Elections in Iraq: Managing Expectations

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by Karen Guttieri

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Introduction

January 30, 2005 the people of Iraq participated in their first open election in fifty years. They voted amid confusion, persistent and escalating violence, and a boycott by key players. American anticipation of Iraq’s vote was intense; American expectations for it, muted. Mixed messages abounded. The U.S. Department of Defense Defend America news website hit a pre-election optimistic high note: “Iraqi Troops Risk Lives for Elections;” and “Iraqi Democracy Will Be Defined by Iraqis.” Meanwhile, mainstream media reported Sunni Arabs were boycotting the vote, Iraqi security forces had deserting some stations, and violence in general was escalating in advance of the elections. Expectation management was in order, and the Bush Administration provided it. The elections, a senior official conceded, would be “messy at best.”[1]

Nuances of Success

The conduct of the election exceeded expectations. All understood that Shiite and Kurdish voters were eager to vote, but how to make it safe for them to do so? Shutting down vehicle traffic, as it turned out, made a world of difference. An extraordinary 260 attacks were sustained Sunday, in a nation habituated to a daily average of 60.[2] Nine people blew themselves up, and yet an estimated sixty percent of Iraqi voters made it to the polls. Because the level (or effect) of the violence was much lower than expected, the U.S. dollar rallied on world markets.[3] The participation rate was quickly compared favorably to American elections, was little mention that this figure appears to have included few Sunnis.[4] President George Bush promptly claimed victory, pronouncing the problematic outcome a “resounding success.”

In this Strategic Insight, I emphasize that the outcome of Sunday’s vote is by definition temporary—Iraq’s third temporary government since the occupation.[5] Although the elections signify a significant step toward self-governance, it is self-governance without a monopoly on the use of force. Authoritarian rulers in the region, no longer worried that a democracy domino will endanger them, are more concerned about the stability of the power equilibrium created by the election. Despite efforts to promote an inclusive, consensual democracy, the name of the game is identity politics.
The electoral formula plus boycott add up to disproportionate under-representation for Arab Sunnis—a diverse and problematic group. Iraq's Shiites (roughly 60% of the population) will now translate demographic weight into government power. The Kurds (at about 20% of the population) united their lists and initiated a referendum on secession in a side vote. The Arab Sunni population (also about 20%)—the minority that dominated under Saddam Hussein—had the most to lose in a democratic contest, and they sought to spoil it. Iraq's Arab Sunnis opted out participation in the rule-making process for the new Iraq, and perhaps, out a unified Iraq. Unless side negotiations bring the Sunnis back in, the next phase of Iraq's post-conflict transition will shake regional power balances and narrow American options in Iraq.

**The Ballot**

In a survey taken just one month prior to the election, as many as 41% of Iraqis asked “what will Iraqis be voting for on January 30?” indicated—incorrectly—that they'd be voting for a president. The correct answer, that the main election is for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), was chosen by fewer than 29%. The 275-member body will perform two important roles:

1. The TNA will choose a 3-member Presidency Council that will in turn select a Prime Minister;
2. The TNA will draft a permanent constitution for Iraq; that is, the TNA will make the rules for the new Iraq.

More days at the polls are to come. The Assembly should finish drafting the constitution by August 15. There will be another big day at the polls when the draft is put up for a popular referendum in October. According to this schedule, a third vote will take place for the new government about December 15, 2005, so that a permanent government of Iraq will be seated on December 31. If two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces reject the constitution, it will go back to the drawing board for another attempt in October 2006. This provision is controversial, because it gives the Kurds (who control three provinces) an effective veto.

Each province also voted for members of a Governorate Council. Most of these will have 41 seats, except Baghdad with 51. In the Kurdish provinces, there will be a third item on the ballot, seats for a 111-member Kurdistan National Assembly. The provisional rules known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) recognizes Kurdistan Regional Government within a unified Iraq, and presents the option for any three provinces to form such a body.

**Election Mechanics**

The event was largely an Iraqi show performed by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. The International Mission for Iraqi Elections based in Amman Jordan provided a small number of monitors. A small United Nations presence assisted the elections.

Some 14.5 million Iraqi citizen aged 18 and older were eligible to vote within Iraq at 5,500 polling stations. Registration began November 1 and in theory ended December 15, but election-day registration was possible in some places. The process was easier in some respects than in a typical post-conflict registration drive, because extraordinary measures were unnecessary. The voting rosters were put together using the Oil for Food rationing lists. When a citizen appeared for their rations, this person was given a paper that showed the registration information for that family. If there were any inaccuracies, the citizen would bring the corrected paper on the following visit. An additional 1-2 million Iraqis were eligible to vote out of country, facilitated by the International Organization for Migration.

Security was the most serious concern given recent increase of rebel activity in the run-
up to the election. U.S. military forces did a “plus up”—increased their number from 135,000 to 150,000 for the election. However, they and their estimated 23,000 multinational military partners stood back, and provided over-the-horizon backup only to Iraqi security forces during the election. Iraqi forces, generously estimated to number 127,000, were far short of the 270,000 some believe are needed to secure the election. Observers were responsible for their own transportation and safety. The government declared a state of emergency, including curfews and restricted movement between provinces and into and out of Iraq. The location of some polling places was kept secret until the last minute, confounding the uncertainty for Iraqis. The number of polling stations steadily declined in the days before the election. It was initially estimated to be 28,000, dropped for several weeks in December to 9,000, until it settled at the 5,500 mark. Long lines were a dangerous possibility.

The electoral commission believed an election untainted by fraud was more important than the turnout, although most Iraqis surveyed were more concerned about security than about the procedural integrity of the polls. A plan for inking the thumb of voters, as done in Afghanistan’s recent election, provided a visual for the President’s State of the Union address. The commission used permanent ink, but decided against using invisible ink. This must have discouraged some voters, those who received death threats if they participated in the elections. On the other hand, it might have encouraged voters in Shiite and Kurdish areas who were strongly encouraged to vote.

The Show Must Go On

There are alternative views on the value of elections after war. The United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook sees elections as vital to create venues for non-violent contests. Another view is that elections are the means by which the United States legitimates the use of force to domestic and international audiences. The first view requires the process to be “widely accepted by the participating population as legitimate and binding” in order to be effective. The second view does not.

Two years seems to be the “magic number” for preparation of elections among those promoting democracy as the best long-term guarantor of peace. However, the conditions in Iraq twenty-two months after intervention clearly did not meet the UN criteria for wide acceptance. Prominent Iraqis of many stripes called for delay in November, but the schedule was firm. One might cite the occupation authority’s proxy constitution for Iraq, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of March 2004, that set a deadline of Jan. 31; or the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 that quotes the TAL. More importantly, the Bush Administration and Shiite forces in Iraq refuse to allow delay.

The Bush Administration could not afford to delay the elections. Columnist Thomas Friedman argued against delay because it would stem the insurgency. Insurgents who are today fighting external occupiers and their collaborators today will, after the elections, no longer be able to call themselves liberators. The third transitional government in Iraq is also the second “sovereign Iraqi” government, but the first citizen-chosen government. After the vote, the insurgent’s true aim—to reassert tyranny—will be obvious. “The civil war we want,” says columnist Thomas Friedman, “is a democratically elected Iraqi government against the Baathist and Islamist militants.” Friedman’s argument is dubious. First, as long as one hundred thousand plus external troops remain in Iraq, we can expect militants to make liberation claims. Second, America does not want civil war in Iraq of any sort. The commander of Multi-National Corps—Iraq, Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz wanted the voting to go forward, in order to avoid a civil war. “There is a greater chance of civil war with a delay,” said Metz, because the insurgents would use a delay to sabotage democratic processes further. What Metz left unspoken is the risk of delay for U.S. relations with Shiite elements.

Some Shiites made veiled threats of violence if elections were postponed. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi warned that “the areas which are safe at
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Present, will burn with fire if the elections are postponed. Influential Shiite leaders have already been put off. Moreover, there is the matter of U.S. debt to Shiite leaders for months of reprieve with their forces. It was not always so. In August 2004, American and Iraqi forces fought the Mahdi Army supporters of renegade Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr for several weeks at the shrine of the Imam Ali in Najaf. This was a bloody encounter with hundreds of casualties and a holy site in the middle. It was concluded after Ayatollah Sistani brokered a deal with Sadr that ended the battle and gave Sadr an opening to participate in Iraqi politics. This peace has provided the military more freedom to concentrate on Sunni insurgents in Falluja, and total occupation of the city in the fall of 2004.

The facts on the ground matter to the politics in the voting booth. U.S. military forces conducted major sweeps of Sunni areas, but these clearly were not voter registration drives. Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces—parts of Baghdad, Anber (including Falluja and Ramadi), Ninevah (including Mosul) and Salahadin (home to Saddam Husssein's hometown, Tikrit) are acknowledged to be "unsafe" for elections. In December, the entire electoral commission in Mosul reportedly quit after they were threatened, voter registration papers were burned, the security forces were chased out of town, militants' posters warned those participating in the elections would be beheaded, and the population was oblivious to the coming election. Dionne Searcey reported from Mosul just weeks before the election that confusion was universal:

Iraqis from the worst and best of neighborhoods say they don't understand whether they're registered or what they're being asked to vote on. Many plan to stay home out of fear. A pharmacist on the west side of town, asked recently about the elections, seemed confident: "Yes, yes, I know. They are happening in other provinces, not in Mosul."

A Democratic Vision

The Transitional Administrative Law of 2004 for now operates as the rules for Iraq. It is supposed to do so until a permanent government is seated in December, but this may be optimistic. Article 4 articulates a vision for the new Iraq:

The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared... based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.

The republican vision is the least problematic. It means simply that the head of state is not a monarch, leaders serve a limited term, and successors are chosen by electoral process. Federalism here specifically refers to power shared "between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations." Federalism generally means a guaranteed division of power, but also works best with other elements that are lacking in Iraq: strong bicameralism in the legislature (a strong Senate to match a strong Congress), a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review. Despite the TAL's expressed intention to proscribe power sharing based upon identity, that is precisely the direction Iraq is headed.

Democracy, as articulated in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, means "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." The radical Sunni Isamist group Ansar al-Sunnah does not agree this is universal. Late December they posted a notice that "rule of the people...denies the belief in one God." They warned that un-Islamic laws could be the product of democracy. As if taking a page from the political playbook of U.S. Republicans in 2004, they warn that their opponents could be leading the people on a path to religiously unacceptable laws, including laws permitting homosexual marriage.
As in many new democracies with non-homogenous populations, the most vexing challenge is to accommodate pluralism, to create a framework that respects differences in political interaction. In societies divided by ethnic and religious cleavages, as in Iraq, how can divergent groups coexist without conflict on the one hand or assimilation on the other? Diffused power and decision-making, so that more people affected by decisions participate in them, are common approaches to encourage people to develop more commitment to society at large.

The federalist vision and the electoral formula designed for Iraq were largely consistent with an approach that seeks to accommodate differences. Arend Lijphart would call this a consensus as opposed to a majoritarian approach to governance. Lijphart provides a useful distinction among democracies according to how they answer the simple question, "who should govern?" Some answer "the majority of the people;" others reply, "as many people as possible." The first general type, majoritarian government, concentrates power in the hands of a bare majority—possibly only a plurality. It relies upon good losers who will return to fight another day. Consensus government seeks to maximize majorities by creating a framework for broad participation and agreement.

Electoral formula in majoritarian democracies commonly give the election to the candidate with the most votes—this may or may not be the same as a majority (over 50 percent), according to the plurality rule. This formula tends to produce gaps in representation, rewarding those with the plurality with a disproportionate number of seats. Proportional representation (PR), as an electoral formula aims to represent both majorities and minorities. This was the formula used in Iraq's January 30 election.

In a PR system, parties nominate lists of candidates and voters cast their ballot for one list or another. Seats are then allocated in proportion to the votes collected. A list including 275 names that receives twenty percent of the vote would send the top fifty-five names on its list to fill seats in the Assembly. In order to promote better gender representation, every third candidate on each list submitted for the Iraqi election must be a woman. Proportional Representation requires multimember districts, so that several voices can be selected from a given constituency (the size of the district is the district magnitude). In Iraq, the district magnitude is the maximum—the entire nation plus out of country voters. This magnitude might be consistent with the vision of a federal Iraq if parties and coalitions in Iraq were well-organized federally, but they are not.

There are some obvious advantages to a PR system with maximum district magnitude in the Iraqi TNA election. As noted, PR is more inclusive and indeed, representative. It encourages alliances. It is also less expensive, more secure because no one has to campaign where it is most dangerous, and most easily accommodates out-of-country voting. On the other hand, this formula favors parties and despite the existence of some long-standing parties, party development in Iraq is in its infancy. Because it is easier to fund a party list than to buy off voters in each district, Michael Rubin argues, this formula favors external influence. The district magnitude means that representatives will not be beholden, and thereby responsible to, particular communities of people. The bottom line is that making the entire nation the district avoided the problem of having to appoint representatives of Mosul and Falluja if voting is impossible in those cities.

It appears unlikely that insecurity lead Iraqi voters to endorse the U.S. Administration’s supposed choice, current Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, running on a slate called the Iraqi List. This slate is ethnically and religiously diverse, and is most importantly is fronted by a perceived “strongman.” The more likely outcome is dominance of the constitutional assembly by the religious Shiite slate United Iraqi Alliance. This is the slate sanctioned by the cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani, although he is not directly participating in the election. The list is topped by Abd al-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, associated with the Badr Corps. Assembly dominance by the Sistani slate does not mean the imposition of clerical rule in Iraq, but will likely lead to a special relationship with Iran.
Powers and Interests in the Iraqi Election

Iran provided sanctuary to the Iraqi group that dominates that slate, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and has anticipated its neighbor’s moment of democracy. The United States relationship with that country has been tense. General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command, rattled a nuclear saber in late November, 2004:

Why the Iranians would want to move against us...is beyond me...If you ever even contemplate our nuclear capability, it should give everybody the clear understanding that there is no power that can match the United States militarily. [33]

Post-election Iraq will also likely draw away from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, nations that are largely Sunni. Jordanian King Abdullah caused a stir in December when he alleged that a large number of Iranians crossed into Iraq before the election. He raised the specter of a “Shiite crescent” from Iraq through Iran to Azerbaijan that might even include Syria and Lebanon. This would destabilize nations with large Shiite populations: “Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this,” he said. “It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it out of the borders of Iraq.”[34]

The Kurdish parties have created a united list in order to improve their position in relation to others. They seek autonomy but will negotiate with the Shiite groups about their mutual concern regarding the Arab Sunnis. Neighboring Turkey and Iran also are home to large Kurdish populations, and encourage Iraq’s Kurds to participate in the constitutional process within Iraq.

Along with Syria, Turkey and Iran possess the heavy land armies that are conceivably capable of occupation of Iraqi terrain if the U.S. military pulls out and Iraq breaks apart. Syria is about seventy-four percent Sunni, but that majority is ruled by minority Alawites, an offshoot of Shiism. Syria therefore has its own concerns about spillover effects of radicalized Sunni populations.

U.S. President George W. Bush has called the elections a “historical marker for our Iraq policy.”[35] Some, including the current Iraqi Interim Government’s Prime Minister Allawi, see this marker as a possible marker for American troop withdrawal.[36] Bush Administration officials have been very clear that after the so-called transfer of sovereignty June 28, U.S. troops would leave if requested. If the country breaks apart, there will be more than one entity with whom the United States would have to negotiate the matter.

The best hope for Iraq, and the region, may be in the discussions among Iraqi Shiite and Sunni leaders that continue despite the Sunni boycott. The idea of “playing with the end result” of the elections by appointing Sunnis to the TNA is hardly appealing. However, for Iraq to remain viable as a nation, disaffected Iraqis must have non-violent mechanisms to express their interest. Iraq has pulled off the election, however imperfect. The drafting of the constitution engage those elements before putting it forward for ratification in another messy and possibly violent vote.

Conclusion

The elections are an important step in Iraq’s externally-forced transition from authoritarian rule and its post-conflict transition to self-governance. Because the Transitional National Assembly will be chosen by Iraqis, it is an improvement on its two predecessors as a step toward a permanent government in Iraq, something America hopes to see. Despite the best intentions of the election’s designers for an inclusive, consensual democracy in Iraq, the TNA will most likely be chosen by an incomplete
number of Iraqis. This election may therefore lead Iraq away from the vision of Iraqi
government—pluralistic, unified, and at peace with its neighbors—America hopes to
see. Iraq’s Sunnis, in opting out of the constitutional process, are opting out of a project
for a unified Iraq. The best hope for achieving peace is in the willingness of those who
do participate in the elections to find accommodation with them. The
disenfranchisement of the increasingly radicalized Sunnis spells trouble for all of Iraq,
the region and U.S. interests.

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2. Borzou Daragahi and Matthew B. Stannard, "Election Could Erode Backing for


4. American pollster James Zogby warns that the Iraq election compares to the 1860
US election and Abraham Lincoln’s victory—just before South Carolina’s secession.
Robin Wright, "President Hails Election as a Success and a Signal," Washington Post,

5. The first was the Iraqi Governing Council, appointed by L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer in July
2003; the second was the Iraqi Interim Government, chosen by Bremer and United
Nations envoy Lakdhar Brahimi with Iraqi advice. Known as a “caretaker government,”
the IIG fills the gap between the “transfer of sovereignty” at the end of the period of
acknowledged military occupation June 28, 2004. It is dominated by major Shiite
Islamist, Kurdish and established parties and led by Prime Minsiter Iyad Allawi.

6. International Republican Institute, IRI, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion November 24 -
December 5, 2004 (cited January 18, 2004). The poll excluded Falluja, Ramadi and
Mosul, as these areas were too dangerous for polling. Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion.

7. United States Department of State, Iraqis Prepare for First Open Election in 50 Years


January 7, 2005.

11. Iraqi Election Information Network also posts the election rules.
12. According to my sources, there were to be 1,200 polls in Baghdad. For an account of the logistics, see James Glanz, "Logistical Challenges Remain before Iraqis Cast Ballots," *The New York Times*, January 20, 2005. In Bosnia, election officials hired local people to fill out a sample ballot while they were timed, but this type of preparation does not appear evident in Iraq. If turnout is 50%, 5,500 stations will need to accommodate 7.25 million voters.


14. Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1999), p. 218. Indeed, the United States in its history has more often failed to promote democracy, and frequently supported repressive regimes.


21. The Badr Corps, for example, is estimated to number over 10,000. When Senator Biden in May 2004 asked about disarming the five major militia groups, Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told him "is not part of the mission unless it is necessary to bring them under control." US Senate, Committee on US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Iraq: The Way Ahead*, May 18, 2004.


24. Dionne Searcey, "Living in Fear, Candidates Lead Stealth Campaign," *Newsday*, January 5, 2005. In nearby Kurdistan, things were also a bit confused. Government posters gave the wrong date (January 31) for the election.


26. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 186-188. In a unitary and central government in the United Kingdom or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, by way of contrast, local governments are “creatures of the central government” and are *financially dependent* on them (p. 17). Christophe Wilcke’s extensive interviews weave a story about a how an early occupation decision by L. Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority not to hold local elections cut short the possibility of robust federalism, and even legitimacy, in Iraq. With a deficit of rule-making and organization at the local level, pragmatic accommodation by military leaders and “politics behind closed doors” emerged instead. Christoph Wilcke, "Castles Built of Sand: US Governance and Exit Strategies in Iraq," *Middle East Report*, Fall 2004. One observer has called the resulting governance deficit “castles built of sand.” The US approach was an unseemly combination, argues Wilcke.


29. A tendency toward federal as opposed to unitary government, and proportional representation as opposed to majoritarian voting formula, are but two of ten features that distinguish consensus from majoritarian democracies. See Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*.


32. Hakim’s older brother was killed in August of 2003 and Hakim himself was the target of an assassination attempt December 30. Da’wa leader Ibrahim Jafari is seventh on the list; secular Shiite Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress is tenth. Another member, Iraqi Hizbollah’s Sattar Jabar, was assassinated Dec. 9, 2004. Monday, December 27, 2004, *Aljazeera.net*.


34. Most Muslims in the world are Sunni, but Iran is 89% Shiite, Iraq is 60-65%, Bahrain is 70%, Azerbaijan is 67%. Shiites form a major sect in Lebanon, and Hezbollah is a Shiite political party. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, "Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran; Leaders Warn against Forming Religious State," *Washington Post*, December 8, 2004.