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ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Dr. James D. Atkinson

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Reviewed by: Colonel Thomas C. Keach, USAF

Date: 27 October 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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30 September 1960

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
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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole



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COLONEL KEACH: General Mundy, Gentlemen:

Today we begin ~~with~~ our course on National Security Objectives, Requirements, and Programs. In going through this process, we attempt to begin with the formulation and follow it through to the logical conclusion of developing programs from our objectives.

Our speaker this morning has been a student of government for many years. He is a teacher, as you know from having read his biography, and he is a writer. Most recently he has written a book titled, "The Edge of War," which contains an introduction by Admiral Burke, and I understand it is to be published on the 14th of November. I am sure many of us will look forward to reading it.

Dr. Atkinson, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the College and to introduce you to the Class of 1961. Dr. Atkinson.

DR. ATKINSON: General Mundy, Members of the Industrial College: It certainly is a pleasure to be here with you. I am especially grateful to Colonel Keach for that commercial. I had hoped that I could have with some thinly clad girls that would pass among you/some copies of the book, but for some reason the Industrial College took a rather dim view of this.

Rudyard Kipling once wrote, "Wherefore praise we famous men

"who with toil of their today bought for us tomorrow." Now the buying of tomorrow is the very essence of national security. In fact, one might say national security is buying tomorrow.

We Americans were fortunate in the past that the task of buying tomorrow was not so very high on the list of national policy goals. Until after the Second World War the problem of national security was a relatively minor one so far as we were concerned. This was so because of our fortunate geographical position, friendly and weak neighbors north and south, and it was also because in part the only then existing worldwide empire, the British Empire, was interested in maintaining the status quo and, with a few brief exceptions, was friendly toward us.

Although intrinsically hostile to our system and to all the things that system represented, the growing new type of empire of the Soviet Union was as yet too weak and too surrounded by barrier states to present a formidable challenge to us.

Indeed, in the period before the Second World War, ^{with} the chain of invisible bases represented by indigenous Communist parties, sympathizers, and dupes, that is, all the camp followers of communism, this new type of empire indeed did not seem an obvious threat but a rather remote one. The Communist apparatus existed, for example, in Latin America, but it had not yet gained power as it has in Cuba today.

World War II and its aftermath changed the picture of the once pleasant

world that we lived in and enjoyed so much. The total defeat of Germany and Japan removed power barriers which had helped to restrain Soviet imperialism. Our own contribution of \$11 billion of lend-lease weapons, machinery, foodstuffs, and goods not only staved off Soviet defeat, but with wartime and postwar UNRRA supplies, helped to provide in part the base for Soviet recovery.

We and our British allies were so engrossed in destroying Naziism and Japanese imperialism that not many of us saw that we were giving at least a certain amount of aid in the creation of an even worse engine of despotism.

But it was not alone the rise of the powerful Soviet imperial system that caused us to devote increased attention to organizing national security. The development of ultra-long-range bombardment aircraft, and still more the appearance of nuclear weapons and long-range guided missiles, created the prospect of a challenge to our homeland in terms never before of such urgency to American policy-makers.

These and other technological developments were accompanied by a greater American awareness of Soviet capacity for mischief-making through unconventional or cold-war operations. A combination of these things, together with Soviet belligerence in 1946, created a climate of opinion that encouraged the President and the Congress to strengthen existing agencies and to create a new organizational structure for our national security.

The emergence of the national security problem, that is, the inescapable and inseparable amalgam of foreign policy and military policy, as the leading problem (and you have only to look in the newspaper this morning, or any morning, to realize that it is the problem) was signaled by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

Along broad lines it provided for the following:

1. The creation of the first U. S. centralized body of intelligence coordination and operation--the CIA. This was a rather belated acknowledgment of the importance of intelligence in national strategy, especially when you realize that the British, under Walsingham, had done the same thing in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in the 16th century.

The Central Intelligence Agency is, of course, under the purview of the National Security Council, but I cite it first in order to underline the importance of the informational basis of national policy formulation.

2. The National Security Council. This body was, in the words of the statute, "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." The importance of the NSC and the recognition of the Federal Government that it marked a definite step forward in our organization for national security is underscored by the language of the Hoover Commission Report, from which I quote:

"The National Security Council is the key organizational agency in the entire security structure and upon its proper and effective operation the success of the whole depends."

The statutory members of the₄National Security Council are the

President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of OCDM. Regular participants, during President Eisenhower's Administration, although they are not statutory, have also included the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Other participants, either in past administrations or presently, or both, include the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and officials whom we might designate as invitational participants. These include, for example, the United States Representative to the United Nations, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and others.

Advisers to the National Security Council, under the terms of the statute, are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Director of CIA. There are also so-called observers, such as the Director of USIA and others, but, as you will be thoroughly briefed about the National Security Council in other lectures, I shall not go into further detail about the composition and the method of operation of the NSC or of its component parts, such as the Planning Board or OCB. Other people, far more competent than I, will go into these details.

A final word should, however, be added with reference to the role of NSC in organizing our national security. Important as it is in the formulation of America's grand strategy, neither it nor the legislation that created it has diminished the constitutional authority of the President

of the United States. He retains the major role and also the major responsibility on his shoulders for our national security. This was emphasized by President Eisenhower himself in a news conference on January 23, 1957, when he said:

"The National Security Council is set up to do one thing: advise the President. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying to put any responsibility on the National Security Council. It's mine."

Nor has the authority of the Congress been decreased. Congress maintains the highly important task of cooperating in the establishment of national security policy, in providing for organizations and agencies (it has to create them by statute) and in keeping the American public informed both as to our needs and as to the progress we are making in attaining adequate national defense .

A current example of the role of Congress in creating agencies related to national security I think may be of interest to you, although I am sure you know about it. It is the present congressional concern with a proposed Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy which would be positive steps in the area of cold or unconditional warfare. Senator Douglas, Democrat of Illinois, and Senator Muntz, Republican of South Dakota, introduced in 1959 a bill which has had bipartisan support--it is S-1689, 86th Congress, First Session--to "create the Freedom Commission for the development of the science of counter-action to the world Communist conspiracy and for the training and

development of leaders in the total political war." The bill would create a Freedom Commission and also, under the supervision of the commission, a Freedom Academy. This is simply one little example.

3. The NSRB--the National Security Resources Board. This agency, created under the Act of 1947, was later known as ODM, and is now--to anticipate somewhat the discussion of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act--the OCDM, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, headed by a Director, whom you have probably read much about, the former Governor of Iowa, Governor Hoegh.

OCDM operates under two major laws--Public Law 920, the wartime statute with special reference to the national emergency, and Public Law 875, which has reference to natural disasters. While I am sure that representatives of OCDM would want, and very properly, to expand on the description of their agency, for the purpose of this discussion I should like to condense OCDM's role as follows:

(1) Civil defense function; (2) Economic mobilization, planning, and coordination. This is of course obvious, as a matter of interest to people of ICAF, and you know a lot more about it than I do. But I would like to summarize Point (2) simply by saying that it represents an attempt by the United States--the first time we have ever tried it--before an emergency to establish the initiative on the part of all federal agencies, under the guidance of OCDM, to make plans for managing our survival.

There are weaknesses here, not so much, perhaps, in the statutory creation but in the fact that we just haven't decided yet, even in the Congress or in the Executive Branch, to go ahead too much. But there is a good deal on the books, and certainly it could be implemented.

(3) There is in OCDM the coordination of Federal assistance to state and local governments in disaster situations in peacetime, including nuclear ones, of which there was a recent very small incident, which you read about.

4. The creation of a new military service, the United States Air Force.

5. The provision for three military departments, Army, Navy, and Air Force, each headed by a Secretary of sub-Cabinet rank, officially, but retaining, because of the rather obvious significance of national security affairs, essentially the prestige of Cabinet rank.

6. The creation of a national military establishment, the Department of Defense, under a new Cabinet officer, the Secretary of Defense. We shall return to this later.

7. The establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a statutory basis. The ancestor of the Joint Chiefs was the old Joint Army and Navy Board which goes back to 1903. Over the years, however, the Joint Army and Navy Board did very little really effective joint planning primarily, of course, because this was still a luxury area for Americans. It was there. Nobody ever did much about it, including the Chief

Executives of various periods, again because we enjoyed a sort of luxury and didn't have to worry too much. Some people, in fact, in the United States worried about any kind of Joint Chiefs, or even a General Staff. They were somewhat like the rather skeptical and fearful Member of Parliament back in the 1890's who said with effect to the British General Staff then being organized, "I suspect soldiers who sit apart and cogitate."

The Joint Chiefs, then, were called that first of all when they were set up as an ad hoc organization in 1942. Their first meeting was 9 February 1942, and that's the first time that you will find the title being used officially--the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As a result of the generally excellent record--not, of course, without some bickering--during World War II, the Joint Chiefs were embodied as a statutory organization by the National Security Act of 1947. They thus became our highest professional planning and strategy body on a permanent basis. And, somewhat like their opposite numbers in Great Britain, they have acquired a very great deal of prestige. One might use Winston Churchill's frame of reference in which he referred to the British Joint Chiefs, as a "corporate body whose professional knowledge was difficult to avoid taking cognizance of." For Sir Winston Churchill, who had a lot of competence of his own, that's quite a statement.

Although the language of the 1947 Act, as well as that of Public

Law 216, entitled National Security Act Amendments of 1949, indicated the intention of the Congress that the Joint Chiefs should be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, I think it is rather interesting that the statute did not specifically (you will see if you look it over) rule out the possibility, at least, that the Joint Chiefs could be a command body.

President Eisenhower, in his Message to Congress in April 1953, made, however, this clarification, which I quote:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, are not a command body but are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. They are responsible for the formulation of strategic plans by which the United States will cope with the challenges of any enemy."

Revisions in the National Security Act in 1949, 1952, and 1958, which we shall again return to, strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, although in a practical way the Chairman had always actually/been more important than the wording of the statute itself would lead you to believe, if you were guided by that alone.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps was added to the Joint Chiefs in 1952 by Congressional statute as regards questions arising within the purview of the Joint Chiefs affecting the Marine Corps.

This basic organization for national security was altered most recently by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958,

Public Law 85-599. I should like to summarize this for you with the aid of a chart which your own excellent group here has prepared.

Chart

No. 1. Unified and Specified Commanders' authority was increased.

No. 2. Unified and Specified Commanders report to the Department of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No. 3. The Joint Staff, that is, the body selected according to the statute in 1958, in approximately equal numbers (I am quoting now from the statute) from the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force. This is a body which serves under the Joint Chiefs and it was increased in both size and importance, although some people feel that it still is not large enough for its task. This may well be a proper criticism. Some people, of course, worry about too many staff persons there, but I am not sure this is justified. Certainly, from the work load here and the responsibilities, I think the criticism that the Joint Staff ought to be still larger is probably well taken.

No. 4. The authority of the Secretary of Defense was further spelled out, because it was not so clear in the 1947 statute, and the authority of the Secretary of Defense was increased.

This I think is an excellent summary, by the way. It's as good a condensation as I have ever seen, and I congratulate whoever drew up this chart. This neatly summarizes what the 1958 statute did.

Now, concerning criticism of our defense structure, since the

passage of the National Security Act of 1947--and this, despite various modifications, still stands as our basic national security structure--this is pretty much it--there have been various criticisms leveled at our provisions for national security. I believe personally, and I may be quite wrong, that a valid criticism would be one concerned with the increasingly heavy layer of civilian deputy, assistant secretaries and various others between the professional military people and the highest decision-makers. Perhaps this is not valid. It appears to me that it is. There are various other criticisms which have been leveled.

But I think one would be less than candid if he were to avoid discussing the question as to whether or not some of the criticisms in the immediate past and presently directed against agencies or organizational structures should rather be directed against states of mind--in short, against our approach as a people (that is, we Americans) toward the national security problem; more specifically, the approach of the articulate, that is, the vocal elements or leaders of public opinion, and those public officials in the Congress, in the Executive, and in the Administrative Branches of the Government.

We Americans are extremely organizational conscious. It is well known that we are, in almost every walk of life, the most highly organized people--some would say we are overorganized--in the world. Hence we often tend to believe that the answer to a problem is either a reorganization or, better yet, a new organization, and many of us have the

idea that this is the panacea--pull out a new organization, jazz up an old organization, and we're off.

Thus, the Associated Press, noting on 19 September 1960 that a retired major general said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a debating society and the "least effective military organization to haunt the United States since the fiasco of the Civil War"--this is quite a sweeping condemnation, even if it were an accurate description, which I do not for a moment admit--attempted to make a really honest analysis of the retired general's criticism, ^{and} asked, "May it be that the general's fire is misdirected?" In other words, is he firing on the wrong target, the right range but the wrong target? That is, while admitting that the JCS--and we could also include the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and many other agencies a stone's throw apart in Washington--is not perhaps the perfect organization, is it not possible that the deeper meaning of service criticism is the following:

The Joint Chiefs, either as individual service heads or as a collective body, have not always had the wherewithal--that is the money, the men, the vehicles, the ships, the aircraft, and the weapon systems--to do the things, or to plan to do the things, that are sometimes expected or even demanded of them. In this, of course, again I may be quite wrong. As The New Yorker would say, "It's the thought for this week."

Finally, I believe that the form and structure, that is, the organizational pattern, of our national security are of continuing importance. There are

certainly valid criticisms which can and which should be raised about so important a matter. I am sure that in the question period you will have many questions which are far better than I will be able to answer. But in the larger perspective it would seem that today the critical area for organizing for national security may well lie in another direction. Again I may be quite wrong. You can shoot me now. That direction, it seems to me, is the organizing of the American mind and the American will, as part of the organizing process, so that those who are responsible under the structure that we have created over the years, especially since the National Security Act of 1947, with its seven main provisions which I listed for you, for our national grand strategy, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will have, and will have in abundance, the means to provide for what the Federalist Papers so wisely said was the common defense. And a critical part of this means is the strengthening of the national character and the national will. It may well be that this is the area of ultimate decision in organizing for national security.

May I leave with you for your thought--despite the comment by a Member of Parliament many years ago that professional military people and professional civilian government people ought to think--and a lot of them do, thank goodness--some brief passages from a new and brilliant novel. It is more meaningful for our time, whether in America or elsewhere in the West, although the novel is laid in Britain, than a host of ponderous, factual volumes that could be read. The novel is entitled,

"When the Kissing Had to Stop." The time is some years in the future. The scene is in England. England is in the process of adopting unilateral disarmament. The immediate scene, from ^{which} the passage which I want to read to you is taken, is a gigantic public demonstration in London.

"When the Kissing Had to Stop." A clergyman, Canon Christian, a very important clergyman, is addressing this huge concourse of people:

"Now I say to you that the soul of England demands that we get rid, once and for all, regardless of the cost, unilaterally if need be, of these monstrous weapons of mass destruction." Of course the crowd roars its applause.

Next to the clergyman on the platform is a prominent scientist of a type that I think you can easily identify. The novelist, I must say, has painted a brilliant picture. I quote:

"Seated between Antonia and Breakway was the round and rosy figure of Victor Cocksure, the famous scientist and Nobel prize winner. He had won the Nobel prize for his brilliant research into metallurgy and kindred subjects but had achieved far wider publicity in England only a couple years ago when, with maximum publicity, he had resigned from his position as a part-time scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defense on the grounds, as he said, that they were debasing pure science by asking for his advice in the construction of missile casings. Never, he wrote in a book that became something of a best seller, never would he let his genius be so prostituted as to be used for the making of weapons

of mass destruction. "

Now we come to a final picture, the picture of the politician, the Member of Parliament, the man who made his career in Parliament by becoming known as Mr. Anti-Nuclear-Bomb. His name is Rupert Page-Gorman. He delivers a fiery address which has this vast multitude cheering and shouting. He ends up like this:

"Must we die that the Pentagon generals may live?"

"No," roared the crowd. "No. No. No."

There, gentlemen, I believe--and I may be quite wrong--is a little something to think about.

Thank you.

MR. MUNCY: Gentlemen, Dr. Atkinson is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Doctor, it has been suggested from time to time that possibly one of the ways to increase the coordination between the Department of State and the Department of Defense is to include on the Joint Chiefs of Staff a senior official of the State Department. Would you comment on that?

DR. ATKINSON: My own view, for what it is worth--and it may be very little--would be that this would not be good. The Joint Chiefs, remember, were conceived to be a corporate body of the highest professional military people, and I think any diminution of this would be bad. Actually--and again I may be quite wrong--it seems to me that over

the years the prestige of the Joint Chiefs generally has grown with the public. I get around the country a fair amount lecturing, and my impression is that their prestige, the prestige of our highest military people, is high.

I wouldn't want, I should think, to take a chance of diminishing that by bringing in a civilian person, as expert as that person might be, and so on. This I think should be a military body. This is simply my own reaction to the advancement of such a change.

QUESTION: In the revision of the National Defense Act of 1958, wherein the specified commanders were directed straight to the JCS in circumventing services, what effect--they do have control of the forces under them--does this have, for example, on the assignment of missions at the Key West Conference, wherein, for example, the Chief of Naval Operations has control of the seas, and yet he does have the forces under him?

DR. ATKINSON: Of course it is obvious that that has changed in the Key West agreement. Wouldn't you agree?

STUDENT: Where has it been changed officially?

DR. ATKINSON: Well, so far as I can see it's under the interpretation of the 1958 Act. It depends, I think--again I may be quite wrong--on how something is interpreted. I mentioned earlier the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Even at a time when he did not have as much statutory authority as he has today, he still had the power.

In the final analysis--and I am not trying to give you a short answer-- this business is pretty much what the Chief Executive wants it to be. That's the reason I used that quotation from President Eisenhower. Constitutionally, and in many other ways, as Commander in Chief, he can pretty much run the show the way he wants. As I say, I am not trying to give you a short answer. I think really this is it.

QUESTION: Would you care to comment further on your education-of-the-public remark?

DR. ATKINSON: In connection with organizing for national security I mentioned that it seemed to me that a part of the organizational process is always an informational process--informing. I think that we must do a job in organizing which is equally informing on the necessity for a very high level of defense preparation and measures, and equally alongside that, of our will, our determination to stand fast, regardless of any threat of nuclear-missile blackmail, and this through all stratas of our society. This was the reason I brought in this novel.

One of the people in the group here wanted to know the name of the author. The author is Constantine Fitzgibbon. He was born in the United States but has lived mostly in Great Britain. He was educated at Oxford and served, beginning in 1939, in the British Army. Constantine Fitzgibbon wrote "When the Kissing Had to Stop." This was one of the reasons why I wanted to stress some passages in this book, because we may in America be faced--and in some quarters we are

already faced--with this very problem. Some of the excerpts that I read from this novel I can give you from the New York Times as statements by people of some prominence in this blessed country of ours. So there is now and in the future there will be a continuing problem. We cannot simply consider making certain organizational changes, as dear as those are to the hearts of Americans, but along with those must go an organization for national security along the lines of a strengthening of our will, of our character, of our moral fiber, and equally the thought in your question, that of educating the people on the consciousness of the kind of world in which we happen to be fated to live.

MR. MUNCY: May I add there that we will have some copies of this book available in our Book Store before very long, in the event you might like to buy it.

DR. ATKINSON: Thank you. I am not trying to sell the book. I just had another thought--instead, buy "The Edge of War." But it is awfully appropriate for the times in which we are living.

QUESTION: I believe you stated that OCDM has some latent strength and power yet to be discovered or perhaps asserted. Would you care to comment on the source of this strength? Is it the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, or the Civil Defense Act?

DR. ATKINSON: I would say both. It seems to me that there is a good deal of statutory authority for OCDM to do a real job, but so far,

neither in Congress, so far as I can see, nor in the Executive has come the recognition which is so necessary in our society. Once again, while we talk about organization, you may have it sitting there, but you've got to push. Unless some recognition has been given that this needs to be done, it won't be done. I think this is a part of the trouble. Now, that's a little too simple an answer, like a lot of the answers I have given.

There is also this other thing. It probably would be good to have some additional legislation to get a little more centralization. The idea that OCDM should have cooperation with the state and local governments, and go along so easily simply by cooperation alone, I think is not so good. But, basically, if it ever gets the recognition I think it can go ahead. I really do. Again I may be quite wrong. I think the latent power is right there that has been given in the statute, but the other hasn't come.

Well, to tell a little story which I think is reasonably correct-- an acquaintance of mine in a certain government agency said that a letter to the head of his agency came from OCDM. While it got a formal reply of the type of thing, you know, "Yours of the 10th ultimo," it lay around an awful long time before anybody bothered with it. One of the reasons is exactly that. We ought, I think, not as a passive measure but as a psychological operation, to be doing something in the construction of air defense. It could be done. There is no real problem. Money is

no problem. It could be done, not as a passive thing but as a psychological operation which would be interpreted very carefully by the KGB. Many little eager beavers are sitting in Moscow analyzing these things all the time. Such a thing would be extremely valuable.

So far it has never been done. Why? Nobody has put steam behind it.

QUESTION: Sir, would you say that the work of the Joint Chiefs tends to be hindered or facilitated on the basis of the type of person we have in the White House, whether he is a person with a civilian background or a person with high military professional competence?

DR. ATKINSON: That's a good question. I would say, of course, it is probably hindered by the fact that he is a professional military man. Certainly. I think there is not much question about that. I think it is something of a hindrance. Remember, I quoted Winston Churchill, a very great figure, indeed, and yet, although he had his wrangles with the British Joint Chiefs, and so on, as he said, he found it hard to disagree with this corporate professional standing, this corporate professional knowledge as embodied in these people. Whereas I think, human nature being what it is, a professional soldier such as General Eisenhower probably would not stand in such a relation.

QUESTION: There has been some talk about the joint career service, as you know. Will you give your opinion of the value of a joint career service?

DR. ATKINSON: Well, again, for what little it is worth--it seems to me that the so-called one-uniform answer is again the old chestnut, the old panacea, that if you put people in one uniform you will learn how to solve your problems. I can't see that there is anything in the way of experience to justify this concept. The people, as Chesterton once said, "who live in the rosy dawn of tomorrow morning," are grasping at things of this kind. It seems like a solution. It's part of our natural ethos of wanting a gimmick instead of doing a little damn hard work.

Now, about a joint career service which would not embody the foolishness of this one-uniform business, it would seem that perhaps there might be a start on the Joint Staff, where people are working together capably. We have some awfully good people there. Oftentimes in America we are so busy running down what we've got that we never pay tribute to the people in uniform. It's easier, I think, for a university professor, in a way, to think along the lines of a professional military man as far as dedication to a profession is concerned. I don't think we pay sufficient tribute to him.

I think in the Joint Staff we are getting something of this concept. Whether it would be possible to do that on any broader basis I honestly don't know. It may. But I think if it does come it will be a sort of evolution. When you try to force these things you are killing the spirit. It's a hard lesson, often, for Americans to learn, and again I refer to

Constantine Fitzbibbon's tremendous novel, "When the Kissing Had to Stop." We are a lot like the British, too, in that respect. It's an Anglo Saxon type of thing, looking for a panacea.

Years ago we thought we could outlaw the demon rum by passing a law. Some people today are saying--people who should know better--that we can disarm by law. That's it. So I think, in answer to your very good question, which I am not really developing fully, in an evolutionary process it might well come, and it might not be a bad thing.

QUESTION: My question relates to the activities of the National Security Council. You mentioned that the Act provided for activity dealing with domestic, foreign, and military activities. Also, in the prepared reading for today there was a comment on the budget in which 70 percent was allocated for security purposes, another 20 percent for fixed expenditures, and 10 percent for the domestic area. In listening to the discussion here today I am impressed that the role of the military seems to be very little on the domestic side.

DR. ATKINSON: In answer to your question let me say this: Domestic policy is cited in the Act and has been reaffirmed, and the NSC has a role there, but it is with relation to how it affects the overall national policy, or what we might call America's grand strategy in world politics.

Some domestic affairs are always being taken into consideration.

For example, whether or not we should subsidize the building of a merchant ship in an American shipyard as a necessary measure is a domestic affair impinging, let's say, in certain areas on wages in the locality, on unemployment, and so on, and at the same time it has implications of our national grand strategy as to whether the Navy has sufficient backup in merchant shipping which could be immediately used, and so on. So these questions are always coming up.

Now, perhaps and I think probably inevitably, because of what we are faced with in this world in which we live, the national grand strategy takes an overriding consideration vis-a-vis domestic affairs.

One point which you made which I thought was good, on which I might just comment, was on the allocation in the budget. One thing that it seems to me we sometimes fall into a trap on is this: National security takes 70 percent of the budget, or 65 percent, or something. This is playing the numbers game. We ought rather to look at it, and I think indeed we must get our people to look at it. And some of them are actually ahead of the leadership, I think, from what I have seen in talking to people in the country on this. They are looking at it not in terms of how much of the budget it is but in terms of what we need. This is our first order of business. That is the thing I am trying to cite. National security policy is buying tomorrow. To me this is it. It's buying a tomorrow.

QUESTION: Sir, you have suggested that the revisions of 1958

have left too much of a layer of installations between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. What suggestions as to further revisions occur to you to thin down this layer of installations?

DR. ATKINSON: As I said, it seems to me that this is a valid criticism. ^{be} May/it isn't. I think it would seem that there should be nothing between the Joint Chiefs--and maybe nothing between other military people--and the Secretary of Defense and the President and/or NSC--nothing at all. It would seem to me that it might be wise to even have a statute so that the clear intention of Congress could be this. Once again, despite criticism by writers or retired generals or others, over the years as a corporate body they haven't done too badly, I think in all honesty. In a society such as ours, properly, there should be rewards so that the ablest people eventually get to the top, and if not indeed at the Joint Chiefs level then immediately below it, where they've got lots of bridge work on the trollers, and where they play a proper role in our society.

Probably one thing that has inhibited this is again in the psychological area. We have had a whole generation of novelists and writers of factual works. I won't refer to any by name, although I could list a murderers' row. They have talked so much about the "military mind" and about the man on horseback and the danger of military control over the civilian authority that they have sort of buffaloed the people of the country into thinking that, unless there is some civilian who is peeking

at every officer, the country won't be safe.

Now, of course this is pretty nonsensical. There has never been any tradition of this kind in our country. I would say again, in answering your question, that I think it is partly a psychological proposition.

QUESTION: For what it is worth, you have a hold on the educational problem. I think, though, it should start at a little higher level than the general public, perhaps in some higher level in government. As we learn more about the cold war, is there a good chance that NSC might end up as a Cabinet meeting?

DR. ATKINSON: That's a good question, and good remarks, naturally, since you are cheering me on. I certainly do agree, though, about education higher up. I mentioned those who are articulate or the vocal element, who lead public opinion--such as Walter Lippman. I wish I could get him to read this novel. Maybe he has. I hope he has. I certainly agree on government and articulate leaders. That's a good point that you made.

Now about the other--NSC has been described by a high official in Mr. Truman's Administration as a super Cabinet. If I understand your question correctly--and correct me if I don't--it is: Would it be better if there would be perhaps some changes which would make official a super Cabinet? Is that correct? Maybe I didn't quite understand you.

STUDENT: Everything the Government does for the people or the country bears on that security, in my opinion. For this reason it seems

that the whole Cabinet is involved in national security.

DR. ATKINSON: I agree, and on that basis perhaps they should be welded into the NSC. It could be done on an invitational basis, making them sort of, shall we say, interim members. Otherwise, if they were all formal members, it might just take a little bit away from the attention, the prestige, and the intangibles of the two key people, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. But certainly your point is well taken.

I have to concur with you that really just about everything is a problem bearing on our national security. We live in a world in which freedom has to be a ~~pistol-packin'~~ mama, or she's not going to be very free. It's hard for some people, I think, to grasp this. But it is an unalterable fact of life, at least as far as we can see.

QUESTION: Would I be correct in interpreting some of the comments you made, particularly in reference to the second question preceding
it
this? Would/be correct to interpret your comment to mean that you would be in favor of having the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an active voting member on the National Security Council?

DR. ATKINSON: Yes. In fact I would like to see all the Joint Chiefs sitting permanently on the National Security Council. I think they belong there. Somebody had better get the hook and take me off here real quick. But this is the way I see it. I say yes, and I'd even

add the others. They ought to be sitting right there. Just to add one thing to that, in all honesty, I can see, it seems to me, an awful lot of very solid, good thinking that is being done by military people.

This, incidentally, comes out in this novel.

MR. MUNCY: Dr. Atkinson, you have given us many stimulating thoughts relating to our national organization for security. I suspect that many of us will be wanting to find out rather quickly "When the Kissing Has to Stop?" Thank you.

DR. ATKINSON: Thank you.