

ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY

5 October 1959

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NATIONAL SECURITY

5 October 1959

DR. HUNTER: General Mundy, General Houseman, Captain Shoeni, Gentlemen: My job this morning is a rather simple one but an important one. It is to lay before you, in broad perspective, the changes in the organization for national security since the Second World War.

The emphasis will be on major changes seen in broad perspective. It is neither possible nor desirable for our purposes this morning to get into the details either of legislation or the functioning of specific agencies, however important. You will have individual lectures on some of the agencies later. I shall place emphasis on the substance, rather than on the skeletal framework, of the changes in organizational arrangements. I shall not show you a single organizational chart.

Let me begin by saying that not since the Federal Government was established back in 1789 have more far-reaching changes, both organizationally and policywise, been made in the security system of this country than since 1947. Note that I speak here not of national defense, not of the Military Establishment, but of the national security system. I will comment on this term later.

Now, all of you, as senior officers in the armed services and in the civil service, have lived through, and many have participated in, the changes of which I shall speak this morning. Most of you have been materially affected by these changes. Much of what I say will be familiar to you; yet it will be useful to begin this unit by refreshing your recollection of a rather hectic period in the history of the armed services.

I shall organize my remarks around some four major headings, as shown on the easel card here:

Organization for National Security Since 1945

1. The new international position of the United States.
2. Organization for national security before 1939.

3. The National Security Act of 1947.
4. Changes in the security structure since 1947.

The first item I shall dispose of very quickly, for it is very familiar ground. In substance, here is the situation we faced following the war:

For more than three centuries, Great Britain had been the classic exponent and supporter of the concept of an international balance of power. This was the idea that no one power or coalition of powers should be allowed to become militarily so powerful as to present a serious threat to the continuing security of other nations. For more than three centuries, England had been the keystone in this balance of power system.

Now, two world wars first weakened and then destroyed this traditional balance of power. When allied victory came in 1945, the major powers of Western Europe, victors and defeated alike, had been reduced to a condition of virtual economic collapse. France was on her back. Italy and Germany were occupied. The United Kingdom had been bled white by the long struggle, which for many months she had carried on virtually alone. The greater part of her capital investment abroad had been liquidated to finance the war, and the large contribution made by this overseas investment to the national income had gone down the drain.

In the Far East, Japan was occupied, and China was torn by civil war. On the great continental land mass of Eurasia, only the U.S.S.R. remained in a strong, though in a war-weakened position. But her economic and military recovery, as you will recall, was very rapid, owing largely to a vigorous and ruthless program of economic restoration and expansion. Europe's weakness was Russia's opportunity; and she moved in, of course, with an aggressive program of territorial and political aggrandizement. There was no power in Europe or Asia capable of checking her.

The result, in effect, was the wrecking of this traditional balance of power system. Here we have a great paradox. A global war which had been fought to uphold and maintain the balance of power system which Hitler threatened actually ended with the virtual collapse of this system; and there remained no nation capable of stopping Russia except the United States.

Now, prior to 1941 we had been all but outside the balance of power system. We were like, so to speak, a fire department of one city which responds to alarms in an adjoining city only when fires have reached disaster proportions and threaten to overwhelm that city's fire-fighting resources. In both World War I and II we came to the rescue of the Allied Powers only when their defeat seemed imminent. But after World War II, ours was, so to speak, the only fire department capable of dealing with a major conflagration.

We were faced then with the grim alternatives: Either we must take the lead or Russia would take over. At the end of the war, most Americans hoped, as you will recall, that we might return to something like our traditional position of detachment in European affairs. But we soon learned that this was out of the question. In place of the old balance of power system, we were faced with the harsh realities of a very different system--a bipolar system, with one pole at Moscow and the other here in Washington. Here inescapably were the centers of power.

These, then, were the postwar developments, familiar to all of you, which compelled the United States drastically to revamp policies and organizations concerned with national security. And this brings me down to point two in our outline: "Organization for national security prior to World War II." This, too, can be passed over rather quickly, but it's important.

Without a brief backward look, we can hardly appreciate the magnitude and significance of the changes that have taken place more recently. It is well to remember, too, that Congress has a strong historic sense, a long collective memory. It has deeply ingrained attitudes, based on long past experience.

Before 1939 we had, of course, a War Department and a Navy Department and a State Department, each active in its own corner of the field, each doing its duty in the manner prescribed by statute and tradition, each with its own problems, its own headaches, and, too, its own rather limited conception of the job to be done. Today, as we look back on those prewar days, we are impressed by the separateness which marked the course of each of these three major agencies in dealing with the problems of national security.

In this pre-1939 situation, it is important, first, to note that there was no specific agency charged with national security policy and planning on the national level; that is, on the national level as distinguished from

the military service level. This does not mean, of course, that there was neither policy nor planning in respect to security, but virtually no planning went on outside the military services. Security policy formulation rested almost entirely with the President, in consultation, of course, with such advisers among the Cabinet officers as he might confide in.

Even within the armed services, military planning prior to 1940 was on a very limited scale and largely uncoordinated. You may not realize it, but this very building we are in represents an historic landmark in the evolution of planning so far as the War Department and Army are concerned. The Army War College, for which this building was erected in the early 1900's, was the first step in Secretary of War Elihu Root's revolutionary program of giving the Army a General Staff whose primary task was planning in a hitherto planless organization.

I hope you will forgive me a brief excursion into ancient history by quoting from an article in the "Saturday Evening Post" some 30 years ago by Major General Harbord. "In the War Department at the time of the Spanish American War," wrote General Harbord, "there was no thinking department . . . none . . . specially charged with the duty of foresight or initiative. No one did any general planning involving the use of the military machine as a whole. The army," he continued, "was run after the manner of a correspondence school. The ancient grind about the Army being a fine place if it were not for the soldiers well describes the staff attitude. In the happy, careless 90's before the Spanish American War no one was charged with preparing the team for teamwork." Mind you, General Harbord is not speaking of military teamwork across the board, but simply of teamwork within the Army.

Now, as a result of the initiative, the drive, and the insight of Secretary Root, a substantial beginning was made in changing this anomalous situation so far as the War Department and Army were concerned, first, by establishing in 1901 the Army War College, with certain general staff powers; and, second, by the creation in the War Department of a General Staff with responsibility for military planning. This was done in the face of great opposition. Yet, for a variety of reasons, further progress was slow. Little headway was made in the War Department planning until after the First World War.

During the 1920's and the 1930's, war plans were prepared both by the Army and the Navy, but largely independently of each other;

until the impending outbreak of war in Europe in 1938-1939 brought their planning together to some extent through a Joint Army and Navy Board, consisting of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, assisted by a Joint Planning Committee. This Board and this Committee coordinated war plans in those areas where agreement could be reached. Only in the field of industrial mobilization planning was there regular machinery for joint planning in the old Army and Navy Munitions Board.

The relations of the two armed services to each other before World War II have been described by a former officer on the Army and Navy Staff College faculty as follows:

"It was all too clear that we had fought all of our wars with an Army and with a Navy. We generally have fought two wars, one on land and one on sea. Always we had fought with two separate forces: separate in organization, in tradition, and, worst of all, separate in sentiment. But they had this in common: Each was ignorant of the other."

Now, if the two armed services had little knowledge and understanding of each other and operated in substantial isolation, this was even more true of the relations between the armed services and the State Department. Of course, it was the job of the State Department to formulate and administer the national policies of this country in our relations with other countries. These policies inevitably involved risks and commitments by the United States. And these risks and commitments, accepted in the pursuit of our foreign policy goals, might well, sooner or later, involve this country in war or the threat of war.

To pursue such policies without recognizing and evaluating the possible military consequences and preparing for such consequences was a foolhardy business. Nothing is more essential for an effective national policy, it is generally recognized today, than close coordination of foreign and military policies. Yet during the 1920's and the 1930's there was very little of such coordination. No machinery, formal or informal, existed for this purpose.

There was a rather interesting proposal made by an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, one Franklin Roosevelt, back in 1919--this on the basis of his wartime experience here in Washington. This proposal was for an Army-Navy-State Department Joint Staff. But the proposal got nowhere. It was lost sight of and discovered years later buried in the Latin American files.

So, between the wars the military departments and the State Department operated independently of each other, and to a large extent in ignorance of each other's policies and plans, or, as between the Army and the Navy, in substantial disagreement on some of the major planning issues involved.

So much, then, for the pre-World War II situation.

Now, between 1939 and 1945, a war of global proportions was fought, and during these years we learned the facts of national security the hard way. We learned how to plan, to organize, and to conduct joint operations and combined operations in the field. We learned how vital was the close interlocking of foreign policy and military policy. We learned, again the hard way, that you don't fight a war simply to win it; you fight a war to attain national objectives; that is, political objectives to which military objectives must be subordinated.

Still another lesson that we learned during the war was that lack of planning, lack of preparation, and ignorance added greatly to the length and to the human and material costs of the war, and resulted not only in a heavy burden during and after the war, but in a serious depletion of our natural resources.

Well, the result of all this experience was that after the war was over, in fact, even before the war had come to an end, beginning as early as the spring of 1944, we got busy putting our house in order securitywise. A number of studies and investigations were made, both within the military departments and by Congress. And there was long and, at times, rather heated public discussion of the major issues.

The end product of this investigation and discussion was the National Security Act of 1947, passed in the summer of that year. This act provided the statutory base for the elaborate set of agencies which I shall shortly discuss. This act of 1947 marks the great divide in the long evolution of our national security system and policy. And this brings us to point three in my outline.

Now, many of you are already familiar with the Act of 1947 and its amendments. If not, I think you may find it worth your while sometime to read through them. An hour in the library will be enough to go through all of them, though without reading them too intensively.

Before considering the more significant provisions of the Act of 1947, let me point out certain fundamental concepts which give meaning

and purpose to the entire system of security under the act. There are, as I see it, three such concepts:

The central concept is that indicated in the title itself--national security. This concept of national security contrasts very sharply with the traditional and rather passive concept of national defense conceived almost solely in military terms. Defense, military defense, plays, of course, a vital role, the central role; but this functions within the larger framework of national security, under the new system.

The second basic concept running through the act is that of coordination--the coordination not only of the armed services in the planning and conduct of military operations; but, at least of equal importance, the coordination of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Both our prewar and wartime experience had made very clear again and again the vital importance of having military and foreign policies that were not only consistent with each other, but which were mutually supporting.

Now, the third concept that runs through the entire Act of 1947 can be summed up in the phrase, or the cliché if you like, security is everybody's business. And, equally, it is everybody's responsibility. As we examine the various parts of the act, we'll see that not only the military departments but all the major executive departments and agencies of the Government are again and again brought into the security picture.

All right. Now let's turn to the act itself. The first thing to note is the purpose of the act, described as:

"An Act to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense, for a National Military Establishment, including the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security."

Let me repeat that--"for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security."

In this phrasing we have, in effect, the basis for a revolution in national security policy. In brief, and as the remainder of the act makes very clear, the Armed Forces are no longer the sole guardians of the Nation's safety. "It is the intent of Congress," runs the

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introductory statement of policy, "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; and to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security . . ." and so on.

Now, it's worth noting that Title I, comprising about one-third of the entire act, is not concerned with the Armed Forces at all. It describes the organization and functions of three new nonmilitary agencies outside the Military Establishment but having important, top-level security responsibilities--the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Note that Title I is headed "Coordination for National Security." I'd like to take a brief look at the three new agencies which are now added to the security structure of this country.

Of the National Security Council the act reads:

"The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

The membership of this Council is very illuminating. As named in the original act, the members appear in the following order: first, the President; second--and note well--the Secretary of State; third, the Secretary of Defense, followed in the first act by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; fourth, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and, finally, a provision was made for adding other members from among the heads of the executive departments and other agencies.

"It shall be the duty of the Council," reads the act, "first, to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith."

Note here particularly that two sides of the security situation are stressed--on one side, national objectives, commitments, and risks; on the other, national power, actual and potential. Obviously, the two must be kept reasonably well in balance.

Secondly, "It shall be the duty of the Council to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security and to make recommendations to the President on the same," etc.

Here in the National Security Council we have, at long last, a top-level policy agency, headed by the President, whose job is to take an overall view of the security position and the security policies of the United States and to advise the President concerning the same.

The second of the three new civilian agencies established by the National Security Act of 1947 is CIA. Briefly summarized, the function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to insure, under the direction of the NSC, a sound and adequate intelligence base for the formulation and execution of our national security policies.

Very clearly, if our national security policies were to be sound and effective, they had to be based on accurate intelligence on all matters bearing upon national security. So the job of CIA, as set up, was to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence relating to national security, and to perform such other intelligence activities as might be assigned to it. Obviously, this was a big job and an important one. Most of you, presumably all of you, have some acquaintance with CIA, and you will hear a great deal more about it. I need not go into it further here.

This brings us, then, to the third of these new civilian agencies--the National Security Resources Board(NSRB)--in many ways the most important agency of the lot from the viewpoint of our studies here at the Industrial College. Of course, as most of you I shall assume know, NSRB no longer exists; but the present Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) is, with certain modifications of function and form, a continuation of NSRB.

Now, NSRB and OCDM are the postwar successors of a prewar planning agency located in the old War Department. This was the Planning Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Under the Defense Act of 1920 (which was the post-World War I equivalent of the National Security Act of 1947), Congress assigned to the Assistant Secretary of War responsibility for planning for the mobilization of industry in wartime. And for the next 16 or 18 years--down to World War II--a group of officers in the Planning Branch of the War Department handled the mobilization planning responsibility of the Assistant

Secretary of War. It carried on all the planning of that sort that was done in this country, along with certain work by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, to which I shall refer later. It was in connection, as you probably know, with the planning for industrial mobilization in the 1920's and 1930's that the predecessor of this College, the Army Industrial College, was founded.

Now, I can't stop here to discuss the results of this planning for industrial mobilization carried on within the War Department for many years prior to World War II. Let me say simply that while this planning was in many ways valuable, especially at the technical service procurement level, the formal plans for industrial mobilization were never adopted as such; and there was more or less dissatisfaction with both the methods and the results of this planning activity.

During World War II, to a much greater extent even than in World War I, we came to realize the predominant rôle of productive resources in our national military strength. Accordingly, economic mobilization, which was a broader term than industrial mobilization, came in for a great deal of attention in the thinking which led to the National Security Act of 1947. The result was certain radical changes in the organizational arrangements for planning in this field; namely, economic mobilization.

First, except in respect to military functions related to procurement, economic mobilization planning was taken out of the Military Establishment, where it had been since 1920, and given to the civilian agency to which I have already referred--the National Security Resources Board. In part this was done from a widely held, although possibly incorrect, view that the War Department had fallen down on the economic mobilization planning job during the 1920's and 1930's. But to a larger degree, I think, this reassignment of responsibility for planning from a military department to a civilian agency reflected the growing feeling that modern warfare demanded the fullest and most effective application of all the resources of the Nation, civilian and military; and that planning for the mobilization of the economy, no less than the direction of the economy in wartime, was preeminently a civilian job, and one which best could be done by those most competent to deal with problems involving the civilian economy; namely, civilians.

Secondly, the responsibility for economic mobilization planning was raised from that of a minor branch of one of the military departments, where it had enjoyed little prestige and no great influence; and

it was placed in an independent executive agency, directly responsible to the President. NSRB had no operating responsibilities or authority. Its role was advisory only, but it was a staff arm of the highest executive authority, the President.

In the language of the statute: "It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including . . ." and then the act went on to enumerate most of the major areas to which your study will be directed throughout the next nine months--manpower, natural and industrial resources, maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, coordination of procurement and production, and so on down the line.

Now, a third point I want to make about the NSRB ties in with what I earlier noted about security being everybody's business. NSRB was established as a board consisting of the heads of seven Cabinet departments, Defense, State, Commerce, Labor, Interior, Treasury, and Agriculture. Further, NSRB was directed by statute to use to a maximum extent the facilities and resources of the Executive Department. This was done, and has continued to be done, by the successor agencies of NSRB--the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the present OCDM. NSRB and its successor agencies have operated primarily as policy formulating and coordinating agencies, delegating to major Government departments and agencies responsibility for planning and readiness activities in specific mobilization areas.

To sum up, then, our prewar and wartime experience led to the setting up under the National Security Act of 1947 three new civilian agencies, all within the Executive Office of the President and directly responsible to him--one, NSC, to serve as a focal point for the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security; another, CIA, to provide the intelligence base for these policies; and a third, NSRB, succeeded in turn by ODM and OCDM, to ride herd on national security planning and readiness measures on the economic resources side.

Now, for the last 10 or 15 minutes I've been talking about the new organization for national security and I've barely mentioned the armed services. Title II, comprising more than half of the act spacewise, covers this side of the security picture. It is headed "The National Military Establishment." As later amended by several statutes, this part of the act is the basic charter of the postwar military organization

of this country. I don't propose to consider here this part of the act in any detail. You are all more or less familiar with the results of Title II, if not with its language. I shall limit my attention to some general comments on certain features of the act.

Let me remind you again of some of the reasons for this overhaul of the Military Establishment represented by Title II. The wartime experience had demonstrated very forcibly the hopeless inadequacy of certain features of the prewar military structure. The result was a hasty and improvised revamping of that structure once we got into the war in 1941, and this was very frustrating. This was done, incidentally, by Executive order and most of it would expire with the President's war powers following the war.

Now, if we were to select any one major deficiency as outstanding in the prewar military structure, I think it is clear from what I've said already and what you know from your own experience that it was lack of coordination, and of any machinery for coordination, between the separate armed services. Even within the individual services there was, in some respects, inadequate coordination. And this had led during the war to important departmental changes at the time in both the War and Navy Departments. In commenting on the prewar military establishment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization declared: "Adequate mutual understanding, which is so essential to unity, was lacking to an alarming degree."

Of course, from the military point of view this lack of coordination was significant primarily for its effect upon combat operations in the field, in other words, in military effectiveness against the enemy. But Congressmen, not being military experts, perhaps quite naturally tended to see the lack of coordination between the military departments primarily in terms of efficiency in management and of cost in dollars. The committee hearings leading to the act of 1947 and its later amendments are filled with expressions of this concern with costs. And you will recall the many horrible examples that were paraded before committees on the Hill of excessive cost and waste resulting from lack of coordination in procurement and supply matters. A major, perhaps the major objective of the reorganization of the Military Establishment, from the point of view of many at least, was the elimination of waste and excessive costs, especially that resulting from the duplication of services and facilities and the lack of standardization of supplies and equipment.

All right. How then did the framers of the act of 1947 propose to deal with the problems growing out of the lack of coordination? Well, organizationally, as you will recall, they proposed to accomplish this in two principal ways.

The first was by placing the three military departments--Army, Navy, and the newly established Air Force (which was given separate status by the act) within the framework of an overall organization entitled "The National Military Establishment." At the head of this overall organization they placed a Secretary of Defense, a civilian, defined by the act as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security." As you will recall, this overhead organization was a compromise between the desire of the Army and the Air Force for a strongly unified single department and Navy opposition to this concept.

The second organizational device employed by the act of 1947 to provide coordination within the Military Establishment was a group of joint agencies dealing with important activities involving the three services. There were four principal ones--the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. I shall refer briefly only to the Joint Chiefs and the Munitions Board.

The importance of the Joint Chiefs for our studies here rests primarily on their responsibility for preparing strategic plans and joint logistic plans, and the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the three services. Strategic plans provide the primary basis for economic mobilization planning. The one must follow the other as the cart the horse.

The Munitions Board, under a civilian chairman, was assigned broad responsibilities of planning for the military aspects of economic mobilization and of coordinating all matters within the three military departments relating to production, procurement, and other phases of logistics. The Munitions Board was in a sense the military counterpart, the opposite number, of the National Security Resources Board, working within the framework of the national policies developed by NSRB.

There is one other important agency concerned with national security not included in the Security Act of 1947 which I want to mention briefly here, although it comes a little later. This was the Federal Civil Defense Administration, established by act of Congress in January, 1950--

another independent agency responsible directly to the President. Civil defense was, of course, a response to the new dimension given to warfare by strategic bombing; and the rise of civil defense is simply another illustration of the point that I made earlier--that defense is no longer a monopoly of the military. It is, again, everybody's business. In World War II the home front ceased to be merely a figure of speech. At least with the major European powers and in the Far East it became a very grim reality.

Civil defense activities had their beginning in the War Department in 1946, but in 1949, responsibility in this area was shifted to NSRB; and a year later, in 1950, the Federal Civil Defense Administration was set up as an independent agency--an independent agency to do an important nonmilitary but defense job. And finally, last year, after long frustration and long-continued controversy over civil defense policies, FCDA was combined with ODM in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

This brings us, then, to point four in our outline--the changes introduced since 1947.

Now, the first significant point to note here is that, while some changes were introduced since 1947 in the nonmilitary segments of the national security structure--for example, the amalgamation of ODM and FCDA--the major problems and difficulties and the major controversies of the past 10 years center in the Department of Defense, in the military segments which, quantitywise, dominate the security picture. It is with the Department of Defense, its organization, problems, and functioning that continuing concern is chiefly felt and to which reorganization proposals and changes are chiefly directed from time to time.

Now, of course, the new Military Establishment, as you will recall, set up under the act of 1947, operated with something less than the hoped-for results. Judged by the controversy, the confusion, and the bitterness of feeling which followed, the act of 1947 resulted in very little either of unity or unification. Indeed, in many ways, in many functions, the result was not unification so much as triplication.

Let me quote President Eisenhower in his message to Congress on reorganization of defense, April, 1958: "In the battle over reorganization in 1947," he declared, "the lessons of World War II were lost. Tradition won. The resulting National Military Establishment," he

went on to say, "was little more than a weak confederacy of sovereign military unity . . . a loose aggregation that was unmanageable."

For our purposes it is enough to say that Congress was not satisfied with many of the results of reorganization under the act of 1947, and in two years came up with the National Security Amendments of 1949, which became law in August of that year. These amendments were nearly as long as the original act, and they dealt almost wholly with the Military Establishment.

The most important single result was greatly to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense throughout the Military Establishment. The three military departments, for example, lost their status as full Cabinet departments. They lost in a sense their representation on the National Security Council, where the Secretary of Defense became the sole representative of the Military Establishment. No longer, as under the original act, did the three departmental secretaries have direct access to the President and the Bureau of the Budget over the head of the Secretary of Defense. And in a variety of other ways, Congress in the amendments of 1949 sought further to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense. And there were many other changes that need not be taken up here.

However, the changes introduced in 1949 failed to bring entire satisfaction. Congress wasn't too happy with the results as they worked out. Neither was the new Administration under President Eisenhower. The result was the adoption in 1953 of Reorganization Plan No. 6.

The announced chief purpose of Reorganization Plan No. 6 was further to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense. For instance, the original act of 1947 authorized the Secretary "to exercise general direction, authority, and control" over the National Military Establishment. In the amendments of 1949 the Secretary, under the direction of the President, "shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense." That weak and weasel word "general" was eliminated.

Now listen to the words of President Eisenhower in submitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress: "No function in any part of the Department of Defense . . . should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense," he went on to say, "is the accountable civilian

head of the Department of Defense, and, under the law, my principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department."

To this end, the Reorganization Plan proposed to provide the Secretary of Defense with a more efficient staff organization. It abolished two of the boards established by the act of 1947--the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board--assigning their functions, with certain other duties, to six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense, each with a staff and an assigned area of responsibility.

It was generally thought, or at least hoped, that Reorganization Plan No. 6 would mark the end of the long-drawn-out controversy over unification; but it was the end, as it turned out, only of another chapter in the controversy. Dissatisfaction continued within the Department of Defense, within the Executive Office, and especially up on Capitol Hill. If anything, the situation tended to become more confused, because new elements of complexity had been added--above all, the development of new weapons systems--atomic weapons, missiles, guided and ballistic--more recently the developments respecting outer space, and the impact of these developments on the roles and missions controversy.

So the old controversy over the defense organization soon flamed up again. There was widespread discussion. Numerous investigations and studies were made, both by governmental and private bodies. The Second Hoover Commission, for example, in its appraisal of Government organization gave particular attention to the Department of Defense. It set up a special Committee on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense to review the much-criticized procurement and supply operations, involving, as we have seen, tens of billions of expenditures annually. And in the summer of 1955 this committee made its report to Congress.

Now, the Committee was loaded with big-time business and industrial operators. It directed its attention specifically to the problem of how to improve the business management of the Department of Defense, which, it noted, took 60 cents or more out of every taxpayer's dollar.

The first objective of such improvement, the report declared, was "clear and unchallenged direction of the entire Defense Establishment by the Secretary of Defense." We have heard this notion before--beefing up the Secretary of Defense's power.

Now, I don't propose to summarize the contents of this report, but will simply cite a few of the points it highlights.

It contended that the structure of the military departments had not kept pace with the vastly increased importance of support activities in present-day warfare. They expressed their belief that the organization of the departments had given inadequate recognition to the impact of the new military support demands on the available natural resources of the Nation. The industrial resources, the national labor force, and the public purse.

A central thesis of this and related reports of the Hoover Commission was that:

"The management of the Defense Establishment is no longer principally one of managing tactical operations. Of equal importance today is the development and production of implements, supplies, and services of war . . . This aspect of defense management," they declared, "has come to require as much specialized knowledge and expert direction as is traditional in the command of tactical operations."

The Committee urged "the pressing importance of securing greater recognition of the support, that is, logistic activities" in the services. They called attention to the repeated efforts by Congress and the Administration to coordinate the common supply and service activities of the military services, and the very limited success of these efforts.

The report also advocated changes in personnel policy so as to increase the use of civilians in management and technical positions for supply support activities, and to improve the effectiveness and career outlook for military personnel assigned to support activities. In its recent report on national security, the CED takes a similar position.

The Committee went further, proposing the establishment of a separate civilian agency to administer common supply and service activities. An effort was later made to attach a rider to the DOD appropriation bill providing for such a separate service of supply agency. This failed.

Well, I shall not even attempt to sketch the developments which culminated in the Defense Reorganization Act of last year, 1958. In many respects, these developments focused upon differences of opinion between the White House and Congress over what was necessary and

desirable, with the President supporting the position of those advocating more centralized control and greater unification within the Department of Defense. He requested, first and foremost, greater and more clearly defined authority for the Secretary of Defense, supported by unified strategic and tactical planning, by unified commands, and by direct and flexible authority in the management of funds. He pleaded with the Congress to free the Secretary of Defense from "excessive statutory restraints." He urged that we "free ourselves of the emotional attachments to service systems of an era that is no more. Service responsibilities and activities," he declared, "must always be only the branches, not the central trunk, of the national security tree."

Of course, the reorganization proposals were by no means a reflection simply of the President's views. On the contrary, they incorporated the recommendations of a highly experienced group of former civilian and military participants in defense management, including three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a general way these proposals were in line with the recommendations of the Rockefeller committee and parallel many of its specific recommendations. The report of the CED on national security found the reorganization proposals in broad outline basically sound and said they should be adopted.

Some of you may recall the objections raised on the Hill, particularly in the House, to some of the President's proposals. The requests for strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense were declared by the House Armed Services Committee to be unnecessarily broad. Congress, it was declared, could not abdicate its constitutional responsibility respecting national security.

In the outcome, however, the President was to a surprising degree given what he asked for--a greatly increased measure of authority for himself and especially for the Secretary of Defense in managing the Department of Defense--for example, authority to assign or reassign to departments or services the development and operational use of new weapons, and the authority to consolidate any supply or service function common to more than one service into a single administering agency. Moreover, unified or specified combatant commands are provided for, which are made responsible directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Now, with this latest reorganization of the Department of Defense hardly completed it might be assumed that the situation was, for the

time being at least, fairly stabilized. The more optimistic might have expected that we had at long last reached the end of the postwar shake-down of the Military Establishment. Possibly so, but there are many, both in Congress and out, who would take sharp exception to this comforting view.

Take the month-old report of the House Committee on Government Operations, which devoted its study to the missile programs in relation to the national security establishment. This report refers to the widely held belief "that agencies are being piled on agencies, compounding administrative confusion in a military establishment already too complex, too unwieldy, top heavy with layers of criss-crossing authority."

The Committee outlines, for example, some 20 major changes made since 1945 in the organizational arrangements within the DOD for coordinating missile programs. They speak of "the baffling nature of the problems of organizing a defense effort which is so large and complex as to be almost unmanageable." The tendency of each service to develop duplicate or competing weapon systems, intensified in the missile field, they declare, "has led many prominent military men and civilians to advocate a complete unification of the armed services. The logic of new weapon technology," in the Committee's view, "has virtually destroyed the traditional basis for services organized around land, sea, and air missions."

Now, the House Committee on Government Operations doesn't go so far as to propose full unification of the three services into one, but it recommends preparatory studies to determine whether a merger of the Army and the Air Force would not be the best solution. In their view, merger of the missile effort cannot be achieved short of an Army-Air Force merger.

On the other side of the Hill we have also a continued ferment of thinking respecting defense organization. Senators Engle and Symington, for example, are waging a campaign to effect a complete reorganization of the Department of Defense to meet, as they see it, the requirements of the missile and space age. Senator Symington in a speech last July declared that the time was long overdue for Congress to force the Administration to reorganize its defenses on the basis of progress in the nuclear age. Congress, he declared, should appropriate on the basis, not of a predetermined split among the three services, but on the basis of functions to be performed.

Some six weeks later Senator Engle delivered a speech headed "Functional Reorganization for National Defense: A 'Must' in the Space Age." He cited President Eisenhower's earlier message to Congress (April, 1958) declaring that "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever" and that "peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact," adding, "Why do we not change our organization to meet the new kind of war that must be fought? Such a change," Senator Engle declared, "will call for a complete reorganization of the Department of Defense along the lines of functions and missions, rather than the outmoded Army and Navy and Air Force organizational setup."

Criticisms of national security organization and functioning have, of course, not been confined to the Department of Defense, although the Pentagon has inevitably been the main target. Take the frequent storms centering in the civilian agencies responsible for civil and defense mobilization and culminating in various organizational and other changes. The National Security Resources Board gave way to the Office of Defense Mobilization, and ODM in turn swallowed up FCDA to become the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Or was it FCDA that swallowed ODM? Or maybe it was a marriage of convenience, a shotgun wedding. In no area of national security, I suppose, has the uncertainty, confusion, misdirection of effort, and stalemate been greater than in the civil defense field.

The National Security Council has been a continuing target of criticism, although the role of Congress here has been less frenetic. Let me cite just one authority, a distinguished political scientist, Professor Hans Morgenthau, of the University of Chicago, in the lead article in the New York Times Magazine for 7 June 1959 entitled "Can we Entrust Defense to a Committee?"

The title of the article implies the argument: "The virtues of the committee system are few, its vices are many. The National Security Council shares in both. The Council," Morgenthau contends, "has failed in the vital task of initiating new policies and resolving major conflicts of views and interests. It shies away from bold decisions, glosses over issues rather than settling them, and resorts to compromises and evasions." "The heart of the problem," Morgenthau declares, "lies in the congenital inability of the National Security Council to present the President with an overall view of the issue and sharply defined alternatives." His remedy is to interpose between NSC and the President another man with power of decision.

Now, you will have noticed that all along this morning I've played it safe and cool in dealing with these hot issues, quoting congressional committees, Senators, and the like. This isn't simply the natural caution of a bureaucrat determined not to stick out his neck by as much as an inch. In an area so vast, so complex, and containing so much that is new and now, of course, quite literally out of this world, it is extraordinarily difficult to have intelligent opinions concerning, let alone solutions of, problems of the kind that we are dealing with here. Let me quote a statement, however, which I suppose a few would find objection to and most of us might be willing to endorse. I quote from the concluding observations of the report of the House Committee on Government Operations, dated 2 September 1959:

"There are no simple, small remedies for the big problems. The problems are built into our Government processes, our business methods, our weapon technologies, our military and political institutions--in short, our way of life in the cold war world."

This statement leads me to make a concluding observation--one which came to me the other day as I was hightailing it up Massachusetts Avenue after work. This is not a very profound observation, indeed it is perhaps a rather obvious one, but I think it one well worth making nonetheless.

In dealing with organization for national security, and especially with the Department of Defense and its acute organizational difficulties, we are simply dealing with one facet of one of the major problems of our times--a problem which cuts across and reverberates through every segment of our society and our culture. This is the problem of managing bigness.

It is a problem relatively new to us; indeed, a problem which has taken form largely during the past 50 years. In 1902 or 1903, when J. P. Morgan completed his successful promotion of United States Steel, we had our first billion dollar corporation, with \$1.4 billion capitalization. Even admitting that close to half of this capitalization was, in stock market terminology, water, it was regarded by Americans as a colossal and fearsome fact; and, incidentally, by the British business world too. Just about 50 years later, in 1955, another tremendous business organization was the first to make and report an annual profit in excess of \$1 billion. It was General Motors in that happy year of 1954-55, which reported \$2.8 billion profit before taxes--just double the dollars comprising United States Steel's inflated capitalization of

50 years earlier. And yet the operations of General Motors today are almost, if not quite, peanuts compared with those of the Federal Government, or its largest component, the Department of Defense. And the Federal Government's operations in turn are, in some respects, peanuts compared with those managed by the governments of the two leading Communist powers.

Yet quite apart from the opposition and the competition of these hostile powers, the problem of bigness and its management would still be with us and growing more acute all the time. We see it in every activity, not only in business and industry, but in amusement, recreation, sport, education, all means of communication--in every phase of urban and suburban living. We tend to view the matter primarily in terms of what we can do to it--that is, to the management of this bigness.

But equally or possibly more serious is the problem of what bigness and its management do to us, all of us. Many of you are acquainted with such books as David Riesman's "The Lonely Crowd" and Whyte's "The Organization Man." In terms of some of the traditional American values, such as independence and individualism, the consequences of living with and managing bigness are rather forbidding.

What worries many people, of course, is this: Successfully to cope with such massive and complex problems as those we have faced in the national security area since 1945 may result in still further erosion and dilution of the traditional American values--values developed and nourished over several centuries of living in a far simpler way and when few things were too big for the individual family, aided by the small community, to manage.

Thank you.

COLONEL LACKAS: Dr. Hunter is now ready for questions.

DR. HUNTER: May I make a suggestion before the questions start? This is partly in the interest of self-preservation. On this morning's subject we are all experts, so I suggest, and suggested to John, that we throw the questions and comments open to general discussion, with the emphasis more on comments than questions, except as they may be directed to the combined manpower and brainpower of this group.

QUESTION: Recently we have had a news bulletin to the effect that I think it is Senator Cooper, of Kentucky, has a bill in the hopper for eliminating the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries as part of this picture. Could you comment on this?

DR. HUNTER: I missed that reference to Senator Cooper. I do recall seeing, without having time to follow up, a reference to a suggestion that the present Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments become Under Secretaries of the Department of Defense.

Do any of the rest of you know anything further about this proposal? (No response.)

QUESTION: Would you care to comment on who the prime movers were behind the National Security Act of 1947? Was this principally a congressionally inspired act or did the executive branch develop it?

DR. HUNTER: It worked in both directions. There was a tremendous amount of discussion and thinking that went on. Of course you recall that, so far as the military reorganization was concerned, the initiative there was taken within the Department. You will recall that a committee or group was set up of certain high-ranking officers, who were sent out, I think it was in 1944, to tour the various theaters and to talk with top-echelon officers, to get their ideas as to what the post-war military setup should be.

You may recall also that they reported a predominance of sentiment in favor of "real" unification, and that later some of those who had at that time expressed sentiments favorable to unification later backtracked somewhat.

So I believe that on the military side the initiative came largely from within the military departments. On other aspects of it, the Congress and committees up on the Hill took the initiative.

QUESTION: Would you fit the Psychological Strategy Board, the now defunct PSB, into its proper place inside your review?

DR. HUNTER: I'm afraid I'll have to refer that to someone who is more acquainted with that outfit than I am. Can anyone here supply the answer? (No response.)

COLONEL LACKAS: Wouldn't you say that the OCB is a descendant of it?

STUDENT: That's a moot question. I just wanted to find out what someone else thought about it.

COLONEL LACKAS: The assumption is that it is a descendant of it.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you care to comment on the benefits and evils of merging all three services into one armed service?

DR. HUNTER: Not unless you give me one mile head start. This question is too vast and too involved.

It's easy to agree in a sort of offhand manner with the point made by, say, Senators Engle and Symington that we ought to reorganize the services in terms of present-day functions. But when you begin to think through the implications of it, it's simply colossal. To have an organization of such tremendous size as this and to try not only to shift gears overnight, but to introduce an entirely new mode of operation and thinking--this is, to me, an appalling task, although perhaps a necessary one.

Incidentally, I think it would be most valuable for us in this country to learn how the Soviets and Communist China, organizationally speaking, are doing the extraordinary things reported of them. I think it's too easy an answer to say, "well, if you don't obey, you're liquidated." I think that's much too easy an answer.

I heard a paper given at a meeting of one of the professional societies in New York several weeks ago describing some of the developments in Communist China, and the extraordinary capacity that they have shown to manage tremendous resources, and especially tens of millions of underemployed Chinese. The population is so dense that they don't begin to have enough to keep them occupied in the basic industry, which is agriculture. And the extraordinary capacity of a state only 10 years old to manage various economic activities involving hundreds of millions of people is worth noting.

STUDENT: I believe we should have unification.

DR. HUNTER: Supporting documents?

STUDENT: The idea of having a Secretary of Defense, with a complete staff; a Secretary for Army, Air, and Navy, with complete

staffs, civilian--that's one thing. And then we come to the military, and they have complete staffs. There's so much room for equivocation, procrastination, getting papers lost, taking under advisement, and dual responsibilities that a lot of really important answers never come out. We don't get a crystal-clear policy. I think in many cases, even if we were on the wrong road but all going down it, we would be better off than to have several people heading in different directions.

DR. HUNTER: Are you keeping the Army, Navy, and Air Force as departments?

STUDENT: I see no reason to have a Navy Air Force, a Marine Air Force, and a U.S. Air Force. I am under the impression that the U.S. Army has the world's third largest navy.

QUESTION: I can't agree with that, but I do think we should do something, because we seem to have at the very top level the National Security Council; and if I understand your remarks correctly today, we don't have the benefit of the mind and training of a single military man in it, except that by accident we have a President now who is so trained; and this is the top level. Are we subordinating our military completely? Are we going to have this national security without their benefit? If so, why do we have an Industrial College and a National War College to train people when we take somebody out of Proctor and Gamble and put him on the National Security Council to decide what to do? How are we going to get a military man into the top level?

COLONEL LACKAS: If I may comment on that: In my talk this morning, if you recall, I said that the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a two-way street; that they serve as the strategic planning agency, and they also serve in an advisory capacity to the National Security Council; and in that regard they contribute their military training and their military background.

I also indicated in my talk that the problem is not merely a military problem; that the problem transcends perhaps the whole spectrum of human experience. And I particularly emphasized the political and economic aspects of this problem, which have to be taken care of because it is feasible that we could have an extended cold war in which at the same time that we have a formidable military force as a sort of fire department, we also have the objective of maintaining a strong and vital economic and political organization and a substantially high morale on the part of our people. These are not simple military problems. They

require people of a variety of experience to contribute toward their solution.

STUDENT: I only wanted to include the military in that.

COLONEL LACKAS: I did say, though, that the JCS can do this.

QUESTION: I think this is a question, Doctor, that you won't have to get a mile head start on. What is your opinion concerning the continuation of the Corps of Engineers in their civilian activities? I am thinking particularly of the flood control work and the rivers and harbors activities, much of which duplicates the activities of other agencies, particularly the Department of the Interior.

DR. HUNTER: I have heard of that hot one before, and I drop it quickly too.

Of course, before one is in position to comment on any issue, one has to be thoroughly informed on the issue. My information is that which is derived simply from reading newspaper headlines and hearing occasional references to this controversy here.

If you are operating in simple logical terms, without reference to actualities, one can say yes. But perhaps the Corps of Engineers was given civilian duties to do at a time when there were very few military duties to perform, and these duties snowball over the years. Gradually the Corps becomes a great organization and a great vested interest. So you can say, Well, we'll lop it off and go back to where we should have been. But I don't think you can deal realistically with a situation of this kind on the basis simply of logic. However, I don't think the fate of the Nation depends on which way you settle this issue.

QUESTION: I noticed in the New York Times this morning that a congressional committee--and I'm sure it's not just one--is reopening the question, or partially reopening it, again as to who should be the principal adviser to the President in matters of national security. Of course, recognizing that this coordination between the DOD and the State Department is the big problem, they went on to point out that during Dulles' lifetime, or before he stepped down at least, just by the force of his personality he had become the President's principal adviser on national security. But there was some feeling that perhaps we ought to consider setting up a separate Cabinet position to perform that function. Do you have any thoughts or comments along that line?

DR. HUNTER: No. None of my own really that are worth consideration. I have none to present. I simply refer back to that suggestion of Hans Morgenthau of setting up a man between the NSC and the President. His feeling is that if you had one man responsible for coming up to the President, not with a compromise solution, not with a solution that evades the issue or glosses over the issues, but with a solution based on careful consideration of the alternatives and a resolution of those alternatives, then the NSC might cease to be what is in his opinion an agency which does not operate to its greatest effectiveness.

QUESTION: Doctor, you mentioned in your talk that the State Department formulates and administers foreign policy; that we found it necessary for them to correlate and coordinate with the National Military Establishment, the Department of Defense, to have a balance in national security with regard to the risks involved. We have now today one of the largest businesses in the world in the Department of Defense. Have you seen any place in your studies or any planning in the National Military Establishment input, preparation, or procedures for a sudden outbreak of peace?

DR. HUNTER: That's a nice one. I have not. Have any of the rest of you? (No response.) That is almost a dreadful thing to think of of happening, I mean, in terms of its implications for change.

Some have been concerned, of course, about what the effect on the national economy would be. There was some discussion in connection with Mr. K's visit on that subject. I believe that at his San Francisco meeting with a group of businessmen this matter came up for discussion, and the businessmen who were Mr. Khrushchev's hosts suggested that they thought the American economy could take the transition to a condition of "peace." In view of our success in making the difficult adjustments following World War II and the Korean War, I think we need not worry unduly about our ability to make the economic adjustment from cold war to real peace if and when that comes.

COMMENT: We don't consider peace quite our everyday job and so I want to brush off that question. I'm not referring to that. But my good friend here beside me opened up a subject which I think needs a naval point of view.

Some of you may remember that at the time we went into this present organization for national security, the Navy's position was that we kind of won a war successfully. We had the Secretary of War, with

four assistants -- it was three at the time. We had the Secretary of the Navy, with three assistants. These were the people who could raise flags and have guns shot off for them and be called "Honorable." There might be a few of them left even today. And I suspect that we went into this triservice unification in order to establish a third service and not necessarily to unify. This may be a little false remembrance on my part as the years have rolled past.

But I would like to suggest that unification, so-called, and the establishment of a sole source in the committee that the President calls his Cabinet may be the greatest mistake that has ever been made in the history of democracy in this country or any other country; that certainly anything as big as \$40 billion--and sometimes it's been \$80 billion--deserves at least two representatives in the Cabinet speaking for it. The President's span of control is already confused. He has 13, 14, 15--I've lost track, on the Cabinet. And if Oveta Culp Hobby can sit there representing the Health, Education, and Welfare Department, and then have a Labor Department that has relatively few employees represented, certainly the military agencies could have two representatives, and I'd even be willing to have a third. So I'll just make the simple suggestion that every change in the direction of more unification is bad.

QUESTION: Doctor, there is some implication in your remarks, and I think there is factual evidence for it, that the National Security Council as such does not do the job it was set up to do. Is this a mechanical result of the way they were formed under the act? Or is it the antipathy of the various departments that they have to deal with at the executive level of Government? Or is it the fact that they just sit there and don't do anything because of this kind of vacuum thing?

I refer back to one previous speaker's statement that our foreign policy and our foreign trade policy are at odds; that many times our military policy and trade policy are at odds--the fact that we haven't been able to handle our balance of payments situation with regard to exports and imports and the dollar situation. What lies behind the fact that the National Security Council, which under the act was organized to do this coordinating of executive effort and to provide and recommend policies to the President and to Congress--why won't it work?

DR. HUNTER: All the analyses that I have seen on this subject--and I have made no independent ones of my own--suggest that this difficulty is built in, mechanically, so to speak, into the National Security

Council; that the members of the National Security Council are not there simply as wise men, wise individuals, in their own right to deal independently with and focus attention independently upon particular issues; but that they are there as representatives and are considered as representatives of particular agencies. They reflect viewpoints of agencies. They cannot go off on their own. Consequently there is the problem which results in efforts to harmonize frequently conflicting viewpoints and frequently conflicting interests of the various agencies represented.

That cuts all the way across the board and is not confined to the National Security Council. The Committee on Government Operations, in its recent report on missiles to which I referred, at one point called up the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress and asked the Service to prepare independently an enumeration of all the agencies in the Federal Government that had their hand in the missile pie. And the Library of Congress came up, simply listing the major ones, with, I think it was, 108 or 110, all of which were involved at one stage or one level and had to be consulted.

I recall a lecture that we had two or three years ago, a joint lecture with the War College, by a former member of the top policy outfit of the State Department, describing why it was that it was so difficult for the State Department to act promptly and decisively when any emergency, any major foreign policy issue, arose. He had a big chart and he showed how the action of the State Department in this particular situation had a direct impact on not only a dozen or 20 agencies in the Federal Government, but an impact upon our relations with 40 or 50 other nations. And so, instead of coming up with a quick answer, they had to go through the process of consulting literally scores of individuals, agencies, and nations. This is the manner in which we are accustomed to function. Perhaps there is another and better way of doing it. It involves presumably getting and applying entirely new organizational concepts.

COLONEL LACKAS: Your question is also applicable to the structure of the General Staff. And so we find the recommendation made that the Chiefs not be from the components--the Army, Navy, and Air Force--but that they be separate and apart from the military services.

I might make one other observation, if I may. An agency like the National Security Council, I suspect, comes about because the Cabinet, which at one time we conceived to be the primary policy-recommending

body, has a tendency to become unwieldy and so, to solve this problem, a smaller Cabinet-type organization is created. This is the experience of other nations.

I myself have been guilty of recommending that we ought to have economists on the Council to coordinate our economic programs with our military programs. But the moment you do that, you enlarge the Council, and the span of control of the President is weakened, and the basic objective of reducing the number of people is not achieved.

Thank you, Doctor. I think this will conclude the discussion.

(17 November 1959--4, 400)B/en:mr