HOMELAND SECURITY:
LEVERAGING ARMY EXPERTISE TO
DEVELOP JOINT-INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Brian W. Lauritzen
United States Army

Colonel Mark J. Eshelman
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Homeland Security: Leveraging Army Expertise to Develop Joint-Interagency Doctrine**

**Brian Lauritzen**

**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050**

**Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**

**See attached file.**

**Security Classification:**
- **Report:** Unclassified
- **Abstract:** Unclassified
- **This Page:** Unclassified

**Number of Pages:** 29
This paper concludes that the Department of Homeland Security should leverage the expertise of the military, and the Army in particular, in developing a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security. The paper will first provide an overview of the context in which doctrine has an appropriate place in the process of developing policy and guidance regarding Homeland Security and the role of the military. The paper will make the case through examples and analysis, that the military and the Army have developed an expertise in areas with direct application to Homeland Security. Further, the paper will show how this expertise and the attendant doctrinal implications provide opportunities for efficient development of a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security. By acknowledging that doctrine development in a Joint and/or Homeland Security environment is not a new idea, the paper will discuss the subtlety in making the transition from existing DoD doctrine to developing a doctrinal template for the Department of Homeland Security to guide its interagency operations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT**........................................................................................................................................................................ iii  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .......................................................................................................................................................... vii  
**HOMELAND SECURITY: LEVERAGING ARMY EXPERTISE TO DEVELOP JOINT-INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE** ............................................................................................................................................................. 1  
  **THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DOCTRINE** ................................................................................................................................. 2  
  **THE ARMY, DOD, AND HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE LINKAGE** .............................................................. 4  
  **LEVERAGING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND TECHNOLOGY** ................................................................. 9  
  **CONCLUSION** ........................................................................................................................................................................ 11  
**ENDNOTES** ............................................................................................................................................................................. 15  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ....................................................................................................................................................................... 19
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my family for their patience in giving me dedicated time to complete this project, humoring me when I asked for a quick proofreading, and always providing unconditional support. I also wish to express a special thanks to COL Mark Eshelman for his guidance and mentorship as I shaped the paper and developed my perspective. Colonel Eshelman also provided invaluable proofreading assistance.
The topic of Homeland Security has become the subject of increased debate since September 11, 2001. Homeland Security, for the purposes of this document, specifically includes those actions involved in implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security which requires the mobilization and organization of the National assets “to secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks.” The prevailing philosophy, both in the Department of Defense and in civilian circles, is that the military’s role in homeland security beyond specific homeland defense mission areas (where homeland defense involves the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure from external attack), is one of a supporting or assistance nature and not a leading role. Therefore, in order to fully capitalize on the military’s assistance, it is useful to examine the broad range of expertise the military can bring to bear and how best to leverage this expertise for Homeland Security. This paper will explore the idea that, because the execution of Homeland Security tasks requires a great deal of preparation, training, assessment and coordination to ensure qualitative execution, there is a need for a joint-interagency Homeland Security doctrine to complement the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the existing and draft versions of Service and Joint Homeland Security-related doctrinal publications. Further, the paper will make the case for an expansion of the Army’s current role of support to civilian authorities to encompass a role for the Army to assist the Department of Homeland Security develop a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security. In defining the Army’s role, we will leverage on-going initiatives that can correspondingly provide a basis for improving interoperability and standardizing operations among the organizations involved in Homeland Security. A collaborative effort between the Departments of Defense, Army, and Homeland Security, to develop a joint-interagency Homeland Security doctrine will yield an efficient and effective path to success.

The Department of Homeland Security has been directed, as a matter of policy, to develop an interagency approach to the execution of Homeland Security tasks. “Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security, working with federal, state, local, and non-governmental public safety organizations, will build a comprehensive national incident management system …. The Department would ensure that this national system defines common terminology for all parties, provides a unified command structure, and is scalable to meet incidents of all sizes.” The essence of how the Army can help is based upon modeling a
common set of principles and beliefs about the conduct of operations after the Army’s approach to doctrine development.

Doctrine development is a necessary part of the process of developing interoperability and standardization once a core policy, such as that posed by the National Strategy for Homeland Security, exists. “Doctrine is the concise expression of [an organization’s] approach and contributions to full spectrum operations …” Because of the evolving nature of homeland security requirements and the need for flexibility, a prescriptive approach is inappropriate. The concept of doctrine development and application is a key area where the Army can provide help in its role of support to civilian authority.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DOCTRINE

The development of a common set of operating principles and a unified command structure for executing Homeland Security tasks is an important element in ensuring success. “Doctrine provides the basis for how to organize, operate, and interact with other organizations. In short, doctrine tells us who we are, what we are supposed to achieve, and how we must proceed to accomplish our objectives. Doctrine can help us better manage missions, functions, priorities, policies, organizational design, requirements, capabilities, command and control authorities, and allocation of resources.” In his April 2002 testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States indicates the essence of the need for intergovernmental and interagency cooperation: “The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability of all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another.” Effective communication and cooperation depends upon establishment of common operating principles and beliefs achieved through a common doctrine. The Army has a distinct blend of skills in organizational expertise, operational doctrine development, and training assessment methodologies that provide a strong basis for an expanded role for the Army in developing a joint inter-agency doctrinal framework for Homeland Security.

The Army’s role in a pre-crisis environment is an important aspect of identifying those areas of expertise that yield productive results. The “lines of communication must be opened between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security; between federal, state, and local levels of government; and between the government and private sectors.” It is important that we take the time to define parameters for how the Department of
Defense can share its expertise with the civilian sector. We must break down the barriers to interagency cooperation. A review of a senior leader symposium conducted at the U.S. Army War College to study the command and control structure for Homeland Security, provides a startling conclusion about the stereotypical view of using the military in a pre-crisis role: “The philosophical obstacle that DoD supports state and local requirements only in an extremis situation was viewed as a major concern.”

An interagency and joint Service doctrine development initiative is not necessarily a new approach and doctrine development is not a skill peculiar to the Army. The Joint and Combatant Command communities, through their publication of such documents as Joint Publication 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations) and 3-26 (Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security), and the Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, indicate the importance of a coordinated effort between the interagency and the military communities. “Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.” Both the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security and the Department of Defense (DoD) Homeland Security (HLS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) provide foundational guidance for the nature of interaction among the elements within the Joint military community and between the military and the interagency. The “DoD Homeland Security JOC, describes how DoD intends to perform its responsibilities associated with securing the Homeland, to include Homeland Defense (HLD), Civil Support (CS), and Emergency Preparedness (EP).”

The Department of Homeland Security provides a potential focal point to leverage the expertise and investment previously made by the Army, in developing standardized procedures and a common operating environment, in preserving the security of our Nation, our citizens, and our infrastructure. We need only look back to our Constitution and see that among our founding principles was the existence of our government to “insure domestic tranquility, provide for common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” As Terrence Kelly concluded in his paper on Homeland Security and Transformation, the Army’s involvement in Homeland Security missions is deeply rooted in our history. Kelly reminds us, “For over a century and a half, from the formation of the nation until World War II, defending the nation-proper from foreign or domestic attack was arguably the primary mission of the Army.” During this 150 year period, the Army arguably matured in its development and application of standardized procedures. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security originates from a bill signed into law by President Bush on 25 November 2002. “The bill authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to reorganize and reallocate
functions within the department as necessary.” The military’s role in homeland security is not a new idea, but the evolution of the military’s role and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security provide a unique opportunity for the Army to share its expertise in another way.

THE ARMY, DOD, AND HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE LINKAGE

To answer the question of how the military and specifically, the Army, can help in doctrine development, we must examine the nature of the tasks that fall under the Homeland Security umbrella to see if there is an existing expertise from within the military that the DHS can leverage. Although the concept of Homeland Security has formally evolved since 1999, the Bush administration formally outlined critical mission areas in its National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002. The following six mission areas comprise the essence of Homeland Security: “intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.”

Close examination of the emergency preparedness and response and protecting critical infrastructure mission areas for example, reveals opportunities to apply military expertise and expand the Army’s role in Homeland Security. There are twelve specific initiatives within the emergency preparedness and response mission area: “Integrate separate federal response plans into a single all-discipline incident management plan, Create a national incident management system, Improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities, Enable seamless communications among all responders, Prepare health care providers for catastrophic terrorism, Augment America’s pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles, Prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination, Plan for military support to civil authorities, Build a Citizen Corps, Implement the First Responder Initiative of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget, Build a national training and evaluation system, and Enhance the victim support system.” Among the twelve specific initiatives, are those with implications for a correlative military doctrinal application:

- “Improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities;
- Create a national incident management system;
- Plan for military support to civil authorities;
- Enable seamless communication among all responders.”

The very nature of tactical counterterrorism lends itself to employing the military Special Operations Forces and the Army’s corresponding doctrine development efforts. As the
comprehensive analysis done by RAND in 2001 indicates, the specific relevance for counterterrorism and military assistance to civil authorities is found distinctly in military mission areas. The RAND analysis states: “The U.S. Army and other services have a number of capabilities .... Perhaps the most obvious are the special operations capabilities available from force providers in the CONUS (Continental United States) ... that can be used in counterterrorism ... and for direct action ....” As Thomas Lujan reminded us in his article for Parameters, “the United States has for many years fielded military units specifically equipped and trained to deal with terrorist threats throughout the world.” In light of the September 11, 2001 attacks, it is important for us to recognize that “throughout the world” includes acts and threats in our homeland. The counterterrorism mission does not necessarily represent an expansion of the Army’s role, but the training and doctrine development attendant to Special Operations and sustaining the Army’s expertise provides an excellent opportunity for other agencies to leverage the military’s investment.

There is strong policy support for developing approaches to ensure we have an effective counterterrorism program where agencies and individuals are linked by a common doctrine and set of standing operating procedures. “With advance warning, we have various federal, state, and local response assets that can intercede and prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks. These include law enforcement, emergency response, and military teams. It is also crucial that these individuals be prepared and able to work effectively with each other.”

“The Department of Homeland Security, as the lead federal agency for incident management in the United States, will, under the President’s plan, establish a program for certifying the preparedness of all civilian teams and individuals to execute and deal with the consequences of ... counterterrorist actions.” The President’s vision for Homeland Security also addresses a collaborative effort to produce a fully integrated management system capable of responding to any terrorist attack.

**National Vision:** We will strive to create a fully integrated national emergency response system that is adaptable enough to deal with any terrorist attack .... Under the President’s proposal, .... The Department would aim to ensure that leaders at all levels of government have complete incident awareness and can communicate with and command all appropriate response personnel. Our federal, state, and local governments would ensure that all response personnel and organizations—including the law enforcement, military, emergency response ....are properly trained, and exercised to respond ....

The initiative to improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities coupled with the initiative to create a national incident management system implies a need to develop doctrine in order to standardized procedures across the broad spectrum of agencies involved in incident response. At a minimum we can expect local and state law enforcement and public safety agencies to
interact with federal agencies as a matter of course when responding to a suspected terrorist incident or crisis. The success of an integrated approach to incident response and a national incident management system depends largely on the existence of a common operating guidance.

The Army’s recognized expertise in homeland defense and a specific mission area such as counterterrorism provides a key opportunity to contribute to doctrine development in Homeland Security. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states: “The Department [of Defense] would take the lead in defending the people and territory of our country, supported by other agencies.” The concept of defending the people and territory, strikes at the heart of the issue of domestic counterterrorism— a critical mission area of Homeland Security. In fact, the Army has the requisite expertise to fulfill both the response role and the training role for domestic counterterrorism activities. The Army has the requisite background and experience for assumption of the counterterrorism role, has a recognized expertise in response and training, and is equipped to decisively engage the terrorism perpetrators. However, the National Strategy for Homeland Security places the burden of domestic counterterrorism on law enforcement organizations. This overlapping responsibility for a critical mission area of Homeland Security signifies an opportunity to expand the Army’s role by leveraging Army expertise in doctrine development and training. The Army doctrine development processes provide a template for the development of interagency domestic counterterrorism doctrine and the broader implications for infrastructure security. As Peter Gillette indicates in his article for National Security Watch, “The creation of the Department of Homeland Security marks the major reorganization of nearly two dozen disparate … federal agencies. While progress [thus far] is undeniable, the structural, functional, and administrative flaws in the department must be resolved as soon as possible to protect the American public … and codify emergency response.” The Department of Homeland Security should fully tap into the Army’s expertise in doctrine development, organizational structuring, and leveraging technologies for enhanced situational awareness as an expansion of the Army’s role in Homeland Security.

The President’s directive to organize and define roles and missions and establish standing operating procedures in the Homeland Security environment is an opportunity for an expanded role for an institution that thrives on standardization and unity of command—the U.S. Army. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 emphasizes the President’s desire to “end a great deal of duplication and overlapping responsibilities.” “The division of responsibilities between DoD and DHS (the Department of Homeland Security) should be reexamined. The current division prevents achieving the unity of command necessary for a global defense-in-depth.” As an
example where the Army’s approach to doctrine development could help, one of the key lessons learned from the Northern Edge antiterrorism exercises in Alaska was the need for a common command and control structure and common (or at least compatible) information architecture. The Northern Edge exercises are annual joint training exercises designed to test various emergency response scenarios. Generally, the exercise involves all branches of the military service, as well as, state and local government agencies. Many problems occurred because of the lack of standardized procedures. A Congressionally-mandated terrorism response exercise known as TOPOFF 2 further illustrated command and control challenges within the Interagency. “TOPOFF (Top Officials) 2 was the first national combating terrorism exercise conducted since DHS was established. Multiple direction and control nodes, numerous liaisons, and an increasing number of response teams complicated coordination, communications, and unity of effort.”

Unity of Command is also a long-standing principle of military operations. The Army’s core Operations document Field Manual 3, Operations, highlights Unity of Command as one of the nine principles of war and emphasizes the importance of the unity of effort inherent in a unity of command. “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. The joint, multinational, and interagency nature of unified action creates situations where … commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.”

The United States military has thrived for over two and a quarter centuries on the development of standing operating procedures and doctrine. Such procedures permit units and organizations to operate in a complementary fashion even though direct communications links may fail or do not exist.

The Army’s has a background in both force protection and infrastructure security that have corresponding applications to homeland security tasks. In 1997, the Army formalized its approach to Force Protection when the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) produced Regulation 525-13. This particular regulation “prescribes responsibilities, policies, procedures, and minimum standards for developing, implementing, and managing a Force Protection Program.” Broadening the application of Force Protection to the principles of protecting key infrastructure and civilian leadership nodes is where the Army’s investment and maturation over the past several years can pay big dividends. The TRADOC regulation 525-13 was built upon the comprehensive report rendered by General Wayne Downing (the Downing Report), which analyzed the June 1996 terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers. “The report recommended numerous changes in the way the Department of Defense has traditionally managed FP [Force Protection].” The Downing Report led to the Army’s identification of several areas within the realm of security enhancement such as, “Force Protection training, physical security for facilities
and installations, intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination, and better use of technology.

Each of the applications identified in the Downing Report has a direct correlation to the civilian sector and to initiatives within the Homeland Security environment. Force Protection in a civilian context corresponds to the protection of the public and security of facilities and installations corresponds to critical infrastructure protection. The Downing Report initiatives and the subsequent research, analysis and documentation approach that the Army has taken through its regulatory and field manual development efforts for Force Protection, provide relevant models for the development of a national incident response and/or Homeland Security doctrine. The RAND Corporation in its 2001 report regarding the Army’s preparation for its role in Homeland Security, also highlights another point to emphasize when developing an approach to a national incident response doctrine. “The specific DoD and Army roles in domestic crisis management activities are likely to be conditioned by the … on-scene coordinator’s [lead federal (non-military) agency] assessments of which capabilities are needed ….”

The RAND report implies the need for a collaborative effort in doctrine development in order to determine the military’s capabilities prior to the actual incident—yet another vote for military assistance to civilian authorities in the pre-crisis/emergency environment.

Arguably, a recommendation that the Army assume an expanded role in Homeland Security is plowing contentious ground, but the expanded role in support of civilian authorities and a significant degree of cooperation is not without precedent. From a domestic preparedness standpoint, as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, the Department of Defense has had several years of experience working with civilian organizations in developing first-responder capabilities in the WMD response arena. “Since 1996, DoD has prepared more than 28,000 first-responder trainers in over 105 cities …. Additionally, DoD runs an exercise program designed to improve interaction among federal agencies and departments.” These prior relationships provide a basis for the development efforts that can produce a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security.

The Army’s experience in its role of support to civilian authorities is compatible with an expanded pre-crisis role for the Army in Homeland Security that includes assisting the DHS to develop doctrine for conducting interagency operations. Support to civil authorities is among the Army’s “Essential and Enduring Capabilities.” In defining the initiative for support to civil authorities, the President’s strategy explicitly highlights official policy such as National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) and legislation as points of emphasis for the importance of the military role. “Military support to civil authorities pursuant to a terrorist threat or attack may take the form of providing technical support and assistance to law enforcement; assisting in
restoration of law and order; loaning specialized equipment; and assisting in consequence
management.”39 As previously mentioned, the Army’s definition of doctrine similarly describes
an expression of an organization’s approach across the full spectrum of operations.40 We must
harness this shared concept of operations in developing a joint-interagency doctrine for
Homeland Security. The intent is to leverage the Army’s previous and ongoing investment in
certain initiatives in order to devise a doctrine for the more efficient and effective application of
resources in Homeland Security strategy. Essentially, what we want to create is a “shared
vision” that effectively brings together the organizations responsible for Homeland Security and
Homeland Defense and develop “not a ‘cookbook’ but a set of principles and guiding
practices.”41 The resulting interagency doctrine for Homeland Security will harness a common
set of principles and guidelines to achieve national objectives that are mutually shared by both
the DoD and DHS. The CJCS defines doctrine as “Fundamental principles by which the military
forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives,” effectively
highlighting doctrine as the link between military operations and national objectives.42

**LEVERAGING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND TECHNOLOGY**

There is a recognized need for common situational awareness to enhance unity of effort
during crisis response and to have federal, state, and local agencies work together for an
effective and efficient path to the development of joint Homeland Security doctrine. There are
parallels between the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the creation
of the Department of Defense.43 Just as the successful coordination within the Department of
Defense in the late 1940s and early 1950s depended upon the use of existing systems and a
common language, the coordination across the many agencies involved in Homeland Security
requires the efficient leveraging of systems already in place. “It is imperative that the
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security be clearly articulated, including
standardized training and operations at state and local levels, legal parameters, and
cooperation with DoD.”44 A compatible communications network among all responders provides
the key metric for success. “It is crucial for response personnel to have and use equipment,
systems, and procedures that allow them to communicate with one another.”45 It is important
therefore, that interagency doctrine implementation efforts are not impeded by a lack of
compatible communications networks. One area where the military devotes considerable
resource investment is in information sharing and connectivity to produce battlefield situational
awareness. The National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates that the Department of
Homeland Security must “develop a national emergency communications plan to establish
protocols, processes, and national standards..." The United States military has practiced
information sharing as a way to exact devastating effects on the enemy. Most recently in
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. ground forces were able to exploit the use of
information sharing. "In Afghanistan, U.S. forces found and hit moving targets in minutes by
sharing information. In Iraq, national intelligence moved in minutes to a B-1 bomber that hit the
meeting place of senior Iraqis." This art and science of information sharing and
communications compatibility is not commonplace within the civilian network that will likely have
to initiate the immediate response to a terrorist act in the United States. Most local authorities
do not have the latest in technology and do not have the requisite connectivity for the level of
information sharing necessary for success in an asymmetric environment. Because of the
relative imbalance in communications and information technology between the military and
civilian sectors, it is critical that our nation's Homeland Security strategy take advantage of
ongoing efforts within the Army and in a broader sense, the Department of Defense to develop,
document, and exploit information gathering and communications technologies and gain
situational awareness. Again, military competency with doctrine development would be
invaluable in developing and documenting solutions.

An additional means to leverage military investment in development of seamless
communications and standardized organizational procedures and design is through on-going
research and development activities and unified command initiatives. One example of the
military making great strides is in the emerging technologies arena. "The Defense Department's
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program... develops information-sharing
technologies and procedures that can bridge gaps between the many agencies... This
information sharing enables greater synergy and efficiency in homeland security." The ability
to provide compatible information technologies across all federal, state, and local agencies
sharing the responsibility for Homeland Security is a critical component of success. As the
director for information structure in the White House Office of Homeland Security indicated in
December of 2002, "Sorting through and integrating different computer information systems
from the twenty-two agencies slated to comprise the Department of Homeland Security presents
a challenge." An important by-product of doctrine is the formalization of guidelines for an
information sharing program. The active ACTD programs within the Army and DoD provide
opportunities for the Department of Homeland Security to leverage technology to implement
information sharing policies as part of a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security.

One of the purposes of doctrine is to manage organizational design. As an example,
from a Unified Command perspective, leveraging the United States Northern Command
structure, as both a centralized support node, as well as, an organizational template, provides a tremendous opportunity for efficient structural development. The Department of Defense created United States Northern Command in October of 2002 in an effort to bolster the command and control capabilities for homeland defense missions (military missions to protect the United States from attacks and threats emanating from outside the United States borders). A recently released Defense Science Board report also “recommends that USNORTHCOM implement a communications system demonstration to reduce redundancies and unify intelligence sources.” This need for interoperability and compatible communications links is a key reason why the Army has so heavily invested in its network of situational awareness platforms. One example where the Army has already invested in situation awareness technologies is in the Army’s Battle Command System (ABCS) which networks each of the key operating systems and environments to develop a common situational awareness picture for operational commanders. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and on-going developmental systems provide excellent opportunities for the critical interface between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security in doctrine development. These technologies and synchronization initiatives contribute to the management of organizational design so that the Department of Homeland Security can develop a common operating doctrine for the joint-interagency Homeland Security environment.

CONCLUSION

Time is clearly of the essence with regard to the protection of our homeland. We must take full advantage of the strides that the military has made in improving interoperability and developing doctrinal templates for use in developing a doctrine for Homeland Security.

“Interagency cooperation has been recognized as a key enabler for future military operations, especially defense of the homeland, and was included as an essential element of Joint Vision 2020.”

The Army has the relevant expertise and experience, as well as, on-going technological investments and initiatives, to provide organization, planning, and doctrine development assistance to the Department of Homeland Security. With expertise in counterterrorism, infrastructure protection, and interagency operations, the Army should assume an expanded role as a key advisor and participant in joint-interagency Homeland Security doctrine development. The Army’s elaborate training, education, and doctrine development system that falls under the auspices of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) provides an excellent model for an expanded role in the development of standardized procedures, command and
control structures, and situation awareness methodologies. The Army’s Field Manual 3-0, Operations, states that, “Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities… as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.” Further, the RAND analysis also indicates specific applications for the military: “the Army can provide important support to civilian law enforcement organizations, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, transportation, and logistics support under many circumstances.” A primary reference book for members of the Army staff, How the Army Runs, further establishes the Army’s long-standing participation in Homeland Security missions: “Moreover, the Army’s extensive experience in supporting civil authorities [Military Assistance to Civilian Authority] during peacetime disasters, national security emergencies, and special events enhances homeland security, and has kept the U.S. Army in the forefront of domestic disaster response.” These documents indicate a significant degree of participation, experience, and formal documentation of the Army’s frequent forays into Homeland Security tasks in a supporting role. The logical extension is to capitalize on and apply the Army’s expertise in a pre-emergency role as part of a doctrine development effort.

Recent actions within the Bush administration indicate the commitment to a continued development of an integrated Homeland Security team and an opportunity to leverage the Army’s expertise. In October 2003, Secretary Ridge approved the Initial National Response Plan. This particular plan is “designed to help develop a unified approach to domestic incident management across the Nation. The [plan] represents a significant first step toward the overall goal of integrating the current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single all-hazards plan.” This particular action by Secretary Ridge is an example of taking the next step in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. The “Initial Response Plan” is another example where capitalizing on the military’s investment in doctrine development could reap the benefit of a follow-on comprehensive response plan.

As the Department of Homeland Security formally develops guidance and principles to achieve the national objectives, it is imperative to leverage known expertise and flatten the learning curve. The Department of Defense and the United States Army in particular, bring several attributes to bear in the arena of Homeland Security. A Defense Science Board report released in November 2003 indicates that by leveraging Department of Defense expertise we can enhance homeland security. “... DoD can enhance homeland security by ‘exporting’ relevant core competencies that match the needs of other organizations with homeland security responsibilities. The DSB [Defense Science Board] identifies three of these core competencies: training and exercises, experimentation, and operational-level planning and execution.” The
very nature of the development of standardized procedures and a common operating
environment directly reflects the Army’s doctrine development strength. “Because homeland
security involves a variety of players, it places a premium on cooperation and coordination.”61
In examining where the Army has a depth of expertise that our Nation can leverage, we have
revealed a robust institutional emphasis on supporting civilian authorities, conducting
counterterrorism operations, providing infrastructure security, and ensuring force protection.
These areas of expertise coupled with the standing operating procedures and guiding principles
that create the conditions for success, provide the basis for an Army contribution to the
development of a joint-interagency doctrine for Homeland Security in those areas.

The Army provides a means by which the Department of defense and the Department of
Homeland Security can collaborate to develop a joint interagency doctrine for homeland
security. Courtney Wirwahn indicates in her article for National Security Watch, “In an era
where sustained operations have become the norm, the Army makes a vital contribution to
homeland defense. But as the Department of Homeland Security, USNORTHCOM, and the
office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense mature, an opportunity exists to
transform current processes and responsibilities to facilitate effective and efficient Army
involvement and contributions ….”62 On 17 December 2003, the President signed two specific
7 establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize
United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
attacks.63 Directive number 8 “establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United
States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness
goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance ….”64
These two Presidential directives when coupled with the release of the Initial National Response
Plan for Homeland Security and the continuing Joint doctrine development efforts, further
underscore the timeliness and urgency for a concerted effort to develop joint-interagency
doctrinal templates across the spectrum of Homeland Security planning and response. The
Presidential Directives provide the impetus for developing a documented set of principles and
beliefs that provide a common basis for interaction and mission accomplishment.

Execution oversight of the Homeland Security functions should rightfully remain with a
non-military lead federal agency. However, the need for a joint-interagency Homeland Security
doctrine to explicitly answer the questions: who, what, and how, is paramount. The expanded
role for the Army in assisting in developing this doctrine leverages an existing expertise and
shares that expertise in order to gain near term efficiencies and enduring effectiveness.

WORD COUNT= 5,511
ENDNOTES


2 Department of Defense, Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (USNORTHCOM, Coordination Draft, 27 October 2003), 1.


4 Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, 14 June 2001), para. 1-44.

5 Ibid.


9 Ibid., 1.


11 Department of Defense, 5.


13 Ibid.


16 Ibid., 42-45.

17 Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by speakers participating in the New York City Commandant’s lecture series.


Gillette, 7.


Department of the Army, para. 4-44 through 4-45.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Larson and Peters, 83.

38 MG Fred Robinson, “Strategic Readiness System General Officer Steering Committee,” briefing slides, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 7 January 2004.


40 Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, 14 June 2001), para. 1-44.


43 Ross and Coleman.

44 Gillette, 7.


46 Ibid.


48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.


51 Croall.

52 Riley.


55 Dobbs.

57 Larson and Peters, 71.


61 Dobbs.

62 Wirwahn, 4.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


