

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW
UNITED STATES ARMY (ANNEX A)
AFTER ACTION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
091950OCT92

SUBJECT: Summary of United States Army Support to Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA)

1. **Purpose:** To provide an overview of the United States Army disaster support in response to Hurricane Andrew under operational control of Joint Task Force Andrew.

2. **Information:**

a. Hurricane Andrew was the nation's worst natural disaster in terms of financial loss and property damage. Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew, composed of active federal military forces and U.S. Army Reserve forces who volunteered for active duty, deployed and formed to assist civil authorities in providing disaster response operations and humanitarian assistance to the disaster victims. The operation was conducted in three phases:

(1) Phase I: Relief Phase - Provided immediate life support systems--food and water, shelter, medical supplies and services, sanitation, and transportation.

(2) Phase II: Recovery Phase - Ensured sustainment of those services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, State, and local authorities, within our capabilities, to establish public and private services.

(3) Phase III: Reconstitution - Continued the reestablishment of services under control of non-DOD Federal, State, and local governments while JTF Andrew redeployed.

b. Participating elements of Joint Task Force Andrew included Second U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps with elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Corps Support Command, 10th Mountain Division, the U.S. Army Materiel Command, and other Active component and Reserve component units. A complete U.S. Army troop list is at enclosure 1.

3. The following formal assessments were conducted during the AAR collection effort.

a. DOD, Federal/State/Local Civil Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO) Interoperability: The U.S. Army forces deployed to Miami were working under the auspices of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) Plans and in

conjunction with the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The DOD mission began with a tasking from CINCFOR to Second U.S. Army to appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew. In accordance with the Second U.S. Army MACA plan and the Federal Response Plan the DCO and his advanced Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) deployed on 23 Aug 92 to the Florida state EOC in Tallahassee, FL and began coordination with the FEMA appointed Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and his ERT-A teams which represented the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) deployed to facilitate the Federal emergency response. Also assembled in the Florida State EOC was the Governor and his State counterparts to the Federal ESFs. As Second U.S. Army rapidly transitioned to a fully functioning JTF, interoperability effectiveness was hampered due to a limited knowledge by new personnel of disaster relief plans. These relief plans should be briefed daily to new personnel. In addition, copies of the latest Federal Response Plan should be distributed to key personnel. The deployment of a Presidential Task Force (PTF) added an unforeseen dimension to the interoperability process.

The JTF liaison with Federal and State civil agencies was the DCO. The Readiness Group Commander appointed as the DCO by the Second U.S. Army Commander facilitated early interoperability with the civil sector because he was able to deploy his staff for administrative and operational support and had been trained on MACA and the FRP. The DCO was also familiar with the operations and force structure of the Florida Army National Guard (FLARNG) as a result of his RG duties. As a result, coordinated operations among Active component units and the FLARNG early in the Andrew experience were a success.

The interoperability between the JTF and PVOs was a result of coordination between the DCO and FEMA. Mission taskings for PVOs were developed by the American Red Cross (ESF #6), validated by FEMA, and if appropriate, passed to the DCO for further coordination and execution by the JTF.

Another interoperability success was the assignment of military Areas of Operations (AO) along municipality boundaries. Military commanders were collocated with their civilian counterparts.

Civil Affairs assets were ideal for facilitating interoperability and should be assigned early in disaster relief operations.

b. Joint Command and Control: The CONUSA provides the nucleus for a JTF for catastrophic disaster relief operations because the CONUSA is the CINCFOR designated key regional DOD MACA planner. CONUSAs are given the responsibility for regional

planning, coordination, and execution of MACA operations for disaster relief operations. In the contiguous US the CINCFOR is responsible for disaster relief operations. Joint Task Forces are addressed in the Second U.S. Army MACA plan but not in organizational and functional detail because no template exists for CONUS operations of this nature. At a minimum, there should be Joint Doctrine developed for DOD response to catastrophic disasters in CONUS. The Joint Doctrine should become a part of MACA plans at all levels and trained throughout the chain of command in conjunction with its interface with the FRP. Subsequent training with FEMA and state agencies responsible for disaster operations would provide for optimum command and control during the deployment phase of the operation.

c. Health Care: The Army medical effort in support of the Hurricane Andrew relief effort was coordinated through ESF 8 and in conjunction with a Presidential appointee serving as the Federal medical coordinator. Active component elements from the 44th Medical Brigade began to flow into South Dade County on 28 August as part of the logistical task force from Fort Bragg. Division level medical assets subsequently arrived with the 82d Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions. The medical brigade headquarters collocated with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Management Support Unit (MSU) in the disaster area. The brigade staff provided structure, consistency, and expertise as volunteer Public Health Service (PHS) officers rotated through. A daily coordination meeting included representatives from many state and local health agencies, Red Cross, Salvation Army, interested local citizens and members of the brigade staff. The Army was thus part of a coordinated medical effort.

The medical effort was managed within the following functional areas: evacuation, treatment, facilities, preventive medicine, mental health, veterinary, dental, and medical logistics. The brigade staff included Army experts in each of these areas. The Army expert provided leadership while encouraging the appropriate civilian agency to take the lead. Area support/primary care assets of the newly formed Area Support Medical Battalion were effective in outreach to isolated parts of the civilian community. Division medics provided Level I and Level II care to civilians as troops identified needs within their areas of operation. Army units accounted for more than half of the 67,000 total patient contacts made by the Federal relief effort. Care above this level was referred into the civilian system.

Civilian Emergency Medical Service (EMS) was effective in regulating patients into the northern Miami hospitals; thus military hospitalization, though available, was not required for civilian casualties. Six Army preventive medicine units (two

arrived unrequested by JTF) were incorporated into the overall sanitation, water, and vector control effort working cooperatively with PHS, Navy, Marine, Air Force and state and local preventive medicine assets. The 32d Medical Logistics Battalion established a Class VIII depot operation at Opa-Locka Airport to receive, classify, and distribute donated medical supplies through the Florida State Health and Rehabilitative Services to civilian relief medical facilities and to military medical elements.

Overall the medical support went well. Doctrine for medical disaster relief should reflect the importance of coordinated medical efforts among all agencies, Federal and Civilian, and of baseline knowledge of assets available from other services to include the NDMS. It may be appropriate to amend the Stafford Act to make clear that medical services can be provided to disaster relief personnel. The state and local health agencies must be active players since health statutes govern public health matters from immunizations and school physicals to sanitary inspections.

d. Logistics: Prompt logistics response met immediate life-threatening needs of disaster victims by providing food, bottled water, clothing, beds/bedding, and temporary shelters. Current doctrine needs to be developed for disaster relief logistics. However, there are a number of manuals available that give guidelines in logistics support. For example, FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, suggests three guidelines for disaster relief: tailor the package for the mission, arrange for contracting early on, and use local resources. Based on Hurricane Andrew experience, logistics units should be included in the first group of Army units deploying to a disaster area, in order to develop the logistics infrastructure so that humanitarian relief support can begin. Simultaneously, contracting should commence for those items that the Army cannot provide or supply in the quantities required (i.e., reefer vans, ice, dumpsters, and porto-lets). Contingency contracts should be drawn up before a disaster occurs. This will alleviate time wasted in finding contractors after a disaster has already happened.

In-place real property, such as vacant warehouses and parking lots, was quickly acquired to enable expedited receipt, storage and distribution operations. The U.S. Forest Service activated its Incident Command System and coordinated with other Federal agencies to quickly establish a warehouse and staging area to receive, store and issue Federal supplies and equipment at Miami Airport. Army Materiel Command then assumed this warehouse and also established a theater-wide wholesale operation for DOD and Federally-purchased materiel plus donated relief goods, using a

successful combination of military and commercial resources. These resources included both leased and military materiel handling equipment (MHE) and trucking, civilian and soldier warehouse operators, and a combination of fixed commercial and temporary military covered storage structures.

ARFOR quickly established an effective resupply and sustainment flow using the DOD distribution system and a daily USAF logistics flight from the rear (Fort Bragg and Fort Drum). The ARFOR commander was tasked to provide consumable supply support to all non-based ashore forces, including the U.S. Marine Corps personnel.

The 1st COSCOM established a single source supply request site by using one Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS-1) at each Corps Support Group (CSG) in support of the 82nd ABN Division and 10th MTN Division respectively. Requisitions were forwarded to the SARSS-2A site located at the Corps Materiel Management Center (CMMC) (FWD). Requisitions were transceived via MSE to the CMMC (Rear). Requests were filled out of Fort Bragg GS/DS stocks, configured, and shipped via ALOC to Homestead AFB. This force projection distribution system minimized forward deployed stockage hence reducing ASL and PLL required for deploying units in support of disaster relief operations.

e. Communications and Automation: ARFOR elements primarily used organic tactical communications as they began the relief effort. These tactical systems provided critical command and control capabilities and initial support to the vital Combat Service Support (CSS) units. However, CSS did not have sufficient equipment authorized to install tactical communications at every Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT) and Humanitarian Depot. Initially, commercial cellular telephones and the tactical network provided the needed support but, as the commercial network was restored, regular telephone service replaced the cellular and tactical telephones. The ARFOR also operated in the CINCFOR UHF TACSAT net with the JTF HQs and its other components.

Although cellular telephones and hand-held radios provided a minimal early communications enhancement to the tactical network, widespread use of these means by the civilian community quickly overwhelmed surviving relays. All efforts should be made to locate command and control elements, MKTs, LSCs and depots near surviving commercial telephone exchanges.

f. Engineer Operations and Sustainment: On 24 August 1992 Hurricane Andrew passed through southern Florida destroying public utilities, thousands of structures, and leaving an estimated 42 million cubic yards of debris. The operation saw

the largest joint and combined engineer force (Army, Air Force and Marine engineers; Navy Seabees; Canadian engineers; and United States Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) employees and contractors) ever assembled cleaning and repairing the destruction.

The first JTF engineers on the scene were employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Jacksonville District) and members of the 841st Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve) from Miami. The Jacksonville District personnel immediately went to work with in-house labor to remove debris and let contracts to provide water, ice, porto-lets and debris removal to open roads. The 841st Engineer Battalion, utilizing volunteer soldiers, cleared roads and the runways of Homestead Air Force Base. In the following days and weeks the ARFOR engineer force grew to over 2,500 personnel and the Jacksonville District expanded to over 600 Army employees and 4,000 contractor personnel.

An area of operations was established with Task Force All American (82nd) in the north, and Task Force Mountain (10th) in the south. The ARFOR engineers were organized under the 20th Engineer Brigade. The 20th Engineer Brigade held the 92nd Engineer Battalion(-) in general support. TF All American had the following engineer support: 27th and 46th Engineer Battalions; and the 264th, B/307th, and 362nd Engineer Companies. TF Mountain had the following engineer support: 937th Engineer Group; 841st (Reserve)(-), 41st, and 43rd Engineer Battalions; and the 63rd, 586th and 642nd Engineer Companies. These engineers cleared roads and runways; removed debris; built Life Support Centers; provided generators; repaired roads and conducted a variety of other engineer missions. The USACE Prime Power Engineer Battalion provided generator support to the Northwest Wellfield (Miami's largest source of water) and to numerous other facilities and organizations. The Jacksonville District (USACE), provided immediate response support and quickly moved to long term recovery operations with nearly \$400 million in contractual authority under ESF #3 for such items as debris removal, roof repair, school repair, trailer court clearing, etc.

The ARFOR engineers in conjunction with USACE restored immediate basic human needs and mobilized private and local contractors to carry on with recovery operations. ARFOR engineers hauled over 43,000 dump truck loads of debris utilizing 220 dump trucks and 55 bucket loaders. Engineer units were augmented by over 170 leased dump trucks and 50 leased bucket loaders. Additionally, they erected and maintained two Life Support Centers. USACE contractual effort removed over 4 million cubic yards of debris, roofed over 5,000 homes, cleared over 1800 mobile home pads, delivered over 1.42 million gallons of potable water and issued over 3,000 tons of ice.

Military engineers filled the gap until contractors, volunteer relief organizations, and local communities could be mobilized to carry on with disaster recovery. Appointing a USACE Division Engineer as the JTF Engineer and using an active duty Engineer Group as the JTF Engineer staff ensured the synchronization of the USACE (ESF-3) and military JTF engineer effort. USACE's contractual capability reinforced and complemented the military engineer effort in the early stages of recovery and ultimately allowed military engineers to disengage as private contractors came on line.

Four lessons learned were: (1) Engineer forces flowed into the area of operations without an accurate engineer reconnaissance and assessment. Had a good engineer assessment been accomplished in the first 12-24 hours of the disaster, synchronized engineer recovery effort could have been brought to bear much earlier. (2) Class IV push packages for disasters need to be developed as very little construction material is available in an area hit by a disaster. (3) The appropriate USACE Division Engineer should become the JTF Engineer and the nearest active duty Engineer Group should provide the JTF Engineer staff. (4) The ability to supplement TO&E organizations with rental equipment in domestic disasters greatly enhances their capabilities.

g. Military Police/Physical Security: Military Police played a significant and effective role in this disaster relief operation. Both active component and FLARNG military police deployed early and conducted mission support in accordance with established doctrine. FLARNG military police were not federalized and therefore were not subject to constraints imposed by Federal law (18 USC 1385, commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act). They performed security and law enforcement missions in support of the disaster area. Active component military police support included traffic control (but only where such activity was in furtherance of a military purpose, e.g., facilitating the movement of military convoy traffic), area and route reconnaissance, security of military equipment and supplies, force protection, discipline, law and order (military personnel only), and VIP security. Active component military police did not conduct civilian law enforcement operations.

This disaster relief operation validated the requirement for the early deployment of military police in similar operations to include the need for MP representation on the disaster assessment team immediately after a disaster occurs. Standardized training, combined with a focus on deployability and operational readiness, resulted in successful interoperability among MP units. Interagency coordination also went well, demonstrating the criticality of MP LNOs with civil authorities and with the

National Guard early in disaster relief operations. The lack of compatible communications with civil authorities had a negative impact on interoperability. Physical security was successful. The conscious efforts by Provost Marshals and command emphasis at all levels on physical security measures kept incidents of theft/loss of Government equipment extremely low. Civilian volunteer agencies were not aware of security measures and received advice and assistance from military police on physical security concerns.

h. Joint Airspace Management: Army Aviation Command and Control (A2C2) procedures for JTF Andrew were initially developed at an ad hoc meeting of the JTF and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), with representatives from USAF, USN, USCG and the FLARNG. There was no initial response by the DA Regional Representative (DARR) under AR 95-2, paragraph 6-55. XVIII Corps A2C2 representatives working with the FAA and JTF Aviation Officer published an Aviation Procedures Guide (APG), based in part on a 1989 proposed FAA Helicopter Routing Plan for the Miami TLA. Operations in support of disaster relief within urban areas on U.S. soil, with-in place FAA operating facilities are not addressed in Joint Air Doctrine.

The JTF's immediate NOTAM distribution to XVIII ABN Corps, Flight OPNS Centers, NAVFOR, FAA and non-JTF flying units was key to flight safety. The Aviation Safety Officer is an integral aspect of the JTF aviation operations.

i. Joint Transportation Operations and Sustainment: The deployment of forces to support JTF Andrew and the subsequent transportation support of these forces went well. For XVIII ABN Corps and subordinate elements the deployment was an excellent validation of the Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) program. Many units deployed on less than 48 hours notice during a weekend.

The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was not used as designed during the initial deployment. The majority of the actual arrival information for commercial aircraft moves never was entered into JOPES. The other system, Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TCACCIS) was used very little during the deployment. The Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) was not activated until several days after JTF Andrew was formed. There is not a set structure nor a designated, trained group of personnel to form a JMCC.

In CONUS, the JMCC structure should include a Joint Transportation Office (JTO) to give the JMCC the capability to make commercial transportation arrangements.

One of the highlights of the retail distribution system was the use of 5-ton engineer bridge trucks using the Palletized Load System (PLS) concept. The engineers had removable cargo beds for these trucks. The trucks were capable of dropping their loaded cargo beds at a retail site without the aid of any Material Handling Equipment (MHE). This kept the trucks from being dependent on MHE which was not always available at the retail sites.

j. PAO/PIO Operations: Volunteers from U.S. Army Reserve public affairs detachments augmented the JTF Public Affairs Office, the Joint Information Center and the broadcasting staff of Radio Recovery. Prior to integrating the Reserve component, the early deployment of active-duty public affairs elements was key in keeping the media informed in a crisis situation while obtaining the logistical support necessary to establish the JIC.

The media relations tempo in this operation was quicker than in previous joint task force humanitarian assistance missions. Reporters used their own equipment, were mobile and had unrestricted access in covering the relief operation. These variables presented a significant public information challenge.

Public affairs provided timely information about the relief activities of all uniformed services and spoke with one voice through continuous coordination of the issues and in multiple languages. This was crucial early in the operation when disseminating crisis information was critical in establishing the public's confidence in the military's ability to provide disaster relief. As military leaders collocated with civilian leaders in the affected areas, public affairs officers collocated with their counterparts as well. The result was a visible signal to the media of the high degree of the civil/military team's commitment to doing what was necessary to provide relief.

Clearly, the American people's impression of a joint task force humanitarian assistance mission depends upon what they see and hear on television and radio news, and what they read in newspapers and national news magazines. The public's perception of the JTF's success is influenced by close coordination between the JIC and JTF PAO. The concept of the JIC was definitely validated, as was the use of a USAR Press Camp Headquarters as the JIC's operational structure.

k. Transition (Military and Civilian): The U.S. Army's level of support to JTF Andrew followed the three phases (enclosure 2). Even though all three phases began almost immediately the largest number of Army forces were needed during the relief phase. As basic survival needs were met fewer forces were needed during the recovery phase and we learned that even

fewer Army forces are required during the reconstitution phase. Our experience in disengaging from our humanitarian relief role in the Hurricane Andrew area of operations suggests it may be appropriate in future disaster relief operations to only have two phases, Relief and Recovery. We learned in this disaster relief operation that our third phase, Reconstitution, is not a phase which is followed by other Federal agencies in the Federal Response Plan and may suggest a mission duration for the Army which is well beyond our humanitarian relief role. During this disaster relief mission we found it was impossible to disengage and redeploy units in a normal manner. Disengagement and redeployment required a methodology which we termed Operational Mission Capability Adjustment (OMCA). These adjustments we derived by careful analysis of the following factors:

- (1) Mission Status.
- (2) Criteria for completion.
- (3) Other requirements.
- (4) Coordination with local community.
- (5) Coordination with FEMA.
- (6) Public Affairs considerations.
- (7) Political considerations.

An example of an OMCA analysis is at enclosure 3.

The critical factor in transition is one of perception. As forces are released from their missions it must be done in such a manner that it precludes the perception of abandonment. Only then should Army units be released from the disaster area.

1. JTF Functions, Evolution and Development: Due to the severity and magnitude of Hurricane Andrew, a JTF was the appropriate organization to command and control the military's participation in the operation. A CONUSA is the ideal organization to form the JTF. An earlier and more comprehensive damage assessment would have facilitated early JTF operations.

Early knowledge of Andrew's magnitude would have provided commanders a base to determine force levels and types of forces required. All appropriate Army information collection resources should be used. Civil Affairs and Special Forces damage assessment teams should be inserted early to provide comprehensive assessment on the extent of the disaster.

military forces and property is welcome and legal. US Marshals and other civilian law enforcement agencies as well as the state National Guard may also assist.

MILITARY/CIVILIAN COORDINATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION (Tab C)

Initial disaster coordination with local, state and federal authorities and agencies is a military leader responsibility which is facilitated by civil affairs (CA) assets. Military leaders at all levels must be familiar with the scope and purview of civilian authorities and must ensure civilian authorities know precisely the identity of the critical military decision makers or points of contact. The success and speed of transition from civil-military to civil operations is a function of the effective synchronization of military and civilian elements. After civilian and military leaders establish the plan, CA assets work the details. Civil affairs assets are the functional facilitators after the initial leader liaison and more importantly allow leaders to remove themselves as the disaster relief transitions back to a totally civilian operation.

The coordination and synchronization of disaster relief efforts between the ARFOR and the multitude of civilian government and emergency assistance agencies challenged all participants involved in the operation. Disaster assistance by the military in US territory is predominantly a civil matter. Resolution of many problems is a function of local, state or federal governments working with the active Army.

Shortly after immediate emergency relief efforts are initiated, a central point must be established to coordinate volunteer, religious and national organization assistance within the disaster area. Much duplication of effort will exist and is not necessarily bad. However, because not all organizations knew what other organizations were in the area and what their capabilities were, assistance was often not acquired at all or in a timely manner. There is a need for some agency (Red Cross, VOAD, United Way, Salvation Army, FEMA or others), to set up localized and centralized clearing houses for information on assistance available. These locations must be publicized to the affected areas by all available means.

Coordination and synchronization with local, State, and Federal agencies operating within the ARFOR area of operations improved. Continual assessment of needs coupled with maturing working relationships helped to standardize operating procedures within the ARFOR. The ad hoc nature of the early days of phase I settled into a routine as the days passed.