the former Soviet Union capitulated to the US led coalition after a thirty day air campaign followed by a hundred hour ground campaign. However, American gloating over this stunning display of martial prowess became quickly overshadowed by the emergence of a new ambiguous strategic environment that quickly filled the vacuum created by the disintegration of the Cold War paradigm.

Demonstrating the struggle of the United States national leadership to understand the emerging strategic environment, the national security strategy experienced continuous revision.

from 1991-1999. During this period the Office of the President of the United States of America released eight new National Security Strategies (NSS). While the annual issuing of NSS demonstrates a national leadership devoted to assessment, formulation of policy and reassessment of policy in a rapidly changing strategic environment; the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not produce implementing National Military Strategies as quickly. Illustrating this fact, during the period 1991-1999 the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff produced three implementing National Military Strategies (NMS) in 1992, 1995 and 1997. Although outside the time period covered by this paper, the national leadership produced a NSS in 1990 and two additional NSSs since 1999 while the department of defense still operates from the 1997 NMS. Adding those three additional NSSs to the equation, the national leadership produced eleven NSSs to three corresponding NMSs. The Army’s struggle for a vision statement equaled that of the national leadership as it began a period of downsizing and reorganization on a scale not experienced since the end of World War II.


The United States Army generated the forces that won the Persian Gulf War from a force structure of eighteen divisions. This force structure included a sizable forward deployed presence in Germany consisting of two Corps headquarters, the V Corps and VII Corps that controlled elements of six divisions (1AD, 2AD, 3AD, 1ID, 3ID & 8ID), along with numerous separate brigades, consisting of approximately 195,000 soldiers. The United States maintained one Division in Korea (2ID) and three stateside corps headquarters, I, III & XVIII Corps, controlled eleven divisions, 1CD, 4ID, 5ID, 6ID, 7ID, 9ID, 10ID, 24ID, 25ID, 82 ABN, 101 AASLT, based

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in the United States of America. Supporting the active force, the reserve forces fielded an additional ten divisions.9

As the United States Army returned from victory in the Persian Gulf, General Gordon Russell Sullivan became the 32nd Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA). General Sullivan served as the CSA from 21 June 1991-20 June 1995. Commission as an armor officer upon graduating from Norwich in 1959, Gordon Sullivan’s career included two tours in Vietnam, four in Germany and one in Korea. During his first tour in Vietnam in 1962 he served initially as an assistant Civil/Guard/Self-Defense Corps Advisor, 21st Infantry Division and then as an executive assistant chief of staff, J-2 (Intelligence), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The highest level of command achieved by General Sullivan was command of 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas from July 1988-July 1989.10

During General Sullivan’s tenure as the CSA he initiated the process that moved the Army away from its Cold War heritage towards its role in the new strategic environment. Much of Sullivan’s energy was consumed by the tremendous administrative challenges of reducing the eighteen division active army to a twelve division active army along with the reduction of the reserve forces from ten divisions to six divisions as dictated by the 1992 Base Force Concept outlined in the 1992 NMS. Although, the United States’ military drawdown truly began in 1987 before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the period of the biggest and quickest reductions occurred during Sullivan’s tenure as the CSA.11 Sullivan supervised the process that quickly reduced the Army’s force structure by 40%. In 1989 the active duty end strength consisted of 2,130,000. The goal for active duty end strength in 1999 was 1,445,000. Sullivan supervised the

deactivation of six Army Divisions as the active component of the Army reduced force structure from eighteen to twelve divisions. During this deactivation process, Sullivan received guidance to deactivate two additional active Army divisions as authorized force structure fell from twelve to ten divisions. The Army in Europe experienced a 50% reduction stabilizing at 100,000 soldiers, the majority assigned to two divisions, the 1ID & 1AD which consisted of two forward deployed brigades under the V Corps Headquarters. Simultaneous with the active duty force reductions the reserve component reduced end strength from 1,170,000 in 1989 to 893,000 in 1999. From 1989 until 1999 the Army’s budget decreased 44%. In addition to the significant force reductions Sullivan led the Army through the first Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC) designed to decrease excess real property and infrastructure maintained by the Armed Forces.

In addition to coping with significant turmoil caused by budget and force structure reductions the Army and its Persian Gulf veterans struggled with an identity crisis. In the new strategic environment the National Leadership and the Military Leadership had to adjust the culture of the Army so that its serving members were just as comfortable as Peace Keepers as Warriors. As the new strategic environment focused the daily operations of the Army on operations other than war (OOTW) versus high-intensity conflict the Army experienced internal and external tension.

The Army has a long history of participating in conflicts classified by the 1990’s label of OOTW or the current label of stability and support (SASO) operations. Throughout the 18th and 19th century the Army participated in nearly continuous Indian Wars while the Army performed constabulary and frontier duties for an expanding nation. During reconstruction after the

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12 All numbers and statistics originate from the 1995 National Military Strategy pages 6 & 17.
13 Spiszer, Monograph Eliminating the Divisions In Favor of a Group-Based Force Structure: Should the U.S. Army Break the Phalanx? Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS. AY 97-98, 30.
14 The 1993 Field Manual 100-5, Operations referred to stability and support operations as operations other than war (OOTW). FM 3-0, Operations dtd 2001 replaced OOTW with Stability and Support Operations.
American Civil War, the Army occupied and conducted nation building for nearly twenty years in the former Confederacy. At the turn of the 20th century the Army participated in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and as recently as 1972 the United States Army participated in counterinsurgency and SASO in South Vietnam. After Vietnam the Army focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and high intensity combat. With the focus on high intensity combat many of the historical SASO lessons learned became foreign to the serving officer corps. Immediately after the conclusion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War operations in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994) and Bosnia (1995) revived a need for proficiency in SASO.

These issues confronted General Sullivan as he led the Army through a challenging period. General Sullivan shouldered the task of protecting the institutional health of the Army, while intelligently reducing the force structure and infrastructure of the United States Army and conducting daily OOTW missions that frequently transitioned to combat operations. General Sullivan recognized the Army possessed a culture and force structure designed to defeat a Soviet threat in the European. Changing these characteristics represented a difficult task; however, due to the enormous daily turmoil in the force. General Sullivan therefore aspired to create a solid foundation for his successor to continue the Army’s transformation.

General Sullivan wanted the leaders and service members of the Army to remember the historical results of the Army’s mismanagement of the post World War II drawdown. His vision and message to the Army’s Officer Corps became, “No more Task Force Smiths.” Task Force Smith (TF Smith) consisted of 1/21 Infantry from the 24th Infantry Division. This infantry task force commanded by LTC Smith served in Japan on occupation duty in Japan. Undermanned, poorly equipped and suffering from a lack of training deemed unnecessary for occupation units, LTC Smith deployed his battalion with twelve hours notice to the Korean Peninsula. Upon arriving on the Peninsula TF Smith’s received the mission to block an attacking North Korean
Army over running South Korea. On 2 July 1951, LTC Smith deployed with his available combat power, two infantry companies, and four days later fought a delaying action against the North Koreans. This engagement resulted in a demoralizing defeat of American forces. The poorly managed post World War II drawdown sealed TF Smith’s fate. General Gordon vowed that even as the Army deactivated substantial force structure, the remaining force while smaller would consist of adequately equipped, manned and trained units. To prepare for the future General Gordon initiated the Army Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and an Army After Next (AAN) study. These two programs created a foundation for the Army’s continuing transformation led by the 33rd CSA, General Dennis J. Reimer.


General Dennis J. Reimer served as the 33rd Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 20 June 1995 through 21 June 1999. General Reimer received his commission as a Field Artillery officer from the United States Military Academy in 1962. As with his predecessor he had multiple tours overseas including two tours in Vietnam, a tour in Germany as the commander of the division artillery for the 8th Infantry Division and a tour in Korea as the Chief of Staff, Combined Field Army and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command. During his first tour in Vietnam he served as an advisor to a South Vietnamese Army battalion. His second tour in Vietnam he served as an executive officer for a field artillery battalion in the 9th Infantry Division. During General Reimer’s service in Vietnam he received the Bronze star Medal with “V” device and the Purple Heart. The highest level of command achieved by General Reimer was, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces Command, headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Like

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Sullivan, Reimer commanded an Army Division; Reimer commanded the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson and also like Sullivan Reimer never commanded an Army Corps.\textsuperscript{16}

Reimer received an Army from General Sullivan which had weathered the most painful parts of the drawdown and budget cuts. The 1995 Quadrennial Defense Review published by the Secretary of Defense endorsed the national strategy of deterring and defeating nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with region allies.\textsuperscript{17} This national strategy required that the active duty Army retain ten divisions. The Army in Europe had completed its drawdown and had stabilized at 100,000 soldiers. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process was well under way and the biggest on-going force structure reorganization was occurring in the reserve component as the guard finally acknowledged the need to update its archaic combat divisions to fifteen more deployable and employable enhanced separate brigades.\textsuperscript{18}

While the momentum of the Army’s drawdown slowed on Reimer’s watch the pace of OOTW operations continued at a hectic pace. The major OOTW operations occurring on General Reimer’s watch included a dwindling commitment to Haiti, the commitment of United States Army forces to Bosnia and the commitment of Army forces in support of operations in Kosovo. In each of these operations the Army received criticism from both internal and external sources for failing to meet performance expectations. The Army’s focus on high-intensity combat prepared individual American soldiers, leaders and units for conflict with a peer competitor; but the 1990’s presented the Army with missions demanding expertise across the spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} All biographical data obtained from www.nationalveteransday.org accessed 15 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid 16.
\textsuperscript{19} Peter J. Boyer, “A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” \textit{The New Yorker} July 1, 2002, 54-67.
General Sullivan managed to plant a conceptual seed, even though the tremendous administrative challenges of reducing the force structure and infrastructure of the Army majority consumed a majority of his energy. General Sullivan instigated the conceptual transformation of the cold war United States Army by initiating the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and the “Army After Next” (AAN) studies. These initiatives explored the potential of emerging information technologies for the design and employment of future Army force structure. General Sullivan’s replacement General Reimer concurred with his predecessor’s insights concerning the potential of emerging information technologies continuing the AWE and replacing the AAN with the Force XXI experiment. The Force XXI experiment pursued the fielding of the world’s first fully digitalized division. Under General Reimer’s supervision the effort, visibility and resources of the Army AWE and Force XXI experimentation increased substantially.

As the AWEs continued and the 1990’s drew to a close, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor concluded that although a step in the right direction, General Reimer’s abandoning of AAN for the Force XXI concept represented an overly-conservative and incremental approach, merely layering information technologies on the existing Army culture and force structure. LTC Macgregor advocated this position in his 1997 book, *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP). BTP proposed that the 1990’s represented one of the rare periods in history when military organizations perched on the precipice of a Revolutionary in Military Affairs (RMA). Emerging information technologies combined with a significant change in the national security situation promised a revolutionary advancement of the Army’s capabilities if synchronized with corresponding changes in doctrine, organization, and culture.\(^{20}\) The magnitude of Macgregor’s changes far exceeded the parameters envisioned by the Force XXI experimentation. Macgregor insisted that the Army immediately begin a transformation of its culture, force structure and doctrine while enhancing compatibility with sister services to guide

the transformation process. General Reimer intrigued by the fresh thoughts proposed in BTP ordered copies of the book distributed to every general in the Army. However, the Army’s General officers resisted the magnitude of change envisioned by Macgregor and elected to continue the slow methodical; change reflected by the Force XXI experimentation.  


Two years after the General officer’s of the Army rejected Macgregor’s call for change, General Eric K. Shinseki became the Army’s 34th Chief of Staff on 22 June 1999. General Eric Shinseki received a commission as a field artillery officer upon graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1965. Due to a shortage of company grade officer’s Shinseki shipped to Vietnam six months after graduation, before completion of the Field Artillery Officers Basic Course. During his first tour he served with both the 9th and 25th Infantry Division as an Artillery Forward Observer. Within three months of being assigned to the 9th ID as a forward observer for an Infantry Company, enemy mortar fire wounded 2LT Shinseki. After recovering from these wounds Eric Shinseki reported to the 25th Infantry Division and served with this division until seriously wounded in a helicopter crash. After spending seven months at Tripler Army Medical Center, in Honolulu convalescing, 1LT Shinseki transferred to armor branch, attended the Armor Advanced Course at Fort Knox and returned to Vietnam to command A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. seven weeks later newly promoted Captain Shinseki received his third wound when he stepped on a land mine. This injury resulting in the loss of his right foot and part of the right lower leg caused him to spend the next year in Tripler recovering. The magnitude of this injury should have medically ended Captain Shinseki’s military career, but an unknown major working at the Army’s personnel center in Washington D. C. made a successful personal appeal on behalf of Eric Shinseki to the Secretary of the Army saving his career. Shinseki went on to serve over ten years in Europe, in assorted staff and command positions in Germany and a NATO staff billet in Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (Verona, Italy). Unlike

his two predecessors he never served a tour in Korea. General Shinseki commanded the 1st
Cavalry Division, served as the Commanding General, United States Army Europe (USAEUR),
the Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe (NATO) and the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Shinseki’s awards of note include, the Bronze Star Medal with
“V” (Valor) device with two Oak Leaf Clusters. The oak leaf clusters represent two additional
awards for valor in combat for a total of three awards for valor in combat. General Shinseki
received two awards of the Purple Heart for wounds received due to enemy acts.22

General Shinseki’s biographical information speaks of a man of incredible character,
courage and persistence. Of the three CSA’s of the Army during the 1990’s his record of
performance stands out from that of his predecessors. General Shinseki’s assumption of duties as
the CSA continued the generation shift of the senior Army leadership. General Sullivan
graduated from Norwich in 1959, Reimer from USMA in 62 and Shinseki from USMA in 65.

General Shinseki served under Reimer as the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, before
becoming the CSA. As Vice Chief, General Shinseki witnessed the rejection of the Army’s
General Officers concerning any substantial reform, and weathered the embarrassment caused by
the Army’s inability to appropriately respond to the Kosovo campaign in 1998.23 As the new
CSA, Shinseki determined his first priority as accelerating transformation in the United States
Army and introduction the Objective Force in 1999. The Objective Force Army represented a
more strategically deployable force that bridged the gap between heavy and light forces. The
Objective Force represents much more than a new force structure or fielding of new equipment
and technology; it represents a significant cultural and doctrinal shift for the United States Army.

22 All biographical data comes from Peter J. Boyer, “A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?”
Conclusions

The period 1991-1999 represented an extraordinary period of change for the United States Army. Future historians will probably equate the magnitude of change to other significant periods of change in the Army’s history such as immediately following the American Civil War, World War II and the Vietnam War. During the 1990s the United States Army experienced a 40% reduction in force structure and manpower and a 45% reduction in fiscal budgets. These numbers include a significant reapportioning of forces as the Army closed excess infrastructure and reduced forces in Europe by 50%. During the 1990s three CSA’s led the Army through an intense period of force reductions, restructuring and mission change these men were General Sullivan, General Reimer and General Shinseki respectively. Each of these CSAs contributed by moving the Army forward as it adjusted to the new strategic environment.

Historians may conclude that General Sullivan’s stewardship of the post Cold War drawdown represented his greatest contribution to the Army. He supervised perhaps the best managed drawdown in the United States Army’s history. General Sullivan succeeded in initiating the conceptual foundations of the Army’s post Cold War transformation with such studies as the AWEs and AAN program. However, the importance of getting the drawdown right and the daily administrative demands of reducing the force structure while supporting operations in Somalia and Haiti kept both the Army and its leadership focused on near term goals and objectives.

Under General Reimer’s leadership from 1995-1999, the pace of the drawdown slowed. Budgets and the level of authorized forces stabilized. In an emerging trend the national leadership continued to commit landpower to OOTW missions including the introduction of land forces to Bosnia. General Reimer continued General Sullivan’s AWE experiments but discontinued the AAN program and began the Force XXI concept. The Force XXI concept attempted to maximize the operational possibilities of the Information Age, by fielding the first digitalized division. After reading BTP General Reimer raised the possibility to the general officers of the Army that the Army could indeed be at a point in its evolution that exceeded the
parameters envisioned in Force XXI and might need to pursue significant cultural and force structure reforms. The Army’s general officer community strongly resisted this suggestion and General Reimer never resurfaced the issue and continued the force XXI experiments.

Two years after the publication of BTP, General Eric Shinseki became the 34th CSA. General Shinseki assumed office of an organization with a stabilized end strength and budget, finished with the process of realigning forces in Europe and reprieved from additional BRAC closures. As he assumed office operations in Kosovo and Bosnia stabilized and for the first time in a decade the Army as an institution could devout serious attention towards transforming for the future as opposed to reacting to the present. General Shinseki seized this opportunity to advocate significant reform of the Army and to elevate this reform to the institution’s first priority.

General Eric Shinseki a persistent man of character and courage dedicated himself to leading the Army through this change regardless of criticisms of those comfortable with the status quo.

Finally, General Shinseki realized that if the Army failed to provide the national leadership with acceptable employment capabilities and options, the Army risked the loss of political support and financial resources in the future.24

These thoughts led General Shinseki to unveil Transformation in October 1999. Under General Shinseki’s leadership Transformation addressed the operational gap between the Army’s light units, which he considered too vulnerable, and its heavy units, which he considered strategically unresponsive.25 Transformation initiatives developed a hybrid medium weight force appropriate for employment in conflicts ranging from peacekeeping to high intensity conflict against an Iraqi or North Korean regional threat. The new force structure named the Objective Force relied on emerging information technologies. These technologies enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities with improved connectivity to sister services and joint assets at lower echelons. The embedding of such capabilities allowed the Objective Force to

24 Peter J. Boyer, “A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” The New Yorker July 1, 2002, 64.
maneuver dominating at the strategic, operational and tactical level of war, avoid detection and facilitate precision strikes at a time and place chosen by friendly forces. The Objective Force used a common vehicle platform reducing the operational logistics requirements and reduced air transportation requirements by complying with Air Force C-130 aircraft weight requirements. The Objective Force satisfied the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2020, capable of full spectrum dominance through dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection. General Shinseki’s vision created a force better structured, trained and organized to meet the strategic and security demands of the 21st century. The Objective Force represents the physical embodiment of Army transformation. However the Army’s transformation exceeds the introduction of new force structures and technologies. To succeed transformation must change the culture of the Army. This monograph proposes that General Shinseki’s Objective Force contains many advanced and matured concepts initially advocated by Colonel Macgregor in *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**MACGREGOR’S CONCEPTS**

Military establishments achieve a Revolution in Military Affairs when they successfully exploit technology, organization, training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat.

Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor

Colonel Macgregor’s book *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP) proposed that a new operational concept supported by organization, doctrine and cultural changes can revolutionize the military’s capabilities. Colonel Macgregor believed

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27 Joint Vision 2020, 2.
the Information Revolution producing profound changes in the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities of the Army; if synchronized with doctrine, organizational and cultural modifications promised a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This chapter identifies four of Macgregor’s concepts worthy of additional study. The chapter begins by presenting Macgregor’s opinions on the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, transitions to the integration of the Army into the joint community and concludes with a discussion on possible Army tactical force structure and cultural modifications.

**Landpower’s Relevance in the 21st Century**

An advocate of landpower, Colonel Macgregor made four valuable points concerning the value of landpower in the 21st century. First, expect the demand for landpower forces to remain high. Second, landpower can uniquely influence both allies and adversaries. Third, landpower represents the only force capable of creating the necessary conditions for economic recovery and growth. Fourth the United States military must maintain the ability to conduct a multidimensional campaign.

Macgregor’s first observation concerning the continuing high demand for landpower appears accurate. At the close of the 20th century stability and support operations kept the Army gainfully employed. Macgregor noted that from 1991-1997 the Army deployed conventional force soldiers to Somalia (93), Haiti (94), Bosnia (95) and Rwanda (97). In 2003 the Army maintains considerable conventional forces in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Germany, Iraq, Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait and the Sinai. These forces perform missions across the spectrum of war from peacetime military engagement with allies to smaller scale contingencies to major theater war operations.

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Macgregor’s second observation that the commitment of landpower sends an unambiguous signal of support for our allies and deterrence to our adversaries remains accurate. The deployment of landpower demonstrates an acceptance of risk and a commitment by the national leadership of the United States that tomahawk missile or long range precision air strikes can not convey.31 While air and naval forces unequivocally possess the ability to reach enemy forces anywhere in the world, clever adversaries develop techniques to mitigate the effects of these forces and more importantly discredit the absence of United States landpower forces as a sign of lacking commitment and national resolve on behalf of the United States.

Macgregor’s third observation argued that only landpower can create the conditions of stability required for economic recovery and growth. Macgregor stated, “Landpower has the capability to enable states and peoples to develop political and economic structures that secure domestic prosperity and international peace.”32 Macgregor asserted that “security is the real basis for economic growth” an argument resembling that presented in The Lexus and an Olive Tree, the 1999 bestseller authored by Thomas L. Friedman discussing the phenomenon of Globalization.

Macgregor’s fourth observation challenged the belief that the United States military will always achieve air and sea superiority. A great way to guarantee the loss of air and sea dominance is to solely invest in technologies supporting operations in these mediums. The logic of this argument is simple. Over reliance and over investment in air and sea technologies, increases the likelihood that adversaries can develop effective countermeasures simply because this procurement strategy focusing on only two mediums and greatly reduces the complexity of the problem an enemy must overcome. Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Sinnreich in a 2002 land warfare paper echoed this point. In this paper these men state:

Preclusion alone, if it is to be successful, will require near-simultaneous air, ground, space and special operations to deny the aggressor

32 Ibid 24.
early offensive success and avoid permitting him to emplace some portions of his defensive system unhindered while others are attacked.\textsuperscript{33}

The need for dominant landpower capabilities in the 21st century remains undisputable. The Information Revolution may allow numerically smaller landpower forces to succeed during combat operations if close coordination with air and sea forces is achieved through leveraging emerging technologies. However, recent history demonstrates that the ability to win the peace still requires large quantities of landpower which saturates a geographic location for an extended period of time. The operations in Bosnia and Kosovo confirm this hypothesis. The commitment of landpower does indeed send an unambiguous signal of support for our allies and deterrence to our adversaries, and only landpower appears capable of creating the conditions of stability required for economic recovery and growth.

Finally, the United States must maintain the ability to conduct a multi-dimensional campaign. Macgregor concludes the second chapter of BTP by stating that it is not a question of the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, but how landpower can leverage the emerging technologies of the Information Revolution to attain qualitatively superior fighting power; as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat.\textsuperscript{34} To understand this one must understand how Macgregor views the Army’s relationship with the joint community.

The Integration of the Army into the Joint Community

Macgregor’s greatest contribution in BTP may be his attempt to better integrate the Army into the joint community. Macgregor recognized that future victories centered around the ability of militaries to create over whelming effects on an enemy through the integration of all service components at the lowest possible echelon. If information dominance is critical to success in

future war then those militaries that acquire and share information within internal service echelons and battle operating systems or functions and externally between service components can observe, detect and act faster that an adversaries and therefore emerge victorious.\textsuperscript{35}

The ability to share information between headquarters and to transmit pertinent data to units and platforms that possess the means to affect the enemy becomes critical to acting faster than an adversary. This leads to a discussion of the functionality and structure of the headquarters analyzing information and directing action. Currently the Army has three echelons of headquarters above the brigade level. These are the Division, Corps and Army Component headquarters. None of these headquarters are permanently configured to operate as a standing joint task force. Of these three headquarters Colonel Macgregor viewed the Corps Headquarters as the Army command and control organization best suited for quickly leveraging the Information Revolution and simultaneously embedding within the joint community. For this reason he proposed a modification of the organization of the Army Corps Headquarters resulting in the four current Army Corps Headquarters Corps (I, III, V & XVIII) being designated as standing Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters.

Not only did Macgregor suggest the four Army Corps Headquarters become standing joint task force headquarters but also these organizations develop a formal relationship with regional combatant commanders. To establish this relationship Macgregor proposed in BTP that I, III, V & VXIII align with USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USFK/CFC and USACOM.\textsuperscript{36} Macgregor argued that this type of relationship would create an organization better prepared to operate under the control of a Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) and more familiar with the RCC’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Since the publication of BTP in 1997, USACOM disbanded and USJFCOM was established as a functional unified command dedicated to analysis of the joint integration and training issues. This concept may be worthy of additional study.

current V Corps headquarters could be aligned with USEUCOM, III Corps with USCENTCOM, I Corps with USPACOM and VXIII with USSOUTHCOM. USFK/CFC is not a RCC and doesn’t warrant the establishment of a permanent relationship with a US Army Corps operating as a standing JTF whereas USPACOM is a RCC. CDRUSPACOM could authorize direct coordination and emphasis increased training between USFK/CFC and I Corps.

Included below is Macgregor’s concept for a Corps level Army headquarters modified to fulfill the responsibilities of a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

This organization augments the current Army Corps level headquarters with two Major Generals and aligns the Corps headquarters with the linear battlefield organization of deep, close and rear. The deep, close and rear battlefield organization was in doctrinal compliance with the Army’s capstone Field Manual FM 100-5 published in 1993 and is still a valid battlefield organization in the Army’s current capstone manual FM 3-0, dated June 2001.\(^\text{37}\) While the structure and organization of command and control elements is fundamental to a military

\(^{36}\) Ibid, 150.
organization’s performance in conflict; equally important is the quality of its pre-conflict training. In BTP, Macgregor included some insightful concepts for the advancement of joint training. Colonel Macgregor identified two pertinent issues concerning joint training in BTP. These issues are the resourcing and frequency of joint training. To illustrate the value of well resourced collective training, Macgregor devotes several pages to the development of the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs) during the 1980’s. Macgregor points out that while considered expensive and unorthodox at their inception, the investment in the Army’s three “dirt” or maneuver training centers and one battle staff training program paid huge dividends during the Persian Gulf War.

Even though Macgregor uses the Army’s CTCs as an example of the importance of well-resourced and planned collective training, he proposes a different concept to correcting joint training deficiencies. To correct these deficiencies, Macgregor approaches the issue of joint training as a structural deficiency propagated by the service components. Colonel Macgregor suggests that service components routinely assign units to Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) on a rotational basis. These units then train in an Area of Responsibility (AOR) verses developing a joint training center in the United States of America modeled after the Army’s CTCs. In Macgregor’s concept service components retain responsibility for tactical and operational certification on service specific core competencies. After service units achieve acceptable proficiency in service specific competencies they report to RCCs and train in a specific AOR under the supervision of the RCC and his staff.

Colonel Macgregor recommended that the Army institutes a quarterly cycle training program to support this concept. The individual cycles of this annual training program consist of training, deployment and reconstitution and each cycle lasts three months. Units in the deployment cycle deploy to the AOR under a RCC and participate in joint training under the direction of the RCC and his staff. The benefits of this approach include the establishment of habitual relationships between tactical units and standing JTFs and the involvement of the RCC.
as a commander responsible for joint training. Service components still retain the responsibility for service specific core competencies and organizational structures. Colonel Macgregor expressed several thoughts on how the Army should structure tactical units and select and educate the leaders of these units.

**Tactical Force Structure Recommendations**

Building on his view of how the Army service component contribute to the joint warfighting team, Macgregor offers new Army organizational designs that may allow tactical units to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat. He builds a foundation for the introduction of his organizational designs by highlighting what he views as some embedded implications emerging from the Forces XXI experiments. A specific possibility emerging from the Force XXI experimentation was that information dominance may enable future combat organizations leveraging emerging information technologies to substantially increase lethality and integrate combined arms formations at lower echelons.

Colonel Macgregor suggests that emerging information technologies may allow the Army to continue the historic migration of combined arms formations to lower echelons by transforming the United States Army, to a Brigade versus Division based organization. Macgregor designs permanent combined arms brigade-size formations embedded with the connectivity to fully integrate into the joint community. He names these new organizations “Combat Groups”. Assigned to the Groups are permanent combined arms battalions, with permanent combined arms platoons at the company level. These battalion formations possess organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and connectivity to leverage joint command, control, communication, computer, and ISR (C4ISR) systems at the brigade level, and increased ISR and C4ISR capabilities embedded in its battalions. A brigadier

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general commands the groups with a colonel serving as a chief of staff. Former battalion commanders fill the primary staff positions. Colonel Macgregor modifies the Army's current staff configuration by combining intelligence with operations and creating a primary staff position for a strike coordinator, an information coordinator and a Civil Affairs/Psychological operations officer. The command and control organization of Macgregor's Combat Group is illustrated in Figure 3.2.

![Figure 3.2: Macgregor's Staff Structure of a Combat Group, BTP: Page 81](image)

Macgregor develops four distinct group organizations. Each group specializes in a specific mission profile, designated as Heavy Combat, Airborne-Air Assault, Heavy Reconnaissance and Light Reconnaissance. The subordinate battalions within a group structure to perform the functions of armed reconnaissance, direct fire and indirect fire. Identical C4ISR and sustainment structure supports every group and battalion. Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 & 3.6 represent the flow charts for each type of Combat Group.
Several organizational structure similarities emerge between Colonel Macgregor’s
Combat Group and Shinseki’s Stryker Brigades. Both organizations focus on the ability to
leverage information dominance; both lighten and reduce the logistical requirements of armor
formations while providing infantry formations with increased mobility and lethality; both center
around the thesis that combined arms brigades are now the Army’s primary Unit of Action (UA)

39 Ibid, 76.
40 Ibid, 77.
41 Ibid, 79.
42 Ibid, 80.
and both significantly change the historical function of headquarters units at the Division and Corps level. In both organizations the division level and higher Army Headquarters possess equipment and personnel facilitating joint connectivity and no longer habitually associate with specific army brigade-sized tactical units. Finally, both organizations continue the trend of combined arms formations to a lower echelon and interestingly enough both organizations demonstrate a utility for wheeled capability specifically the LAV III.

Colonel Macgregor expected the adoption of group formations to meet considerable cultural resistance and recommended several ways to mitigate this friction. For example, the new group formations continue to wear division patches and maintain traditional lineages with parent divisions.\textsuperscript{43} Colonel Macgregor recognized branch parochialism as one of the greatest obstacles to implementation of the group structure and warned against aggressively instituting changes that fundamentally changed the basic career patterns of the Army’s branches until cultural and educational changes could subvert the institutional power of the Army’s basic branches.\textsuperscript{44} These warnings led us to a discussion of what cultural changes Macgregor deemed necessary for his new force to succeed and how he envisioned altering the Army culture.

\textbf{Culture & Education}

The ability to influence the thought process and mindset of an organization is the first step in changing an organizational culture. A means to influence this thought process and organizational approach to problem solving is through education. If the targeted culture resists the change process the ability to introduce fundamental change becomes exponentially harder. A reoccurring trend in the interviews conducted to support this monograph was the resistance of the Army’s institutional culture to any meaningful or significant positive change. The means to change a culture is often through its personnel and education systems and policies. Colonel Macgregor offers some thoughts on current Army personnel management policies and systems.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 67.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 68.
Macgregor presented home basing as a concept worthy of adoption. Macgregor’s construct calls for his Combat Groups to home base from a CONUS location, from which the units train, maintain and focus on service specific core competences, building the foundation for their contributions to the joint force. Once groups have cycled through their Reconstitution and Training cycle, Combat Groups deploy to a Regional Combatant Command for a period of four months during a Deployment Ready Cycle. Macgregor states that home basing could eliminate huge costs to the Army for the moving and maintaining of military families overseas. Home basing will also allow military families to establish long term roots in a civilian community, for spouse employment and children’s education. The author of this monograph believes that there exist as many negative as well as positive second and third order effects regarding a policy of home basing and believe that Macgregor’s thoughts on this topic serve merely as a point of departure for further study. An Armor officer with a considerable amount of his career devoted to the education of other officers, Macgregor’s insights on the Officer Education system appear more insightful.

Colonel Macgregor criticizes the Army’s field grade officer education system. Macgregor believes that the Army’s current selection system does not select officers with favorable attitudes towards change and risk taking.\(^{45}\) Macgregor basis his comments on the observation that officers who do not challenge the status quo or embarrass their bosses receive favorable comments on Army’s performance evaluation tool, the officer evaluation report (OER). As with most things in life, accomplished risk takers develop these skills over years of practice and usually possess a history of one or two bad decisions. A venture capitalist represents an appropriate business analogy. A foolish investor gives his money to a venture capitalist financing his first business undertaking. An investor equally foolish gives his money to a venture capitalist with a resume of continuing failures. However, a venture capitalist with a resume history

consisting of initial failures followed by increasing success as learned the skill of identifying and limiting losses quickly, while simultaneously exploiting investment opportunities. This venture capitalist represents a skilled and learning venture capitalist, worthy of an investor’s capital. For this reason Macgregor views the use of the OER as the only evaluation tool determining whether or not an officer gets selected for field grade education programs as fundamentally flawed.\textsuperscript{46}

Macgregor advocates the institution of a system of written pretests for entrance to field grade officer professional schools. Under the Macgregor system prospective candidates would compete on an annual written test over a three year period. To gain entrance to school during one of these testing periods the prospective candidate must score in the top twenty percent of those officers taking the test.\textsuperscript{47} The author of this monograph believes that this concept if applied to entrance for the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) would exasperate the disenfranchisement that currently occurs when serving officers fail to earn a slot to CGSC at the 12-13 year point of their career. The current system of selection for field grade education does appear to be fundamentally flawed and Macgregor institution of pretesting and additional inputs other than the OER into the selection process appears valid. More importantly he hints at how the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leveraging information technologies could advance the education of officers currently serving in the Field Army.

TRADOC using information technologies must play a greater role in assisting corps, division, brigade and battalion commander’s in developing standardized and readily accessible officer professional development (OPD) programs. These OPD classes and programs made available either on line or on a compact disk could further the concept of life long learning throughout the professional officer corps. These OPD programs while developing a common base throughout the army’s officer corps could be constructed in such a manner as to support the

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 168.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, 168.
autonomy of tactical commander’s by supporting the modification of specific classes based upon a unit training needs and mission profile.

Additionally Macgregor identifies the absence of opportunity in the Army’s field grade officer education system for operations career field officers to attend civilian master level education. This may be a fundamental flaw because these officers represent the pool of officers destined under the current system to become the senior leaders of the Army. These are the officers who in future assignment will directly coordinate with the United States political leadership at the national level. Currently the only opportunity for Army field grade operations officers to attend a fully funded masters program is the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and this is a military versus civilian run program.

Macgregor’s final comments concerning the field grade officer education process concerns the lack of well-resourced joint education programs. While JFCOM as made enormous strides in developing a joint education program, including the development of a mandatory Joint Staff Officer’s course for all officers assigned to joint billets, this course is only two months long and falls short of the level of education provided by individual services for their service component planners. Currently each service sends their operational component planners through a year long advanced operational education process. These schools are the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Amphibious Warfare (SAAWS). The quality of the twelve month service specific schools is vastly superior to the two month joint school resulting in the awkward situation that service component staffs officers are better trained, educated and prepared for their assignments then the officers serving on their higher headquarters on joint staffs at the RCC and national level.
Summary

Colonel Macgregor covers a number of issues as he presents his vision for changes in the 1997 Army. His foresees many implications for improvements in Joint and Army operations possible through the leveraging of emerging information technologies. The previous chapter identifies four of Macgregor’s concepts that this author believes worthy of additional study. The chapter began by presenting Macgregor’s opinions on the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, transitioned to the integration of the Army into the joint community and concluded with a discussion on possible tactical force structure and cultural modifications necessary in the Army.

As a landpower advocate, Colonel Macgregor presents a convincing argument supporting the belief that landpower will continue to be decisive in war, high to mid intensity conflict and stability and support operations throughout the remainder of the 21st century. Macgregor made four valuable points in BTP concerning the value of landpower in the 21st century. These points are: the demand for landpower forces will continue to remain high, landpower can uniquely influence both friends and foes, landpower is the only force capable of creating the necessary conditions for economic recovery and growth and finally the United States military must maintain the ability to conduct a multidimensional campaign. Macgregor concludes his presentation of the enduring value of landpower in BTP by stating that it is not a question of the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, but how landpower can leverage the emerging technologies of the Information Revolution to attain qualitatively superior fighting power; as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat.48

This question leads to his discussion of how landpower can best be organized and embedded with the appropriate capabilities to contribute to the joint force. Colonel Macgregor believed that the ARFOR headquarters level was too high of an echelon of command to establish connectivity with the joint community. He believed the correct echelon of command was now at

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the Corps level headquarters and that the Army and joint community must commit to redesigning Army Corps Headquarters to perform as standing JTFs. Macgregor’s last noteworthy proposal at the joint level concerned the rotation of Army tactical units to AORs for joint training under the control and supervision of RCCs. Macgregor contended that this would enhance joint interoperability and force RCCs to be responsible not only for employment but the joint training of component forces.

Macgregor believed that the Force XXI experimentation demonstrated that information dominance may enable future combat organizations leveraging emerging information technologies to substantially increase lethality and integrate combined arms formations at lower echelons. This migration enabled the Army to transition from a division to a brigade based Army. Macgregor developed combined arms brigade formations embedded with the connectivity allowing full integrate with the joint community. He named these organizations “Combat Groups”. Each Group contained combined arms battalion formations, with increased organic combined arms capabilities at the company level. Several similar design characteristics emerge between Colonel Macgregor’s Combat Group and Shinseki’s Stryker Brigades, including the ability to leverage information dominance, and reduce logistical support requirements while providing tactical formations with increased mobility and lethality. Finally, both concepts identify combined arms brigades as the Army’s primary Unit of Action (UA) and advocate a modification of the echelonment and functionality of the Army’s command and control elements.

Colonel Macgregor identified the importance of overcoming current cultural norms to implement meaningful changes. He submitted that the means to change a culture is often through its personnel and education systems and policies. In the area of personnel policies he advocated the concept of home-basing. His comments on the Army’s field grade officer education system are profound. He believed that the use of the OER as the only evaluation tool determining
whether or not an officer gets selected for field grade education programs is a fundamentally flawed. Macgregor advocated a system of written pretests for entrance to field grade professional schools and the expansion of opportunities for operations branch career field officers to receive civilian master level education. In the area of joint education he strongly advocated the strengthening of the joint education process.

CHAPTER FOUR
ENDURING CONCEPTS

After demonstrating the relevance of landpower in the 21st century, Colonel Macgregor presents three concepts in Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (BTP) meriting further study. These concepts include techniques for integration of the Army into the joint community, new tactical force structure initiatives and United States Army cultural modifications. Influenced by observations generated by ongoing Force XXI experiments attempting to field the world’s first fully digitalized division, Macgregor advocated the development of information dominant combat organizations composed of combined arms formations integrated at the brigade echelon. Finally, Colonel Macgregor recognized that a critical precondition for implementing institutional changes hinged on the Army’s modification of organizational culture.

The publication of BTP coincided with an intense period of change for the United States Army. During the years 1991-2003 the Army executed the largest drawdown since World War II, participated in world-wide combat, stability and support operations and managed scarce acquisition and research and development (A&RD) resources to maintain landpower dominance in the 21st century. Three Chief of Staffs of the Army (CSAs) led the Army through this decade.

49 Ibid, 60.
50 Ibid, 60.
of force reductions, restructuring and mission change. These generals were General Sullivan, General Reimer and General Shinseki respectively.

General Sullivan led the Army through the most intense period of the drawdown. General Reimer led the Army as it mastered the execution of Stability and Support Operations and General Shinseki pursued a fundamental change to the Army’s warfighting construct with the initiation of “Transformation” in October 1999. Since 1999, transformation efforts resulted in the fielding of the Stryker Brigades. These brigades represent a new medium weight-force designed to participate in conflicts ranging from peacekeeping to high intensity conflict. The Stryker Brigades do not achieve the demanding design parameters of the Objective Force concept, but serve as an initial force structure design. The Stryker Brigades represent a positive step towards the achievement of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs design criteria envisioned by Joint Vision (JV) 2020. The JV 2020 vision directs United States military forces to achieve full spectrum dominance through dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection. Using the JV2020 as criteria Colonel Macgregor’s and General Shinseki’s most significant concepts reside in the areas of material, leadership and organization development.

Material

Colonel Macgregor and General Shinseki proposed concepts requiring the acquisition process to develop technologies facilitating the creation of an “informationally” superior organization. Macgregor failed to offer a long-term material acquisition or research and development (A&RD) vision in BTP. Colonel Macgregor purposely limited his discussion to weapon systems the Army maintained in 1997 or expected to field within the next ten years. Conversely, General Shinseki’s Objective Force concept offers a long-term vision for A&RD.

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General Shinseki complicated the A&RD process, by invalidating the assumption concerning the accessibility of forward basing and the availability of strategic transportation systems to project the Army’s heavy and bulky weapon systems and operational supplies. In addition to directing future landpower force structures to strategically deploy by airlift, General Shinseki required these forces to maintain the level of survivability, lethality and tactical mobility of current armor formations. General Shinseki’s design parameters for the Objective Force generated a complex problem for A&RD and force designers versus Macgregor’s concept of organizational redesign.

The demanding design parameters and characteristics for the Objective Force dictated by General Shinseki require emerging information technologies to reduce the magnitude of historic strategic and operational challenges caused by logistical sustainability and communication architecture. At the strategic and operational level of war the ability to logistically sustain and communicate with dispersed subordinate forces often reduces the options available to leaders responsible for these levels of war. General Shinseki recognized the connection between the strategic and operational problems of logistics and communications and the capabilities of tactical units. If information technologies improved the organic reconnaissance, surveillance and communication capabilities of tactical combat formations then achieving a reduction on the demand placed on operational logistics and communications becomes obtainable. These capabilities enhanced in a tactical force structure can revolutionize the Army’s approach to warfighting resulting in the fielding of lighter force structures, dramatically reducing the theater stockpiles of logistic supplies without a corresponding degradation in survivability, lethality and mobility.

The following two paragraphs summarize the characteristics of the Objective Force.

The Objective Force is strategically and operationally responsive, an Army that can deploy a brigade-sized Unit of Action (UA) in 96 hours, a division-size Unit of Employment (UE) in 120 hours, and 5 division-size UEs in

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54 Ibid, ii.
30 days using a mix of air, sea, and land movement and pre-positioned equipment. It arrives at multiple entry points as a coherent, integrated combined arms team capable of rapidly concentrating combat power with dramatically reduced theater stockpiles through reach-back access to supplies; sustained velocity management; real-time tracking of material, equipment and personnel (military, DOD civilian and contractor); commonality of systems and components; and interdependency (interoperability) with joint, inter-agency and multi-national forces.

Objective Force systems support decisive dominant maneuver-horizontal and vertical, day and night-in all weather and terrain as a dismounted or mounted combined arms team with unyielding unit integrity. The Objective force provides the best combination of low-observable, ballistic protection, long range acquisition and targeting, and first round hit-and-kill technologies. They are capable of destroying adversary formations at longer ranges with smaller calibers, greater precision and more devastating effects.

This sets a high standard for material A&RD programs. Programs incapable of meeting these stringent requirements represent a waste of precious A&RD funds. Although, Macgregor failed to provide a mature vision for A&RD in BTP, he did identify the importance of information dominance achieved through improved connectivity with joint forces and the need for combined arms formations possessing organic horizontal and vertical maneuver capabilities with significantly improved ISR assets at the brigade equivalent echelon. Both Colonel Macgregor’s and General Shinseki’s concepts support dominant maneuver and precision engagement. General Shinseki’s Objective Force improved focused logistics perhaps at the expense of full dimension protection whereas Colonel Macgregor’s Group concept retained full dimension protection at the expense of improving focused logistics. Regardless the requirement to significantly change the Army’s culture represents a commonality in both concepts.

**Leadership**

Macgregor identified education as the quickest means to change an institutional culture. Colonel Macgregor focused his discussion on the field grade officer education system. Colonel Macgregor’s criticism of the OER as a limited means of selecting officers for further education and the development of written entrance requirements merits additional study. Additional valid criticism include the limited opportunities for operations career field officers to obtain advanced
degrees at civilian institutions and the lack of a well-resourced joint education program for officers serving at the Regional Combatant Command level. Macgregor advocates the education of officers who develop a joint approach to military problem solving versus a service component framework. Contrary to Colonel Macgregor’s approach, General Shinseki instituted long-term and broad systematic changes to the Army’s officer education system.

General Shinseki’s efforts pursue a bottom up versus top down approach to educational reform. Significant educational initiatives initiated by General Shinseki include the introduction of the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC). BOLC focuses on developing the warrior ethos in newly commissioned officers in a branch immaterial mixed gender environment. Only officers commissioned in the specialty branches such as doctors, dentist, lawyers and chaplains do not attend this course. The Armor and Infantry Centers continue to research the possibility of a consolidated combat arms school for combined arms captains. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) finalizes a new program of instruction called the Intermediate Level Education Program (ILE). ILE enhances the tactical and operational education of operations career field majors. Finally the SAMS program added two additional seminars increasing the annual graduation of officers with advanced education at the operational level of war by nearly a third. These necessary educational improvements enable a cultural change that facilitates the adoption of the JV2020 operational concepts. While A&RD and educational programs build a solid foundation for adopting the operational concepts of JV2020, new organizational structures must emerge to fully realize the vision of JV2020.

Ibid. ii.

The author personally observed the initiation of these education programs during the last four years of his career. The author’s recent assignments include Small Group Instructor at Fort Benning. During this assignment the author observed the initiation of staff studies for the consolidation of the Armor and Infantry Captains Career Course. The author then served as an Infantry Officer Basic Course Company Commander. During this assignment the author executed the first mixed gender, mixed branch BOLC pilot course. The author currently attends SAMS and observed the institution of the ILE program and the expansion of the SAMS program during the last two years.
Organization

Macgregor’s Group and General Shinseki’s Objective Force concepts represent significant organization modifications. Macgregor’s concept offers a near-term solution through reorganization versus General Shinseki long-term solution of force development. Macgregor’s concept depends on the availability of forward basing whereas General Shinseki’s pursues the difficult problem of projecting a lethal, survivable and tactically mobile force over strategic distances. Both structures support the JV2020 concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement through the leveraging of emerging information technologies and both concepts advance the integration of the Army into the joint community.

Colonel Macgregor proposes that the United States Army volunteer to lead the development of a standing joint task force headquarters. Macgregor states that the Army’s command and control echelon easily modified to support this new role is the Army Corps Headquarters. To enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the Regional Combatant Commander’s (RCC) joint training responsibilities and oversight. Macgregor advocates the development of tactical force packages that rotate to an Area of Responsibilities for joint training developed and supervised by the RCC.

The structure of Colonel Macgregor’s Groups attempt to create many of the capabilities delineated in the design parameters of the Objective Force. Colonel Macgregor recognized the value of vertical forcible entry capabilities specifically requiring the manning of these formations with soldiers fully trained in the application of Airborne and Air Assault insertion techniques. Colonel Macgregor recognized the need for developing force structures with outstanding operational and tactical mobility. To improve operational mobility Macgregor incorporated army aviation into each of his Groups and resourced these organizations with abundant tracked and wheeled vehicles. While Macgregor’s Group design supports the JV2020 operational concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement s the Groups retained such systems as the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Comanche and Apache attack helicopters and
Crusader artillery. While these systems improve tactical mobility and dominant maneuver they complicate the JV2020 goal of obtaining focused logistics and can not achieve the strategic deployability design parameters outlined for the Objective Force.

Macgregor’s Group and General Shinseki’s Objective Force design continue the historic migration of combined arms formations to lower echelons of employment. Colonel Macgregor achieved this by recommending the organic assignment of aviation and artillery to his Group formations. The Objective Force achieves this by organically assigning an aviation detachment and artillery battalion to UA brigades and tank companies with the UA’s organic infantry battalions. Both organizations advocate the development of greater connectivity with the sister services at lowest echelons possible to increase access to joint firepower and information.

CONCLUSION

The following chapter used the JV2020 operational concepts as criteria to compare and contrast Colonel Macgregor’s Group concept with General Shinseki’s Objective Force concept. This analysis results in three recommendations. First, the Army must continue to invest A&RD funds in technologies producing informationally dominant force structures, capable of dominant maneuver, precision engagement and full-dimension protection. These technologies can not sacrifice the lethality, survivability and tactically mobility residing in the current heavy force structure and must increase ISR and joint connectivity at lower echelons. Furthermore, these technologies must increase strategic deployability while decreasing the required logistical support infrastructure. Second, to enable the Army to adopt the operational requirements of JV2020, the Army must continue to examine and restructure educational systems and institutions. Third, the Army must develop and field organization structures that continue the historic migration of

58 Ibid, 76-80.
combined arms formations to lower echelons while simultaneously improving the integration of these formations into the joint community.

Colonel Macgregor represents an Agent of Change for the United States Army. In 1997 Colonel Macgregor recognized the security environment of the 21st century required fundamental changes to the institutional norms of the United States Army. To address these challenges he wrote the book, *Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (BTP). Colonel Macgregor, a serving officer, displayed commendable courage by presenting non-standard concepts to the institutionally conservative United States Army. BTP caused considerable controversy, but it served the needs of the Army and nation, sparking wide spread institutional introspection within the ranks of the United States Army. If the Army desires to maintain the institutional flexibility to adapt quicker than adversaries to rapidly changing circumstances than the Army must nurture an institutional climate valuing intellectual challenges to the status quo versus a system that rewards subservient officers satisfied with acquiescence and regurgitation of culturally and institutionally excepted solutions to dynamic and complex problems.
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