PLANS FOR CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

11 February 1959

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Washington, D. C.
Mr. Owen R. Jones, Deputy Assistant Director for Transportation, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, was appointed to the post in October 1958. He entered the Government in April 1958 as Assistant Director for Transportation in the Office of Defense Mobilization, and held this post until his present appointment. Mr. Jones was born 1 February 1904 in Plymouth, Pennsylvania. He attended Ursinus College (B. S. in Business Administration 1927) and LaSalle Extension University. He spent his entire business career with The General Electric Company, starting with the company at its Production, Switchgear Plant in Philadelphia in 1927. In 1934 he became Superintendent of Traffic and Transportation for General Electric and in 1948 Assistant to the General Traffic Manager at Schenectady, N. Y. From 1952 until his retirement, Mr. Jones was General Electric's Manager of Traffic Services at New York City. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.
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COLONEL AKERS: Yesterday we examined the strictly military aspects of transportation in a major emergency. This morning we turn our attention to the larger problems of overall Government planning for the control of all transportation during a general war, a limited war, or even a combination of several limited wars.

We are fortunate in having with us this morning as our speaker a man who has devoted almost all of his adult life to the transportation field. It is also fitting that this man should hold the key transportation position in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

It is a great pleasure to present to this class the Assistant Deputy Director for Transportation, OCDM, Mr. Owen R. Jones.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Colonel Akers.

General Mundy, Students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Guests: I have looked forward with a great deal of pleasure to returning to visit the Industrial College, and I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you plans and ideas for the control of transportation in the event of any emergency. This is an ideal forum for examining our national defense policy—a place where it can be considered, analyzed, and debated. Furthermore, in transportation we recognize that the need for coordination and cooperation between the military and civilian effort is probably greater than in any other resource. At least it touches in one form or another every phase of our daily existence in peace or war.

During my 30 years in traffic and transportation in private industry, the problems of defense mobilization and related civil defense went unnoticed or at least they were largely ignored or unappreciated in carrying out my job; and I dare say this was true of most of my associates in traffic in other companies. However, since assuming my position in the Federal Government less than a year ago as Deputy Assistant Director for Transportation, I have become fully cognizant of my assignment. To me it is the most fascinating and demanding task I have ever undertaken; and I hope that I can convince and convert others to the full realization of their obligation and contribution to mobilizing the transportation resources of our country.
In my position in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization I have the assignment of bringing together for the purposes of planning our mobilization and civil defense, all of the many diverse interests in the Nation's transportation resources. These interests, as you know, extend broadly through Government to every level and widely through industry and the entire economy. They include, besides Government agencies, the business trade associations, the traffic clubs, the carrier firms, the transportation educator, and even the highway patrolman.

Within recent years transportation planning has progressed through some of the most frustrating phases which you in military planning are familiar with in your work. Somewhere along the line we stopped looking back at World War II as our primary source of guidance and started building plans based on the ever-present threat of an enemy with nuclear weapons and a capability of delivering them against us. Possibly we are now going through yet another important phase or perhaps entering a new phase.

Recent planning efforts, it seems to me, were largely paper efforts. We had to get new assumptions and new plans down on paper in order to know where we were and where we were going. Of course, the paper will continue; but the emphasis and direction seem to be shifting. More and more one hears of, and in various budding ways begins to see, the growing efforts toward operational readiness. In earlier days, when we were thinking in terms of building to full war potential after the war had started, we spoke in terms of lead time and stockpiles and production potential. Now, following a period of confused transition, we are thinking in terms of a war that could be upon us suddenly, perhaps tomorrow, perhaps next year, or perhaps at some indefinite time in the future. Our new approach to this problem can be read in such terms as standby orders, ready reserves, current and continuing capability. These are the aspects of operational readiness which we in transportation are currently concerned with and which I would like to discuss further with you.

First of all, before I get in the specifics of some of these things, I would like to review the actions which, more than anything else on the civilian side of defense planning, has brought about the new approach and emphasis. I have reference to the Presidential action of Reorganization Order No. 1, 1958.

Before President Eisenhower issued this reorganization order, combining the Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization agencies, the people engaged in those activities were pursuing two largely
independent courses of action with much overlapping. Defense Mobilization was working from the top down. Its emphasis was on the Federal aspect of industrial preparedness for war. Civil Defense, on the other hand, was working from the bottom up. Its emphasis was on State and local planning. The bringing together of these two was in some respects an organizational nightmare, but without a doubt it was a functional stroke of genius.

Now that the adjustment problems have largely simmered down, we can see how the two different but equally important aspects of the national planning effort have been blended into mutually complementing segments of a single agency. This combining aspect is evident throughout the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and particularly in the organization of the staff which I head.

Chart 1, page 4.--Transportation in the new setup comes under Resources and Production and reports to the Director of OCDM through his Assistant Director of Resources and Production.

The Deputy Assistant Director for Transportation is the policy spokesman and coordinator of all transportation planning activities within OCDM and the point of contact for all transportation matters (within the Federal Government).

There are two divisions within the office. The Program Planning Office, located in Washington, formulates general problems and develops in cooperation with other agencies, the overall national transportation plan, forecasts of traffic movement requirements, and standby action measures for implementing these. The State and Local Guidance Office, presently located in Battle Creek, gives direction in furtherance of national policies and objectives to transportation officials and industry personnel engaged at State and local levels in various aspects of operational planning of transportation.

Other important elements of the organization are the Transportation Officers in each of the eight OCDM Federal regions. Although these are staff officers under the regional directors and report to them, they are our technical aides and receive instructions on transportation and technical matters from me, usually through the Battle Creek office.
CHART 1

OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION

DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR TRANSPORTATION

PROGRAM PLANNING DIVISION

STATE AND LOCAL GUIDANCE DIVISION

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION OFFICES

- TECHNICAL SUPERVISION
- LIAISON AND GUIDANCE
You who are or have been in the military services and who may have had dealings with the civilian side of defense in the past know how confusing it often was. There was the transportation representative of ODM in each of the 10 regions, and a transportation representative of FCDA in each of 7 regions. Now there is only one OCDM transportation representative in each of our 8 Federal regions, and only the single coordinator of these at the top.

Transportation's working force in Government does not, of course, stop here. Much of the emergency planning work is done by other Government agencies, including Defense, either under existing authority through delegation from OCDM, or through cooperative arrangements with us. Among these agencies with transportation interests there are two major types.

First, there are those primarily interested in transportation from the standpoint of the control of carriers, regulation of service, or promotion of a segment of the transportation industry. With reference to their probable wartime roles, we might refer to these as the controllers. They include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Defense Air Transportation Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Maritime Administration, the Bureau of Public Roads, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, and other segments of the Department of Commerce.

Then there are those agencies primarily interested in transportation from the standpoint of the services they require in order to carry out their own emergency missions or the tasks of their segment of the economy. These can be referred to as the claimants for transportation. They include the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Post Office Department, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

And there are others of these which are hard to classify as claimants alone, since they also control or operate sizeable segments of transportation themselves. Among these are the General Services Administration, which handles Government administrative transportation; and the Department of the Interior, largely responsible for petroleum movements by pipelines.

We consult with each of these in connection with their phases of transportation planning for defense. But, of course, the largest and by far the most active of the transportation controllers and claimants are the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
The interest and responsibility of Department of Defense agencies in transportation extends the entire range from control to claimancy, from complete ownership and operation of their organic resources to various degrees of dependence upon common carriage. At one extreme you have your own military transport fleet—the Military Air Transport Service and the Military Sea Transport Service—and the vehicular equipment assigned to troop units. Next you have the air and maritime reserve fleets, which are preallocated and committed to your control in wartime. Then there are the various contract operations whereby commercial transport firms serve military installations and activities.

The other extreme of military reliance on transportation resources, that which is entirely outside their control, is reflected in functions of your Military Traffic Management Agency—the various transportation officers, including the transportation officers at posts, camps, and stations, who program, route, and negotiate rates on, and otherwise arrange for military shipments for for-hire carriage. It is in these latter aspects of transportation that we in the nonmilitary planning sphere are most interested, for it is here that our responsibility lies for assuring you and other defense users the type of service and support in wartime which you require.

This, then, is how we see our overall transportation mission and objective—to be prepared in the various segments of industrial transportation, to support all essential elements of national defense in time of emergency, including the military efforts, civilian survival, and industrial recovery and production.

Now, in order that I may introduce you to some of our specific plans and measures for accomplishing these things, I would like to paint a brief picture of how we see the transportation outlook for that direst of assumed war situations—that of mass nuclear attack on the Nation.

Whether such an attack might be directed against military bases, centers of population, or our great industrial cities, it is certain that transportation, along with other critical segments of the economy, would suffer severely. Ports and key terminals would surely be damaged or lost. Automated lines and systems standing in the way of military combat efforts would be disrupted entirely or reduced to specialized tasks. But such transport as remained and could be mustered locally and pressed into use would be employed in rushing replenishment supplies and munitions to fast-depleting missile sites and carrying jet and other fuels to retaliatory bases.
Transportation in this early postattack phase would have to evacuate wounded from the damaged areas and move fire-fighting, medical, and other disaster services into these areas. Each surviving community would initially have to pick itself up and try to get along with food and materials on hand. But this would not last very long. Deadly radioactive fallout, spreading like great areas of blight over the land, would cause some sectors to be evacuated indefinitely, others to become isolated islands of survival. The interdependence of neighboring communities, even of military bases and their nearby civilian neighbors, would become evident as those with excesses of medicine or other supplies moved to the aid of those in worse circumstances than themselves.

During this period of adjustment and survival there would be the call upon transportation to undertake the relocation of large segments of population at the same time that the military were seeking speedy movement of troops to ports and bases and distant fighting fronts. The interdependence of every part of the national economy on every other is a thing we know very well in transportation, because it is upon us that such interdependent existence relies.

Transportation shut off to any point is like the shutting off of blood to an organ of the body. Shut off the transfer of fuel to a major producing or dispensing site and you may shut off Nike missiles waiting to be fired at another site. Shut off the flow of food to workers and you may close out the production of desperately needed weapons. The flow to vital organs must be restored, and quickly, or the organs die.

The segmentation of lines would be as serious a matter in this stage as the loss of equipment and terminal facilities. Even the carriers of wide territorial coverage, if they find their lines broken and their management separated, would likely have to submit to local direction. Then, as the recovery effort progressed, transportation segments would have to be tied back together piece by piece, every mode being employed cooperatively to get individual high-priority movements through. Later, as fallout deteriorated and decontamination and restoration of basic utilities progressed, transportation would grow outward from separated areas to join and combine with systems of other areas. Gradually the networks and main connecting arteries would be restored on a region-by-region basis. Then in as short a time as possible some semblance of a continental network of transportation would be revived and brought under national control.

The periods of extreme crisis will have passed, and with them the most crucial of national problems in all the important resource areas,
that is, the problem of how to get all that will be needed from the limited resources at hand.

The crux of the transportation problem in an emergency will be simply that there will not be enough service to take care of everyone's needs. Decisions will have to be made quickly and on the spot. What has been precommitted? What moves first? What gets deferred so that a higher-priority movement can be rushed through? Insofar as we can answer these questions broadly and in advance, we have tried to answer them. Part of the answer I have already mentioned with the reference to preallocated facilities. Other answers can be found in the Air Priority System of the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce, the transport mobilization orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the port utilization and shipping controls of the Maritime Administration and the Navy.

But even these important plans and agreements do not answer the questions of the little man on the spot—the question of the freight agent in the Atlanta Terminal who has, let us say, just received a request to move a carload of bandages with Civil Defense priority number 1, and a carload of bombs with military priority number 1, and yet has only a single car to ship either in. The answer, of course, is that we cannot hope to solve his and every other individual's problem in advance of actual events. But we can, we believe, give him, his carrier, the Government officers involved, shipper and receiver, a measure of built-in readiness, that is, operational capability to meet whatever problem may arise.

Now, how do we get this operational capability? First of all, let me point out that we have a sizeable portion of it already. An experienced and alert transportation industry, built and continued by skills and incentives of the American competitive economy, has a certain natural capability of strategic import, which has stood us in good stead in all our wars and may yet do it again.

In mobilization planning we plan to capitalize on this great reservoir of transportation strength by the simple expedient of keeping our hands off it to the extent possible. Some of our basic policies for a time of emergency have to do with this. They are as follows:

Private ownership and operation of the transportation industry shall continue in an attack emergency unless the exigencies of warfare dictate otherwise.
Second, unless circumstances of an attack make it impossible, shippers will be expected to continue to place their transportation requirements directly with the carriers, subject to such emergency orders, embargos, and priorities as may be applied.

Controls over intercity transportation of all types will be established only to the degree required by the nature and severity of the emergency.

Now, these policies simply mean that we recognize that the men in industry, doing day-to-day jobs, are the ones upon whom we should rely for emergency. We cannot replace them and we should not complicate our problem by thinking that we should or could.

Similarly we recognize that you, the military shipper, like other transport users, know what you need in the way of transport space and can do the job of going out and procuring it better than anyone else. It is not part of our problem or job to try and do this job for you. It is when you reach the point of needing transport where none is available, of trying to meet a shipping deadline when someone has you closed out on a higher priority, that we expect you to look to us for a solution.

When these things are clear, the transportation problems for emergency become of more manageable size. Our specific interest in maintaining and building capability is not in the existing large areas of successful carrier-shipper operation, but in the bolstering of the weak spots, the opening up of bottlenecks, the expansion of a service where demand is likely to be greatest, the institution of new services where required, and the resolution of conflicting claims.

Our approach toward getting this extra needed capability is along three paths:

1. Through a standby emergency organization composed of executive reservists from industry and the professions prepared to step in immediately and supervise the emergency task.

2. Through active programs of Government readiness to expand and improve available data, of informed personnel, and of functional staffs at national and field levels.

3. Through improved strategic capability of the transport industry at large.
I will just discuss this last point first.

Once we have identified and substantiated our need to overcome a weak segment of the transport industry, we will be in position to propose recommendations to the President or the Congress or to take actions within the powers and responsibilities given us which will act to overcome those weaknesses.

Likely areas under current consideration for improving the built-in readiness of the transport industry include:

- Dispersion of management and storage of management records.
- Cross-training of supervisory personnel.
- Preallocation and stocking of fuels and parts.
- Conversion kits for quick adjustment of one form of transport to another, for example, freight cars to rail passenger cars.
- Stockpiling of certain end items now being abandoned as obsolete; for example, barges, passenger coaches, steam locomotives, etc.
- Prefabrication of certain facilities likely to be lost and in short supply, that is, piers, emergency overpasses, bridges, etc.
- Simplification of regulatory controls, including standardization of State laws pertaining to interstate traffic.
- Encouragement of industry advances tending toward more flexible operations; for example, containerization programs; physical integration programs like Piggy Back, Fishy Back, and so on.
- There are many others.

In matters of building our Government capability to meet emergency requirements we are, of course, engaged in programs of Government continuity, relocation, and standby staffing at both national and regional levels, and in improving our planning effort in cooperation with State and local governments. But the two programs which I want to mention to you as of particular interest to the military are those of transportation damage assessment and traffic movement requirements.
In the first of these, damage assessment, we are building up comprehensive inventories of all transportation resources of the Nation and are improving our machine methods of applying to these, various attack data which will give us in a very short time period a fairly comprehensive picture of the Nation's transportation capability following an attack.

In the other of these programs, traffic movement requirements, we seek to obtain from the various agencies of Government, particularly Defense, long- and short-range forecasts of their emergency movement requirements as a basis for advance adjustments in carrier traffic patterns.

This information will be used the way carriers now use shipper advisory bulletins, for example, and traffic forecasts—not as a basis for filling specific requests for transport, but in order to assure that transport will be available in the area of need at the time the shipper feels he will need it.

Closely related to this whole study is that of priorities and allocations within and between the military services, which is a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are working with JCS to improve our mutual readiness in this regard.

I come now to an item to which we have been giving a great deal of thought in recent months. In order to be able to meet the problems presented in the field of transportation, and to have sufficient scope and authority to carry out such action measures as may be required in wartime, we are building an emergency standby organization of ideal proportions.

Chart 2, page 12.--This is the organization planned for our national headquarters in emergency. Into it will be integrated key existing segments of the Government, as well as the best industry brains available to us. Under it all the diverse modes of transport will function together for the first time.

Notice the two-fold nature of the staff organization. The Assistant for Operations and Maintenance is primarily interested in the problems of the various carriers and assists them in obtaining fuel and other critical resources they will require. The Assistant for Traffic Management, on the other hand, is interested in the problems of the wartime shipper. He will coordinate national movements and assists the defense shipper to get vital cargoes through when normal procedures fail.
CHART 2

EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATION

LIAISON

ADMINISTRATOR

DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATION

COUNSEL

INFORMATION

ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

DIVISIONS:
- AIR CARRIERS
- MOTOR CARRIERS
- RAIL CARRIERS
- WATER CARRIERS
- PORT CONTROL
- OCEAN SHIPPING
- COMMERCIAL STORAGE
- CLAIMANCY COORDINATOR
- FOR FUELS AND SUPPLY

ASSISTANT FOR CARRIER FINANCE AND REHABILITATION

ASSISTANT FOR EMERGENCY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

TRAFFIC DIVISION:
- NORTHEAST
- MIDWEST
- SOUTHERN
- NORTHWEST
- SOUTHWEST
- EMERGENCY RATES AND ROUTES DIVISION

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION OFFICES
A similar staff structure is contemplated for each of the wartime regional transportation offices. However, here there may be adjustments based on needs of the particular area that is served. For example, an interior region might not have need for a port control division but might need an augmented rail carrier division. One office might have an Army liaison attached to it, another a Navy, and so on. Flexibility is our rule as we approach the operating levels in this work.

Insofar as practicable, we plan to preselect individuals to staff the wartime organizations. Existing Federal transportation agencies will be called upon to supply a nucleus of persons for the new agency. But the primary source of its members will be the National Defense Executive Reserve. Transportation presently has a sizeable segment of the skilled men from industry and the professions included in the President's executive reserve program. We are constantly reviewing the qualifications and positions of these men with a view toward assuring ourselves that we will have men capable and willing to act when the chips are down.

Manpower, then, as the skilled reserve manpower of industry, is at the very base of our new operational readiness. We think it gives added meaning and reality to national defense.

And, gentlemen, we are facing critical problems every day. Every day is a crisis. The Chinese define "crisis" by two characters—the one meaning "danger" and the other "opportunity." Every crisis is an opportunity to meet the challenge of danger, and the degree of our effort will be the measure of our success.

COLONEL AKERS: Gentlemen, Mr. Jones is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, it's a very sobering thought to all of us that war could happen any hour, or tomorrow, or the next day. The thing about it is that as soon as this happens, there will be tremendous competition for movements between military and nonmilitary cargo. I wonder if there are any positive arrangements existing right now between your office and that of Mr. Earl Smith, the Department of Defense Director of Transportation, as to what we should do tomorrow if it happens.

MR. JONES: Well, of course I could right away quote the National Plan, which Governor Hoegh distributed all over the country. He says in that plan that in the first 14 days everyone should be prepared to take care of himself. It will be a matter of individual survival. They should
have food for themselves for 14 days and not look to anybody else for food. In the next 14 days there will be some movement going on and these people can start looking for help from their immediate communities.

Looking at it over on the military side, provided the military can move—and they're human too, let's not forget—the Air Force has, for example, done a very good job of logistics planning for petroleum. Probably some here are familiar with that. They have visited every one of our regional offices and we have sat with them and discussed their planning program. In connection with reserves which they have located at various points at various locations in the country to furnish jet fuels and aviation gas to their logistical air force, they have asked for a pre-allocation of tank trucks to carry this aviation gas and jet fuels from the reserves to the point of use. They have an interim preallocation right now for transportation, and not only the transportation, but also for the manpower needed for the job and the power required for the job.

Is that along the line you are thinking of? Incidentally, I might say this: that Earl Smith and I talk to each other, I should judge, an average of once a week. We are very well acquainted. We know what each other is doing both at Earl's level and mine and my staff and his staff.

QUESTION: That's along the line, but I was thinking primarily of whether or not there is an actual organization, whether it exists on paper, whether there exists any organization that coordinates your duties with those of the Department of Defense.

MR. JONES: Actually, no. There is I think, a need for a greater fusion, let's say, or blending of purposes of the military and OCDM. I really feel that way too.

QUESTION: In the overall postattack picture does any particular means of transportation appear to assume a measure of greater importance than any other that might warrant extra preparations for such a situation?

MR. JONES: No. I don't think there is particularly, unless we think of trucks. And just as soon as we mention truck transportation, both bus and freight carriers, passenger and freight carriers, someone comes up with the argument that, well, the railroads have centralized traffic control and with very few people involved they can hook on a bunch of cars and move a mass of people or a mass of freight with fewer people than would be required for trucks. So there are arguments on both sides. And for other modes too.
I will say this: I think the effort at the local level will undoubtedly be the crux. It will be your ambulances, your local cartage companies that will be the principal mode of transportation used for the immediate survival at the local level. As we get into interstate travel it’s not inconceivable that we will use a truck to start out a shipment and a freight car somewhere in between and even possibly an airplane to handle part of the movement. Those of you who have seen fallout maps—and I’m sure all of you have—realize the problem of getting around contaminated areas.

QUESTION: I have two questions, but I’d like to start by referring to your remark to the effect that you might let the transportation industry operate on their own to the greatest extent possible. If this is correct, I have in mind that during World War II and also in World War I and just before II, we found that voluntary controls of any kind were somewhat of a farce. I mean, they just didn’t accomplish what they were after. If we let the transportation industry operate on their own, with advice or guidance, we will probably run into the same thing again. I would like to know how you stand on that. I have another question too. You also mentioned stockpiling of certain things. What program does OCDM or anybody have for funding for such stockpiles?

MR. JONES: The last question will be the easiest. We have none. We are not doing any in transportation. So that answers that.

The first part of that question was what?

STUDENT: The freedom that you mentioned for the industry to operate on their own and the failure of that back in World War II.

MR. JONES: Further on in my talk I mentioned the orders that would go into effect, such as the air priority orders which would be administered by the Department of Defense and that had been coordinated with the Department of Commerce. Also there are in existence for emergency use—and they are self-initiating orders—the ICC orders. They are orders which embargo freight shipments, passenger movements, and so on, so that we do not get congestion of the ports. We have port control orders that will prevent saturating the ports with freight that cannot be handled or moved.

I may have given a wrong impression there when I said that the railroads would be free to operate. They will be free to operate under these controls. It will be handled in the same way as at present when a bridge
is out. If a railroad bridge is out, for example, the Interstate Commerce Commission issues a routing order immediately, so that, for the railroad's own protection, the railroad can reroute freight that had been routed over a bridge that is now out. The railroad has the authority, when issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, to reroute that freight; and the shipper who has put the routing on the bill of lading cannot criticize the railroad for their action, because the railroad is supported by the ICC, and the ICC has issued an order. We have that thing occurring in peacetime all the time. So this would be no different except that it would be on a much larger and broader scale.

QUESTION: Sir, as an old operational readiness officer, one of the principal criteria was that we must have in being and operating in peacetime the organization which will function in wartime. My specific question is: With your proposed wartime centralization of control, that last chart that you showed, is anything being done now or any consideration being given to gathering together all the various control agencies for transportation into a unit or a single organization at this time which could function in peacetime and consequently be prepared and capable of functioning in wartime?

MR. JONES: Yes. We have, as probably most of you know, these Operations Alert. Those in the military have not participated too heavily in the transportation phase of these except as they have at my insistence that we want you in and must let you know what we're doing. We have these Operations Alert every year. They are spread out in order to do problems which if squeezed together into the period of an actual condition you just couldn't cover.

But in our last Exercise Alert we had an Emergency Transportation Agency that went to the relocation site. We had everybody in a slot—the maritime, the air, the rail, the operation maintenance side of it. We had the traffic management side of it. All of those people from the various agencies, plus our executive reserves, participated in the exercise so that they knew how and were able to operate. They got some experience in operating under an emergency situation. Problems were simulated.

We can do a lot better job than we are doing, I will agree. But this last Alert in 1958, I am informed, came off much better than the one in 1957 or any of its predecessors. So I hope that in 1959 we will have a still better one. However, I am not able to measure the others with 1958, because I have only seen 1959, and then I had to pick
myself up by the bootstraps and learn what it was all about. But we do actually go through an exercise with this agency.

I might say this: Just to put it in simple terms, my job in OCDM is the job of mustering all of our transportation resources together into one compatible organization that is effective. When we go into an exercise, I don't take over the job as the administrator of that emergency agency. Normally I wouldn't. I would serve on the staff of someone who was designated by the Director of OCDM to be the administrator of that agency. Last year Lew Rothschild was the administrator of the Emergency Transportation Agency in the Alert exercise at the relocation site. In the time of an emergency probably somebody else will be heading that agency. I would be on his staff as an adviser or whatnot.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, along the line of the last two questions I assume that your hands-off policy with respect to the industry in time of emergency simply means that OCDM does not intend to get into operation. Is that correct?

MR. JONES: No. What I mean by that is this: that the railroads, working in peacetime, should be perfectly capable and more so of operating under the emergency situation than to trot in a lot of professionals and say "Here are the railroads, here's the whole transportation system of the country. Go ahead and run it." If we've got an industrial organization in being, that's what we want to use.

QUESTION: OCDM as the emergency transportation agency will administer priorities where impasses come about?

MR. JONES: That's correct.

QUESTION: Then do we assume that that policy also applies to the existing transportation agencies of Government? Will they have the job of coordinating operations? What is their relationship?

MR. JONES: Yes. In the emergency transportation setup these agencies of Government who are doing the emergency planning now understand that we do not do any conflicting planning in OCDM. We provide guidelines and policy to agencies of the Government who are delegated the job of planning. In the Maritime area, Maritime is delegated all the planning for any emergency and they keep us informed of what should be done.
Now, comes the Emergency Transportation Agency, the Maritime will have men in our transportation agency. In the operation and maintenance end, the securing of ships and so on; and they will possibly have a man in the traffic management end. That's not unlikely, because people who are experienced in moving particular kinds of goods are the men that we would look for. General executive reservists would fill the jobs in the traffic management area of the job.

Incidentally, as a part of this Emergency Transportation Agency we would certainly look for military representation. That is why we welcome military representation and coordination with us now.

QUESTION: In line also with the last question, sir, who in the Government end is actually coordinating or giving some degree of direction to the amalgamation or coordination of all of the traffic management plans? You said you don't. You just give policy guidance.

MR. JONES: Do you mean traffic management or transportation plans?

STUDENT: Transportation. Who in effect is actually giving direction in the amalgamation of the plans?

MR. JONES: I am.

STUDENT: And, second, what happens to all these other agencies who are also involved in transportation when the super-agency takes over? Are they all amalgamated together?

MR. JONES: Yes. They all come in with their know-how.

Now, this organization will be made up of two groups. There is the one group of Government agencies who have been doing the planning, and they know what the job is. There's this other group that come in, of executive reservists, who have been indoctrinated and trained in their jobs, mostly at the regional level. There won't be too many executive reservists at the national level.

QUESTION: What happens to the transportation activities in ICC?

MR. JONES: Well, in the ICC, for example, the two bureaus that are the most interested in this and that would come into this agency are the Bureau of Motor Carriers and the Bureau of Safety and Service.
The Bureau of Motor Carriers, as the name implies, has charge of certain motor carrier functions throughout the country. So they are particularly suited to give expert advice and planning for the motor carriers. The Safety and Service Bureau of the ICC is, let's say, the railroad phase of the Interstate Commerce Commission and their relation is with the railroads.

So there are two bureaus actually in the ICC that would come into or sponsor sections in this Emergency Transportation Agency. The rest of it, the rate regulatory part of the ICC, stays where it is. They are of little use in this organization as such, because we don't need rate people. We want people to move stuff. Rates will be frozen then, probably for a while anyway. So we are only looking for the operating part of it.

Now, the Maritime Board is not in this picture. It's the Maritime Administration that is in the picture--the people who know about ports and ships, the operating people.

QUESTION: Duty to country, I would say, is probably unknown to certain individuals, such as Jimmy Hoffa. I wonder if there's any concern with or plan whereby individuals of that nature could be turned over to the Army for safekeeping at Leavenworth.

MR. JONES: Someone asked me the other day: "Why don't you have an advisory committee and get Jimmy Hoffa on your committee?" I said: "That sounds like a manpower problem to me. Let the manpower people worry about that. I don't want any part of him." So we only want good operating people in our advisory group.

But I think that in any emergency, of course—we would use competent union officials.

I think they will all be Americans when the emergency comes. They've got to have 14 days of food too.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, if my memory serves me correctly, during the last Operation Alert I think it was 165 or thereabouts major cities were hit in this country. I know that some people have advanced the idea that maybe they wouldn't hit Washington because by leaving it intact it might actually benefit the cause of the enemy. But, nevertheless, they might hit it. And if they did hit it and these other 164 major cities, my question is. Where would you be? Where would your office be? Where would OCDM be? How much transportation do you think you would have left?
MR. JONES: First of all, let's work from the top down. Where would OCDM be? We have a relocation site which is a hardened site, or at least is in the stages of being hardened, so we could operate in it. There is an alert cadre there now. So that conceivably if something should happen overnight and Washington goes out, there is somebody there running the Government until somebody can arrive to take over. The communications are all set in and so on. So we do have an alert cadre that is on duty there 24 hours a day.

From the transportation standpoint it is very unlikely that much movement will take place under such an attack pattern as you mention. Our major ports will all be out. As I recall, in our last Alert we had only two small ports up around Connecticut and Rhode Island that you could get into. All the rest were out of business. This was on the Alert. This is not a classified attack pattern either. That attack pattern was spread all over the country. We estimated there would be 50 million people to die, with many more million sick and injured.

The transportation would have to pick itself up and try to get operating, just like anything else. Even the individual has to pick himself up and get operating. There would be very little movement, I would think, in the first couple of weeks. That's what it looks like, based on these attack patterns. We're running attack patterns at our National Damage Assessment Center all the time now just to see what kind of answers we can come up with. It's practice work.

Did you have another base to your question or did I cover it?

STUDENT: I think you might have covered it—how much transportation actually will be left.

MR. JONES: I'll tell you about how much. Based on this last Alert and the attack pattern, we would have a percentage capability in our transportation plant which would be somewhat above that of production industries. This would increase quite rapidly until in about a year our operations would begin to approach preattack levels.

QUESTION: I know that you say the plan is to keep these transportation industries in private hands if possible. Assuming you suffer a heavy loss of transportation facilities, undoubtedly then the Government would have to take over. I am a bit concerned along the same line that I think Mr. Miner Williams was, as to plans between Defense and OCDM. I know of the authority that the President has, acting through the Army, to take over land transportation and through the Secretary
of the Air Force to take over air transportation and operate it. I
assume, however, that the operation would probably be through OCDM.
Is there any plan to actually operate? If so, would it be through the
Department of Defense or OCDM under war power?

MR. JONES: Well, the President has that power today, even in
peacetime, to take over the railroads, or any transportation. In fact,
he has the generals tabbed any time the Government takes it over. They
are presidents of railroads.

Let me say this: The railroads or any transportation people, wheth-
er they are running a truckline or a railroad, they are meeting com-
mitments every day. They are a disciplined organization. They're
working on schedules. If they didn't work on schedules, they would be
piling trains and trucks up on the roads every day. Then someone
would have to take them over. But as long as they are performing in
the way they are today, even though they had only a low percent capabi-
ity, I think they should still be permitted to operate on their own insofar
as they can. Naturally, they will need an awful lot of help from people at
that time other than their own.

Now, the military, as far as I can see, within the territorial area--
and I'm not a military man; I'm speaking off the cuff now--are going to
have just as hard a time picking themselves up after one of these attacks
as any other disciplined force in the country, in my opinion. You may
differ with me on that, but we live and breathe the same air. There's
no more protection on the body of the military man than there is on the
body of the civilian. And there's all this radiation that hits you.

QUESTION: I am having a little trouble with your organization. I
believe you mentioned that you have a State and Local Guidance Division
in Battle Creek, Michigan, and also that you have eight regional trans-
portation offices. You further mentioned the fact that your main product
is guidance and not programing. I would like to know just a little bit
about what guidance is put out by this regional office or division at
Battle Creek which could not be put out by the regional offices. What is
the relationship between the civilian offices, and what happens to this
division during an emergency?

MR. JONES: The Battle Creek office is the former FCDA operation
which is now blended into one organization and operation under trans-
portation in OCDM. This group gives guidance. In other words, they
lay out a program of survival and advise the State transportation people
of what they should do in the broad picture for survival. They provide
them with all the information which comes out of our research. Then the State people make up their plans for civilian survival in the event of emergency.

What happens in the making of these plans is that they hire a consulting group, then put them under contract. A plan is drawn up. These consulting groups of course, use one State as a guinea pig and get their experience there. Then they get into other States and through that experience get up a pretty good plan.

That plan is reviewed. The coordination with the State and the contact with the State and local people are done actually through our regional transportation officers. The transportation officer is well acquainted with all types of transportation people in his region. In fact, under our setup today, you might say he's a two-headed fellow. On the one hand, he's taking technical direction on transportation policy from us at headquarters, that is, under the national picture; but he's also working this guidance job with the States. So he has two jobs to do there.

I might mention one more thing, talking about organization. If an emergency should come, that transportation officer in the region in all probability will become the same kind of a fellow that I would become under an emergency setup. He would be reporting, perhaps, to the president of a railroad or the director of traffic of some large concern, who would become the regional transportation officer and be running the job under the policy set up by the National Transportation Agency.

QUESTION: In the present economic position of the railroads certain passenger cars when they wear out, are not being replaced. That results in lower numbers of cars. In the long-range trend what does this mean to transportation readiness?

MR. JONES: Every car that is cut up for scrap, whether it is a passenger car or a Pullman car or a freight car, and is not replaced, naturally takes that much of a resource away from us.

The job of maintaining a fleet, let's say, of stockpiling a fleet, is a difficult one. First of all, if you let it sit on a siding someplace and don't use it, it's just like an empty house; it goes to pieces on you. If you don't live in the house, if you don't move the fleet and maintain it, you don't have much when it comes to the emergency.

I mentioned steam locomotives. I hesitated a long while before I left that in. I was going to take it out of here. I did mention steam locomotives, but I don't think you'll find many around, even today.
But the cost of stockpiling and maintaining in good condition equipment like that would be astronomical. We have had all kinds of suggestions come in, for example, one to load up a freight train and put it in a big warehouse, put locomotives in there, load these cars up with medicines and canned goods and so on, so that, comes an emergency, we'll open the doors and go right out with that train from Seattle to St. Paul. Now, how are you going to get from Seattle to St. Paul if you've got to go through a lot of fallout? And maybe that's where the bomb hit--right on that warehouse. I don't know. So I don't think the Government has the money to put out to do any stockpiling like that.

We regret the fact that the railroads are financially not able to come back and replace equipment they are breaking up.

There is one ray of light in this picture and that's these Piggy Back and containerization programs. They are making standard containers. They are making first of all, the flat car which carries two 35-foot containers. Those containers can be loaded right on to a trailer chassis, and the container and its load carried to destination. Now, when you can get some economies worked into that kind of program, maybe the cars that we are cutting up are being replaced by better containers and flat car combinations which might save us in time of emergency.

QUESTION: I have a specific question with regard to the administration of priorities in an emergency. You say you're going to leave this up to the local carriers. If we should wake up tomorrow morning and find that we have 22 percent, do you have some instructions out to the ticket sellers over at the National Airport that they can't sell my mother-in-law a ticket to go to southwest Texas or something? In other words, do you have some sort of an organization to administer priorities?

MR. JONES: Yes, sir. There's a manual about that thick which is already in being. As far as air priorities are concerned, they will be administered by the military. So if you've got them in, you can get your mother-in-law to Texas.

COLONEL AKERS: Mr. Jones, I want to thank you on the part of the faculty and students for a very interesting presentation. Thank you very much.

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