STATE CIVIL DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Dr. Richard Gerstell

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Reviewed by Col E. J. Ingmire, USA on 30 October 1963.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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# STATE CIVIL DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS

22 October 1963

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Reviewed by Col E. J. Ingmire, USA. Date: 30 October 1963.

Reported by Grace R. O'Toole.

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.
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22 October 1963

CAPTAIN HENRY: Admiral Rose, Gentlemen: This morning we continue our consider-
ation of civil defense matters, turning our attention to State Civil Defense Plans and Programs.

You have all read our speaker's biography and are well aware that he is emi-

nently qualified to add much to our knowledge in the next 45 minutes.

It is a pleasure to present to you Dr. Richard Gerstell, the Civil Defense Director for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Gerstell.

DR. GERSTELL: Admiral Rose, Captain Henry, and Gentlemen: It is a pleasure to be here. I will speak informally. I suppose I have to tell a story. Back in September when school was starting, the teacher was running through the class and finding out the names of the children and what their daddies did. She came to little Mary and asked her name. Mary gave her name. She asked, "What does your daddy do?" Mary said, "Why, he plays the piano in a house of prostitution." That shook the teacher a little bit, but she was used to the young ones, and she went on and got the rest of the dope. But she made a point several weeks later of getting hold of Mary's mother and telling her about this. Mary's mother said, "Oh, yes. I can understand that. As a family we have unanimously agreed that we will do anything we can to keep people from knowing that Dad is the State Civil Defense Director."

That is not only my position but I have been at it for some years. I have been at it here, I suppose you would say, on the banks of the Potomac at the policy-making level. I have been at the grass roots, too, in a county organization, and I have been State Director, I guess, over 12 years now.
In the remarks I will make I think it is only fair to say that I shall be critical. I always am. Some people say that the only thing that goes on right under my nose that I don't know anything about is that big mouth of mine. But in being critical please let me assure you that I do not do it just for the sake of being critical, because in most cases I am criticizing myself as well as others. I think that, in this whole field of civil defense, which certainly everyone knows is confusing, to put it mildly, if we can actually point to a time, date, and place where some of these mistakes were made, perhaps we can get it squared away.

All this, incidentally, was so I could find my speech here. I don't want to give this afternoon's talk this morning and vice versa.

I will start, if I may, just briefly by running through the history of civil defense in the United States since World War II, since the World War II organization folded up. First, in 1946, if I remember correctly, came the Bull Board on the subject. This was the name of the general who headed it. The Bull Board reported that in their opinion there very definitely should be a continuing civil defense in the United States.

Then in early 1948, a little ahead of the time that the Berlin Airlift started, President Truman asked former Secretary of Defense Forrestal to get together a group and make a more detailed study of civil defense. This was the Office of Civil Defense Planning within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It became known as the Hopley Group after Russell J. Hopley, former President of Northwest Bell, who headed it. They came out with a publication known as "Civil Defense for National Security," and again recommended a continuing, permanent organization for civil defense within the United States, including the Federal Government, the State governments, and county and local governments. Secretary Forrestal wrote a rather lengthy memorandum to the President in delivering the so-called Hopley Report, and strongly recommended that there be within the Federal Government a strong civil defense organization. He summed
up two things—the arguments in favor of having it within the Department of Defense where you could take advantage of all the purchasing power and all that sort of thing that lay in the Department of Defense, and on the other side of the coin he listed all the reasons why it should be a civilian organization, under civilian control, reporting directly to the President.

The President came back with a very brief memorandum saying essentially, "Thank you, but I disagree that this should be done, and I am transferring what activities have been going on in your office to what was within the National Security Resource Board, and we will have a small group of coordinators over there." The General Services Administration, I remember, for one, would teach everybody how to fight fires, and somebody else would do things. But it was a loosely run proposition with really no feeling that much had to be done about this.

Then, of course, the Korean War broke, and Mr. Symington, who was then head of the National Security Resources Board, formed an Office of Civil Defense under his own or the agency's powers, and in late 1950—and finally enacted in January of 1951—we had the formation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, an independent agency in the Government.

Subsequently, if my memory serves me correctly, along toward 1956 or 1957, or perhaps it was 1958—I just can't recall right now—the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the former Office of Defense Mobilization were merged, and they came up with an organization known as the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. At that time great hay was made of the fact that now we had all nonmilitary defense right under the President, the same as the military defense, and we were on the road.

Then came 1961, more specifically July of 1961, when President Kennedy took the merged organization, the OCDM—I hate letters—the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and split it again, and put the civil defense responsibilities in the
Department of Defense and the other responsibilities--the Office of Emergency Planning, so-called--remained within the Executive Office of the President.

Now, all this has had a great deal of effect on the States. Let me cite just a few of these things, so that you can get an idea of some of the problems we have had. When the Federal Civil Defense Administration was formed and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed, basically what they were talking about was a warmed-over World War II civil defense with a little radiological defense thrown in. Under the law specifically civil defense was the responsibility of the States and their local communities, and the Federal Government would give out publications and advice. My daddy told me when I was quite young about advice. It's poor stuff. Wise men don't need it; jackasses won't take it; and you'll only get in trouble by giving it.

Then we we moved to the next big advance, at least in the headlines. In late 1954 and 1955 came what was known as the evacuation policy. "We'll blow the sirens and everybody will take to the hills and nobody will be killed or injured." In Pennsylvania we never accepted it. We fought it, and probably my popularity reached an alltime low because of the opposition. We figured it just couldn't be done. We used some of our most horrible examples. At that time the Schuylkill Expressway into City Hall tying on to the Pennsylvania Turnpike wasn't finished, but we would say, "Let's supposed it were finished, and let's suppose that everybody in Philadelphia started out in cars and there were enough passenger cars registered in Philadelphia with less than three people per car so that you could get all the Philadelphians out. If you put them on the nonexistent Schuylkill Expressway and then on to the Pennsylvania Turnpike and used all four lanes westbound, and put them bumper to bumper, and nothing happened, the first cars would be 17 miles west of the Ohio line before the last ones left City Hall." Somebody said, "If you think they'd be moving, you're crazy."
This was in the face of the fact that the first hydrogen bomb had been exploded. Certainly there were many people, not only in Washington but out in the hinterlands, that knew something about what was beginning to be done with missiles, and that the warning time was going to grow shorter rather than longer.

So now we have come along to where the emphasis from the Federal Government now is almost exclusively on fallout shelters. I believe in fallout shelters, and I think that they could make the difference in the event of an attack against this Nation, the possible difference between death and survival for the Nation. But I am one of those—and we have had a number of discussions with Mr. Pittman—who say right now about this complete emphasis on fallout shelters and the statement that you have no civil defense if you do not have fallout shelters, "Yes, and if all you have is fallout shelters you have no civil defense either. You have to have everything that goes along with them." This has to be a very broad program and has to be attacked from various angles.

So much for the history and some of our problems. Now what do the States have? All of the 50 States and certain territories and possessions have civil defense agencies of one sort or another. In some few States, quite a few States, the Adjutant General is the Director of Civil Defense, but civil defense like everything else, it seems, has grown up, and you have that flow of the almighty dollar out of Washington to the States, and so forth, and, if you are going to get that almighty dollar to pay half of your personnel and administrative expenses, and if you head the agency as Adjutant General, with dual responsibilities, you must have a full-time deputy who is your civil defense representative. Quite a number of States have that.

Other States have a civil defense agency headed by a director appointed by the governor, and the agency itself, through its head, reports directly to the governor.
It's his director. In other States there are commissions or councils, rather large bodies, that hold the power, and of which the governor is a member. They then employ a staff, allegedly professional, to do the work. Pennsylvania is one of these. We have what is known as the State Council of Civil Defense. It consists of the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Adjutant General, the Auditor General—to check up on the money—the Secretary of Internal Affairs, the majority and minority leaders of the House and the Senate, the Secretary of Health, and four citizens appointed by the Governor.

Some people in Washington were very critical of that sort of setup and said, "It's too big, it's too unwieldy? What could they do?" Actually I think it has worked out very well, because you have a bipartisan body, and you have the top part of the government right there. I am quite sure from my experience with it, since the creation in 1951, with the record that we have never had our budget request cut by the General Assembly, and once—I don't understand this—we got more than we asked for—I don't know whether it was a slip of the pen or what, but we did, anyway—that the only reason we got it was because the members of the General Assembly, the leaders, sit right in on the discussions, and they know something about it. Also, if you were in a wartime situation, some of the things that would have to be done, I think, could more readily be done, with less question, with the representatives of the General Assembly as a part of the organization.

So this body, with rather broad powers under the law, is the policy-making and the emergency group, but they leave the emergency operations and the day-to-day work to the Director of Civil Defense, who is employed by the Council and serves at the pleasure of the Council. The Director reports day to day, and in floods and things of that type, to the Governor, with the Council meeting as is necessary.

This brings one thing to mind right here. Practically all of the States—there
are a few which do not have this provision in the law. I believe in 47 States responsibility for action in national disasters is a responsibility of the State civil defense agency. Under the Federal Civil Defense Act as it stands today, by definition, civil defense is related solely to attack situations. It puts us very often in a very ridiculous position.

Let me give you two examples. We have a great deal of equipment in Pennsylvania, both for the State Council of Civil Defense and the county and local organizations, which has been purchased in part with Federal funds. When you made application for this you signed. I have signed for millions of dollars worth of property, and I have said, "I certify on behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that this will be used only for civil defense purposes, according to this, that, and the other, in the Code of Federal Regulations," and so forth. So, what happens? Along comes a natural disaster and you need to use the radio or something else. So I follow the State law. It's to my favor. I use the radio and what have you, and I am inside the law so far as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is concerned—in fact, I'd be hung if I didn't use it—but, so far as the Federal Government is concerned, I'm technically in violation of the law. It hasn't rained for a long time in Pennsylvania. If it's like this up there this morning, everybody is happy, but hoping that it will rain. Out of Federal civil defense stockpiles this week we've got out some 20 miles of 8-inch pipe and pumps and generators, and water purifiers. But this is not to impede the drought or to help people who need water. Perish the thought! I signed the paper myself putting this out as a civil defense training exercise, if you will.

The present HR-8200, the so-called shelter development bill which has passed the House and is now pending in the Senate, would change this. But I mean these are the types of things we are into all the time. This is the battle we are fighting today.
A lot of people want to say it's all apathy, and this, that, and the other. Well, there is a certain amount of that very definite disinterest. But some of the stuff that's killing us all the time is paper, paper, paper, and more paper, and most of it out of Washington. Very little of it either out of Washington or out of Harrisburg makes too damn much sense.

Now, what have we in Pennsylvania in the way of an organization? This parallels what goes on in most of the States to a greater or lesser degree. The New York State has Civil Defense Commission, I believe, more employees than any other State agency. I think New York City has more than the State of New York and more than anybody else.

We have, first, the State agency, in other words, the working group, so to speak, which I head, which is a group of approximately 50 full-time employees, including our technical staff, our clerks and stenos, the people who keep our stockpiles and see that they don't walk off and that the buildings are heated so certain of the items don't freeze, and that sort of thing. We have, then, 50 people, most of them in Harrisburg. But then we split. Geographically we are not a very large State--45,000 square miles. We have 11 million people. We have 67 counties. You can't deal with everybody very effectively out of Harrisburg, so for administrative and operational purposes we divide the State, then, into three areas, each composed of roughly, 20 counties. In each of those areas we have an area headquarters with a small staff, and that's where the State organization stops.

Then each political subdivision in Pennsylvania—that means county, city, borough, town, or township, and there 2652 of them—must by law establish an organization for civil defense in accordance with the State plan and program. We do allow them to combine groups that are together, and some things of that type. We have on the rolls, then, going from the area now into the county and local governments, where they take over financially, and what have you. the county and local civil
defense agencies. We have some 2,000 directors and organizations in the State. I must be perfectly frank with you--some of them are very well organized and do a wonderful job, and others are nothing more than the name of an individual who has been duly appointed and is director, and somebody has said, "We've got that civil defense taken care of--we recommended that somebody be appointed director, and the Governor did it." They'll tell him, "Now, whatever you do, you do civil defense to beat hell, but don't spend a nickel or embarrass us." So we have everything in between. There has been a great deal of work done by many of the county and local governments, and there has been at least a limited test of what can be and has been done.

Let me cite one example. I use it because I want to come back to it in a minute. There's a county with a very small population in Northwestern Pennsylvania. There are a few little oil wells still dribbling out a little oil. It's a forested county and it's got the county seat, a town of about 10,000 in it; and that's it. The Allegheny River flows through it. In this little town of Warren, on one side of the river, back a mile and one-half, on high ground, is the State hospital, and on the other side of the river, right down in the River Park, is a very nice community hospital of some 350 beds. The Allegheny floods all the time, all too often. Except right now, we haven't got any water in it. But on the other hand it's usually flooding. Back in 1956 along came a flood. I believe it turned out to be the record flood on history. We have a flood forecast system. We knew it would flood. We sent the word up on what this was going to do. They began to move, and moved very effectively. Among other things they evacuated everybody out of Warren General Hospital to the State hospital some 3 miles away, with the vehicles going through water. There were six cardiac patients who had to stay there. They made provisions for sandbagging. They
had their emergency generators. The only concern which developed in this whole thing was that, with several doctors and the heart cases up on the top floor, somebody became a little worried about whether or not there would be some carbon monoxide from these gasoline generators that were providing the power getting up there. The county director said, "You know, that's one damn thing we never figured on--a carbon monoxide indicator." Of course, that wasn't in the mining area, and it took them a little scratching around to get a carbon monoxide indicator. But they had done a very good job.

This is true with many organizations. As I say, we have everything from there to nothing.

Now, what is the general policy under which we operate? What are we trying to do, and how do we go about some of these things? First of all, the State law places upon the State government, and, more specifically, the State Council of Civil Defense, and upon the local governments insofar as their civil defense organizations are concerned, a provision which says that, "to avoid the duplication of services and facilities, you shall use the services and facilities and the offices and officers, and so forth, of the other government agencies, and they shall cooperate as requested." So we have a tie with all the governmental departments, and they are all working with us. In that connection--I think this is very important, because, in our minds, this is the only way it can work--there is no sense in going out and trying to create a civil defense police force, and a civil defense fire department, and a civil defense medical agency. We augment insofar as they exist the existing facilities. In other words, we don't start a new police force. We recruit and train auxiliaries for the existing police force, and those people work under the Chief, as a part of his force.
This goes through medically, and so forth, using the State and community health departments and fire departments, and that sort of thing. We establish new only those things for which there is no counterpart in day-to-day government. I am speaking of warning, radiological defense, and things of that type.

Then, one other thing which I think is highly important, and which was a very touchy subject in the early years, is this question: "Is that guy in the basement of the Capitol going to take us over?" "Us" means industry. The answer is very definitely no. We have avoided this for obvious reasons. What the hell would I do with the Pennsylvania Railroad if I took it over? I don't know the first thing about running one, or an industrial plant, or anything else. We have said to them, "Look. We'll give you assistance and advice." I've told you what I think of that. "We'll give you what help we can, but it's up to you, inside your fence, to take the common-sense measures that may mean the difference to you between staying in business and getting knocked out of business should the day come." This has been accepted and it has worked very effectively.

In many places we see very outstanding examples of what industry can do. Some of you, I am sure, are familiar with the program that Roman Hawes has in the Philadelphia area of blast-proof shelters, and so forth. Going to the other end of the State, in the steel industry, Jones and Laughlin has a very able organization to deal with emergencies, including shelters in existing buildings, somewhat beefed up here and there, but not newly constructed as are the Roman Hawes buildings. It's a good, industrial civil defense organization.

I think perhaps the best example I can give you is the electric utility industry. Pennsylvania basically is served by eight major electric utilities all tied in together, with the power dams and the steam generators, and they all go on and off
automatically. As you know, the electric utility industry doesn't like any more governmental regulation. They were scared to death that we were going to get in the act with them. We have. We went to them and said, "We want your help. We are not going to touch your property a bit, but we want you to keep it going, and we want to give you the help we can. How are we going to get at this?" The way we have gotten at it is they have formed what is known as the Defense Coordinating Committee of the Pennsylvania Electric Association. That's the big-eight utilities. They have picked out key operating personnel, a small group, who work with us and who have men assigned to our area headquarters. These are operating personnel, now, people who know something about throwing these switches, and so forth. They work with us. In times of emergency we feed information in to them as to what we know—for example, in a flood, what the predicted crest is going to be, and the changes of certain power plants going out, and that sort of thing, because of flooding. We would do the same thing. We would feed to them in times of emergency, wartime emergency, what we knew of the situation as it came to us from over the State and from other States. Based on that they would strive to do two things—to maintain electric service and, if the electric service is out, to give priority in the restoration of it to those things and places that we name first. Of course we name ourselves first, civil defense, schools, hospitals, government, and so forth. We tell them, "You get power back to those places first. That's your pigeon. If you need a transformer you know what kind of transformer you need. You know where you normally get it. You try there, and if you can't get it, you borrow it from some other company, or throw the switch and use their power. You maintain or restore this power. The only damn thing we can give you is some raw labor, which probably won't be very good."
Here you get into problems. We thought it would be a good idea to have some people trained to help electric-utility people in laying emergency lines, and that sort of thing. What happened? We got fouled up with the unions. "We ain't going to have anybody climbing up that pole who don't belong to the league." The labor we get and give them will be awful raw, I can assure you. Basically they will be able to clear rubble and that sort of thing.

We go one step further. We have a great deal of communications under our control, and some of the electric utilities. They were worried for fear we were going to take their radio away from them. We said, "You need your radio for your service, we need our radio for ours. But we'll make a deal with you. If we have more traffic than we can carry, if you will tie in, will you carry some of ours? Conversely, if you have more traffic than you can handle and we can carry some, we'll carry yours." This has been worked out. In one test they came in, and I think they have very good reason to be proud. They asked in the middle, the Governor if they could do one thing. They asked if he would give them a message, starting in the basement of the Capitol in Harrisburg, because they would like to take it to Florida by radio, inland, because hurricanes are a big headache to them, and they would like to get an answer in Florida to whatever question he asked and bring it back and see with the kind of communications how long it would take to do it. I have forgotten the question that the Governor asked, but it was a question that had to be answered in the State Capital in Tallahassee, and the answer came back, inland, through radio no-wire lines, into the basement, in a matter of 19 minutes.

They are a part of our State radiological monitoring network. They have gone all out on this sort of thing, to protect their own properties. The Federal Civil Defense School in Brooklyn has been accused of running a radiological defense
instructors' course purely for representatives of Pennsylvania electric utilities. I can see their point. Seventy-five percent of their customers have come from Pennsylvania electric utilities.

We've got to work with them, work together, and not try to take them over.

Now, what have we done? This guy is so smart. He's been up there so long and talked so big. We do have a good warning system. The Federal Government brings it to us, feeding through NORAD, and in our case it could come directly, but normally it would come into 26 air defense divisions. You can pick up a speaker and talk or listen to it come out of the box. The greater portion of it is wire line, but it's battery powered and we know in times when commercial power is out that it will work. So we do get a warning from the North American Air Defense Command or through the 26 air defense divisions. We get it in a matter of seconds. Then we pick up on an electronics system that we rent from Bell and the associated independent companies. Here's what you get into. Everybody thinks Pennsylvania is covered by Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania. That seems to be the one people have heard of. But on this one warning system we are into 100 and some different telephone companies.

We use this bell and light system. You dial and the lights flash on the other end. The Federal Government brings it to the State. The State takes it to the communities, and the communities blow the sirens. We have bought with Federal assistance and otherwise some $25 million worth of communications equipment. We have in addition our own State police system, We have our own civil defense system Statewide. We have a highway department system. We have a forest and water system. We have a flood forecast system. And we have a turnpike system which covers about two-thirds of the State.
We have trained and recruited some 35,000 auxiliary policemen to work with the local police forces, and that sort of thing. We have made progress along those lines. And, as I say, in floods and things of that type it has been tested, at least to a limited degree, and we have saved lives.

Now, operationally, how does this all work? How does this local civil defense organization that I mentioned tie in with the county, the area, the State, and the Federal Government? Well, our basic operational policy is this: If something happens everybody doesn't take off in two directions, one running and the other going in to do something just on their own. "There's the flash; we'd better get over there and do something." To make it simple—and it will never be this simple—let's suppose that something happened in Lancaster City, in the county of Lancaster, in our Eastern Area of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. All right. The Lancaster City Civil Defense Director basically is the Mayor's emergency representative or chief of staff, or whatever you might want to call him. He throws everything he has and that there is in the City of Lancaster into fighting the problem. That's not a very good term—fighting the problem. He does whatever has to be done to get hold of the situation. If he needs help he goes to the county director who, if he can get it from other cities and towns within the county, supplies it from there, and it's finished business, or, if he can't get it, the county director, in the county, he goes to the area, and the area will supply it from another county—in most cases it would be the nearest one, but sometimes that wouldn't be the case—and, if the area can't fill the need, they come to the State, and we try to get it from another area, and if we can't get it there then we come to the regional agency of the Federal Government, hoping that Uncle Sam, or through him some other State, will give it to us.
So we have what has been termed a chain of command. It's not the chain of command that you have in the military where, at least theoretically, the President can transfer the lowest private. This is from the President to the governors to the county commissioners and on down the line the way the Government flows and that God-Almighty dollar comes, you know--Harrisburg to Washington, to the county, and on down, everybody taking their administrative cut out of it. It's a line of established governmental authority. It is not a rigid chain of command.

Under the law we have the right and do use all municipal and volunteer agencies and the personnel and equipment thereof, wherever needed, in the State. But you can appreciate that; as much as he might like to do so, the President can fire no governor, and no governor can fire the duly elected county commissioners, and the county commissioners can't fire the mayors. We've got an established chain of governmental authority, and that's what we work through with a rather big club on them, saying, "This is the way to do it, and the only way to do it. If you don't do it this way, you won't get any help."

So we have the State, county, and local organizations, tied in and working under an established chain of authority.

I have been speaking up until now, you will realize, I am sure, about the immediate postattack problems--the maintenance of law and order, the rescuing of people, and things that have to be done now. I haven't gotten into this postattack recovery or rehabilitation, and purposely so, because I want to come back now to where I started. I, for one--and I don't think I am alone among the civil defense directors--have read many times some of the recent Executive Orders. I am not being critical of the President, except that I am trying to point out the problems we have here. Certainly the wording of the Executive Order transferring civil defense, so to speak, to the Department of Defense, and leaving emergency
planning or postattack recovery, or whatever you want to call it—now the popular words seem to be emergency preparedness—in a lot of fields. Just who holds the bag—the Office of Civil Defense within the Department of Defense or the Office of Emergency Planning? How do you get into some of these postattack long-range problems? There's no clear cutoff. They talk about 90 days, and this, that, and the other. But these things really become gummy. We have struggled with them, and in most cases we've gone to the floor with the problems on top of us. There have been exceptions.

In the food end of things, after years, we have finally reached an agreement which we like, with the United States Department of Agriculture. They said very clearly, "We'll go to here; you go from there on." Basically they say they'll do the production, the processing, and the distribution of food down through the wholesale level. This belongs to Uncle Sam. From there out Gerstell will take care of it.

All right. When you've got that kind of basis you know what's sitting in your lap, and you can begin to tackle it, and they can struggle with their end. But what do we get into and what have we been into with things such as transportation? Twelve years ago we had some of the best transportation people in Pennsylvania join with us in a committee representing the railroads, the truckers, and I don't know who all, meeting together to try to find out what we were going to do about this transportation. Just to split it down a little bit, what has happened just on truck transportation alone? We have gotten no place, because we can't get an answer as to who controls what trucks. Is ICC going to control the trucks that are licensed ICC carriers? Can we have the rest? In one big meeting down here they said, "Yes, you can." I said, "All right, then, the garbage trucks are ours, and a couple of bread trucks, and the rest are yours." They said, "Yes, but we'll tell you how
to use the garbage trucks," I said, "Then, why the hell don't you take it all over and let me worry with something else?" I got nowhere.

The problem is getting clearer. It's getting bigger. Economic stabilization, I know, is of interest to you. It's away over my head. There is only one person in Pennsylvania less capable of stabilizing the economy than the Civil Defense Director of Kittytube, and that is the State Civil Defense Director. When it comes to economic stabilization, this has got to be a Federal thing. I think the Federal Government has got to come out and say, "Bang. This is it." There is still a hesitancy here in Washington. "Don't tell them that we are going to do so and so." I think the American public knows that, if there is a nuclear attack on this country, by golly, things are going to be tougher than they ever were before. If they didn't like rationing and a few of the things that went on in World War II, they ain't seen nothing yet.

Some of these problems are just so complex that there is no real progress. We are further ahead than we were, but we're barely out on to the road, let alone going down it. It's easy to say, "All right, manage the resources, Gerstell. You take care of them in the 90 days when you won't hear from Washington." Thank God. "You go ahead and manage things." That's fine for the things you can manage.

I'll use this example. We'll get away from the Port of Philadelphia, which is an international situation. I can't understand that. There's no definition that I can find out yet as to what kind of port it is." They come and ask some damn good questions.

But let's go and manage the resources in Western Pennsylvania. Take the City of Pittsburgh, in Allegheny County, 128 political subdivisions. Twenty-five percent of the world's steel is produced there. The ore comes from the Great Lakes and Canada, and a little bit from South America, and the coal comes from three States.
The steel goes all over the world. How in hell are you going to manage it on a county basis?

These are some of the things I can't understand.

Gentlemen, it has been a pleasure to be with you. I understand that I am to be subjected to questions, and I can't give you that security duck-out. So when it comes time for the questions you shoot and I'll do my best to talk around the questions.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN HENRY: Gentlemen, Dr. Gerstell is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, during the different situation of exactly one year ago day, what information, as the State Director of Civil Defense, did you receive from the Federal Civil Defense authorities?

DR. GERSTELL: None. I would like to elaborate on that. I want to clarify one thing. I was vaccinated with a victrola needle, so talking is no problem. I said something about Philadelphia being international. What I mean is that their port activities and things are international. God only knows, it's a part of Pennsylvania. Sometimes they think they are an independent state, and sometimes we wish they were. But I want to clarify the record. They are not international. It's a city and a county in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Now, what did we receive from the Federal Government, specifically OCD? Actually, nothing. We had word that the President was going to make a speech. We immediately called the staff in and got ready. The switchboard lit up, and everybody had all the $64 questions.

The first word we had from the Federal Government of any kind was from an agency that called and said, "I am reporting DETCON 3." I guess it was that at that
time. And he said, "What the hell does that mean?" About three days later we got a message that said, "As you know, there is a situation." We knew that. We very unhappy about this whole thing. I think all the States were. I think most of us realized what the situation was. This is my own two cents worth. I guess our plans have been built for the other fellow moving against us, and here, I think, they called it a quarantine. I think an embargo is an act of war. We were moving out and I guess our plans didn't cover going both ways.

We had no official notice from Washington other than subsequently the Governor got invited to several meetings.

QUESTION: Dr. Gerstell, do you feel that you get good cooperation and assistance from the military installations in Pennsylvania?

DR. GERSTELL: Yes, very definitely. Sometimes we do things, and we are quite pleased. I'd like to write somebody in Washington and complement somebody, but I figure that instead of helping him I'll hurt him. It's good that--in Washington terms--there are those gray areas. Right now somebody asked a question when we were going out in the hall: How do we go about it if we want formally military assistance? We've got one potential channel, through the 21st Corps at Indiantown Gap into Meade. We've got the Office of Civil Defense Regional Headquarters at Olney, Maryland. We know where Meade is. If we really want it and in a hurry, we go all three ways, and usually somebody will take care of it while the other two argue about whether it is permissible.

The cooperation of the services has been good. There is a very definite need, we feel, for clarification of how the State should request all military assistance. You appreciate the problems here. You've got the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps Depots, and things that don't fit under the operational command.

A lot of improvement has been made, and more will be, but very definitely we are
very much pleased with the cooperation that we have received from the armed services through the years.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Gerstell, my question relates to who should pick up the tab. I understand that a really effective civil defense program would cost about $20 billion in the course of five years. The Federal Government seems to think that industry should pick up the tab, and industry by its inaction doesn't seem to agree. If you agree that it would probably cost about $20 billion, how do you think this could be worked out, and who should pick up the tab?

**DR. GERSTELL:** That's a good question. I'll talk around it, probably. A $20 billion figure, I think, is basically one that includes among other things quite a bit of shelter construction, and this does require, any effective civil defense program does require, the expenditure of money on the part of all concerned, and everybody is concerned.

How do you split it, and where do you stand on some of these things? Today if you are a civil defense volunteer Internal Revenue Service will allow you to knock off something for the gas you bought to go take care of this, that, and the other. But getting all that into your income form is more than it's worth, so they skip it.

Industry has made, to my mind, some very legitimate requests for information to Internal Revenue Service as to where they would stand if they spent certain money for certain things. Expressing my personal opinion, I am inclined to think that there has been too rigid restriction placed and not enough recognition given to the money that industry has spent. This has been spent, of course, to keep themselves in business, yes, but also to keep the Nation going. I think that this has to be recognized. I think there have to be expenditures on all parts. Just how you get it financed today is always a battle with Congress. What have you got that makes sense that they will give you money for? So far we just haven't hit it. It's a
responsibility, I think, that government has not squared up to all the way down the line.

As directly as I can answer you, I think that everybody has got to help finance it, government, industry, and everybody together, but I think government has to pick up a big part of the load. Where does the Government get the money? You know that. Of course, if attack comes, I don't know whether money will be worth anything, but whatever money we are using will come out of Washington. A fellow said, "You Pennsylvanians are trying to balance your budget, but you are always screaming for more money from Washington? How do you account for that?" Our answer to that is, "Hell, you make the money down here."

QUESTION: Sir, the general tendency is to ignore these fallout shelters, yet it is an established fact that, if you want to maximize damage against a soft urban target you have a true air burst where you worry about blast & thermal and initial radiation. Wouldn't it be better to try to sell it on this basis, sell shelters? Would you care to comment on this?

DR. GERSTELL: This selling is a very difficult proposition and so are shelters as a whole, because you are talking about the United States as a whole. Then, when you look at the United States, a tremendous percentage of the population is in a very small geographical area--New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and so forth--and the rest is the great expanse. So when you talk fallout shelters you do run into just what you are saying. For example, the people in Philadelphia will say to us, "Never mind that fallout shelter stuff. We're going to be No. 1." Of course Pittsburgh says the same thing. So we have to have those blast-proof shelters.

This is not a very good answer, but what is being said essentially is that economically you can go, certainly now, only for the fallout shelters, and point out to the Philadelphians, "Yes, but if it turns out by intent or accident that you
are not hit, the fallout shelters in Philadelphia could be all important to you, and any shelter provides at least limited protection from blast and heat."

I think you have a very good point. The thing has got to be made broader and people have to come to understand just what we are talking about by shelter. Certainly it needs a broader approach than just talking about fallout shelters.

I agree with you, yes, sir.

**QUESTION:** What is the peak population requirement for shelters in the State of Pennsylvania? Can you tell us the number of shelter spaces that have been found and stocked as covered in the National Survey Program?

**DR. GERSTELL:** In round numbers I can give you the figures. They change every day, so I am a little behind, so don't hold me to these. In round numbers we have 11 million people, and they should all be sheltered. The National Shelter Survey Marking and Stocking Program has turned up or located, or, as they say, identified space, and this depends upon how you read it. Now, for 5 to 7 million people, but this does not include some tremendous areas, such as our big limestone mines in Western Pennsylvania, where in one mine, for example, the area is measured in several hundred acres. You could put about a million people in there, but there are no million people anywhere near it. So that hasn't shown up in the total.

Let's say that in round numbers there are 11/people, and there are 5 million potential shelters, and they represent about 7500 buildings, and about 60 percent of those have been licensed to be stocked, and about 25 percent have been stocked.

But now we are talking figures. This is very misleading not only in Pennsylvania but nationally, right here, beginning in Washington. Here's a building here with a capacity, based on 10 square feet per person, because it has ventilation and protection factors, 40 or more, in which you could put 10,000 people. This building is in use every day, so you can put crackers and water drums, and sanitation kits for only 2500 in the building.
So my question to the Federal Government has been: "What have we got? Shelter for 10,000 people with very meager rations, or have we got a shelter for 2500 people stocked for two weeks?"

When you get into figures they become meaningless. Total population is 11 million. There are 5 million shelters, a tremendous number of them in the wrong place, about 60 percent licensed and roughly 30 percent stocked.

QUESTION: In large metropolitan areas like Philadelphia and New York there are--probably some interstate problems? How do the States handle these?

DR. GERSTELL: There are, very definitely. Philadelphia would be a very good example in several ways. Under the State Civil Defense Act--and I believe this ties into the Federal Act, too--the States have among themselves, filed with and approved by the Congress of the United States, mutual aid compacts, whereby they agree to furnish assistance, one to the other. We've done that with all our surrounding States, as a matter of fact, and most of the time it has been two-way. I think we've given and they have given.

The question at the moment is--and this relates to the exact position of the Office of Civil Defense as established within the Department of Defense--would we go, if we needed something in Pennsylvania and figured New Jersey had it, from Harrisburg to Region 2 Headquarters of the Federal Government at Olney, Maryland, and would they go to the Regional Headquarters of the Federal Civil Defense Office at Harvard, Massachusetts, and would they come back to Trenton? We are only 90 miles away. Well, sometimes we might go that way, but, in the middle of the night, when things have been close and tight, it's a matter of direct State to State contact.

I think you are also raising this question: This one is simple. The Philadelphia metropolitan area is Philadelphia and surrounding communities in Pennsylvania,
Caden, and surrounding communities in New Jersey, and part of Delaware, if you want to stretch it down to Wilmington—you know, the greater Chamber of Commerce idea. Then the question is: Who is king bee in this area? Right now there are three king bees, Philadelphia, Camden, and Wilmington—the three mayors. You'd say offhand, "That's ridiculous. This is all one area." I'll go along with you. But we've struggled with this type of problem over the years. If you were a military commander in there and had to manage that whole thing, and you had that Delaware River sitting in the middle of it, you quite likely would say, "All right. You take care of this side, and you take care of that side."

I think this is maybe not as bad as it might seem. But no one person holds control over the Philadelphia metropolitan area. And, of course, picture New Jersey. They've got two problems. They've got South Jersey, with Camden tying into Philadelphia and the horrible State of Pennsylvania, and on the north all that's tied into not only New York but Connecticut. So they really have these problems, and they'd be better able to answer this question than I.

QUESTION: Doctor, along with our preoccupation with civil defense, there has been reference to defense against nuclear attack, and rightly so. I would like to ask what consideration your agency has given to defense against a chemical or biological attack.

DR. GERSTELL: We have given a great deal of consideration to it. Some of the Army installations help us with the instruction. Our activities at the present time are limited to some general indoctrination courses on what the hazards of possible chemical and biological warfare are.

A few years ago I was besieged with salesmen who wanted to sell us atraphine sulphate to stockpile in case the nerve gases were used. It was handy and everybody gave themselves and the next fellows shots. We held off on this. We played both
sides of the fence. We used the Washington term, you know, the calculated risk. We said, "Well, we don't think this is really too pressing." Then, if the Federal Government said, "Well, it really is," then we'd come back to this question, "What do you mean, there are going to be gas masks for everybody? You showed us the model for the babies and everything, but, where are these gas masks, and who buys them?"

Until the United States Government tells the States that this is proportionately a greater threat than we have been told about now, I think the activities in the States, and I know the activities in the State of Pennsylvania, are very limited, and I think they will remain that way.

QUESTION: Sir, you have indicated a certain lack of decision making at the Federal level. You have explained it in part by saying it would excite the people if they'd hear about the problems involved in civil defense. This would involve such things as garbage trucks and other trucks. Why do you think this is true at the Federal level?

DR. GERSTELL: Let me take a little more blame. Don't think that out in the counties and places they don't think the same way about Harrisburg. I think the basic problem here is this great thing that has grown up, that has become the Federal Government, with so many agencies directly concerned, and with overlapping to some extent of authority.

As I say, and this is a personal opinion, I think there is a need for clarification of the Executive Orders of last winter. It has not always been a lack of decision. It has also been a case of one agency reading the Executive Order this way and the other one that way, and out in the State they begin to cost. In other words, we wonder sometimes, should we be listening to the Bureau of Public Roads or to ICC on this, or to both. We are listening to both, but then all of us come
up with problems. So there is the size of the problem and the size of the Government dealing with the problems. I still feel that there is a hesitancy on the part of leaders of government, Federal and State, certainly, to flatfootedly say, "Look, here's the thing." Let me be specific. The United States Department of Labor has prepositioned (a good word) or given the local offices of the United States Department of Labor 1961 regulations that provide for the U. S. Department of Labor stabilizing or controlling wages and salaries. They have been out there for over 2 years, and when we called the Harrisburg Office of the U. S. Department of Labor and said, "Have you got this wage and salary stabilization thing?" they said, "Yes, we have." We asked, "Could we look at it?" They answered, "No, you may not." We asked, "Ain't we part of the act?" They answered, "Yeah, but Pop says no."

So we went to Chambersburg, which is the regional office. Well, finally we got one through the Office of Emergency Planning, by going to Mr. McDermott, the Director. Here is a 20-page proposition of regulations ostensibly to go into effect to stabilize or freeze wages and salaries, down to how you appeal, who can be promoted, how you handle it. But there seems to be a great hesitancy to let the public know about this, or even the States.

I think the public is ready for this. If you put it out today, everybody would bitch, including me. I don't want you to freeze my salary. But I think the American people realize that in this type of thing there has got to be rigid control. And I think there is this marked hesitancy in Washington to be ready to speak out. I think the people will accept it.

QUESTION: What planning coordination exists between Pennsylvania and the Second Army?

DR. GERSTEII: Several years ago some of the Reserve groups, with some help from the Second Army proper, made some studies of military support to civil government
in some of the target areas—Philadelphia, New York, and some of the others. Then, running along with that, there was some direct contact with the staff at Meade.

At the present time there are a number of publications which outline how this military support would be effected. Our difficulty at the moment is knowing whether it is really going to work that way. Nobody seems to want to say, "Yes, that's the Bible. That's the road we are going down." I think perhaps Mr. Pittman touched on some of these things yesterday.

I would be inclined to think that—this is a personal opinion and is not worth much—those books that are on file now will not be in the form that they are in presently. I guess you would say in Washington, "The plan has not been implemented."

CAPTAIN HENRY: Dr. Gerstell, we have learned a lot this morning, and we have enjoyed the process. Thank you.