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**FEMA and Hurricane Andrew Disaster Relief
JULLS From the CALL Unclassified Restricted Database**

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JULLS LONG REPORT 10/09/92

1. (u) JULLS NUMBER: 00248-76510 (00007), submitted by SJA, MAJ STRONG, 224-4316, (703)614-4316.
2. (u) operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by @TF ANDREW on 09/27/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: FE14A, LIAISON.
4. (U) TITLE: DOD Interface with FEMA.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: All DOD disaster relief activities must originate with FEMA taskings.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: Upon declaration of a major disaster, FEMA is authorized to coordinate the activities of all Federal agencies, including DOD, in the declared disaster area. As the lead Federal Agency, FEMA determines how Federal resources are to be made available to meet the requirements identified by the state. Accordingly, the JTF possessed no authority to engage in relief activities other than as directed by FEMA. It is critical that DOD assistance be keyed to a FEMA tasking so that reimbursement may be sought for those expenses (i.e., costs over and above normal operating expenses) incurred incident to the relief effort. The liaison between FEMA and the JTF was the Defense Coordinating officer (DCO) and his staff, the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE).
- 7 (U) LESSON LEARNED: Military units must execute only those relief activities that have been approved by FEMA and passed through the DCO.
- 8 (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: That commanders and staff officers be sensitized to the necessity of executing only those disaster relief activities that have been approved by FEMA.
9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: LEGAL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: NONE

(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91379-89160 (00038), submitted by MAJ GARNETT,, John, 471-8572, (512)221-6001.
2. (U) No type DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF ANDREW on 09/14/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: No keywords..

4. (U) TITLE: FEMA/DoD coordination (MED)

5. (?) OBSERVATION: There is a lack of understanding of mission requirements between subordinate FEMA and JTF--medical elements.

6. (?) DISCUSSION: Both FEMA and JTF medical personal are extremely knowledgeable of their individual requirements. However, there appears to be a lack of understanding concerning mission requirements between the two. Indicators that seem to perpetuate this situation are a limited knowledge of each others available resources and an unfamiliarity with operational procedures.

7. (?) LESSON LEARNED: Subordinate elements of disaster relief operations need to be informed of their counterparts capabilities and requirements.

8. (?) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The DoD in conjunction with FEMA should conduct training seminars to enhance subordinate awareness of requirements, resources, and operational procedures.

9. (?) COMMENTS: (91379-89160)

--- (U) SUBJECT: NONE

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: NONE

(U) Lesson distributed by: EAC/JTF.

JULLS LONG REPORT 10/09/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91552-76780 (00047), submitted by G3 PLANS, COL BAR.EFIELD, 236-4806, (919)396-9506.

2 (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on O;/14/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: ED/TNG.

4. (U) TITLE: Requirement for FEMA Information.

5 (U) OBSERVATION: Lack of familiarity with FEMA structure, rules, capabilities, and mission hampered rapid deployment forces and caused confusion about responsibilities during Hurricane Andrew relief operations.

6 (U) DISCUSSION: Relatively little is known about FEMA at the corps level and below. Domestic disaster relief operations require close cooperation between FEMA and deployment of In particular, XVIII ABN rapigrp d its regular Army units. Major Subordinate Commands (MSCS) need information on the organization, capabilities, roles, and mission of FEMA during a disaster relief mission. Time constraints and mission requirements preclude XVIII ABN Corps commanders and staff from performing a detailed study of FEMA. Nonetheless, XVIII ABN corps must have rapid access to information on FEMA during a domestic disaster.

7 (U) LESSON LEARNED: XVIII ABN Corps Headquarters and elements with disaster response mission, roles, and capabilities. A video tap:lpresentation with supplementary written information would low rapid review by key deployable Army leaders during crisis response.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: XVIII ABS Corps obtain FEMA video tape and information pamphlet and distribute this material to corps MSCIS commanders.

(U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT 10/09/92

1- (U) S NUMBER: 9;?611-89883 (00098), submitted by G4, LTC Koch, 341-5491, (315)77;?-5491.

2. (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF ANDREW on 09/25/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: MOUNTAIN, OTHER AGENCIES, OPERATIONS, ENGINEERING, FEMA.

4. (U) TITLE: Federal Emergency Management (FEMA)/Army Interface.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Interface between FEMA and Army units at division and lower levels need improvement.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: At the Joint Task Force (JTF) level, FEMA interfaces with the military through the Defense coordinator office (DCO). By law, the DCO is a Colonel appointed those duties. Below the JTF level, no comparable interface exists. The JTF also interfaces at the state level with a variety of agencies. The division-level established links with the local government (Homestead, Florida City, and South Dade County) and other agencies working at the government centers (Red Cro@s and HRS). Many questions dealing directly with policies and procedures necessary to reach the desired end state arose and required answers from FE?4A. A senior FEMA representative was not provided to the division and local government until the fourth week after the Hurricane, thereby hindering the decision-making process and frustrating actions aimed at reaching "end-state".

7: (U) LESSON LEARNED: PL responsible FEMA representative or liaison is required at the Division-level early on in the disaster recovery effort.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: FEMA appoint knowledgeable liaison as the force develops and collocate these personnel with the division and local centers of government.

9. (U) COMMENTS: NONE

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP (U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 00147-79594 (00012), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3-OC, MAJ Kinney, 367-5872, (404)669-5872.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, OTHER AGENCIES, DOD DIRECTIVES, OTHER DIRECTIVES, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, FEMA.

4. (U) TITLE: Federal Response Plan (FRP) Implementation.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The mission assignment authority was retained by the Federal Coordination Officer (FCO). Mission tasking authority was not delegated to each Emergency Support Function (ESF) in accordance with (IAW) the FRP.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: a. (U) Federal assistance is provided to state and local authorities IAW procedures outlined in the FRP. Designated Federal agencies/departments are designated as the primary Federal agency/department for managing the support of specified Emergency Support Functions (ESF). This responsibility includes tasking authority over designated supporting Federal agencies/ departments. The lead agency/department for each ESF tasks supporting agencies/departments as necessary to carry out assigned ESF missions.

b. (U) For Hurricane Andrew response, the FRP was not fully implemented. Although the ESFs were activated, tasking authority was withheld from the ESFS. The ESFs were activated to coordinate ESF support, but only the FCO had mission tasking authority.

c. (U) The fact that only the FCO could task, not the ESFS, was not disseminated to all. This lack of dissemination of information caused confusion as to who could task and to whom would DOD/FORSCOM respond.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Need to announce as soon as possible the extent of FRP implementation and insure wide dissemination of information.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Upon implementation of the FRP in whole or part, FEMA announce to all the extent to which the FRP is implemented, which ESFs are activated, and who has tasking authority.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (00147-79594)

--- (U) SUBJECT: PLANS AND POLICY

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91450-30796 (00002), submitted by CALL, LTC Howard, (508)356-1360.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS, DOCTRINE, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: There Was A Lack Of Joint Disaster Relief Doctrine.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The lack of definitive, joint disaster relief doctrine had an adverse effect on the DOD response to the disaster relief effort.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: Joint disaster relief doctrine is non existent according to the Center for Joint Doctrine at McDill, APB. Instead of a doctrinal document, several other documents serve as DOD guidance for Disaster Relief operations. Specifically the Federal Response Plan for Public Law 93-288 (DEC 1991) and DOD Directive 3025.1 Use of Military Resource During Peacetime Civil Emergencies are the key documents. AR 500-60 is the Army regulation governing support for disaster relief. All three documents address the authority, responsibility and limitations of various federal agencies and departments; however, there is no single document that articulates the how, what, where, when, and who relative to a national disaster. Further there is nothing resembling a tactics, techniques, and procedures manual familiar to those in the Army.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: See Above paragraph.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Based on existing laws, directives and regulations and in consort with the lessons learned from JTF Andrew and other disaster relief efforts, develop a set of disaster relief doctrinal documents at both the joint and service level. These documents should be disaster and magnitude specific in accordance with FEMA classification specifications.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: COMMAND & CONTROL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: DOCTRINE

(U) Action managed by: DOMS/JCS/FC, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91623-75230 (00003), submitted by CALL, LTC Howard, (508)356-1360.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR an 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: Damage Assessment Must Be More Timely And Comprehensive.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The initial damage assessment should be more timely and comprehensive. Also, military assets should be considered for use early in the damage assessment process.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: Virtually everyone interviewed was critical of the early assessment effort. In fact, the delay in requesting and deploying adequate military and other federal assistance is often attributed to an inadequate and untimely initial assessment. For instance, the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) was not included when the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and State Coordinating Officer conducted their damage assessment. Also, the use of technical capabilities like satellite imagery were not maximized. Also, other military assets like special forces disaster assessment teams, that have the capability to assess damaged areas immediately after a disaster, were not used early in the assessment process.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: See above paragraph.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: When addressing disasters with the potential for major damage, military assets should be considered for use early in the damage assessment process.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING

(U) Action managed by: FC/ FEMA, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91644-85171 (00004), submitted by CALL, LTC Howard,-, (508)356-1360.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR oil 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS, C2 (COMMAND AND CONTROL), SPECLAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: There Is A Need To Review The Implementation Of A Joint Task Force.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: There is a great deal of discussion concerning the ability of a Joint Task Force (JTF) to stand up quickly and effectively. Most of the discussion (argument) is centered around the most appropriate organization to head up tile JTF from a command and control perspective. The discussion is not judgemental of the 2nd Army's performance but more a debate as to what type organization is best suited to head up a disaster relief JTF. Others maintain that a corps headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps in particular) is best suited because it is a deployable headquarters; is immediately operational; is better suited than a Continental US Army (CONUSA) to operate in a joint environment; and facilitates command and control by eliminating the necessity of one headquarters.

A minority suggested that a new standing JTF for non-combatant missions might be feasible. While opinions varied, suggestions included a cadre JTF that could be expanded as necessary; a JTF that could address both domestic and military issues.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: Most interviewees maintain that CONUSAs are best suited to head up a disaster relief JTF because tile CONUSA conducts Military Assistance to Civil Authority planning; provides liaison to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); exercises with FEMA; provides regional Defense Coordinating Officers/Defense Coordinating Elements; and provides liaison with the other services. Others maintain that a corps headquarters (specifically the XVIII Airborne Corps) is better suited because it is deployable, is functional almost immediately upon arrival; understands joint operations better than a CONUSA, and would eliminate the necessity of one headquarters.

A minority suggested that consideration should be given to a new standing JTF. While there was no consensus as to what this JTF might look like, suggestions included a cadre JTF; a JTF that could be expanded as necessary; a JTF that could address both domestic and international disaster relief missions; and a JTF that could handle other humanitarian assistance type missions.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: See above paragraph.

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91569-31696 (00009), submitted by ARFOR, COL BURCKHARDT, 791-7119, (305)224-7119.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, OPERATIONS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: Where Was The Centralized Point For Damage Assessment?.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: It was unclear which staff element agency at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Joint Task Force (JTF) was responsible for centralized management and production of damage assessment information or products.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: Damage assessment or natural disasters is analogous to Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for military combat operations. Responsibility for BDA rests with the theater and JTF intelligence staffs and targeting cells, with significant input from USAF resources. The Army Forces (ARFOR) and Corps intelligence staffs provide information to support BDA, but are not primarily responsible for it. For Continental U.S. based natural disasters, the civilian community and Federal Government, through the FEMA, act as the "THEATER" commander. The FEMA and the civilian community, primarily the county Government level, have the resources, including the Geographic Information System (GIS), the authority, and an existing disaster relief plan to best organize and manage damage assessment. The FEMA and its JTF counterparts, are in the best position to produce timely and accurate damage assessment products necessary for the proper planning and execution of disaster relief operations.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Timely and accurate damage assessment are vital to commanders in planning and executing disaster relief operations. The resources to receive, integrate, and manage volumes of disaster information and the authority to task commercial and Government assets reside with FEMA, the local Government, and to a lesser extent the JTF.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: During future natural disasters in CONUS, FEMA and the JTF should establish a damage assessment task force. The damage assessment task force would be responsible for the following:

A. Standardizing all damage assessment reporting.

B. Receiving, validating, prioritizing, and processing all damage assessment requests for information.

C. Maintaining a damage assessment database and library of imagery.

D. Analyzing damage assessment requirements and develop a collection plan to collect damage assessment information.

E. Tasking/requesting both commercial and Government Imagery Collection Agencies and assets to image the disaster area in accordance with the collection plan and provide imagery products on an initial and continuing basis during disaster relief operations.

F. Managing and tasking all. disaster assessment teams (including all civilian and military teams) in accordance with the collection plan, to provide specific information concerning damage to the infrastructure.,

G. Receiving, analyzing, and processing all damage assessment reporting, ensuring it is integrated into the GIS or similar automated, computerized, map-based system.

H. Producing damage assessment products including templates, overlays, maps, charts, and reports.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

(U) SUBJECT: PLANS AND POLICY

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING

(U) Action managed by: FEMA, action worked by: , RAP number: Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 92556-15571 (00010), submitted by JTF G-3, MAJ TATE, 341-6119, (315)772-6119.
2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS, ENGINEERING, LSC, LIFE SUPPORT CENTER, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.
4. (U) TITLE: Requirements Of A Life Support Center (LSC).
5. (U) OBSERVATION: Task organization and guidance for required element to establish and operate an LSC do not exist.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: A LSC established by the cooperative efforts of military and civil organizations requires the following:
 - a. Red Cross is in charge of the LSC and provides administration and operational guidance. It screens all victims, approves and assigns housing (tents) for occupancy. A minimum of two personnel, supplemented with a military or local civilian linguist, and a military civil affairs team are essential to processing disaster victims. Twelve hour operations is acceptable.
 - b. Health rehabilitation services are critical to managing the health of the camp. Nurses provide immediate first aid immunizations, and health care, as well as, counseling to include mental health. They assist in placing special needs and elderly persons in other housing that fits their needs. A key element in health services is the requirement for an ambulance and medic, military or civilian.
 - c. Child Care Centers are established through a coordinated effort of Red Cross, Health Services, and available civic organizations to establish a quality of life service for children, which also allows parents the freedom to pursue assistance in disaster recovery.
 - d. Food preparation and distribution is essential from the onset with military rations provided immediately through distribution of Meals Ready To Eat (MRE) and hot meals. Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs) are necessary and crucial until contract feeding can be obtained. 11/13/92
 - e. State and Federal agencies that distribute food stamps, relief checks, and job assistance are needed to assist in victim recovery.
 - f. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representatives are required to provide processing of applicants for follow-on housing, i.e., trailers, and issuing monetary

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 92530-22637 (00012), submitted by JTF J3, COL Harper, 797-7498, (404)362-7498.
2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS, JOINT PLANNING, FEMA, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.
4. (U) TITLE: FEMA Interface and the Federal Response Plan.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not activate the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP calls for the FEMA HQ and regional offices to "notify federal departments and agencies regarding activation of some or all of the ESFs and other structures of the plan". Confusion was created among the federal agencies by use of the terms "implementation" and "activation". By virtue of this confusion, interface between the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) was ill-defined and poorly managed.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The FRP describes mechanisms and structures by which the federal government mobilizes resources and conducts activities to augment state and local response elements in a disaster or emergency situation. The ESF concept of interface between the Federal Coordinating Office (FCO), the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), the Joint Task Force (JTF) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) can be summarized thusly: The DCO serves in the field as the point of contact to the FCO and the ESFs for requests for military assistance. The DCO/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) coordinate support and provides liaison to the ESFs. Most DOD forces are not familiar with the FRP and FEMA.

Second U.S. Army staff and Readiness Group staffs were the smartest uniformed personnel regarding disaster response, due to heavy planning and participation in the Second U.S. Army Southeastern Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Seminars (SECMEPS). Second U.S. Army had planned to export this seminar to the active duty Corps and Divisions in the coming year. The FCO and the DCO have a unique relationship - no other agency of the government can bring more resources to bear in less time than the services represented by the DCO. Twelve ESFs serve as the primary mechanism through which federal response assistance is provided to assist an affected state:

ESF 1 - Transportation: Coordinates federal transportation support to state and local government, private volunteer organizations and federal agencies requiring transportation to perform their emergency services missions,

ESF 2 - Communications: Provides federal telecommunications support to federal, state, and local emergency response elements. Coordinates establishment of temporary communications in the affected area.

ESF 3 - Public Works and Engineering: Provides engineering support to assist the states in needs related to lifesaving or life protecting.

ESF 4 - Firefighting: Manages and coordinates firefighting activities, including the detection and suppression of fires on federal lands, and providing firefighters, equipment, and supplies in support of state and local agencies involved in rural and urban firefighting.

ESF 5 - Information and Planning: Collects, processes and disseminates information about potential or actual disasters or emergencies to facilitate the overall activities of the federal government in providing response assistance.

ESF 6 - Mass Care: Coordinates efforts to provide shelter, food, and emergency first aid. Operates a Disaster Welfare Information System to collect, receive, and report information about the status of victims and assist with family reunification within the disaster area; and to coordinate bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies to disaster victims following a disaster.

ESF 7 - Resource Support; Provides logistical and resource support to federal organizations during the immediate response phase of a disaster. Includes emergency relief supplies, space, office equipment, office supplies, telecommunications, contracting services, transportation service (in cooperation with ESF 1) and personnel.

ESF 8 - Health and Medical Services: Provides coordinated assistance to supplement state and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs following an emergency,

ESF 9 - Urban Search and Rescue: Locate, extricate and provide for the immediate medical treatment of victims trapped in collapsed structures.

ESF 10 - Hazardous Materials: Provides federal support to state and local governments in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or release of hazardous materials following a catastrophe.

ESF 11 - Food: Activities are undertaken to identify food assistance needs in the aftermath of a major disaster or emergency. They obtain appropriate food supplies, arrange for transportation of those food supplies to designated staging areas. May authorize food stamp assistance,

ESF 12 - Energy: Coordinates the provision of emergency power and fuel to support immediate response operations as well as providing power and fuel to normalize community functioning. Includes producing, refining, transporting, generating, transmitting, conserving, building, and maintaining energy systems and system components. When the FRP is activated by FEMA, each ESF is granted tasking authority over its supporting agencies. Since DOD supports every other ESF, its role in disaster relief is proportionally larger than any other agency's. The confusion over the "activation" of the FRP resulted in all ESFs being told that only the FCO and Deputy FCO for Response could approve missions.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: That in future response operations, FEMA activate the Federal Response Plan by a published order signed by the FEMA Director. This will eliminate any confusion among the responding federal agencies as to what their duties and responsibilities are.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: FEMA/DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91651-88465 (00018), submitted by JTF J-3/AAR, CAPT Webster, 797-7536, (404)934-6924. 11/13/92

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: PLAN, OPERATION, TASKING AUTHORITY, DOD, NAVY, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: Federal Response Plan Not Utilized.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not follow the Federal Response Plan in the response to Hurricane Andrew. Confusion existed among the other federal agencies as to what authority was necessary for tasking, and the means to gain the correct authority.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The Federal Response Plan was approved in April 1992 and was amended to existing FEMA processes for activation in the event of a catastrophic disaster, where the prompt response by one of the twelve "Emergency Support Functions" (ESFs) is imperative. Prior to the disaster declaration by the President of the US, FEMA "implemented" the Federal Response Plan and assembled the applicable federal agencies at the Regional Operations center in Atlanta, GA on 22 August 1992. Following the disaster declaration on 24 August 1992, the media and FEMA expressed the fact that the "new" emergency plan was "activated", however, in the FEMA SITREP of 25 August 1992, Mr. Glenn Woodard of FEMA specifically states that "tasking authority has not been given to the ESFs." The President of the US (POTUS) declared on national television that the military would be used to respond.

The massive DOD response resulted in FERA authorized taskings that did not necessarily originate from the State of Florida nor from the affected county, Dade. Further, because the enormity of the relief effort necessary by DOD was not clear on 2B - 29 August, when the DOD was committed by the President of the US, both the Army and the Navy committed extensive resources to the response without clear knowledge how these assets would be used. The Army and the Navy each approached this problem in different methods, each of which appears to have been successful:

a. The Army processed tasks from the Federal Coordinating Officer to authorize the commitment of extensive assets from the XVIII Corps, and once the forces were in Florida, processed authorized taskings prior to committing those resources to any task.

b. The Navy was authorized tasking only to establish two 2500-person "tent cities" and a twenty-person clinical facility when CINCLANTFLT authorized six vessels to deploy for disaster response activities at or near the port of Miami. A Navy Task Force (CTF 28) commander was deployed to the Army Joint Task Force (JTF) offices to coordinate the arrival of the ships and to identify and prepare missions for the CTF resources. Validation of tasking was either performed by the Navy resources, once they arrived, or just prior to arrival.

7. (U) LESSONS LEARNED: The existing FRP and statute structure places the responding DOD Commander in jeopardy either of under staffing to assure budgetary conservation or possible "waste" for over-responding to a disaster that has not been assessed, nor specific tasking provided. 11/13/92

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The method of tasking authority needs to be reviewed and potentially modified to account for the general inability of the victim area to effectively assess their own damage and communicate needs to the state and federal level. If the resulting method of response is graduated based on severity of the disaster, the parent authority will need to keep all

respondents informed of the plan being enforced by area of response.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (91651-88465) Action on this item requires interaction by FEMA, DOD and other responding federal agencies. DOD needs to assess the impact of accepting more authority in the disaster response phase. Additional response by DOD may require statutory revision.

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: FEMA/DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91732-40032 (00019), submitted by JTF J-3/AAR, CAPT Webster, 797-7536, (404)934-6924. 11/13/92

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: USN (US NAVY), ORDERS/GUIDANCE, UNIT TRAINING, NAVY, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: DOD Disaster Plan Program Knowledge by Shipboard Personnel Needs Improvement.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The wardroom and crews of six Navy vessels called to action on short notice were not cognizant of the military Support for Civil Authority Program, issues, funding, non-reporting relationships, prior to their assignment.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The Department of Defense Directives, Navy Guidance and other data regarding National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) provide basic policy, guidance and direction concerning Navy commands providing support to civil authority both in life-threatening situations and in Presidential Declarations; catastrophic and otherwise.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: JTF Andrew utilized modified processes from either the process required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in non-catastrophic situations or the process described in the Federal Response Plan. The Commodore, TF and the Navy Defense Coordinating Element provided sufficient process guidance to assure tasking was not held up and the existing assets were effectively used. With little direct guidance on disaster response, good Navy people developed very effective techniques and controls to respond.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Navy should consider implementing a training program for those ships that can be taped and provided to ships that are alerted for disaster response. The involvement of the existing Navy Liaison Officer program under COMNAVRESFOR, New Orleans would provide prompt response and would assure continuity of this information. A "Disaster Planning Guide" might be considered for forces afloat and NMCB / ACU u8e, but should not provide more than guidance

9. (U) COMMENTS: (91732-40032) COMNAVRESFOR (Code 404) is sponsor of the Navy Liaison Officer Program and has assets liaison to each Continental Army, FEMA Regional Office, FORSCOM, and each state.

--- (U) SUBJECT: PLANS AND POLICY

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: TRAINING

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91743-28568 (00020), submitted by JTF J-3/AAR, CAPT Webster, 797-7536, (404)934-6924. 11/13/92

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: USN (US NAVY), AT SEA, DEPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT TYPE, NAVY, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: Use of Navy Repair Ships in Disaster Response Effective.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: JTF Andrew employed the services of six Navy ships to assist in the response to damage caused by Hurricane Andrew in south Dade county, FL. Two of these vessels were Tenders or afloat ship repair vessels, which provided workforces of over 500 technicians each and repair facilities for major refurbishment.

6. (C) DISCUSSION: The USS Hunley (AS 31) and the USS Sierra (AD 18) arrived on 31 August 1992 at Port of Miami piers and were tasked immediately to assist in tent setup, school damage assessment, and FEMA administrative assistance. For the most part, the ships foundry, motor rewind, carpentry, and other industrial shops were not put to use, however, each ship's complement of 1000 normally provides off-ship repair and was prepared to provide significant numbers of skilled technicians and experienced personnel.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Navy repair ships provide extensive repair resources that are appropriate for any coastal disaster response.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Joint disaster planning should include the use of Navy Repair Vessels as a response and recovery platform. The additional benefit of housing for the Navy personnel assigned would make these vessels attractive even in the worst disaster.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (91743-28568) None

--- (U) SUBJECT: PLANS AND POLICY

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: FC/DOMS/CNO, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (11) JULLS NUMBER: 00244-75779 (00026), submitted by JTF SJA, MAJ STRONG, 224-4316, (703)614-4316.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RELIEF WORKERS, MEDICAL SUPPORT, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: Provision of Routine Medical Support to Civilian Relief Workers Is Allowed.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: If tasked by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Public Health Service, the military may provide routine medical services to civilian relief workers as well as disaster victims.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: On its face, the Stafford Act appears to authorize the provision of routine medical services to disaster victims only, not to relief workers. However, the Office of the General Counsel, FEMA, opined that the Act (42 U.S.C. 5170(b)) does authorize the provision of routine medical services to relief workers. Under this authority, FEMA or the Public Health Service, which has the primary responsibility for relief worker health under the Federal Response Plan, may task DOD to provide these medical services.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: FEMA or Public Health Service taskings to the military to operate aid stations in the disaster area should include the treatment of relief workers as well as disaster victims.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

(U) SUBJECT: LEGAL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING

(U) Action managed by: CALL, action worked by: , RAP number: Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 00248-76510 (00027), submitted by JTF SJA, MAJ STRONG, 224-4316, (703)614-4316.
2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: FEMA, LIAISON, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.
4. (U) TITLE: DOD Interface with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
5. (U) OBSERVATION: All DOD disaster relief activities must originate with FEMA taskings.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: Upon declaration of a major disaster, FEMA is authorized to coordinate the activities of all Federal agencies, including DOD, in the declared disaster area. As the lead Federal Agency, FEMA determines how Federal resources are to be made available to meet the requirements identified by the State. Accordingly, the JTF possessed no authority to engage in relief activities other than as directed by FEMA. It is critical that DOD assistance be keyed to a FEMA tasking so that reimbursement may be sought for those expenses (i.e., costs over and above normal operating expenses) incurred incident to the relief effort. The liaison between FEMA and the JTF was the Defense Coordinating officer (DCO) and his staff, the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE).
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Military units must execute only those relief activities that have been approved by FEMA and passed through the DCO.
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: That commanders and staff officers be sensitized to the necessity of executing only those disaster relief activities that have been approved by FEMA.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: LEGAL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING

(U) Action managed by: FORSCOM, action worked by: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 00249-61370 (00028), submitted MAJ STRONG, 224-4316, (703)614-4316. by JTF SJA,
2. (11) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: CHAPLAINS, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, U.S. CONSTITUTION, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM. 1J /13/92
4. (U) TITLE: Chaplain Activities Included A Wide Range Of Support.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: The Joint Task Force (JTF) chaplains ministered to the spiritual needs of disaster victims, a potentially controversial activity given the constitutional prohibition on government sponsored religion and the narrow grounds on which the military chaplaincy has been constitutionally justified.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: JTF chaplains provided a wide range of support services, both secular and spiritual, to disaster victims. While chaplains prayed with disaster victims (sometimes in their homes) and distributed Bibles and crosses, they also provided stress counseling and furnished information as to where shelter, food, and other emergency services could be found. The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, in essence, prohibits governmental sponsorship of religion. In determining whether certain conduct is in violation of the Establishment Clause, the courts have developed a 3 part test. In effect, the activity is permissible if it has a secular purpose, its primary effect does not advance religion, and it does not create an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Administering to the spiritual needs of the disaster victims fails to satisfy this test. Moreover, when the military chaplaincy was challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause, the court confirmed the constitutionality of the chaplaincy but did so, in part, on the basis that the mission of the chaplaincy was to engage in activities designed to meet the religious needs of a pluralistic military community. Therefore, providing for the spiritual needs of

civilian disaster victims falls outside the narrow constitutional parameters in which the military chaplaincy lawfully operates, and invites further court challenges from those who would see the chaplaincy abolished or further constrained.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Military chaplains do have a role in disaster relief operations. However, their participation must serve a secular vis-a-vis a spiritual. purpose. Therefore, to the extent their secular counseling skills are requested by local authorities, through FEMA, they can lawfully provide these services to disaster victims. If their spiritual and secular roles cannot be successfully segregated, chaplain participation must be limited to administering to the spiritual needs of those military personnel located in the disaster area.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: In future disaster relief operations, chaplain activities should be confined to ministering to the needs of the force, except to the extent that chaplains can perform FEMA directed, secular counseling or other informational functions.

9. (U) COMMENTS: None.

--- (U) SUBJECT: LEGAL

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING ---(U) Action managed by: FORSCOM, action worked by: , RAP number; . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91462-16511 (00029), PETERSEN, 797-7808, (404)362-7808. 11/13/92

submitted by JTF J4, LTC

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF' conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: CLASS I, LOGISTICS,USDA, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.

4. (U) TITLE: US Department Of Agriculture Rations For Workers.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Ration Source Suitability for Feeding operations. Were Unsuitable

Emergency

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was tasked by the Federal Emergency Management Activity to provide subsistence to agencies feeding disaster victims. Tile USDA issued bulk excess food commodities. These rations were perishable, semi-perishable and lacked variety of choices. The USDA rations required extensive handling, refrigeration and were unsuited for long-term relief operations.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: See above paragraph.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: FEMA should adopt the Armys concept of the Right Meal, Right Time, Right Place. Assuming Army feeding through Phase I-III. the following should be adopted:

THE RIGHT MEAL (RATION)

a. PHASE 1 RELIEF

The Meal Ready to Eat (MRE) should be the only ration issued immediately after an disaster. It requires no refrigeration, preparation, and it is easily pushed forward to the people that need food to survive. The issuance of flameless heater and pouch bread will contribute to their acceptance and use.

b. PHASE 2 RECOVERY

The T-ration should be the next and only ration introduced to the disaster area by DOD. The T-ration comes in 18 man modules.

it is prepackaged with entree, starch, vegetable, dessert, condiments of salt, pepper, sugar, instant coffee, cream, hot sauce, Kool aid, peanut butter, jelly, disposable cups, plates, knives, forks, spoons and trash bags. It requires no refrigeration, is easy to prepare, and it enhances field sanitation. UHT is the milk of choice. Limited quantities of ice are needed for chilling beverages only. The PHASE 2 relief feeding cycle should be T-MRE-T.

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C. PHASE 3 RECONSTITUTION

As the theater/relief operation stabilizes the T-rations could be enhanced with the issuance of portion control (PC) boxes of dry cereal, fresh bread, fresh fruits, salad and vegetables. Fresh 1/2 pints of milk and fresh fruits and vegetables place an increased requirement for ice. the theater of relief feeding cycle should be T-MRE-T, however the Task Force CDR may elect to serve T-T-T.

THE RIGHT TIME - THE RIGHT PLACE

- a. Phase I - MREs pushed forward immediately to the lowest user, shelter sites to individuals. MREs trucked or airlifted as the situation dictates.
- b. Phase 2 - T-rations pushed forward as fast as soldiers (NG/AC) can mobilize. The Kitchen Company Level Field Feeding (KCLFF) is best suited for the preparation and serving of T-Rations. the KCLFF requires ONE cook and ONE soldier to load, unload, prepare and serve 300 people per meal. Each forward deployed Relief Field Feeding Team (RFFT) should consist of two cooks, two drivers (helpers), two 2 prime movers. Truck 1 would transport KCLFF, water, and T-rations. Truck #1 will pull a trailer containing fuel, field gear, and a shelter. If adequate personnel and primemovers are available Truck #2 will haul addition T-rations and pull a 400 gal water trailer.
- c. PHASE 3 - Sustained feeding operations continue with resupply of rations and water. Relief Field Feeding Teams could easily relocate as determined by theater Commander.
- d. PHASE 4 - Relief Field Feeding Teams will be redeployed as soon as civilian contractor assumes the feeding mission.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: LOGISTICS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: MATERIEL

--- (U) Action managed by: FEMA/USDA, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT 11/13/92

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 00140-54023 (00035), submitted by JTF J1, Dr. Dunn, 797-7615, (404)362-7615.
2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: PHASE II, FAMILY PROGRAMS.
4. (U) TITLE: Family Programs Disaster Relief Mission.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: A Family Programs staff assistance visit to Reserve Component (RC) Family Assistance Centers (FACs) on 17-20 Sep 92 indicated that a coordinating link between the RC Family Programs Coordinators and the various disaster relief agencies was missing.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: A FAC assessment by Second Army Family Programs staff determined that approximately 350 RC families were directly affected by Hurricane Andrew; about 57 % of these sustained total losses. Local Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) Family Program teams had fanned out quickly into the community to provide assistance and information. FAC staff members expressed concern for their lack of complete, timely, and accurate information about available assistance from civilian and relief agencies, e.g., disaster loans, disaster housing assistance, grants, disaster

unemployment, income tax advice, legal advice, disaster loans to farmers or ranchers, social security assistance, veterans' assistance, emergency individual and family needs, contractor's licensing, insurance information. They also had limited information on the Life Support Centers (LSCs).

The Second Army Family Programs element deployed to Joint Task Force Andrew on 22 Sep 92. This presence created an RC link to high level federal, state, local, and military disaster assistance agencies. The now designated JTF Andrew Family Programs staff interfaced with the Defense Coordination Office (DCO) to receive current information on the Life Support Centers which was part of the Disaster Housing Program. Most importantly, an information flow link was established between RC Family Programs and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Enrollment in FEMA was required in order to receive benefits from the various types of federal, state, and local disaster assistance programs.

JTF Andrew Family Programs staff attendance at high level disaster assistance meetings ensured up-to-the-minute information in realtime. The result was Disaster Assistance Program information being more effectively disseminated to the FACs. The FEMA linkage also gained access to the agency's comprehensive registration data bank. This permitted a case by case listing of RC soldier families affected by the disaster.

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The JTF Andrew Family Programs element developed a RC tracking system and quickly furnished updated reports to FACS. This action resulted in those grassroots agencies getting prompt status reports to soldiers about their disaster assistance requests. As a matter of fact, the JTF Andrew Family Programs staff coupled with the FAC system caused information to get passed more quickly than FEMA's because FEMA relied upon the mail, which was disrupted by the widespread destruction. Given the initial chaotic conditions, an earlier arrival of the Second Army Family Programs element would have provided the much needed information flow between RC Family Program staff and civilian human service agencies and FEMA in a more timely manner.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: The Continental United States Army (CONUSA) Family Programs element must be part of the "fly-away team" deployment package that reacts to any contingency in which RC families are affected. The Family Program element serves as a clearinghouse for current and rapid information dissemination on civilian and military assistance. An immediate direct link must be established between Family Programs Coordinators and DCO and FEMA in any disaster relief operation in order to provide realtime information to affected military families.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Include the Family Program function in the deployment package for on-site staff in disaster relief operations and similar contingencies.

9. (U) COMMENTS: None

--- (U) SUBJECT: PERSONNEL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

(U) Action managed by: CALL, action Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 00657-57960 (00005), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3-OC, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, DOD (DEPARTMENT OF DEF), OTHER AGENCIES, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, DOD DIRECTIVES, JOINT PLANNING, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, FEMA, CATASTROPHIC DISASTER, USACE, DIR OF MIL SPT (DOMS), CONUSA, DEFENSE COORD OFFICER.

4. (U) TITLE: DOD's Initial Response Responsibilities for a Catastrophe.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Recent catastrophic disasters, e.g., Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, have required greater military involvement than currently envisioned in the Federal Response Plan (FRP). A catastrophic earthquake would likely involve significant military support well beyond the support required for Urban Search and Rescue (US&R).

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) The Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead federal agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3, Public Works and Engineering, and ESF 9, Urban Search and Rescue. Within DOD, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the DOD Operating Agent for ESF 3. The USACE draws upon supporting ESF agencies for technical personnel and expertise. It has power generators and personnel to operate the generators to provide emergency power. Since the USACE has no assigned forces, the primary means of accomplishing the functions of debris removal, emergency demolition, restoration of essential facilities, and water supply is through civilian contracting.

b. (U) For ESF 9, the Director of Military Support (DOMS) will designate a Supported Commander-in-Chief (CINC) at time of execution to be the DOD Operating Agent. Within the Continental US, CINCFOR will be the Supported CINC and the ESF 9 Operating Agent.

c. (U) The DOD is a supporting agency to all other ESFS. Other ESFs can come to DOD and request support for their ESF responsibilities. As the designated Supported CINC, CINCFOR can task all DOD forces in the US for support.

d. (U) All military forces operate under military control, even when supporting other federal agencies. The supported federal agencies provide missions, directions, and guidance. But the military chain of command is responsible for the execution of assigned tasks.

e. (U) When a catastrophic disaster occurs, rapid and massive federal support is required. The military has the capability to respond rapidly with the kinds of support initially required: medical, engineering, communications, mass care (including shelter, food, and water), transportation (including helicopters and all wheel drive vehicles to move within the disaster area), and organizational structures (e-g., joint and functional task forces).

f. (U) Since other federal agencies, including the USACE, have technical experts, but limited pools of manpower, they rely heavily on contracting and civilian organizations to provide many ESF functions. Contracting and reliance on civilian organizations has not been able to provide the rapid, massive response required following a catastrophic disaster. Contacting and civilian organizations do provide major support, even surpassing military support, after a period of time. But time is required.

g. (U) Because of this, the military is called upon to provide the rapid, initial federal response. The military's rapid response capability surpasses the rapid response capability of other primary ESF agencies to provide the massive support required immediately following a catastrophe. When the military does provide the initial, massive federal response, the other primary ESF agencies must assume ESF functions from the military as rapidly as possible. The primary ESF agency should not continue to rely on the initial response military forces for continuing ESF functions. military forces should be replaced as rapidly as possible.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: The military can expect to be the initial response force following a catastrophic disaster.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

a. (U) DOMS work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to incorporate DOD's initial response requirements in the FRP.

b. (U) FEMA revise the FRP to clarify DOD's initial response requirements following a catastrophic disaster. FEMA should revise the FRP Concept of Operations to reflect the military's initial response.

c. (U) FORSCOM J5 develop and publish a Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan which incorporates the military's probable initial response requirements.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (00657-57960)

10/09/92

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91766-03686 (00029), submitted by JTF ENGINEER, MAJ Anderson, 797-7704, (404)362-7704.

2. (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on 09/17/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: PRIORITY OF EFFORT-ENGR, FEMA, ESF 3, PHASE I.

4. (U) TITLE: Engineer Priority of Effort Were Not Properly Focused.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Engineer priorities established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency -(FEMA) were not properly focused.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: Engineer priorities for debris removal upon my arrival on 28 Aug 92 were stated as clearance in devastated area with priorities working from north to south. There was no attempt to identify critical road nets and mass engineer effort to get those nets open, and then concentrate on lower priority missions.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: Engineer effort must be focused on the most critical actions to ensure they are accomplished first.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: FEMA (ESF 3) establish engineer priorities based on what systems need to be repaired first to ensure the health and well being of the victims.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: ENGINEER

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING

(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

10/09/92 JULLS LONG REPORT

1 (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91563-01909 (00004), submitted by JTF EKGINEER, MAJ Meeks, 835-4221, (706)545-4221.

2. (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on 09/15/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: CLASS IV, PHASE II.

4. (U) TITLE: It Was Difficult For Class IV Distribution.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Difficulty in distributing large quantities of construction material to relief organizations.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: A rough estimate of needed construction material was determined and then requested. As the material flowed into the hurricane damaged area, the concept was for the military to be a wholesale outlet for construction materials. Retail customers such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Religious Organizations were contacted and asked to be the retail outlets. The relief organizations realized the need and wanted the material. The difficulty that these retailers experienced was with storage space. Warehouse space was at a premium and the relief organizations were hesitant to take possession of the quantities of material that the military had requested. The concern was that the relief organizations would have to pay high warehouse rental fees for months or possibly years.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: After major disasters, warehouse space is difficult to locate. Major organizations, businesses and local governments are all competing for warehouse space.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Have FEMA coordinate and pay for warehouse storage. Allocate this warehouse space to the various relief agencies based on need. This would give planners a better idea on the total warehouse space available and put one organization in charge of allocating space.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: LOGISTICS

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: MATERIEL

(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

11/13/92 JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 01629-40705 (00007), submitted by TCJ3/j4-LPP, RAJ Collinsworth, 576-8025, (618)256-8025.
2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: DISASTER, ANDREW, HURRICANE ANDREW RESPONSE, FLORIDA, DOMS, LOUISIANA, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM.
4. (U) TITLE: Relationship Between USTRANSCOM and DOMS, CINCFOR and JTF.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: The relationships of USTRANSCOM with the Director of Military Support (DOMS), the supported CINC (CINCFOR), and Joint Task Forces (JTF) need to be clearly stated in all documents impacting domestic disaster relief operations.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: In the initial aftermath of the Hurricane Andrew response, FEMA, DOMS, CINCFOR, and JTF Andrew were calling USTRANSCOM and our TCC's directly for transportation support. This created confusion as to who was in charge, and who constituted competent authority to task us for transportation support.
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: The relationship between USTRANSCOM and DOMS, CINCFOR and JTF must be clearly defined to coordinate any future Massive Domestic Disaster Relief (DDR).
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Briefings to CINCTRANS, the DCINC, and the Director Operations/Logistics resulted in the following action plan.
 - a. (U) Release a message to DOMS stating the relationship between USTC and DOMS for future Massive Domestic Disaster Relief (DDR) response.
 - b. (U) Educate the USTC staff on the DOMS role.
 - c. (U) Publish USTC DDR Planning Order.
 - d. (U) Work with the supported CINCs as they develop their DDR plans.
 - e. (U) Publish USTC supporting plans to supported CINC's DDR plans.
 - f. (U) With DOMS, propose revisions to Federal Response Plan.
9. (U) COMMENTS: (01629-40705) The OPR's for the recommended actions listed above are as follows:

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91735-05932 (00008), submitted by COSCOM, 360-1411.
2. (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on 09/16/92.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: LOGISTICS.
4. (U) TITLE: SUPPLY ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: EARLY INTO THE RELIEF OPERATION THERE APPEARED TO BE LITTLE TO NO SYSTEM TO ACCURATELY ACCOUNT FOR SUPPLIES ISSUED FROM THE FEMA/AMC WAREHOUSE LOCATED IN HANGER 22 MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: WITH A GREAT SENSE OF URGENCY AND SPEED, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ISSUED AND DREW ASSETS FROM THE FEMA/AMC DEPOT LOCATED IN THE EASTERN AIRLINES HANGER 22 LOCATED AT THE MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. INITIALLY, PARK SERVICE PERSONNEL MANAGED THE OPERATION OF UNLOADING, LOADING AND STORING SUPPLIES AS THEY ARRIVED IN THE AO IN SUPPORT OF THE RELIEF EFFORT. AS MILITARY UNITS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES REQUESTED THESE SUPPLIES, THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AND TRANSPORTED WITH LITTLE TO NO REGARDS TO ACCOUNTABILITY. THERE APPEARED TO BE A "WE'LL CATCH UP WHEN WE CAN ATTITUDE". IT NOW APPEARS THE ARMY AND SPECIFICALLY 2D SUPPORT CENTER (MMC) WILL HAVE THE MISSION OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND PROCESSING FOR TURN-IN EQUIPMENT AS IT BECOMES DEOBLIGATED. IF FEMA HAD MAINTAINED REASONABLY ACCURATE RECORDS AS THEY ISSUED EQUIPMENT, THE ACCOUTABILITY AND RETURN OF SUCH EQUIPMENT WOULD BE NEXT TO AUTOMATIC. AS IT IS, THERE IS NO SOLID INVENTORY OF WHAT HAS BEEN ISSUED AND HOW MUCH SHOULD BE RETURNED WHEN THE RELIEF EFFORT IS CONCLUDED.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: MAINTAIN ACCURATE SUPPLY RECORDS FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF ANY OPERATION.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: FEMA ATTAIN AUTOMATED SUPPLY SYSTEM THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE MILITARY IN SUPPORT OF A RELIEF.

9. (U) COMMENTS: NONE.

--- (U) SUBJECT: NONE

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: NONE

JULLS LONG REPORT

1 (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91752-40166 (00021), submitted by JTF EKGINEER, John J. Blake, -, (404)331-6740. 2. (U) Operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on 09/17/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: TRAINING, TASKING PROCEDURES, OPERATIONS, PHASE I.

4. (U) TITLE: Tasking Procedures Were Not Understood.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Many of JTF-Andrew did not understand the proper procedure for tasking various agencies. 6. (U) DISCUSSION: The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is the legal authority for disaster relief. This plan is administered by FFMA. The "golden rule" says that he who has the gold, rules. FEMA has the money so all tasks must be approved/issued by them. The plan creates 12 Emergency Support r,,znct4-ons %IESF) ' -hat will coordinate taskings. Also, the DOD has a Defense Coordination Office (DCO) or coordination can be directly with FEMA. Since nothing can be accomplished without money and FEMA has the money, nothing can be directed without FEMA.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: All except FEMA and some ESFs are coordinators not directors of tasks.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Entities who will support relief efforts should school their members in the FRP and their coordination role. They should also, exercise with FEMA.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

--- (U) SUBJECT: COMMAND & CONTROL

(U) INTEROPERABILITY: TRAINING

(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLQ NUMBER: 91747-85515 (00018), submitted by JTF ENGINEER, Tim Monteen, -t (312)886-8451.
2. (), operation DISASTER RELIEF conducted by JTF-ANDREW on 09/17/02.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, PHASE I.
4. (U) **TITLE: Priority of Effort Missions Were Not Immediately Executed.**
5. (U) OBSERVATION: Life support (ie..ifood, water, housing, sanitation)--services were not provided during the first few days immediately following Hurricane Andrew.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: The Federal Response Plan (FRP) was implemented but the 12 primary agencies were not given the authority to immediately execute life support missions. This decision by FEMA critically delayed providing essential life support services. Each primary agency even if not requested by local government officials must execute essential life support missions immediately. If the JTF is to have a role in providing these essential services, its responsibilities must be defined in the FRP.
7. (u) LESSON LEARNED: Essential life support services must be provided immediately. The JTF has the resources and capabilities to react immediately.
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Define the JTF's responsibilities in the Federal Response Plan. Require each primary agency to develop a SOP for deploying/executing life support services.
9. (U) COMMENTS:
--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS
(U) INTEROPERABILITY: PLANNING
(U) Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

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