From 6-19 June 2004, a team composed of staff members from the United States Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the National Defense University traveled to Indonesia and Malaysia in support of the Pacific Command’s Subject Matter Exchange Program. This team consisted of Dr. Richard Winslow, Professor Bert Tussing and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Turner of CSL; and Dr. Greg Foster of the National Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces. At the behest of our hosts in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, these four prepared and delivered presentations on the United States’ Defense Organization, Structures and Capabilities; Strategic Conceptual Development and its Application in the U.S National Security Strategy; the Evolving Homeland Security Mission in the United States and its Supporting Infrastructure; and the Combined Forces Land Component Command campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom. All or portions of these briefs were presented to the Kodiklat Angkatan Darat (KODIKLAT AD), the Indonesian Army Education Training and Doctrine Command; the Sekola Kenmono (SESKO-TNI), Indonesia’s Joint War College; the Lembaga Kitahanan Nasional (LEMHANNAS), the Republic of Indonesia’s National Resilience Institute; and Maktab Pertahanan Angkatan Tentera, the Malaysian Armed Forces Defense College.

Dr. Foster’s presentation began with a discussion of organizational theory, showing how the precepts of that theory were made manifest in the structure, functions, and capabilities of the Department of Defense. In the course of his presentation he showed where the Department was organized variably in terms of function, mission, and geography. He introduced the students at the various defense colleges to the traditional, constitutional, and statutory authorities that have led to the formation and function of DoD, and devoted particular attention to the importance and effect the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have had on its current organization. Dr. Foster juxtaposed the roles and missions of DoD alongside other key components of our “national security establishment and national security community,” including the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community. He showed how the common concerns of these agencies intersected at the National Security Council, and went on to describe the roles and functions of that organization. The professor directed attention to the makeup of the Department of Defense (from the Office of the Secretary, through the Under and Assistant Secretariats, and on to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities); the Military Departments; the Joint Staff; and the Combatant Commands. Dr. Foster ended by revisiting certain “organizational imperatives” surrounding the Department of Defense, including the paramount importance of civilian control of the military in the American paradigm.
**Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange**

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Lieutenant Colonel Turner’s presentation on the development of the United States’ National Security Strategy (NSS) began with a discussion of the conceptual building blocks that serve as the foundation of that strategy: national values, national interests, and the national objectives that stem from those values and grow out of those interests. He pointed out that the Strategy deliberately involves the commitment of all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—in bringing about, promoting and protecting national objectives. LTC Turner gave his audience specific examples of each element of national power, and emphasized the interdependency of each element in fulfilling the strategic objectives embodied in the NSS. He portrayed the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States as a supporting document to the NSS, and reiterated the Clausewitzian role of the military in its warfighting function as accompanying the other elements of national powers to bring about a necessary end. LTC Turner delineated the three “levels of war” for his audience—tactical, operational, and strategic—and explained their role in supporting the nation’s “grand strategy.” In doing so, however, he reminded the audience of the persistent impact of other elements of national power, even as the military element was being employed at all three levels.

Having presented a generic approach to how the NSS is developed and supported by the NMS, LTC Turner turned the discussion to address the specific elements of the current National Security Strategy, and the National Military Strategy that supports it. He reminded the audience that the “goals” of the National Security Strategy were direct reflections of our national values: political and economic freedom around the globe; peaceful relations with other nations; and preservation of human dignity. In accomplishing those “ends,” he laid out a litany of “ways” the United States sought to attain them, to include support for emerging democracies; encouraging free markets and trade; strengthening alliances in the Global War on Terrorism; stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and championing aspirations for human dignity by promoting initiatives in health and education. Throughout his presentation, however, LTC Turner made it clear that America could not “stand alone” in these global aspirations; that transnational needs and transnational threats would require dedicated transnational cooperation, of which the United States was only a part.

Professor Tussing’s presentation on the evolving face of homeland security emphasized the evolutionary nature of the new domestic security apparatus in the United States. He pointed out that an attitude of complacent security, enjoyed practically since the end of the War of 1812, had been replaced with a cataclysmic urgency launched on 11 September 2001. The transnational threat that emerged from the shadows on that day resulted in a shakeup that immediately challenged our traditional concept of defense and deterrence. Professor Tussing juxtaposed the new terrorist challenge, characterized by an intent to indiscriminately inflict mass casualties, against the vulnerabilities of a free society whose very nature made it all the more vulnerable to such an insidious threat. He went on to talk about the seminal strategies that were being developed to meet this “grave new world,” focusing primarily on the National Strategy for Homeland Security, but also paying notice to the “implementing strategies” (such as the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism). These implementing strategies will be the nation’s means in bringing domestic security concepts to practical application.

The professor next described what he referred to as “the Homeland Defense Triumvirate:” the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM). He outlined the charter, mission, function, and structure of each, while emphasizing the challenges each organization faced in forming, and commented on the “interagency challenges” that had yet to be overcome in strengthening the domestic security effort within the United States. Finally, Professor Tussing discussed the importance of the international cooperation in each of these organizations’ mission, reminding his audience of the inextricable tie between global stability and domestic security within the United States.
In fulfilling a specific request from the Indonesian and Malaysian War Colleges, Dr. Richard Winslow offered a presentation on the Combined Forces Land Component Command campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The briefing’s intent was to illustrate how U.S. land force commanders plan campaigns, using OIF as an example. Dr. Winslow began his presentation by describing the situation in Iraq on the eve of the campaign to include an analysis of the Hussein regime’s possible lines of operation. He then stepped through the CFLCC commander’s mission analysis, beginning with the USCENTCOM mission and phasing construct. The briefing proceeded on through the CFLCC commander’s mission statement, intent, and task organization; the organization of the battlespace; and the tasks assigned to CFLCC’s subordinate commanders.

Dr. Winslow briefly described the actual conduct and accomplishments of Phase III decisive operations, and the repositioning of forces that was necessary to transition to Phase IV stability operations. The advance of the Army’s V Corps and the first Marine Expeditionary Force proceeded with a speed that surpassed all expectations, closing on Baghdad and ending the “execution” stage of planned operations over 80 days ahead of the forecast schedule. This “unintended success,” however, came with a challenging set of consequences in that many of the “Phase IV” forces (those designed to serve as the foundation for stability operations following the major combat evolution) had not had time to close with their positions in theater. Thus, while the combatant operations had been executed with historic efficiency, the stability operations began on an inherently unstable footing.

For the Indonesian War College, because of the time allocated, this concluded the presentation. Because more time was available at the Malaysian Defense College, the presentation there continued with discussions on the concept for stability operations. These operations were the ones focused on setting the stage for transition: achieving Iraqi, regional and international support; providing for security and the Rule of Law; commencing infrastructure recovery; expanding humanitarian assistance operations; and generally providing for governance and administration until a new Iraqi government was prepared to take over the reins. While clear progress has been made in all of these areas, Dr. Winslow suggested that the tentative posture in which they began would give rise to debate for years to come over whether the right numbers and types of forces were in theater prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The final portion of Dr. Winslow’s presentation contained a short review of the evolution of the CFLCC campaign plan, showing how planning was continuous, iterative and constantly adjusting from September 2001 until execution. Throughout the various iterations of the plan, the desired “end states” of the campaign remained constant: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime; the defeat or capitulation of the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard Forces Command; the physical control of Iraq by coalition forces; and the sustainment of vital life support infrastructure for the Iraqi people. In order to achieve these ends, the coalition made their way progressively through a series of Operations Plans (OPLANS) that began with what was envisioned to be the application of a single Corps executing a relatively limited objective attack, to the eventual plan which called for the simultaneous assault of two Corps dedicated to regime overthrow.

Conclusion

The Subject Matter Expert Exchange program is viewed by USARPAC to be an important element in PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation program with both Malaysia and Indonesia. In Indonesia, in fact, it served as part of a “new beginning” in relations between our militaries, following a temporary cessation of International Military Education and Training (IMET) and associated programs. Perhaps as a function of the same, the questions raised in the Joint War College and the National Resilience Center in Indonesia were occasionally “pointed,” revealing a perspective that sometimes casts the United States as a hegemonic giant beyond constraints. However, over time the CSL/NDU training team was able to promote a free and open dialogue with both our Indonesian and Malaysian audiences. In the end, the Commandants and Directors of all of the institutions visited by the briefing team had made it clear that they wanted to keep that dialogue open, and have already begun inquiries towards having the program continued in their countries. As such, both the American presenters and their hosts have reemphasized the importance of shared perspectives and discourse in broadening and strengthening our strategic partnership in South East Asia.
The views expressed in this report are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect official policy or position of the United States Army War College, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other Department or Agency within the U.S. Government. Further, these views do not reflect uniform agreement among exercise participants. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.