

Effects Based Operations: A Yom Kippur War Case Study


Steven M. Beres
Shannon M. Corey
Jonathan E. Tarter

Evidence Based Research, Inc.

Agenda



- Historical and Geopolitical Background
- The Crisis
- Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) Analysis of the crisis
- Insights
- Problems
- Questions

Egypt and Israel Face Off on the Sinai





The IDF Encircles the Third Army



Sinai Campaign

The Israel Defense Forces encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the Sinai Peninsula.




The Crisis: October 24th

- Moscow alerted its military, including up to 40,000 troops, strategic bombers and airborne forces
- Soviet military actions caused an increase in SIGINT traffic that U.S. intelligence picked up
- Rumors circulated that Soviet nuclear warheads were being deployed in the region
- This case study focuses on events that occurred between when Anwar Sadat delivered his letter to the U.N. at 3:00 p.m. on the 24th to the end of the crisis on the 25th.

October 24th: Sadat Appeals to the U.N.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat appealed to the U.S. and Soviet Union for a joint peacekeeping force to enforce a cease-fire on the Sinai.



The USSR accepted this proposal and threatened to take unilateral action to impose a cease-fire.

U.S. Strategic Objectives

- Unilateral Soviet action on the Sinai would threaten the Cold War status quo.
- The U.S. had to maintain the global perception that it was a superpower. As Kissinger said,
 - “The judgment was that if another American-armed country were defeated by Soviet armed countries, the inevitable lessons that anybody around the world would have to draw, is to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union.”
- Nixon summed it up:
 - “No one is more keenly aware of the stakes: oil and our strategic position.”

The U.S. Military Response



Kissinger responded with an implicit nuclear threat: “Should the two great nuclear powers be called upon to provide forces, it would introduce an extremely dangerous potential for great-power rivalry in the area.”

Nixon raised the alert of U.S. force to Defense Condition 3, alerted the 82nd Airborne, and ordered the *USS John F. Kennedy* to the Mediterranean.



The U.S. Diplomatic Response: Oct. 25

- The U.S. delivered a reply to Soviet U.N. Amb. Dobrynin: “We must view your suggestions of unilateral action as a matter of gravest concern, involving incalculable consequences.”



- It then referenced the 1973 Non-proliferation treaty: “In the spirit of our agreements, this is the time for acting not unilaterally, but in harmony and with cool heads.”

Crisis Averted

- Kissinger held a press conference at the State Dept on Oct. 25

“We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. “We, both of us, have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life.”



Analytical Approach

- Exploratory Case Study Methodology
- Based on work of Dr. Robert Yin on case study design and methods
 - Definition/Problem
 - Design of case study
 - Data collection
 - Data analysis
 - Reporting
- Data Sources: Documents and Archival Records
- Important to keep a case study in the context of when it occurred

Effects-Based Operations: DIME


- DIME was selected as a way to examine the concept
- Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) is a relatively simple representation of actionable arenas
- DIME is broad enough to encompass the dimensions introduced by case study of the Yom Kippur War.
- Terminology used by JFCOM

DIME Definitions

- **Diplomatic:** Negotiation between nations through official channels.
- **Information:** Knowledge of specific events or situations that has been gathered or received by communicating intelligence or news.
- **Military:** Of or relating to the armed forces.
- **Economic:** Of or returning to the production, development, and management of a nation's national wealth.

Case Study Focus

- This case study focuses on events that occurred between when Anwar Sadat delivered his letter to the U.N. at 3:00 p.m. on the 24th to the end of the crisis on the 25th.
- The focus is the escalating and subsequently defused tension between the two superpowers
- This case study exclusively examined U.S. actions (as opposed to Soviet actions)
- ...Again, remember the context!



Actions and Reactions

The actions during the crisis can be broken down into nine major actions/reactions:

- Sadat proposed joint U.S./Soviet peacekeeping force (impetus for the escalation)
- USSR accepted Sadat's proposal
- U.S. rejected the proposal
- Brezhnev sent a note saying the Soviet Union would consider reacting unilaterally.
- U.S. raised alert level to DEFCON 3 and activated strategic forces.
- USSR signals intelligence networks picked up U.S. alert
- U.S. responded to Brezhnev's note with a note to Amb. Dobrynin
- Kissinger held a press conference to tell the world about the crisis
- It was determined that a U.N. peacekeeping force will intervene excluding the major superpowers (U.S. and USSR)

DIME Analysis

US Goal: Avoid Superpower Confrontation in the Middle East

Soviet Action/Reaction

US Action/Reaction

Sadat Proposes Joint Force (10/24 3:00 p.m.)

USSR accepts
(10/24 7:00 p.m.)

Brezhnev threatens
unilateral
action (10/24 9:00 p.m.)

USSR SIGINT
intercepts US alert
(10/25 early a.m.)

D

Kissinger refuses
joint force (10/24 7-8:00 p.m.)

I

US Alert
(10/25 2:00 a.m.)

M

US Alert
(10/25 2:00 a.m.)

E

US response to Brezhnev
(10/25 5:40 a.m.)

Kissinger's press conference
(10/25 12:00 p.m.)

Result: UN Peacekeeping force excluding US/USSR

Insights

- Effects-Based Operations is not a new concept
 - Leaders have used the principles of Effects-Based Operations in conflict to solve crises without explicitly acknowledging it as a guiding principle
- The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was a good example of U.S. policy makers making their decisions with an "effects-based mindset."
- The military itself is a tool for the greater political process
- The "M" cannot expect to make "D" or "E" decisions, *but it must be conscious of DIME effects, and DIME environment*

Problems

- How does economics fit into this analysis?
- Is DIME the right way to analyze historical case studies of effects-based operations?
- Others?

References

- Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, “Nuclear Weapons and the 1973 Middle East Crisis,” *The Use of Force: Third Edition*, eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, the University Press of America: 1988.
- Henry Kissinger, “Secretary’s Staff Meeting,” Oct. 23, 1973. Declassified on March 3, 1998. Available at the National Security Archive. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
- Memorandum of Conversation, the White House, Oct. 17, 1973. Unclassified on Aug. 20, 2003. The document can be found at the National Security Archive.
- Ed Smith, *Effects Based Operations*, CCRP: 2002.