

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Evolving Military Strategy and Developing Homeland Security:  
An opportunity to share resources

by

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## ABSTRACT

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The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the evolution of U.S. military strategy. Thirteen years of military engagement with Iraq provide tangible evidence of how military strategy has changed. Threats to American interests have evolved from large scale conventional military forces overseas to non-state actors using asymmetric methods of attacking U.S. interests overseas or domestically.

Current U.S. military strategy relies on technological advances that enhance the execution of military operations. Training in realistic simulated combat environments allows the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop, refine and practice tactics that support military strategy. Training is a key element for integrating the human and technological elements into a force to conduct military operations.

If viewed from the tactical level, the implementing strategy for homeland security has many elements common to military strategy. The similarity of threats, environments and techniques to defeat the threat provide opportunities for the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to efficiently develop and use training capabilities. The DHS should embrace elements of military strategy and technology to defeat asymmetric threats within the borders of the U.S. Cooperative efforts should foster better working relationships between DOD and DHS, more efficiently use resources and promote commonality of technology between military and civil-military responders. Through these means, the DOD and DHS can improve the inter-department integration for insuring security.



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## EVOLVING MILITARY STRATEGY AND DEVELOPING HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE RESOURCES

Terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the citizens of the United States. Terrorists are patient, flexible, adaptable and determined adversaries. They seek out the seams and vulnerabilities in the defenses of their potential targets. The horrific events of 9-11 have left little doubt in any American's mind that preparing first line responders and local elected and appointed officials is of paramount importance.

? Tom Arminio, Patriot-News  
Harrisburg, Pa 16 Nov 2003

The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) dramatically altered the U.S. view of war. Today's U.S. military capability effectively marginalizes conventional military threats to domestic and overseas interests. To avoid it's military strengths, threats to the U.S. are evolving in the form of "asymmetric threats". American military strategy is evolving to address the more probable asymmetric threats of terrorism and to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks.

The following current U.S. strategies address these new asymmetric threats:

- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
- The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- The National Strategy for Homeland Security
- The National Military Strategy (Quadrennial Defense Review)

However, these national strategies are not fully developed or integrated down to the appropriate responsive and actionable levels. Lack of an integrated national strategy increases U.S. vulnerability to attack as well as impacts its ability to effectively respond to and recover from an attack. Prior to 9/11, Americans relied on security strategies designed to meet and defeat it's enemies off-shore. But by their nature, asymmetric attacks are more difficult to detect and prevent. Thus, asymmetric attackers will exploit seams in U.S. security posture. President Bush recognized these vulnerabilities and made significant organizational changes by establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and realigning other federal agencies into the DHS.

The creation of the DHS has provided a significant step toward integrating domestic agencies and local governments to meet national strategy objectives. However, we can still

improve our preparations to counter the evolving asymmetric threat. One area for making improvements is to expand Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) beyond the traditional natural disaster assistance to include counter-terrorist assistance.

This Strategy Research Project traces the recent evolution of U.S. military strategy that set the stage for the current environment. It then analyzes the current threat environment and the roles of U.S. security organizations. It concludes with recommendations for a more cooperative relationship and greater sharing of resources between the DOD and Homeland Security organizations.

## **DEFINING ASYMMETRIC THREATS**

Terrorist events offer tangible, tragic illustrations of asymmetric threats to U.S. interests. Dictionaries generally define asymmetric as: not symmetrical or lacking proportion. But two more extensive definitions which provide strategic insight beyond the commonplace reference to “asymmetrical threats” are:

- “Asymmetric” describes a situation in which an adversary employs weaponry or tactics in unexpected or unsanctioned ways. Asymmetry also describes a situation in which the attacker is willing to use weapons and tactics that the victim is unwilling to use, possibly because they are viewed as immoral or illegal. The use of asymmetric weapons and tactics can enable an adversary to win against a more powerful enemy—an enemy that may be unable or unwilling to respond in-kind—as history has repeatedly proven.<sup>1</sup>
- “A broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations, conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals or by indigenous or surrogate forces under their control, specifically targeting weaknesses and vulnerabilities within an enemy government or armed force.”<sup>2</sup>

## **EVOLVING U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY**

### **U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE PERSIAN GULF DURING THE 1980’S**

The first element of U.S. military strategy was to maintain a naval presence in the region. The U.S. provided additional presence by maintaining pre-positioned equipment storage sites in the region and conducting joint training exercises. To address the Middle Eastern vs. Soviet scaled threats, the U.S. developed varying force package deployment capabilities. These packages ranged from a level one ground component package of 16,000 troops for a regional

threat to 200,000 troops for a Soviet threat. Naval presence also varied in size from three ship Maritime Expeditionary Force, surface action force and multiple carrier battle groups.<sup>3</sup> During this period, U.S. planning assumed that the Soviets would continue to threaten Europe. Military strategists considered asymmetric threats but evaluated these threats as low risk threats.

#### U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY DURING DESERT STORM

The military strategy of exercising threat scaled force packages in the Persian Gulf region was unchanged. However, with the effective end of the cold war, military downsizing altered the type and amount of forces available within the force packages. The previous U.S. planning assumption of a Soviet threat in Europe was no longer valid.<sup>4</sup>

During DESERT STORM, the U.S. had its most highly trained ground, air and naval forces available to deploy into the Persian Gulf region. This allowed the U.S. to concentrate its latest military technology on an opponent smaller than the Soviet threat. The primary focus of the military effort was to defeat the Iraqi forces and restore the land borders of Kuwait.

The military strategy was effective in support of the political objectives. The prewar borders were restored and the Kuwaiti government was reinstated. U.S. forces' dominance of all aspects of land, air and sea warfare during clearly demonstrated to world actors the overwhelming superiority of conventional U.S. military capabilities including:

- Equipment and Technology
- Tactics and Training
- Force Effects Synchronization
- Force Projection

However, the environmental terrorism in the Kuwait oil fields surprised U.S. strategists and demonstrated a deficiency in asymmetric warfare planning considerations.

#### U.S. STRATEGY FOR IRAQ BETWEEN THE GULF WARS

U.S. national interests were unchanged during this period. The U.S. refined its military strategy and employed four concepts in its execution:

- Strategic Agility
- Overseas Presence
- Power Projection
- Decisive Force<sup>5</sup>

The military strategy denied Iraq the means to pose a military threat beyond its borders. The military strategy was coupled with economic and political strategies that denied Iraq the

ability to replace its lost military capabilities or modernize existing capabilities. The U.S. maintained air superiority and fully suppressed Iraq's offensive air capabilities. U.S. strategy did address Iraq's WMD potential but minimized planning and preparations for other forms of asymmetric warfare.

#### IRAQI STRATEGY DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

The Iraqi interests at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were to preserve the regime and prevent the assembly of unified coalition forces. The Iraqi military strategy relied on force preservation and consolidation in urbanized areas. Iraq recognized from the outset that its forces would be ineffective against U.S. forces in the conduct of conventional ground warfare. Iraqi strategy attempted to neutralize the domination of U.S. maneuver capabilities and maximize U.S. casualties. To counter U.S. capabilities, the Iraqis employed asymmetric tactics to attack deployed forces. These Iraqi asymmetric warfare tactics were very different from their previous use of chemical warfare or potential threats of WMD. Soldiers, Saddam loyalists and other supporters of the regime doffed military uniforms and blended into the general population to resist the coalition. Upon the U.S. seizing Baghdad, asymmetric attacks on coalition forces became common but still random in occurrence. The attackers varied their methods and targets which made it difficult for the coalition to predict and defeat their effort. U.S. and coalition forces were unprepared for the volume and method of these asymmetric attacks. U.S. leaders minimized the ability of the attackers and the force size necessary to counter them. To date, the asymmetric attacks have been very effective, causing the U.S. and its allies to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq.

#### U.S. STRATEGY FOR IRAQ DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

During OIF, the priorities of the U.S. and its allies were to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime and establish a legitimate democratic Iraqi government with international recognition. The U.S. military strategy outlined three concepts to address military threats:

- Swift defeat of enemies
- Military actions coordinated with allies and friends
- Transforming to sustain military advantages<sup>6</sup>

The U.S. employed four means to accomplish these strategies during OIF:

- Flexible Basing

- Temporary access to foreign support bases as required
- Redistribution of Forces
- Improvements to link and node structure force mobility and pre-positioning<sup>7</sup>

#### ANALYSIS AND LIKELY MILITARY STRATEGY

Saddam Hussein's military strategy failed; indeed his ability to wage conventional war dissolved. His regime was unable to secure its increasingly narrow national interests through conventional military means. Generally, strategists formulate military strategy to support national objectives. Instead, the Iraqis formulated national interests upon what they believed their military forces could accomplish.

There will be two Iraqi military strategies employed for the foreseeable future. Iraqi forces supported by the U.S. led coalition will focus on internal stabilization. The remnants of the failed Iraqi regime will employ a second strategy of asymmetric or unconventional warfare against the U.S. led coalition.

The first strategy will rely on the U.S. or possibly the United Nations (U.N.) to address external defense since Iraq is incapable of addressing external threats or opportunities. In the near term, the Iraqis should rely on the U.S. to reduce the turmoil associated with a potential change in military leadership from coalition to U.N. forces. In the long term, Iraq will need UN recognition for legitimacy so that it can return to full international trade and diplomatic participation.

The second strategy, asymmetric warfare tactics, or terrorism, directed against the coalition will persist for the foreseeable future. Current strategy is to attack the will of the U.S. and to continue to attrit the national will by sending U.S. soldiers home in body bags and appealing to world opinion as to the legitimacy and viability of the U.S. led coalition. Saddam loyalists are relying on applied pressure from the international community as well as from within U.S. borders to cause the U.S. to disengage from Iraq.<sup>8</sup> The U.S. will have to adjust the implementation of its military strategy to the asymmetric attacks and unconventional warfare taking place within Iraq.

It is clear that the execution of military power was decisive, but it remains to be seen whether or not it contributes to the overall evident success that Blechman described.<sup>9</sup> U.S. leadership employed a preemptive strategy to defeat terrorism and asymmetric threats in Iraq. It is argued that these threats would have eventually presented themselves on U.S. soil. It also became clear to all potential enemies that directly engaging U.S. military capabilities requires significant resources and invites extraordinary levels of risk. Enemies will have to use other methods to successfully engage the U.S. to attack its vulnerabilities, not its strengths.

To succeed in Iraq, the U.S. needs to provide better domestic security for the Iraqi population. To defend our homeland, we need to bolster our ability to counter terrorist attacks—primarily a DHS task. Clearly, the DOD and DHS must be prepared to respond to asymmetric threats. The departments should expand their efforts to jointly provide U.S. domestic security with a more wholistic perspective—from overseas and into the continental U.S. The following discusses the commonality of the threat and potential for sharing resources to enhance the joint domestic security efforts.

#### **THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT**

In the Cold War system, the most likely threat to our olive tree was from another olive tree. It was from your neighbor coming over, violently digging up your olive tree and planting his in its place. .... The biggest threat today to your olive tree is likely to come from the Lexus? from all the anonymous, transnational, homogenizing, standardizing market forces and technologies that make up today's globalizing economic system. There are some things about this system that can make the Lexus so overpowering it can overrun and overwhelm every olive tree in sight? breaking down communities, steamrolling environments and crowding out traditions? and this can produce a real olive tree backlash.

? Thomas L. Friedman April 2000  
The Lexus and the Olive Tree

Friedman's writings point to the root cause of the asymmetric attacks on U.S. interests ? olive tree backlash. Olive tree backlash is a response to hegemonic encroachment on a less influential culture. That is, enemies with comparatively minimal resources are attacking global powers because of cultural friction generated by globalization. Our enemies seek to stop globalization and restore the balance of influences they feel are more suited to their culture. The World Trade Center Twin Towers and the Pentagon embodied global qualities and symbology of Friedman's "Lexus". Just as the global marketplace is a new 21<sup>st</sup> century dynamic, so also—unfortunately—is global terrorism.

The decisive events of 9/11 caused the U.S. to reconsider national security strategy and examine asymmetric threats to domestic assets. Prior to 9/11, the most significant adjustment to missions and roles of any federal emergency response agencies was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shifting its resources from civil defense to disaster relief and recovery operations.<sup>10</sup> FEMA did this at the end of the Cold War because there were no perceived defense threats to domestic interests. Prior to 9/11, terrorists using asymmetric

means had attacked the U.S. on numerous occasions with no discernable change in national security strategy. The events summarized in Table 1, although not necessarily related, demonstrate U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric attacks.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Remarks</b>	<b>Significance</b>
23 Oct 83	Marine Barracks bombing	241 killed	Demonstrated American vulnerability to terrorist attacks
Sep- Oct 84	Food Poisoning Dallas, Or.	751 cases of Salmonella gastroenteritis	First modern bio-terrorism attack in US. (Rajneeshee cult)
21 Dec 88	Pan Am Flt 103 Bombing	259 killed on aircraft 11 killed on ground	Serious aviation security flaws: Aviation Security Improvement Act
Dec 90 – Mar 91	Operation Desert Storm	Iraqi WMD programs identified	Provides context for understanding WMD threat. Triggered 1996 Act on WMD
22 Jan 92	Kuwait Oil Fires	Environmental Terrorism	EPAs first foreign assessment
26 Feb 93	World Trade Center Bombing	6 killed 1,042 injured \$300M property	Demonstrated vulnerability to non-state actor threats and non traditional threat
19 Apr 95	Oklahoma City Bombing	169 killed 500 injured	Deadliest attack on US soil, asymmetric application of conventional means
26 Jun 96	Khobar Tower Bombing	19 killed 500 injured	Al-Qaida initiated
27 Jul 96	Olympic Park Bombing	1 killed 111 injured	Driving force for “The Defense Against WMD Act”
7 Aug 98	U.S. Embassy bombings (Kenya and Tanzania)	200 killed 1,000 injured	US policy makers shifted counter terrorism to proactive and global posture. Al-Qaida implicated
12 Oct 00	Attack on the USS COLE	17 killed 39 injured	Demonstrated vulnerability of military capital assets. Al-Qaida implicated
11 Sep 01	World Trade Center & Pentagon attacks	3,000 plus killed 1,000 plus injured	Demonstrated vulnerability and capability of asymmetric methods using conventional means
Sep – Oct 01	Anthrax Attacks	3 killed U.S. Congressional leadership disrupted	Demonstrated vulnerability and potential anonymity of using asymmetric methods.

TABLE 1 ASYMMETRIC EVENTS SUMMARY<sup>11</sup>

The reaction to the September and October 2001 anthrax attacks and previous public reaction to the explosion of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, established that with catastrophic events, the immediate U.S. media mindset is to assume terrorism at work until proven



otherwise. The anthrax attacks were later proven by the FBI to be terrorist attacks.<sup>12</sup> Collectively, these events had a profound impact on the strategic environment and U.S. security interests. U.S. citizens no longer expect immunity from the changing face of global threats.

#### THE HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT AND ENVIRONMENT

It is clear that enemies will use asymmetric delivery means against U.S. civil targets. The events of 9/11 provided conclusive evidence that domestic facilities and assets are targets and can effectively be engaged by asymmetric means. Comments by the Secretary of Defense reflect that DOD is transforming its strategies to counter the evolving threat in the current strategic environment. The Secretary of Defense also recognized enemy use of asymmetric attacks is causing the U.S. to shift its threat based strategy and focus.

“We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight”.

? Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,  
National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

Historically, geographic isolation and cooperative neighboring countries have minimized conventional military threats to the continental U.S.. However, vast borders, abundant international commerce and an open culture now expose the U.S. to unconventional tactics and threats of terrorism. The National Strategy for Homeland Security specifically addresses the need to defeat terrorism before it arrives within the U.S. borders. Since terrorists, by their nature, are difficult to detect before they act, it is imperative that the U.S. prevent and prepare for counter action in the domestic domain.<sup>13</sup>

The threat to domestic interests will focus on key nodes in the U.S. infrastructure such as economic hubs. Terrorists will target high-value assets possessing the potential to dramatically disrupt daily life in the U.S., create casualties and gain immediate and widespread media coverage. High-value assets include symbols of our national sovereignty, transportation and utilities, prominent leaders and their families, and events of national interest such as championship sporting events. They will also target urbanized areas which are difficult to protect yet will yield high casualty rates or dramatic results from the application of WMD or the unconventional application of conventional tools.

Our enemies purpose seems to be to attack the will of the American people and influence the political forces within the U.S.. Terrorists could easily use suicide bombers, mail bombs, WMD and chemical hoaxes to replicate the effects of on-going Iraqi terrorist attacks within the U.S.. Terrorists lack conventional military, diplomatic and economic power. Terrorists wield power through media attention gained by the shock effects of their attacks. Thus, terrorists believe they can counter their lack of conventional power to achieve their objectives.

## HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

The U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security (HLS) as: “the concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks”.<sup>14</sup> Homeland defense is defined as: “the military protection of the United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression”.<sup>15</sup>

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subordinate agencies are responsible for coordinating U.S. government support for local government agencies. The four directorates within the DHS are:

- Border and Transportation Security
- Emergency Preparedness and Response
- Science and Technology
- Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection<sup>16</sup>

Unlike the DOD, the DHS has no command and control authority over Reserves or National Guard forces. National Guard forces operate solely under state control unless activated by federal authority. However, the federal government provides the National Guard the majority of the financial resources and equipment which is common to active component forces.

Mixed funding and control relationships create organizational and planning gaps or “seams”, depending on the specific activation status of National Guard units. Emergency response planners for the DOD and DHS must remember that control of units will vary depending on federal activation or deployment status. DHS planners must also take into account that states do not receive or generate replacement units for activated or deployed National Guard units.

Current planning, organizing and response processes for domestic incidents create “seams” in homeland security. Within the U.S. planning framework, domestic incidents are viewed as local events until they escalate beyond the response capability of the local

government. Thus, a significant time lag can occur from initial evaluation of a local civil issue to identifying the issue as a national security or defense event.

#### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFSHORE FOCUS CREATES “SEAMS”**

Historically, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been organized, trained and equipped for the conduct of military operations against military adversaries outside the continental U.S.. The DOD also has provided military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) in emergency situations. Normally in response to natural disasters, military assistance is provided to support another agency when that agency responds to an event or set of circumstances. Thus, the DOD has maintained a reactive mindset in its approach to domestic events.<sup>17</sup> Due to events of 9/11, it is now conceivable military operations for homeland defense may be conducted on domestic soil with the DOD as the lead agency with assistance from civil authorities. This concept is embedded in the DOD’s requirement to provide consequence management as part of its MACA mission. Consequence management, by its nature, is reactive and does not insure sufficient attention to threat awareness, deterring actions or training for asymmetric threats to U.S. domestic interests.

The DOD can improve civil response processes in support of homeland security objectives. A more pro-active DOD approach to civil preparedness will better serve domestic security interests. The asymmetric nature of terrorist threats and attacks can rapidly escalate from a local domestic response to national security events, thus exploiting a “seam” in preparedness, due to time lags in determining the scope, coordinating and executing a national response. These lags occur as authorities determine jurisdiction and capability required to counter the event.

#### **RESERVE COMPONENTS: PRIMARY MACA RESOURCE**

The National Guard is the primary MACA provider for civil emergency responses since respective state governors can task state units to perform military operations without federal activation.

The Guard’s primary mission has been to train for DOD warfighting tasks. Historically, their more immediate missions have been emergency response to local civil issues as determined by state leadership. Guard units are well trained and equipped to handle military missions. Their command and control processes and procedures for responding to local civil emergencies and threats are well defined and coordinated. Historic local missions and close personal ties to communities place the Guard in a unique position to work closely and effectively

with local communities. Perhaps most critically, Guard units are the most readily available military trained response teams for domestic threats requiring immediate military operations. Through the DOD and the National Guard Bureau, the federal government provides the majority of financial resources that support the Guard. Communities where a Guard unit is located provides the majority of the manpower for that unit. Local civil authorities then have a financially efficient pool of rapid responders, under state control.

Reserve forces also have a civil response role. However, Reserve forces report to the DOD and do not routinely interface with local authorities. Reservists have similar ties to their local communities but the Reserve units don't have state civil mission response requirements and don't train to support local and state authorities. Reserve activation and unit control remain under the authority of the DOD.

The Guard and the Reserves share common training, equipment and command and control systems. However, these systems are designed for military purposes and not specifically suited for MACA.

## **IMPROVING SECURITY AND SHARING RESOURCES**

### **PROVIDING MORE EFFECTIVE CIVIL RESPONSE**

The similarity of threat environments and counter threat responses, present DOD and DHS with similar and potentially overlapping operational environments. Common factors of these environments include:

- Urbanized operating environment
- Threat: asymmetric terrorist or WMD attacks
- Increased reliance on network centric capabilities

Currently, military and civil organizations are equipped, trained, staffed and controlled with different systems that are not interoperable. Examples include:

- Communication and networking systems
- Staff processes and interaction procedures
- Unit level tactics, techniques and procedures

Between different civil localities communications systems vary; leadership roles, authorities and responsibilities are different and operating procedures are unique. Ideally, these things should be the same or similar enough that the various military components as well as other federal agencies could be interoperable in supporting civil response operations.

By establishing joint working groups, the DOD and DHS can facilitate effective coordination and response to civil emergencies and pursue resource sharing and leveraging initiatives. There are three areas where the DOD and DHS should initiate joint working groups to share resources and develop some operational commonalities:

- Training Capabilities
- Non-lethal weapons technology
- Command and control technology and processes

#### TRAINING CAPABILITIES

Training is the key focus area as it serves to clarify or mitigate issues in the other areas. It also provides the most immediate economical impact on cooperative security efforts. Organizations can minimize procedural and operational cultural differences and equipment interoperability issues through recurring combined training exercises. Training together creates understanding and interoperability, reducing organizational “seams” between agencies in the performance of homeland security and defense missions. Training will also identify potential weaknesses within existing plans and facilitate routine responses in times of emergency.

The DOD can provide training opportunities and facilities to enhance civil-military training events. DOD resources can be used to facilitate training at all levels from the individual through staff cell training. The DOD has made significant investments in live, virtual and constructive training sites and capabilities that have civil response application consistent with DHS mission requirements.

Live training investments include fixed and mobile instrumented MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) complexes. These facilities provide opportunities to practice and rehearse unit level Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for operations in an urban environment. The sites have interactive target arrays, support live fire training and force-on-force exercises and include sophisticated recording and control facilities. Units conducting exercises get immediate performance feedback in multi-media on-site theaters. MOUT complexes facilitate the immediate identification of unit effectiveness and training deficiencies which reinforces procedures or corrects deficiencies through iterative training scenarios. These training capabilities are well-suited for small unit civil response training.

Virtual trainers are available for individual or small unit utilization. These training devices support leader planning and skill development, individual skills development and interactive exercises. These trainers provide complex terrain with integrated effects that are interactive with

the user. Virtual training simulations could provide civil response teams and control elements the interactive training necessary for emergency response scenarios.

Constructive trainers are available to support staff planning and to support simulation exercises for staff actions and responses. These types of simulations allow staffs to develop procedures and formulate plans without involving subordinate units in active training. Civil response leadership and control elements could adapt these for emergency response or crisis action training.

Although various civil authorities have invested in numerous similar training capabilities, these capabilities are not part of a coherent national strategy. Thus potential training opportunities have been suboptimized. Through cooperative training efforts using existing training capabilities, DOD and DHS could garner lessons about training simulation interoperability requirements and inter-agency coordination and planning differences.

The DHS and DOD should work together to prioritize required capabilities. The identification and prioritization of DOD training capabilities should consider the DHS planning priorities for homeland security. DHS can coordinate with the DOD to supplement or provide additional training capabilities. This process would also serve to identify needed training resources.

#### NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Civil authorities have traditionally used non-lethal weapons in law enforcement activities and emergency responses. Military tactical operations have conversely relied on the threat or use of lethal weapons. The evolving and changing threat environment and the adjustments to national strategy indicate Military Stability and Sustainment Operations (SASO) will increase in significance and frequency. These types of operations will place the DOD in operational environments more similar to the operating environment of the DHS. The DOD recognizes SASO increases requirements for non-lethal weapons. The DOD does not have a funded program focused on development of non-lethal weapons technology. The DOD has related but uncoordinated programs that spend approximately \$5M annually on non-lethal weapon applications. Figures identifying the amount of money civil authorities spend on non-lethal development and procurement aren't available.<sup>18</sup> Based solely on the variety of products available in the law enforcement marketplace, collectively civil authorities spend significantly more than the DOD on non-lethal development and procurement.

With the DOD evolving role in SASO and homeland security, there are opportunities to share resources for developing non-lethal weapons technology. Currently, DOD and civil

technology sharing occurs primarily through private industry marketing initiatives. Private firms develop a capability and then market that capability with modifications based on customer desires. These technologies are often driven by uncoordinated requirements from numerous civil agencies.

A joint DOD and DHS working group should be established which could identify common requirements, as well as those that are military specific or civil specific. The working group could establish performance specifications and standards to improve interoperability and focus developmental funding to improve efficiency. Currently within the DOD, the U.S. Marine Corps has such a working group. The DHS executive representative participates in this group for briefing purposes only.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY

Sharing a common operating picture or depiction of the operating environment between military and civilian authorities is critical to providing effective civil responses. Civil and military authorities will increasingly rely on networking technologies to integrate efforts between agencies. Operating graphics, mapping and unit tracking are a few of the critical pieces of information that should appear in that common picture. Civil agencies generally do not operate using a common operating picture at all agency levels or between local agencies. Investment in a common command and control technology requires local initiative and should begin after significant review of local requirements and capabilities. Since updating and maintaining current communication technology is expensive, software intensive federation techniques are the most probable technical solutions for the foreseeable future. Local agencies should consider these changes as part of their capital infrastructure investment programs for system updates or system replacement.

Operating in the urban environment presents significant technical and tactical control issues. The physics of the environment and technology limitations make it difficult for operational units to maintain tactical communications and situational awareness. The DOD has several development programs that may produce technical solutions to these problems. Through a joint working group, the DOD and DHS could manage the various requirements and share development costs.

## NEAR TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

Within the next year, the DOD and DHS must develop a joint vision of how the respective agencies will integrate existing capabilities. They must also develop concept plans for sharing resources, joint technology development and improving interagency coordination.

The DOD and DHS should host range and training conferences for the purpose of scheduling facility usage and educating civil authorities about existing DOD training capabilities. Scheduling joint and civil-military training exercises is a logical output of this training conference.

The DOD, through the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) planning staff, should review the DHS priorities for asset protection. Concurrently, DOD should update inventories of training capabilities. The DOD should make projections of the expected utilization rates for these inventories and this will identify available training capacity of DOD training complexes and simulations. NORTHCOM should identify those relevant virtual and constructive simulations that are easily exported and can be hosted on commercial computers and networks.

DHS should provide the DOD with access to the recently created National Incident Management System (NIMS). Joint access to NIMS will enhance interagency operations by accelerating information management and command and control processes. Federal intelligence agencies may also benefit and provide links through NIMS to provide a more coherent intelligence network facilitating improved threat tracking. NIMS is the "nation's first standardized management plan that creates a unified structure for federal, state, and local lines of government for incident response. NIMS gives all our nation's responders the same framework for incident management and fully puts into practice the concept of 'One mission, one team, one fight.'<sup>19</sup> The key elements of NIMS include.<sup>20</sup>

- Incident Command System (ICS) – standard incident management organization that establishes five functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration—for management of all major incidents.<sup>21</sup>
- Preparedness – advanced preparation through planning, training, exercises, qualification and certification, equipment acquisition and certification, and publication management. This incorporates public education and construction standards as preventive deterrents.<sup>22</sup>
- Communications and Information Management – prescribing interoperable communications systems.<sup>23</sup>
- Joint Information System (JIS) – providing the public with timely and accurate messages.<sup>24</sup>



- NIMS Integration Center (NIC) – provides oversight and strategic direction for NIMS.<sup>25</sup>

## **LONG TERM CONSIDERATIONS**

The executive leadership of the DOD and DHS should more closely integrate U.S. national strategies and initiate actions to ensure operational plans are put into place to support the strategies. A critical element of this effort may be the integration of national and local intelligence networks and assets to quickly and appropriately disseminate threat information. Providing secure internet to local authorities that accesses national level threat information should be considered.

Improving U.S. security in an efficient manner requires an integrated approach to HLS and HLD. Immediate security requirements will be the short term factor for daily actions but the U.S. should place more emphasis on long term efforts and plans. Established joint working groups for technology sharing and resource pooling should become commonplace and replace localized 'ad hoc' trading, sharing and bartering of capabilities. This summarized process should improve DOD—DHS interoperability:

- Joint review of security and defense priorities with agreed to list of priorities
- Form a joint, training working group for:
  1. Training priorities
  2. Presenting training facilities and capabilities established utilization priorities
  3. Identifying sub-working groups and operating guidelines
- Joint prioritization of development goals
- Issue joint guidance for asset sharing and financial responsibilities

Placing the National Guard under DHS control will improve military responses to domestic incidents. The Guard should remain as the primary MACA provider with additional emphasis from DHS on homeland security missions. The Guard should be organized and trained to respond as battalion level units and below. DOD should adjust active component structure and restructure the Reserves to compensate for missions the Guard was previously assigned by the DOD.

The upcoming Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC FY05) should consider HLS and HLD as significant factor in retaining infrastructure. Existing infrastructure that is identified as excess to the DOD may have application for training facilities or as civil defense shelters, treatment facilities or recovery/response staging areas.

The melding of twenty-two agencies to form the DHS presented significant challenges to its leadership. It will take years to realize the synergistic effects and efficiencies of consolidating numerous agencies into a single department. Secretary Ridge established priorities which were discussed in open forum during a Homeland Security Conference. These priorities are:

- Information sharing with focus on Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Standards for Interoperable Equipment
- Integrated Border & Port Security Systems
- New Technologies & Tools
- More Prepared Communities
- Improve and Protect Immigration Practices
- 21<sup>st</sup> Century Department<sup>26</sup>

Secretary Ridge's priorities provide direction and will shape the inter-agency coordination between subordinate elements of the DHS and DOD.

DHS has initiated strategic actions which provide member agencies and other agencies increased access to threat information and technology. The department is using information technology to manage and distribute information which they gather from numerous electronic sources to reduce alert and response times.<sup>27</sup> Plugging the DOD into the DHS networks will eliminate seams between security and defense and provide a more coherent, wholistic picture of the threat environment and therefore improve both security and defense.

WORD COUNT= 5,812



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Kathleen Bailey, "1993: World Trade Center Bomb terrorises New York", BBCi On-Line 1993 [journal on-line]; available from <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/newsid\\_2516000/2516469.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/newsid_2516000/2516469.stm)>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Michael Kolodize, "The Asymmetric Threat Army Logistics Management College", [journal on-line]; available from; <<http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JulAug01/MS628.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Sam Nunn, "Nunn 1990: A New Military Strategy", *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1990, p.34.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 16

<sup>5</sup> John Shalikashvili, "National Military Strategy", 1997 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, *QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2001) 21.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>8</sup> Barry Blechman, "The Intervention Dilemma", *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1995, p.66.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>10</sup> "FEMA Fully Activated in Response to Apparent Terrorist Events", 2001 [journal on-line]; available from <[http://fema.gov/nwz01/nwz01\\_92.shtm](http://fema.gov/nwz01/nwz01_92.shtm)>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Rubin, Claire, "Major Terrorism Events and Their Outcomes (1998-2001)", 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/wp/wp107/wp107.html>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2004.

<sup>12</sup> "2001 Anthrax Attacks", 2001 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/12/28/141842.shtml>>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2004.

<sup>13</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House) 10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>16</sup> Dan Vitiello, "Homeland Security: Protecting the U.S. Food Supply," USDA Washington, DC.

<sup>17</sup> Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College 2003-2004) 463.

<sup>18</sup> Alan Schaffer, "Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Industry Day, Science and Technology," Marine Corps Base Quantico, Quantico, Va. November 4 2003.

<sup>19</sup>"Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Approves National Incident Management System (NIMS)", 2004 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3259>>; Internet; accessed March 7, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Mark Eshelman <[mark.eshelman@carlisle.army.mil](mailto:mark.eshelman@carlisle.army.mil)>, "HLS Conference; Trip Report," trip report notes with comments, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 2 March 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid..

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