CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Incorporating Non-Lethal Technology

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

We’re on the Web! Come visit us at: <http://call.army.mil>
FOREWORD

This newsletter addresses new non-lethal weapons that have been developed based on the latest technologies available today and how to apply them at the unit level.

Studies dealing with non-lethal weapons and technologies can be grouped into two major categories. The first category includes those studies that are primarily conceptual in nature, such as policies and regulations, and theoretical arguments for and against the integration of non-lethal weapons into U.S. national security strategy. Studies in the second category focus on the scientific and technical aspects of non-lethal technologies.

This newsletter attempts to bridge that gap. It documents the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed by combat forces executing recent peace operations missions. New non-lethal weapons and updated TTP are needed by Army forces to give commanders broader options in applying graduated responses during civil disturbance missions. Non-lethal weapons, TTP, and training provide commanders those options.

This newsletter is designed for your use and dissemination. If your unit has identified other relevant lessons or information, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting CALL at DSN 552-2255 or 3035, FAX DSN 552-9564, or commercial (913) 684-9564. Our e-mail address is: <call@leavenworth.army.mil> and our WWW home page is <http://call.army.mil>. Be sure to include your phone number and complete address.

MICHAEL A. HIEMSTRA
COL, FA
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
CALL has many products of interest to the Total Force. A partial listing may be found at the back of this publication. We invite you to visit our web site at:

http://call.army.mil

The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/2255 or DSN 552-3035/2255; FAX DSN 552-3035/2255; e-mail: <segliel@leavenworth.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

NOTE: ANY PUBLICATIONS REFERENCED IN THIS NEWSLETTER (OTHER THAN THE CALL NEWSLETTERS), SUCH AS ARS, FMS, TMS, MUST BE OBTAINED THROUGH YOUR PINPOINT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

LOCAL REPRODUCTION OF THIS NEWSLETTER IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED!
CHAPTER 1
Learning from the Riots of the 1990s

Historically, war has been characterized by the application of deadly force. However, recent U.S. contingencies in Somalia, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were peace operations, primarily, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The principle of restraint is a recurring characteristic of these operations. This principle requires that forces “apply appropriate military capability prudently,” with due regard for collateral damage.\(^1\) During these missions, soldiers are repeatedly challenged to cope with noncombatants and civil disturbances perpetuated by large, unruly crowds. U.S. soldiers used force or the threat of force to control these outbreaks but were equipped only with lethal weapon systems. The typical U.S. unit does not possess weapon systems that bridge the gap between minimal and lethal force.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and the U.S. Defense Strategy both emphasize that the United States will participate in peace operations when they support U.S. interests.\(^2\) U.S. forces deploying to peace operations need to be equipped with the proper weapon systems to counter the likely threats while exercising appropriate restraint in the use of force. Recent history shows that the most likely threats are from civil disturbances.

Non-lethal weapons provide the means to control the situation in a manner that adheres to the principle of restraint, without excessively constraining the freedom of action of the military force. Used properly, non-lethal weapons provide the tactical commander with broader options in applying graduated levels of force to meet the threats common to peace operations. Non-lethal weapons in the hands of trained soldiers can save lives and reduce the violence often associated with confrontations between unruly mobs and peace operations forces.

LTC Martin N. Stanton identified certain characteristics of civil disturbances which he used to profile riots in third-world countries based on his studies of recent peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to LTC Stanton, third-world country civil disturbances are characterized by the following:\(^3\)

- **Riots tend to be massive.** Generally, rioters significantly outnumber riot-control forces. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was common for a platoon of soldiers to be given the mission of controlling several hundred angry civilians.

- **Riots can be lethal.** Many riots turn lethal as one side takes advantage of the situation and tries to harm individuals or members of other groups. An example of this is the displaced person resettlement attempts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Muslims, crossing the zone of separation to resettle in their former homes, were severely beaten by Bosnian Serbs who did not want them to resettle on the so-called Serb side of the zone of separation.

---


Riots are often carefully organized by factional leaders; they are not just spontaneous outbursts by the local populace. Examples include: (1) Peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a local political party paid civilians to demonstrate against the newly elected government. The local political party also used buses to transport demonstrators to the site of the demonstration. (2) According to news reports, groups organized and instigated civil disturbances in Seattle, WA, to protest U.S. support of the World Trade Organization.

Riots may involve large numbers of women and children. Demonstration organizers understand the reluctance of U.S. forces to risk injury to women and children. For this reason, organizers encourage women and children to take part in demonstrations to protect armed fighters or gunmen in the crowd.

Riots are likely where there is no functioning government and no law enforcement. In regions where government officials are ineffective or apathetic, there is no law and order. In some instances, local officials and police orchestrate civil disturbances and encourage the citizenry to riot and demonstrate. In many civil disturbances in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb police did little to assist U.S. forces in riot situations.

Today, most peace operations involve forces from various nations. When the forces of these nations are combined in executing a peace operation, it is likely there will be several perspectives on how riots and civil disturbances should be controlled. Multi-national forces differ in their doctrine and training, especially in the use of force.

U.S. Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 1985, is the current doctrinal reference on civil disturbances. Most tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) addressed in this manual were developed from experiences gained during domestic riots in the 1960s. Many of the formations that are discussed in the manual are based on four-platoon companies. Today, the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) of most Army units has only three platoons per company. The manual also does not take into account the new technological advances in non-lethal weapons and munitions. Non-lethal weapons “include methods for individual and crowd control, ways to separate belligerents from other belligerents and from non-combatants, and ways to monitor the separation.” There is no Army doctrine on the use of non-lethal weapons and munitions. The manual must be updated to include doctrine and TTP on the use of the new non-lethal weapons that are available today. Forces currently conducting peace operations continue to identify and develop new TTP to deal with the civil disturbance threat. The Army is also looking into new non-lethal technology and how to employ non-lethal weapons and munitions.

U.S. forces will almost certainly be involved in peace operations in the future. In his recent book, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare, COL John B. Alexander, states:

“There is a great deal of debate about the appropriate role for America to play on the world’s stage. Some argue that we should stay close to home. We should, they say, only use our military force when our national interests are directly threatened. The reality is that we have been involved in peace support operations, we are involved in peace support operations, and we will be involved in peace support operations. It is up to the President and Congress to determine when and how to apply force. These challenges will not go away. In fact, they will probably multiply with the devolution of other former nation-states into subelements. What is absolutely clear is that, to meet the challenges of the future, we urgently need non-lethal weapons options. Once developed and provided to our troops, non-lethal weapons will offer a wider range of responses to these difficult situations.”

U.S. forces deployed to peace operations need to be trained and equipped to meet the threat and challenges they will face. The international community expects a technologically sophisticated superpower to control unarmed hostile individuals and mobs by applying force that is proportionate and which protects innocent lives.

---

CHAPTER 2
Non-Lethal Weapons and Equipment

Recent U.S. military involvement in peace operations underscores the need to field non-lethal weapon systems. During these operations, it is critical to prevent aggressors from carrying out disruptive activities such as rioting, looting, and harassing, threatening, or attacking individuals or opposition groups. “A force armed only with traditional military weapons normally has only two options for enforcing compliance: threats of deadly force and application of deadly force. This limitation creates a critical vulnerability which belligerents may quickly discern and use to their advantage. Non-lethal capabilities provide a wider range of options which augment traditional means of deadly force, but do not replace them.”

Non-lethal Weapons and Equipment Currently Available

Soldiers trained in warfighting and the application of “deadly force” were deployed to Bosnia to establish a stable environment where peace could be nurtured among the former warring factions. In a peacekeeping mission, such as Operation JOINT GUARD, soldiers quelled riots and civil disturbances, situations that usually involve violence. In Bosnia, it was essential for soldiers to know how to react to angry mobs that tried to disrupt their peacekeeping role by throwing rocks and shouting insults at them.

Any protest has the potential of escalating into a very serious situation. However, military restraint is necessary to sustain the credibility of the peacekeeping force. Graduated responses are needed by the peacekeeping force to control crowds. This requires training. Soldiers in Bosnia trained on new “non-lethal munitions” that were still under development, including the Sponge grenade that fires a multiple pellet grenade from an M203 rifle. Although the technology is quite new, the need for its use is immediate. The soldiers’ goal was to induce the crowds to back off (using the least amount of force necessary to avoid injuring or killing civilians) so the peacekeeping force could gain control of the situation.

The Sponge grenade is designed to knock down a person up to 30 meters away when hit in the chest or abdomen. The stinger and foam baton round disperses a shot group similar to that of a shotgun. The Sponge grenade should be aimed at one individual, such as the principal instigator or leader of the mob inciting the disturbance. This non-lethal weapon is designed to knock an individual down or off balance so that he can be captured by a riot control “snatch-and-grab” team. (This TTP is described in detail in Chapter 4). The rounds are designed to be fired from 10-30 meters away as the photo below illustrates.
Non-lethal munitions provide a graduated response to a hostile act. The M203 sponge grenade will easily knock over a demonstrator. However, soldiers who used the grenade in training commented that the grenade could easily injure or possibly kill someone if it hit a person in the head. Although it is not intended to harm protestors or demonstrators, it would be difficult for a hostile individual to tell he is being engaged by a non-lethal weapon since the sponge grenade is fired from a weapon designed for lethal use. These munitions have yet to be employed in a riot. The concern is that the grenades, when fired, could lead to panic or increased violence in the crowd. If a demonstrator has a weapon, for instance, and is engaged by a soldier using his rifle to fire a sponge grenade, the demonstrator might return fire from his lethal weapon. The graduated response is most effective when the hostile mob knows that the line of lethality is not being crossed.

**Types of Non-lethal Weapons**

Tactical commanders should be aware of the types of non-lethal technologies that are being developed. Federal projects involved in developing non-lethal weapons include:

- **Anti-traction Technology:** Teflon-type environmentally neutral lubricants that make footholds or traction exceedingly difficult. A product of this type can be used to deny access to areas or cover a unit’s flank.

- **Sticky Foam:** Extremely adhesive foam that immobilizes individuals. This foam can be used to subdue an individual or reinforce obstacles.

- **Anesthetics:** Tranquilizers, dispensed with gas or darts, that could put people to sleep.

- **Infrasound:** Low-frequency sound generators that incapacitate individuals by causing nausea, disorientation, and bowel spasms.

- **Microwave Transmitters:** Directionally oriented devices that heat skin to an unbearable degree as people approach them.

- **Lasers:** Man-portable and vehicle-mounted eye-safe personnel flashers.

- **Electrical Shockers:** Stand-off, hand-launched, electrical shock projectiles.

- **Pyrotechnics:** Rapid-bloom smoke grenades and enhanced smoke grenades.

- **Vortex Weapons:** The vortex gun fires a doughnut-shaped shock wave, powerful enough to knock people down. The gun can also be filled with a riot-control agent (pepper spray) that not only knocks the person down but also produces a chemical irritant.

**Selecting Non-Lethal Weapons and Munitions**

In his article, *Non-Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?*, F. M. Lorenz provides the criteria for selection of non-lethal systems. They are: availability, quantity, performance in the field, time required to train individuals with no previous experience in their employment, and the need to deliver the munitions using organic weapon systems.²

Availability. Soldiers in the field need non-lethal systems immediately. Most peace-operation deployments are reactions to a crisis. Non-lethal systems need to be readily available with short lead times in requisition and delivery.

Quantity. Companies that manufacture non-lethal systems normally do not keep large inventories of these systems on hand. The market for non-lethal systems does not justify maintaining large inventories. Therefore, when selecting non-lethal systems, planners must consider the quantity required for the entire force to support a peace operation to ensure that manufacturers can meet that requirement.

Performance in the field. Planners should consider the environment in which the peace operation is expected to occur. Some non-lethal systems work better in some environments than others. For example, an anti-traction lubricant may work extremely well on an asphalt road but poorly on a dirt road. Planners should determine the best overall non-lethal system that will support the types of operations that troops are expected to perform.

Time required to train individuals with no previous experience in the employment of non-lethal weapons. Most peace operations require quick responses by deploying forces. Often, there is insufficient time available to train soldiers on non-lethal systems that are extremely complex or difficult to use. It would be inappropriate to place a soldier in front of a large, hostile crowd with a weapon system in which he is not properly trained or in which he has little confidence.

Time required to deliver non-lethal munitions using organic weapon systems. Riot situations in peace operations can quickly turn from a non-lethal situation to a lethal one. Soldiers need to be able to quickly transition from non-lethal to lethal as the situation dictates.

Army Non-lethal Weapon (NLW) Plans and Programs for the Future

The following overview of the new system development plan to assist soldiers as peace operations are executed is provided for reference and information.

Background
Over the last nine years, peace operations in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia placed demanding challenges on our soldiers and leaders. The presence of non-combatants and civilians in those operations required our troops to use imaginative techniques when executing missions to avoid endangering innocent bystanders. Having the right tools to execute missions in volatile and dangerous situations enhances the capability to succeed. Non-lethal weapons provide that enhanced capability.

Definition
Non-lethal weapons are defined as weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel and material, while minimizing permanent injuries and fatalities or undesirable damage to property and the environment.

Core Capability Requirements
The following requirements, identified by warfighting CINCs, provide a framework for a Joint concept for non-lethal weapons. There are two categories: counter-personnel and counter-material. Counter-personnel capabilities help reduce risk of fatalities or serious casualties to non-combatants, as well as to friendly or opposition forces. Counter-material capabilities render equipment and facilities unusable without complete destruction.

Within the two categories, there are six functional areas. The counter-personnel category contains four functional areas: (1) crowd control; (2) incapacitation of personnel; (3) area denial to personnel; and (4) clearing facilities of personnel. The counter-material category has two functional areas: (1) area denial to vehicles, and (2) disabling vehicles, vessels, and facilities.
**Army Proponents for Non-lethal Weapons**

The U. S. Army Infantry Center is the proponent for tactical applications, and the U.S. Military Police School is the proponent for law enforcement applications.

**The Current Plan**

In the near future, when a unit is notified to deploy and conduct a non-traditional military operation, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, it will draw and use a Non-lethal Capability Set (NLCS) to enhance its force protection and to reduce noncombatant casualties. The following paragraphs give a brief description of a NLCS and how the Army plans to use and train on this set.

**Description**

An NLCS will contain the weapon systems, munitions, and equipment required to satisfy most operational requirements for an enhanced capability to apply non-lethal force. It is designed to augment lethal forces and will be employed in a manner that will incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities or permanent injury or damage to property and the environment. The NLCS is designed to support a battalion task force. A 200-man company, reinforced with support personnel, was selected as a conceptual basis for employment of the components. The set contents can be divided into four categories:

 ✓ **Individual Protective Equipment.** These items include face and body shields (ballistic and riot-control types), shin and knee guards, and other protective garments as they become available.

 ✓ **Weapons.** These items include a shotgun, riot batons, Individual Oleoresin Capsicum Pepper Spray (OC) or M36 CR Dispensers, Riot Control Agent dispersers, restraining devices, and a variety of non-lethal munitions.

 ✓ **Enhancement Devices.** These are devices, such as bullhorns and voice-amplifying devices (for protective masks), to increase command and control capabilities. They also include high-intensity searchlights and devices that can be used at local checkpoints for area denial.

 ✓ **Training Devices/Allocations.** Each capability includes training devices and training ammunition. Training ammunition is the minimum necessary to conduct live-fire qualification or familiarization for each ammunition type. Since many of the operations that require non-lethal capabilities have gone on for extended periods, these sets provide training ammunition for three separate unit rotations before training stocks require replenishment or munition stocks need rotation.

The following illustrations depict some of the equipment that the NLCS will contain:

**Non-Ballistic Riot Face Shield/Ballistic Face Shield.** This riot face shield (size 0.15mm or 0.25mm) provides individual soldiers improved facial protection from thrown objects.
Non-Ballistic Riot Body Shield. The riot body shield provides individual soldiers improved protection from frontal, side, and overhead assault. (Size 24” x 48” x 4mm (Armadillo) or 24” x 48” x 6mm (Jamco)/Ballistic Body Shield, Size 24” x 36” with 4” x 16” View-Port (Protect or ABA).)

Non-Ballistic Riot Shin Guard/Ballistic Shin Guard. Riot shin guards provide individual soldiers with improved protection from thrown objects. The shin guards are lightweight and standard black in color. The ballistic shin guard provides protection against small arms fire up to 9mm FMJ (124 grain bullet at 1,400 FPS). It is primarily used by Special Reaction Teams (SRTs) in forced entry scenarios and for selected MOUT operations.

Portable Bullhorn. This is a critical communication enhancement device for conducting crowd-control tactics. The bullhorn facilitates communication with crowds in conjunction with Linguist/PSYOP support and assists with communication of commands to troops engaged in crowd control by projecting over crowd noise.

Individual Voice Amplification System. This is also a critical communication enhancement device for conducting crowd-control tactics using Riot-Control Agents while wearing a protective mask. This device facilitates oral communications and increases the user’s ability to communicate using radios and other devices.
Individual Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Dispenser w/Carrier or M36 Individual CS Dispenser. These individual Riot Control Agent dispensers are intended primarily for self defense or to keep rioters out of arms reach of soldiers conducting crowd-control tactics or engaged in missions where a noncombatant threat exists. For example, OC can be carried and used in areas where theft of weapons and equipment is a common noncombatant threat.

Mid-Sized Riot-Control Dispenser OC/CS. This Riot Control Agent dispenser is intended for employment by formations conducting crowd control, law enforcement and internment/resettlement operations. It is lightweight, is operated by one individual, and is easily refilled/pressurized with currently available maintenance equipment (or 2½ and 5-ton truck compressors). It provides a small unit self-defense capabilities from large crowds out to 10 meters (more range is possible based on wind). It also provides an offensive capability to clear crowds from critical areas (toward preplanned escape routes).

Lightweight Disposable Restraints. Also known as “Flex-Cuffs,” large numbers of these disposable restraints can be carried by individual soldiers and used to immobilize individuals. These restraints usually need to be cut off to be removed and come with a safe cutting device. They can also be cut off with utility shears. A reusable red-colored training device is available.

Sting Ball/Stun Grenade. This is a Commercial, Off-the Shelf (COTS) item that provides a hand-thrown, non-lethal stun effect against hostile crowds. It gives soldiers engaged in patrolling, convoy, or crowd control a non-lethal capability to break contact, enforce a buffer zone (stand-off distance) with a violent crowd, or clear an area of a violent crowd. It operates like a standard hand grenade, detonating a few seconds after the spoon is released. It dispenses rubber balls in a circular pattern of approximately 50 feet.
**Twelve-gauge Aerial Diversionary Device Round.** This round gives soldiers involved in convoy operations or crowd control a multi-shot, non-lethal capability to distract individuals or crowds. In crowd control, it can be used to provide a warning shot by delivering a flash-bang projectile over the heads of a violent or potentially violent crowd (ideally this is fired in conjunction with other distraction devices and troop maneuvers) to allow other troop formations to maneuver to more advantageous positions. The round is designed for ranges of 75-100 meters. To avoid injuring people, the round should be aimed about 5 meters above the heads of a crowd and not be fired in enclosed areas.

**Twelve-gauge Non-Lethal Area Target Cartridge.** The area target cartridge round gives soldiers a capability to stun/deter two or three people without penetrating the body by delivering a strong blow to the body. This munition fills a wide range of possible non-lethal weapons applications. In crowd control, it gives soldiers a multi-shot non-lethal capability to break contact or enforce a buffer zone (stand-off distance). It can also provide similar capabilities to law enforcement operations, internment/resettlement facilities and U.S. military detention facilities. The round is fired at center mass of an adult subject at ranges between 10 - 30 meters. Shots fired at subjects closer than 10 meters can cause injury. Beyond 30 meters, the projectile loses accuracy and may no longer have the velocity required to stun or deter an individual.

**40mm Crowd Dispersal Round (Area).** The 40mm Crowd Dispersal Round, like the 12-gauge round, gives soldiers a capability to stun individuals without penetrating the body by delivering a strong blow to the body. This munition fills a wide range of possible non-lethal weapons applications. It gives soldiers a non-lethal capability to break contact, enforce a buffer zone (stand-off distance) with a violent crowd, or clear an area of a violent crowd. It can also provide similar capabilities to law enforcement operations, internment/resettlement facilities and U.S. military detention facilities. The round is fired at center mass of an adult subject at ranges between 10 - 30 meters away. Shots fired at subjects closer than 10 meters may cause injury. Beyond 30 meters, the projectile loses accuracy and may no longer have the velocity to stun or deter an individual.
40mm Sponge Round (Point). This round also gives soldiers a capability to stun individuals without penetrating the body by delivering a strong blow to the body. It also gives soldiers in convoy or crowd-control formations a non-lethal capability to break contact, enforce a buffer zone (stand-off distance) with a violent crowd, or stun an individual threat for possible detention by snatch teams. It also provides similar capabilities to law enforcement operations, internment and resettlement facilities and U.S. military detention facilities. The round is fired at center of mass of an adult subject at ranges between 10 - 50 meters. Shots fired at subjects closer than 10 meters may cause injury.

Training Strategies

An NLCS is a prepositioned stock that will satisfy specific mission requirements. Because of this contingency method of allocation, and the special characteristics of some non-lethal components, there will be special training requirements for soldiers: User Training, Train-the-Trainer Training, and Institutional Training.

✔ User Training. User training is provided through a Multi-Media Training Support Package (MMTSP) and is supplemented by a Mobile Training Team to conduct Train-the-Trainer certification. The MMTSP will be drawn with the NLCS and will also be available through one of the Army training websites to ensure widest possible dissemination and rapid updating.

✔ Train-the-Trainer Training. Train-the-trainer personnel can license or certify soldiers in the use of specific NLCS components and certify unit trainers in small unit TTPs. Personnel operating special support equipment should be licensed on their automated DA Form 348. Train-the-Trainer training will be accomplished through an approved Train-the-Trainer course. Currently, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has the only Non-lethal Weapon Instructor Course located at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort McClellan, AL. There are plans to make this a joint course in the future. In addition to this course, the plan is to formalize NLCS Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to meet Army training requirements on an emergency basis. Units requiring a Non-lethal weapon MTT will have to submit a request to Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA) who, if approved, will forward the tasking to Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

✔ Institutional Training. Soldiers should be aware of non-lethal (NL) programs as part of their professional development. There should be some general instruction on NLCS capabilities at the service schools, particularly for those branches (Infantry and Military Police) most likely to employ NLCS. The USAMPS currently provides instructions on NL programs at its service schools and the USAIS is looking at the requirements to provide it in the future.

The Army is fielding five NLCS in FY00. By FY05, the Army plans to have a total of 30 fielded.
Currently Funded Acquisition Programs

There are seven funded acquisition programs under development. As these items are developed and fielded, they will be included into the NLCS or used in conjunction with the NLCS. The funded programs are:

1. Modular Crowd Control Munition (MCCM). MCCM is a non-lethal variant of the current Claymore mine. The lethal fragmentary payload is replaced with numerous rubber ball blunt-impact munitions for use in crowd control.

2. Portable Vehicle Immobilization System (PVIS). PVIS is a pre-emplaced capture system designed to stop a 7,500-pound vehicle traveling at speeds up to 45 miles per hour without causing permanent injury to the occupants.

3. NL Crowd Dispersal Cartridge (NLCDC). The NLCDC is intended to fire a non-lethal cartridge from the M203 40mm Grenade Launcher for crowd control. It will provide the warfighter with a means to strike a targeted individual with a direct fire, low hazard, and non-shrapnel-producing blunt-trauma round from 15 to 30 meters.

4. Bounding NL Munition (BNLM). BNLM is intended to be a non-lethal tactical area denial munition for site security and perimeter defense. The payloads produce an audible alert signal to friendly forces within a range of 200 meters.

5. Canister-Launched Area Denial System (CLADS). CLADS provide friendly forces a rapidly dispensed, non-lethal area denial capability. The CLADS launcher can be used to deliver a variety of payloads, including BNLMs.

6. The 66mm Non-lethal Munitions. The 66mm Non-lethal Munitions provide a short-range, indirect fire, crowd control/area denial non-lethal capability that can be employed from the Light Vehicle Obscurant Smoke System (LVOSS). The two types of munitions are: (a) Blunt Trauma with 450 32-caliber rubber balls inside a rubber housing attached to a metal base, and (b) Distraction (flash-bang) device made of a polyurethane material which produces audible and visual distractions.

7. Foam Applications. Foam applications provide the capability to temporarily delay access to building openings in MOUT operations and temporarily disable selected equipment, vehicles, and weapons.

Technology Investments Programs (TIPs)

TIPs are initiatives (one to two year) that overcome identified shortcomings in a core capability during a short life-cycle. They stimulate governmental laboratories, industry, and academia to work together to solve problems. They generate new technological concepts and solutions that meet current or future NL mission needs and requirements. Seven TIPs are currently funded:

1. Pulsed Chemical Laser. The objective is to create a flash-bang effect on a target with varying amounts of energy. The effect is equivalent to delivering a massless, blunt-shrapnel impact on the surface of the target.

2. Frangible Mortar Casing. The objective is to develop an NL mortar round based on the existing M821 120mm high explosive round. The non-lethal weapon round flight performance should closely match the aerodynamics, ballistics, firing tables, and propellant loads of rounds in the inventory.
3. **NL 81mm Mortar.** The objective of this program is to develop and demonstrate an NL 81mm mortar round capable of delivering long range NL payloads. The desired effect is to cause disorientation and distraction among a crowd in a targeted area.

4. **Microcapsules.** The objective is to determine the effectiveness of encapsulating NL chemicals with respect to delivery. It will offer significantly improved ways of delivering chemical agents similar to the ones already being used, but which are crudely delivered.

5. **Airborne Tactical Laser.** The objective is to conduct a feasibility study to determine effectiveness of an airborne tactical laser to conduct NL engagements. The payoff will be in providing stand-off ranges when conducting NL engagements against material targets.

6. **Overhead Chemical Agent Dispersal System (OCADS).** The objective is to demonstrate the ability to rapidly disperse NL chemicals over large areas. The OCADS provides a flash-bang effect when the chemical agents are rapidly dispersed. It can be used for crowd control or to provide a remotely generated protective barrier.

7. **Non-Lethal Weapon-Guided Projectile.** The objective is to conduct a feasibility study to determine possible usage to include payload tradeoff analysis and effective studies. In addition, this effort will explore the feasibility of applying guided projectile technologies to provide long-range delivery and deployment of non-lethal weapons.

At the conclusion of each TIP period, the decision to keep or terminate the program will be made by the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) of the U.S. Marine Corps. The JNLWD was established as the DOD agency to oversee the funding of Joint, non-lethal weapons requirements and programs.
Chapter 3
Developing a Graduated Response Utilizing
Lethal and Non-Lethal Weapons

Situation: The country of Coriland has undergone civil unrest for four months. Guerrilla forces have taken three major cities and are now attacking the capitol. An airborne infantry company has been deployed at the request of the U.S. Ambassador to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation in an uncertain, possibly hostile environment. The company has just landed on the hot landing zone (HLZ) and has begun movement toward the U.S. Embassy. Along its route, the lead platoon encounters a crowd of demonstrators numbering well over 300.

The platoon leader immediately directs his attached Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) to broadcast the United States' intent and approved psychological message to the crowd. The crowd begins to yell louder and move toward the platoon. Realizing that the situation is beginning to escalate and the crowd is becoming a threat to his mission, the platoon leader directs his men to place their weapons at the ready and has the lead squad chamber rounds in their weapons.

The TPT immediately escalates its message to warnings. The warnings inform the crowd that U.S. forces will use whatever force is necessary to accomplish their mission and to defend themselves. An attached interpreter is finally able to start a conversation with the apparent leader of the crowd. The leader makes it clear that his people will not clear the way. They have no intention of letting the U.S. force pass. They fear that if the Americans are evacuated, their government will collapse and they will be left fearing for their lives from the guerillas.

Twenty or so demonstrators from the crowd form a line in front of the U.S. force. They are carrying axes, machetes, and clubs. The platoon leader has been constantly reporting to his higher headquarters. Higher dispatches a UH60 with an Airborne Loud Speaker (ALS) to the scene. The UH60 hovers over the crowd. The ALS broadcasts a warning to the crowd. It is specifically directed at the armed civilians. The crowd wavers, but does not disperse.

By this time, the company commander is on site. In conjunction with the interpreter and TPT, he decides to demonstrate his company’s capability. He uses a non-infrared laser pointer to place a spot on a vehicle away from civilians. He has the interpreter direct the crowd’s attention toward the vehicle and orders his sniper to shoot at the laser spot. The crowd immediately relents. The commander directs his force to move forward in a crowd-control wedge formation. The force eventually makes it to the objective without a hostile situation developing and no casualties.

The increased U.S. participation in contingency operations, such as stability operations in Bosnia, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in Africa, and humanitarian assistance in Haiti, underscores the need to establish procedures for applying graduated military responses to situations that threaten these missions. Numerous Graduated Response Matrices (GRMs) and other products exist in the military. These products graphically portray available responses in a graduated manner. The intent is to give on-site commanders a list of options with which to control or diffuse a situation before it gets out of hand. Most threats can be eliminated without loss of life or collateral damage by effectively applying the resources available.
The Southern European Task Force Lion Brigade (SLB) developed a GRM that is beneficial to other military units facing contingency missions. It is unique because it effectively integrates non-lethal with lethal responses, all in accordance with the Rules of Engagement. This chapter addresses the requirements for a GRM, how the SLB developed its GRM, discusses each category and response, and explains how to use the GRM to conduct graduated response training.

**Planning a GRM**

**Step 1. Identify the need for a GRM.** This is done during the mission analysis portion of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Missions that require soldiers and units to enforce treaties or accords, protect the lives of civilians in uncertain or hostile environments, such as NEOs, or provide large-scale humanitarian assistance demand some sort of graduated response criteria to maintain order and prevent uncertain environments from becoming hostile. Not all missions require a GRM. The decision to use a GRM requires careful consideration. Once the staff has agreed that a GRM is necessary, it requires guidance from the commander regarding the response options available. Determining the appropriate responses is based on the facts, assumptions, and constraints/limitations identified during mission analysis.

Planners (staff) must agree on the intent of the GRM. First, the GRM is foremost a training and rehearsal tool. It provides leaders with the most likely vignettes that can be incorporated into course-of-action analysis, pre-deployment training, and rehearsals. Second, the GRM becomes a handy reference during situations that require graduated responses.

**Step 2. Establish a team to develop the GRM.** In a recent Joint Task Force training exercise, the SLB established a GRM team. It was headed by the Fire Support Element (FSE). It also included the brigade legal officer, a psychological operations (PSYOP) representative, and a land information warfare/information operations officer. Since the GRM is designed to give commanders/leaders graduated options for dealing with both hostile and non-hostile threats to the mission, this team composition allows for target selection, application of the rules of engagement, and attack using both lethal and non-lethal means.

**Step 3. Develop Targets.** The FSE, in conjunction with the S2 section, developed targets for both lethal and non-lethal attack. In the case of stability operations, these targets are usually not the conventional specific point or piece of equipment on the ground. They are more situational than specific. The GRM identified situations or acts that subordinate elements could face during the mission. The example GRM in Figure 1 on page 3-5 shows three possible situations or acts that on-site commanders could expect to encounter. From the targeting standpoint, these are groups of more specific targets.

During mission analysis, the FSO identified both non-lethal and lethal assets available to his unit. A Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) attached to the unit is an example of a non-lethal attack asset which was not overlooked. Examples of what the FSO should look for are:

- Riot-Control Agents.
- Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs).
- EW Assets.
- Civil Affairs (CA) Team.
- Information Operations (IO) Team.
- Artillery Smoke Projectiles.
- Aircraft (AH-64s, OH-58Ds, AC130).
- Mortars.
The lethal assets described could very well be used in a non-lethal show of force or demonstration to diffuse a situation before it requires lethal force. The critical element of this mission analysis by the FSO was not to focus solely on lethal attack assets. In stability operations, the U.S. Army wants to prevent acts of hostility first and then be prepared, if necessary, to apply lethal force.

The FSO then used the planning guidance given at the end of the mission analysis brief and listed the responses at the top of the form, as shown in the SLB example (Figure 1). Graduated responses ranged from command presence through the show of force, a demonstration, the use of Riot Control Agents and techniques all the way to the application of lethal force using snipers, small arms, AC130, and indirect fires.

**Step 4. Staff Coordination.** This is the point where the rest of the GRM team came together to complete the escalation sequence for each response. PSYOP and legal representatives were critical attendees during the escalation sequencing process. In the area of psychological operations, the TPT must exploit the effects of all responses.

*Example:* A crowd gathers in front of U.S. forces conducting an operation. The on-site commander, in conjunction with the TPT, sends a message out to the crowd that is consistent with the Information Operations campaign. This does not work, so the unit hands out information handbills/leaflets in the native language. The TPT then exploits these messages and reinforces them with another pre-planned message. Task Force Eagle (TFE) applied this type of non-lethal response to the riot at Lukavak during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The TFE leadership became involved in a situation where approximately 100 personnel, many holding sticks and rocks, were blocking a convoy route. By effectively using a Civil Affairs Team, an interpreter, and the local police, the TFE leadership was able to prevent escalation and accomplish the mission. Face-to-face communication, the use of a loud speaker system, and clear message content are effective TTP in preventing situations from turning hostile and endangering the mission.

The legal officer evaluates each escalation-of-force option and graduated response to ensure it is consistent with the ROE. The GRM was designed to recommend applications of force consistent with the ROE, yet not limit the leader or individual soldier’s right of self-defense. The SLB graduated response matrix shows clearly that if a hostile act occurs, lethal options will be first and foremost.

In the case of lethal responses, the commander’s guidance must again be applied. In the example, lethal responses were allowed only in self-defense. Additionally, there were five conditions that had to be met before release of lethal AC130 or indirect fires. In all lethal responses, the use of the TPT and PSYOP messages to exploit the effects of the lethal attack were critical in controlling the situation and restoring it back to non-lethal or less threatening circumstances.

**Step 5. Wargame.** Once the types of escalations for each potential graduated response are determined and annotated, the GRM must then be war-gamed. The staff must walk through each act or situation from the on-site commander’s standpoint.

*Example:* In the opening vignette, the SLB team ran across an issue with the use of Riot Control Agents against groups armed with firearms. During wargaming, the SLB team decided that using Riot Control Agents against a well-armed threat could incite precisely the escalation in the situation that it was trying to avoid, thereby violating the commander’s guidance.

*Result:* The SLB GRM directed that Riot Control Agents not be employed in that particular situation.

TFE’s response to the riot at Doboj produced some valuable lessons learned in this area.

*Example:* TFE soldiers reported that approximately 300 Muslims had gathered at a bridge near the town of Doboj. Several hundred Serbs, many armed with axes and knives, also gathered. The Serbs intended to prevent the Muslims from entering the town. The crowds became hostile, particularly the Serbs. TFE soldiers were ordered to
fire warning shots into the air. These shots had little effect. Civilians in Bosnia were accustomed to weapons being fired in the air during celebrations. Shots fired safely on the ground in front of the hostile crowd (a demonstration of force) proved much more effective. Subsequently, TFE employed helicopters (rotor wash) to separate the crowds. This was a clear example of escalating non-lethal force to diffuse a potentially hostile situation.

Using the SLB method of wargaming the GRM, it is possible that firing warning shots in the air would have been deemed ineffective and an alternative response should be developed, such as firing warning shots on the ground in front of crowds. This example is not intended to critique the TFE responses but to build on lessons learned.

**Step 6. Command Approval.** Once the GRM has been war-gamed, it must be submitted to the commander for approval. This is the final check to ensure the GRM team has applied the commander’s guidance correctly and met his intent.

**Step 7. Distribution.** The SOP dictates how the GRM is issued. The SLB issues the GRM as an appendix to the FS annex. The FSO briefs it during the operations order. The final product is also issued as a 5” x 8” (or smaller)-sized card. The GRM is printed on one side and the ROE on the other. This gives leaders at all levels a pocket-sized reference. *Use caution when producing the GRM cards to ensure that they are readable day and night (not too small).*

**Preparation**

**GRM training.** Units should develop a GRM that covers any number of situations. It should include various responses and escalations for each response. The finished product should drive graduated response training at least down to squad level.

**Technique:** Develop Situational Training Exercises (STXs). STX lanes give leaders at all levels an opportunity to deal with situations common to contingency operations. STX lanes teach leaders how to react to different situations in a graduated, or escalated, manner.

**Example:** One platoon (or squad for platoon training) could serve as a hostile/non-hostile crowd, while the other two platoons deal with the situation IAW the GRM. This training should be integrated into the RAMP (Return fire with accurate fire, Anticipate attack, Measure your force, Protect only lives with deadly force) ROE training model (*CALL Newsletter No. 96-6, ROE Training - An Alternative Approach, May 96*). The GRM becomes the tool to rehearse each of the RAMP rules.

This training also reduces reliance on the reference card. This, in turn, allows for more rapid responses IAW the commander’s guidance. The fact is that if you do not train as you are required to fight, you will suffer the consequences when *the real thing* occurs. For the infantry company or platoon, this type of training should be included as battle-drill training. It is truly a battle drill that troops need to be ready to execute in a contingency operation.

**Execution**

Proper planning and preparation lead to successful execution. Staffs at all levels must not only understand the GRM, they must also anticipate requirements within the escalated response criteria. For example, in the opening vignette, the UH60 airborne loudspeaker system would have to be launched by the SLB during different periods of the operation. Anticipating this response by making sure the aircraft and crew are ready saves time for the on-site commander.

**Conclusion**

The graduated response matrix is a valuable tool in stability and support operations. Units conducting contingency operations must be ready to employ effective non-lethal and lethal responses to control situations, maintain tactical initiative, and eliminate both hostile and non-hostile threats. Unit commanders should view this as a way to prevent uncontrolled hostile situations, save lives and, ultimately, contribute to successful mission accomplishment.
**FIGURE 1: Example of a GRADUATED RESPONSE MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE ACT</th>
<th>UNARMED CIVILIANS</th>
<th>ARMED CIVILIAN PERSONS/ CROWDS (KNIVES, CLUBS, ETC.)</th>
<th>ARMED CROWDS/ MILITARY (FIREARMS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMD PRES/ PSYOP</td>
<td>ON-SITE COMMANDER TPT DIRECTS BROADCAST OF LS MESSAGE AND/OR PAS OUT BANDEROS, ESCALATE MESSAGE FROM INFORMATIVE TO WARING OF FORCE</td>
<td>ALONG WITH ESCALATING PSYOP MESSAGE, DISPLAY FORCE IN A GRADUATED MANNER, OVERT SIGNALS OVER CROWD, SOLDIERS ARM WEAPONS, ETC., EXPLOIT PSYCH EFFECT OF SHOW OF FORCE</td>
<td>DO NOT USE LEADING AGENTS. MAY ESCALATE SITUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW OF FORCE</td>
<td>DO NOT USE TOWARD UNARMED CIVILIANS</td>
<td>EXPLOIT PSYCH EFFECT OF SHOW OF FORCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE</td>
<td>-EMPLOY RC AGENTS AT POINT OF PENETRATION -USE PSYOP TO EXPLOIT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT -MOVE THROUGH CROWD USING ROT CONTROL FORMATIONS AND MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES</td>
<td>-TARGET LEADING OR TROUBLE MAKERS -EXPLOIT PROXIMITY OF CIVILIANS</td>
<td>-SNIPER ATTACK IS INSUFFICIENT -EXPLOIT PSYCH EFFECT OF LETHAL STRIKE INITIALLY, SUBSEQUENT FIRES BASED ON SITUATION -EXPLOIT PSYCH IMPACT OF EACH STRIKE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIOT CONTROL MEANS (IF APPROVED)</td>
<td>-USE MINIMUM RESPONSE -EXPLOIT PSYCH EFFECT OF LETHAL STRIKE</td>
<td>-SNIPER ATTACK (SNIPER RESPONSE) -USE MINIMUM RESPONSE</td>
<td>-DIRECTED BY ON-SITE COMMANDER, CONSIDER REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR USE WHEN: 1. ALL NON-LETHAL MEANS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, 2. THERE ARE PHYSICAL EYES ON TARGET, 3. TARGET EXCEEDS THE CAPABILITY OF DIRECT FIRE, 4. PROXIMITY TO CIVILIANS HAS BEEN CONSIDERED, 5. RISK TO FRIENDLY FORCES/EVACUEES OUTWEIGHS RISK OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-LETHAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LETHAL</td>
<td>AERIAL FIRES (EUCOM COMMANDER APPROVAL REQUIRED)</td>
<td>INDIRECT FIRES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMALL ARMS DIRECT FIRES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IAW POE
Chapter 4
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

In addition to the need for non-lethal civil disturbance doctrine and equipment and the graduated response matrix, effective TTP are needed to employ non-lethal weapons in contingency operations. This chapter addresses TTP that have been developed and used in the field. Applying deadly force is, of course, fundamental for soldiers trained in combat operations. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the current doctrinal reference, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, includes TTP developed from experiences gained in domestic riots in the 1960s -- based on companies with four platoons rather than the three-platoon companies found in most Army units today. Because it was written in the 1960s, the manual also does not take into account the new technological advances made in non-lethal weapons and munitions. Non-lethal weapons doctrine is needed and should address methods for controlling individuals and crowds, ways to separate belligerents from other belligerents and from non-combatants, and ways to monitor the separation. Currently, there is no Army doctrine on non-lethal weapons and munitions. FM 19-15 needs to be updated. Soldiers participating in peace operations continue to identify new TTP to deal with the civil disturbance threat. This includes looking to new technology and employing recently developed non-lethal weapons and munitions.

The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly.

--Helmuth von Moltke, 1800-1891

While the term “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” (IPB) is used in stability and support operations, locations where civil disturbances generally occur are not battlefields. The keys to success in accomplishing civil disturbance missions are the development of operational IPB prior to deployment and aggressive gathering of intelligence information during the operation. The importance of IPB is significant today as units deploy more frequently to peace operations, normally as part of a Joint Task Force. The deployment of units into potentially hostile urban environments and their subsequent employment against ambiguous threats make IPB critical. The primary difference between IPB for conventional war and that produced for peace operations is the focus. A high degree of detail is required to develop patterns that allow a predictive analysis to emerge. To conduct threat analysis for possible civil disturbances, an enormous demand for demographic information is required to support a commander’s decision process. The focus that IPB provides during the decisionmaking process is crucial to mission success.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) identified challenges faced by units deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovia and documented the solutions developed so that follow-on units could access the available knowledge and apply successful TTP to situations that might occur in their area of operations. Information is the key to developing plans for appropriate responses to civil disturbances. Coordination with local authorities and local police, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should be effected by ARFOR staffs (down to battalion level) prior to the mobilization and deployment of forces to quell riots or control crowds. Each civil disturbance must be viewed as a potential flashpoint. The application of nonlethal means to control crowds is key to successfully accomplishing civil disturbance missions. If lethal force is the initial or primary force used, violence will erupt.

4-1
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, battalions developed a list of Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) that facilitated their gathering of information. Units also identified potential problems that their soldiers might face while conducting peace operations. How to deal with civil disturbances and demonstrations were the key aspects of every staff wargaming session before operations orders were produced. Units understood that civil authorities and police were responsible for maintaining law and order; however, units also were required to prevent overt violence. This put soldiers in an uncertain predicament: “Do I let the civil police attempt to control the situation and watch civilians get injured or killed, or do I perform the job of the police?”

The creation of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) to implement the terms of the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided some much-needed guidance on how U.S. soldiers should conduct such missions. At division level and below, the mission of the JMC included disseminating policy; issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures; coordinating the required actions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP); resolving military complaints, questions and problems; coordinating civil/military actions where appropriate; and developing confidence-building measures among the factions. The GFAP served as the baseline for determining the roles of the military and civil authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Joint Military Commission Policy and Planning Guidance Handbook, 6th edition, was a by-product of the GFAP document and could not have been written without the GFAP first being established. Chapter 10 of the handbook spells out the “bottom line” by stating as policy for all soldiers assigned to Task Force Eagle that: “Civilian law enforcement agencies, not SFOR, are responsible for maintaining civil order and ensuring civilian freedom of movement. SFOR is not structured for civil disturbance or riot control and should avoid getting involved in efforts by the local civilian authorities to quell civil disorder through appropriate measures. Unless a crowd, armed or unarmed, presents a threat to SFOR, its mission, or another party, the Entities must take responsibility for police work.”

Chapter 10 also discusses some key factors that should be considered by peacekeeping forces, such as:

**Indicators that a crowd movement may be a threat:**
- Groups of more than 50 people, and groups comprised mostly of military-age males.
- Gatherings of women and children as a screen for a following crowd of military-age males.
- Advance media promotion.
- Failure to coordinate with police and government authorities on both sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), or with UNHCR or IPTF.
- Gatherings of counter-demonstrators, or persons intending to oppose the movement.
- Presence of weapons or any expression of hostile intent.

**SFOR would:**
- Immediately bring the crowd action to the attention of the local police.
- Take actions to delay, defuse, frustrate, or otherwise influence the crowd to disperse, if necessary:
  - Close established checkpoints when a hostile confrontation is expected.
  - Establish temporary checkpoints to control the movement of hostile crowds.
  - Disarm hostile civilian groups outside the ZOS.
- Take a position of tactical advantage over the crowd, regardless of whether the police are present, and observe, record (taking photographs, if possible), and report.
  - Disengage before being surrounded by the hostile crowd. Use force in accordance with the ROE.
  - Support legitimate and controlled, non-threatening movement across the IEBL.
  - Arrange advance meetings of IPTF, local authorities, local police, and UNHCR.
  - Enlist the support of faction military commanders. Ensure they understand that their forces may not become involved directly to provide security or to block movement. Military faction support is limited to using their influence with civil authorities.
- Monitor events to ensure they have been coordinated and properly executed.
- Hold the Parties accountable when they fail to meet their responsibilities to ensure freedom of movement and to control civil violence.
◆ SFOR would not:
- Assume responsibility for controlling civil disturbances.
- Provide security for demonstrators.
- Interpose themselves between a crowd and its possible objective, or between crowds.
- Enter a crowd except in accordance with the ROE to stop a serious crime.

◆ Legal Notes:
- A civilian crowd that meets peacefully and moves with no hostile intent is not illegal. However, such a crowd has the potential to become a mob and commit criminal acts.
- COMSFOR is the release authority for the use of riot-control measures.

◆ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures:
- Avoiding Confrontations. The most likely confrontation sites were at the IEBL. The next most likely sites were the marchers’ or visitors’ destinations (cemetery, village). The SFOR applied the following TTP to avoid confrontations.
  - Keep the crossing or visiting group on a bus.
  - Check passengers for weapons.
  - Halt the bus before it reaches its destination (potential confrontation site).
  - Do not allow passengers to dismount if there is an uncontrollable crowd at the destination.
  - Prevent a counter-protest group from forming at the destination site.
  - Halt vehicles as far away as METT-T permits; if there is no uncontrollable crowd at the potential confrontation site, have the passengers dismount and walk to the destination.
  - Establish temporary checkpoints on routes leading to the destination or potential confrontation site.
  - Check people who arrive at the checkpoint for weapons. (All units involved with riot-control operations must be prepared to stop all vehicle or pedestrian traffic seeking to pass through SFOR checkpoints.)
  - Avoid conspicuous, stationary SFOR presence at locations where such a presence may draw a hostile crowd next to a political party headquarters).

- Dealing with Hostile Crowds. When a hostile crowd gathers, the following initiatives should be considered:
  - Inner-Ring Coordination (coordination that should take place at the tactical level -- at the scene of the disturbance):
    - Connect IPTF with the local police.
    - Connect the SFOR MSC Commander with senior town officials.
    - Keep civil police in front if a crowd gathers.
    - Confiscate weapons from unauthorized persons.
    - Using caution, get photos and video of participants, particularly agitators, and others who are not working to defuse the situation.
  - Outer Ring Preparation (measures that should be effected by higher headquarters at the operational or strategic levels):
    - Be prepared to seal off Weapons Storage Sites that could affect the situation.
    - Be prepared to counter a misinformation campaign.
    - Be prepared to meet with senior local officials.

Delaying the Occurrence of Civil Disturbances

The Area of Operations (AO) that units were assigned to patrol in Bosnia was often too large for available unit resources to manage effectively. In addition to providing local base camp security, ground maneuver units were charged with guarding key logistic and communication sites, as well as critical command and control nodes. Battalion-sized units were tasked to also conduct local force protection patrols, and to be prepared to execute various contingency plans such as support to the Office of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ambassador’s office for resettlement, assistance to the IPTF,
international organizations and non-governmental organizations, joint commission officers, special forces teams, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These taskings and contingency plans quickly drained available manpower. This problem manifested itself when factions threatened to riot or gather in large numbers to demonstrate. A technique that units developed to “stall for time” so that manpower could be shifted from one sector of the AOR to another was to delay the busses, or vehicles carrying demonstrators.

A technique units developed was to temporarily block the road on which the busses transported the demonstrators. Once the demonstrators dismounted from their vehicles and closed on the soldiers in their HMMWVs, the soldiers “leap-frogged” one kilometer further down the road. This was repeated as often as necessary. Eventually, the crowd would get tired and give up the idea of conducting a demonstration. The following illustration depicts this technique.

If constantly unloading from the busses did not dissuade the crowd from demonstrating, at least time was gained to muster a force big enough to adequately prepare for riot-control operations. To successfully conduct this delaying tactic, a detailed IPB is required from the S-2. Key routes into the demonstration site must be analyzed.

It is also important to realize that just as U.S. forces could block the roads leading into a demonstration or potential riot location, various factions that wanted to conduct demonstrations could also block roads, preventing relief forces from assisting with riot control. This is precisely what occurred in September of 1997, near the town of Brcko. Early one morning, a platoon from Camp McGovern was dispatched to secure a suspected weapons storage site. The unit was tasked to destroy any military vehicles and equipment located at the site, if necessary. As the platoon of tanks and attached engineer vehicles approached the suspected weapons storage site, a crowd chanting Serbian slogans and waving banners tried to prevent U.S. forces from approaching the site. The crowd was described as being “well organized,” carrying hand-held radios and prepared political posters. Just as the platoon approached, the crowd positioned vehicles across the road in an attempt to block the soldiers’ passage out of the area. The photograph on page 4-5 shows how effectively a truck can block a roadway.
The platoon became trapped and the crowd began spitting on the vehicles and throwing stones at the soldiers. Although no soldiers were hurt, the crowd was able to isolate and surround a Bradley Fighting Vehicle so that the vehicle could not move without hurting several civilians in the crowd. The platoon then moved in tanks and directed the hot exhaust at the crowd to clear a path big enough for the Bradley to get through. The soldiers threw smoke grenades at the crowd and the crowd threw them back. The crowd also tried to crawl on top of the tanks, and soldiers reacted by swinging the gun tubes around to knock them off.

The soldiers used a technique of moving forward and backward to try to wear down the crowd while still keeping the storage site within range. The crowd continued to press the platoon, but, as the sun went down, the crowd dissipated and people went home. No injuries were reported.
Roads are key to any Peace Support Operation. Whoever controls the road networks in mountainous terrain, such as that found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, controls all situations that develop.

Experience shows that crowds will wear themselves out, and individual members of any crowd will begin to tire and elect to go home. Patience on the part of any enforcement agency will pay off in the long run by minimizing collateral damage, as well as personal injuries or loss of life to the local population.

Leaders, and soldiers, at all levels, must be prepared for the eventuality that they will encounter an angry mob when deployed on a Peace Support mission.

What to do if a Riot Does Occur

If recent history repeats itself, the U.S. Army will frequently be deployed to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. These operations inherently include the likelihood that troops will encounter civil disturbances. Handling these disturbances effectively will have a decisive effect on our success in support and stability operations.

A poorly handled civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potentially long-term negative effects for the mission -- placing our soldiers in greater danger both during the disturbance and afterward. Conversely, a well-handled situation can lead to an enhanced view of the U.S. Army’s strength and professionalism, potentially resulting in fewer disturbances in the future.

During the late summer of 1996, there was an increase in the resettlement of civilians from all sides of the Former Warring Factions (FWFs) throughout contested sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As this resettlement took place, the Implementation Force (IFOR) experienced a dramatic rise in the number of incidents in which Muslim families left the Bosnia Federation, crossed the ZOS and attempted to reinhabit their previous homes. The GFAP ensured refugees the right to reinhabit previously owned homes.

In this peace enforcement operation, local officials and police were responsible for ensuring the safety of their citizens, including UNHCR-sponsored refugees. IFOR assisted this process by providing general military security and by facilitating negotiations.

In August of 1996, the Republic Srpska Ministry of the Interior Police, armed with pistols and sticks, attempted to evict several Muslim families from houses in the town of Mahala. IFOR responded to the incident because it was a clear violation of the GFAP. IFOR separated the two groups and disarmed the Ministry of the Interior Police. Local radio stations began broadcasting messages encouraging locals to gather outside the IPTF headquarters in Zvornic to protest the actions of IFOR. A mob quickly formed. They beat one IPTF officer and overturned and destroyed an IPTF vehicle parked in front of the station. The unruly mob surrounded the IPTF headquarters trapping the IPTF officers inside. Within a short time, the mob formed a convoy of approximately 250 personnel to move to Mahala to protest the actions of IFOR at the scene of the original incident. The situation was in danger of rapidly escalating out of control. Task Force Eagle quickly implemented its crowd-control techniques to quell the situation.

Plans and unit battle drills must be developed for peace operations just as they are for combat. Preparation for peace operations must be based on sound civil disturbance doctrine -- which was lacking for units deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having dealt with several civil disturbances throughout the area of operation, deployed units improvised and developed TTP to successfully deal with riots and civil demonstrations.
The TTP can be described using the acronym **IDAM**: **Isolate, Dominate**, maintain common situational Awareness, and employ Multi-dimensional/Multi-echeloned actions.¹

**Isolate**, in time and space, the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs) in the theater developed TTP that “isolated” riots or demonstrations to keep them from spreading into bigger and potentially more violent explosions of emotional expression. The idea was to close access in and out of the demonstration location. Once access was closed, rioters tended to tire within hours, and the demonstrations died down, eventually resulting in a peaceful conclusion. The picture below shows how vehicular Traffic Control Points (TCPs), poised to further isolate the riot, if control was lost, might be positioned on the road network leading into and out of the demonstration site. TCPs can also be emplaced using engineer-type barrier material to create an obstacle that is difficult to bypass. Appendix A discusses this technique and provides a Training and Evaluation Outline (TEO) (with task/condition/standard) that facilitates training.

**Dominate** the situation through force presence and control of information resources. In the past, units demonstrated an overwhelming show of force at the checkpoints, and dispatched attack helicopters to conduct overflights above demonstrations and massing civilian mobs. Also, using all the air assets available gave ground commanders a “bird’s-eye view” of events on the ground. Helicopter overflights provided real-time situation reports ensuring units knew the “ground truth” at all times. This knowledge gave commanders a decisive advantage in both negotiations with potentially hostile elements and tactical maneuvers.

¹ Dickens, Mark, MAJ, and Murphy, Rob, CPT, *Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia, News From the Front!*, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Nov-Dec 96, p 18.
Units can dominate a civil disturbance using non-lethal munitions. However, it is important to consider force protection issues. Non-lethal weapons and munitions should always be accompanied with lethal munitions and the capability to employ them. At the time of publication of this newsletter, only grenadiers in rifle platoons were equipped with the “sponge” M203 rounds. All other soldiers carried the same equipment and ammunition they would use in a combat situation. The picture on the left illustrates how a sniper is positioned to overwatch the soldiers responding to a civil disturbance. Also attack helicopters can provide a show of force.

The task organization that emerged as the “minimum required” to respond to a civil disturbance is an infantry rifle company, or like-sized company of 120 soldiers, augmented with battalion scouts/snipers, a Civil Affairs team, and a PYSOP team. One platoon is positioned to either prevent collateral damage from occuring or to separate opposing factions; one platoon assists with the linkup of local police or the IPTF; and one platoon postures to serve as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). If aviation is available, it can provide an excellent bird’s-eye view of vehicular movement into and out of the civil disturbance. Also, the rotor wash of a helicopter is an excellent non-lethal technique that is used effectively to disperse crowds.

To dominate a civil disturbance, it may be necessary to actually detain personnel who are leading the civil disturbance. An instigator is identified as a person that is “prodding” others to commit disruptive acts, or the one who is orchestrating the group. Often, an instigator will be carrying a bullhorn or hand-held radio. Lessons learned by the MP School indicate that forcibly snatching instigators from demonstrations or riots can alleviate the organized violence of a crowd. The non-lethal TTP that has been developed for a unit conducting riot-control operations is to first positively identify an instigator, then send in a “snatch-and-grab” team to forcibly remove him.

The smallest unit that can employ the “snatch-and-grab” technique is a platoon. Before a platoon deploys to quell a riot, a four-soldier snatch-and-grab team should be identified. Two of the soldiers secure the individual and two provide security. Once an instigator is identified in a hostile crowd, the snatch-and-grab team deploys into the crowd and grabs the assailant and pulls him back behind the friendly picket line.

It is imperative that the four-man snatch-and-grab team wear the Kevlar helmet with face shield and flak vest, but the team should not bring weapons or LBE with them into the crowd. Only batons should be carried into the crowd by the two-man security team. The snatch-and-grab team needs to remain in contact with the adjacent soldiers on the line formation as they pass through. That formation should remain ready to respond to any crowd actions that threaten the snatch-and-grab team. Once the snatch-and-grab team has apprehended the riot instigator, it needs to go directly to a secure location out of the crowd’s line of sight. Again, Appendix A provides a TEO with which to train soldiers to achieve proficiency in applying this technique.
Military Working Dog (MWD) teams can also be employed in conjunction with riot-control formations as a method of increasing the crowd’s apprehension about approaching or engaging the formation. The MWD Teams should be placed behind the crowd-control formation, in plain sight of the crowd, but in front of the command element and M33s. (NOTE: The M33 is a man-pack, riot-control dispenser. It contains CS (tear gas) and can be modified to discharge OC (pepper spray). It is a large, clumsy apparatus. An interim, mid-size riot-control dispenser has been developed and approved for use. This dispenser is included in the TRADOC non-lethal capability sets that will be fielded in FY 01.) The MWD Teams work back and forth behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The presence of MWDs, coupled with the presence of soldiers prepared to conduct civil disturbance operations, produce a profound psychological effect on the crowd.

CAUTION: MWD Teams must depart the area prior to the use of riot-control agents. MWD Teams must move a safe distance from the crowd to ensure the safety of the K-9s.

Another element that is crucial for successful civil disturbance operations is the use of combat cameramen. Events must be documented to hold personnel, factions, and gangs or groups accountable. To ensure that the right message is being presented, the information environment must be controlled through the synchronized efforts of the Public Affairs Office (PAO), the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), and the PSYOP and Civil Affairs offices.

Awareness, the third principle of IDAM, is maintained through timely, accurate and complete, multi-source reporting. Reports can be received from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit checkpoints, air assets, such as Kiowa Warriors and AH-64s, close liaison with the IPTF as well as European Community Civil Monitors, all contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, soldiers in Bosnia also used Predator and Pioneer UAV platforms to better observe large sectors of an AO. The reports produced are analyzed and relayed to each unit involved in the operation.

Lastly, Task Force Eagle employed Multi-dimensional, multi-echeloned actions. While subordinate units provided local security at hot spots, TFE headquarters trained to focus its efforts on the larger tactical and political spectrum. Using all the international resources at his disposal, the TFE commander influenced the Minister of the Interior (Republic of Srpska) and other leaders of political factions to assist with quieting civilian unrest. The carrot-and-the-stick analogy applies here. Aid in huge amounts was available to factions that assisted and cooperated with the provisions of GFAP. Those that did not help, or that hindered the peace efforts exerted by the international community, were arrested and imprisoned. A key point that the command used, on a routine basis, was to employ all available resources to influence outcomes. The staff can “weight” a main effort by convincing local radio and television stations to stop making inflammatory broadcasts and begin making broadcasts designed to quell and disperse the crowds.

Key Lessons Learned:

● The IDAM TTP was developed in an environment void of doctrine and leader training curriculum. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, does not mention riot-control techniques although riot control is a mission that is an inherent and recurring characteristic of peace operations.

● Isolating and controlling riots, such as those that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, require collective training by units and deliberate planning by staffs before deploying to a peace operation. Trying to train units to an effective level of proficiency after deployment is difficult as units become quickly engaged in operational tasks and are often too spread out in the AO to conduct effective collective training.
Appendix A
Training for Civil Disturbances

When units prepare for peacekeeping or stability operations, there is very little Army doctrine that addresses the question: How should we train? The following example has been modified from a draft MTP currently developed by the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The draft MTP was developed as a training document to use to train soldiers and units on how to respond to emergencies that are likely to occur at U.S. Army confinement facilities. The following training outlines and evaluations are modified versions of this impressive work. They are provided here in response to numerous requests for training techniques from soldiers and units preparing to execute peace operations.

PERFORM CIVIL DISTURBANCE PROCEDURES

Objective: The objective of the following training and evaluation outlines is to train company-sized units in the performance of civil disturbance procedures. Proficiency in performing civil disturbance procedures is reflected by the ability to quickly and deliberately execute the disturbance control procedures required to prevent the loss of life, property or to regain control of a unit’s assigned area of responsibility.

Leader Training: Preliminary leader training should include:

- Instruction on unit SOPs and regulations.
- Instruction on crowd psychology and the U.S. Army goals in the area of operations to which the unit is preparing to deploy.
- Training Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) to ensure leaders articulate one clearly understood standard to the soldiers.
- Leader training on basic disturbance control procedures IAW FM 19-15.

Training Enhancers: After the leaders have been trained and the soldiers have displayed competency in the supporting individual tasks, the following Lane Training Exercises (LTXs) can be conducted under several different OPFOR options as training enhancers.

- Rioter responding to show of force only.
- Loss of control of a protected area (a mosque or a cathedral).
- Loss of control of a restricted area (a base camp housing American soldiers and equipment).

1 Developed by SFC Michael Jones, Correctional Emergency Response Team (CERT) NCOIC, 705th Military Police Battalion.
The exercise should be tailored to the proficiency level of the unit and the type of civil disturbance most likely to be encountered in the unit’s real-world mission. The trainers must build upon basics before attempting complex options.

During training, leaders must enforce the individual task standards. As completed tasks become more difficult by adjusting the OPFOR, the correct performance of individual task becomes paramount.

The OPFOR must be rehearsed and limited to a few realistic scenarios to be taken against the training unit. The OPFOR evaluator/controller must exercise close control over the OPFOR’s actions to ensure the OPFOR provides responses appropriate to the training desired.

Element: Company

Task: Perform Civil Disturbance Procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>(Circle)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

TRAINING STATUS: T P U (Circle)

Conditions: The Company has been directed to be the assault force to quell a civil disturbance. The disturbance has been limited to a single road intersection in front of the city hall.

Task Standard: Civil order is restored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Tasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*+1. The Company Commander receives the unit’s mission and plan from the BN Operations Officer.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2. The 1SG coordinates for equipment issue.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*+3. The Company Commander issues warning order to PSGs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*+4. The Company Commander/First Sergeant conducts troop-leading procedures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Analyze and restate the mission.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Begin estimate of the situation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Conduct backward planning.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Plan use of available time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Begin formulation of tentative plan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Organize soldiers and equipment; designate special teams.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Continue situation estimate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Develop and analyze courses of action.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Sub-Tasks and Standards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Tasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Conduct leader’s reconnaissance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Complete tentative plan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Coordinate and update information.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Complete the plan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Issue operation order.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Inspect, rehearse, supervise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*+5. The Company Commander briefs the company on the use of force and priorities of force.*

*+6. The Company Commander designates staging area/site assembly point.*

*+7. The Company Commander coordinates fire support, and engineer support.*

*+8. The Company Commander coordinates with adjacent units.*

+9. The company moves to the staging area/site assembly area.

+10. The company gains access to the disturbance site.

  a. Breach/remove any obstacles or obstructions to the disturbance area.
  b. Secure breach to prevent possible escapes.
  c. Move unit through breach.

+11. The company isolates the disturbance site.

  a. Prevent the disturbance from spreading to unaffected areas.
  b. Prevent other demonstrators from entering the disturbance area.
  c. Allow the safe departure of demonstrators from the disturbance area.

+12. The company applies priorities of force as necessary.

  a. Commander uses riot-control formations to contain and demonstration.
  b. Positive command and control are maintained.
  c. Deploy snatch-and-grab teams to extract and apprehend instigators as necessary.

  d. Deploy escort teams to escort and link up with civil authorities, PAO, PSYOP, SJA or Civil Affairs personnel.
Sub-Tasks and Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Tasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e. Evacuate injured soldiers and demonstrators to casualty collection point.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Commander reports accountability of instigators, hostages, and casualties to Bn S-3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*+* 13. Company secures area and awaits further orders.

**TASK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY BLOCK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS EVAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS “GO”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *+ Indicates a critical leader subtask.
+ Indicates critical subtask.

**Individual tasks supporting T&EO.**

**STP 19-95C14-SM-TG**

- 191-381-1290 Detect Symptoms of Unusual or Potentially Deviant Behaviors of Prisoners
- 191-381-1323 Prepare Observation and Disciplinary Reports
- 191-376-5128 Protect a Crime Scene
- 191-381-1255 Restrain a Prisoner
- 191-381-1289 Strip-Search a Prisoner
- 191-376-4121 Use a Riot Baton
- 191-376-5103 Use Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques
- 191-381-1257 Participate in Riot-Control Formations
- 191-381-1291 Apply Priorities of Force
- 191-381-1321 Take Action in Case of Disorder

**EMPLOY A SNATCH-AND-GRAB TEAM**

**Element:** Company

**Task:** Employ a Snatch-and-Grab Team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>(Circle)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING STATUS:</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Circle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conditions:** A Snatch-and-Grab Team is identified from within the company formation and instructed to detain an instigator from an on-going civil disturbance.

**Task Standard:** The Snatch-and-Grab Team moves the instigator from the area per instructions of the OIC without injury to the instigator or team members, using the minimum amount of force necessary.
### Subtasks and Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>+1.</strong> OIC receives mission.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Alerts snatch-and-grab team, combat cameraman and Line Medic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Determines if instigator has a weapon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Ensures team members take precautions against HIV infection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Determines if OC pepper spray is authorized.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Briefs snatch-and-grab team leader.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+2.</strong> Team Leader.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Briefs assembled team members on move.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Determines and assembles equipment required to complete move.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Checks each team member for proper wear of equipment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Conducts rehearsal as time permits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+3.</strong> On-duty combat cameraman.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Films briefing and the actual snatch and grab of the instigator.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Ensures use of force statement is completed upon completion of the detainment of the instigator.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+4.</strong> OIC briefs assembled personnel. Brief contains:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Identification of the instigator.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Where the instigator will be moved to and classification once moved there (strip-searched, handcuffed).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Reason or incident that has resulted in the requirement for the use of force and what the team will be instructed to accomplish.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Motives and history of the group that is demonstrating, and of the instigator if available (verbally or physically abusive, indicted war criminal).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Identification of over-watching element.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>OC pepper spray authorized/not authorized.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Additional instructions, if needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+5. Team members state duty position/requirements.

   a. Each member of the snatch-and-grab team, to include the line medic will step in front of the camera and state the following:

      (1) I am (state name and rank); I am the number one man. My mission is to pin the instigator using the minimum amount of force necessary.

      (2) I am (state name and rank); I am the number two man. My mission is to secure the instigator’s right arm and apply the wrist restraints using the minimum amount of force necessary. I carry the wrist restraint(s). The number two person will hold up the wrist restraints.

      (3) I am (state name and rank); I am the number three man. My mission is to secure the instigator’s left arm and assist the number two man in applying the wrist restraints using the minimum amount of force necessary.

      (4) I am (state name and rank); I am the number four man. My mission is to secure the instigator’s right leg and apply the leg restraints using the minimum amount of force necessary. The number four man will hold up the leg restraints.

      (5) I am (state name and rank); I am the number five man. My mission is to identify the instigator and to secure the instigator’s left leg and assist the number four man in applying the leg restraints using the minimum amount of force necessary. I am also the team leader for this mission and I am responsible for ensuring that the team uses the minimum amount of force necessary throughout the move.

      (6) I am (state name and rank); I am the number six man. My mission is to assist the team in any way possible using the minimum amount of force necessary. The number six man will hold up any additional equipment that is being utilized.

      (7) I am (state name and rank); I am the line medic. I will treat any and all medical emergencies that may occur during the move.

   b. Each member of the team after stating their mission will then execute an about-face allowing the camera to see the number on the back of his helmet and flak vest, take one step forward and execute another about-face.
Subtasks and Standards

+6. Team action during the move.

   a. The cameraman will position himself where the entire event can be recorded. This film is important, for legal reasons, during peacekeeping missions where intent and actions on execution can be shown.

   b. The line medic will carry an aid bag and be positioned where he can observe the entire situation. The medic will render medical assistance to anyone that may require it during the mission.

   c. On order, the team will march in column to the instigator’s location and remain in a column, prepared to enter and restrain the instigator.

   d. The number one person carrying the pinning shield will stop in front of the instigator’s location. The number one person now becomes the “eyes and ears of the team.”

   f. The number one man will observe the entire area, checking for anything that may cause harm to the team or the instigator.

   g. If the number one man does note a danger or hazard, he will notify the rest of the team. To ensure that all team members have heard the number one man, each member of the team will grab the right shoulder of the member in front of him and pass the message up the column. If there is no response, the number one man will repeat the information until all members are aware of the danger.

   h. Upon contact with the instigator, the number one man’s mission is to pin the instigator by attempting to guide the instigator into the team and secure the instigator’s head to prevent any injury to the instigator or the team.

   i. The number two man will stand directly behind the number one man, with both hands on the waist of the number one man, preparing to push the number one man into the crowd if there is resistance. Once inside the crowd, the number two man will secure the instigator’s right arm and apply the wrist restraints to the instigator’s wrist behind the instigator’s back, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

   j. Once the number two man has the wrist restraints secured on the instigator, the number two man will announce to the team, “HANDS SECURE” and will position himself where he can carry the instigator at the direction of the team leader.

   k. Once the hands are secure, the number three man will position himself where he can carry the instigator as the team leader directs.
l. Once the hands and arms are secure, the number four man will secure the instigator’s right leg and apply the leg restraints on the instigator, using the minimum force necessary. The number five man will secure the instigator’s left leg and assist the number four man in applying the leg restraints, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

m. Once the leg restraints are secured, the number four man will announce to the team “LEGS SECURE.” The number four and five men will position themselves where they can carry the instigator as the team leader directs.

n. Once the crowd is out of sight, the team leader will command the team, “Prepare to Lower,” “Team Lower.” At this time, the team will simultaneously slowly lower the instigator to the floor. At that time the team leader will ensure that both hand and leg restraints are double-locked to prevent injury to the instigator during subsequent movement, as applicable.

o. At this time, the medic will check the instigator for injuries.

p. When the medic has completed examining the instigator, the team leader will direct the team to lift and move the instigator to the pre-designated holding area.

### TASK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY BLOCK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS EVAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS “GO”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *+ Indicates a critical leader subtask.
+ Indicates critical subtask.

**Individual supporting tasks:**

**STP 19-95C14-SM-TG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>191-381-1323</th>
<th>191-381-1255</th>
<th>191-376-5103</th>
<th>191-381-1257</th>
<th>191-381-1292</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare Observation and Disciplinary Reports</td>
<td>Restrain a Prisoner</td>
<td>Use Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques</td>
<td>Participate in Riot-Control Formations</td>
<td>Apply Priorities of Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORM CASUALTY COLLECTION

Element: Company

Task: Perform Casualty Collection Procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>(Circle)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| TRAINING STATUS | T | P | U | (Circle) |

Conditions: The company has been directed to perform casualty collection procedures as a result of a natural disaster. There are fatalities and numerous injuries. Both cadre and instigators have been injured. The unit has been recalled. The disaster is over, and the building has been declared safe to enter.

Task Standard: Quickly locate and evacuate all injured personnel without compromising custody and control. Maintain accountability of all personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*+1. Company Commander receives the unit’s mission.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*+2. Company Commander briefs PSGs on the mission.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*+3. Company Commander task-organizes and assigns missions to subordinate units.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Combat lifesavers are identified and utilized.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Unit integrity is maintained.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+4. 1SG coordinates for equipment issue.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+5. Unit searches for casualties in affected area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. NCOIC maintains control.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. NCOIC maintains contact with litter team NCOIC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Proper safety equipment is used by all members of the team.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Search continues until all personnel are accounted for.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+6. Unit evacuates wounded to the casualty collection point.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Renders immediate aid and uses proper technique for transporting by litter.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Uses proper restraints when necessary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Maintains identification items with instigator when possible.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Litter teams NCOIC maintains contact with search team NCOIC and casualty collection point NCOIC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+7. Unit maintains security and accountability at the casualty collection point.
   a. NCOIC sets security to prevent any unauthorized entry or exit.
   b. NCOIC maintains log and accountability roster.
   c. Sign-out roster is reported to the EOC as required.
   d. Proper restraints are used.
   e. NCOIC maintains contact with litter team NCOIC and escort NCOIC.
   f. Separates the dead from the wounded.

+8. Unit escorts detainees to area aid stations or hospitals.
   a. NCOIC ensures that proper restraints are used when transporting suspects.
   b. NCOIC ensures that the proper level of escort is provided with each vehicle.
   c. NCOIC coordinates with each hospital NCOIC to ensure the proper number of guards are provided.

+9. Unit provides security as required.

### TASK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY BLOCK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS EVAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS “GO”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *+ Indicates a critical leader subtask.
+ Indicates a critical subtask.
**REACT TO THE MEDIA**

**Element:** Company

**Task:** React to the Media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>(Circle)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| TRAINING STATUS: | T | P | U | (Circle) |

**Conditions:** The unit is participating in a stability and support operation and is approached by what appears to be legitimate media representatives outside of a controlled area or compound. An interview would not affect any soldier’s ability to conduct his assigned tasks.

**Task Standard:** Soldiers and unit leaders are able to effectively interact with reporters, television crews, and other members of the media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Soldiers are not forced to talk to the media, but they do not give the impression that they are withholding information.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. When soldiers are approached, they:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Do not speculate or render opinions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Discuss only areas or matters of which they have direct knowledge.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. If soldiers do not know the answer to a question, they respond by saying, “I don’t know.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Media personnel are treated equally and fairly, regardless of whether they are credentialed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interviews are authorized with unescorted, non-credentialed media representatives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Soldiers do not allow access to controlled areas if the media are not credentialed or escorted by a higher headquarters public affairs escort.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Recognized reporters are allowed access to controlled areas with a unit escort or media liason.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Higher command is notified.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ESTABLISH AND SUPERVISE A TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT

Element: Squad

Task: Establish and Supervise a Traffic Control Point.

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle)

TRAINING STATUS: T P U (Circle)

Conditions: Units conducting stability and support operations will be tasked with a wide variety of tasks that will require engineer-type obstacles and must be able to secure the obstacle to enforce control and compliance with existing treaties and mandates. During the execution of responding to a civil disturbance, establishing traffic control points will assist units in isolating potential riots, and minimize escalation.

Task Standard: By maximizing the use of engineer-type obstacles, the unit was effective in asserting the necessary population control measures required to support the overall stability operation.

Subtasks and Standards | GO | NO GO
--- | --- | ---
1. Conduct reconnaissance and develop a plan:
   a. Reconnaissance and barrier emplacement are completed rapidly.
   b. Barrier material is selected based on likely traffic.
   c. Obstacle supports overall plan and uses the terrain to prevent people from bypassing the traffic control point.
2. Squads construct necessary obstacles:
   a. Primary obstacles are constructed first.
   b. Unit maintains security during construction.
   c. Leader positions personnel to operate the control point as completed.
3. Obstacles are sited:
   a. Obstacles support the overall unit plan.
   b. Control points are covered by observation and direct fire for force protection.
   c. Control point supports adjacent unit mission.
   d. Observation points are outside hand-grenade range.

4. Unit operates the traffic control point.
   a. Sentries are posted to stop, redirect traffic, and explain the purpose of the control point.
   b. Signs showing closed roads, areas, or detours are posted.
   c. When vehicles or personnel attempt to breach or bypass the traffic control point, sentries use the graduated response technique as authorized by the Rules of Engagement.

5. Unit leader reports emplacement/removal of control point to higher headquarters:
   a. Leader reports changes/completion of obstacle.
   b. Unit recovers obstacles with the same personnel who emplaced them.
   c. Unit reports removal of control point.

6. Or, unit reports transfer of responsibility when relieved.

**TASK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY BLOCK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS EVAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS “GO”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPLY THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Element: Company

Task: Train the Rules of Engagement.

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle)

TRAINING STATUS: T P U (Circle)

Conditions: Your unit is deployed to a noncombat, but potentially hostile situation, to promote stability, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, assist civil authorities, or protect U.S. interests.

Task Standards:

1. Defend yourself and members of your unit with initiative.
2. Apply all levels of force only when necessary.
3. Apply an amount of force proportionate to each threat encountered.
4. Transition appropriately to combat when ordered to do so by your chain of command.

Subtasks and Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtasks and Standards</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Returns fire with aimed fire.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identifies clear demonstrations of hostile intent using the SALUTE factors. (Size, how many individuals are you facing? Activity, what is he doing, for example, is he pointing a weapon? Location, is he within small arms range? In a prepared firing position? Has he entered a restricted area? Unit, is he wearing a uniform? Part of an organized armed force? Time, how soon before he is upon you? Equipment, is he armed? With what? What are the range and lethality of his weapon?) Anticipates attack by firing first.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identifies situation where hostile intent is unclear using the SALUTE factors. Holds fire while maintaining or seeking a secure position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Responds with measured force when confronted with a potentially hostile force. Uses the scale of VEWPRIK measures. (Verbal warning: tell person(s) in native language to disperse, stay away, or halt. Exhibit Weapon: show your weapon or use some other display that shows you have superior force at your disposal. Warning shot: shoot a warning shot, if authorized. Caution: Warning shots may be interpreted as incoming fire by the person you are trying to “warn” away. Pepper Spray: spray cayenne pepper spray, if authorized and available, and the individual is close enough. Riot Stick: strike with riot stick, if authorized and available, and if the individual is close enough. Poke fleshy parts of the body first, arms and legs next, and, if necessary, escalate to striking the head. Injure with fire, shoot to wound. Kill with fire, shoot to kill.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Omits lower level VEWPRIK measures if the threat quickly grows deadly (civilian pulls grenade out from underneath clothing and prepares to throw).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Declines to use deadly force when piece of property is snatched (sunglasses).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subtasks and Standards | GO | NO GO
---|---|---
7. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect comrades and persons under U.S. control. |  | 
8. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect key property designated by commander (U.S. aircraft). |  | 
9. When told that a force has been designated a “hostile force,” fires aimed shots at members of hostile force whether or not they show hostile intent. |  | 
10. When told that a force has been designated a “hostile force,” continues to use RAMP when encountering civilians, prisoners, and casualties. (Return fire with aimed fire. Anticipate attack. Use force first if, but only if, clear indicators of hostile intent are observed. Measure the amount of force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Protect with deadly force only human life, and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.) |  | 
11. When told that attacks of a particular kind have been reported against U.S. or coalition forces in the area (hand grenades delivered by civilians, car bomb attacks, Molotov cocktails), consider these potential threats when looking for indicators of hostile intent. |  | 
12. Seeks clarification in terms of RAMP when given instructions on use of force that does not fit the RAMP format. |  | 

**TASK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY BLOCK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITERATION</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS EVAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SUBTASKS &amp; STANDARDS “GO”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-15
Appendix B
Sources of Information on Civil Disturbance Operations

Doctrinal Literature:

FM 7-98, Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict
FM 19-4, Military Police Law and Order Operations
FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances
FM 100-23, Peace Operations
FM 100-5, Operations
FM 100-6, Information Operations
FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics
FM 90-40, Multi-Service Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Non-lethal Weapons
TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Military Operations Battlefield Visualization Concept
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-73 w/Ch 1, Military Operations, Concept for Non-lethal Capabilities in Army Operations

Non-Doctrinal Literature:

CALL Newsletter No. 96-6, ROE Training, An Alternative Approach, May 96.
CALL Newsletter No. 96-11, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Disturbances, Nov 96.
CALL News From the Front!, Sep - Oct 96, Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia.
CALL News From the Front!, Nov – Dec 96, Synchronizing the Response to Civil Disturbances.
Infantry Branch Concept on Non-lethal Tactical Applications.