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**INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA**

by

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June 2005

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**INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN
LATIN AMERICA**

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The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the importance of sharing information when dealing with activities related to international terrorism in Latin America, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist events against the United States on September 11, 2001. The importance of information on international terrorism is critical in the war against terrorism, particularly in the region due to the potential for those activities associated with the already existent organized crime. The importance of information includes organizations. Therefore, the proposed organizational process makes it possible to facilitate the sharing of information considering the complexity involved. At the same time, the necessity of information about the threat of terrorism can be demonstrated through the use of game theory. This model can drive the states to use all means necessary to obtain relevant information. The requirement for information sharing must be solved based on the relevance of the threats and the need for increased security for the states in the region.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the importance of sharing information when dealing with activities related to international terrorism in Latin America. Despite the fact that the region has endured a long period of terrorism and connected activities since the Cold War era, and still is experiencing some of the activities that are primarily linked to criminal activities, the circumstances have especially changed in the aftermath of the terrorist events against the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11).

The implications of international terrorism after those events attain a new position in terms of international relations, the nature, and relevance of the threats, and the priority placed on U.S. national security and on the states in the region. The effects of this asymmetric threat immediately generated a common response from the countries of the region as an attack on the region itself, expressed through the Organizations of American States (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001). The United Nations, as mentioned by its Secretary General Kofi Annan (2002), also condemned it, expressing that “terrorism is a global threat with global effects ... its consequences affect every aspect of the United Nations agenda”. Therefore, the war on terrorism declared by the United States against that non-traditional enemy must include Latin America as a partner in fighting terrorism (Johnson 2001, Zedillo 2001). Nevertheless, international terrorism has different implications in the region because of the perception of this threat, which is not accorded the same priority in the region as demonstrated in the last meeting of the Ministers of Defense held on November 2004, in Quito, Ecuador (Lobe, Lucas, Shanker, 2004; Washington Office on Latin America, 2004).

The importance of information on international terrorism seems to be obvious. Therefore, sharing information would be considered logical. However, it is not so simple. The term “information” means “facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form” (Military Dictionary DODa), and it can be applied to aspects of international terrorism. The term “intelligence” means “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning

foreign countries or areas” (Military Dictionary DODb). However, as mentioned by Dearth (1995), “Intelligence is many things to many people, depending upon their particular roles and perspectives” (p. 2). Somoza (2001) mentions that some definitions of intelligence consider knowledge, threat and decision (translation by the author) as the common elements of those definitions. The problem with definitions continues when dealing with terrorism. Ganor (2001), citing Schmidt and Youngman, analyzed 109 different definitions on terrorism in which they found that violence appeared 83.5% of the time, political 65%, terror 51%, threats 47%, and physiological effects 41.5%, among the most important components of the definitions (pp. 1-2). Therefore, violence is the main component of terrorism regardless of its origin. The legal framework that prevails in the region is the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (June 3, 2002), which “does not include a definition of terrorism or offense,” and refers to the already existent conventions to define offenses (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 14).

The problem of definition does not remain only at the scholastic level, especially when trying to share information in the region. Therefore, if considering previous definitions, the “raw material” in order to obtain intelligence would be information. If the information depends on the threat and if it is not defined, it is a problem. In addition, the problem increases when the security organizations in charge are not clearly identified and do not keep current to handle this threat, where some problems linked to police and judicial corruption exist, where a lack of coordination among countries continues, and in some cases where, “infiltration of security agencies by terrorists”, exists (Garrastazu & Haar, p. 3). Therefore, the results of the analysis can be easily imagined to be disadvantageous to the security forces, which incidentally, are in the process of identifying their new roles within the legacy of internal problems especially related to the intelligence services, which affect the regional unification efforts against international terrorism in the region. It is also important to mention the potential for terrorist activities in the region when linked with the already existent organized crime.

Finally, the gap between the preparation of the attackers and the victim’s possible reaction leaves a small margin of error that requires a different approach when taking into account information about terrorism (Handel, 1995, pp. 221-224). If violence is the main

component of terrorism and has no limits (Laqueur, 2000, pp. 155-157), this violence will also have socio-political and physiological consequences of the highest order. Meanwhile, this “non-state war” continues, and increases their activities in the region (Manwaring, 2004, p. 26).

B. BACKGROUND

Mares (2001) considers the historical conditions of the region in terms of security as a “violent peace”. These conditions have profound implications when trying to establish a new security architecture for the Americas that can generate multilateral cooperation (Nuñez, 2002). This is the scenario in which international terrorism must be considered, and it needs to be based on the definition of “terrorism involving the citizens or property of more than one country” (Perl, 2004). The prior experience of terrorism in the region was linked to internal activities, and when external activities occurred, they were linked to a common ideological origin. However, the importance of alliances to combat a common threat currently constitutes a priority when dealing with international terrorism (White House, 2003). It becomes more critical because of the potential risk that such kinds of actions represent and the correspondent strategic implications as mentioned by Wilkinson (2000). It is then necessary to act against old paradigms and not only include defense related actions but diplomatic actions as well.

The consolidation of democracy in the region is in transition, especially the institutions that include the security forces: the military and police. Under these circumstances, improvements in military civilian relations must continue because of the region’s increasing integration (Franko, 2000). While the region’s security problem is somehow implicit for all of society’s actors, the role of the security forces in the region is still extremely influential and is crucial in fighting against international terrorism. In addition, the region’s information systems depend directly or indirectly on those institutions, with a structure that was primarily oriented towards conventional threats, and in some cases, towards internal threats. The unorthodox use of that structure had generated not only internal problems with human rights in some countries but also an implicit lack of trust in international cooperation, especially with some countries

perceived as traditional enemies. Consequently, the states are obligated to regulate and professionalize this activity as a condition for efficiency and trust (Bruneau, 2000).

The implications of an international terrorist act generated in the region will have serious implications on relations among the states, and primarily, if such an action is intended to affect U.S. interests. The information required to prevent such actions will be considered vital, and therefore, obtaining it will be considered a priority. In this case, cooperative intelligence activities among states play an important role because of the importance of local information to produce timely and efficient analyses in the potential target state.

This general view is important to consider as a framework to understand the “establishment” of security in the region, especially when trying to share information to fight international terrorism and their associated problems. The same consideration applies to activities related to information about international terrorism from U.S. agencies and the international organizations in the region.

C. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER REVIEW

The analysis in this thesis is based on the hypothesis that information sharing is key in successfully combating international terrorism nets in the Americas. This requires seeking cooperation, regional agreements, and the sharing of intelligence. The thesis considers the nature of actions originating from a non-state enemy and the repercussions that could reach the tenet of a conventional war. The role of information, which is critical for any decision, reaches a new dimension when considering international terrorism because of its criticality to act quickly. This thesis intends to demonstrate the necessity to share information about international terrorism by using game theory. This procedure will consider the circumstances and could comprise reciprocal cooperation, the use of international organizations and agreements, and the use of special intelligence operations. Considering this, each activity will generate different outcomes and consequences that could affect regional relations and security among its states.

The use of game theory to analyze the importance of information in relation to international terrorism does not pretend to be the solution to this problem but rather it intends to present a procedure that might facilitate understanding and the need to obtain

and share information in a complex environment. The thesis emphasizes the importance of sharing information when dealing with international terrorism regardless of the origin, which includes some links to existing traditional threats in the region. It also considers the importance of obtaining information, which can drive the activities of states to develop programs that thwart terrorism and enhance regional security.

Chapter II examines international terrorism in the region and the traditional terrorist related activities with potential international repercussions already in existence. Chapter III considers the current status of international laws, international organizations, international agreements, and the organization of the security systems that prevail in the region. Chapter IV analyzes the existing structures in the region to deal with information focusing more on the organizations, the availability of information related to international terrorism, and the possibility of sharing information. Chapter V analyzes the necessity of information for defeating international terrorism using game theory. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the thesis and proposes new areas for further studies.

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II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE REGION

A. DEFINING THE THREATS IN THE REGION

The importance of defining the threats is to establish a general background about the existent and perceived threats in the region so as to assess their importance in connection with international terrorism. The traditional threat was primarily based on the concept of national security, derived from the European geopolitical vision of space and resources. Therefore, the concept of threat was defined by that view, and thereby generated grievances among countries from the region (Child, 1990). The ideological struggle based on communism, primarily with internal effects, determined most of the security policies within the region. The end of the Cold War coincided with the consolidation of democracy in the region. Only a few remnants of the old ideological war exist, especially in Colombia and Peru. However, as cited by Schulz (2000) prior to 9/11, according to Clinton's National Security Strategy for a New Century, the "principal security concerns in the hemisphere today are transnational in nature, stemming from such activities as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism" (p. 4).

The characteristics of international terrorism as a threat after 9/11 go beyond the classical approach of international relations and security because "the reality is that internal and transnational non state actors can be as important as traditional nation-states" (Manwaring, 2004, p. 4). However, the problem increases when those new actors are not considered a threat and do not receive the proper attention.

The attacks of 9/11 against the United States precipitated the response from a region that demonstrated a logical and unanimous solidarity against such an intolerable crime. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, democracy prevailed in the region and new concepts of integration derived from economic initiatives principally from the United States emerged. As a consequence, the region changed its traditional concept of defense against conventional threats towards a security approach, which encompasses the region's new reality. The U.S. initiative for the region was to improve security institutions by accelerating the process through direct contact among the region's

Ministers of Defense and by generating a new security architecture according to that new reality (Nuñez, 2002). Manwaring M., Fontela W., Grizzard M. and Rempe, D. (2003) analyze the problem of security in the region in terms that include not only the traditional concept of sovereignty but the new threats to security as well (pp. 3-16).

Lemozy (2003) summarizes the regional perspective of threats generated during the Panel on Intelligence and New Threats organized by the Center of Hemispheric Studies in Santiago, Chile, on October 28-30, 2003. This Panel particularly mentioned, “International terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime as the main threats considered in the global security agenda” (Lemozy, p. 6) (Translation by the author). A similar position is held by SOUTHCOM which considers “narcoterrorism, gang violence, branches of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations [support activities]... and radical populism as another major concern in the region” (Hill, 2004).

The perception of the threats in the region is described in the Declaration on Security in the Americas, during the Special Conference on Security from the Organization of American States, held in Mexico on October 28 (OAS, 2003). Chapter II, No. 4, lit. m. of that Declaration includes the actual threats considered in the region:

- Terrorism, transnational crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connection among them;
- Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states;
- Natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation;
- Trafficking of people;
- Attacks on cyber security;
- The potential damage arising in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous material, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and
- The possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.

This list represents the perceived threats in the region. Therefore, it is important to consider these threats to understand in context the importance of international terrorism

in the region. Otherwise, as mentioned by Manwaring (2004), “Latin American Countries perceive that the United States is going its own way in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)” (p. 1).

Delgado (2003) considers it important to classify those activities, differentiating the ones originated through illicit activities such as terrorism, drug trafficking and so on, from those generated by socio-economic conditions or natural and environmental circumstances (p. 9). This division, helps in assigning responsibilities to the proper organizations, and to highlight the threat of international terrorism in the region. (Delgado, 2003, pp. 8-10., Sain, 2003., Sillone, 2003, pp. 3-6).

In this regard, it is necessary to consider that the conventional threat of “external aggression [that] retains credibility, but not the urgency it once had” (Manwaring, 2004, p. 18). These considerations do not change the increased importance of sharing information about international terrorism. In this regard, it is important to consider Cilluffo (2000) who mentions that,

The lines between organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are quickly becoming blurred. It cannot be seen through a diplomacy, military, law enforcement, drug enforcement, or intelligence lens alone. It must be a prism of all these that offer a comprehensive and coordinated approach (p. 7).

When considering information about international terrorism, it is not necessary to separate organized crime from terrorism, despite the fact that those activities pursue different goals. However, some circumstances as mentioned by Cilluffo (2000) could generate a “relationship mutually beneficial” (p. 1). Makarenko (2004) goes further and mentions that, “Weak or failed states foster the convergence between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the convergent groups” (p. 138).

B. INTERNATIONAL THREATS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Trying to separate internal from external threats is becoming difficult in a global society where the players interact in many ways. However, the intention of this separation is to focus on the external activities associated with international terrorism.

When considering the transformation of conflict, Metz and Millen as cited by Manwaring (2004, p. 26), consider that the actual strategic-political wars consist of “1) direct interstate war, 2) nonstate war, 3) intrastate war, and 4) indirect interstate war”. From these, the nonstate war, and intrastate war are more likely to occur in the region. When considering the analysis of information about international terrorism, it is important to consider all the actors involved in these strategic-political wars, bearing in mind that each country or sub-region could play and would be affected in a different way.

1. Intrastate Wars within the Region

Subversion in the region was a clear threat identified by the communist struggle that was confronted with the prevailing paradigms of the Cold War. Metz and Millen (2004) mention that:

21st-century insurgency is clearly a descendent of a similar phenomenon that blossomed in the golden age of insurgency in the second half of the 20th century. At that time, many states in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and even on the periphery of Europe were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes, unpopular dictators, new fragile governments, or colonial occupiers. Socialist radicalism and nationalism inspired revolutionaries around the world and provided an ethical justification for political violence (p. 8).

The existence of remnants of insurgence is evident in the region, especially in the Andean region, and exists as an insurgent potential in the region (Daly, 2004). The insurgency in Colombia is the main security concern of that country but its effects spillover into the entire region. The interaction between insurgents and illicit drug producers has generated pivotal support from the United States through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) since 2000 (Sullivan, 2005). However, the events of 9/11 changed the definition of the threat with respect to terrorist groups in the region (Marcella, 2003, p. 34). This new concept of threat required a different approach from the United States for military aid to Colombia to support the government’s unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security (Perl, 2004). The actual situation of the subversive groups, which now are included in the list of Foreign Terrorist organizations (FTO) by the Department of State include in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitary (AUC); and from Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), as the

most important in the region (Sullivan, 2005). In the region, the United States still considers Cuba a state that supports terrorism but with a passive or less active role (Perl, 2004). In Central America, it is important to consider the Zapatista National Revolutionary Army (EZNL), which is the largest and most sophisticated insurgent group in Mexico. Its strategy is based on indigenous claims and in engaging the government in a prolonged process of negotiations. The group has earned itself the title of the “first post-communist insurgency while its strategy has been characterized as social netwar” (Miro, 2003, p. 35).

An important consideration of revolutionary insurgency is that while an underground organization and procedures are maintained, those groups undergo a transmutation in ideology and partnership support, but that reflects the new “asymmetric Power Projection” to include the projection of terrorism with criminal links (Metz & Millen, 2004, pp. 11-14). In any case, it is important to consider that the use of terrorism by the insurgency constitutes another form of warfare widely used due to “its unique place in the universe of political violence” (Merari, 1993, p. 213). That violence receives different responses from the governments of the region.

2. Non State Actors Linked with International Terrorism and International Crime in the Region

The main actors associated with nonstate wars considered by Metz and Millen, include “Criminal and terrorist [groups] that thrive among various host states and use ...terrorist and insurgency methods to maintain freedom of movement and their own security. The al Qaida terrorist network is an example” (As cited by Manwaring 2004, p. 26). Criminal actions are pretty well defined and somehow worked out by the current internal and international law in the region. However, when actions become terrorism, they are noticeably identified within each country, based on the effects of such actions. The actors associated with that kind of threat are not considered in the same way in each country and international law to define such actions does not exist (Fitzgerald, 2002, pp. 13-15).

a. International Terrorism

The importance of international terrorism and its related activities varies in each sub-region. In the Caribbean, the main concern during the Cold War was the Cuban-

Soviet threat. After 9/11, the financial support of terrorist activities and its connection to drug related activities became a priority (Sullivan, 2004). Central America is not considered an active region for international terrorism despite the fact that it is considered a safe haven for political activities of extremist organizations and latent subversion exists in some rural areas. However, persistent concern exists about the presence of members of international terrorist organizations associated with the Middle East who may try to recruit members and cross the border into the United States (Rodriguez, 2004). In the Andean region, the main concern has been the relationship between internal and international drug traders, and occasionally, the presence of external actors associated with subversive groups (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001). The Southern cone experienced international terrorism connected with the Middle East in the Tri Border Area (TBA) through the presence of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA), demonstrate an example of this presence (Sullivan, 2004, pp. 9-10).

The presence of international terrorism associated with the Middle East generated great concern, but only after 9/11, when some connections to certain members of al Qaida with the region were established (Blanche, 2003, Daly, 2003, Westerman, 2002). The range of activities of the international terrorist groups that operate in different countries has increased the apprehension of the region's governments due to those group's potential and the difficulty in tracking their activities. Only limited activities are known to be related to international terrorism, but the region has increasingly established new evidence of the presence of terrorists in different places of the region. The main concern relevant to the purpose of this thesis, refers to the information available on this threat in the region prior to 9/11, and the existing information about potential activities in the entire region, considering that "one-third of the terrorist organizations operating worldwide, including one linked to Osama bin Laden, located or operate in Latin America" (Johnson, 2001).

Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev (2002) mention that "the objectives of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida and the Symbiotic organized-crime networks that help

sustain these groups are not confined territorially or ideological to a particular region” (p. 97). The terrorist network will operate where necessary according to the circumstances, especially in areas that are not expected to be affected by terrorism or that are not familiar with such activities. According to Levitt (2002b), “Cracking down on terrorist financing will only succeed in dismantling terrorist groups’ logistical and financial support networks and by extension preventing terrorist attacks”.

Terrorism is not limited to traditional means of violence. The actions and capabilities of the counterterrorist forces obligate the terrorist groups to innovate. Jackson (2001) mentions, “for groups seeking legitimacy and respect in today’s technological advanced world, the sophistication of a groups’ attack can be of utmost importance” (p. 185). The use of “innovation applied to terrorist groups can take different meanings across the spectrum of technology acquisition activities” (Jackson, 2001, p. 203). In this aspect, Crenshaw (2001) considers that it can refer not only to technological but also to organizational innovations, which include improvements in the terror network as well as new areas of operation.

b. International Crime – Terrorist Related Activities

When analyzing international terrorism in the region, illicit activities are the common factor when describing this kind of threat. Terrorism definitely has changed from the 1970’s and the same has happened with traditional organized crime, which was identified with the classical mafias, “both activities have exploited the change in the international environment and, more importantly, they have overlapped to a degree unimaginable prior to 1990” (Jane’s, 2000).

Ferguson (2002) considers that organized crime “remains a major transnational as well as national problem for the Western hemisphere”, especially because of the economic resources and the illegal trade linked with drugs and arms (p. 2). Ferguson (2002) also observes that the problems that affect the region “are tied to the issue of trans boundary effects, or to uncontrolled transnational activities and effects, where international organized criminal groups and illicit forms of trade cross national boundaries with considerable ease” (p. 3).

The risk increases not only because a nexus with international terrorism can occur, but also because the traditional “paths and means” to reach the continental United States that already exist and are used for illegal activities, can be used by extra-regional international terrorists (Islamic), even though those actions supposedly contradict the interests of traditional crime. Related to this, Ronquillo (2005) mentions the possible relationship of criminal gangs from Central America that have connections with the United States, and are suspected of having some links to Middle East terrorism. The importance of terrorism in Colombia and the impact for the region is analyzed by Laqueur (2003). He considers the relationship between terrorism and other illegal activities and states that the “FARC and ELP ideology is the struggle against government corruption, but the presence of so much money in the hands of the terrorists is bound to create similar problems” (p. 206).

According to Shelley (2003), “The phenomenon of transnational crime, terrorism, and corruption are all too often viewed as separate, and they grow in tandem with the economic and political conditions” (p. 302). This is the predominant reality in the region where subversion and drugs intensify that problem causing an increasing gap between the resources available to the State and those available to the outlaws (Shelley, 2003).

The new tendency globally, and particularly in the region, is to consider that relationship. Tamara Makarenko, has considered this link and mentions it as a “Crime-Terror Continuum” (2004, p. 129). That relationship can be represented to generate a model of a relationship that includes alliances, operational motivations, and possible convergence besides including the “Black Hole” thesis that represents the possible failure of the state as a final consequence (Makarenko, 2001, 2003, 2004).

III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

A. THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AND TERRORISM

1. The General Assembly

According to the United Nations (UN, 2004a) “terrorism has been a concern to the international community since 1937 when the League of Nations elaborated the convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism”. The United Nations has established “12 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states responsibilities for terrorism” and some additional resolutions through the Security Council and General Assembly on “specific incidents” (UN, 2004b). However, Peterson (2003) observes that a common discussion in the General Assembly among the states refers to the “inability to agree on a common definition about, terrorism, terrorist acts, and international terrorism” (p. 177). Attitudes are deeply divided because of the implications a single definition represents.

This is important to consider because the internal, regional, and global motivations for generating terrorism has had a series of political, military, and diplomatic implications (Mani, 2003). A different approach exists between the General Assembly and the Security Council that is important to consider, the “Assembly resolutions emphasize treating terrorism as a form of transnational crime to be suppressed through policing while council resolutions treat terrorism as a security question” (Peterson, 2003, p. 183). Mani (2003) mentions that “the General Assembly ceded its place to the Security Council in addressing terrorism”, and that the “significant point of departure was the assembly’s 1994 resolution 60, Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism”, which concluded the “Defense of Non-State Terrorism” (p. 223). Those “measures to eliminate” terrorism demonstrated the need to “develop national and international legal rules adequate to suppressing terrorism”, and the Assembly established a “new ad hoc committee of international terrorism in 1996” (Peterson, 2003, p. 183).

2. The Security Council

According to Oudraat (2003), international terrorism “was placed on the Security Council’s agenda in the early 1990s”, and states that “On January 31, 1992, at the Council’s first-ever meeting of heads of state and government, the members of the council expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts” (p. 151). Oudraat (2003) also observes that the United States was particularly interested “after the bombings of its embassies in East Africa,” and that U.S. President Bill Clinton in the General Assembly in 1998 “placed the fight against terrorism at the top of the United States agenda” (Oudraat, p. 151). In 1999, the “Security Council recognized international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and strongly condemned all such acts in resolution 1269” (Oudraat, 2003, p. 151).

Oudraat (2003) observes that a great concern of the United States and the Security Council was motivated by five tendencies (pp. 151-152):

- An increasing proportion of terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities and citizens
- The average number of casualties per incident increased
- Terrorist groups seemed to be operating as part of a global network.
- Fears that terrorism might one day use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were increasing
- The United States was, and is, particularly concerned by the role that certain states play in supporting and sponsoring terrorism

The UN Security Council resolutions linked to international terrorism included economic sanctions against Libya in 1992, Sudan in 1996, and Afghanistan in 1999. Those actions demonstrated the importance of multilateral responses and facilitated the rapid response after the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. This was accomplished with “two resolutions particularly important, resolution 1868 of September 12 [that] legitimized militarized action against terrorism [and] resolutions 1363 of September 28, 2001, broaden the scope of international responses” (Oudraat, 2003, pp. 153-158). Schrijver (2003) observes that “Resolution 1373 was the first legally binding Security Council resolution addressing international terrorism as a global phenomenon

without referring to a particular state or region” (p. 58). The common theme in all the resolutions emphasizes the threat represented by international terrorism, and the importance of a lawful response and respect for human rights. In addition, it considers the importance of cooperation and the sharing of information among the states on this issue.

The General Assembly resolutions of December 1999 and December 2001, mention “to intensify, as and where appropriate, the exchange of information of facts related to terrorism and, in so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or unverified information” (UN, General Assembly, 2000). The Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on the problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1456, addresses that these “resolutions had established the intimate link between the fight against terrorism and other priorities of the United Nations” (UN, Security Council, S/2004/70). The Report also emphasizes the importance of liaison activities with international and regional organizations, especially for technical assistance, and mentions when referring to WMD and trans-national organized crime that “CTC has shown that anti-terrorism measures related to those fields is interrelated to-and inseparable—from anti-terrorism measures under the Resolution” (UN, Security Council, S/2004/70).

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1535 on March 26, 2004, in which it decides to revitalize the Counter-Terrorism Committee, assisted by a Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with the intent to “enhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001)” (UN, Security Council, S/RES/1535, 2004). In this regard, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1566 on October 8, 2004, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which condemns terrorism and establishes in art. 6 “Calls upon relevant international, regional and sub regional organizations to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to intensify their interaction with the UN and in particular with the CTC” (UN, Security Council, S/RES/1566, 2004). Resolution 1566 includes an activity that is innovative and establishes the resolution’s nature of enforcement as mentioned in article 8:

Directs the CTC, as matter of priority and, when appropriate, in close cooperation with the relevant international, regional and sub regional organizations to start visits to States, with the consent of the States concerned, in order to enhance the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and facilitate the provision of technical and other assistance for such implementation (UN, Security Council, S/RES/1566, 2004).

The reference to UN resolutions against international terrorism is very important because it establishes a legal framework to support the actions of the states and the international and regional organizations confronting international terrorism. This reference permits visualizing the spectrum of possible actions that the UN or the affected states can assume considering the importance that such kinds of actions can represent for the security of the states.

These resolutions generates new responsibilities for the states and regional organizations related to international terrorism that must be considered. In addition, it demonstrates the importance of establishing a basic network of cooperation especially for sharing information on this threat in order to facilitate the actions and avoid false perceptions that would lead the international organizations and the states to make wrong decisions. Thus, they are obligated to act with all the organizations dealing with international terrorism or their related activities such as the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Atomic Energy (IAEA), and INTERPOL, among the most important.

B. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AND TERRORISM

1. The OAS Response to International Terrorism

Fitzgerald (2002), observes that the OAS “has always been on the forefront of issues regarding terrorism, [and that the attacks against the US on September 11], heightened the necessity to address this issue,” and mentions that “as early as the beginning of the 1970’s the OAS was involved with confronting the problem of terrorism and its effects on OAS members” (p. 2). The first Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Lima, Peru, in 1996, adopted “the Declaration and the Plan of Action on

Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism” (OAS, 1999). The Second Conference held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, set the basis for the creation of the Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), and considered among other resolutions “to transmit to CICTE, for implementation, as the Directory of Competences for the Prevention, Combating, and Elimination of Terrorism, and the Inter-American Database on Terrorism, as well as the establishment of a framework for technical cooperation” (OAS, 1998). The OAS General Assembly through resolution AG/RES. 1650 formally established the CICTE on June 7, 1999 (OAS, 1999). The first regular meeting of the CICTE was held in October 1999, and no session was held in 2000. However, the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States “force the CICTE to renew and strengthen its anti-terrorism position” and “two special sessions on October 15 and November 29, 2001” were held (Fitzgerald, 2002). According to the OAS mandate, the mission of the CICTE is to serve “for the coordination of efforts to protect the citizens of the member nations from the scourges of terrorism. Functioning through the exchange of information amongst the preeminent leaders, subject matter experts and decision makers work together to strengthen hemispheric solidarity and security” (OAS, 2002).

Among other considerations, Article 28 of the Statute of the CICTE mentions the importance:

To create an inter-American network for gathering and transmitting data via the competent national authorities designed to exchange information and experiences with the activities or persons, groups, organizations, and movements linked to terrorist acts as well as with the methods, sources of finance and entities directly or indirectly protecting or supporting them, and their possible links to other crimes, including the creation of an inter-American database on terrorism issues that will be at the disposal of Member States (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 5).

It is important to consider that the “CICTE was conceived in the mid-1990’s in the wake of the twin bombings in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1992 and 1994” and supported the OAS resolutions due to the terrorist attacks against the United States (Black, 2004).

2. The OAS Response after the Events of September 11, 2001

The most important resolutions after 9/11 were made during the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the region on September 21, 2001, and more significantly, because the states invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio Treaty, as an unprecedented response to the U.S. terrorist attacks 10 days earlier (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 7). Furthermore, during that meeting, the states passed a resolution “Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism” (OAS, 2001). In that meeting, in addition to condemning those attacks that took place in the United States, it recognizes “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations” (OAS, 2001). This resolution reflects an unprecedented procedure of invoking the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio Treaty, which demonstrated that it is still important to respond to terrorist attacks (Grossman, 2003). Noriega (2003) observes, “Our experience since September 11, 2001, in mobilizing hemispheric support and response to fight terrorism under the OAS Charter and Rio Treaty proves that the current hemispheric structure can address the region’s essential security needs”.

On June 3, 2002, the OAS General Assembly passed the resolution adopting the “Inter-American Convention against Terrorism” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 14). That resolution mentions some “international cooperative obligations”, which deal with border control, training, and cooperation among law enforcement authorities, and improve communications “between the competent authorities in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offenses established in the international instrument” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 16).

The final document that constitutes the basis for a security matter in the region is the “Declaration on Security in the Americas” adopted in the third plenary session in Mexico, which includes international terrorism as a threat to the region (OAS, 2003). According to the OAS Secretary General it “adopted a multidimensional approach adopted in Barbados, which recognizes that many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemispheric security are transnational in nature and require international

cooperation” (Gaviria, 2004). Noriega (2003) summarizes the effects of these threats in the region when he mentions, “terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics and precursor chemicals, attacks on critical infrastructure and transnational criminal enterprises threaten democracy and undermine the security and prosperity of our citizens in too many of our states”.

3. International Cooperation

From a security perspective, “A dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security” (Devost, Houghton and Pollard, 2002). This dilemma involves the implementation of the already existent agreements and the activities of the organizations that deal with international terrorism and related activities in the region. Any decision must consider the political implications and the consequences that represent a confrontation against that kind of threat for every state considering that international terrorism is not necessarily a priority for most of the countries in the region.

Terrorism and international crime can also affect economic integration. Such was the case when MERCOSUR was established, and given the importance of the Tri border Area (TBA), Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and the United States decided to create a Counterterrorism Group “3+1” with the goal of increasing cooperation, exchanging information and cooperating in law enforcement” in that region (Department of State, 2003). Similar agreements about narcotics have been reached in the Caribbean, in the Andean region, and the same requirement was necessary for NAFTA agreements. Some of the organizations that could be considered for specific situations with activities related to this threat include the Inter American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Consultative Committee of the Inter American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), the Inter American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), the South American Actions Task Force (GAFISID), and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), among the most important. In addition, it is

significant to mention the cooperation that the states must have with the United States regardless of any consideration since it constitutes the main target state for international terrorist activities.

Similarly, the UN and the OAS respond to international terrorism, because of their opposition to international terrorist actions. Both organizations, through their correspondent General Assemblies, reject such kinds of actions with unanimous political support. The main difference is in the enforcement of any decision. The UN has the Security Council to enforce a resolution. On the other hand, the OAS, even though it evoked the Rio Treaty in the case of the terrorist acts against the United States in 2001, it does not have a clear instrument to act against such threats. The resolutions of the UN Security Council in evoking Charter VII of the United Nations, especially concerning the role of the CTC, will obligate it to actualize the OAS resolutions. However, the character of enforcement or at least control, in order to implement Resolution 1337 (UN, Security Council, S/RES/1566, 2004), will require that the states and the security agencies encompass this new reality, which requires identifying international terrorism according to the potential threat it represents to the international community. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a common response based on what such a threat represents, which must include the study and control of this threat and their related activities due to the repercussions on the security of the states. The states of the region need to recognize that the threat that represents an international terrorist action could obligate the potentially affected state to act as it were an external aggression. Therefore, the basic action that any state must fulfill is the requirement to share information about this possible activity. Thus, the exchange of information about this kind of threat becomes a priority because of what it represents to the potential target state, bearing in mind that the state will use any means necessary to obtain that information. At the same time, this information will be used to support any decision under the existing international legal framework, and the way in which that information is received will avoid misinterpretations, facilitate the making of decisions, and the prosecution of terrorism.

Problems of coordination persist despite the relevance of terrorism to the security of the states of the region and to the concerns of the international organizations, and the drive to create new organizations and agreements in order to share information about international terrorism. The lack of a common definition and priority about this sort of threat makes it difficult to cooperate and share information among the states of the region and their security organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to expedite the development of a procedure for sharing information among the states in order to exploit the existing agreements.

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IV. IMPORTANCE OF AN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION-PROCESS STRUCTURE TO SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

A. IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION

The role of intelligence in any kind of war is basic, it is even more important when referring to terrorism. In the United States, the existing structure against traditional threats failed and after the events of 9/11, forced a complete restructuring of the system, was undertaken. The problem associated with this threat increases in the region when international terrorism is not considered a priority. However, the relationship between terrorism and criminal activities represent a real threat to the state where those activities are present. Defense related scholars and security chiefs must consider the effects that terrorism have on security so as to study such a threat as a danger to the existence of the states and to the region's on-going process of economic integration. The circumstances created by terrorism require a different approach to generate cooperation within the states of the region including all the sub regional and international organizations. This cooperation in terms of security must consider the importance of developing legal agreements to secure political and legal support, including the correspondent oversight that guarantees to expedite procedures required to deal with such a threat.

1. The Importance of Information in the War on Terrorism in Latin America

As a result of the history in the region, the potential of today's new terrorism is not fully appreciated nor are there adequate security structures available to prevent terrorist attacks. Therefore, international terrorist organizations and their related activities could increase their presence with the corresponding effects on society and become more difficult to confront later.

When considering the importance of intelligence, Russell (2003a) observes that in many countries of Latin America, there is a "devolution of national strategic intelligence" (p. 3), and that there is an increase in operational intelligence. Besides, Kenney (2003) when mentioning intelligence against the "drug trafficking enterprises", considers the importance of timely, reliable, and accurate information, critical for operations and legal

purposes (pp. 212-214). In any case, as mentioned by Treverton (2005), there are at least three types of intelligence, tactical, operative, and strategic, but “interestingly, transnational issues – organized crime, narcotics, terrorism, and weapon proliferation – run across the three types” (p. 23).

This is particularly important in the region because of the activities of the main terrorism group with international projections, the FARC from Colombia which is supposed to have a “Marxist Leninist ideology”; an ideology that “is used mainly as a glue to hold the organization together and to indoctrinate new recruits, and does not play a significant role in the formation of their policy” (Janes, 2005, p. 2). Therefore, the activities must be understood in that context especially when those actions affect not only the neighboring countries but also the entire region (Millet, 2002). The motivation of those groups also must be understood, so the potential activities linked with those groups could be paid the proper attention at the corresponding level of analysis in each state of the region.

2. The Importance of Information in the War on Terror

The terrorist attack of 9/11 against the United States was a surprise to the defense leaders and to the intelligence community (IC). The initial blame for the events of 9/11 was directed against the intelligence community. The result was a restructuring of the IC that included not only the structure but also procedures, doctrine, and priorities (Verton, 2003, pp. 165-191).

According to Jackson (2001), “the potential for international cooperation among terrorist groups for operational or ideological reasons has long been a focus of interest” (p. 199). Parachini (2003) mentions that the FARC among other groups, especially those which are supposed to pursue political goals, “political vision, practical military utility, and moral codes all restrained them in part from seeking and using unconventional weapons” (p. 45). This could be the case for this organization and even for the particular interest of continuing their profitable illicit activities, but it may not be the case for other terrorist organizations with other motivations, which can use criminal organizations or their members to employ unconventional weapons. The criminal activities and the actual

criminal networks existent in the region could facilitate the objectives of a terrorist group due to the varied regional and intercontinental transportation nets that terminate in the United States.

Crenshaw (1988) mentions that “terrorism is par excellence a strategy of surprise; necessary for small groups who must thereby compensate for weakness in numbers and destructive capability” (p. 14). Therefore, “the existence of opportunities for a surprise attack may generate a political incentive for terrorism where none existed before” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 14).

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House, 2003) mentions that the identified enemy requires a common effort where intelligence constitutes an essential component in order to prevail by using any means possible, and considers the importance of international cooperation. It encourages the Intelligence Community “to expand and improve relations with their foreign counterparts in an effort to take better advantage of their source reporting”. In addition, it states, “America will focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally” (White House, 2003, p. 17).

When Byman and El Baradei (2003) analyze the War on Terrorism, they consider that the terrorist events of al Qaeda have generated a global intelligence operation against this terrorist group, and that regardless of the capacity of the police and intelligence services, intelligence operations have become a priority. Nevertheless, the traditional efforts of the intelligence services do not consider international terrorism a priority in Latin America. The initial intent of sharing information in the region is primarily due to a particular interest especially from the United States, and since it is required by international agreements, the act of sharing information to fight against international terrorism as a coordinated activity is still an ongoing goal.

3. The Importance of Sharing Information about International Terrorism in the Region

The information available in the security agencies on international terrorism needs to be handled differently because, in essence, it identifies a real threat to the target state. Lefebvre (2003) when mentioning the “difficulties and dilemmas of International

Intelligence Cooperation” refers to the reasons and restraints on cooperation that are important to analyze, when considering the situation in Latin America. Among the reasons, Lefebvre (2003) mentions that “no one agency can do and know everything” (p. 534), and that is especially important when dealing with international terrorism. The best cooperation can be obtained when the benefits of such cooperation are evident for all parties and the risks demanded are fully understood. In addition, these activities may serve to fulfill some limitations existing in certain areas (Lefebvre, 2003). Therefore, cooperation constitutes a priority and it is different in each country and sub-region due to particular necessities that demand bilateral and common agreements to confront those kinds of threats. The bilateral agreements between the countries of the Andean Region and the Multilateral Agreements in the Caribbean and the South Cone constitute some examples.

Lefebvre (2003) also observes some limitations that restrain cooperation among the states which are particularly sensible in the region such as the different perceptions of the threat, the distribution of power, the records on Human Rights, and some legal issues (pp. 534-535). Those conditions must be considered when seeking cooperation on security and the sharing of information concerning international terrorism. In this regard, Clough (2004) also considers the importance of having a second opinion and sharing “ideas and concepts with someone from a different nation, but with the same responsibilities, will always be advantageous, either to reinforce theories or to avoid narrow thinking” (p. 605).

The need for information about the new threats has been analyzed in the region through various conferences promoted by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, considering the role of intelligence within the security structure of each state and the necessity of an increasing participation of civilians in defense matters. The recent events of international terrorism increased the necessity for coordination and sharing of information that is critical. As an example Wishart (2002), when considering the importance of the intelligence networks in the Tri Border area of South America, emphasizes the role that MERCOSUR can represent for multilateral cooperation even with the United States.

4. A Proposed Organization-Process to Share Information in the Region
a. *The Actual Structure-Process for Sharing Information in the Region*

Salazar (2002), when considering the importance of transforming the United States IC, observes that “terrorism, drug trafficking and the proliferation of WMD represent the predominant threats”, and that the war on terrorism includes those transnational threats such as drug trafficking in the region that “provide funds for terrorists organizations that target America” (pp. 252-253). Therefore, the importance of information about the threat is based on the organization that can obtain and share information through international cooperation. According to Russell (2003b), most of the intelligence structures in Latin America were oriented to support domestic political concerns more than serious external threats to the state. The new discussion about the role of intelligence at the regional level has been promoted by the Center for Hemispheric Studies since 1997 and still is a topic of study (Russell, 2003b). The main concern in civil society within Latin America has been the control of the intelligence services by society and the correspondent oversight (Bruneau, 2000, Ugarte, 2002), and about the professionalism of that activity in the region (Russell and Lemozy, 2002). The role of the intelligence services in relation to the new democratic scenario in the region is improving. However, when considering international terrorism, the actual conditions increase the possibilities for terrorists to act in the region. Chiri (2002), when considering the importance of intelligence in the Americas and the importance of “moving beyond old paradigms”, mentions that three elements are predominant in confronting the intelligence systems of the countries of the region. “First, new forces that threaten national and international stability, such as terrorism and transnational criminal activity, second the revolution in information technology, which impacts upon the economic environment and influences the intelligence process, third, the interrelationship between intelligence and politics” (p. 1). These circumstances in the security structure of the region could result in surprise due to a failure of intelligence as occurred in the United States (Porch and Wirtz, 2002). Therefore, the regional states where international terrorism begins need to increase their strategic vision about the capacity of the threat and the repercussions of failing to cooperate.

b. Proposed Organization to Share Information about International Terrorism and Related or Potential Activities

When trying to consider new intelligence structures in the region to support activities against international terrorism, it is vital to consider that more than the structure itself, it is important that the process and the conditions allow information to be shared. The information environment in the region is complex because it includes different sub regions that geographically and historically do not share common interests (Dominguez, 1998). Under these conditions, the structure of the security organizations must follow the requirement of each state, but at the same time, it is important to count on a process to share information that includes the complete spectrum of activities of terrorism in the region.

According to Daft (2001), the structure that can be used to meet the requirements of a complex and unstable environment, such as the case of the region, is a matrix structure. It allows the necessary coordination to satisfy the necessity of information and easy sharing of resources, especially personnel (Daft, 2001, p. 47), see Figure 1. According to Daft (2001), “the matrix is a strong form of horizontal linkage,” and the characteristics of this structure make it possible to consider that information about international terrorism that is required by a particular security organization is also correlated with the need of information from a specific sub region or state. Daft (2001) also considers that some requirements are necessary to adopt this structure. The first is the necessity to share resources such as personnel and equipment, the second is to have dual authority when necessary, or mutual channels of cooperation, and the final requirement is a “complex and uncertain” threat (Daft, 2001, pp. 45-46).




Figure 1. Organization-Process Model for Sharing Information about International Terrorism in Latin America. After (Daft, 2001, p. 46, Dual- Authority Structure in a Matrix Organization). The structure considers different organizations that could belong to a specific region or act independently.

The proposed Organization-Process Model for sharing information about international terrorism considers the environment of the region and all regional and international organizations. The organization-process is not based on structure, which of course, but uses the actual systems to emphasize the processes more than on the structure. The requirement of information from a particular sub region or security organizations that deal with international terrorism, will maintain an appropriate dynamic to the organization-process motivated by their own interests. It is important to consider that a legal framework and the corresponding agreements facilitate the process and collaboration among the agencies within the countries and the sub regions.

The proposed Organization-Process Model for sharing information about international terrorism is based on a “matrix organization structure”, which has some characteristics that are important to consider when dealing with the problem and also has particular “strengths and weaknesses” that must be considered (Daft, 2001, p. 47).

c. Strengths. Refer to Figure 1

(1) “Achieves coordination necessary to meet dual demands of customers” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is important because each sub region has particular interests with respect to the threat that international terrorism represents. At the same time, the internal, regional, and international organizations that deal with the problem have their own priorities. Those demands could be overcome with this structure.

(2) “Flexible sharing of human resources across products [organizations that deal with the threat]” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). The characteristic of the threat with an ample range of criminal-terrorist activities requires mutual support in specialized personnel and technology. The case of WMD, global illegal finances, legal support, cyber crime, small weapons trafficking, narcotics, and international crime and so on, can be considered examples of required cooperation and support among the states and sub regions, especially when considering the relationship with international terrorist activities that have the potential to affect the security of the states and their external relations.

(3) “Suited to complex decisions and frequent changes in an unstable environment” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is important in the region because the socio political conditions in the region generate instability in some particular states or circumstances. Therefore, the Organization-Process Model permits a continuum of proceedings from the other sub regions and organizations that deal with international terrorism or their linked activities to be suitable to make coordinated decisions. International agreements would facilitate this activity.

(4) “Provides opportunity for both functional and product skill development” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). The Organization-Process Structure allows for increasing the knowledge about the threat to all states. Additionally the internal, regional, and international organizations could increase their capacity with the structure that allows

exchanging experiences, knowledge, and information. This circumstance, in the long term, will improve the relationship among the individuals and organizations, generating conditions for common trust.

d. Weaknesses. Refer to Figure 1

(1) “Causes participants to experience dual authority, which can be frustrating and confusing” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This can be a problem because the Organization-Process requires a flow of activities and it can be halted or delayed at multiple points in the process. Therefore, normal cooperation could end.

(2) “Means participants need good interpersonal skills and extensive training” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This is a limitation because the capacity of the personnel and the assets usually differ in each region or security organization, which limits the activities. The limitations increase when there is no established security structure in the state or proper oversight that facilitates the operation at an international level.

(3) “Will not work unless participants understand it and adopt collegial rather than vertical-type relationships” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). This organization does not follow the traditional vertical and hierarchical structures that characterize the security organizations of the region. Rather, it is a “horizontal organization” that generates “horizontal linkages” (Daft, 2001, pp. 36-37). The organization will not work unless a common agreement and established procedures exist based on the local and international agreements, and on the appropriate internal control that permits the sharing of information in a timely matter.

(4) “Requires great effort to maintain power balance” (Daft, 2001, pp. 47-48). The structure facilitates multiple relationships among all the organizations and regions. This represents a dilemma in terms of authority and hierarchy. Effectiveness depends on relationships but still requires a clear foundation based on a legal framework and proper oversight of the process.

Limitations that hinder horizontal linkages within the organization, they can be solved by the use of “information systems” and “direct contact,” and even assigning personnel to the “liaison role” (Daft, 2001, p. 37), refer to Figure 1. Another

option when direct contact or liaisons are not enough is the creation of a “Task Force”, which is a “temporary committee composed of representatives from each department affected by a problem” (Daft, 2001, p. 37). Therefore, each can collaborate, and at the same time, obtain information required for each organization or sub region. The character of the organization would be temporal and based on a specific requirement. Other options that facilitate the linkage mentioned by Daft (2001) consist of assigning a “Full-time Integrator” to facilitate the process, or a “Team” to solve specific problems for a longer period (p. 38). In the region, this possibility would allow collaboration among various organizations and sub regions that otherwise would not occur. Also, especially important is the possibility that liaisons or integrators could be assigned to facilitate that process. The possibility of considering the creation of a special “Task Force” or “Team” to solve or study a specific problem about international terrorism or their related activities is also very important.

This structure facilitates the cooperation among the affected states and organizations, and can focus on specific areas of common interest about related activities by using the existent regional agreements and organizations that deal with international terrorism and its related activities. The importance of this structure is that it represents a process more than a bureaucratic apparatus, and only requires the use of the existent organizations linked by interpersonal relations and the use of the information technology to facilitate contacts.

Any organization that works to collaborate to increase security against international terrorism and its related activities must be designed to prevent a surprise attack. This also includes analyzing the use and innovation in weapons, target selection, and deception. Sharing of information about international terrorism requires a process more than a structure. The obstacles faced by regional security organizations that deal with international terrorism in terms of sharing information could be solved with this proposed organization-process. The information relevant to terrorism requires special treatment considering the implications for the security for each state in the region. The

nature of this activity requires international agreements related to international terrorism which must have the correspondent oversight and approval from each state in order to expedite the process of sharing information.

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V. USE OF GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

A. INTRODUCTION

International terrorism represents a threat to the international community, and especially the illicit associated activities, which affect the security of the states of the region. The existence of terrorism in Latin America is deeply rooted and still is present in the region. In addition, new extra regional international terrorism uses the region for their support activities and has the potential to reach the United States.

The analysis of international terrorism requires a broad approach; therefore, the use of every tool to analyze this kind of threat is important. This chapter uses game theory to demonstrate the possible interactions of the international terrorist organizations and the affected states. The use of modeling to analyze terrorism is not new, and as mentioned by Smith (2001), as terrorist activities “become more complex, leaders need more powerful tools to help them manage, understand, and penetrate this complexity” (p. 1). Smith (2001) also observes that the activities of international terrorist organizations cannot be represented in one simple model. The use of modeling and simulations includes a diversity of variables that can support the decision process for combating terrorism and the model considers possible outcomes based on the availability of information.

Trying to analyze the interaction of all the actors involved in terrorist activities is a complex process. Game theory provides an alternative that facilitates this process because it “is used to figure out what it is likely to happen in a strategic interaction” (Camerer, 2003, p. 7). Game theory facilitates developing strategies and analyzing possible rational choices to obtain preferred outcomes. Game theory can demonstrate the necessity for sharing information about international terrorism among the states of the region (Camerer, 2003).

B. SITUATION

The historical background and actual conditions in the region do not facilitate complete cooperation among the nations. The lack of a common response to terrorism represents a challenge to the affected states to obtain information on international

terrorism and its related activities. The role of the various agencies responsible for this differs in each state. This situation complicates the exchange of information in a timely manner. This problem is partially solved through informal contacts, the use of international organizations, mutual agreements and private enterprises. The lack of a formal procedure may have implications for the state and for the international community when considering legal prosecution of terrorists. Another consideration is that of time. A thorough analysis is not as important as the imperative to transfer information quickly when dealing with international terrorism. Usually, it would be relatively easy to share that information when it is not sensitive to the sponsor state but critical to the potential target state. Finally, the effects of international terrorism go further than the normal expectations of an external threat. As a result, the information to avoid or neutralize a terrorist attack requires different treatment due to the potential effects of that action, such as the case of WMD or any act that generates great social and political chaos.

The variables considered for the game are based on the information in the previous chapters of this thesis that refers to the perception of the threat, the characteristics of international terrorism, the international terrorist organizations, the state security systems, the international organizations, and the necessity of sharing information about this kind of threat. The game makes it possible to consider the role of the actors, the impact of information sharing, and the affect that terrorism can exert on any state. This chapter analyzes the case of Colombia as a target state and some neighbor States, taking into account the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an international terrorist organization.

The use of game theory for the present model will base the analysis in suppositions that pretend to reflect the real situation in this regard, and obtain the more likely outcomes. The model uses cardinal values in the variables and allows presenting the most likely outcome related to the importance of sharing information about international terrorism among the states and organizations. The model permits a continued adaptation of the variables according to the changes and different circumstances existent in international terrorist activities and the implicated actors.

1. Definitions for the Game

Actors	The Target State, Sponsor State, Neighbor State, and the International Terrorist Organization
Target State	The State, coalition, allies or organizations, potentially affected by international terrorist activities.
Sponsor State	The State where the International Terrorist Organization develops their activities directly related to terrorist acts or support activities. It does not necessarily mean that the State supports the International Terrorist Organization.
Neighbor State	The Sponsor State that is directly or indirectly connected with the Target State due to the activities of the International Terrorism Organization, which is accessible or shares physical borders. It has to be considered the actual means of transportation and communication, which facilitates this sort of contact.
International Terrorist Organization	Constitutes a terrorist organization, with an international presence and their related activities. Those organizations in the region are considered as non-state actors.
Need for Information	It will depend on the perception of the threat and the potential expected damage, including the use of all the possible actions of a State to obtain that information.
Threat for the game	It will be considered an inducement to force an action. It has to be credible.
Promise for the game	It will be considered an inducement to generate a needed action. It has to be credible.
International Organizations	The International Organization and the correspondent legislation, any agreement related to international terrorism or their related activities with jurisdiction in the region.

C. THE GAME: SHARING OF INFORMATION BETWEEN A TARGET AND A SPONSOR STATE ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OR ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

The game analyzes the possible outcomes. The game considers the case of international terrorism in the region originated by an internal or external terrorist organization. The model represents all the extreme positions, which are not necessarily present in the region, but must be considered for the purpose of the game. The variables can represent a wide range of possibilities, and could be adapted according to the circumstances. The following variables could be considered for the analysis.

1. Variables Related to the Actors

a. Target State

Table 1. Perception of the International Terrorist Organization (PT), According to the Target State, Including the Correspondent International Agreements and Organizations (IO).

Ordinal Value	Perception of the International Terrorist Organization (PT) related to the Target State, and International Organizations (IO).
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (PT) Priority threat. It is capable of affecting the Target State and allies. Confirmed links with other International Terrorist Organizations. Strong support from existent network of illicit activities ▪ (IO) Sponsor State complies and promotes activities in the international community against terrorism. Facilitate the integration of agencies and sharing of information. The correspondent legal and political framework exists to act with the priority that requires this type of threat.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (PT) Important. Possibility of links with another International Terrorist Organizations and involvement in criminal activities. ▪ (IO) Sponsor State adheres to the agreements primarily as a political posture. International cooperation is occasional and not integrated with all the agencies. The process of sharing information is bureaucratic and the security system is in the process of improvement.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (PT) Not important, it generates political implications. The Sponsor State does not consider those activities that affect the State. There is the possible presence of the threat because of these sorts of conditions. ▪ (IO) Sponsor State partially complies with international agreements. International cooperation is obtained only by request and requires some inducements. The process of sharing information is not established and the security agencies are not completely trustworthy.
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (PT) Fear to the International Terrorist Organization. Sponsor State does not want to act against those activities. Consider that any action will generate repercussions. Facilitate the activities of the threat. ▪ (IO) Sponsor State refuses to cooperate. It does not comply with international agreements and neither does it cooperates on any level with the other states about this kind of threat.

Table 2. Security and Government Agencies (SA) of the Sponsor State and the Accessibility to Information (AI) about International Terrorism or Related Activities.

Ordinal Values	Security and Government Agencies (SA), and Accessibility to Information about the International Terrorist Organization in the Sponsor State (AI).
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (SA) Security and government agencies capable and completely integrated within the state and with international agencies. ▪ (AI) International Organizations and Target State establishes a network with the Sponsor State for control through legal and security channels. There is a timely and complete flow of information.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (SA) Security and government agencies capable but not completely integrated

Ordinal Values	Security and Government Agencies (SA), and Accessibility to Information about the International Terrorist Organization in the Sponsor State (AI).
	internally nor externally. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (AI) International Organizations and Target State establish relationship through official channels, and look for contact with other local organizations. There is a limited legal framework to deal with International Terrorism, and a lack of an appropriate flow of information.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (SA) Security and government agencies not capable and not integrated internally nor externally ▪ (AI) International Organizations and Target State contact other organizations and make indirect approaches to security and government agencies. Limited legal cooperation and flow of information, which is not reliable.
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (SA) Security and government agencies controlled or possible infiltrated by the International Terrorist Organization. Society is easily influenced in favor of the International Terrorist Organization. ▪ (AI) International Organizations and Target State prioritizes the use of threat or indirect approach or covert actions to obtain information. The internal political and legal systems are favorable to the threat. There is not a favorable environment for international cooperation.

b. Sponsor State/Neighbor State

Table 3. The Influence of the International Terrorist Organization (IT), in Relation on the Posture of the Sponsor State.

Ordinal Value	The influence of the International Terrorist Organization (IT) in relation to the Posture of the Sponsor State.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (IT) Sponsor State fears the International Terrorism Organization. Sponsor State does not want to act against that threat nor their associated activities. Any action taken by the government will have political and social implications due to that influence. That will facilitate the threat to continue their activities.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (IT) Sponsor State does not consider important the activities of the International Terrorist Organization, which generates a soft political posture for this kind of action. This posture allows possible activities that support the International Terrorist Organizations.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (IT) Sponsor State considers important the activities of international terrorism, but only as a delinquency activity. Possibility to have links with other Terrorist Organizations and involvement in criminal activities within the Sponsor State. A social demand is present for the visible problems, related to security that generates those related activities.
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (IT) Sponsor State considers the activities of international terrorism as a priority threat capable of affecting the state, a Target State, different organizations, and allies. That risk demands complete cooperation and presents a social and political demand to control that threat.

Table 4. The Need for Information (NI) of the Target State about the Activities of International Terrorism in the Sponsor State.

Ordinal Value	The Need for Information (NI) of the Target State about the activities of the International Terrorism Organization in the Sponsor State.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (NI) Urgent requirement for information due to the influence of the threat, and the increment of activities in the Sponsor State. Confirmed links with other illicit organizations and other possible terrorist attempts. The Target State uses all sorts of means to obtain that information, including international organizations.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (NI) Important need for information, legal prosecution, and the social demand of the Target State to solve that security concern. Prioritize the use of a direct approach to obtain cooperation of the Sponsor State.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (NI) Target State requires information to increase security. Considers only the use of official channels to obtain information about the International Terrorist Organization in the Sponsor State.
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (NI) The information required by the Target State about the International Terrorist Organization is not considered a priority and is mostly channeled through a third party, such as an allied state or an Organization.

D. USE OF GAME THEORY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ORIGINATED BY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC).

The purpose of this model is to analyze the importance of sharing information about the FARC from Colombia in relation to the neighbor states. The case considers the possible actions that Colombia as the Target State and the neighbor states could assume, associated with the activities of that terrorist organization. The game considers as Sponsor States, the Neighbor Countries of the region from where the International Terrorist Organization could operate or conduct support activities. The Threat in this particular case consists of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has an international presence and strong links to illicit activities on a different scale in the Neighbor States that serve to maintain the capacity of the organization. The variables considered for the game are based on assumptions, which lead the actors to develop their own strategy to obtain or negate information.

1. Colombia

This state has endured a struggle against subversives groups for more than 40 years. The FARC is the major group that operates in the country. The group has the ability to obtain international presence political support for its cause that affects the

internal security of the Neighbor States. Colombia considers it vital to obtain information on the activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States and promotes regional and bilateral agreements to obtain information about those activities.

2. The FARC and the Neighbor States

The activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States are considered terrorist actions in those States. The activities of the FARC in the Neighbor States, could affect their international relations, and influence in internal politics. The game is based on the possible postures of the FARC in the neighbor states, assuming the expansion of their illicit activities as a priority in support of the political-military structure of the organization in Colombia. In this case, the cardinal values could be assigned based on the analysis of the variables for the Target and Neighbor States affected by terrorist activities.

3. Colombia-Target State, and the Neighbor States (Affected Directly or Indirectly by the FARC)

Table 5. Colombia-Target State

Colombia		Colombia: value of the variables of the game	
(PT) Perception of the International Terrorist Organization. (IO) Organization and International Agreements with the Neighbor State	(SA) Security and Government Agencies. (AI) Information Accessibility in the Neighbor State	Cardinal values assigned through the analysis of the variables. (Range from 2 to 8).	Ranking of the Colombian more likely outcomes
4	4	6	First Best Outcome
3	3	5	Second Best Outcome
2	2	4	Third Outcome
1	1	2	Worst Outcome

Table 6. The Neighbor States, Considering the Influence of the FARC.

Neighbor State		Neighbor State: value of the variables of the game	
(IT) Influence of the FARC and the posture of the Neighbor State	(NI) Colombia: Need for Information about the activities of the FARC in the Neighbor State	Cardinal values assigned through the analysis of the variables. (Range from 2 to 8).	Ranking of the Neighbor State more likely outcomes
4	4	7	First Best Outcome
3	3	5	Second Best Outcome
2	2	3	Third Outcome
1	1	2	Worst Outcome

a. Colombia (Target State) Preferences

Table 7. Target State Preferences

Outcome	Cardinal Value	Sharing of information about the activities associated with the FARC by the Neighbor State.
First Best Outcome	6	Colombia and Neighbor State maintain complete cooperation and control over the activities of the FARC.
Second Best Outcome	5	Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain cooperation only through formal channels to control possible activities associated with the FARC.
Third Outcome	4	Colombia does not have access to information and is not allowed in the Neighbor State. The information is handled by the Neighbor State; therefore, it is not completely credible.
Worst Outcome	2	Neighbor State fears the FARC and is forced to support or tolerate their activities. The information is limited and non-credible. Colombia is forced to obtain information through different means.

b. Neighbor State (Sponsor State) Preferences, Considering the Influence of the FARC

Table 8. Neighbor State Preferences

Outcome	Cardinal Value	Influence of the FARC in the Neighbor State and Colombia's requirement of information.
First Best Outcome	7	Neighbor State fears the FARC and is forced to support or tolerate its activities. The information is limited and non-credible. Colombia is forced to obtain information related to the FARC in the Neighbor State by any means.
Second Best Outcome	5	The Neighbor State does not control all the activities of the FARC within his state; nor allows any collaboration from Colombia. The information responds only to specific requirements. Colombia searches for agreements and contacts with the Neighbor State to obtain information about the FARC.
Third Outcome	3	Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain cooperation only through formal channels to control the activities of the FARC. The security agencies maintain limited contacts through formal channels.
Worst Outcome	2	Colombia and the Neighbor State maintain complete cooperation and exert control over the activities of the FARC. The security agencies of Colombia establish a network with the Neighbor State for sharing information about the activities related to the FARC.

4. Explication

The game analyzes the relationship between Colombia (Target State) and the Neighbor State, considering the influence of the FARC as an International Terrorist Organization acting against the Neighbor State.

a. *Matrix of the Game*

Table 9. Matrix of the Game

Information sharing about the FARC		Neighbor State	
		Share Information(C)	Influenced by the FARC(D)
Colombia	Share Information (A)	6 → 2 → 5 4 → 5	4 → 5
	Forced to obtain information (B)	5 → 3 → 7 ↑	2 → 7 ↑

b. *Nash Equilibrium*

(1) Finding Dominant Strategies. Colombia

Table 10. Colombia: Dominant Strategy

Information sharing about the FARC		Neighbor State	
		Share Information(C)	Influence by the FARC (D)
Colombia	Share Information (A)	6 → 4	4
	Forced to obtain information (B)	5 → 2 ↑	2 ↑

- Colombia Security Level : 4
- Colombia Goal : Maximize his outcome
- Neighbor State Goal. : Minimize the Colombia's outcome
- Colombia dominant strategy : To Share Information.

(2) Neighbor State. Influenced by the FARC

Table 11. Neighbor State: Dominant Strategy

Information sharing about the FARC		Neighbor State	
		Share Information(C)	Influenced by the FARC (D)
Colombia	Share Information (A)	2 →	→ 5
	Forced to obtain information (B)	3 →	→ 7

Neighbor State Security Level : 5
 Neighbor State Goal : Maximize his outcomes against Colombia
 Colombia Goal: Minimize outcome Neighbor State
 Neighbor State dominant strategy : Influenced by the FARC.

Likely Outcome AD (4, 5)

(3) Conclusion. The Dominant Strategy of Colombia is to Share Information (A). The Dominant Strategy of the Neighbor State is influenced by the FARC (D). Both have their dominant strategies at point AD (4, 5). No one can gain by departing unilaterally from its strategy associated with an outcome.

(4) Pareto Optimal




Figure 2. Parapeto Optimal, Nash Arbitration Point.

(5) Pareto Optimal: BD-AC. The Nash Arbitration Point (NAP) located at AD (4, 5), which is the optimal solution. It is on the Pareto Optimal line. Therefore, every outcome means that there are no options for moves, which would give both players a higher outcome, or give one player the same payoff but the other player a higher payoff. (The game is a zero-sum game)

Conclusion: Exist a unique Nash Equilibrium which is Pareto Optimal.

5. Strategic Moves

Colombia : Dominant strategy – Share Information
Neighbor State : Dominant strategy – Influenced by FARC
Likely outcome : BD (4, 5)

a. *From Colombia's Perspective (Influenced by the FARC)*

First move

If Colombia A, Neighbor State D \rightarrow (4, 5)

If Colombia B, Neighbor State D \rightarrow (2, 7) \rightarrow The best outcome for Neighbor State, Colombia won't do this first move.

If Neighbor State C, Colombia A \rightarrow (6, 2) \rightarrow The best for Colombia, but Neighbor State won't do this first move.

If Neighbor State D, Colombia A \rightarrow (4, 5)

Conclusion: no first move

Threat for the game: Colombia wants C

If Neighbor State does D, then Colombia B \rightarrow (5, 3)

Conclusion: No, Threat. Helps the Neighbor State.

Promise for the game: Colombia wants C

If Neighbor State does C, then Colombia B \rightarrow (2, 7)

Promise: Yes, improves Neighbor State \rightarrow (5, 3)

Conclusion: No promise, does not work alone

b. *From Neighbor State's Perspective*

First move

If Neighbor State C, Colombia A \rightarrow (6, 2)

If Neighbor State D, Colombia A \rightarrow (4, 5)

If Colombia A, Neighbor State D \rightarrow (4, 5)

If Colombia B, Neighbor State D \rightarrow (2, 7)

Conclusion: No first move

Threat for the game: Neighbor State wants B

If Colombia does A, then Neighbor State C \rightarrow (6, 2)

Conclusion: No, Threat, helps Colombia

Promise for the game: Neighbor State wants B

If Colombia does B, then Neighbor State C \rightarrow (5, 3)

Promise: Yes

Conclusion: Exists promise, but (5, 3) is worse than (4, 5)

Neighbor State has a First Move \rightarrow (4, 5)

c. *Conclusion*

The game theory allows establishing the more likely outcomes for the actors. The variables can be considered for the actors according to the changing

circumstances. In this case, Colombia was considered as the target state and the neighbor states were considered because of the influence and activities of the FARC in those states, and the repercussions to Colombia.

The influence of the FARC in Colombia and the neighbor states is based on the sharing of information, which also is affected by the importance that the actors assign to the activities of the FARC. Furthermore, it could be affected by the influence or pressure that the FARC exert in terms of security against the actors, specially the neighbor states.

The final analysis of the game is based on the capacity of Colombia and the neighbor state to share information in order to reduce the influence of the FARC. The final result of the game (according to the value assigned to the variables considering the actual circumstances) is that Colombia's dominant strategy is to share information while the neighbor state dominant strategy is influenced by the FARC.

Under these circumstances, the position of Colombia will be to increase bilateral, regional, and international agreements in order to secure cooperation against the FARC in the neighbor countries. Meanwhile, the FARC will increase their influence in order to discourage the neighbor state from cooperating.

Neither Colombia nor the Neighbor State has the apparent first move which could change the decisions made without communications. Both sides do not have a clear promise or threat. In this case, considering these assumptions, it demonstrated the role of the actors and the possible outcomes based on proposed variables. The use of promises or threats in the game, will be only effective when considering complete cooperation and the sharing of the necessary information to eliminate misperceptions about some actions that the states (neighbor or target state) could assume to confront the threat representing the terrorist organization. The model allows for assuming different possibilities to understand the actions of each actor, and overcome the limitations through the exchange of information about the capacities of the threat among the security forces of the states, and the use of the international organizations when needed.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The process of information sharing about international terrorism in Latin America requires a broad perception because it must include some particular characteristics of the region when considering international terrorism. Initially, it is important to reflect on how international terrorism is perceived in the region as a new threat, and the priority assigned to the security of each state. The analysis of the threats in the region in this regard is important because the threats linked with international terrorism have changed.

The problem of sharing information increases when the threat of international terrorism still is not recognized, and accordingly, not considered a priority, or furthermore, the conditions exist for the illicit activities which aids terrorism, through the use of criminal structures. It is important to consider that security structures in the region are not fully integrated to allow the sharing of information for security and law enforcement purposes. The security structures of the region that deal with information about terrorism are in the process of overcoming internal problems previously linked with misuse and the lack of control from the political and legal systems.

This is important to consider since international agreements are in existence. However, enforcement and cooperation are still ongoing. The threat of international terrorism grows particularly in states where criminal activities are high. Therefore, improvements in a common understanding of the risk of this sort of threat will facilitate cooperation based on already existent agreements, which include the sharing of information.

The initial approach to the problem from an international perspective has not reached a regional agreement, which is usually derived from the perception of the role and interests of the United States. This constitutes a problem when trying to establish a common agreement on international terrorism that only had functioned in bilateral agreements, such as is the case of the United States and Colombia, and bilateral and sub regional agreements in the case of the countries from the Tri Border Area.

This is important to consider because it could determine the possible actions that the states would need to take to solve the requirement of information according to the results from the potential threat that international terrorism represents to all states.

In this case, the potential capacity of a non-state threat (such as international terrorism) increases because it can maintain the initiative even with limited resources. Meanwhile, the opportunities to use conventional and traditional responses from political, economic to military sources diminish. This requires the study of the risks terrorism represents to the security of the region's states.

Therefore, the necessity for cooperation and improvement of the intelligence services is a priority for being prepared to confront international terrorism. In this regard, international cooperation on intelligence matters and sharing of information represents an important part of the solution against international terrorism. The knowledge of culture, language, relationships, and so forth, cannot be improvised and requires time. Therefore, only international cooperation can help to overcome those limitations.

The process of sharing information requires understanding the potential of international terrorism as a threat to the existence of the state. Consequently, the proposed structure for cooperation constitutes a basis for planning mutual support among the security organizations in each particular sub region, including occasional support of special teams for specific requirements. The use of integrators also facilitates the process of sharing all kinds of information related to international terrorism.

In order to be prepared for the new phase of international terrorism in the war against terrorism, the role of information is unique. The necessity of information for any decision is critical and for the use of force at any level, vital. The information process, in order to produce a timely decision, requires international cooperation. Limitations on cooperation, could lead the target states to use unconventional actions in order to obtain that required information. The risks on inaction are too great.

The game theory facilitates analyzing the process of sharing information by adapting variables of the game to each particular necessity, which helps to avoid the normal bias when considering this complex threat. Game theory also facilitates

understanding the likely strategic decisions of the states, and the impact of information. This particular approach makes it possible to put the importance of sharing information into perspective to support a political decision, especially in this region where the socio political and security environment requires thorough understanding and cooperation to fight against international terrorism and their associated activities effectively.

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