THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
IN NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING

28 September 1962

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NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.
Honorable Edward A. McDermott, Director, Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President, was born 28 June 1920 in Dubuque County, Iowa, attended elementary and high school there and received his B.A. degree from Loras College in 1939. He received his J.D. degree from the College of Law of the State University of Iowa in 1942, following which he was admitted to the practice of law in the States of Iowa and Nebraska. He served for a period of three years as attorney in the corporate law department of Montgomery Ward & Co. in Chicago before beginning private general practice of law in Dubuque, Iowa in 1947. In 1950 he served as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections in Washington, D.C. following which he returned to Dubuque where, since 1951, he has been engaged in the general practice of law. Mr. McDermott has served as a professor of business law and economics on the faculty of Loras and Clarke Colleges in Dubuque. He was an Iowa delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1952 and 1960. His nomination by the President on 2 February 1962 was confirmed unanimously by the Senate on 2 April. Prior to this appointment, Mr. McDermott had been Acting Director of OEP and previously was Deputy Director of OEP and its predecessor agency, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. As Director of the OEP, Mr. McDermott is a member of the National Security Council and represents the United States at various NATO Committee meetings at NATO Headquarters in Paris. He is a member of his County, Iowa, and American Bar Associations, the International Association of Insurance Counsels, American Judicature Society, Association of Insurance Attorneys, and other professional organizations. He was a member of the Board of Governors of the Iowa State Bar Association from 1956 to 1960 and is at this time Iowa Commissioner of the National Conference of Uniform Commissioners on State Laws. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.
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ADMIRAL ROSE: So far, during the last few days, we have reviewed the national security objectives and the general processes by which security policy is formulated. We now turn our attention to the role of specific departments and agencies in the formulation and execution of national security policies. Nonmilitary programs and plans to cope with all conditions of national emergency, including nuclear attack upon this nation, are broad and complex. To coordinate and give direction and guidance to the plans and programs from the national level, the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) was established in the Executive Office of the President.

To tell us about the role of OEP in national security planning, we are very fortunate to have with us this morning, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. This is sort of Industrial College of the Armed Forces Week for our speaker this morning. He was good enough to open the first of our national security seminars on Monday of this week, in Boulder, Colorado. And General Wilson tells me that his opening talk was extremely well received. This I can well understand.

He is also ex officio, a member of the Board of Advisers of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

It is a great pleasure to introduce the Honorable Edward A. McDermott, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. Mr. McDermott.

MR. McDERMOTT: Thank you Admiral Rose. As the Admiral suggested, I feel very close to the Industrial College this week because it was my privilege to keynote the national security seminar at Boulder on Monday, and it is now an honor and a pleasure to have this opportunity to participate in your study.
Our discussion today concerns the role of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. First, I think it may be helpful if I supplement your reading assignment by covering some of the reasons for the reorganization of civil defense. Second, I would like to summarize the responsibilities of my agency for you. And third, I will describe how we are carrying out our assignment, including some of our programs and our problems.

What has happened in nonmilitary defense over the past 15 years can be likened in some measure to the science of warfare. I am no military historian, but I do believe military history furnishes an excellent parallel to the nonmilitary field. It is the consensus among such historians, though I am certain some might disagree, that the conventional techniques of World War II had their origins in the tragic War Between the States. You may recall, as a matter of fact, that the Union Pacific Railroad was conceived at the height of this war in a belated effort to bring the resources of the far west to bear in the Union cause. It was not finished until 1869 but it became a great lifeline in two world wars, transporting huge quantities of men and materials across the continent.

But it was in the Civil War that armies first became dependent upon long supply lines in the form of that relatively new mode of transportation, the railroad. While phalanxes still collided, a much higher priority than ever before was assigned the objective of disrupting lines of communication and transportation—and finally, destroying means of production. Ninety years later this very strategy was to decide the issue in World War II. We had learned the value of softening the enemy. I do not suggest that the foot soldier did not supply the final verdict, he did. But the massive, unrelenting attack upon supply lines and means of production doubtless helped to hasten the collapse of the enemy war machine.

When you stop to reflect, with the advantage of hindsight, of course, on the inadequacies of the Maginot Line, which gave the Nazis their early successes, you realize just how difficult it is for military strategy to keep pace with modern weaponry and its potential. The same thing holds true in the field of nonmilitary defense. We have simply not caught up with the thermonuclear age. For a moment let me dwell on the past, only to the extent it is needed to shed light on the present.

In the late forties and early fifties we saw our Government's growing awareness that we had a major nonmilitary defense problem.
This period saw, among other things, the creation of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) by the National Security Act of 1947. Later, in 1950, the Defense Production and Civil Defense Acts resulted in the creation of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which later became the successor to the NSRB, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The painful efforts of these agencies during the next eight years were at best an example of our inability to discard outdated concepts and to keep pace with the threat of increasingly devastating weapons and improved means for their delivery.

To those of you who may be interested in a detailed account of this tortuous evolution I would refer you to the recently published Industrial College blue book on Civil Defense. Parenthetically, I must compliment Admiral Rose and the faculty on this excellent text. It is a difficult job extremely well done. The account reveals that although the mastery of the atom has changed our lives, and in large measure the fundamentals of military strategy, we still balk at changing the old way of doing things. In 1958 after thermonuclear weapons had become a reality and missiles began to figure prominently in the problems of FCDA and ODM, those two agencies were merged into the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) within the Executive Office of the President.

Now, this innovation of mergers sought to eliminate a variety of duplications which had become apparent by that time. Among other things, it sought to acknowledge in tangible terms the fact that people and material resources were equally important. My impression is that although the ceremony was held, the marriage of civil defense and defense mobilization was never consummated. On paper it looked good, but it did not work. Why? The main problem seemed to be that OCDM was unable to obtain the necessary funds to move ahead on a total program. This forced concentration on the more pressing operational aspects, the tangible hardware-type problems of civil defense, at the expense of more forward planning in mobilization and resources management for postattack recovery.

Another contributing factor was the lack of full Presidential support to obtain public and congressional backing which is so vital for a program of nonmilitary preparedness. The split of OCDM into the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and OEP, we are confident, will overcome most of the difficulties inherent in the operation of OCDM. For one thing, it separates the operational and hardware aspects of civil defense, from the broad and long-range policy and planning aspects of the total nonmilitary defense program. This
assures that operational considerations will not encroach on the policy and planning roles of the OEP. At the same time, the prestige and the resources of the Defense Department will make possible greater progress in the implementation of the civil defense program with its operational, warning, communications, radiological defense, and shelter programing. Perhaps most importantly, it resolved a difficult claimancy problem.

With the civil defense operational responsibility in OCDM we witnessed a situation where the resource allocation agency was also responsible for claiming of itself civilian requirements. Under those arrangements one could hardly expect unbiased allocation of resources between military and civilian claimants. I feel, however, that I would be less than candid if I did not admit that the split did create some new, but minor problems while it solved the major ones. For example, the updating of the national plan which is now being revised in cooperation with the OCD. Also, some Federal agencies as well as some State and local governments, are confused by having to work with both OEP and OCD Regional Offices.

Mr. Pittman and I agree that these are procedural matters of minor consequence now being resolved. The OEP, then, is a newly-formed agency exercising a very old function. Its experience dates back to mobilization tasks of World War I, and was considerably enlarged in World War II and Korea. We are responsible for the mobilizations and management of resources for national security purposes. Among other things, this includes the management of an $8 billion stockpile of strategic and critical materials; specific recommendations related to the economic health of our allies and the waging of economic offensive in concert with friendly nations. It also includes national plans and facilities to preserve the Federal structure under any emergency; Coordination of Federal relief activities in time of disaster; continuity of Government programs; readiness for the establishment of the necessary emergency agencies; and a broad advisory role to the President in the field of tariffs, import quotas, and other economic areas.

In this capacity I am honored to serve as a statutory member of the National Security Council (NSC). From time to time the President calls upon the OEP to conduct special studies and analyses having a particular bearing on the national security. For example, in December the President ordered the initiation under my direction of a comprehensive interdepartmental study of petroleum supplies and requirements in relation to national security objectives. This
study, requiring substantial staff support, was just recently concluded and our report submitted to the President. Others, either recently completed or now underway, include a major stockpile study, a study of medical manpower needs and problems, a long-range study of availability of basic and critical materials, and the study of some of our basic national security problems which I will discuss with you on a classified basis later.

Still another function delegated by the President concerns our Executive Reserve Program. In 1955 an amendment to the Defense Production Act authorized the President to establish and train executive reservists for employment in the Government in time of emergency. The effective use of executive civilian talent is the keystone for successful mobilization of our resources when the Nation is confronted by crisis. In 1956 the President issued Executive Order 10660 establishing the National Defense Executive Reserve, and today more than 2,600 reservists are assigned to participating departments and agencies. OEP coordinates the entire Executive Reserve Program in behalf of the President. Next month, on 22 October, we are holding a national conference of executive reservists here in Washington.

An important aspect of this conference will be a shirt-sleeve work session where reservists will report to the departments and agencies with which they are affiliated and will receive specific instruction in their wartime responsibilities.

In the field of natural disaster relief we have taken steps to improve the administration and coordination of Federal disaster relief operations. Following Hurricane Carla, and as a result of an intra-agency study initiated by the President, changes were made in procedure and administration of Federal disaster relief operations so that, first of all, the President can receive more quickly facts needed to make an immediate decision regarding a declaration of a major disaster and allocation of Federal funds.

Secondly, disaster allocations will be more realistic, and initial allocations will be made pending completion of more detailed surveys of need.

And thirdly, procedures have been initiated which will permit applicants to be paid more quickly. We have recently set up new procedures for working with the Red Cross on joint programs of assistance. Close working arrangements with the Red Cross make prompt disaster relief action possible and effective. I might say
parenthetically that the natural disaster responsibilities of the President under Public Law 875 are particularly important to any Chief Executive because it is one instance where he is expected to respond in an emergency directly to an affected civil population.

Getting along with our discussion of resources on the national and local level, let me stress that we are not grappling with ivory tower theories. Perhaps the jargon of the specialist, which is a necessary tool of communication, tends to leave that impression. In truth, we are really talking about the fundamentals of life on this earth; the elemental problems of safeguarding the food we eat, the fuel we consume, the transportation to maintain a steady flow of commerce, an intricate telecommunications system which will continue to function under all conditions, and perhaps most important, the foundation of constitutional government which underpins our way of life. These are the things that concern the OEP.

Of course, most Federal agencies conduct operational functions in all of these fields. In February the President signed nine Executive orders assigning emergency preparedness functions to the Secretaries of Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education, and Welfare; the Postmaster General; the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency; the Housing and Home Finance Administrator; and the Interstate Commerce Commission. In addition there are now 19 other, similar Executive orders that have been prepared and are being cleared through the executive branch of Government. In these orders, the agencies and departments to whom they are directed are instructed, "to develop a state of readiness with respect to all conditions of national emergency, including attack upon the United States."

The President has charged me, as Director of the OEP, with the responsibility to advise and assist him in determining policy for, and in coordinating the performance of these functions with the total national preparedness program. I will not cover all of these delegations in detail, but let me give you a capsule account of some of the operating responsibilities held by the Federal departments and agencies in the emergency planning field.

Having recently completed a review of economics, I am sure you are aware of the magnitude and complexity of our economy and its interaction with cold war operations. It involves the role of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, credit and banking, and savings and loan operations under the Federal Home Loan Bank System, among others. Later in the year I understand that you will study these matters in more detail.
Of particular importance in emergency planning are preparations to manage the economy in the event of limited and general nuclear war. Our national objective is peace, but if this country should be forced to fight even a limited war it must have available and ready for immediate execution, a comprehensive economic stabilization program. This would include credit control and the whole family of direct controls such as wage, price, and rent controls. Rationing might be avoided, depending on the nature and severity of a conflict. The aim of this general approach to economic stabilization in a limited war, would be to prevent psychological inflation not arising out of genuine shortages.

Our economy probably could absorb the initial requirements of a limited war without serious economic impact. But try to imagine our economy hit by a massive nuclear attack, as a result of which 30 or 40 percent of our productive capacity had been destroyed or disrupted. Imagine our Federal Government temporarily unable to regulate or administer, or to respond automatically and instantly. Assume that islands of survival would exist among the heavily damaged areas or the partly damaged areas close to them, and that these would include wholly undamaged but demoralized cities, towns, and communities. What would be the alternative to conventional operations and procedures?

The Federal Government has chosen now, before any such emergency can arise, to develop a national and self-executing capability to respond to the foreseeable economic consequences of such an attack. Such response would have to be through a system of national regulations imposed and generated by people on the spot at State and local levels. Their first problem of course, would be survival, public welfare, and civil defense action. But their second problem, so often lost sight of in this kind of planning, would be to use effectively the remaining resources and people. Your government must attempt to keep our economy solvent, functioning and operating in support of immediate recovery.

Therefore, the OEP has been concentrating on the development of a national capability for a variety of self-triggering economic measures for an emergency. We are endeavoring to preposition national plans and policies, the orders, objectives, machinery, and techniques necessary to insure the continued functioning of the national banking and monetary systems. The Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury, and their colleagues in the Home Loan Bank Board and elsewhere, have worked very hard to help get it started. In at
least 40 States today a substantial beginning has been made in this direction. Let me emphasize again, however, that if the country is to deal with postattack economic problems and controls, it will have to rely strongly on State and local people in financial and related fields. Economic stabilization cannot succeed nationally without local support. In effect, the National Government would not be able to carry out many of its orthodox and classic responsibilities in the event of an attack upon this country, without turning to the undamaged areas and relying upon them to respond.

The development of a local and State capability to impose and administer temporary emergency rationing of a most radical kind, together with price and rent controls, if necessary, is wholly new in the history of this country, even as a temporary substitute for Federal action in such a situation; and this applies to other areas as well. Besides the financial agencies we have also the Department of Labor assigned responsibilities in the economic stabilization field, in the administration of wage and salary stabilization, and the maintenance of effective labor management relations. This is in addition to Labor’s major responsibility, the coordination of manpower.

Similarly, the Department of Agriculture has a vital role in the distribution of available food supplies at the farm and wholesale levels. At the preretail and retail levels, all food except items which are likely to spoil, would be subject to some suspension of sales, which would give local authorities time to evoke prearranged plans to ration those available supplies. The Department of Agriculture does redistribute some stockpiles of surplus commodities, especially wheat, to food deficit areas such as New England and the west coast. This contributes to our ability to sustain the population following severe attack conditions.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is accelerating its program for the stockpiling of essential medical supplies and equipment. Our research indicates that as many as 10 percent of attack casualties can be saved from subsequent death, but medical supplies and equipment must be available. The President has appointed a Health Resources Advisory Committee, to consult with me, as Director of OEP, and assist in establishing standards and procedures for the allocation, distribution, and management of the Nation’s health resources in the event of emergency. This distinguished panel assembled for its first meeting and was received by the President last month.
The Department of Commerce has major responsibilities in connection with the Nation's industrial and economic preparedness for any kind of an emergency. These include not only planning for economic and industrial mobilization, which includes industrial preparedness, but also the responsibility for the industrial support of our defense and other national security procurement at the present time. This latter responsibility is of particular interest to this audience because during this cold war period the Department of Commerce operates the defense materials system which insures the on-time delivery of products and materials for the military, atomic energy, and space programs. The defense materials system is essential in keeping these critical programs on schedule, and in an emergency can be expanded overnight to embrace the entire industrial materials and production complex.

The Secretary of Commerce has assigned the operational responsibility for the defense materials system to the Business and Defense Services Administration (BDSA), in his department. This organization represents the nucleus of an emergency production agency, which, in the event of national emergency or war, would perform functions similar to those of the War Production Board (WPB) during World War II, and the National Production Authority (NPA) during the Korean conflict.

Acting under the direction of OEP, the Department of Commerce and BDSA have readied production measures for all types of emergencies we might have to face.

The vital role of communications and our communications industry is too clear to need definition from me here. Yet we cannot pass lightly over the fact that this country's intricate and interdependent economy relies heavily on quick and effective communication. The need for communications to meet the requirements of limited war has been generally recognized, and the demand for effective communication would be even more urgent following a nuclear attack. Without reliable and effective communications we would not know what happened. We could not determine an intelligent course of action. And we would have no way of keeping our people informed at a time when official information would be the chief means of dispelling fear and heading off panic and confusion.

In such an emergency it would be necessary for Federal, State, and local governments, along with industrial and other private groups, to react as quickly as possible in accordance with plans
designed to further the common recovery. One of the major lessons learned from previous conflict was that we can no longer count upon last minute preparations to meet emergency requirements. Certainly, we cannot rely upon improvisations to meet nuclear attack if it should come. For this reason we are placing greater emphasis upon telecommunications and the assignment of radio frequencies for the purposes of national security. The President has delegated this assignment to me and I have redelegated it to an Assistant Director of my agency, who serves as Director of Telecommunications Management.

Because transportation is one of the most critical national resources, it must be maintained in a healthful condition. It is more directly related to the strategy and logistics of war than almost any other part of our economy. We must be able to move military forces and supplies wherever they are needed in bulk, and we must be able to support the essential needs of the civilian economy in war as well as in peace. Unlike some other aspects of the economy, the services of the transportation industry cannot be held in stockpiles for emergency use. It must be able to respond instantly to whatever emergency may arise. Should attack come suddenly it would be today's trained people and today's existing facilities which would have to meet the emergency.

Each of the present methods of transportation would have its major emergency role in an attack--rail, bus, truck, air, and shipping. Each must be able to respond quickly. Automobiles and trucks would be needed to move survivors and to bring up relief supplies. Waterways, less vulnerable to the effects of nuclear fall-out, would provide emergency avenues of support. Air transport, committed largely to emergency military use, would be invaluable for flying in medical and other supplies. As in the past, rails would be depended upon for carrying the heavier burdens.

Under Executive order assignment, the Department of Commerce, Federal Aviation Agency, and Interstate Commerce Commission have developed and are constantly improving stand-by measures for transportation which would go into effect automatically if we were attacked. The heart of these measures involves priorities for the most urgent traffic and restriction of all but the most essential movement of freight and personnel. These measures are being planned by the best brains in the transportation industry, and in the Federal Transportation Agency, assisted by the executive reserve to which I referred a moment ago.
Another Executive order involves the Department of Interior in the emergency management of electric power, petroleum and gas, minerals and solid fuel. We don't have time to discuss all the delegations nor to cover any of them in detail. Most of the department and agency heads, I am sure, will cover their assignment in some depth when they address you during your course of study here. My main purpose today is to give you a feeling for the complexity of the coordination problems which confront me.

Each of these resource areas is complex in its own right. Yet, the magnitude of this planning job can only be appreciated when you consider the interrelationships among the resource areas; the interdependence and difficulty of execution, through the Federal, State, and local systems, and most of all, the need for standby organization with predesignated staffs ready for instant and automatic response.

Speaking of Executive orders, and because the responsibilities and obligations of the OEP flow from such a wide range of sources, we have had in preparation for several months a new Executive order which codifies and defines the responsibilities of the OEP. It was a happy coincidence that about 10 minutes before I left to come here this morning, the President signed that Executive order--the OEP Executive order--which sets forth this wide range of responsibilities. It was signed within the last couple of hours. I will see, however, that copies of it are made available to you for your reference study later on.

Earlier I mentioned the strategic stockpile. Even if I had not mentioned it, the subject is a hard one to avoid in the newspapers these days. But let me describe for you its purpose and meaning in terms of our national security. The strategic stockpile is composed of about 75 materials, mostly metals and minerals such as zinc, aluminum, lead, and copper, all of which are vital to defense production. It grew out of experiences of shortages in relying on deficient or insufficiently developed domestic resources, and on uncertain or costly foreign sources of supply in time of emergency. In the words of the law giving OEP authority to establish and maintain the stockpile, we are directed "to decrease and prevent wherever possible, a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these materials."

In simple terms, Government recognized in the twilight of conventional war techniques, that we had to have on hand an adequate supply of materials needed to keep industry going and to support any war effort imposed on the United States. The makeup of the
strategic stockpile has not remained static. Neither have its objectives remained the same. It should change as the needs for specific materials change. When the stockpile was first established it was expected to counteract shortages for a period of five years. As stockpile goals were achieved and technological developments forced changes in military strategy, the planning period was reduced to three years. As you may know, we are currently engaged in a thoroughgoing review of the size and makeup of this stockpile. On the legislative side, Senator Symington and his committee are inquiring into past stockpile practices. Concurrently, President Kennedy has appointed a committee of cabinet and other top-ranking officials under my chairmanship, to review the principle and policies which should guide our stockpile program.

Of course, any adjustment of the stockpile has a profound effect upon our domestic economy as well as on foreign markets. The review of the stockpile now taking place in both the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government is being carried out with due recognition of the need to move slowly even when disposals are made. This points up the radical changes in security problems faced by the United States today. As I said earlier, these changes are the product of technological breakthroughs which have come in such rapid succession they tend to overtake our capability to fully comprehend their implications.

During the last 15 years weapons have been developed, which, for the first time, make it feasible to achieve quick destruction of economies and populations. Fundamentally new problems have thereby been created. We have scarcely had time to learn what they are, much less to make substantial progress toward their solution. But think about them we must. In terms of thermonuclear war our traditional concept of emergency planning is no longer adequate. By and large the mobilization base has been designed with little consideration of the possible effects of the massive destruction of facilities supplies and manpower throughout this nation. In planning against the problems of this kind of war, we need to develop not so much a survival base as a recovery base. In order to carry on as a nation after attack, we must be sure that Government itself survives as an operating entity. We must sustain what we would fight to preserve.

For the Federal Government this requires emergency relocation sites located in an arc around Washington. Here most Federal agencies have stored essential records and current papers that would enable them to continue essential operations in a wartime emergency.
The sites are tied into a secure interagency communications system using television, radio, teletype, and telephone, so that all the relocation sites can contact each other to carry on their business. Many of these sites are staffed around the clock by small cadres of administrative and communications specialists. Some of these locations are hardened. We are hopeful that more of them will be upgraded to withstand blast or fallout.

Plans are now being readied for the construction of additional protective sites and these will be continuously manned with adequate operating personnel. In the face of shortened warning time these sites would give us far greater assurance of the continuity and rebuilding of Government in an emergency than we can claim at the present time. The Federal network with its 7,000 field offices is designed to insure that States and communities would not be required to exist indefinitely without assistance from the National Government. But no matter how well we are prepared on the Federal level, we cannot guarantee immediate help for States and communities in a nuclear attack. Emergency planning concepts must be enlarged to insure continuity of civil authority. We need an emergency management organization in being, ready to handle the myriad of resource and economic problems necessary to save lives and sustain survival and expedite recovery.

Our goal is to institute programs in the 50 States, and thousands of local government jurisdictions. This concept is relatively new in emergency planning. It assumes that the resources of the States have not been sufficiently tapped in defense of the Nation, and that the strength and vitality of our society is rooted in local government. Moreover, it is a policy dictated by necessity. With fragmentation and isolation the likely prospect in the wake of an attack, our destiny as a nation will be determined by the ability of States and local communities to survive assault.

Accordingly, we have staked out four immediate objectives in local emergency planning. The States must now prepare to first allocate and control production, distribution, and use of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, petroleum, electric power, and other vital materials that I mentioned earlier. Secondly, they must prepare to manage and provide essential transportation and communications services. Thirdly, States must prepare to stabilize the economy and control and preserve the monetary and credit systems. They must prepare also, to administer a consumer rationing system and other measures for distribution of essential items to consumers.
These are broad objectives. How they would be achieved is another matter. In this regard let me point out what the OEP cannot do. We cannot develop a detailed guidance for each and every locality in this nation. We can provide the benefit of our experience at the national level and we can establish broad criteria, but we cannot lay down blanket rules. Economies differ; the social fabric varies; and the degree and type of industrialization is not the same in any two areas. But recovery is not only probable, it is a certainty if we adequately prepare now. I would not wish to be drawn into the nuclear numbers game controversy in which scientists endeavor to apply precise figures to highly unpredictable conditions. I realize that experts differ widely in their views of the consequences of nuclear attack upon this country.

It is my conviction that we should do well to avoid any extremes of speculation. There is no question that damage would be severe and that many lives would be lost; but this much is certain: in a nuclear attack many areas would be lightly damaged or damaged not at all. Most of our land area is likely to escape concentrated assault, and much of our industrial capacity would remain, under the worst conditions. We must be certain that this remaining capability is utilized with maximum efficiency, and with minimum delay and disorder. It is in the national interest that we be ready to move quickly and purposefully to meet human needs, conserve resources, restore productive facilities, and reestablish a functioning society capable of controlling its own destiny and rebuilding this nation.

The first full-scale effort to achieve this degree of readiness is now under way. As a starter, every Governor has been asked to appoint an emergency planning director and to establish an emergency planning committee drawn from government and private sector leadership. Forty-five emergency planning directors have already been appointed. They and the committee will advise the Governor in assessing the resource readiness of the State, identifying deficient areas and taking steps to correct these weaknesses. All of this has occurred in the past six months. Concurrently, regional offices of OEP have been instructed to offer all possible assistance and guidelines to the State. The components of this new and comprehensive approach to local emergency planning includes first, continuity of government, which is really the core of the whole problem.

Some time ago the OEP, with the assistance of Columbia University and the Council of State Governments, developed sample legislation to guide the States in carrying out a four-point program.
This involves, first, the establishment of lines of emergency succession for key officials to insure that there will always be constitutionally qualified persons to direct an operative government; second, the preservation of essential records to go hand-in-hand with emergency succession for while relatively few records are necessary for emergency operation, they must be at the place where decisions will be made and they must be in a form which makes them immediately useful; third, protected emergency operations centers for government must be available, and the Federal Government matches expenditures of the States for this purpose; and finally, personnel and equipment for efficient emergency operations. This will often require advance enrollment, training, and assignment of volunteer citizens as auxiliaries to the existing State government department. The parallel here, of course, is in the National Executive Reserve Program.

Also in the OEP we have worked with the National Association of County Officials, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the American Municipal Association, to develop a model ordinance enabling succession of key officers in counties and municipalities. This is the counterpart of constitutional amendments at the State level. To date, 45 States have adopted some continuity of government measures. Thirty-two State legislatures have approved amendments to State constitutions for this purpose, and such amendments have been ratified by the people in 22 States.

From continuity of government I will move to the next front on which we are mounting a major assault and that is this question of local management of resources, including manpower and economic stabilization. As in our Federal programs, this covers a great variety of resources, including food, water, health and medical supplies, transportation, petroleum and gas, electric power, manpower, communications, production, housing, and others.

Under limited war or cold war conditions the Federal Government would exercise primary responsibility in these fields as it always has. The OEP uses highly advanced electronic computer techniques to evaluate the capacity of national resources to fill national requirements under emergency conditions. At a national resources evaluation center operated by OEP we feed the machine information about the population, location of resources, factories, powerplants, bridges, and tunnels, and the output is a remarkably accurate but always changing picture of our current resources, plus projections of supply estimates of surviving resources under a wide range of attack conditions.
It is obvious, however, that States and localities will, under a massive attack, be obligated to fend for themselves for at least a period of time. Federal direction will be restored as quickly as possible, but certainly not immediately. Now, this is a revolutionary problem in terms of our planning in this area. These would be trying days for States and local communities. They would have to look to their own resources and to their own ingenuity in dealing with disaster conditions. In this area we have barely scratched the surface, but we are wasting no more time.

Last spring OEP held a series of eight regional conferences throughout the country, at which local emergency management was examined thoroughly. These regional management conferences had a twofold purpose. First, we provided representatives from the States with comprehensive reports on the Federal Government's program of emergency planning. Assembled at these conferences were 3,500 government and nongovernment leaders of the several States comprising eight planning areas. Virtually every topic that I have discussed with you this morning was there reviewed in depth.

Second, and equally important, we heard from State and local representatives the status of their programs; their studies of specific areas; the deficiencies they had discovered; and the measures they proposed to correct these conditions. I believe these meetings, the first of their kind ever held, were of tremendous value. Unlike the past, we did not seek a piecemeal approach in which specific areas were examined separately. Rather, we went after an across-the-board concept, emphasizing the interlocking character of these varied programs such as management of resources, economic stabilization, and continuity of government. This we call the comprehensive program for survival of government and management of resources. We are convinced that every program interacts with others and each aspect must be dovetailed if we are to succeed.

Briefly stated, then, gentlemen, these are some of the on-going activities in the OEP. Much remains to be done. In emergency planning we are on the threshold of an effort which can produce lasting and reassuring results. I fully expect that you will witness in the not too distant future the recasting and remaking of the role of civil emergency planning into a durable and dependable mold which can stand up to the stresses and to the stern requirements of our time.
Thank you.

CAPTAIN BOGLÆY: Mr. McDermott, we certainly appreciate your discussion of the activities of your office with us this morning. On behalf of the Commandant, may I say thank you very much.

MR. McDERMOTT: It was a pleasure to be here.