

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MEETING THE ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS
OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AS PART OF
TRANSFORMATION TO THE FUTURE FORCE**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States asserted that America's national security institutions must be transformed to meet the requirements of a new era in order to build and maintain United States defenses beyond challenge. As part of the total military force and in order to comply with the National Security Strategy, the National Guard must also transform from a Guard of the past to the Guard of the future. It is imperative to the security of the nation, the state, and to the very relevance of the National Guard. This research paper will analyze the current organization of the Guard force, down to the lowest level, and determine its effectiveness and whether the Guard should transform its current organization to meet the transformation needs of the future total force.

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MEETING THE ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AS PART OF TRANSFORMATION TO THE FUTURE FORCE

Transformation is a state of mind. It is about how we think, organize and approach the future. It is how we employ our citizen soldiers and airmen, their units, equipment and capabilities in new and more effective ways.

—LTG H. Steven Blum¹

PURPOSE

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States asserted that America's national security institutions must be transformed to meet the requirements of a new era in order to build and maintain United States defenses beyond challenge.² As part of the total military force and in order to comply with the National Security Strategy, the National Guard must also transform from a National Guard of the past to the National Guard of the future. It is imperative to the security of the nation, the state, and to the very relevance of the National Guard. This research paper will analyze the current organization of the Guard force, down to its lowest level, determine its strategic effectiveness, and determine whether the Guard should transform its current organization to meet the transformation needs of the future total force.

ORIGINATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

In order to determine if the current Guard force will remain effective as part of the total military force, it is important to understand the current organizational differences the Guard adds to the total force organizational mix, beginning with the history of its origin. The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states by the Constitution of the United States under Article 1, Section 8. In peacetime, the National Guard is commanded by the governor of each state or territory. When ordered to active duty for mobilization by the President or called into federal service for emergencies, units of the National Guard are under to the control of the appropriate Service secretary. The militia clause reserves the appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia to each state or territory. In 1903, Congress officially designated the organized militia as the National Guard and established procedures for training and equipping the Guard to active duty military standards.³

ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

The nation should never go to war without the Guard. When you call up the Guard, you call up America. When citizen soldiers come out of schools, communities, they bring the people to the war fight. That is powerful, both to sustain our forces and to send a strong signal to adversaries. It says the will of the American people is tied to this deployment.

—LTG H. Steven Blum⁴

The organization of the National Guard is important to the relevance of the National Guard in the transformation process to the future force, despite how the organization originated or how it has been organized and utilized in the past. The National Guard is now organized to be called to active duty in several different ways. National Guard units and individual Guard members can be called to state active duty in accordance with state laws and regulations in order to deal with natural disasters, civil disturbances, and/or other state emergencies or activities as deemed necessary by the governor of the state. Guard members and units may also be called to federal active duty under United States code Title 10 status as deemed necessary by the President. As part of readiness training in the United States code Title 32 status, the National Guard member attends inactive duty training (IDT) for the Army Guard or a unit training assembly (UTA) for the Air Guard, annual training, and service school training. There are also full-time members of the National Guard who serve in United States code Title 32 status as a member of the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR). Title 32 status personnel are funded by the federal government but remain under the command and control of the state government. These state active duty, IDT/UTA, and federal active duty statuses create the current organization of the National Guard and the three different types of personnel forces: full-time AGR personnel; full-time Technician personnel; and part-time IDT/UTA personnel. The Human Resource Office (HRO) has consolidated responsibility for the administration of both the full-time National Guard technician and AGR programs based on National Guard Regulations (NGRs), Technician Personnel Regulations (TPRs), the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM), Presidential Executive Orders (EO) and other appropriate authorities. The part-time IDT/UTA personnel fall under the command and control of the Title 32 military chain of command. When called to active duty, all three types of personnel forces fall under the Title 10 authority.⁵

Readiness preparation for mobilization and deployment encompasses the primary reason for training of the citizen soldiers and airmen of the National Guard. Every state generally has a regional or multi-functional training center that can facilitate much of the training, or members can be sent to active component schools where slots are available.

The Active Guard and Reserve member, like his or her active duty counterpart, is available for duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The IDT/UTA member and Technician are available when they are called to active duty status in Title 32 or Title 10 by volunteering or by mobilization. They must arrange with their civilian employer to be absent from their full-time work in order to be placed on active duty. Employer Support for the Guard and the Reserve (ESGR) is an organization utilized to help facilitate any issues the employer and employee have with these absences for duty.

Since the National Guard citizen soldiers and airmen are drawn from three different personnel sources, AGR, Technicians, and IDT/UTA, part of the purpose of this paper is to determine if this is an advantage to the organization. This requires analysis of the basic aspects of each of these National Guard personnel sources in the following paragraphs.

Technicians represent the largest element of the full-time Federal work force of the National Guard and conduct the administration and training and maintenance and repair of supplies and equipment issued to the National Guard. This role was initiated to allow the technicians to fulfill the garrison-type, administrative positions and allow the AGR to fulfill the combat, combat support, and combat service support roles in the field units. A National Guard Technician must maintain military membership in the National Guard and hold the military grade specified for that position in a dual status in order to retain employment as a military technician. If the member is separated from the National Guard or ceases to hold the military grade specified for the technician position held, the former National Guard member shall be promptly separated from military technician status. Even though the military technician must meet military standards as well as the AGR member, hours of duty for technicians are prescribed and compensatory time off must be granted for time beyond the regularly prescribed work schedule, so there is not the same 24 hours a day, 365 days a year proviso for the Technician like there is for the AGR personnel. Military technicians perform full-time work in the units they are assigned to and perform military training and duty in their units; however, they are performing their work in civilian, non-military status. They must be available to enter active military service at any time that their unit is called to active duty. Today, because of their number, they provide the day-to-day continuity in the operation and training of Army and Air Guard units. Technicians who are not supervisors or do not hold a personnel staffing or security position are eligible to become a member of an organization labor union. These basic aspects of this source of National Guard membership are not as conducive to ready deployment and mobilization as the AGR member and may be an aspect of the current National Guard organization that should change as part of the transformation process to the future force.

IDT/UTA member status, the third type of National Guard membership being analyzed at its basic level, requires attendance at one drill weekend each month and one annual training period each year (usually two weeks in the summer, depending on the unit mission or training rotation). Weekend drills usually consist of one Saturday and Sunday weekend each month, but occasionally include reporting for duty on Friday nights. Initially, all non-prior service personnel are required to attend initial entry training (IET), also known as Basic Training. Like their active duty counterparts, after Basic Training, Soldiers go to their Advanced Individual Training (AIT), which teaches them the special skills they will need for their job in the National Guard as well as to be a part of the total force. These schools can usually be scheduled to accommodate civilian job or school constraints. Many of the regional training institutes and multi-functional training brigades in the states have acquired the ability to conduct this training and add great value to this process and the future force.

The heart and soul and indeed greatest numbers of the National Guard force are the IDT/UTA members. This is the National Guard member that works in the community and brings the community value to the organization. The AGR members are the most versatile, deployable and viable assets of the National Guard organization. The Technician force, though the largest number of the full-time National Guard force, are not as versatile and as readily deployable as the Active Guard and Reserve members. The National Guard organization would be greatly improved by transitioning the Technician force to AGR members, creating only one type of full-time force member and one type of part-time force member.

There are fifty-four different states and territories that compile the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau is the governing body that administers the funds and controls of the Army and Air National Guard. However, the National Guard Bureau does not command the units; each state and territory Adjutant General has command authority over the Army and Air National Guard units in its command. Transformation has already begun with the provisional reorganization of the National Guard Bureau staff in July of 2003 and each State Area Command is required to be fully joint by fiscal year 2006 to facilitate the jointness needed to be a part of the total force.⁶

TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Successful transformation requires critical thinkers demonstrating “agility of the mind.”

—Arthur K. Cebrowski⁷

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld first endorsed the word “transformation” in 2000. Since then, it has become the word for the prioritization of investment in technologies and concepts of operation for the enhancement of military forces in an integrated way.⁸ The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review working group defined transformation as harnessing the revolution in military affairs in order to make the basic changes⁶ described by the Secretary of Defense. In fact, the current transformation of the military forces has in actuality occurred for over ten years with the process increasing in speed due to the administration’s creation of a transformation czar, a transformation command and a transformation budget.⁹ President Bush stated in his speech at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, on 11 December 2001, that the need for transformation began long before 11 September 2001. The difference today is in the “sense of urgency – the need to build this future force while fighting a present war.”¹⁰ The National Guard, along with its fellow national security institutions, must transform, and it must transform now. In keeping with the National Guard’s more than three hundred years of history, using the Minuteman as its symbol, the Guard routinely and regularly transforms from citizen in the community to warrior in training or battle. So now must it quickly assume and accomplish the dynamic and challenging role of transformation in the same responsive fashion.

The Department of Defense Directorate defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit the nation’s advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain the strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”¹¹ Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, described transformation in a speech to the National Governors Association in Washington, D.C., 22 February 2004, as “...a state of mind. It is about how we think, organize, train, and approach the future. It is how we employ our citizen soldiers and airmen, their units, equipment and capabilities in new and more effective ways.”¹² Within these Department of Defense and National Guard Bureau descriptions of transformation are the general guidelines for the transformation of the National Guard.

According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, “protecting the American homeland from attack is the foremost responsibility of the United States Armed Forces and a primary mission for the Reserve Components.”¹³ This objective or end is reiterated in the National Guard Bureau Campaign Plan for Transformation. The primary mission for the National Guard is to “...secure and defend our homeland, here and abroad...transform as we operate...remain essential – the constitutionally ratified, community-based, dual-missioned citizen militia (Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 15 & 16 United States Constitution).”¹⁴ This clearly

identifies the transformation objective for the National Guard in keeping with the National Guard principles, roles, and missions in regard to its commitment to the National Guard's state, as well as its federal mission.

The April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance identified ways or the concept of how to accomplish this transformation objective. A primary concept is to transform capabilities through force transformation, which includes strengthening joint operations and developing transformational capabilities.¹⁵ In keeping with this pillar of transformation, the National Guard Bureau Chief provided an All States Memorandum in July 2003. It stated the Chief's plan to transform the National Guard Bureau and the individual state headquarters into joint staffs, providing a more relevant relationship with the active component and allowing the National Guard to better serve the Department of Defense and the national strategic objectives.¹⁶ To date, all fifty-four National Guard State Area Command headquarters have converted to standing joint force headquarters. The National Guard Campaign Plan for Transformation further delineates the way to achieve the transformation objective for the Army National Guard by rebalancing Army Guard formations, converting units no longer required, reducing force structure while maintaining end strength, and transforming to modular units in order to integrate with other Army formations.¹⁷ This methodology keeps the National Guard more aligned with the active component, allowing it to speak the same language and better support the joint objective. "Today's force structure – both Active and Reserve components – is the baseline from which the Department (of Defense) will develop a transformed force for the future."¹⁸ The transformed Guard force will be better able to perform seamlessly through this concept of transformation.

"The Army is overstretched and having to lean more heavily on the Reserves and the National Guard for vital functions..." stated Max Boot, author of *The New American Way of War*.¹⁹ The resources or the means to reach the transformation objective for the National Guard are needed to mitigate this very true statement by Mr. Boot. In recent Congressional testimony, General Blum stated that the Army National Guard is undermanned and over-structured, a condition that was sufficient in the Cold War era when the National Guard was a strategic reserve force. During this era, the draft helped fill in the over structured manning gaps. The current authorized force allowance is 388,000 while the number of soldiers assigned is 350,000.²⁰ The National Guard Bureau Chief is saying that to resource transformation, it must retain the resourcing level of 350,000 personnel but reduce the authorized force structure by 38,000 (from 388,000). The total resourcing dollars could then be reinvested for training and equipment in this reduced manning force. This resourcing plan will allow full spectrum

availability of forces, provide fifty percent resourcing to governors for the state missions, primarily homeland defense, and fund twenty-five percent of the force in intensive training to prepare them for deployment. The remaining twenty-five percent of the Guard force is then available to be deployed in support of federal missions.²¹ The mobilization of these resources would also move from “alert, mobilize, train, certify, deploy” to a shorter more efficient period of “train, alert, deploy” with the goal of rotating Army Guard units for deployment once every six years and Air Guard deployments every 15 months.²²

The risk to accomplishing this plan for completing the transformation objective is the very familiar adage of “doing more with less.” The manning numbers reported in the previous paragraph are in line with the numbers that are actually on board and being used today; however, today’s wartime operations tempo for the Guard is the highest it has ever been. The tempo of operations has required multiple units to combine to make up the personnel for one unit of deployment. In many instances, there is potential over utilization by virtue of the same units being deployed more often and for longer periods of time. In the past, the highest fiscal priority has been given to active component units at the expense of reserve component units. As a consequence, the Guard might be doing even more with even less fiscal support, depending on potential fiscal restraints.

The absence of a sense of urgency that President Bush talked about in the speech at The Citadel in December 2001 may be the biggest barrier to transformation of the National Guard. All National Guard State Headquarters have followed Lieutenant General Blum’s directive to transform to a joint headquarters, at least on paper. However, operationally, many states are still doing business the way they have always done it, complying on paper but not putting the joint plan into total effect. The intent is to eventually implement the paper proposal of jointness; but the urgency to truly operate as a joint headquarters has been diminished by the high operations tempo of deployments and the state homeland security and disaster support missions, and thus has been difficult to accomplish.

The primary mission of the National Guard is to secure and defend the homeland, here and abroad.²³ The Guard is overwhelmed by its missions abroad operationally. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense missions and military assistance to civil authorities, but has few permanently assigned forces. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits United States military personnel from direct military involvement in law enforcement activities; under state control and Title 32, National Guard forces are not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act.

COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD

One course of action to counter the current policy of transformation is to maintain the status quo of the National Guard, that is, the status quo prior to any of the current transformation initiatives. To affect this course of action would mean reverting back to the State Area Commands and non-joint National Guard Bureau headquarters, as the National Guard Bureau Chief has already directed the Headquarters at the National Guard Bureau and each state and territory to transform to joint commands. Even though maintaining the status quo prior to recent changes might be a feasible option to undertake, it is not a suitable option to keep the National Guard relevant and integrated seamlessly in with the active component forces. The status quo option, also, would not likely be acceptable in the joint environment and in the national growth to interagency compatibility and operability. Continued National Guard relevance would be risked with this option. Additionally, the National Guard might not have a viable future as part of the total Armed Forces and might risk non-support of the National Security Strategy if the Guard did not transform. Maintaining the status quo would also mean not progressing and, in fact, would be like taking a huge step backward to an older version of the Guard.

Another course of action might be to build up the National Guard forces to the authorized manning level of 388,000, providing a solution to the undermanned issue currently facing the Guard. Today, the Guard falls 38,000 short of its authorized manning level, and recruiting and retention efforts have not been successful at coming anywhere close to feasibly meeting this alternative course of action. The suitability of this option without reintroducing the draft is not likely. The acceptability of bringing back the conscription force versus the all volunteer force is not likely, either. The risk for this option is losing the national support that the all volunteer force has acquired. It has reached a high level of respect and acceptance compared to the negative connotation that the draft had during its use in the Vietnam era. Also, today, regardless of what the public thinks of the war, there is a high regard for the warrior. There is the risk of not progressing towards the new way of doing business and fighting wars that the National Security Strategy espouses.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the difficulties and barriers, General Blum's feasible, suitable and acceptable plan to transform the National Guard into a more "ready, reliable, essential and accessible force worth fighting for"²⁴ (the message leading off the National Guard Transformation Campaign Plan) is the recommended action for the National Guard to continue to take. The transformation

plan will make the National Guard force more relevant, more stable and more predictable. It provides objectives that support national interests and policy. It enables each state to support its state mission as well as its federal mission, helping to meet the national security as well as the homeland defense objectives.

The National Guard Bureau has determined that the National Guard must be predictable and managed to permit twenty-five percent of the force to be deployed for the national mission, twenty-five percent of the force to be in training to replace those that are supporting the national mission, and ensure that fifty percent of the force remains available to the governors for the state mission. To get to this end-state, the National Guard must be able to rebalance its forces worldwide in order to more evenly distribute the great operational burden that the Guard is currently under, allowing burden sharing, enhanced capabilities, and more predictability. The National Guard Bureau has further proposed no more than one substantial involuntary deployment every five or six years for the Army Guard and one deployment every fifteen months for the Air Guard.²⁵

The National Guard must organize, train, equip, and resource its units like the active component counterparts in order to remain relevant and best capable of integrating into the total and joint force. This will allow better interoperability with the active component. The Guard must transform as it operates into modular, capabilities-based forces capable of integrating seamlessly with other formations in joint and combined national operations. The Guard force must train and operate in a joint environment in order to ensure that it can fight jointly and make the transition from citizen to soldier effectively and efficiently. This will also better enable joint state headquarters, joint national headquarters, and incorporation into the state and national civil-military joint environment.

Changing the types of missions and forces best suited to the National Guard has its advantages. In order to better accomplish defending the homeland on the homeland, the force structure of the Guard must be grown in areas of Military Police and Information Operations. Field Artillery units need to be converted, like the active component, and heavy formations need to be converted to light formations.²⁶ This growth and conversion will enhance the relevance and responsiveness of the Guard for homeland defense missions on the homeland in lieu of active component forces. Further, the size and equipment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams must be enhanced to include full-time assets of enhanced medical companies for decontamination and rapid treatment, engineer companies with specialized search and rescue capabilities, and combat units trained to support law enforcement agencies.

This will enhance the relevance and responsiveness of the National Guard for military assistance to civil authority operations in lieu of active component forces on the homeland.

A National Guard officer has been assigned to the newly formed United States Northern Command. The major general serves as chief of staff to the commander of Northern Command who is an active duty Army or Air Force four-star.²⁷ Creating this Northern Command full-time National Guard position will help this joint staff to coordinate directly with the National Guard Bureau and state National Guard Adjutant Generals and Governors and create a vital link to homeland defense resources in the homeland locations where defense in the homeland is required. National Guard units are the most reasonable units to be considered for the homeland defense mission of the Northern Command, and a National Guard officer best knows National Guard units. The National Guard utilizing state authorized or Title 32 National Guard forces based on the NGB directed twenty-five / twenty-five / fifty percent split without being constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act gives Northern Command greater capabilities to coordinate homeland defense and consequence management operations on the homeland. Utilizing the National Guard fully for homeland defense frees active component forces to conduct homeland defense and war-fighting missions abroad, as necessary. Title 10 statuses for National Guard forces would only be utilized in the event of war and full mobilization abroad per President of the United States (POTUS) call-up.

Changing the types of missions and force organizations best suited to the National Guard has its challenges. In fact, transitioning the National Guard organizational composition from a full-time force of AGRs and Technicians to a full-time force of AGRs only, will prove challenging. Overcoming turf and parochialism in the Guard and in the state where homeland defense is required and relinquishing the active component role in the homeland defense at home mission can be the hardest factors of transforming the Guard into a joint, modular, effective homeland defense organization on the homeland. Transformation is not only required in the National Guard but in the active forces as well; understanding the National Guard and believing in its relevance, readiness and effectiveness in homeland defense on the homeland is an absolute imperative for the active component to fully relinquish homeland defense on the homeland to the Guard as part of the seamless total force.

Transformation of National Guard forces to homeland defense forces on the homeland in state or Title 32 status, and limiting missions abroad to the Presidential full-mobilization call-up in Title 10 status as deemed necessary for war or defense abroad is a viable solution (for example, organized brigade combat teams already established in the state organizations). State Troop Command and State Headquarters elements are organized most effectively for

homeland defense missions of Northern Command. Incorporation of the National Guard fully in the Northern Command mission utilizing the National Guard Bureau directed twenty-five / twenty-five / fifty percent split of Guard forces will maintain dual national and state missions as constitutionally directed. Approval of funding for the Guard to grow its Military Police and Information Operation forces and convert its Field Artillery and heavy formations and approval of continued enhanced Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team resources is crucial.

Training time is valuable commodity to National Guard soldiers. That is why the National Guard uses many unique training methods and has established Regional Training Institutes (RTI) and Multi-Functional Training Brigades (MFTB) in the communities where it serves. For example, "real-life" training exercises such as Army National Guard rotations to the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California, to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and to high-tech simulation training and distributive learning, the Army National Guard employs innovative training methods to give its members access to high quality training. However, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the Guard has not experienced the joint opportunities that the active component has been able to acquire. The National Guard needs to have the joint training, experience and status of the joint arena to be a full-fledged member of the transformed total force.²⁸ It needs to grow in these types of joint positions and training and continue progressive training opportunities and grow with technological advances in order to keep the National Guard force in tune with the active forces and ready to deploy and mobilize at any time. It needs to utilize its RTIs and MFTBs in the community to continue the standard training and augment with joint training and homeland defense and security training to promote their ongoing relevance.

CONCLUSIONS

The National Security Strategy's assertion in 2002 that America must transform its national security institutions in order to meet the requirements of a new era rings true and must include the National Guard. In order to remain relevant and viable as part of the total force and in compliance with the National Security Strategy, the National Guard must, as originally stated, transform from a Guard of the past to the Guard of the future. The National Guard Bureau Chief profoundly stated at a recent National Guard Association Conference that this is not your father's National Guard.²⁹

The history of the National Guard is proud but the current organization is not the relevant one to enable its continued support of the future force. To ensure its effectiveness, the National Guard must transform its current organization to meet the transformation needs of the future

total force. In order to be more ready, reliable, essential and accessible, it must rebalance its forces worldwide. It must organize, train, equip, and resource its units like the active component counterparts with light formations and grow in areas such as Military Police and Information Operations. This growth and conversion will better transform the National Guard to better respond to homeland defense and security missions, many times in lieu of active component forces. Further, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams must continue and be enhanced with full-time assets to better support local civil authorities. The National Guard's role in Northern Command needs to continue to grow and develop as a vital link to defense in the homeland. This Northern Command use of the National Guard enhances the active component forces ability to conduct homeland defense and war-fighting missions abroad, as necessary.

Meeting the organizational needs of the National Guard as it transforms to the future force is an ongoing process that will take time and intellect. The National Guard can no longer operate as it has always operated for its continued relevance. Neither can the active component consider the National Guard as it has operated in the past. Believing in its relevance, readiness and effectiveness is an absolute requirement for all players in this seamless total force of the future.

WORD COUNT = 5,082

ENDNOTES

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¹⁸Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 22.

¹⁹Max Boot, "The American Way of War," in *Readings Volume III: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, 2004), 198.

²⁰Blum, "Cutting a New Path," 56.

²¹Army Campaign Plan National Guard Bureau.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no 36 (2004):37.

²⁸LTG H. Steven Blum, "A Vision for the National Guard," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no 36 (2004): 26.

²⁹The quotation referred to in this paragraph was from a National Guard Association Conference in January 2004.

GLOSSARY

AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AIT	Advanced Individual Training
EO	Executive Order
ESGR	Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve
FI	Faculty Instructor
FPM	Federal Personnel Manual
HRO	Human Resource Office
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IET	Initial Entry Training
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
MFTB	Multi-Functional Training Brigade
NGR	National Guard Regulation
NTC	National Training Center
PA	Project Advisor
POTUS	President of the United States
RTI	Regional Training Institute
TOC	Table of Contents
TPR	Technician Personnel Regulation
U.S.	United States
USAWC	U.S. Army War College
UTA	Unit Training Assembly

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